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OF

J. B. FORTESCUE, ESQ.,

PRESERVED AT

DROPMORE.

VOL. VI.

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Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty.

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THIS Report has been prepared and edited, on behalf of the  
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## INTRODUCTION.

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THE letters and reports contained in Volume VI. of the Dropmore Papers embrace a period of one year and five months—from November 1, 1799, to March 31, 1801. They conclude the histories, so far as these are related in Lord Grenville's confidential correspondence, of the second coalition against France, and the passing of the Act of Union between Great Britain and Ireland, begun in Volume IV. and continued in Volume V. Volume IV. records the formation of the coalition and the abortive attempt to carry an Act of Union through the Irish Parliament early in 1799. Volume V. relates mainly to the Continental campaigns of 1799. Volume VI. deals with the secession of Russia from the coalition; the new alliance of Great Britain and Austria; the abolition of the Irish Legislature in 1800; the negotiations and military operations of Bonaparte and of the allies during the same year; the peace of Luneville and the resignation of Pitt's first ministry, in February, 1801.

The radical weakness of the coalition, its want of cohesion and concord, has been explained in the Introductions of the two preceding volumes; how the British and Austrian Governments, while both leaning on the support of the Tzar, formed their plans not only without mutual communication, but in a spirit of antagonism to each other. Owing in large measure to Russian aid, Austrian plans were crowned with success beyond all expectation; British plans, notwithstanding Russian aid, ended in complete failure. We shall now see how that success and that failure contributed about equally to the disruption of the coalition as originally formed; and how by their mutual antagonism the British and Austrian Governments not only flung away a fair opportunity of accomplishing all their aims in conflict with the French Revolution, but gave the Revolution, in its completed form, of military despotism, an opportunity of establishing its supremacy in Europe for fifteen years.

The discord of England and Austria which had such disastrous results was not an effect of any irreconcilable divergence of principles or interests. It was the outcome of forty years of political estrangement, followed by four years of distrustful and unprosperous alliance, during which all the dislikes, suspicions, and prejudices of unfriendly tradition became incarnate in two able and strong-willed ministers who directed the foreign relations of the two monarchies. The transference of the Spanish Netherlands to the Emperor by the treaty of Utrecht, and the Dutch Barrier Treaty four years later, were arrangements made in the interests of England and the Dutch Republic to secure the Belgic provinces against annexation by France. But Austrian statesmen from the first

regarded the acquisition of those provinces as a burden and a danger. Their ordinary revenues hardly defrayed the expenses of government, even in times of peace. Their old constitutions and privileges, guaranteed by the treaty of Utrecht, gave them immunity from arbitrary taxation, and the possession of them involved constant peril of war with a powerful and ambitious neighbour. Partly as a means of escape from this situation, also, perhaps, in the hope of being enabled by the aid of France to exchange the Belgic provinces for Bavaria with the Elector Palatine, the Empress-Queen Maria Theresa, under the guidance of Prince Kaunitz, entered into the ill-omened alliance with Louis XV., which was cemented by the marriage of the Dauphin with her daughter, Marie Antoinette. This new grouping of European powers proved in various ways hurtful to England. It took away from her an old and powerful confederate against France; and the security it afforded for continental peace allowed the French Government, during the war of American Independence, to diminish its army and enlarge its navy. At the same time it encouraged the Emperor Joseph II. to give free rein to the ill-regulated ambition and restless spirit of innovation which, in a few years, brought the Austrian monarchy to the brink of ruin. In order to extend his authority in the Netherlands, and having nothing to fear from the House of Bourbon, he not only expelled the Dutch garrisons and demolished the barrier fortresses which defended the Belgic provinces on the side of France, but, by systematic violations of their civil and religious rights, drove the Belgians to open revolt. The fatuity of his proceedings, which imperilled the chief benefit derived by England from Marlborough's victories, was only fully seen a few years later, when the French Revolution assumed a militant and aggressive character under Girondin guidance; and Joseph's successor, Leopold II., found himself exposed, both as sovereign of the Netherlands and as brother-in-law of Louis XVI., to the first assaults of Jacobin hostility. Leopold, an able and prudent ruler, contrived by skilful management to convert Joseph's most formidable antagonist, Frederick William II., King of Prussia, into an ally against the French Revolution. But as this statesmanlike policy drew away the Prussian king from the Triple Alliance, and Pitt's short-lived system of non-interference in the internal affairs of France, it gave deep offence in England. It is, indeed, a striking proof of the strength of English prejudice against Austria that, on the very eve of the Revolutionary war, the most pacific prince and the most conservative in his policy among the sovereigns of his time, figures in Lord Grenville's correspondence as the most dangerous enemy of the peace of Europe.

Leopold died before war broke out, in 1792; Prince Kaunitz retired from the political stage; and the reins of Austrian government fell to the hands of Baron Thugut. England joined the coalition of German powers after the conquest of the Netherlands by Dumouriez in the autumn of 1792, dragging reluctant Holland in her wake, and infused a fiercer spirit into the war. From the beginning of their new association against France the relations of

England and Austria were a perpetual jar. In the campaign of 1792 the confederate powers, still governed by the spirit of the Emperor Leopold, had invaded France as allies of a dethroned sovereign against revolted subjects. But memories of the war of American Independence were as yet too recent and bitter to allow of any feeling of sympathy for the House of Bourbon finding admittance into the minds of George III. and the majority of Englishmen. They seem at this moment to have regarded France as an old and implacable foe in which revolution was only a new phase of wickedness, and which, whatever form of government it might choose to adopt, must, in the interests of England, be reduced to impotence. During the year 1793, George III. would not allow either brother of Louis XVI. to set foot in any part of his dominions. And the British Government was able to stamp its own policy on the coalition. The plan of campaign for 1793 proposed at Vienna was a combined march of all the forces of the allied powers on Paris—the English from the insurgent provinces of the west; the Germans from the east; the Spaniards and Sardinians from the Appennines and the Alps—to crush the Revolution in its stronghold and dictate terms of peace to France. But the English and Dutch Governments insisted on making the expulsion of the French from the Netherlands the main object of the campaign; and, as the King of Prussia took the side of the power he intended to make his paymaster, Thugut had to give way. A few months later Lord Auckland, representing England at the conference at Antwerp, carried a resolution that no peace should be made with France that did not provide “indemnity for the past and security for the future.” This resolution altered the character of the war. Begun in 1792 for the defence of monarchy and the order it symbolised, the war became in 1793 a scheme of partition. By this new programme, when the French had been expelled from the Netherlands, and that country had been more effectually secured against future aggression, the British Government was to employ its forces in destroying the naval arsenals and commerce and capturing the colonies of France; while its allies found compensation in stripping the common enemy of the territories she had annexed in Europe since the beginning of the reign of Louis XIV. And under pressure from England the Emperor agreed to relinquish all purpose of exchanging Belgium for Bavaria on condition that the Belgic frontier should be extended to the River Somme. This was Dundas’s policy, warmly approved by the King, and adopted by the Cabinet.\* The War Minister himself advocated it as “the only practical policy,” on the ground that the Parliament and people of England could only be induced to bear the burthens of the conflict by showing them that the profit exceeded the loss. Mr. Windham afterwards described the system of his colleague as one of “plunder abroad and patronage at home.” Pushed too far, it saved the French Revolution. Early in August, Valenciennes and Tournay having surrendered to the allies and General Dampierre’s army having been driven in complete rout from the lines of Famars and from Cæsar’s camp, the campaign reached its crisis. France, convulsed

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\* Introduction to Volume III., Dropmore Papers.

with civil war from end to end, had no longer a force in the field which could resist invasion. The Royalists were victorious in the West. In most other departments, Federalists and adherents of the Mountain were locked in a death-grapple. Lyons, Bourdeaux, Marseilles, and Toulon had risen in revolt against the Jacobin yoke of Paris. In these circumstances the Prince of Coburg, Austrian Commander-in-Chief, following instructions from Vienna, proposed to march with the full strength of the allied forces on the French capital, and thus finish the war. But the privateers of Dunkirk had been preying on the commerce of London; and in deference to the clamour of the city, Dundas sent positive orders to the Duke of York to take that little sea-port, for the benefit of England, before engaging in any larger operations. As a result of these orders, the allied armies separated in order to fritter away their strength and spirit in petty sieges, which brought them disgrace. The generals quarrelled and sulked in winter quarters; while the Committee of Public Safety worked with revolutionary energy, rallying to its standard the patriotism and national spirit of France to save the country from dismemberment. The opportunity thus lost did not return. And from this date it seems to have become a maxim with Austrian statesmen that selfishness was the governing motive of all British policy.

It was only in 1795, when the allied armies had been driven across the Rhine; when Prussia and Spain had abandoned the coalition; when the Emperor could not equip another army, that Pitt, having to face the alternative of resigning the Netherlands to France, entertained the idea of alliance with Austria on any basis of financial aid. He had granted a large subsidy to Prussia in 1794, which King Frederick William spent in partitioning Poland; and he would willingly have renewed it in 1795, with some safeguard against misapplication. But in treating with the Emperor, it was only after long hesitation, and with manifest reluctance, that he consented to guarantee an Austrian loan of £4,400,000. Help thus afforded at a high rate of interest, and asserting a right to criticise and direct the operations of Austrian armies, excited no gratitude, and much irritation. And relations requiring easy and delicate handling were only too likely to become strained to the point of breaking in the tenacious grasp of Lord Grenville or Baron Thugut.

Baron Thugut had risen from low beginnings, by eminent merit, the appreciation of successive sovereigns and good fortune, to the highest position in Germany open to a subject not belonging to a sovereign house. The Empress-Queen, his earliest patron, as we are told, changed his name from Thu-na-gut (do no good) to Thugut (do good). His ascent to power was greatly facilitated by an unusual dearth of conspicuous talent among Austrian officials; and he seems to have been finally lifted into the office of Imperial Vice-Chancellor by the strong recommendation of Count Mercy d'Argenteau, whose own claims to it, from long and distinguished service, were pre-eminent. In that high post his superior ability, knowledge, and assiduity quickly won for him the entire confidence of the young and inexperienced Emperor Francis II., and complete control over the Councils of the Empire. This splendid

position was not a bed of roses. Austria, slowly recovering from the disasters that closed the career of Joseph II., found itself prominently engaged in a war against France, with several doubtful allies, and not a single friend. After the Emperor Leopold's death, the King of Prussia, freed from the ascendancy of that able statesman, broke the engagements he had contracted with Austria in order to aggrandize himself in Germany and Poland. This conduct rekindled the jealous rivalries of the leading German powers, which Leopold's skilful policy for a time extinguished. England, long estranged from Austria, did not conceal a preference for Prussia. Catherine II. of Russia, intent on projects of her own in Turkey and Poland which clashed with Austrian interests, gave no support against France. At home the aspect of affairs was hardly more propitious for the Minister. Hatred and fear of the French Revolution made Francis II. and Thugut eager in pursuing the war; the latter impelled by personal ambition as well as by political conviction, though unaffected by any of the motives of religion and kinship which animated the Emperor. But all classes of the Austrian population would have gladly purchased peace by ceding the Netherlands to France. And a proud and powerful aristocracy which filled the chief offices at Court, and nearly all high public employments, looked with scorn and aversion on the low-born adventurer who had climbed into the seat of Prince Kaunitz; and lost no opportunity of thwarting a policy which kept him in power.

We have sketches of Baron Thugut in Lord Grenville's correspondence by different hands. There is a general agreement as to the leading features of his character, but in some pictures the shading is much darker than in others. His career does not entitle him to take rank as a great minister with Kaunitz or Metternich, who filled the same office before and after him; but his great ability, his unwearied industry, his intense devotion to what he believed to be the interests of his sovereign and country, were not denied by candid enemies. On the other hand, the exercise of supreme authority and the impediments, personal as well as public, which he had to encounter, seem to have brought out into greater prominence the defects of a strenuous, vehement, astute, but not lofty nature. His appetite for power grew with the possession of it. He showed himself daily more eager to concentrate the whole direction of the affairs of the monarchy in his own hands; more jealous of possible rivals; more wanting in the patience and self-restraint which Pitt considered the most essential element of statesmanship. Leading a joyless and lonely life, absorbed by cares of state and secluded in what Suvorow called his "infernal cavern," his temper grew sullen and morose. In political conflict he was cunning and unscrupulous. Rubbed against the grain, thwarted in a favourite project, he became obstinate and vindictive, and even reckless of the welfare of the State in order to gratify his spleen. Mr. Wickham, who disliked Thugut as the enemy of Archduke Charles, and made a close and severely critical study of him during several visits to Vienna in 1800, described him as being easily provoked in discussion to indiscreet bursts of anger, during which he blurted out secrets highly damaging to himself. According to the same authority

passion more often than policy governed the old statesman's public conduct. On the other hand, both Sir Morton Eden and Lord Minto, who as resident Ministers at Vienna had more opportunities of forming an impartial judgment, seem not only to have conceived for the Austrian Chancellor genuine admiration and regard, but to have found themselves, often to the great dissatisfaction of the English Foreign Office, in general agreement with his political views. Much also in Thugut's action which unfriendly criticism branded as deliberate deceit, may fairly be ascribed to constitutional caution, seeking the safest outlet from a perplexed or perilous situation. His most pernicious weakness as a minister was, no doubt, an unflinching, but erroneous, belief in his own superior capacity for ordering military operations. He aspired to fill the *role* of Cardinal Richelieu, or Lord Chatham, without possessing the qualifications of a great war minister. In order to have full control of the Austrian armies and to shape their movements in harmony with his political designs, he removed renowned soldiers from the Council of War, and filled their places, and, as opportunity offered, the chief military commands, with his own dependents. This inordinate lust of sway, by fettering the discretion of the ablest Austrian generals, promoting others less capable but more pliable, and especially by depriving his sovereign of the services of Archduke Charles and Marshal Suvorow at critical periods of the war against France, contributed largely to the disasters that overwhelmed Austria in 1800, and brought his own political career to an inglorious end.

Lord Grenville had assumed the direction of foreign affairs in England, under many disadvantages, at the urgent request, and for the convenience of Mr. Pitt. The appointment came as a surprise to the official world. He does not appear to have been specially marked out for the post by natural or acquired fitness. His temperament and habits were rather those of a student than of a man of the world. So late as the year 1797\* we find his friend and admirer, Mr. Windham, lamenting the constitutional reserve and the preference for domestic seclusion which prevented his obtaining by social intercourse the knowledge of men and of contemporary opinion so necessary for an English statesman. He had never given his mind to the study of European politics. Foreign travel had not opened to him opportunities of insight into the manners, peculiarities, and interests of other countries, or corrected the prejudices of an insular education. His diplomatic training did not extend beyond two short missions to Holland and France in 1788. Lord Auckland, whose discursive letters from the Hague glanced over the whole range of Continental affairs, seems to have been his chief guide and instructor during the first years of his career at the Foreign Office. Owing in a great measure to self-distrust, arising out of the deep and even painful sense of his own deficiencies expressed in some of his letters, Lord Grenville's influence in shaping the foreign policy of England during the earlier years of the Revolutionary war seems to have been inferior to that of Mr. Dundas. From their first association in the Cabinet, these two chief colleagues and advisers of Pitt appear to have been in constant

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\* Diary and Correspondence of Lord Malmesbury.

conflict. And in the conferences of the three ministers at Wimbledon or Holwood, when all important measures of government were discussed and settled before being communicated to the whole Cabinet, Pitt, in all matters bearing on the conduct of the war, seems to have almost invariably followed the counsels of Dundas. It was not long, however, before great ability and unwearied application, always directed and sustained by conscientious motive, made Lord Grenville master of all that could be learned from the sources of official information at his command. Intercourse also with the many foreigners of distinction, such as Count Mercy, Talleyrand, Calonne, Malouet, Mallet du Pan, whom the throes of the French Revolution cast from time to time on the shores of England, enlarged and enlightened his mind and increased his knowledge. With knowledge came self-confidence. And the failure of Dundas's "practical system" to cope with revolutionary energy and enthusiasm; the entrance into the Cabinet of leading Whigs, political pupils of Burke, with whom Grenville seems to have found himself, on most questions, in close accord; the strength of his convictions and his tenacity in adhering to them regardless of personal consequences; and his conspicuous success as leader of the House of Lords, gradually raised him to a position in the ministry immediately next to that of Pitt. During the last three years of that famous administration he seems to have been able to make his own views prevail in the Cabinet, on all important questions of external policy. In 1797 we find Lord Malmesbury and Mr. Canning wondering at the extraordinary deference Pitt paid to Grenville's opinion.\* And two years later we find Dundas fallen so low as to become a subject for irreverent jest to colleagues over whom he had once towered as a sort of war-god. On December 29, 1799, Pitt wrote to Grenville in reference to some plan of the Secretary for War, "Dundas's geography, you will observe, is as accurate as his language"; Dundas being as superior to grammar as any Roman emperor. In the meantime Pitt's original policy of exacting from France "indemnity and security" gave place to one, adopted too late and followed too timidly, of cooperating with the emigrant princes for a restoration of the French monarchy, with the boundaries of 1792. But, however Lord Grenville's personal position in the ministry may have varied, during the whole period of his tenure of the seals as Foreign Secretary all important papers issuing from his office were drafted by himself, and bore the stamp of his own character. It was a character thoroughly English in its qualities and its defects. Its patriotism was so ardent as to inspire a profound belief that the cause of England in all its developments, and all circumstances, was the cause of right and of civilisation. A high and even haughty spirit, which scorned anything resembling mean trickery or petty evasion, informed his public utterances, and guarded well in times of danger and discouragement the dignity of the British crown and the interests of the monarchy. And he prided himself on maintaining in international relations the high standard of rectitude by which he governed his private conduct. It may be said that no English statesman of his time stood higher in public confidence for

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\* Diary and Correspondence of Lord Malmesbury.

enlightened views, personal integrity, and fidelity to principle ; although, owing, perhaps, to his secluded habits and a want of popular fibre in his nature, his personal influence fell short of his reputation ; and, beyond the limits of his own social circle, he was respected rather than loved. On the other hand, the very fervour of his patriotism, combined with narrow sympathies, and not enough of imagination to supply the absence of personal experience, made him often unable to appreciate justly the character and situation of a foreign adversary, or to form a correct estimate of forces opposed to him. It made him prone to undervalue an antagonist ; to class Continental statesmen, bred amidst other traditions, representing other national interests, who did not concur in his political views as “ knaves or fools.” For the same reason he was habitually over-sanguine in everything that concerned military enterprises in the planning of which he took part ; easily believing what he wished to believe ; easily forgetting what he did not wish to remember ; jumping eagerly to favourable conclusions in ignorance or neglect of unpleasant, but essential, facts. His public spirit contained a considerable alloy of arrogant dogmatism inherited from his father. He was too much inclined to play the pedagogue. From his vantage ground of moral elevation he castigated neglect of obligation on the part of an ally, or tortuous policy which did not serve English interests, with a zeal which sometimes inflicted irreparable injury on the cause it meant to vindicate. We have seen that the Duke of Brunswick, writing to his sister the Princess of Orange after the treaty of Basle, attributed the secession of the King of Prussia from the first coalition to the offensive tone of Lord Grenville’s despatches. And although so severe a critic of conduct in others which had an injurious effect on English interests, his ethical code allowed him very wide latitude in promoting those interests. The plan devised by Pitt and him in 1796 of obtaining help from the King of Prussia by pandering to that monarch’s cupidity at the expense of petty German states which had given no provocation but helplessness, was stigmatised by George III. as “ immoral ” and “ unjustifiable.”\* It was only by the severest pressure that the two Ministers extorted the King’s consent to what he termed their “ Italian politics.”† Pitt sometimes interfered by way of suggestion, and with a studious avoidance of all appearance of dictation, to tone down passages in Grenville’s drafts, which appeared to him unwise or unseasonable. So late as November, 1800, we find him remonstrating against the “ dry and peremptory tone ” of a paragraph dealing with the dearth of food, in a “ King’s speech ” prepared by the Foreign Minister, as unsuited to an occasion of great public distress. In fact, though never wilfully unjust, Lord Grenville too often tempered justice with severity. His natural bent seems to have been to coercion rather than conciliation ; and when the combative mood prevailed, it was harsh and inexorable. Lord Cornwallis wrote to Colonel Ross in 1800 that he had left the Cabinet with little regret, because its decisions were so much swayed by Lord Grenville’s “ unplacable ” temper.‡

\* Page 140, Vol. III. † Introduction to Volume III. ‡ Cornwallis Correspondence.

The troubled course of the Anglo-Austrian alliance, under the direction of Lord Grenville and Baron Thugut, down to the enforced submission of the Emperor at Leoben ; the estrangement of the two powers ; their junction with Russia to form the second coalition, without mutual concert or common plan, and with a strong disposition to thwart each other, have been related in the Prefaces of Volumes IV. and V. In all these bickerings and jealousies there had been no cause of complaint that a little of mutual trust and goodwill might not have prevented or removed ; no divergence of interests which might not easily have been adjusted. Lord Grenville's peremptory demand of the ratification of a financial convention, very disadvantageous to Austria, at a moment when that monarchy lay exhausted in the armed grip of France, was not a friendly, nor even a considerate, proceeding. An evasive answer, venial in the circumstances, brought lectures and taunts which goaded Thugut to sullen defiance and flat denial of plain obligation, even after the peace of Campo Formio had left him without excuse. In truth, so filled was the Chancellor's mind with distrust of what he termed in jibe " the disinterested policy of England " that, as we have seen, not even his pressing need of additional financial aid, when a renewal of war with France became imminent, could overcome the fear which possessed him that the British Government would use the ratification which it insisted on as a preliminary to amicable discussion, to distress the Emperor, and obtain control of the Austrian armies for its own particular purposes. On the other hand, Lord Grenville's attitude is fully explained in a letter to Mr. Windham, dated September 2, 1799. " My opinion," he wrote, " has long been fixed that good words and liberal conduct are both thrown away on Austrian politicians, and that all our measures towards them should be regulated solely by the view of what we think best and most becoming for ourselves." He seems to have had a more jealous sense of what was due to the British crown than George III. himself. And there can be no doubt that previous to the renewal of Continental war with France in 1799, he not only, owing to ignorance of the defects of the Russian military system, overrated the advantage to England of an alliance with the Tzar, but was unconscious of the increased strength and importance Austria had derived from the support of Russia, from armies thoroughly re-organised under able commanders and excellent staffs and from a rapid decline in the military power of France.

Unfortunately for the stability of this strange experiment in political construction, the third partner on whom the others depended as the regulating power of the second coalition, to control and harmonize its operations, avert collision, and mitigate friction, was constitutionally incapable of governing himself, and became by force of circumstances another element of discord. Paul I., Emperor of Russia, had reached middle age when he ascended the throne ; but no sovereign of his time was so little qualified by education and experience for the exercise of supreme authority. His mother, Catherine II., for reasons of state, had jealously excluded him during her lifetime from all share in the govern-

ment and all high military command. His resentment at the insignificance to which her policy condemned him, though carefully stifled during her reign, displayed itself on his accession to the throne in the banishment of nearly all the able servants of the Crown, as well as Court minions, who had enjoyed her confidence or favour. Competent witnesses allow him many admirable qualities: deep religious sentiment, love of justice, generosity, chivalrous feeling. But through them all there ran the taint of mental insanity, inherited from his father, and which irresponsible authority developed. His mind too easily harboured suspicions, and became the prey of morbid emotions, which, though repressed for a time, sometimes mastered him, and hurried him away far beyond the bounds of prudence and good sense. Unguarded contradiction threw him into transports of passion, in which he lost all self-restraint. And although he generally showed himself eager when reflection came to repair an injury or act of injustice, the sting of his reckless violence rankled and awakened a sense of insecurity in those most exposed to it, which finally cost him his life. In politics, as in everything else, he was the child of impulse, the sport of capricious fancies, often good and noble, but ungoverned in action, and transient in influence. He entered the coalition in the spirit of a knight-errant rather than in that of a statesman, in answer to appeals from all parts of southern Europe to redress the wrongs inflicted by the French Revolution and restore the old order it had overthrown. Of all the lost or injured causes that claimed his protection, none seems to have so appealed to his imagination, or lain so near to his heart, as that of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, which reflected, however faintly, the faith and self-devotion of the crusader to an age of scepticism and selfish ambition. Early in his reign he had constituted himself protector of the Order; and later on, by some form of irregular election, its Grand Master extraordinary. General de Stamford thus sketched the Russian autocrat in a letter from St. Petersburg to Thomas Grenville, dated, June 29, 1799. "*L'Empereur est un prince tel qu'il le faut pour le salut de l'Europe; c'est un ame de feu, pleine de noblesse, sensible à l'honneur et à la gloire, et n'ayant en vue qu'e de faire triompher la cause dont il a embrassé la défense; mais ces sentimens veulent être ménagés; un mot, une expression inconsidérée, la moindre contrariété dans sa volonté, cette volonté prévenue ou trop pressée, peuvent tout-à-coup arrêter chez lui les résolutions les plus importantes. Il souffre l'observation quand elle est juste, et il se rend; mais il faut une grande délicatesse pour oser la lui présenter, et pour qu'il n'en soit pas blessé au début.*"

The chief Continental interest of Great Britain in 1799 was, as it had been in 1793, the permanent separation of the Netherlands from France. Pitt's plan of effecting this object in 1793 was to restore the Belgic provinces to the Emperor, considerably enlarged and strengthened by an annexation of French territory. Since then the policy of dismembering France had been abandoned; and as the Emperor would only take back Belgium in its old form, with the view of exchanging it for some more advantageous possession, it became expedient to secure British interests by some more durable settle-

ment. Weighty considerations pointed to a union of all the Low Countries under the sway of the Prince of Orange as the most eligible arrangement for this purpose. It was the one most likely to enlist the active co-operation of the King of Prussia, by whose aid the expulsion of the French could be most easily and speedily effected. And it might help other English aims hardly inferior in importance. In 1795 the Prince of Orange, after his flight to England, at Lord Grenville's request, sent instructions to the governors of Dutch colonies to deliver them up to the British Government, in order that they might remain in the safe keeping of an ally until the Stadtholderate was restored. The Cape of Good Hope and Ceylon surrendered, subsequently, to British expeditions; but as to how far these capitulations were influenced by the Prince's letters the Dropmore correspondence supplies no information. During the conference at Lille, in 1797, Lord Malmesbury, by Grenville's instructions, insisted on retaining both colonies as British conquests; and the Dutch Revolutionary Government would on no account consent to cede either of them. That this attitude represented national feeling in Holland Lord Grenville appears to have been fully aware. In reply to a letter from Dundas lamenting the delay that had occurred in annexing also the Dutch settlement of Java, he wrote, on May 13, 1799: "I have always thought the conquest of Java an object of great importance. . . . If the Stadtholder is restored, one of the greatest difficulties we should have to encounter will be the demand for the restoration of Ceylon and the Cape, which, from what I have already seen, will, I am certain, be pressed by Prussia as well as by the Dutch. It would be a great means of putting this by if we had Batavia and Surinam to restore to them." And he seems to have thought that by a union of the whole Netherlands under the Prince of Orange a state might be formed of sufficient strength to repel, or at least withstand, the first rush of French aggression; and that the Dutch might be reconciled by an extension of territory in Europe to sacrifices so advantageous to English interests in the East. The two main objects of British Continental policy at the beginning of 1799—(1) union of the Dutch and Austrian Netherlands under the Prince of Orange; (2) the reduction of France to the limits of 1792, a restoration of monarchy being implied—having been submitted in confidence to the Tzar, were adopted by him as a basis for common action and as leading points in the programme of the coalition. To confirm Paul in his good dispositions the British Government pledged itself to hand over Malta to him when taken from the French, for the Knights of St. John, and to promote the formation of an English branch of the Order.

The first point of the Anglo-Russian programme does not appear to have been communicated, or at least only very partially revealed, to the Austrian Government. In regard to the second, Baron Thugut fully concurred in the purpose of reducing France to its monarchical limits. The conquests of the Revolution had been made at the Emperor's expense. Lombardy, lost at Leoben, had been the richest province of his dominions. Subsequent aggressions of the Directory in Switzerland and Italy had almost annihilated his family

interests in those countries and whatever remained of the ancient prerogative of the Imperial Crown. Belgium, though not profitable to Austria in itself, had its value as an article of barter in the political market. A permanent extension of France to the left bank of the Rhine meant the destruction of the Ecclesiastical Electorates, staunch adherents of the House of Hapsburg in the Imperial Diet. But Francis II. and Baron Thugut had lost all faith in the cause of French monarchy, as represented by the emigrant princes; and would not willingly compromise Austrian interests by espousing it. When the campaign of 1799 opened, their plans and efforts were directed solely to recover all that Austria had lost in conflict with the Revolution. The refusal of concert by the English ministry gave the Emperor liberty of action; the alliance of the Tzar gave him security against Prussian machinations in Germany, and a reinforcement of 22,000 troops under Marshal Souvorow, whom he appointed Commander-in-Chief of his forces in Italy.

Pursuing his own policy, as has been told elsewhere, Thugut held the Archduke on the defensive in Switzerland; while Souvarow's victories accomplished his main object, of restoring the Emperor's supremacy in Italy. But here the policy of Austria came into collision with that of Great Britain. "I have never," Lord Grenville wrote to his brother, June 3, 1799, "felt so confident in my life on any one point as I do that the success of the whole war, and every part of this war, depends on pushing the campaign with vigour in Switzerland." And the English plan for expelling the French from the Netherlands by enlisting the action of a subsidised Prussian army, supported by a large Russian corps on the Middle Rhine, having been frustrated by the pacific temper of the King of Prussia, the British Government obtained the concurrence of the Tzar in two new plans for accomplishing their common objects—(1) an Anglo-Russian expedition to Holland; and (2) the assembling in Switzerland of an army of 80,000 or 100,000 men, Russians, Germans, Swiss, and French, under the command of Marshal Souvorow, to expel Massena from Switzerland with the co-operation of the Archduke, and then march into France to restore the monarchy. The Preface to Volume V. of the Dropmore Papers gives a brief account of the failure of the military operations thus concerted. But a knowledge of the intentions involved in the British plans, and of the conditions under which they were framed and pursued, as revealed in Lord Grenville's confidential letters, is necessary for a correct understanding of that failure and of the events that followed it.

*First*, as regards the invasion of Holland.

Confidential information sent to him earlier in the year by his brother, Thomas Grenville, British Minister at Berlin, and derived from emissaries and adherents of the House of Orange in the Dutch Republic, enabled Lord Grenville to reckon on the following circumstances as favouring an Anglo-Russian expedition—general impatience throughout the Netherlands of French dictation and rapacity; the reduction of the French army of occupation in the Dutch Provinces to 5,000 or 6,000 men; disaffection to the revolutionary government in the Dutch army and navy; an eager disposition in the Orange party to take arms, if supported

by a foreign force. Reasoning from these facts, he seems to have convinced himself and Pitt that the British Government could, by means of the army of from 40,000 to 50,000 troops at their disposal—18,000 Russians and about 30,000 English—possess themselves of the entire Netherlands in the course of a short autumn campaign; restore the Dutch Stadtholderate on their own terms; and dispose of Belgium in the manner most conducive to British interests, without the co-operation of Prussia, and in defiance of Austria. On July 27, 1799, he wrote as follows to Dundas:—"The more I think over the subject of the Netherlands the more I am persuaded that the only right suggestion is that which the King made to me on Wednesday, that we should make our force sufficient to be quite certain (at least as much so as the thing will admit) of occupying that whole country ourselves before the winter. It is only in that way that we can put ourselves in a situation to talk to Vienna in the only style which ever succeeds in making them hear reason. If we ultimately decide on giving these provinces back to Austria it should, I think, only be in consideration of co-operation afforded (not promised) for an attack on France." Dundas's answer on July 29 inclined to the opinion that Grenville's expectations of rapid success without Prussian aid were too sanguine, and expressed doubts as to the dispositions of the Dutch. Replying on July 30, Grenville insisted that Sir Ralph Abercromby, in command of the vanguard of the expedition, "would neither do justice to himself nor to us" if he acted with the caution becoming a general invading a hostile country instead of with the confidence of one who can count on meeting only feeble resistance and a whole population ready to welcome him as a deliverer. "Look," he continued, "at the campaign of 1787; how little time it cost the Duke of Brunswick, with all his doubts and hesitations, and cautions and precautions, to march with 25,000 men (no more) from Wesel to Amsterdam; and then let any man tell me what there is in the present circumstances to stop British generals and British soldiers, with the country unanimously in their favour, and with the threatened if not active co-operation of the whole Prussian army." On the same day he wrote as follows to Thomas Grenville, at Berlin:—"I do not now think we shall have a Prussian declaration to assist our expedition, and I am confident, contrary to what seems to be your opinion, that we shall not want Prussian aid to enable us to hold Holland; nay, that we shall do better without it. I still wish to purchase both the declaration and the assistance, in order that the Prussians, by occupying the Meuse, may enable us to occupy the Netherlands, and having thus eleven points in our favour, to talk to our good allies as to the ultimate arrangements to be made respecting those provinces, in the safety of which we have, after all, more concern than all the Powers of Germany together." Dundas gave way. After repeating his own views on the Dutch situation very forcibly on July 31, he continued—"You may rest assured that I am decided to act upon your ideas (in which Mr. Pitt perfectly concurs) rather than upon any doubts of my own. Upon this ground it is my intention to give a final instruction to Sir Ralph Abercromby before he sails, encouraging him, even if

it should be contrary to mere military ideas, to act upon the reasoning of your letter; looking upon himself as going not to conquer a country, but to aid the counter-revolution ready to burst out in it." At or about the time when these letters were written, Lord Grenville was in possession of information from Holland of a more trustworthy character that he could expect to find in reports of Orange partizans. It is contained in a *mémoire* furnished by an independent agent whom General de Stamford despatched to the United Provinces at Thomas Grenville's request, and was forwarded by the latter to London on July 21.\* According to this account there were three distinct parties in the Dutch Republic: the Patriots or Democratic Republicans, now in the ascendant; the Aristocratic or Federal Republicans, historical adversaries of the House of Orange; and the adherents of the Stadtholderate. They had each different views and interests, and agreed only in disliking French domination. Patriots and Federals, who now filled the offices of state, would combine to oppose a restoration of Orange rule. Outside of these parties there was a large population of Catholics who had been freed by French conquest from civil and religious disabilities, and who, though not French partizans, would not support any attempt to restore the old intolerant system. Public opinion, the writer found, was in a state of chaos; and it would require much management to frame any settlement likely to secure general acquiescence. Lord Grenville, however, does not seem to have attached much value to this communication. It considerably diminished the importance of the Orange party with which alone the British Government would enter into alliance. What appears more extraordinary is his assumption that Dutch dissatisfaction with France meant unlimited submission to Great Britain; a theory that can only be explained by misapprehension, or rather obliviousness on his part, of events recorded in his own correspondence, and in which he had been officially and even personally concerned. "We are now," he wrote to his brother on July 30, the letter already quoted, "looking to a counter-revolution in Holland; we have in that case the same difficulties to overcome, which we did not overcome, but yielded to, in 1787 and 1788. Lord Malmesbury was then much more occupied with his own honours than with the permanence of the system he had re-established. You know in what hands the direction of foreign affairs here was then placed. Everything was left to take its course, and a worse course things could not have taken. So far from improving the advantages which that revolution had afforded him, the Prince of Orange was found in every respect weaker and more unprovided in 1794 than he had been in 1786. This we must now prevent . . . You must prepare yourself, therefore, to receive a proposal in form that, as soon as any appearance of Stadtholderian Government shall have been re-established at the Hague, or elsewhere, you should proceed to take upon you the character and functions of Ambassador Extraordinary, charged with the whole political direction of that shapeless mass, which we must, now or never, reduce into a form of efficient and permanent

utility to ourselves, instead of leaving it, as it has been for a century, a dead weight on our exertions whenever it has not been turned against us." And pursuing the same subject in another letter to his brother, he laid down as the British terms of peace with the Dutch after the re-establishment of the Stadtholder, "restoration of the Spice Islands (except Ceylon) and of Demarery, and guarantee of their constitution and territory, on condition of (1) offensive alliance; (2) actual co-operation in this war till peace be made by common consent; (3) express renunciation, and under very strong conditions, of claim of neutral commerce while we are at war; and more than this, I think, we have not to ask of them. Negapatam might be thrown into the bargain as a factory only, but subject to our paramount jurisdiction and control; Ceylon, the Cape, and Cochin would not be heard of."

In the foregoing letter to his brother dated July 30, Lord Grenville, as may be seen by a reference to the Introduction of Volume III. of the Dropmore Papers, did great injustice to Lord Malmesbury, and even to his own predecessor, the Duke of Leeds. It was, no doubt, the unintentional wrong of lapse of memory, caused by the stress and excitement of the political situation. Malmesbury, or Sir James Harris, as he was then called, had no means whatever of exacting conditions from a government which the King of Prussia had restored; and he did more for England by clever diplomacy than probably any other English ambassador of his time could have accomplished. As regards the Duke of Leeds, Pitt, at the end of 1787, appears to have taken all important business relating to Holland out of the hands of the Foreign Secretary, and confided it to those of Grenville himself. When the Stadtholderate was restored in 1787 Harris and Van der Spiegel, Grand Pensionary of Holland, were equally desirous of renewing the political alliance which had existed between England and the Dutch Republic from the reign of Charles II. to 1780. It was recognised on both sides that the chief obstacle to be overcome was the intense exasperation aroused among the Dutch by what Harris himself termed the "bullying and oppressive conduct" of Lord North's administration, which dissolved that alliance. In the war that followed between England and Holland the only permanent English conquest had been Negapatam. It was of little value, as Pitt declared some years later when proposing to relinquish it. But its loss kept alive the memory of what the Dutch resented as a national wrong. And the negotiators agreed that a voluntary restoration of the place, as a mark of friendship on the part of Pitt's Government, would go far to allay the deep distrust of English designs that existed in the Republic. In a letter to Grenville and Pitt dated 27 December, 1787, urging concession on this point as essential to any cordial alliance, Harris wrote:—"My great object is, if possible, to connect this country by indissoluble ties to Great Britain. This is to be effected partly by affection . . . and partly by specific engagements. Affection will follow complaisance, gentle usage, and not too rough and unqualified an exercise of our influence. The reverse lost us the Republic."\* The British Cabinet apparently preferred driving a

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\* Addenda, Volume III., Dropmore Papers.

hard bargain with a Government depending for existence on foreign support. It would only consent to exchange Negapatam for the more valuable settlements of Trinkomali and Rhio, a proposal to which Van der Spiegel could not venture to listen. And the Dutch Minister only succeeded in obtaining the consent of an assembly of the States-General, packed with his own political friends, to the defensive treaty he concluded with Harris, after long and violent opposition. Shortly afterwards Harris, taking advantage of the opportunity afforded by a private visit of the Frederick William II., King of Prussia, to his sister at Loo, persuaded him to enter into a triple alliance with Great Britain and the United Provinces, without consulting his ministers. This arrangement, very unpopular in Prussia as departing from the policy of Frederick the Great, greatly raised the credit of Pitt's ministry on the Continent, and restored England to the place in the European commonwealth she had lost by the war of American Independence. It was for these services that Harris was created Lord Malmesbury. In the same year he separated from Pitt on the Regency question, and was succeeded by Lord Auckland as ambassador at the Hague. The new envoy fully concurred in the opinion of his predecessor and of the Dutch Pensionary, that the defensive alliance they had concluded could not be durable unless strengthened by a commercial treaty, in which the clashing interests of the two peoples should be reconciled by mutual concessions. Auckland had been chiefly concerned in framing a commercial treaty with France in 1786, and no one was better qualified for the more difficult task of treating with Holland which Pitt now committed to Grenville and him. His confidential letters to Grenville, contained in Volume II., give a full account of sterile labours in this new field of pacific effort. The chief point at issue was neutral trade, a main source of the power and prosperity of the Republic, which, in virtue of the treaty of peace concluded with England in 1674, the Dutch had pursued without molestation for one hundred years, down to the war of American Independence. Van der Spiegel, Auckland insisted, offered concessions on this question which no Dutch Government had ever been even asked to make before; and the British Cabinet, inspired by Lord Hawkesbury, answered by demands utterly unreasonable under the circumstances, and which no Dutch minister could possibly concede. As Pitt sided with the President of the Board of Trade, the Dutch negotiation fell through, and with it, as Van der Spiegel lamented, all well-grounded hope of any permanent alliance. The same exacting spirit manifested itself in the political relations of the two Governments, especially after the King of Prussia abandoned the triple alliance. And for the close and cordial union of two nations, designed by Malmesbury and Auckland, was substituted a somewhat galling protectorate, exercised by the Government of Great Britain over a ruling but discredited party in Holland. It was not, therefore, according to the testimony borne by Lord Grenville's own correspondence, owing to neglect on the part of Lord Malmesbury, but rather to the rejection of his advice by the British Cabinet, that "the Prince of Orange was found in every respect weaker and more unprovided in 1794

than he had been in 1786." From later letters of Auckland we know how reluctantly the Government of the Stadtholder, conscious of its own weakness, joined England in war against France, and only when it learned that the French Government would not treat with it separately; how languidly it carried on the war, notwithstanding Lord Grenville's expostulations; how much Dutch ill-will to the English army of the Duke of York facilitated Pichégru's rapid conquest of Holland. George III. wrote to Grenville as follows on December 7, 1794:—"Yesterday my son, the Duke of York, arrived; his account of the unfriendly conduct of the Dutch is far beyond what I before imagined; and what is worse, that the friends of the House of Orange are not behind-hand in animosity to the most violent patriots." Yet, strange as it may seem after this recent experience, Pitt and Grenville appear to have believed that an expeditionary army of less than 50,000 men, of which, as Windham, then Secretary at War, wrote on August 10, "a great part are in a state which no officer could describe as fit for service," could, without aid of any kind from Prussia, bring the Dutch not only to relinquish what they prized most, their chief colonies and their neutral trade, but to incur again the cost and danger of war with France in order to exchange a French for an English yoke. For the Prince of Orange inspired no enthusiasm. His son was unpopular, and the project of uniting all the Netherlands in one state, by which it was apparently hoped to reconcile the Dutch to the sacrifices demanded of them, seems to have found little favour even among the partisans of the House of Orange. Van der Spiegel, still the foremost statesman of that party, objected to it in a memoir sent to Lord Grenville as opposed to the traditions, feelings and interests of the United Provinces.\* And before the summer was over Lord Grenville had himself learned that, without the concurrence of the Emperor, the project was impracticable. A letter from Thomas Grenville, dated August 3, 1799, gives us a glimpse of what seems to have been the main current of Dutch political feeling at this time. It ran in favour not of alliance with either France or England, but of being included with North Germany in the neutral zone protected by the King of Prussia. An arrangement of this sort, then under discussion at Paris, would free Holland from foreign occupation, give it peace, increased security for its trade, and some hope of recovering its colonies at the end of the war. The proclamations issued by the Prince of Orange and General Abercromby, by omitting all reference to the points about which the mass of the Dutch population were most anxious, told them that they had nothing to gain from the Anglo-Russian expedition. The English commanders, instead of eager welcome, had to encounter a chilling apathy which froze any spirit of enterprise Dundas's instructions may have infused into them. They had more troops than could be moved in North Holland, yet they did not venture to despatch a few thousand men to help the Orange leaders in Groningen and Friesland although the British Government had pledged itself to send this aid, and a fleet of vessels was kept in readiness, at a cost of £200 a fortnight, to transport it across the Zuyder Zee.† On the other

\* Page 374, Vol. V.

† Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville, Sept. 27, 1799. Vol. V., Dropmore Papers.

hand, the partizans of the Stadtholder in those provinces, whose compressed zeal, according to Mr. Grenville's earlier reports, was on the point of exploding in premature insurrection, refused to budge an inch until the British succour promised to them arrived from the Helder.\*

*Second*, as to the British plan of campaign in Switzerland.

When the Tzar, at the request of the British Government, communicated this plan to the Emperor Francis II., in order to obtain his co-operation, it met with little favour at Vienna. Austria had old connections with Switzerland, where the conservative party had been accustomed to look to the Emperor for support and protection. And although Baron Thugut would not, with more important interests at stake, risk the loss of an army to restore the cantonal governments overthrown by the French, he looked on it as a task deferred, and resented English interference. He knew also that Archduke Charles and his army at Zurich, proud of recent victories, chafing under the restraints imposed on them by his policy, and intensely jealous of Souvorow's laurels in Italy, would not willingly submit to play a minor part in the campaign against Masséna, which they had opened so brilliantly. There were other strong military objections to the English project. Switzerland, which hardly produced sufficient food for its own consumption, could not support three foreign armies. The original plan of operations in Holland, which was communicated to the Austrian Government before war began, placed the Russian troops commanded by General Korsakow on the Middle Rhine to help Prussian operations; and the march of these troops to Switzerland, in consequence of an adoption of new plans by England and Russia, exposed southern Germany to a French invasion. One point, however, in the new scheme—the removal of Souvorow and his Russians from Italy—was most welcome to the Imperial Chancellor as a means of escape from a position of extreme embarrassment. When the Emperor Francis, as a compliment to his northern ally, appointed Souvorow commander-in-chief of his Italian army, Thugut had expected from the Russian marshal the same submission to the orders of the Aulic Council exacted from all other Imperialist generals, not excepting Archduke Charles. He was a timid war minister, slow to incur risks even for large results. Souvorow's instructions from Vienna made the capture of Mantua the main object of the Italian campaign, and forbid him to cross the Adda till that fortress had surrendered. But the Russian marshal, as he told Lord Mulgrave, had accepted an Austrian command in order to crown a long career in arms with the glory of restoring the French monarchy; and in that and all other respects to fulfil the intentions of his own sovereign. Leaving part of his army with General Kray to besiege Mantua, he marched forward with the rest from victory to victory, finding ample supplies of all kinds for waging war at the expense of his enemy in the captured fortresses of Milan, Turin, and Alessandria. All his battles and sieges were won in spite of prohibitions from the Austrian Council of War and obstruction on the part of subordinates devoted to Baron Thugut. It would be difficult to say whether the Imperial

\* Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville, October 1, 1799. Vol. V. Dropmore Papers.

Government was more incensed by this assumption of independence or elated by successes which promised to accomplish in a single campaign an old and favourite aim of Austrian policy, the bringing of all Italy, directly or indirectly, under the sway of the Emperor. But Souvorow's unauthorised proclamation restoring the government of the King of Sardinia was regarded by Thugut as an offence of the deepest dye, without any extenuating circumstance. It was, in fact, a public protest by an Austrian general against what had now become the fixed purpose of the Vienna Cabinet, to keep all Italy north of Naples, and particularly Piedmont, with its fortresses, in Austrian hands, either as permanent possessions or to supply the needs of the Imperial exchequer till the conclusion of peace. At the same time Souvorow's complaints of the impediments thrown in his way by Austrian jealousies and ill-will, and the immediate annulling of his proclamation by the appointing of an Austrian governor of Piedmont, greatly exasperated the Tzar. On all these accounts it was felt at Vienna that the removal of the Russians' from Italy had become a political necessity, and should only be deferred until Austrian interests had been secured by the surrender of Mantua and the besieged fortresses of Piedmont. Thugut, therefore, to gain time for these military results before replying to the Tzar, suggested to the English minister, Sir Morton Eden, that the British Government should send a military officer to Vienna or to the headquarters of Archduke Charles, at Zurich, to discuss its plan of campaign in Switzerland. Lord Grenville, assuming the question of Austrian co-operation to be now conceded, appointed Lord Mulgrave to proceed to Zurich to superintend the formation of the army intended for Souvorow, and enter into communication with the Archduke. Before leaving London Mulgrave had a conversation with the Austrian minister, Count Starhemberg. The Count's father, Prince Starhemberg, was a leader of the Austrian aristocracy opposed to Baron Thugut; but the diplomatist himself zealously promoted the war against France. He urged Mulgrave to go in the first place to Vienna. Thugut, he said, was *le vrai général*; nothing of importance could be settled with anyone else. Mulgrave reported this counsel to Grenville, who had gone to Dropmore; but the latter would not listen to it.\* "When it was proposed to us," he answered, "to send an officer in your situation, Thugut mentioned that we should send him either to Vienna or to the Archduke's headquarters. He would obviously have preferred the former, and we had strong reasons to prefer the latter, and therefore took him at his word without further discussion. We have an interest in thwarting that system of directing military operations from Vienna, because it has never been employed but to our disadvantage; and we were very desirous of engaging as a party to our measures the person who is to execute them. We have besides a much more advantageous situation with respect to Russia by treating on this subject at the army than by discussing it at Vienna. Korsakow is in a manner placed under our orders. . . . and this gives us two voices out of those [three ?] in the concert. . . . My wish is, therefore,

\* Mulgrave to Grenville, August 2, 1799. Vol. V.

very strongly, that you may not find it necessary to go to Vienna. . . . You must always remember that by doing so you will incur great risk of disobliging the Archduke, and that the private interests of the latter lead to his pushing this campaign actively, while all Thugut's jealousy inclines him the other way."\* This disposition, which he was not slow to divine, to thwart his policy by what he would call an intrigue with Archduke Charles, his most formidable antagonist, appears to have roused into fierce opposition all that was combative in Thugut's nature. When Lord Grenville's decision was known at Vienna orders went from the Council of War to the Archduke to engage in no operations without its sanction. In answer to the communication from St. Petersburg the Emperor, on August 6, 1799, expressed acquiescence in the removal of Souvorow and his Russian troops to Switzerland and confidence that the Marshal would be able, with the force under his immediate command, to drive out Masséna. The new plans adopted by his allies, he continued, had made a change in his own necessary for the protection of Germany and of his particular interests. War with France restored his rights in Belgium, which he did not intend to relinquish to England and Russia. He had, therefore, determined to move the Archduke's army from Switzerland to Mayence to defend Swabia, occupy Belgium, and thus co-operate with the Anglo-Russian expedition to Holland. And in order, still further, to aid Paul's plans, an Austrian corps of 30,000 men would be stationed on the Upper Rhine to co-operate in Souvorow's invasion of France by besieging Belfort and Thuringin at the proper season—namely, in the following year. Thugut had already sent Count Dietrichstein at the end of July with orders to the Archduke to withdraw with all his troops to Mayence when Korsakow's Russian corps arrived at Zurich. The Emperor, Dietrichstein explained, on arriving at the Austrian headquarters, had given this order for political reasons, constrained to it by the pressure put upon him by his allies, particularly by the Government of Great Britain. News arriving soon after at Vienna of the surrender of Mantua, the Emperor wrote to Souvorow to hand over his Italian command to General Melas, and lead his Russian bands into Switzerland. And when Lord Mulgrave reached Berlin on his way to Zurich, in the middle of August, he was met by despatches from Lord Minto, now British Minister at Vienna, announcing Baron Thugut's declaration that military concert with England was at present "unnecessary, the plan of operations being not only determined upon, but what remains of it about to be executed." Mulgrave, however, by the advice of Thomas Grenville, pursued his journey.†

The order to evacuate Switzerland at the bidding of the English and Russian Governments caused deep resentment in the Archduke's army. Mr. Wickham, British Resident Minister, hitherto a welcome visitor at the Austrian headquarters, suddenly found himself

\* Grenville to Mulgrave, August, 3, 1799, Vol. V.

† T. Grenville to Lord Grenville, August 15, 1799; Lord Mulgrave to Lord Grenville, August 18, 1799. Vol. V.

received there with lowering brows and sharp reproaches. And in answer to his protestations of disbelief in Dietrichstein's statement, the Archduke read out to him a passage to the same effect in a letter he had just received from his brother the Emperor. But preparations for departure were suddenly arrested by a vigorous attack of Masséna, which drove in the whole Austrian line, expelled General Jellachich from the little Cantons, captured the St. Gothard Pass, and thus interrupted Austrian communication with Italy.\* Wickham's report of Dietrichstein's mission was read in the British Cabinet with anger and consternation. This last move of Baron Thugut had completely dislocated its Swiss plans. Lord Grenville at once instructed Minto to give formal contradiction to the Count's misrepresentations, and to quit Vienna unless the order to the Archduke was immediately recalled. He also invoked the Tzar's interference to save the Russian armies from destruction. Thugut at first refused to listen to Minto's demand. When, however, accounts reached him of Masséna's offensive movement he gave way so far as to promise that the Archduke should remain in his defensive position at Zurich without taking part in any plan of active operations. But hardly had this concession been extorted from him when news of a French foray into Wurtemberg gave him an excuse for withdrawing it.

When Mulgrave reached Switzerland he found the Austrians moving off to Germany. In a short interview he convinced the Archduke of the injustice done to the English Cabinet by Dietrichstein's statement, but was unable to arrest his march. General Korsakow had already arrived at Zurich, but, meeting with an ungracious reception at the Austrian headquarters, drew off his men to a distant position. The Archduke, however, left an Austrian corps of 23,000 men under General Hotze in the Grisons to hold the French in check until Souvorow brought his troops from Italy. Discord, confusion, and discouragement met Mulgrave at every turn. "The jealousy and hatred," he wrote to Grenville, "arising from envy and conceit, that the Austrians feel towards the Russians is beyond all example; and I am convinced that they would be much more gratified by a serious calamity happening to the Russians than by any success that could be obtained even by themselves against the enemy."† Korsakow's army, estimated on paper as 45,000 men, did not exceed 30,000; and 10,000 of these, being Cossack cavalry, were useless in a mountainous country. The infantry was admirable, but had neither magazines, proper equipments, nor a competent commander. Swiss recruiting had failed. In all the cantons, not excepting the two lately occupied by the Austrians, the government was revolutionary. In the mountain districts, old strongholds of the conservative cause, the flower of the male population had fallen in a desperate struggle against the French or taken service under the Emperor. And the arrogant temper of Colonel Crauford, the British commissary, gave general offence. Instead, therefore, of 70,000 or 80,000 troops

\* Wickham to Grenville, August 14, 1799, *et seq.* Public Record Office.

† Mulgrave to Grenville, September 1, 1799, Vol. V.

in British pay, as Lord Grenville had calculated in London, Souvorow would hardly have 40,000 under his command, including those he might bring from Italy. And the greater part of this army was now exposed to imminent danger of destruction, in an indefensible position at Zurich, by the folly of General Korsakow, who refused to move to safer ground. Mulgrave, therefore, hurried down into Italy to warn Souvorow of the situation he would have to face after crossing the Alps. He found the marshal in very depressed spirits. Complaints from the King of Sardinia had filled the Tzar's mind with distrust of Austrian designs, which evasive answers from Vienna served to confirm. He therefore proposed that the allied powers should send representatives to a conference, in which the particular aims of each and the general aims of the coalition should be clearly defined. Lord Grenville accepted this proposal. Baron Thugut refused, on the plea that any discussion of terms of peace would be premature until another campaign brought the end of the war into nearer view. Paul, highly incensed by this answer, declared that no more Russian blood should be spilled to feed Austrian rapacity. He announced his intention of continuing war against France in concert only with George III., and sent an order to Souvorow to quit Italy at once. The Russian marshal opened his mind to Mulgrave with the same frankness as later on, with more time at his disposal, in conference with Wickham. And the substance of his remarks in these various conversations, so far as they bore on the British project of a Swiss campaign, is given here. He condemned the British plan of conquering Switzerland by means of an army composed mainly of Russian troops as utterly impracticable. The Russian military system, he explained, was still in a rude stage of development. It provided neither staff, commissariat, nor magazines. His officers were only instructed in regimental duties. The pay of all ranks was miserably insufficient, that of the soldier being only equivalent to 1½d. a day. Russian armies had been accustomed to fight on open plains and to live at free quarters on the enemy's country. They knew nothing of mountain warfare, and must starve in Switzerland, already eaten bare by the French. The proper plan would be to use the Swiss and German levies of the English Government in strengthening the army of the Archduke against Masséna, and to leave himself in Italy to complete the conquest of that country and enter France by forcing the passage of the River Var. It was only by having at his command Austrian military appliances and a trained Austrian staff, which had served him with great devotion, that he had been able to accomplish so much during the present campaign. He had answered a letter from the Emperor Francis II. depriving him of his Italian command by a remonstrance. But the orders of his own sovereign must be obeyed without a murmur. In order to give effect to them he had adopted a plan drawn up by his Austrian chief of the staff, Weinrotha, of a combined attack on Masséna's position by Korsakow, Hotze, and himself, in front, flank, and rear. The date fixed for its execution was September 26th. Of the hazards and uncertainties of this plan by which three bodies of troops, widely separated from each other and without any connecting link, were to advance against an enemy greatly

superior in strength, he seemed to be fully aware. And he insisted on the necessity of the Archduke's immediate return to Switzerland to co-operate with him. Mulgrave's report of this interview expressed profound admiration of the old warrior's genius; of the clear insight and wide grasp of the military situation displayed in his discourse.\* But it was with great misgiving as to the issue of the enterprise in which Souvorow was now engaged that the British envoy set out for Vienna to urge compliance with his demand for Austrian co-operation. He arrived in that capital to find his worst fears verified. Souvorow was delayed three days at the foot of the St. Gothard waiting for means of transport. Having forced his way across the pass, he reached Aldorf by the Devil's Bridge on September 28, to find that Masséna, anticipating him, had attacked and routed the armies of Korsakow and Hotze on the 24th, and was inclosing himself in an iron circle from which escape seemed almost impossible. Fighting his way with great loss to Glarus, he led his men thence over one of the most frightful of Swiss glaciers into the Grisons, and finally arrived at Coire without guns or baggage after a march hardly paralleled in military annals. This decisive defeat was also the death-blow of the Anglo-Russian expedition to Holland, the Directory being now able to send large reinforcements to General Brune. In the conflict between Austrian and English policy in the Netherlands and Switzerland, Thugut had won on both issues. But all the real gain went to France. There is every reason to believe that England and Austria, acting in cordial concert with each other and with Russia against the common foe, might have accomplished with ease in the summer and autumn of 1799 all the aims which were achieved only after fifteen years more of desolating warfare, at a cost of blood and treasure probably unsurpassed in any equal period of European history.

Baron Thugut does not appear to have been much alarmed at first by the prospect of losing a Russian alliance, which had become a hindrance rather than a help to Austrian policy. The Emperor and his minister, flushed with success, confident in the strength and spirit of victorious armies, and growing daily more impatient of dictation from St. Petersburg, which opposed a peremptory veto to their Italian projects, had already determined to dispense with Russian aid in every field of Austrian military operations, except in proportions and on conditions which should bring it completely under their own control. Above all things, Souvarow should not again be placed in command of Austrian troops. At the same time Thugut's acute perception, however clouded by the fumes of political conflict, could not be altogether blind to the risks Austria incurred by setting the Tzar at defiance. A sense of isolation and an urgent need of financial aid led him to seek a secret understanding with the British Government, which had no interests in Italy antagonistic to those of the Emperor. Lord Grenville had early in the summer sent Lord Minto as British minister to Vienna to recover ground supposed to have been lost by Sir Morton Eden's credulity and want of back-bone, and to assert British interests by more vigilant and masterful action. But it seemed to some of his diplomatic colleagues that, in the course of a

\* Mulgrave to Grenville, September 12, 1799. Public Record Office.

few weeks, Minto fell as completely as his predecessor had fallen under the Chancellor's spell, and accepted his statements with equal facility. In confidential discussions during the last fortnight in August, Thugut proposed to Minto that the British and Austrian Governments should endeavour, without consulting any other power, to come to an understanding by frankly disclosing to each other the political objects each had specially in view. If agreement could not be arrived at, he said, mutual confidences might be forgotten. The Emperor, Thugut confessed, meant to keep all upper Italy to the River Var, and the three Papal Legations. He did not want Bavaria, nor even the Netherlands, unless enlarged and fortified by the addition of French Flanders. The Netherlands might be given to the King of Sardinia as compensation for loss of Italian territory, or even to the Prince of Orange on condition that England transferred to them the burden of Austrian loans. He asked the British Government to lend its support to these arrangements.

When Minto brought forward the unratified convention of 1797, as an insuperable obstacle to political concert, Thugut replied that the Emperor feared to ruin his credit in Germany by avowing that he had borrowed money at such high interest in the English market. If, however, the British Government would engage to keep the transaction secret till the close of the present war, ratification might be obtained.\*

There is reason to doubt whether Thugut, in this apparently frank revelation of rapacity, made a full avowal of the ambitious designs he had formed in the intoxication of rapid conquest. A few months later Lord Keith, commanding the naval forces of Great Britain in the Mediterranean, sent Dundas from Palermo the substance of what purported to be a memorandum on Italy, presented by the Imperial Chancellor to his sovereign.† In this document the policy is insisted on of bringing all the states of that peninsula under the Emperor's sway, either as absolute possessions or as dependencies. In the latter category figure the Kingdom of Naples, the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, and whatever remnant of territory Austria might leave to the Pope. The communication seems to have been made to Lord Keith by the Queen of Naples, sister of the Empress, both of these ladies being political antagonists of Baron Thugut.

The British Cabinet was quite willing, so far as the Emperor Paul could be induced to consent, to give Austria a free hand in Italy. It was desirable for British interests that stronger barriers should be raised in every quarter against French aggression. Pitt even considered that compensation for the King of Sardinia was rather a matter of favour than of right. As for the wishes or interests of the populations affected by these territorial changes, if they entered at all into the calculations of statesmen at that time, they weighed as chaff in the balance of political advantage. But English distrust of Thugut's methods had not been diminished by Dietrichstein's mission to Switzerland and the explanations of it given at Vienna. Thugut, indeed, vehemently repudiated all responsibility for his emissary's language, but no one seems to have attached any credit to

\* Minto to Grenville, 16-31 August, 1799. Public Record Office.

† Keith to Dundas, February 10, 1800. P. 122.

the denial. And the British Cabinet, though placing a much higher value on Austrian co-operation than it had done earlier in the year, still looked on a Russian alliance as the main plank—in fact the only sound plank—of its Continental system. Lord Grenville, therefore, instructed Lord Minto to inform Thugut that the British Government would enter into no negotiation with that of the Emperor without the concurrence of the Tzar, its best ally; and that the financial convention, when ratified at Vienna, must be laid before the British Parliament. These conditions being satisfied, it would do everything in its power to promote Austrian interests in Italy.\*

The season for military operations on a large scale in 1799 having now passed, the British Government prepared a new plan of campaign for 1800, which Lord Grenville sent to Mr. Wickham to be laid before Souvorov. Following nearly the same lines as that which had failed so signally, it proposed to assemble in Switzerland an army of 100,000 men in British pay, under the marshal's command, composed as to two-thirds of Russians and as to one-third of Germans, Swiss, and French. But to supply deficiencies of the Russian military organisation there was to be an English commissariat and a staff of English, German, and French officers formed by Lord Mulgrave, who was to fill the post of adjutant or quartermaster general, besides taking command of the Swiss.

Souvorov reached Swabia in very bad humour with the Austrian officials, whom he held responsible for his defeat; with Thugut for removing him from Italy and exposing his army to destruction, with Melas for delaying his march by not furnishing means of transport, with the Archduke for returning too late to Switzerland to give him support. The infantry under his command, including Korsakow's troops, now a mere mob of marauders, did not exceed 28,000 men. They were in absolute need of rest, re-organisation, and re-equipment. Nevertheless he immediately proposed to the Archduke a combined attack on Masséna, who now occupied the position at Zurich so long held by the Austrians. The Archduke, fettered by instructions from Vienna, offered in reply to distract the attention of the French by a demonstration in force, while the Russians assaulted the fortified lines of a victorious and much stronger enemy. This answer, and still more the form in which it was conveyed, stirred the smouldering antagonism of the two generals to open quarrel. Souvorov, on assuming the chief command in Italy, had been made an Austrian field-marshal by the Emperor Francis II. For his subsequent victories his own sovereign had created him prince, with the title of Italiski. The Archduke, animated by jealousy and dislike, would only allow him, in official communication, the rank of Russian Field Marshal. And Souvorov, fiercely resenting the omission of his other titles as a deliberate slight, returned insult for insult, refused an invitation to a personal conference, and prepared to withdraw his troops into winter quarters at Augsburg. This trouble was still brewing when Wickham paid the first of several visits to the marshal to arrange with him a new plan of campaign. The British minister had already conceived almost unbounded admiration for the Austrian army, and particularly for its commander and its staff, with whom he had

\* Grenville to Minto, August 31, 1799. Public Record Office.

associated for some months, on a footing of intimacy. It would not be surprising, therefore, if their prejudices and animosities should in some measure, without his knowledge, have coloured his views of the Russian army and its general. His letters certainly deal faithfully with everything in Souvorow's character or conduct that seemed to his sharp scrutiny to savour of eccentricity or invite censure. But they testify, more grudgingly perhaps, but not less amply, than those of Lord Mulgrave, to the extraordinary vigour of mind, clearness of view, and firm grasp of the whole military situation displayed in the Marshal's conversation. And the impression of the old warrior they leave on the reader's mind, as of one easily roused to anger but easily appeased, frank and courteous to strangers, and greatly beloved by all who lived in close relations with him, is certainly pleasing. Souvorow listened attentively, but without approval, to the plan sketched by Lord Grenville; and repeated to Wickham the objections he had already stated to Lord Mulgrave. The idea of a composite staff, hastily gathered from all nations, moved him to mirth. The Swiss and Bavarian levies, he said, should be given to the Archduke to strengthen his army. "I want to go to Italy because my troops and officers are not fitted for mountain warfare. I want to march into France by Dauphiné while the Archduke operates in Switzerland and Franche Comté." If this arrangement could not be made, he still insisted on having an Austrian staff of his own selection and a mixed army of Russians and Austrians under his command. Into the burning question of the pillage and indiscipline of his troops, which provoked loud outcries in Switzerland and Germany, and gave Baron Thugut just ground of complaint, he would not enter. But some of his officers were less reticent, and they enabled Wickham to form some estimate of the difficulty of applying a remedy. The Russian soldiers had been used in their Eastern campaigns to live by pillage. Without better pay and a commissariat they must plunder or starve. His army was a favourite hobby of the Tzar. He was so proud of it, so assured of its perfect organisation by old generals who flattered his foibles, that Souvorow himself did not dare to suggest improvement. It was only from Count Woronzow in London that any hint of deficiency would be tolerated, and then only as an echo of English opinion. Wickham, therefore, proposed to Lord Grenville to make use of Woronzow's reports to open the Tzar's eyes to the wants of his troops. In the meantime the atmosphere in which the Minister lived was hot with strife. The Archduke protested loudly against the withdrawal of the Russians to Augsburg, leaving him to face Masséna alone. Italiski replied with taunts. Grand Duke Constantine Paul's second son, now serving his apprenticeship to arms, a half-crazed malignant savage, blew the coals of discord with all his might. Wickham, in despair, hastily summoned Lord Mulgrave back from Vienna to mediate between the enraged chiefs. But Mulgrave, finding that he could do nothing with Thugut, had already gone to Berlin on his road to England. Then a passing dread at Vienna of the Tzar's rising anger allayed the storm. The Archduke lowered his tone to entreaty, and the arrival on the scene of Prince Esterhazy, bearing the order of Maria Theresa and friendly greetings from the Emperor Francis to Souvorow and the

Grand Duke, seemed to have reduced conflict to general accord, when an insulting expression applied to him by the Archduke, coming to Italiski's knowledge, provoked a furious retort which put an end to all hope of co-operation between the two commanders. Luckily for Germany the unprovided state of Masséna's army disabled that skilful general from profiting by the discord of his enemies.\*

Having learned from Lord Minto that the Imperial Government could not be forced or persuaded to allow Souvorow to resume command of its armies in Italy, and from Mr. Wickham the result of his conferences with the Russian marshal, Lord Grenville drew up a new project of concert against France, and sent it early in November to Sir Charles Whitworth to be laid before the Tzar. By this scheme the Russian troops to be assembled in Switzerland were to be paid at the rates current in German armies. In order to secure the co-operation of Austria, Baron Thugut was to be asked to furnish the general plan of campaign for the coming year, which would be transmitted to St. Petersburg for Paul's approval. And as an additional means of binding the Emperor Francis to act in strict concert with his allies, it was suggested that he should be allowed to retain possession of Piedmont and Savoy, the King of Sardinia receiving Tuscany and the Papal Legations in exchange, and the Austrian Netherlands being handed over to the Grand Duke of Tuscany. In return for this concession to its Italian aims the Austrian Government was to satisfy Souvorow's requirements of an Austrian staff of his own selection and a body of 30,000 Austrian troops under his exclusive orders, and to furnish the magazines, guns, and whatever else might be needful to equip his army for a campaign. To act in co-operation with Souvorow, Lord Grenville added, the Archduke would have 100,000 men on the Rhine and Melas 80,000 in Italy, and 70,000 British troops would be available for descents on the coasts of France to support Royalist insurrections. The internal discord of the Republic and the impaired strength of its Government opened, he considered, a certain prospect that these forces, acting cordially in unison, would accomplish all the aims of the coalition in the course of another campaign. It was also suggested that the 15,000 Russian troops which had returned to England from Holland might be employed in the Mediterranean to conquer Majorca for the Tzar. Whitworth was enjoined to do all in his power to reconcile Paul to these proposals and to remove any jealousies or suspicions that insinuations hostile to England might have sown in the autocrat's mind. He was to state that the British Government would take no step in foreign policy without the Tzar's concurrence; to repeat in the most emphatic manner that it had no selfish designs on Malta, but would place that island, as already agreed upon, at the Tzar's disposition, and would soon propose the formation of an English branch of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem. To give more effect to Whitworth's representations Lord Grenville despatched Sir Home Popham, who had won Paul's favour when negotiating the Dutch expedition earlier in the year, on a second mission to St. Petersburg.

Concurrently with these instructions to Whitworth, others went

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\* Wickham to Grenville, October 17, *et seq.* Public Record Office.

from Whitehall to Lord Minto to apply to Baron Thugut for a plan of campaign, and to require of him the Austrian staff, troops, and military equipments needed for the formation of Souvorow's army in Switzerland. If this demand were refused Minto was to announce that George III. would take no further part in the war on the Continent, and would advise the Czar to follow his example. In the communication to the Tzar we find Lord Grenville, for the first time, urging the necessity of concert with Austria, which Paul had vainly insisted on, when the coalition was forming. It does not seem probable that the modified English project would have been acceptable to either of the powers to which it was addressed; but hardly was it launched when a blast from St. Petersburg swept it into the limbo<sup>s</sup> of political abortions. Paul's anger had been so excited against the Austrian Government by complaints from Italy, and the evacuation of Switzerland by the Archduke, that news of the defeat of his armies by Masséna produced an explosion of resentment which found vent in a peremptory order recalling Souvorow and his troops to Russia, and in letters to the Emperor Francis II. and King George III. His letter to the Emperor declared their alliance suspended until satisfaction had been given for recent disloyal action, by the dismissal of Baron Thugut from office, and the renunciation of Austrian projects of annexation in Italy. That to George III. announced the rupture of Paul's alliance with the Emperor, and proposed a new league of Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, Denmark, and Sweden to curb the rapacity of Austria, while continuing war with the Republican government of France. Having himself broken off relations with the King of Prussia for not joining the coalition, Paul suggested that Thomas Grenville should be sent back to Berlin to smooth the way for a reconciliation. With the same object in view he had ordered, he said, Baron Krudener, his Minister at Copenhagen, then returning home on leave of absence, to halt at Berlin, and take advantage of any opening for a renewal of friendly intercourse.\* This letter does not appear to have been answered. It had, indeed, a very different effect on British policy from that intended by its author. The quarrel of the Emperors and the recall of Souvorow put an end to British plans of campaign in Switzerland. Lord Grenville therefore reduced the application for Russian troops he had made through Whitworth and Popham to 15,000 or 20,000 men to reinforce the army of Archduke Charles, and 30,000 or 40,000 more, including those already in England, to serve in British expeditions to France and Holland. About the same time—November 26—he instructed Lord Minto to ask Baron Thugut for frank explanations with a view to concert between Great Britain and Austria in carrying on the war against France. On the other hand, jealousy of Austria, always a ruling motive of Prussian statesmen, and now common to Russia and Prussia, could not fail to bring these powers again into accord. Baron Krudener, breaking his journey at Berlin, was welcomed by Count Haugwitz, and the conferences that followed between these ministers restored the amicable relations of the sovereigns they represented.

The answer of the Emperor Francis to the Tzar's letter expressed

\* Paul I. to Count Woronzow, October 15, 1799, p. 32.

regret for Paul's dissatisfaction, but ignored his complaints and his demand for reparation, and insisted on the right of Austria to an extension of dominion in Italy. Earlier in the year Count Dietrichstein had arranged a marriage between Paul's daughter, the Grand Duchess Alexandria, and Archduke Joseph, Palatine of Hungary. It was a scheme of Baron Thugut to draw the Tzar away from George III. into closer relations with the Emperor. But although Paul, from affection for his daughter, would not now break off this match, he did not allow it to affect his political attitude. He refused to receive Dietrichstein at his Court, and in a rejoinder to the Emperor declared in emphatic terms his intention to oppose Austrian encroachment on Sardinian or Papal territory. Shortly afterwards, Lord Grenville's representations, supported by the reports of Count Woronzow and the counsels of Count Panin, now Russian Vice-Chancellor, shook the resolution Paul had taken to withdraw from the coalition. At the end of November he sent permission to Souvorow, who was returning home by slow marches, to halt in Bohemia, while negotiations went on at Vienna. But the Emperor and Thugut, now irritated to the pitch of defiance by interference with their Italian projects, refused at first to allow any Russian troops to remain in the Empire. Minto, in great alarm, interposed as a mediator, and hurried off to Prague to patch up a compromise. He found that he had undertaken an impossible task. Souvorow insisted on Lord Grenville's proposal—the command of a mixed army of 100,000 men, with an Austrian staff. Thugut would not give any Austrian troops, nor allow more than 20,000 Russians to remain in Germany. Fruitless altercations consumed several weeks, and were ended in January, 1801, by news of an incident in Italy which brought the two empires to the very verge of war. Ancona, after a long blockade by an army commanded by the Austrian General Froelisch and a Russian naval squadron under Admiral Ushâkow, surrendered to the former, who accepted, without objection, articles of capitulation drawn up by the French commandant in terms grossly offensive to Russia. He followed up this display of ill-will by ordering Russian flags to be torn down from the public buildings of the town and the ships in the harbour. Paul, on receiving his admiral's report, demanded an apology from the Austrian Government and the dismissal of General Froelisch. Thugut, influenced apparently by the spirit of contradiction which sometimes possessed him, threw all the blame on the Russians. Thereupon Paul, justly incensed, ordered Souvorow to return at once, and forbade Count Cobentzl to appear at his Court until the redress he had demanded was given. His hatred of Jacobin government restrained him from resorting to violent measures which might prevent or delay the restoration of the French monarchy. But he arranged with the King of Prussia for joint action to frustrate Austrian projects of annexation, when the time came to settle the terms of a general peace.

Meantime Thugut had produced his plan of campaign at the beginning of December. It discarded Souvorow and excluded Russians from the chief fields of military operations on the Continent. The Austrian armies, it declared, would be quite able to expel the French from Italy and Switzerland if the British Govern-

ment reinforced that of the Archduke with the 30,000 German auxiliaries Mr. Wickham was about to levy ; or, what would answer better, gave a subsidy to the Emperor to enable him to levy them himself. Russian troops, it added, could be used by the British Government with great advantage to the common cause in expeditions to Holland and the coasts of France, with which the Austrian armies might co-operate. In forwarding this sketch to Lord Grenville, Lord Minto reported in cipher that the Austrian Chancellor showed himself more eager every day to come to a thorough understanding with the English Government. In fact, notwithstanding the dogged obstinacy with which he clung to his projects and his antipathies, Thugut could not altogether shut his eyes to the peril involved in the improving relations of Russia and Prussia or his ears to Lord Grenville's repeated warnings against driving the Tzar to extremities. Then, again, financial difficulties weighed on him more heavily every day. His expectations of relief from the resources of Italy had been disappointed. Not only had French requisitions impoverished the country, but a spirit of passive resistance, aroused by the arrogance and ineptitude of Austrian officials, by old dynastic attachments, and by national aspirations, sealed up the ordinary sources of revenue in some of the occupied States. Slowly and with evident reluctance during the early part of December he receded from untenable ground. He reduced the Austrian demand of all Piedmont and Savoy to one for the Novarese, including Alexandria and other fortresses, for which the King of Sardinia should receive full compensation from Genoese territory. He agreed to make the restoration of the French monarchy a leading article of the common programme. Finally, he consented to ratify the financial convention of 1797. Having thus cleared his ground, he proposed as terms of alliance and concert—(1) that the British Government should relieve the Emperor of the burden of the last Austrian loan ; (2) that it should advance to him £1,600,000, soon afterwards raised to £2,000,000, of which £200,000 was required at once for pressing needs ; the whole to be repaid from a new Austrian loan to be floated after the close of the war with the help of British credit ; (3) that it should support the Emperor in the acquisition of the Papal Legations, the Novarese with its fortresses, and the city and territory of Genoa.

These proposals of Baron Thugut, coming immediately after the Emperor Paul's letter to George III., were followed by a complete change in the political attitude of the British Government towards its Imperial allies. The chief agent in effecting this alteration, so far as individual influence operated, was Mr. William Wickham. His mission to Switzerland in 1796-7 had won for him unbounded confidence from Lord Grenville. He returned to that country in 1799 invested with extraordinary powers, and instructed to act at once on his own judgment in all matters requiring prompt decision. Whatever arrangement Wickham should make, Lord Grenville wrote in confidence, he was prepared to approve as the best that could be made in the circumstances, and to give it full support. In the course of this second mission the British minister formed or renewed intimate personal relations with nearly all the Continental leaders of the coalition against France—with Archduke Charles and

Prince Italiski, with Baron Thugut at Vienna, Count Montg elas at Munich, and Advoyer Steiguer in Switzerland ; with the chiefs of the Royalist party in eastern and southern France, Pichegru and Willot its generals, M. D'Andr  its most influential and trustworthy agent, Count de Pr cy the heroic defender of Lyons. These connections enabled him to throw light on various subjects of high importance, of which the British ministry had only very imperfect knowledge. It was mainly from Wickham's reports of the defects of Russian military organisation and the open hostility of the Russian and Austrian armies, that it learned the impracticability of its plans of campaign in Switzerland. Glowing descriptions in the same reports of the superb condition of the Austrian armies, under able commanders and staffs of extraordinary merit, taught it to form a new and quite different estimate of the comparative importance of Russia or Austria as an ally for accomplishing British aims on the Continent. It was also through Wickham that the Cabinet obtained its most valuable information in regard to the state of France. M. D'Andr  had for many years carried on secret correspondence with prominent men of all parties in Paris. Trimming politicians—and this category included nearly every Republican of note, not a regicide, under the Directory—who shrank from communication with ordinary Royalist agents as perilous indiscretion, confided without fear in D'Andr , whose wary prudence, though often severely tested, was never found wanting. With like confidence D'Andr  freely disclosed to Wickham information which he withheld from babbling courtiers of the emigrant princes. Through this channel Grenville obtained copies of confidential reports to the French War Office of the diminishing strength of the Republican armies, and undoubted evidence of the internal distraction and financial distress which crippled the Directory. And it was these circumstances—the military superiority of Austria and the opportunity offered by the weakness of France—together with a conviction, founded on the pacific temper and failing revenue of England, that this opportunity must be promptly seized if their own Continental aims were to be accomplished, that shaped the action of the British Government at the beginning of the year 1800.

As an adviser under ordinary circumstances, and in matters with which his mission was concerned, Wickham appears to have been not undeserving of the trust reposed in him by Lord Grenville. He was able, zealous, hard-working, and personally devoted to his official chief ; an acute judge of men and political conditions, and skilful in turning them to advantage. Unsparring of himself, he was by his own confession irritable and exacting in his relations with subordinates whose methods did not please him or whose labours fell below his own high standard of public duty. We may also allow him the credit he claims for himself of being patient and wary in dealing with adversaries. And although his personal integrity was spotless, he seems, when British interests were to be advanced, to have been hardly less hampered by scruples than Count Haugwitz or Baron Thugut. In fact, his qualities as a public servant made him a type of what is called *efficiency*. He had also the defects of these qualities. His self-confidence led him to form estimates

which sometimes proved exaggerated, of the influence he exercised over men and events. Intensely practical, his mind seems to have been but slenderly endowed with the faculty of imagination, and therefore wanting in the insight which recognises genius of a high order, with its power of creating resources and opportunities, inspiring men, moulding events, working miracles. He read Baron Thugut in his changing moods like an open book. He could discern the great abilities and sterling qualities concealed from ordinary observers under the dull aspect of Archduke Charles. The superb order, exact discipline, and military pride of the Austrian army, the scientific methods of its staffs, "unequalled in Europe, and from whom it is more than probable that some of the first generals of modern times will spring," appealed so convincingly to him that he accepted it, at its own valuation, as practically invincible. But Souvorow remained to the end of their intercourse more or less of a mystery to him. It never seems to have entered into his calculations that the substitution of Melas for the Russian marshal as commander-in-chief in Italy could sensibly affect the fortunes of the war. Yet Souvorow's victories had been to a great extent instrumental in raising the military spirit of Austria from a state of profound dejection to that condition of arrogant self-reliance which so moved his admiration. Far more hurtful to the cause for which he laboured was Wickham's failure to see any particular significance in Bonaparte's return to France to grasp the reins of government. It hardly appears to have occurred to him that France under Bonaparte was a more formidable adversary than under Barras. This was, of course, blindness common to the whole British Cabinet. There is nothing more noticeable in Lord Grenville's correspondence at this time than the absence of any recognition of merit in Bonaparte. He is mentioned only to be depreciated. When he became First Consul, *Sa Mājestē très Corse*, figures in letters between Lord Grenville and his brothers as a ridiculous pretender. When the victorious Consul had pulverised the coalition, he became to them all an object of virtuous hatred, an incarnation of evil. But for Wickham, who lived in a broader and less prejudiced atmosphere, and who had seen, at the time of his first Swiss mission, all that he had been able to accomplish during many months of assiduous labour and secret intrigue completely demolished by Bonaparte's marvellous achievements in Italy, there was less excuse.

An instance of Lord Grenville's confidence in Wickham's judgment occurs in connection with a curious negotiation carried on during the year 1799 by the secretary of the Director Barras with the Royalist agents, M. Fauche-Borel and Count de Maison-fort, for the restoration of the French monarchy. The conditions agreed upon are set down at full length on pages 177-184 of Vol. V. The Emperor Paul, at the instance of Count de Provence, afterwards Louis XVIII., requested the British Government to advance the sum of twelve millions of francs demanded on behalf of Barras. Lord Grenville had no faith in the project, which was to be effected by one of the Republican armies, purged by Barras of its Jacobin elements and placed under the command of General Pichégru, with the support of

the Russian army of General Korsakow. But he referred the whole matter to Wickham, with liberty to decide as he should think fit. What Wickham thought about it does not appear. All the papers relating to the scheme fell into Masséna's hands, together with Korsakow's personal effects, after the battle of Zurich, which crushed it out of existence. Among the incidents connected with the revolution of the 18th Brumaire nothing caused more general surprise than the tame submission of the redoubtable Barras, who had raised himself to power, and kept it, by three successful *coups d'état*, to expulsion from office without even an attempt to make terms for himself. The explanation seems to be that Talleyrand, who had been privy to the negotiation with Count de Provence, revealed it to Bonaparte, and thus delivered the peccant Director into the hands of his former *protégé*, the "little Corsican officer" of the siege of Toulon and Vendémiaire 13.

Although Wickham miscalculated the military power of Austria without Souvorow, and against Bonaparte, the advices he forwarded from France, however coloured by the passions and hopes of the Royalist party from which they emanated, could hardly exaggerate the distress and weakness of the Republic during the last days of the Directory. It was a condition of hopeless bankruptcy, of military inefficiency, of universal discontent rising to armed revolt in eighteen departments of the West. Impecuniosity was a chronic malady of the Republic, comparatively harmless in days of revolutionary fervour, fatal in days of national depression. It had originated in two fiscal innovations introduced by the National Assembly—one abolishing internal indirect taxation, which had supplied one-third of the revenue of the French monarchy; the other transferring the assessment of direct taxation to local authorities chosen by popular election. As these bodies neglected a thankless duty, the collection of national revenue annually fell more and more into arrear, and the widening gap between public receipts and public expenditure was covered by enormous emissions of *assignats*, which swamped the money market, and fell rapidly in value as a medium of exchange. During the dictatorship of the Committee of Public Safety, revolutionary energy overcame all difficulties by placing the whole property and population of France under requisition for the public service. But in the re-action that followed the downfall of Robespierre, wholesale confiscation had to be abandoned. The governing authorities had recourse to new issues of paper money, and when these lost all value as national currency, to repudiation of public debt. During the year 1799 all the proceeds of taxation and all the resources of public credit had not sufficed to provide for one-half of necessary public expenditure. Every branch of the service was starved into inefficiency; army contractors, public functionaries, and other creditors of the State were not paid at all, or paid only by "bills of arrears," to be held over till money came into the Treasury, or exchanged for unsaleable national domains. Rich speculators bought up these bills for half the nominal value, and made immense profit by returning them to the Exchequer in payment of taxes. A progressive forced loan, designed by the Directory to fleece these capitalists, failed in its object, and swelled

public clamour. The armies unpaid, ill-fed, unsupplied with winter clothing or munitions of war, could hardly be held together. Especially the soldiers of the army of Italy, cooped up early in autumn by the Austrians in the barren mountains of Liguria, and closely blockaded along the whole coastline by English frigates, perished in great numbers of cold and hunger. Reinforcements supplied by conscription almost immediately abandoned their colours, and covered the roads, particularly of southern France, with brigands and sturdy beggars. And although the victories of Masséna and Brune and the discord of the allies allowed the Directory ample breathing-time in the autumn, it found itself unable to despatch troops to the revolted provinces of the west, where a spirit of resistance, provoked by the law of conscription, and fanned into fury by the law of hostages, blazed up in insurrection from the English Channel to the Garonne. The French 5 per cent. *rentes* fell to 7. After the revolution of the 18th Brumaire, Gaudin, whom Bonaparte made Minister of Finance, found less than £7,000 in the Treasury. Government lived from hand to mouth, as best it could. In the Minister's own words, finance no longer existed in France.\*

A leading feature of the original British plan of military operations for 1799 was the despatch of a body of troops to Brittany in the autumn. When the army employed in the expedition to Holland returned to England at the end of October, Lord Buckingham urged that it should be sent at once to help the French royalists. More timid counsels prevailed. Lord Grenville replied that Government could not risk the loss of the 30,000 effectives who had come back from the Helder in an enterprise full of hazard at that late season. Its policy must be to nurse the military strength of the country during the winter, so as to have 70,000 men available for foreign service in the spring of 1800. In the meantime liberal supplies of money, arms and ammunition should be sent to Brittany to feed the insurrection. At the end of November he announced that two such consignments had already reached the French coast.†

On November 30, 1799, Lord Grenville officially informed Wickham that reports of the disaffection of General Masséna and his army to the new French Government had reached England, and authorised him to purchase their aid on any terms that might secure it. Wickham was also instructed to induce deserters from the Republican armies to take service under Louis XVIII. by offering them French military pay at the current rates. Count d'Artois, it may be stated, had been empowered to recruit the royalist forces in western France in the same manner to the extent of 70,000 men. A long *confidential* letter accompanied this despatch. It expressed Lord Grenville's "infinite obligations" for intelligence and advice which had been "his chief guide and direction" in recent difficulties, and had saved him from the error of trusting in Souvorow as the instrument designed by Providence to give victory to Great Britain in a final effort against France. For however able the British Government might be to carry on a defensive struggle for many years, one more Continental campaign was the limit of its power for offensive warfare. He felt confident that, even without Russian aid, Austria would be able to

\* Thiers. *Consulate and Empire*.

† Court and Cabinets of George III.

reduce France to the frontiers of 1789, perhaps to restore the French monarchy, if Thugut could be brought to pursue a straightforward course. The English Government on its side was silently preparing for "an immense effort" in the following spring to support the royalists of western France. Bonaparte could only maintain his power by using French armies to repress his Jacobin enemies. This necessity must leave him without troops to oppose western insurgents, or Austrian foes advancing from the east. His only resource, therefore, lay in a negotiation for peace. If this expedient failed him, as it must "if there was a grain of sense in Austrian councils," he should have to choose between deportation to Cayenne and submission to Louis XVIII. In order to force the Consul quickly to one of these issues, Wickham was urged to raise insurrections during the winter in the south and east of France, which might distract attention from La Vendée and co-operate with British expeditions in the following spring. In carrying out these instructions he was to act on his own judgment without fear or delay, and to continue supplying the Cabinet with information and advice.\*

On December 13 Wickham replied to these communications by a public despatch and a private letter. In the former he reported that, with the approval of Archduke Charles, he had commissioned General Pichégru to enrol an army of French deserters to act with the Austrians in Franche Comté; and General Willot to collect another army of the same material in Dauphiné. Willot would concert operations with General Melas and with the British commanders in the Mediterranean. Count de Précý would raise Lyons and the surrounding districts. Trustworthy intelligence had enabled him, Wickham wrote, to form an estimate of the comparative strength of the opposing forces in the next campaign. The Archduke would have under his orders 100,000 Austrians on the Rhine, and Melas the same number in Italy. To the Rhine army Wickham hoped, by Swiss enrolments and German treaties, to add 40,000 men in British pay, and 20,000 Sardinians might also be taken into British pay to reinforce the army of Melas. On the other hand, the military strength of France was greatly exaggerated in official returns. The army of Italy, exceeding on paper 60,000 men, had only 30,000 effectives. Bonaparte by great efforts might be able to place in the field from 150,000 to 180,000 men altogether, a force inferior to the Austrians in numbers, and still more in quality and equipment. As to financial resources, a leading banker of Paris calculated the extraordinary aid the Consul might be able to obtain, by using every means at his disposal, at three and a half millions sterling; a sum utterly inadequate to supply the needs of the French armies. In conclusion, the despatch stated that the new French Government would probably have general support for a time. "It seems possible that the war will be conducted with more talents and energy than has lately been the case." But Bonaparte "cannot steer long between Jacobins and Royalists." If he fails to obtain peace he must lean for support on the former, and forfeit public favour, as he can only carry on war by resorting to revolutionary methods.

In his private letter of the same date Wickham wrote—The question (of carrying on war) is reduced to this: "are you prepared

to throw yourselves into the arms of the House of Austria or no? If not, renounce at once every idea of a Continental war against France, for you can neither carry it on without Austria nor force her to carry it on in any other than her own way." Lord Grenville, he continued, must alter his methods, must flatter and cajole and feign confidence, instead of dictating military operations and criticising political action. By doing with a good grace what he cannot help, giving Austrian strategists a free hand, by praising and occasionally pensioning them, he can exercise considerable influence over the movements of Austrian armies. Above all things, it was necessary to avoid showing distrust of Baron Thugut, however tortuous and irritating the Chancellor's conduct might be. His quarrel with the Russians had fixed him on his throne for ever; reconciling to him his bitterest ill-wishers, the army of the Rhine and the states of south Germany, which had hated him for hating their favourite, the Archduke. He now reigned without rival or possible successor. The British Cabinet, as we shall see, followed this counsel, though in some respects with halting steps.

When Lord Grenville instructed Sir Charles Whitworth in November, 1799, to ask for Russian auxiliaries not only to take part in British expeditions to the coast of France, but also to reinforce the Archduke's army on the Rhine, he must have felt that he was making a hazardous experiment on the Tzar's temper. Writing at the same time to inform Lord Minto of his efforts at St. Petersburg in favour of Austria, he added—"Far from blaming the Emperor of Russia, I must say if I were a Russian minister I should be very deaf to the remonstrances of England on the subject." And this was before news had come of the outrage at Ancona, which aggravated previous injury by public insult. The tacit refusal of the British Government to espouse his quarrel with the Emperor Francis, still more its application to him, urged by Whitworth with indiscreet zeal, to stultify himself in the face of Europe by helping Austria to despoil princes whom he had pledged himself to protect, could not fail to incense Paul, and call down his anger on the diplomatist who identified himself with such a proposal. Ill-feeling also arose out of the failure of the joint expedition to Holland, which prevented any further association of English and Russian troops in a common enterprise. In his reports, official and private, of the attack on Brune's positions near Bergen on September 19, the Duke of York had cast the whole blame of defeat on the headlong indiscipline of the Russian column led by General Hermann. On the other hand, the Russians complained that, having occupied Bergen, they were left without British support, to be crushed by an overwhelming concentration of French troops. And as Mr. Windham remarked in a letter to Lord Grenville, the absence of any report of the movements of the column contiguous to the Russians, and under the immediate command of the Duke, left it open to doubt whether, though the Russians advance had been precipitate, that of the English might not have been tardy. Whatever the merits of the case, Hermann's defeat and capture occasioned recriminations in the allied army which had an injurious effect on its subsequent operations. After the return of the expedition to England, General Essen, Hermann's successor,

both in general conversation and in a report to his sovereign, attributed the bad success of the military operations to the incapacity of the Duke of York. His language aroused great resentment at the Court of George III. and in the highest English military circles. And although Paul, in consequence of advices from Count Woronzow, dismissed both Hermann and Essen from his service, the accusations of the latter general, constantly repeated at St. Petersburg, appear to have rankled in his mind. Under these adverse influences, while Dundas, hitherto an advocate for treating only with Russia as an ally in Continental affairs, now declared that Russian soldiers could only be used with advantage in small detached bodies, drilled and commanded by English officers, the Tzar, when authorising the employment of Essen's troops in an expedition to Brittany, made the condition that they should not be commanded by an English general, and especially not by the Duke of York. About the same time Count Tolstoi, a Russian officer who had been attached to the headquarters of the Archduke at Zurich, returned to St. Petersburg. Questioned by the Tzar, he blurted out the whole truth of the deficiencies and depredations of Korsakow's army. Paul's resentment seems to have fallen on the Russian generals who had shrunk from incurring his anger by dispelling his illusions. Suvorow sank into the grave under the shock of a curt message from an ungrateful master announcing his disgrace. Other Russian generals were deprived of their commands. And Count Vioménil, a French *émigré*, was placed at the head of the 15,000 Russian troops wintering in the Channel islands, with authority, under Count Woronzow's direction, to form a French staff, and supply whatever else was necessary to make them a fighting machine formidable only to an enemy. The disinclination, however, of the British Government to send any of its troops to act with those of Vioménil, on the ground of incompatibility of temper, put an end to the project of an expedition to Brittany, and the Russians returned home in the spring of 1800. Other causes of dissatisfaction at the Court of St. Petersburg were the refusal of George III. to allow British officers who had served in Holland to wear Russian decorations sent to them by Paul, and the convention of El Arish for the evacuation of Egypt by the French, signed on board Sir Sidney Smith's ship the *Tigre* by General Kleber and the Turkish Grand Vizier. Sir Home Popham, who had started for St. Petersburg in November, 1799, bearing a letter from King George to the Tzar, and charged by Lord Grenville with explanations on every point likely to provoke discussion, being delayed by contrary winds, did not reach his destination till late in the following March, when cordial alliance had given place to complete estrangement. Paul's enmity to the Republican government of France had not yet diminished, but it was now counterbalanced by enmity to Thugut and his Italian policy. And he fell back into alliance with Prussia and the Prussian system of vigilant inactivity, to watch his enemies exhausting themselves in a final struggle, and intervene at the crucial moment to dictate terms of peace.

With the end of the year came Bonaparte's letters to the chiefs of the coalition, proposing peace. Lord Buckingham, to whom

Lord Grenville sent a copy of the Consul's letter to George III., as a new year's gift, counselled his brother to return a "moderate" answer, it being for the interests of the Ministry to conciliate public opinion, which inclined strongly to negotiation. The British reply, or rather replies, were wholly written by Lord Grenville, though altered from the original form in deference to suggestions from Pitt and Canning. Thomas Grenville informed Lord Buckingham that the answer to the Consul's letter caused a good deal of dissatisfaction even among supporters of the Government. It was in fact a public declaration of the convictions already expressed in Lord Grenville's confidential letters to his brothers and to Wickham. "His very Corsican Majesty," without adequate resources in men or money for carrying on war, or independent support from either of the two hostile parties that divided France, could only maintain his position by making peace. It would be sheer folly, therefore, on the part of the allied powers to negotiate instead of crushing him, and thus ending the war on their own terms. And this opinion of Bonaparte's extreme weakness found support in the inaction of the French armies during the winter, in striking contrast to the all-conquering energy he had hitherto shown in war. But events in France had already disproved the assumptions on which Lord Grenville based his train of reasoning, making it clear that the great mass of the French population were neither Jacobins nor adherents of Louis XVIII. They would no doubt have preferred some form of constitutional monarchy, such as that accepted in 1791 by Louis XVI. to the feeble and corrupt Jacobinism of a Directory which trampled on civil and religious rights and prolonged war to serve its own selfish ends. But the Frenchmen who would have welcomed back a monarchy of divine right, the *ancien régime* with its inequalities and abuses represented by the emigrant princes, at the price too of national humiliation and diminished territory, formed only a small minority of the nation. The return from Egypt of the victorious general who had dictated the peace of Campo Formio, the most glorious in the national annals, awakened in France a sense of profound relief. His seizing the reins of government was sanctioned by general support. The conciliatory measures that followed, repealing proscriptive decrees, opening the churches for Christian worship, inviting able men of all parties to unite in serving the State, increased public confidence. With confidence, credit revived, and the great obstacle in his way, financial distress, rapidly diminished. Instead of the three and a half millions sterling to which his prospect of borrowing was limited in the reports sent by Wickham, he contrived to raise thirteen and a half millions—an amount insufficient for the needs of the Consular government, but enough to give it a fair start.\* If the French people ardently desired peace, Bonaparte also sincerely desired it as necessary for France and for the establishment of his own power. But it was peace on lines not too dissimilar from those of Campo Formio. He knew well that peace on terms to which the British Government would consent must destroy the reputation for success on which his authority rested. It is probable, therefore, that the haughty and scornful answer returned to his overture to George III. was far from un-

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\* Thiers. *Consulate and Empire*.

welcome to him. Meant as a trumpet blast to rouse up opposition against him, it appears to have produced a contrary effect. It gave Talleyrand an opening for a telling retort. It silenced the cry for peace in France; and it stimulated the opinion which, as we shall see, was rapidly gaining ground on the Continent—that England, from selfish motives, prolonged a war by which she alone profited, while all other nations suffered.

The Tzar took no notice of Bonaparte's letter to him. To that addressed to the Emperor, Baron Thugut returned a courteous reply, putting aside rather than rejecting the overture, and leaving a door open for discussion which continued to the end of the war. This temporising policy gave Lord Grenville and his colleagues no little uneasiness. But Thugut refused to make any disclosure of the First Consul's proposals until the British Government had accepted his terms for an offensive alliance against France. Bonaparte was more successful in restoring the good relations between France and Prussia which had been interrupted in the previous summer. By giving assurances of his intention of withdrawing French troops from Holland at the conclusion of peace, and of supporting Prussian interests in Germany, he came to a friendly understanding with the Court of Berlin. Count Haugwitz testified his good wishes to the Consular Government by fruitless endeavours to reconcile it with the Tzar, and to dissuade the Elector of Bavaria from joining the coalition.

Negotiation did not retard strenuous preparations by all the belligerent powers for the renewal of hostilities in spring. Count d'Artois having notified in December his intention of putting himself at the head of the Breton insurgents, Pitt agreed to send him with a large body of British troops to the peninsula of Rhuis in the following spring, on condition that the plan of this expedition prepared by M. de Rozière, a French strategist, provided a safe landing place, a defensible position on the peninsula, and adequate facilities for re-embarkation in case of defeat. De Rozière insisted that his plan fully satisfied these requirements. But General Sir Charles Grey, to whom Pitt referred it for advice, condemned it in unqualified terms. Before any decision was announced, all opportunity of testing the merits of the project passed away. One of the first matters to which Bonaparte turned his attention on becoming Chief of the State was the pacification of western France. With this object he offered the insurgents full redress of all their grievances in return for submission, and authorised General Hédouville to arrange an armistice in order that terms of peace might be discussed. The theatre of civil war was divided into two sections by the River Loire. During the obstinate struggle for religion rather than for monarchy, ended by General Hoche in 1796, La Vendée, to the south of the river, had been turned into a desert. It still remained in a very impoverished state, besides being, during the greater part of the year, shut in from external aid by a treacherous coast. In the departments north of the Loire, particularly those of Brittany and Normandy, the fire and sword of Jacobin conquest had made much less havoc; and frequent communication with Count d'Artois, and consignments of money and arms from England kept the spirit of insurrection from flagging.

The disintegrating influence of these differing circumstances manifested itself in a conference of Royalist leaders held at Pouancé at the close of the year 1799. The southern delegates, swayed by the advice of Abbé Bernier, an able and politic ecclesiastic who had convinced himself of the stability and good intentions of the Consular Government, were for accepting Hédouville's proposals. Those from districts north of the Loire, following instructions from Monsieur, stood out for an additional pledge that monarchy should be restored, and despatched two of their number—Hyde de Neuville and Andigni—to Paris to treat with Bonaparte on this subject. An interview at the Tuileries effectually dispelled any illusions the envoys may have cherished that the First Consul intended treading in the footsteps of General Monk. And when, on their return, the chiefs at Pouancé sought to gain further time by spinning out negotiations, Bonaparte put an end to the armistice, and placed General Brune, a red-hot Jacobin, at the head of 60,000 troops to proclaim martial law and crush the revolt. The Vendéens immediately accepted the terms offered by Hédouville. The royalists of Anjou, Maine, and Brittany, after a feeble attempt at resistance, laid down their arms on the same conditions. The Norman chief, Count Frotté, who submitted last, was taken and shot in violation of good faith. The other leaders, with the exception of Georges Cadoudal, who retired to England, accepted the new order of things in France with more or less of good will. And the British Government found the chief avenue through which it hoped to assail the Consular Government effectually closed against it. For although it offered shortly afterwards to land Viomenil and his Russians on the Breton coast, it refused to risk British troops in such a desperate adventure.

In the middle of February the British Cabinet had definitely fixed the main lines of its policy for the year 1800; and Lord Grenville communicated its decisions to Mr. Wickham, Lord Minto, and Sir Charles Whitworth. Wickham was informed that all his plans had been approved and his advice adopted. He was authorised to conclude treaties with the Electors of Bavaria and Wurtemberg, and minor states of southern Germany for troops to serve under Archduke Charles, at a cost to the British Exchequer of £1,000,000, afterwards raised to £1,500,000. £500,000 more was placed at his disposal, as secret service money, to defray the expenses of royalist armies under Generals Pichégu and Willot. And the British Government undertook to send 20,000 British troops to the Mediterranean to co-operate with Willot.

Grenville's despatch to Lord Minto replied, as follows, to Baron Thugut's proposals. In addition to Wickham's expenditure, and £200,000 granted for the pay of Piedmontese troops, to serve under General Melas, £1,600,000 would be advanced to the Emperor in monthly instalments, without interest, to be repaid for a new Austrian loan at the end of the war. George III. renounced all claim to interfere by advice or criticism with Austrian military operations, and engaged to give them powerful support during the next campaign by expeditions to the coast of France. He approved of the territorial exchanges Thugut proposed making with the King of

Sardinia, who should be allowed to return at once to his dominions. If the Emperor did not wish to keep the Belgic provinces, they might be given, at his option, to the Prince of Orange, to Archduke Charles to hold as a fief of the empire, or to the Grand Duke of Tuscany as a means of facilitating Austrian arrangements in Italy. Whichever mode of settlement might be agreed on, the British Government would afford Austria the financial relief Thugut desired by transferring to them the whole burden of recent Austrian loans. In return, the Emperor was required not to consent to the retention of any part of the Netherlands by France, and not to negotiate separately with that power.

This altered attitude in regard to the disposal of Belgium was explained in a private letter to Lord Minto. The Cabinet, Lord Grenville wrote, did not expect repayment from Austria, and had in view an arrangement for preventing a great and constantly recurring waste of time and money in raising and training a new army at the beginning of every war. This was to garrison Belgic fortresses with British troops, and require of the new ruler to pay and maintain the garrisons in lieu of interest on the transferred loans. In this way, it was thought, Belgium might be secured against French aggression, and England, without expense to herself, might possess an army ready for immediate service whenever she found herself engaged in hostilities with any other power.

At the same time Lord Grenville, in a *most secret* despatch, instructed Whitworth to inform the Tzar that the British Government no longer needed Russian troops, and had concluded a new treaty with the Emperor, affording Austria considerable financial aid. He was to use every effort to remove any bad impression this intelligence might make on Paul's mind.

The task here imposed on the English Minister at St. Petersburg would have taxed the skill of a far abler and more tactful representative, after the repeated assurances given to Paul that the British Government would enter into no new engagements without his concurrence. It mattered little, therefore, that Whitworth was no longer in a position even to attempt it. His indiscreet language in conversation with Count Cobentzl, coming to the ears, or probably the eyes, of the Chancellor Rastopsin, who as Postmaster-General had discovered the key to the Austrian Minister's ciphered despatches, gave deep offence at the Russian Court. Paul no longer granted him audience, and at the beginning of February applied through Count Woronzow for his recall. Meantime, the relations of Russia and Austria became every day worse. An Austrian Court of Inquiry found the Russian charges against General Froelisch, commanding at Ancona, proved, and suspended him from his employment. This inadequate penalty inflamed to a higher pitch the anger of the Tzar, who recalled M. Katichev from a special mission to Vienna, and returned friendly letters from the Emperor and Empress unopened. Count Cobentzl, finding patient endurance of the slights daily put on him profitless, retired from St. Petersburg. In these circumstances its avowed preference for an Austrian alliance could not fail to alienate Paul from the British Government. Treating Whitworth as he had treated Cobentzl, he refused passports for the official messengers of

the English embassy. Sir Home Popham arrived late in March at St. Petersburg, and after a month passed in fruitless efforts to obtain audience from a Russian minister, or answers to official letters, returned home. About the same time Whitworth, lately solaced by elevation to an Irish peerage, received leave of absence from Lord Grenville. Paul, who had asked for his recall, then sent orders to Count Woronzow to repair to the Continent for the benefit of his health; and all friendly intercourse between the two Governments ceased.

Lord Minto expected, on receiving Lord Grenville's answer to Baron Thugut's proposals, that it would bring the two Governments into complete accord, and dispel all reserve as to Austrian negotiations with Bonaparte. To his astonishment, it threw the Imperial Chancellor into a towering passion. The British Government, Thugut complained, had not complied with his demands in essential particulars—a loan of £2,000,000, an immediate advance of £200,000, an undertaking to support the Emperor in annexing the Legations. Hot controversy followed, and Minto only averted a quarrel by conceding the points in dispute, with the exception of that relating to the Legations, which he referred to Lord Grenville. Thugut in return made a partial disclosure of his correspondence with Talleyrand, now French Minister of Foreign Affairs. He assured Minto that Bonaparte was willing to allow him his own way in Italy, and that the Emperor only continued the war in defence of English interests in the Netherlands. It was known, however, from Wickham's reports, that Bonaparte refused to surrender the Rhine provinces. And as Thugut felt confident of winning on the field of battle better terms from France than he could now obtain by negotiation, Minto had no doubt of the resumption of hostilities in the spring. Finally, the British Government agreed to advance £2,400,000 to the Emperor in three instalments of £800,000, payable on the first days of April, June, and September, 1800; to advise the King of Sardinia to consent to the exchange of territory required by Austria; to acquiesce in an Austrian annexation of the Papal Legations. The treaty was to remain in operation till February, 1801, and the articles relating to Sardinia and the Netherlands were not to be published. The King of Sardinia, however, rejected the proposals made to him by Lord Grenville on behalf of Austria, and appealed to the Tzar, who promised to defend him. And although all Thugut's demands had been virtually conceded, the Emperor did not sign his new treaty of alliance with King George III. till the sword had again decided the fate of Europe. For some months Austria and Great Britain acted in concert, so far as the latter acted at all, without any binding agreement; Austria receiving no financial aid, and being at liberty to negotiate separately with France. This hesitation astonished, as well as embarrassed, the British Cabinet. But all classes in Austria, as we learn from the despatches of British Ministers at Vienna, opposed a continuation of war for the expulsion of the French from the Netherlands, or a restoration of the French monarchy. And Thugut probably thought that, by one or two Austrian victories at the beginning of the next campaign, he might obtain all he wanted, without committing himself to a pursuit of objects more particularly affecting the interests of Great Britain.

In the meantime Mr. Wickham was making treaties for the hire of German troops with the Electors of Bavaria, the Duke of Wurtemberg, the Circle of Swabia, and finally, the Elector of Maintz. His most difficult task was first accomplished. Bavaria had been saved from annexation to Austria by Frederick the Great of Prussia. Since then the Electors had regarded the Kings of Prussia as political allies and the Emperors as political enemies. Bonaparte spared no effort to keep Bavaria out of the coalition. And King Frederick William III. of Prussia, supported by the almost unanimous voice of public opinion in the Electorate itself, brought all his influence to bear on the same side. On the other hand, the Elector was swayed towards an Anglo-Austrian alliance by Count de Montg elas, a Minister hateful to his states and people as an innovator of the same type as the Emperor Joseph II. As Montg elas's principles naturally inclined him to favour France, Wickham could only account for his political action by a desire to relieve the pecuniary needs of his sovereign, and make him independent of the Bavarian states. It would seem, however, from a remark in one of the English Minister's later letters, that the secret service fund at his command enabled him to use arguments convincing to Montg elas. Distracted by these rival influences the Elector appealed to the Tzar for advice, who, still eager to restore the French monarchy, turned the scale by counselling him to join the coalition, and promising him protection. But though successful in Germany, Wickham found his plans for raising troubles in the interior of France collapse before the growing power and popularity of the Consular government. The pacification of western France, the recall of Suvorow, Bonaparte's energy and comprehensive toleration, cowed or conciliated disaffection in the east and south. Pichgru found no support in Franche Comt e, nor Pr ecy at Lyons; and Willot went on his mission tardily, and with little prospect of success. Frenchmen of all shades of opinion had rallied to the call of Bonaparte. Political exiles of every class—Carnot and Barth el emy, former members of the Directory; Malonet and Mounier, devoted servants of Louis XVI., friends and councillors of Lord Grenville when living in England during the Reign of Terror—returned to France as supporters of the new system, and were welcomed back to public employment. Count de Prov ence sent letters to the First Consul through Abb e Montesquieu and the Third Consul Le Brun; regicides and nobles of historic pedigree jostled each other in the *salon* of his wife. Wickham still inferred public penury from the unprovided state of the French armies. But, as he discovered too late, Bonaparte had already closed the gulf of national insolvency. One of the first measures the Consul obtained from the new Legislative Assembly was an Act transferring local administration, including the assessment of taxes, from councils chosen by popular election to Prefects and Sub-Prefects appointed by himself. From the searching and exact methods of these functionaries, not only a large increase of annual revenue, but a gradual gathering in of accumulated arrears, might safely be expected. The leading bankers of Paris, associated by Bonaparte to form the Bank of France, began to discount Government bills, and the more pressing needs of

the State were thus supplied. Another circumstance adverse to the coalition was the retirement of Archduke Charles in March from his command on the Rhine. This step, attributed officially to ill-health, but resulting mainly from impatience of Thugut's yoke, caused great dissatisfaction not only in the Austrian army, but also in the German states to which Wickham was accredited. Still this minister's letters to Grenville during March and April showed no abatement of confidence. Improvement in the financial condition of France operated gradually; and Bonaparte skilfully concealed his resources as well as his plans. He had transferred Masséna to Italy, and placed Moreau in chief command of the French army of the Rhine, which he raised by reinforcements to 100,000 men. But, as Wickham reported, it was ill-paid, ill-fed, ill-equipped, and discontented. It had no cavalry, the horses having died of famine; and the French Government being unable to purchase others, Moreau could engage in no offensive operations. Moreover, according to the reports, the Consul had exhausted all his resources to strengthen the army of the Rhine, leaving the army of Italy without reinforcement or supplies, in a miserable condition of weakness and want. The army of reserve at Dijon, composed of a few hundred of raw conscripts and invalids, was the jest of Europe. On the other hand, Wickham depicted the Austrian army of the Rhine, which he strengthened daily by German auxiliaries in British pay, as being in the highest state of spirit and efficiency. Marshal Kray, its new commander, the victor of Magnano, and a general of acknowledged merit, enjoyed Thugut's entire confidence. He had the additional advantage of being advised by three famous strategists—Schmidt, Weyrother, and the Marquis de Chasteler—who had been chiefs of the staff to the Archduke and Souvorow. For Weyrother's abilities, Bonaparte, as well as Souvorow, had expressed the highest admiration. "Between Schmidt, Weyrother and Chasteler," Wickham wrote on March 27, "there is at this moment a reunion of talents at the Austrian head-quarters such as never has been assembled before. If all this was destined to be beaten, 'he could only say that Providence has some great object in view beyond the reach of our faculties of which the Consul is to be the leading instrument.'" The accounts from Paris transmitted by him were equally encouraging. Bonaparte, being hemmed in by difficulties of every kind, had formed no plans. The Jacobins, enraged at his monopoly of authority and his partiality for Royalists, conspired against him under Bernadotte and other generals of note. Talleyrand secretly betrayed him. In this state of insecurity he could not venture to quit Paris, and had sent Berthier to represent him at the camp of Dijon. And, while Wickham thus buoyed up the hopes of the English Cabinet, Lord Grenville's frequent announcements to him of formidable British expeditions about to set sail for the French coasts, satisfied the Austrian leaders that no troops could be drawn from the interior of France to reinforce the armies of Moreau and Masséna.

The Austrians were the first to take the field. Early in April General Melas cut in two the long thin line of Masséna's army by a victory at Voltri; forced the French commander, with the greater part of his troops, to fall back into Genoa; and leaving General

Ott with 30,000 men to besiege that city, drove General Suchet, with the smaller section of the beaten army, across the River Var into France. By the general plan of campaign drawn up at Vienna, and communicated by Wickham in cipher to Lord Grenville, Marshal Kray was to remain stationary on the Upper Rhine till the surrender of Genoa should enable Melas to despatch 25,000 men across the Alps to assail Moreau in the rear. Then Kray, choosing according to his discretion one of the plans submitted to him by his three chiefs of the staff, was to cross the river and attack Moreau; while Melas forced the passage of the Var, and supported by Willot's levies and 25,000 British troops brought from Minorea by Sir Charles Stuart, pushed on into the interior of France. Genoa, closely blockaded on land by General Ott and at sea by Lord Keith, was known to be so short of provisions that its capture could be a question only of weeks, or perhaps even of days. But Masséna, by an extraordinary example of resolution and endurance, gained time for Bonaparte to execute a daring plan of counter attack, of which it does not appear that the famous Austrian strategists had formed a conception. Towards the end of April, while Kray, expecting every moment official news of the fall of Genoa, held his army in readiness to move, Moreau, deceiving him by skilful manœuvres, crossed the Rhine at Schaffhausen, turned the left wing of the Austrians, and captured their magazines at Stockach. Pursuing his success, he defeated Kray in well-contested battles at Engen and Möskirch, and drove him across the Danube to Ulm. Only a great superiority in cavalry and artillery saved the Austrians from a decisive defeat. Their loss in killed and wounded did not much exceed that of the French, but their sudden discomfiture so completely demoralized them that Kray, being badly beaten in an effort to resume the offensive at Biberach, found himself reduced to absolute inaction. Moreau, having secretly despatched 15,000 men to cross the St. Gothard into Italy, and interposed between Kray's army and Switzerland, sat down quietly at Augsburg, to watch his antagonist. In the meantime columns of troops of all arms, fully equipped, marched across France to the head of the Lake of Geneva. When advices reached Paris that Moreau had passed the Rhine, Bonaparte started for Dijon, passed on to Villeneuve, and led 40,000 men across the Great St. Bernard, while 10,000 more crossed the Little St. Bernard. Melas was at Nice when a report reached him that Berthier, with the army of reserve from Dijon, had descended into Piedmont. The news troubled him little, recent intelligence from Vienna having assured him that it could only be a feeble attempt at a diversion. But he returned to Turin, leaving General Ulnitz to carry the *tête du pont* of St. Lorenzo which guarded the passage of the Var. An Austrian officer sent to Chivasso, having recognised Bonaparte, his report opened Melas's eyes to the gravity of the situation, and the Austrian army was ordered to concentrate without delay at Alexandria. General Ott, unwilling to lose a prize that seemed already within his grasp, delayed a day to offer Masséna the most favourable terms of capitulation; and the French general, long isolated from all intelligence, and not having one day's rations for his troops, marched out of Genoa with the honours of war. Ulnitz failed in repeated

assaults on the bridge of St. Lorenzo, and hurried away to the Austrian rendezvous, hotly pursued by Suchet, who formed a junction with Masséna in Melas's rear. In the meantime Bonaparte had turned aside to Milan to meet the French troops sent by Moreau, and take possession of the Austrian magazines in Lombardy. Having accomplished these purposes, he marched against Melas, and won a decisive victory at Marengo on June 14. Two days afterwards the beaten commander signed the convention of Alexandria, which allowed him to withdraw his army behind the Mincio, on condition of giving up Genoa and all the fortresses of Piedmont and Lombardy to the conqueror. Moreau's prolonged inaction was at first attributed, in accounts sent to England, to weakness resulting from losses in battle. But no sooner had advices reached him of Bonaparte's passage of the Alps than he crossed the Danube, dislodged Kray's army from its strong position at Ulm, and drove it before him like a flock of sheep till it found refuge behind the Inn. Being now master of Munich and nearly all Bavaria, which paid heavily in contributions for the policy of Montgélés, he referred an application from Marshal Kray for an armistice to Paris. And Bonaparte, having entered into negotiations for peace with the Emperor, agreed to a general cessation of hostilities till September.

Wickham's first reports to Grenville of the Austrian reverses on the Rhine, while frankly acknowledging, made light of them. Bonaparte, he wrote on May 8, had relinquished Italy in order to conquer it in Germany. His plans had been most skilfully conceived and admirably executed. He had paid up Moreau's army, and inspired it with such enthusiasm that, as all Austrian officers agreed, it surpassed in fighting power any French army hitherto sent into the field. Nevertheless, he had lost the game. Kray, whose situation was for a time critical, had now gathered all his scattered corps into a safe position, and was superior to the enemy in strength. And the surrender of Genoa, by leaving Melas at liberty to carry out the Vienna programme, must change the fortunes of the campaign. But Kray's disgraceful defeat at Biberach seems to have opened Wickham's eyes. Writing again a few days afterwards he described the Austrian camp as a scene of discouragement and confusion. The three chiefs of the staff were at loggerheads. Weyrother, whose plan Kray had adopted, was disabled by a fall. Schmidt, since the rejection of his plan, would give no further advice. The army hated Chasteler, and had lost all confidence in Kray. Only rest and the return of the Archduke could restore it to efficiency. Moreau's passive attitude puzzled him. And it was not till the end of May that intelligence from France enabled him to read the riddle, and inform Lord Grenville that the campaign would be decided by Bonaparte himself in Italy. His want of earlier information, as he explained afterwards, was a consequence of Thugut's quarrel with the Archduke. Fasbinder, head of the Austrian Intelligence Department, resigned with the Commander-in-Chief; and the branch of the service which he directed fell into complete disorder. At the end of April André sent Fasbinder word that Bonaparte was about to lead 50,000 men over the Alps; and on May 1 sent to Wickham himself full details of the expedition. But

the courier bringing them was detained for eighteen days at the Austrian out-posts, and they reached the English minister too late to be of service. His reports during the following months of the state of the Austrian army gave no hope of improvement without a change in the command. We hear no more from him of its famous Chiefs of the Staff, but his confidence in Archduke Charles seemed to increase with disaster. The ultimate success of the campaign, he wrote on July 15, depends on the question—"Shall we have the Archduke or no? If we have him we shall drive the enemy headlong over the Rhine in a week." And, again, on July 25, "with a commander-in-chief enjoying its confidence, it (the Austrian army) would beat the French army to pieces, even with Bonaparte at its head, and the ghost of Desaix to boot, to direct and encourage it in battle." In the meantime he concluded a new treaty with the Elector of Bavaria for additional troops, those already hired having fought with conspicuous valour. This negotiation, involving a joint guarantee of the Electorate by Great Britain and Austria, took him again to Vienna. He found the whole population—court, nobles, citizens—as he had already found the Bavarians, crying aloud for peace. Thugut alone stood firm against the clamour, governed, Wickham thought, not so much by policy as by passion. His hatred of Souvorow had caused the fatal quarrel with Russia; his hatred of the Archduke led him to reject the sole means of resisting France. Wickham found also at Vienna, as well as in Kray's army, much dissatisfaction with Great Britain. The troops led by Bonaparte into Italy had been drawn chiefly from the west and south of France, to which the British Government had undertaken to send expeditions, so as to keep the whole sea-board in perpetual alarm of invasion. But, it was complained, they had failed to redeem their pledges. This was a reproach which Mr. Wickham must have found it difficult to answer. The military plans and operations of the English Cabinet during the year 1800, as presented to us in confidential letters of Pitt and Dundas, are a strange exhibition of miscalculation, wavering purpose, and ineffectual action. The "immense effort" announced by Lord Grenville to Wickham towards the end of 1799, which was to produce 70,000 troops for expeditions against France in the following spring, does not appear to have given Government the command of 30,000 troops for any enterprise during the whole of the year 1800. At the beginning of this year Pitt, as we have seen, was eagerly bent on sending a considerable force with Count D'Artois to Brittany. When this plan, which included the capture of Brest, hung fire, the Cabinet determined to send all available troops under Sir Charles Stuart to co-operate with the Austrians and insurgent royalists in Provence; and Dundas despatched that general on a preliminary mission to concert operations with Mr. Wickham and General Melas. But Stuart's sudden resignation from dissatisfaction at instructions given to him to restore Malta, when taken, to the Knights of St. John, caused this scheme to be postponed till it was no longer practicable. The English Ministry then turned its attention again to Brittany, and particularly to the capture of Belleisle. Pitt and Grenville seem to have believed for a short time that an attack on that island had

actually begun. But at the last moment the officers employed differed in opinion in regard to the chances of success. And as Dundas would run no risks, the attempt was abandoned. Pitt's mind seems to have veered from week to week, backwards and forwards between Brittany and the Mediterranean, under conflicting arguments of Grenville and Dundas, without ever settling on any definite conclusion. While English ministers discussed and consulted, Bonaparte withdrew every man fit for active service from the menaced coasts to win the battle of Marengo, which, by completely establishing his authority in France, gave them more effectual security against invasion. Sir Ralph Abercromby, who succeeded Sir Charles Stuart as commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, in obedience to instructions from Mr. Dundas, employed the forces under his orders, originally destined for descents on France, in less hazardous expeditions to the coasts of Spain.

Probably at no other period of its history did the military reputation of England, in all respects except bravery in the field, fall so low as during Pitt's first ministry. It was not only the Emperor Paul who refused to allow his troops to serve under an English general; neither Baron Thugut nor General Melas could be induced to detach a body of Austrian cavalry to act in France under Sir Charles Stuart. Nor was this unflattering judgment merely the verdict of foreign opinion. The incapacity of British officers specially selected for important duties on the Continent is a subject of constant reproach and misgiving in the confidential letters of Lord Grenville and Mr. Wickham. On March 27, 1800,\* Wickham wrote in reference to British officers sent to organise and pay a Swiss army corps—"I have sworn never to have anything to do with your military men again unless they will learn their own business better before they come abroad, or have a more moderate opinion of their own knowledge, and suffer themselves to be instructed. Besides, it is not to be conceived (bravery and presence of mind in the field excepted) how very cheap we are holden on the Continent." Again, on May 8—"Our officers, particularly those that call themselves staff-officers, are totally unfit for anything of the kind; and it is only since I have meddled with military arrangements myself, in consequence of their evident incapacity, that I have been able to judge of the extent to which that incapacity is carried." Lord Grenville replied on May 20—"I have long seen reason to judge as you do of the capacity of our officers. Something may be allowed for want of opportunity to learn; but if when that is thrown into their way they will not learn, they are incurable." Lord Elgin, British Minister at Constantinople, wrote on December 29, 1799, in reference to officers sent from the Horse Guards to train the Sultan's troops in a knowledge of military science: "Seeing Englishmen in authority in Turkey takes away all delight in reading *Don Quixote*."†

From the middle of July to the end of November, 1800, hostilities between France and Austria were interrupted by negotiations. Immediately after his victory at Marengo on June 14, Bonaparte sent Count St. Julien, one of his prisoners, with a second letter to the Emperor proposing peace. Unfortunately for Austria the envoy arrived at Vienna too late, the treaty with England, so long under

\* Page 183.

† Page 89.

discussion, having been signed by Francis II. on June 20, a few hours before receiving news from Italy of the defeat of General Melas. The Emperor, in order to gain time, despatched St. Julien to Paris, whither the First Consul had returned, with a pacific answer. It gave the messenger no authority to treat; but Talleyrand persuaded him to sign preliminaries of peace; and Bonaparte sent him back with them to Vienna, accompanied by his aide-de-camp Duroc, who had orders to require acceptance or refusal of them within five days. St. Julien had to expiate his indiscretion in a Bohemian fortress. But Thugut wrote to Talleyrand announcing the mutual engagements of the Austrian and British Governments, and the willingness of the latter, as expressed to him by Lord Minto, to join in negotiation for a general peace. Conferring subsequently with Lord Minto on the conditions that might be obtained from Bonaparte, Thugut suggested that the secret articles of the Anglo-Austrian treaty should be abandoned as no longer attainable. But Lord Grenville declared in reply that the British Government would not be a party to any political arrangement which allowed France to retain Belgium. A congress with its protracted discussions must obviously, in the present state of the Continental campaign, be far more advantageous to Austria than to France. At the same time the French garrisons in Malta and Egypt, closely blockaded by British fleets, stood in pressing need of reinforcements and supplies. Talleyrand, therefore, demanded of the British Government, through M. Otto, a French agent in London, a naval armistice, with full liberty of communication by sea, as compensation to France for the benefits that would accrue to Austria from a prolongation of the military armistice. On this condition the French Government was willing to consent to a meeting of representatives of the belligerent powers at Luneville to discuss the terms of a general peace. The British Government desired negotiation as a means of gaining time, Wickham's reports having convinced it that the Austrian armies in their present demoralized condition could not continue the war on the Continent with any prospect of success. On the other hand, it knew that the fortress of Valetta must soon surrender for want of food. It had derived a very erroneous impression of the weakness and unprovided state of the French army in Egypt from intercepted letters of General Kleber and other discontented officers, written after Bonaparte's departure, with little attention to veracity, in order to justify to the Directory an unauthorised treaty with the Grand Vizier, which would enable them to return to France. And it wished to be at liberty to capture Spanish treasure-ships coming to Europe from America at the close of the year. With the view, therefore, of deferring the renewal of hostilities in Germany and Italy on any decisive scale till the following year, without materially compromising the particular interests of Great Britain, it offered to agree to a naval armistice of less than three months' duration, which would allow Valetta and Alexandria to be provisioned for ten days at a time. { Lord Grenville's sanguine temper and disposition to undervalue an antagonist were curiously exemplified in the belief he entertained that Bonaparte would eagerly grasp at this concession. A report reaching him from Paris through a foreign channel that the French

people called loudly for peace with England, he wrote to Pitt that this intelligence "may certainly enable us both to raise our demands as to terms, and to insist strictly on the conditions of our project of armistice."\* He also wrote to Lord Minto that if England and Austria only stood firm, they might impose their own conditions on France. And he applied for passports for Mr. Thomas Grenville, whom he appointed to represent Great Britain at Luneville, where Joseph Bonaparte had already arrived as the representative of France. But the First Consul, on receiving Lord Grenville's answer, at once ordered ten days' notice to be given to the Austrian armies in Italy and Germany of the termination of the armistice. He then, as an ultimatum to the British Government, required liberty for six French frigates to go to Alexandria, and return, without scrutiny or hindrance. And on this demand being rejected, he refused passports for Mr. Grenville, and gave Austria the option of separate negotiation or war.

Wickham had reported on July 25, that to send the Austrian army on the Inn again into the field without a change of commanders would be "risking its utter destruction." Later on he wrote that Baron Thugut had made no attempt during the armistice to restore its spirit and discipline either by removing Marshal Kray or ridding it of incapable and jealous generals who caballed against him. When Moreau gave notice early in September of a renewal of hostilities, the Emperor repaired to the camp on the Inn to put an end to disorders by assuming the command. Count Lehrbach accompanied him as Minister in attendance, and General Lauer as Chief of his Staff. He found his army in no condition or disposition to fight. By Lehrbach's advice, but without consulting Wickham, he purchased a prolongation of the armistice for forty-five days, at the price for which alone Bonaparte would grant it—namely, the surrender of the blockaded fortresses of Ulm, Ingolstadt, and Philipsburg to Moreau. Wickham would have preferred, as he wrote, "to go back fighting to Vienna," and left the Austrian camp "to avoid committing himself."† Lord Grenville, in a letter to Count Staremberg, condemned this convention of Hohenlinden as "most shameful." Lord Minto wrote that Thugut had shed tears of rage and mortification at the dishonour of his country, and resigned his appointments of Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Emperor then placed Lehrbach at the head of the Foreign Office, with injunctions to be guided by the advice of Thugut, who still held office as Minister for Italy. But the old statesman could not brook this arrangement. If not at his instigation, certainly with his privacy and concurrence, Lord Minto demanded audience of the Emperor, and remonstrated in strenuous language against Lehrbach's appointment as an insult to Great Britain. Francis II., with a spirit which evidently astonished the British Minister, repelled the pretension of a foreign power to dictate to him his selection of public servants. And Thugut, seeing that he had allowed his passions to carry him too far, persuaded Minto to withdraw the obnoxious protest, and formulate the objection to Lehrbach in less offensive terms. The Emperor then placed Count Cobentzl in charge of the Foreign Office; and being incensed against Thugut for what Lehrbach and the public

\* Grenville to Pitt, September 23, p. 329.

† Wickham to Grenville, September 20, p. 326.

voice of Vienna denounced as disloyal intrigue, he heaped reproaches on his old favourite, and never fully trusted him again. Having thus cast off the influence by which he had been so long governed, he appealed to Archduke Charles to resume command of the army of Germany; appointed General Bellegarde to succeed Melas in Italy; sent Count Cobentzl to Moreau's headquarters to ask for a further prolongation of the armistice; and applied to the British Government for the second instalment of the £2,400,000 it had agreed to advance. The first £800,000 had been paid in August after the ratification of the Anglo-Austrian treaty at Vienna; and Lord Minto now wrote that the Emperor was in dire need of the second, to supply the wants of his troops. Archduke Charles being disabled by illness from active exertion, a younger brother, Archduke John, took command of the Austrian army on the Inn, and began weeding out old officers, and making other reforms, which had been too long deferred. Cobentzl, having made his application at the French headquarters, proceeded to Luneville to confer with Joseph Bonaparte; and thence, of his own accord, to Paris, at the invitation of the First Consul. Pitt and Grenville, inferring from this journey an intention to treat separately for peace with Bonaparte, refused payment of the second instalment of the Austrian loan. But Cobentzl, during a short stay at Paris, firmly refused to discuss any question but the armistice with Talleyrand, except in concert with Mr. Grenville. Returning to Luneville from a bootless mission he tried to persuade the British government to remove the obstacle to a conference by conceding Bonaparte's demand of free communication with Egypt. Lord Grenville refused, declaring that he had yielded too much already. Being now, however, somewhat reassured on the subject of Austrian good faith, he informed Lord Minto that £800,000 would be remitted to Vienna when news reached England of the actual renewal of hostilities in Germany. It was in these circumstances that the French and Austrian armies again took the field in the last days of November.

During the armistice between France and Austria the British government had directed its military operations against Spain. Spain was a member of the first coalition, and followed the lead of Prussia in making peace with the French Republic in 1795. After a short period of neutrality, irritation, caused by attacks on Spanish trade by British cruisers, led the government of King Charles IV. into uncongenial and unnatural alliance with the mortal foes of the House of Bourbon. When, however, the French Directory tottered to its fall in the summer of 1799, the Spanish government, which, owing to the imbecility of the king, meant his queen, an Italian princess, and her favourite, Godoy, Duke of Aleudia, showed a strong disposition to make peace with Great Britain. Bonaparte, partly by presents to Godoy, partly by working on the queen's ambition for the aggrandisement of the House of Parma, whose heir had married her daughter, changed incipient defection into feeble support. For the great monarchy of Charles I. and Philip II., supreme on land and sea during the greater part of the 16th century, had fallen into impotence, even for defence, under Charles IV. In the autumn of 1798, Sir Charles Stuart, in command of a small British force, finding Minorca practically undefended, had taken possession of the

island without firing a shot. A secret report from the minister of Sweden at Madrid, written in August, 1800, and communicated by Mr. Arbuthnot, British consul at Lisbon, to Lord Grenville, gives an astonishing picture of the weakness and impecuniosity of a power which still held sway over the richest countries of the new world.\* Still the geographical position of Spain, its magnificent harbours and arsenals, its natural resources and high national qualities which two centuries of misgovernment had done little to impair, made its alliance of considerable importance to England or France. Portugal, since the Methuen treaty of 1703, had been closely united to Great Britain. Although also fallen on evil days, the Prince Regent, a son-in-law of the Spanish King, being unable, according to a confidential report from the British minister, Mr. Frere, to protect life and property even in the capital, it contributed troops and ships for the siege of Malta; and the Tagus at Lisbon afforded a safe and most convenient station for British fleets. In order to deprive Great Britain of this advantage, the Spanish government, by a compact with Bonaparte, undertook to compel Portugal to renounce its ancient alliance. Failing in persuasion, it resorted to threats, but could not equip an army to enforce them. The British government sent a small body of troops to aid its ally, and planned expeditions against Spanish arsenals, and galleons from America, to give the enemy employment at home, and gather in the rich harvest of plunder that lay at the mercy of an enterprising antagonist. In July Sir James Pulteney sailed from Minorca with 15,000 troops to capture Ferrol. The place seems to have been defended at first chiefly by the bravado of the Spanish commander. But this sufficed to hold Pulteney in check, till hasty musters reinforced the garrison; and then he re-embarked his army without venturing on an assault. A small share of the heroic audacity so conspicuous in the operations of the naval service would, no doubt, have made him master of the place.

In October Lord Keith carried Sir Ralph Abercrombie with over 25,000 troops to besiege Cadiz. This enterprise also failed. On closer view it seemed too hazardous to the British general, and he returned to Minorca without loss, but without any increase of honour. Another expedition, under the same commander, sailing for Leghorn, to aid the Grand Duke of Tuscany and the Austrians, was forestalled by the unscrupulous energy of the French. General Dupont marching into the country before the armistice terminated, dispersed the Tuscan levies, occupied the capital, and seized an immense depot of British merchandise at Leghorn. Early in September, however, Malta surrendered to General Pigot.

So many miscarriages, and particularly in attempts which had seemed to offer all the conditions of easy conquest, caused great dissatisfaction in England. Dearth of food and of employment produced much misery and turbulence in many parts of the kingdom during the year 1800; and George III. seems to have been averse to despatching troops that could ill be spared at home on such uncertain ventures. It is evident from some of Dundas's letters that his relations, as war minister, with his sovereign, and with

the Duke of York, involved a good deal of friction in the course of the summer. We learn also from the Diaries of Mr. Windham and Lord Malmesbury that a little later in this year, the king meditated a change of ministry, which would have installed those statesmen in the offices of Mr. Pitt and Lord Grenville. Dundas, however, with little support from the rest of the Cabinet, organised the bold and fortunate expedition to Egypt, in which Abercromby amply redeemed any discredit that might have attached to him from previous ill-success, and closed a meritorious career by a splendid victory. Two letters, written in March, 1801, and included in this volume, from General John Moore, afterwards victor at Corunna, to his father, the author of "Zuleika," give us interesting accounts of the landing of the British army at Aboukir; and the subsequent action, in which Abercromby received a mortal wound.

While the coalition against France crumbled to pieces under the blows of Bonaparte in the south of Europe, a coalition to resist alleged abuses of the maritime supremacy of Great Britain took form in the North. Lord Whitworth's explanation of the rupture of friendly relations between England and Russia was, that the Tzar had gone mad. Paul, he averred, had been spoiled by flattery; in order to bring him to his senses he should be treated with indifference. No doubt Paul had been flattered and humoured to the top of his bent by envoys from many states of Europe imploring aid against the French Revolution. Among these, Whitworth himself had been conspicuous for the assiduity and success with which he paid court to the Russian sovereign. But a review of all the circumstances of this estrangement leaves the impression that a saner autocrat than Paul might well have felt aggrieved by the conduct of his partners in the coalition. The flagrant ingratitude of Austria when, owing in great measure to his support, it had risen from depression and peril to such a height of advantage as, in Baron Thugut's opinion, gave the Emperor control of the political situation, had been acknowledged by Lord Grenville as a just ground of quarrel. Yet the British Government, which had pledged itself repeatedly to act only in concert with the Tzar, in all whose plans he had cordially joined, not only refused to combine with him in saving from Austrian rapacity sovereigns whom he had taken under his protection as sufferers for the common cause, but concluded, without consulting him, a treaty which gave that rapacity free rein, and large help in men and money. No doubt Pitt's ministry shaped its altered course by the light of fuller knowledge of the political and military conditions with which it had to deal. And the credit it might fairly claim of acting from a sense of duty was not affected by the circumstance that its new views of British opportunities and interests, in exaggerating the military strength of Austria, and almost ignoring Bonaparte, proved quite as deceptive, and more disastrous than the old. But the change of policy might have been accompanied with more of consideration for a discarded ally, and more of forbearance for resentment which must have been foreseen. In fact Paul, however intemperate in his manner of treating individuals who incurred his displeasure, seems to have exercised, as a politician, considerable self-restraint. By reinforcing Souvorow's army when it halted on

the Austrian frontier, and listening to the overtures Bonaparte made to him through the King of Prussia, he might have completely paralysed Austria, or compelled the Court of Vienna to give the satisfaction he demanded. And, although he withdrew from the coalition, he continued to help the interests he had joined it to promote. Lord Grenville himself seems to have felt at a later date, as Mr. Pitt certainly felt, that if, in compliance with Paul's wish, an able and tactful diplomatist had been sent to replace Lord Whitworth, and aid the efforts of the Russian Vice-Chancellor, Count Panin, and of Count Woronzow in London, to maintain an English alliance, a violent breach of it might have been averted. But it was one of those emergencies in which Lord Grenville's distinguishing qualities as Foreign Minister asserted themselves. His public spirit was so high that it shrank from even the appearance of condoning an affront, especially from a power of the first rank. And he resented Paul's refusal of pass-ports for Lord Whitworth's messengers as an insult to George III. Moreover, from over-rating the value of a Russian alliance to Great Britain, he had passed to the opposite extreme of undue depreciation. It would even seem as if his tardy discovery of the defects of the Russian military organisation unconsciously brought with it a sense of injury, as if he had been duped. Instead, therefore, of listening to Count Woronzow's appeal to him to overlook the Tzar's breaches of international usage, as freaks of disordered impulse, he followed his own inclination and the counsels of Lord Whitworth, passing abruptly from flattering attentions to "indifference" and "affected neglect." Bonaparte adopted a different line. He considered the friendship of Russia an object of the highest importance for France; and, undiscouraged by the repulses his first advances had met, pursued it with remarkable skill. Having little prospect of being able to relieve Valetta, he offered to hand over the fortress to Paul as Grand Master of the Order of Knights Hospitallers. At the same time he took another step equally adapted to serve his purpose. 6,000 Russian prisoners captured in Holland and Switzerland still remained in France, the British Government having refused to take them in exchange for French prisoners in England. Bonaparte collected these soldiers, had them newly clothed and armed, and presented them to the Tzar as a tribute of respect to the Russian army. These marks of attention, directed to points on which he was particularly sensitive, from one whose exploits excited extraordinary admiration throughout Europe, could not fail to gratify Paul. He accepted both offers; authorised Baron Krudener, his minister at Berlin, to treat for peace with General Beurnonville, the Minister of France; and despatched General Springporten to take command of the Russian troops in France as a garrison for Malta. But though no longer hostile to the Consular government, he entered into no alliance with it, even when old relations with Denmark and Sweden brought Russia into conflict with Great Britain.

The Scandanavian kingdoms had been parties to the Armed Neutrality of the North in 1780, and to the Declaration of Maritime Rights issued in its name by the Empress Catherine II. of Russia. One of the propositions enunciated in this manifesto was that trading

ships of a neutral power, under convoy of a ship of war flying the national flag, were exempted from search by a declaration of the naval officer in charge that the cargoes belonged to the country he represented, and contained nothing "contraband of war." Pitt's government, on the other hand, asserted its right, as a belligerent, to search neutral vessels under all circumstances, for an enemy's goods or "contraband of war"; and British cruisers took forcible possession of Danish and Swedish frigates resisting search, as well as of the merchantmen they convoyed. All parties concerned in these collisions claimed redress for breaches of maritime law. And the violent interruption of their trade, to the great benefit of British trade, stirred public feeling in the countries thus aggrieved to the highest pitch of animosity against Great Britain. In August Lord Grenville sent Lord Whitworth, escorted by a naval squadron under Admiral Dickson, to demand satisfaction at Copenhagen for resistance offered by a Danish frigate in the Downs. Count Bernsdorff retorted that it was not from the victims of unjust violence that reparation was due; and, as Lord Spencer, at the Admiralty, thought the time inopportune for proceeding to extremities, a compromise was patched up, which delayed an open rupture, but settled nothing. The Tzar published a manifesto in defence of his allies, and laid an embargo on British merchandise until Admiral Dickson's fleet left the Baltic. Pitt had an uneasy sense of a storm brewing in the north. The Austrian alliance, on which he elected to lean, had already proved a broken reed; and the whole aspect of Continental affairs was discouraging. He suggested to Grenville, towards the close of summer, to send Mr. Garlike, Secretary of Legation at Berlin, to St. Petersburg, unofficially, but with dormant credentials, to confer with Count Panin. A proposal of the same kind came to Grenville from his brother-in-law, Lord Carysfort, now British Minister at the Prussian Court. Carysfort reported that Russia and Prussia were agreed to set bounds to immoderate views of acquisition whether of France or Austria. From communications made to him by Baron Krudener, he inferred a disposition at St. Petersburg to co-operate with England in re-establishing peace on equitable terms. Lord Grenville, however, gave the project of an unofficial mission only cold encouragement. No one knew better that reconciliation with Paul involved the condition of restoring Malta to the Knights Hospitallers, in regard to which he and his colleagues had changed their minds. The cessation of diplomatic intercourse with Russia he thought fortunate, inasmuch as it deprived the Tzar of an opportunity of putting embarrassing questions on that subject; and he cautioned his brother-in-law against discussing it with Baron Krudener.

Malta, now a rock of offence to several great powers, was given by the Emperor Charles V., in 1630, to the Knights Hospitallers, after their expulsion from Rhodes by Solyman the Magnificent, to hold as a fief of the kingdom of Naples. From that time it had been the headquarters of the Order until surrendered to Bonaparte in June, 1798. A treaty signed at St. Petersburg, in December, 1798, bound the British Government to hand over the island to the Tzar as protector of the Knights, when it should be recovered from the French.

Letters of Grenville and Dundas, written in April, 1800, show that the British Cabinet still adhered to this engagement, and that Sir Charles Stuart threw up his command in the Mediterranean because his instructions ordered him to give effect to it. So late as June, 1800, Sir A. Paget, British Minister at the Court of the Two Sicilies, gave explicit assurances to his Russian colleague, Chevalier Italinski, that the treaty would be scrupulously observed. Meantime, however, glowing accounts of the natural resources and vast advantages of the island began to pour in on Lord Grenville from various quarters. Mr. Wickham was particularly urgent with him not to part with it; and aspired, at the close of his diplomatic mission, to the governorship of it, as an appointment little inferior in importance to any other under the British crown. There is also some indication in Lord Grenville's correspondence with Lord Minto that the Ministry, seeing the hopes it had founded on an Austrian alliance evaporate, resolved to retain the conquests of Great Britain at sea, as a counterpoise to those of France on the Continent. And, in regard to the treaty with Russia, Lord Grenville seems to have considered the British Government absolved from it, by the Tzar's conduct in accepting the island from Bonaparte, and espousing the cause of his Scandinavian allies. At all events, Dundas's instructions to Sir Ralph Abercromby, who succeeded Sir Charles Stuart as commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, directed him to take possession of Malta for the British crown. Sir A. Paget reported in September that General Acton, the Neapolitan prime minister, had questioned him on this point, and intimated confidentially that if the British Government no longer intended to restore La Valetta to the Order of St. John, his sovereign would recall the Neapolitan troops engaged in the siege. By this time, however, La Valetta had surrendered to General Pigot, and King George's ensign was floating on the old stronghold of the Knights. The report of this circumstance seems to have so affected the Tzar as to throw him into paroxysms of rage which endangered his life. He confiscated all British property in Russia till the treaty of December, 1798, should be carried out; and issued a proclamation to explain and justify the proceeding. Being still more exasperated by Lord Grenville's answer, stronger perhaps in invective than in argument, he dismissed Count Panin from the office of Vice-Chancellor; sent M. de Kalitchew, Panin's successor, on a mission to Paris, and revived the Armed Neutrality of the North. The King of Prussia, in retaliation for the seizure and confiscation of a Prussian merchantman, sent troops to occupy Cuxhaven, the port of communication between England and the Continent, into which the prize had been carried, and joined the Northern League. The British Government on its side treated the revival of the confederacy as a declaration of war, and despatched Sir Hyde Parker with a naval armament to assail it at Copenhagen, where it was most vulnerable. But the main events of the conflict—the bombardment of the Danish capital by Lord Nelson, the annexation of Hanover by the King of Prussia, the murder of the Emperor Paul, which dissolved the Northern Confederacy—occurred after Lord Grenville's retirement from office, and do not fall within the compass of this volume.

Lord Carysfort's confidential letters from Berlin contained in this volume are valuable as bringing to our knowledge an important element of public opinion on the Continent at this time, in regard to which Lord Grenville's other official correspondents appear to have joined in what may be termed a conspiracy of silence. He was an amateur diplomatist who had accepted a mission to the Prussian Court at Lord Grenville's request. And his independent position and intimate relations with the Foreign Secretary enabled him to speak his mind with candour, and tell unpalatable truths without fear of consequences. His letters leave little doubt that the show of moderation and the pacific efforts which the circumstances of France, and his own, dictated to Bonaparte, contrasting forcibly with the implacable attitude and the oppressive maritime policy of the British Government, had not only arrested the hostile tide of Continental feeling against France, but turned it full against England as the common enemy of Europe. Instead of the honour justly due to the champion of outraged right, ordered liberty, and all the highest interests of civilization which Lord Grenville claimed for her, England under his auspices had become odious—not in one country alone, nor merely to popular prejudice, but, as Carysfort declared, universally, and to educated conviction in its most conservative manifestations, whether political, social, or literary, as a sordid monopolist—keeping war alive for her special objects and particular profit, without regarding the evils her selfish egotism entailed on the rest of the world. It may be mentioned in this connection that, when negotiating early in the year with the Emperor, the British Government demanded Austrian support for its maritime system, as the condition of English support of an Austrian annexation of Genoa and other territory bordering the Mediterranean, Thugut, as Lord Minto reported, preferred relinquishing Genoa to incurring the public odium to which compliance with this demand would expose his sovereign.\* Carysfort proposed to employ Gentz, a brilliant German publicist, who stood with Burke and Mallet du Pan in the foremost rank of literary champions of the old order against revolutionary innovation, to combat hostile criticism, and educate foreign opinion to a juster appreciation of British policy. Ill-will, which he thought utterly unreasonable, does not appear to have given Lord Grenville much concern; nor did he care much, perhaps, to convert antagonists whom he so frankly despised as "fools and madmen." Still he allowed his brother-in-law to retain Gentz's literary services to explain and defend English policy, by a pension of £200 a year. An Introductory essay or *Memoire*, by the German writer sent to Lord Grenville, and included in this volume, amply confirms Lord Carysfort's representations, and shows in what discouraging circumstances Gentz advocated a cause which must have seemed well-nigh desperate, until the fears excited by Bonaparte's unbridled ambition caused another revulsion of European opinion.

At the end of November the war between France and Austria entered its last phase. But the issue was no longer doubtful. The French armies, flushed with victory, re-equipped at the expense of Germany and Italy, and re-inforced by Bonaparte, were in superb

\* Minto to Grenville, September 2, 1800. Public Record Office.

condition. The Austrians, inferior in number and broken in spirit, had the additional disadvantage of being badly supplied with food and clothing in the depth of a severe winter. The British Government, while constraining the Emperor to continue the war for an object no longer attainable—the separation of Belgium from France—and heaping reproach on the timid expedients by which he had sought to avert imminent defeat, allowed unjust suspicion of his good faith to withhold the money absolutely needed, as Lord Minto wrote, to send his troops into the field, until intelligence should have reached England that hostilities had been renewed. When this intelligence arrived, it was an announcement that the Austrians had suffered a crushing defeat; and then Pitt decided to make no further payment. Archduke John having failed in an attempt to turn the French position between the Isar and the Inn, was beaten by Moreau in the decisive battle of Hohenlinden. He tried to rally his troops at Salzburg for a stand against the pursuing enemy. But, disheartened by want and fatigue, they flung away their arms and fled. Then the Emperor prevailed on Archduke Charles to resume the command. This change, on which Wickham had so confidently relied as the certain harbinger of victory, added disgrace to defeat. The army, taking it to mean a prolongation of the war, could hardly be restrained from open revolt. Its chief officers, without awaiting the arrival of the general who had been their idol, sent Prince John of Lichstentien to the Emperor to represent the absolute necessity of making peace. Archduke Charles, on reaching the camp, found himself confronted, as Wickham wrote, by “a general combination of cowardice and mutiny.” Meantime, General Brune in Italy drove his Austrian opponent, Bellegarde, from the lines of the Mincio and the Adige, back into the passes of the Tyrolese Alps. The unfortunate Emperor, in order to save Vienna, consented to treat separately for peace. He wrote to George III. excusing this breach of a treaty which had still some weeks to run, by the plea of imperious necessity. Lord Minto and Mr. Wickham bore testimony to the scrupulous fidelity with which he had adhered to his engagements under very severe trials, and to the prostrate condition of the Austrian monarchy. The answer of the British monarch acknowledged his ally’s good faith in handsome terms, and gave assurance of undiminished friendship. Thugut seems to have cherished the illusion of being still able to conclude peace on the “Campo Formio basis,” which he had rejected before the campaign opened; and, perhaps, even of luring Bonaparte into a general conference, as barren of results as the Congress of Rastadt. But the First Consul, while consenting, at the request of the Tzar to spare the Kings of Sardinia and Naples and the Elector of Bavaria, compelled the last Roman Emperor to pass under the yoke of unconditional submission. The treaty of Luneville, signed in February, 1801, pushed back the Austrian boundary in Italy from the Mincio to the Adige; forced the Emperor to cede the left bank of the Rhine to France, not only as a German sovereign, but as representative of the whole Germanic body; stipulated that lay rulers dispossessed by this cession should be compensated in Germany, but gave the Ecclesiastical Electors, staunch adherents

of the House of Hapsburgh, no claim to indemnity; deprived the Emperor's brother of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, and bestowed it on the son-in-law of the Queen of Spain, who assumed the title of King of Etruria.

After the conclusion of the peace of Luneville Baron Thugut disappeared from the political stage on which for ten eventful years he had filled so large a space. Nothing, perhaps, in his conduct on it became him less than his manner of leaving it. His unavailing struggles, as described by Mr. Wickham, and with more of sympathy and indulgence by Lord Minto, to retain the direction of public affairs, without enjoying the confidence of his sovereign, or being willing to accept arrangements which the welfare of the monarchy made imperative, betrayed a lamentable want of personal dignity and public spirit. The Emperor broke his fall, and acknowledged his services, by the grant of an estate in Galicia.

On the subject of the political measure which involved, as an unforeseen consequence, the downfall of Pitt's first administration, Legislative Union of Great Britain and Ireland, the correspondence in Volume VI. is significantly reticent. It tells us nothing of the means or methods by which failure in the Irish Parliamentary session of 1799 was converted to success in that of 1800. Lord Grenville, no doubt, was kept well-informed of all essential particulars by the Irish Chief Secretary. But Lord Castlereagh, instead of committing them to paper, appears to have reserved them for personal communication in London. Lord Grenville seems to have been equally cautious in his mode of conveying intelligence to the Marquis of Buckingham, whose eager interest in the measure, chafed under this unaccustomed reserve. Brief notes from Mr. Cooke, Under Secretary at Dublin Castle, recorded for Grenville's information the daily progress of the Bill through the Irish Parliament. These bulletins, though doubtless very acceptable at the time, possess little historical interest. The writer's evident anxiety in regard to the stability of the Government majority, as numbers rose and fell in the division lists during the course of the debates, recalls the Lord Lieutenant's statement to General Ross, that half of those voting for the measure would be at least as much delighted by its defeat as any member of the Opposition. A temperate letter from Lord Farnham, an Irish peer, dealing with the fiscal part of the new settlement, seems to show that the arrangements fixing the proportion of taxation for each island pressed very unequally on Ireland. This communication does not appear to have been answered. Pitt's letters contain no allusion whatever to the Act of Union. A still deeper silence covers everything bearing on the introduction of the measure intended to supplement that Act, by substituting a political for a religious test as a qualification for public employment. Two brief notes from Pitt to Grenville, dated February 1, 1801, refer obscurely to differences of opinion between Ministers and the King, and serious consequences involved. Lord Buckingham wrote to his brother on February 3 warmly approving of the course adopted by the Ministry in resigning office. On the 6th Lord Grenville wrote to Lord Carysfort announcing the resignation of a majority of the Cabinet, in consequence of the King's refusal

to sanction a Bill for the removal of the religious disabilities of the Irish Catholics; the formation of a new administration by Mr. Addington from colleagues and followers of Mr. Pitt; the writer's determination to give the new Ministers zealous support, and earnest hope that his personal connections would follow his example. Of the unlooked for dissensions in the Cabinet, or the secret intrigues disclosed in Lord Stanhope's *Life of Pitt*, we find no hint whatever. One of the earliest appointments made by Mr. Addington gave Lord Hawkesbury charge of the Foreign Office. Lord Grenville wrote on February 11, in most cordial and characteristic terms, to place at his successor's service whatever knowledge might have been acquired by the writer in the course of "ten years' observation of those wretched things which are called governments on the Continent of Europe." Then the King's health broke down under the strain of the political crisis, and the formation of the new Ministry was suspended for several weeks. But Lord Grenville retired to Dropmore, and beyond responding to Lord Hawkesbury's requests for advice and information, seems to have taken no further part, except what was absolutely required by official formalities, in the deliberations of the Cabinet or the transaction of public business.

WALTER FITZPATRICK.

THE MANUSCRIPTS OF  
J. B. FORTESCUE, ESQUIRE,  
PRESERVED AT DROPMORE.

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VOL. VI.

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MINTO.

*Private.*

1799, November 1. Cleveland Row.—“I have little to add to the voluminous dispatches which you will receive by Captain Forster. Certainly M. Thugut will have no reason to complain if, at the moment he is doing us all the mischief he can, we return good for evil, and induce the Emperor of Russia to agree to leave Piedmont in the hands of Austria. This part, however, of the arrangement (if it can be by an ample equivalent to the King of Sardinia be reconciled to the principles of honour and justice) will, I think, in its effect be advantageous to our future interests; as it will so fundamentally overthrow that favourite system of French policy, the surrounding that country with small and weak states. What relates to the Netherlands I do not like as well; but as this is part of the bear-skin which yet remains to be cut off, we may be more liberal of it.

“You will probably think our plans for next year are at least formed on a scale sufficiently large. It is, however, I am convinced, by such efforts only that we can obtain our object.

“It was this year within our grasp, if Austria would have consented to be placed in a state of power, security, and prosperity, such as it has never yet seen. This, however, was not to be, and we must make the best of things as they are. Even so a campaign that has driven the enemy from Verona and Reggio to Nice, is not to be considered as one of inconsiderable glory or benefit.

“I fear we shall have endless difficulties when we come to treat for magazines and supplies with the most shabby set of people in Europe. It will require no small degree of firmness at the outset to convince them that we are not at their mercy, which we really are in this respect, though we must not let them think so.” *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MINTO.

*Private.*

1799, November 1, at night.—“We have accounts that the whole mass of Royalists in all the north-west provinces of France has risen. We are preparing to support them by money, arms, and stores, if we cannot yet do so by troops. I have just received

the enclosed from Mr. Wickham. The suggestion appears to me so just that I think I cannot do better than send it to you confidentially in his own words. I well know they will accord with your ideas, but Thugut's mind is a most unfriendly soil for the cultivation of any just or liberal sentiment on that subject." *Copy.*

COUNT WORONZOW TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, November 3. Harley Street.—“ Je vous envoie la lettre que j'ai reçue hier du Comte Stakelberg de Suisse. Comme sa main est difficile à lire je joins une copie à l'original, en vous priant de me renvoyer le dernier. Si vous avez quelques nouvelles postérieures ou plus détaillées sur tout ce qui regarde ces affaires, et particulièrement sur ce qui regarde notre grand maréchal, je vous supplie de me le communiquer. L'idée de prendre ses quartiers à Vienne [Vérone] ou Milan me paroît trop étrange pour être vraie. Je vous rend mille grâces pour l'information secrète de ce qui se fait à Vienne, que vous avez eu la bonté de m'envoyer avant hier.”

*Enclosure.*

COUNT C. J. STACKELBERG TO COUNT WORONZOW.

1799, October 15. Feldkirch.—“ Je viens de recevoir la lettre que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire le 12<sup>8</sup> Septembre. Très flatté de ce que vous avez bien voulu acquiescer à ma demande relativement à l'ouverture d'une correspondance officielle, mon regret est de voir qu'elle cessera bientôt, vu le manque d'intérêt qu'elle auroit pour votre Excellence. Je prévois le terme de l'offensive et la fin d'une campagne qui, sans la perfidie du cabinet Autrichien, auroit été décisive, et peut-être la dernière, par le rétablissement de l'ancien ordre de choses en France. Le Maréchal Souvaroff, victorieux des hommes et des élémens, a poursuivi sa marche triomphale depuis l'Italie jusqu'au Vorarlberg; mais voyant son armée diminuée, manquant de vêtemens, il s'est sagement décidé, au lieu de se porter en avant comme il en avoit été question, à aller vers Shaffhouse se réunir avec M. de Korsakoff, pour où il est parti ce matin, se dirigeant par Bregentz, Mersbourg et Singen. Arrivé dans ces environs, les deux armées amalgamées ensemble, son projet (à moins qu'il ait changé depuis hier) est de mettre le marché à la main à l'Archiduc et de lui offrir un dernier effort sur la Suisse; mais seulement à la condition d'une co-opération loyale et vigoureuse de sa part; si non, d'aller avec son armée réunie prendre des quartiers d'hiver. Sur le choix de ceux-ci, le maréchal n'étoit pas décidé, mais penchoit pour Vérone ou Milan. Je voudrois que ce projet pût être exécuté, devant fort embarasser la cour de Vienne comme obstacle à ses négociations avec le Directoire qu'on dit reprises chaudement. Dans tous les cas, je me flatte que nous ne ferons la campagne prochaine qu'à bonnes enseignes et avec la certitude de n'être pas la dupe du Baron Thugut. Qu'on conviendra d'un plan d'opérations fixe, avec la spécification précise du rôle que devra y jouer l'armée Autrichienne, enfin qu'on parviendra à faire prononcer la cour de Vienne sur ses prétentions, en cherchant

surtout à la lier de manière à n'être plus dans la continuelle inquiétude de lui voir abandonner la cause commune. En écrivant à Petersbourg, je ne cesse pas de parler en ce sens, mais que pourroit ma foible voix si elle n'étoit soutenu par d'autres, méritants, à juste titre, d'être plus écoutées.

“Tout ce que dans votre lettre vous avez bien voulu me dire au sujet de M. Wickham m'a paru de la plus grande justesse. Son mérite n'a pu m'échaper, et je crois qu'il rendra justice à la confiance que je lui témoigne, sollicitée d'ailleurs par l'union des deux Cours.” *Copy.*

#### W. WYNDHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, November 3. Park Street, Westminster.—“Bad as the present state of things is, it furnishes no reason for relaxing our endeavours, nor, with respect to operations more immediately dependant on us, for changing their direction. The Royalists, however culpable or unfortunate for having begun so suddenly and prematurely, however doomed, I fear, to ultimate and perhaps speedy ruin, must yet be supported to the utmost of our power; and, if we would give to our efforts a chance of success, be supported with all possible promptness and alacrity. The least difference of success or failure in the outset may change the whole face of their affairs; and nothing is more obvious than that such success or failure may depend upon the arrival, sooner or later, of a cargo, or even upon a letter satisfying them to what extent they may depend upon us, and what measures they may take in consequence.

“I allude here particularly to the determination to be taken, and the power to be given to them in consequence, of trying the effect upon the Republican army of taking into pay those who should join the Royal standard. *Without* some impression of that sort, it is difficult to conceive how they should succeed; *with* such an impression, operating even to no great extent, there is no saying what effects may not be produced. The whole tenor of the information which I have at all times received, joined to opinions and facts occurring in the last communications, strongly favour the belief of the possibility at least of such an impression, especially if the trial should be made before any reverses shall have checked the confidence that might be entertained of the final success of their cause.

“With the concurrence of Mr. Pitt, I have thrown out in a letter to one of the chiefs what may encourage them to take that step within moderate bounds, should the necessity of their affairs drive them to the expedient, and the advantages of it appear likely to be important and decisive. In fact it is one of those measures which can hardly operate further than as its operation must be wished. If it should produce great expense, it must produce proportionate advantage. If I had been writing for myself I should certainly have made my encouragement much more explicit.

“Unfortunately this indirect permission, whatever operation it may have, is lying at present on board *Captain Keats'* at

Portsmouth, and may not reach them, I know not when. It is melancholy to think that nearly the first evidence of our good will, the first sign of life that they will receive from us, will not come till three weeks, or a month perhaps, after they have been in full insurrection. It is the more necessary that all possible activity should now be used, and the evidences of our intentions be the most speedy and decisive. Mr. Pitt mentioned your idea of recommending to *Monsieur* to repair to Jersey. I doubt only from the consideration of its quickening the exertions of the Directory before the Royalist party shall have got sufficient consistency; yet the effect of such a proclamation as was proposed I understand, at the same time, may be looked to as very considerable. And if the proclamation is to be issued, there seems to be an end to the objections which might otherwise be felt to placing *Monsieur* at Jersey. I am to see him to-morrow, and, without directly making the proposal, will endeavour to learn what his own ideas and feelings upon the subject are.

“What I had in view principally in beginning this letter was to state some ideas growing out of conversations which I have had lately with De la Rosière. By the way, having come over here for the purpose of attending *Monsieur* when there was a question of his going to Switzerland, he would be much obliged to you, in case his presence here should be further desired, to say a word to Mr. Walpole by which he might stand excused to the Government in Portugal.

“Combining what I collected of his opinions with such as one may form for oneself, it seems as if the course of events between this and the next campaign (supposing that there is to be another campaign, on the part I mean of the Austrians) would of itself necessarily place the Austrians in that position, in which there would be the best chance of making them fall in with our views in the prosecution of the war. If the Austrians should be unable to make peace, which I cannot but think is likely to be the case, and the French should make a winter campaign, which in the event of war continuing may still more be relied on, the part in which, according to Rosière’s opinion, the French ought to make their irruption, is low down upon the Rhine between Coblenz and Mayence.

“Now this is near the part where, according to the plan which Rosière would form for the next campaign, the allied armies ought to enter France, which he thinks ought to be a little above Mayence, by Spire, Worms, and Manheim.

“His general plan of campaign rests upon what seems to me the only rational basis, namely that of standing on the defensive with respect to all distant possessions, and directing all offensive operations against the body of France itself, aided by a civil war to be raised where the materials for it shall be found most abundant, and most capable of being used to advantage. In this instance his defensive operations would be in Italy, in the Black Forest, and in the Grisons; while his offensive operations, being in fact the only efficacious defence, should be an irruption into France in the quarter above-mentioned, aided by a civil war within.

“Surely if such a general plan were well pressed upon the Austrians, particularly after they may have been beaten into a temper somewhat more tractable by their experience during the course of the winter, the obvious truth of its principles may produce its effect upon their minds, more especially if this royalist war should be capable of being maintained, and they should be taught practically its value by the necessity of looking often to its assistance. I cannot but think, therefore, that good might arise if, by some contrivance, Rosière might be sent to Vienna to explain and enforce his own plan. I don’t recollect for certain whether, at the time it was intended he should go, his journey was put off from any considerations that would create an obstacle to his being listened to at present. His name stands high in Europe, and his authority upon a subject of this sort can hardly fail to make some impression. There may be the further recommendation to his plan, that it so far agrees with the favourite project at Vienna as that it brings the chief of their force low down upon the Rhine.

“To return to the insurrection in Brittany; everything must depend upon the vigour and promptness of our exertions. It is a state of things that cannot brook the delays of official or diplomatic proceedings. It is a military operation, the fate of which hangs upon hours. Dutheil informed me to-day that, by intercepted accounts from the agents of the Directory, the situation of Normandy was such, the temper of the people so strongly Royalist, and the difficulty so great of paying the Republican troops that, in their opinion, should the Royalists be supplied with arms and money, the province must be lost. He wished, therefore, above all things, that money should be sent to St. Marcouf. But, alas! no money is to be had. The dollars, except those brought in with the Spanish prizes, are all gone to Hamburg. Surely now is a time when we might have recourse to the measure which I wished for long ago, of coining *louis* at Birmingham. Between Louis XVI. and XVIII. there can never be any difficulty of evading the law, if there could ever have been any uneasiness upon that score; and the apprehension is not now, I conceive, in force about sending coin out of the country. At all events, if from any over-strained scruple, from any remissness or want of attention, we suffer this insurrection to fall to the ground when it might by any means have been supported, there will [be] no end to our remorse, any more than to the reproach which must justly attach upon our conduct.

“Arrangements have, I understand, been made for appointing cruising squadrons; but according to the best judgment I can form, subject of course even in my own mind to further information, the service will never be properly carried on, nor the full benefit be felt of our naval superiority, till Quiberon is made a station for the fleet.”

LORD GRENVILLE to W. PITT.

1799, November 4. Dropmore.—“By the Bishop of Lincoln’s

desire I send you the enclosed, which I received from him. It certainly well deserves attention; the facts are truly alarming, especially as relating to a part of England where one might least expect to find such a state of things. What must it be in London and its neighbourhood, and in the manufacturing countries? The remedies are good so far as they go, but are, I fear, very inadequate to the mischief.

“I am not now sufficiently acquainted with the extent and nature of the jurisdiction which our bishops may legally exercise over their clergy, to decide whether there is a deficiency in that respect, or only in their practice and habit on that subject. But without wishing, I am sure in the smallest degree, to join in, or to countenance, the cry which is raised for ill purposes against the body of our clergy, I cannot but think that no reformation would be more effectual (though others would certainly be wanted in addition to it) than one which should ensure to every parish the residence either of the parson, or of his curate; and should provide in his ecclesiastical superior a real and practical (not a nominal) inspection and control over the general tenor of his life and manners, and over his regularity and diligence in the discharge both of certain fixed and stated duties, now growing daily more and more into disuse, and of that general duty of attention and care which a clergyman owes to his flock. It is evidently the object and intention of our ecclesiastical constitution that such superintendence and control should be exercised, and without it our church Establishment must be one of less subordination than that of the Presbyterians.

“You are not one of those very wise men who think that the religious habits of a people are indifferent to their civil government. I know it has been a complaint at all times that the principles of religion and piety were gradually losing their hold on the people of this country. But it would be a strange blindness not to see that this complaint, whether just or not at other periods, is now but too well founded. The moment is peculiarly well fitted for applying a remedy to this evil, and I trust you will take it into serious and *active* consideration.

“The only objection I have ever heard against such a regulation as should require residence (either of the parson or curate) in every parish, is the scantiness of the provision in many parishes, which must reduce the person who had no other dependence for his support to a condition far below the decent station of his profession. If that be the case the remedy is in the hands of Parliament, and no reasonable man, or well wisher to the establishments of this country would be dissatisfied with any provisions tending only to remedy this evil, if they were accompanied with suitable restraints to prevent the mischiefs which now exists.

“I know that all these things must be touched with a tender hand, but we live in a period when the old rule *quieta non movere*, excellent as it generally is, has been found inapplicable to almost every branch of our Government. These things are all stirred by the restless spirit of the times, and our duty is to give them a right direction and keep them, if we can, in a due course.” *Copy.*

## LORD GRENVILLE to the BISHOP OF LINCOLN.

1799, November 4. Dropmore.—“I was very much obliged to you for the attention you were good enough to pay to the letter with which I troubled you, and I had real pleasure in finding that the evil had been exaggerated to me; though, even on the result of your enquiries, it certainly appears that a number of legal or justifiable excuses in particular cases produces a general state of things such as is by no means to be wished.

“The paper you enclosed to me affords a most satisfactory proof of attention to the subject, and I am confident that good must result from it. The statement of facts is truly alarming, and I consider it the more so because I apprehend those facts must exist in a far greater proportion in London and other great cities and towns, and in their neighbourhood, as well as through all the manufacturing countries, than in such a district as that to which this paper relates.

“I have, as you desired, transmitted it to Mr. Pitt, with some observations that occurred to me on the subject.

“You will, I am sure, not suspect me of wishing to countenance the cry which ill disposed people, or which fanatics, raise against the body of our clergy; nor do I by any means impute to them the blame which ought to fall on the general carelessness and growing irreligion of the people of this country. But there are two points which I think require and admit of correction, and you will not be hurt at my stating them to you freely. I am inclined to believe that in both cases it is the law itself that is as much or more defective than the practice, but of that point I speak ignorantly, and you can easily correct me.

“The first is this; the very constitution of our church Establishment, the very name and function, as I apprehend it, of bishops, supposes a constant superintendence and control over the clergy who are subordinate to them—over their general lives and conduct, and over their zeal and diligence in the discharge of their peculiar duties. A spirit of liberality, a commendable dislike to the appearance of too much assumption and exercise of power over inferiors, and perhaps something of the prevailing ideas of the times extending itself to those inferiors, have, as it seems to me, diminished that superintendence, till it is become in many cases merely nominal; and in hardly any so regular, apparent, and constant, as to answer many of the chief purposes of its institution, particularly those which relate to public opinion. I have occasionally heard in conversation upon this subject, that the legal power of the bishop is really defective in this respect, and that some instances of failure, where the authority has been attempted to be exercised, and has with impunity been set at defiance, have led to a prudent forbearance, in order not to expose a function to irreverence and contumacy which cannot suffer either without great public mischief.

“Should this be the case, I think the remedy is not difficult. No man will suspect the present bench of bishops of a desire to assume that sort of spiritual authority which, extending itself far into the temporal concerns of the laity, has formerly been justly odious in this kingdom; nor would it be necessary, or perhaps

proper, that the proposal should proceed from them, though their assistance would be wanted to frame, to digest, and to execute it. I am persuaded that reasonable and temperate measures tending to give to the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the bishop over his clergy such a degree of weight and efficacy as to provide an effectual control and superintendence where our church Establishment supposes it to exist, would meet the approbation of all moderate men in the present moment; because there seems to be among persons of that description a general persuasion that increased exertions are necessary to counteract the dangers with which we are threatened.

“Next to this, and as a part of it, I consider that which is adverted to in your letter. I mean a provision for securing to every parish, and in every case without exception, the constant residence either of the parson or his curate; the cure of souls being unquestionably a duty which cannot be discharged without both the influence and the knowledge which residence alone can give.

“The objection, I know, which is commonly urged against this in practice—for in theory and principle I have heard none—is that the provision is in many cases inadequate, when single, to maintain a clergyman in the decent station which befits his profession, and will compensate the charge of his education. If this be the only difficulty the remedy is in the hands of Parliament, and if the details were attentively collected, and a plan well adjusted to enable the Legislature to enforce residence in all cases—of course I mean prospectively only and so as not to interfere with present rights—I do believe that the expense of supplying the deficiency which might be necessary to be provided for in such a system would be readily and cheerfully borne.

“I have taken the liberty to suggest to your consideration these two ideas, because they arise out of the subject of the paper you sent me, but are not, and could not be expected to be, adverted to there. I am far from seeing any objection to the legislative remedies which are suggested in that paper to the evils there stated, and I cannot but admire and applaud the impression which is there expressed of the necessity of an increased zeal and assiduity as the best mode both of refuting the calumnies, and of counteracting the acts of those who are converting the religious sentiments, where they do still prevail, of the lower orders of the people into a means of destroying the religious establishment of the state.

“I should be very happy when you return to town to converse with you on this whole subject. If it is viewed politically it is of no small concern, but it is not possible to consider it in that relation only.” *Copy.*

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, November 5. Stowe.—“I fear from what I hear from Tom that there is very little chance of bringing you down to Stowe, and the roads and weather are very little tempting to induce me to pass to Dropmore for a day or two. I must therefore urge

you by letter to consider what I have been turning very much in my mind for the last eight days; I mean the question of a winter campaign in Normandy, co-operating and combining with it supplies of clothing, arms, and money towards Nantz, where the Chouans appear in such force. When we last talked on this subject, and discussed the inconvenience of a winter campaign, we argued upon it as a question on which we might choose. I fear that this is no longer our situation. I am convinced that the Emperor will be bought off by negotiation during the course of the winter by France unless she really has sufficient confidence in her situation as to deem herself able to overthrow *by force* his situation and government. But they have so much to gain by a peace with Austria, and so much to tempt him with in Italy, that I feel certain that such a peace will be made, leaving them with a secure frontier (for the struggle of the Empire can be nothing) from Holland to the furthest extremity of their old or their new line; excepting only such part of it as Suwarow can threaten with his existing force, cut off by the Emperor's neutrality from reinforcements or even from supplies. Their first operation will be (if it is not already done) to crush every attempt at counter-revolution by the Chouans or Royalists; and in the spring we shall be to expect to see them in that force on their coasts which they will be able to collect, having their arms completely at liberty; a force certainly sufficient to protect Normandy or France against us, and perhaps sufficient, with the support of 53 ships now in Brest and Rochfort waiting only for the Duke of York's present of 8,000 seamen to man them, to give us serious alarms for Ireland. You will likewise remember that we shall not be stronger in point of men than we are at this moment, whilst at the same time the French will every moment be gaining ground by adding conscripts.

"Such are my reasons for thinking that, from the unfortunate *military mismanagement* in Holland, you have no longer the same choice, but that you must, in your own defence, use the 50,000 effective troops whom you now have for offensive winter operations in Normandy. I say nothing upon the plan of your operation, for that must depend upon so many circumstances not within my reach; but the general line of attack and movement seems simple and obvious, and would be much assisted by the operations of the insurgents as far as I can trace them from the newspapers. And, at all events, we shall have, even *malgré lui*, the co-operation of the Emperor added to that of Suwarow; a co-operation which, by detaining French troops on the Neckar, the Rhine, in Switzerland, and in Piedmont, must assist us out of any possible calculation. If you ask me whether I am sanguine enough to hope to finish the war by such an attempt, I dare not answer yes; but I clearly see ruin if we postpone all idea of offence to a period when it will be physically impossible that we should succeed. You will observe that I have not touched upon any of several collateral considerations that must occur to you, if you have the patience to read this letter with attention. I am perfectly sensible that all this must have occurred to you, and yet it is a satisfaction to me to state my thoughts

upon our situation, which I fear will be very critical. I do not, of course, ask you for any detailed answer upon this subject, but pray put my mind at ease by telling me 'that our ideas do not materially differ'; though I am well aware how many contingencies may ultimately be to decide upon your operations."

*Postscript.*—"You will think me very mischievously inclined when I tell you that I have been reading George II.'s proceedings upon the convention of Closter-Seven; and having clearly settled in my mind that the Duke of York ought to be disavowed, I am equally clear that he will be avowed; and so I must be content, as I am not quite ready to hang you for your share in it."

LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT STARHEMBERG.

1799, November 6. Cleveland Row.—"J'ai reçu votre billet au sujet de la négociation de M. le Baron de Mylius. Il est très simple que notre Cour insiste sur l'exécution d'un traité conclus et signé. Il ne l'est pas moins que Sa Majesté ne puisse pas consentir à prendre à sa solde des troupes qui ne seroient pas à sa disposition, et je serois bien éloigné de conseiller Sa Majesté de se départir de ce principe, même pour un objet bien plus important que celui dont il est question. Il paroît donc que la négociation tombe d'elle-même, et je ne vois aucun mezzoterminé capable de concilier ces deux points." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to the MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

1799, November 6.—"I have been ruminating on some ecclesiastical projects, but I do not know whether I shall be able to bring them to bear, nor do I yet possess all the knowledge of the actual state of things which is necessary in order to enable me to fix my own judgment. They relate to the two points of episcopal jurisdiction and superintendance, and residence of parochial clergy.

"My notion is to strengthen, if necessary, the legal powers of the bishops, so as to give them effective means both of suspension and deprivation in all cases both of improper life and manners, and of remissness in the execution of certain *stated duties* which they are to be required to exact from all their parochial clergy. To enable them, from the chapters in their dioceses, at their own choice, to augment the number of their archdeacons or *visitants*, under whatever name may best suit the old constitutional forms of our Church. To require them, or in their absence the archdeacon or other proper person, to hold fixed and invariable annual visitations, at which, calling if necessary to their assistance a certain number of their beneficed or dignified clergy, they should receive the reports of their archdeacons and other visitants, and should *at such visitation*, or at furthest at the next visitation, proceed by sentence either of suspension or deprivation against all persons who should appear on such reports to be of scandalous life or conversation, to have published irreligious, immoral or seditious books, or to have been remiss in the performance of such *stated duties* as

above. Lastly to compel the bishops to return these reports, and their proceedings thereon at their visitations to their metropolitans, by whom they should be annually laid before the King, with their observations thereon.

“As to parochial residence, the idea would be to require that no person shall, on any pretence, be non resident on his living without appointing a curate to be there *constantly* resident in his room. And to charge on the consolidated fund a sum sufficient to make up every living throughout the kingdom to the amount of £70 *per annum*, with the single exception of such parishes as, being adjacent to each other, it might be fit to *conjoin* for this purpose by the act of proper commissioners to act with the bishop. Where, therefore, the living fell short of £70, the parson would receive the difference from the public, but be compelled to personal and constant residence ; and some provision might be made for the residence and maintenance of his curate in the single case of absence with the bishop's license from *extreme necessity* of sickness. Where the living amounted to £75 or upwards, he would have the choice, as at present, of residing, or finding some legal excuse for non-residence ; but, in the latter case, he would be obliged to provide a curate constantly resident ; and in both cases proper certificates of residence would be required to be produced to the *Visitants*.

“The hardship, whatever it was, which this regulation would bring on the body of the clergy at large (I do not speak of particular cases) would be amply compensated by the addition which the Legislature would thus make to the smaller livings ; and the expense of this last measure would be much more than compensated to the public by the benefit which must arise from the constant residence of a clergyman in every parish throughout the kingdom.

“By what I have called *stated duties* above I mean that, from these resident clergymen who would no longer have the plea of other duty to perform, I would certainly exact, by enumeration, many points of their duty (evening service, catechism, visitation of sick, and other points) which are now growing, or grown into disuse.

“You would much oblige me by your ideas on these points. On the first I have been told that it is no more, or little more, than the law as it now exists. All I can say is that I am sure it is not the practice as it now exists ; and that this is not the only case where it has been found to be highly useful to re-enact, with small variation, the existing law, in order to call the attention and excite the zeal both of those who are to execute the law, and of those who are to obey it.

“You are not, I am very certain, one of those extremely profound politicians who have, among other happy discoveries of this age, found out that the religion of the people has no influence on its morals, or its morals on the prosperity and good government of the State. You will not therefore think that an attention to this subject is either unbecoming Government and Parliament, or is ill suited to such a moment as the present.” *Extract.*

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, November 8. Harley Street.—“M. Frère m'a fait savoir

hier-au-soir que vous désirez que je vienne aujourd'hui chez vous, et que ce soir vous enverrez un courier en Russie.

“Je me rendrai chez vous entre midi et une heure ; mais quand au courier, je vous supplie de me faire la faveure de ne l'expédier que demain, samedi au soir ; car le Duc d'York m'ayent ordonné de passer chez lui aujourd'hui à trois heures, voilà toute une matinée employée sans pouvoir rien écrire, et je ne puis m'appliquer à aucun travail après avoir mangé, sans avoir le lendemain une attaque de bile qui me tourmente dix à quinze jours après. Vingt-quatre heures ne vous feront pas une différence, et m'épargneront une maladie.”

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, November 8. Somerset Place.—“I do not feel quite at ease upon the result of yesterday's Cabinet. The deliberation was pretty far advanced before I was able to join you, and indeed if it had been otherwise, I am so far from having a separate opinion to state, that I confess myself totally at a loss to figure any speedy effects to arise from Continental alliance ; and, under that impression, the *leaning* of my opinion, for it is really little more than that, would have been to have kept ourselves to a very general declaration both to Vienna and Petersburg that we had exhausted every endeavour we had in our power to unite them in any effectual or beneficial co-operation, and must therefore leave it to themselves to consider very seriously the situation into which those unfortunate jealousies and animosities had brought them ; that if they, taught by fatal experience, and looking distinctly to the probable impending consequences of the triumphs of France, should form any plan in which *the* aid of Britain, by subsidies to Russian troops, could be of real utility, we should be glad to listen to it with every disposition to co-operate with it ; but, if no such plan was laid before us, we had nothing left but, upon our own resources, to maintain firmly the same dignified line of conduct we had hitherto pursued, which was to maintain at all events the power and independence of Great Britain. In my communication with Russia I would, of course, distinctly state that, be the result of the difficulties of the present moment what it may, it was our fixed and deliberate purpose to maintain and cultivate our connexion and friendship with the Court of Petersburg.

“Perhaps when you carry into execution the minute of Cabinet which you yesterday laid before us, it may not go much further than I have stated ; but you will better understand my ground of diffidence on this subject when I state to you that, after the perusal of Mr. Wickham's letters recently received, I am impressed with a perfect conviction that it is in vain to look for any effectual aid from the armies of Russia in the course of next campaign. They are brave men, and are, I suppose, as good materials as can be for the formation of a powerful army ; and, even in their present state, are in Russia itself, or in Turkey, as irresistible troops as can be supposed. But on the other hand if they are to act either

in Italy or in Switzerland, they must be totally new modelled, and every principle in their formation and constitution must be altered and of new arranged. I cannot disguise from myself that, in so far as my judgment goes, this is a work of such extent and so complicated in its operations that, after having come under heavy pecuniary obligations which we must fulfil, we shall find ourselves disappointed in our expectations, and the country so disgusted with repeated mortifications and disappointments as will render it impossible for us to rally their spirits, or to make them submit with patience to the struggle they may be called upon to encounter. Perhaps if the material fortresses of Italy could be garrisoned with Russian troops, where they could be regularly fed, and deprived of the means of plundering, a small Austrian force in Italy might be sufficient for the rest of its defence; and then the great strength of the Austrian force might be employed in other quarters; and to that force we might add considerably by subsidizing the Bavarian troops, or any others that the States of Germany could furnish in addition to the proper troops of Austria. By an arrangement, joined to the diversions we would have it in our power to make from home and in the Mediterranean, I think I see daylight before me to lead to a campaign that would occupy all the armies that France could collect. In the meantime the Russian troops at home as well as those employed in garrison in Italy might be forming into such a state of discipline and new arrangement, as would enable them in a future campaign to take their share in active military operations, wherever it may be most expedient to employ them.

“Compte Woronzow is of opinion the Russian troops cannot be sent home without previous communication with the Emperor; and he is likewise of opinion that Sir Home Popham ought to go by the most expeditious route without any *détour*.”

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, November 8. Hollwood.—“Nothing occurs to me on reading the despatches to vary in any degree the line we talked of this morning; but there arise two separate points on which some answer seems necessary, and on which I should like to know your ideas; I mean what relates to our own views at the peace, and to the new proposal about the ratification. Would it not be right also to bring under Thugut’s view the strong probability that the projects of France may force a winter campaign whether he will or no, and to endeavour to learn whether he is prepared with any and what plan of military operation adapted to that case?”

#### LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

1799, November 9. Cleveland Row.—“I think our decision of Thursday as stated in the minute then taken, and since explained more in detail in the despatch to Lord Minto, does not go a great

deal further than the ideas contained in your letter. But I am, on the whole, of opinion that it is better to take the chance of doing what we can with the Russians next year, and I do not see why we should not reckon pretty confidently on the success of any force composed in the manner which Suwarow has recommended, and on which we have agreed to insist.

“I have talked a little to-day with Sir Home Popham about the Majorca expedition. He seems so much to agree with me in thinking the proposal likely to be peculiarly acceptable to the Emperor, that I own I should be extremely glad to find that it was one which, on further examination, was judged practicable. The possession of those islands and of Gibraltar would, I think, enable us, with an active officer in the command of the Mediterranean fleet, to keep the Spaniards in constant alarm for their coasts and ports in that sea, and would be more likely than anything else to drive them to the necessity of peace. I hope the thing may be so far examined before he goes as to enable him (if it is adopted) to lay it in some detail before the Emperor. And, in that case, the ships ought, if possible, to be ready to sail as soon as the answer is received, which may be in less than two months from this time.” *Copy.*

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, November 9. Stowe.—“I am very sorry to see your mind so decidedly made up against the idea of further offensive operations during the winter; because I certainly see very black clouds gathering for the spring, and all collateral assistance by co-operation or diversion most uncertain, I should even say most certainly out of the question. You must see that I do not offer to you this measure as one that I adopt from choice, but from necessity. The communications from the moment the cold weather sets in are as certain as northerly to easterly winds can make them; and if it was possible to begin with the surprise of Havre, Cherbourg, or St. Malo, you would turn the difficulties of the season on the enemy, if you obliged them to make head against their insurgents, as well as against you in winter. Havre may hold a long time against a land siege, so may Cherbourg if the *montagne* is occupied; I know less of St. Malo. I agree perfectly with you that the insurgents have risen too soon; but if they are not supported during the winter by something more than the desultory attempt of landing a few arms, and a little money, the whole of that exertion, whatever it may be, will be crushed very long before your period of March or April; and your fifty thousand men will then most certainly be too weak for the force that will be employed against them. I understand that you had got from this last militia levy twelve thousand men, a few days ago; you bring back, as you say, thirty thousand from Holland; you had seven or eight thousand disposable men who did not go there, such as light infantry of the Guards corps half-completed, and others more forward in point of numbers; exclusive of the garrisons of Jersey and Guernsey, part of whom

would, of course, be applicable to a movement on the coast of Normandy. This would complete your force to fifty thousand, without waiting for your Irish militia recruits, or your exchanged prisoners, or your Dutch royalists. I wish likewise to remind you that from the moment that it is understood you mean to remain quiet all the winter, you must double your Irish garrison, and *pro tanto* you will weaken your offensive army, as it is most clear that the French, acting on their plan of invasion in force (of 1759 and 1779, and again under Hoche in 1796) will not let the months of November and December roll over without an attempt.

“My mind is so strongly impressed with the necessity that I cannot avoid again and again pressing you to adopt some measure of this nature ; but if not, give at least the impression of it, and endeavour to derive some advantage from the experience.

“I do agree with you most cordially and entirely in your ideas respecting the clergy ; and have very long groaned over the very many abuses which I am willing to suppose the Bishops cannot correct, because most certainly they do not wish to grapple with them ; but I conceive that your task is so far easy that a reference to ancient principles and practice will save you much trouble. The idea of constant parochial visitation, independent of that of the Bishop or Archdeacon, exists in the ancient establishment of Rural Deans ; an appointment now hardly known, but spoken of in the highest terms by our ecclesiastical writers.

“Your scheme of a constant resident on each of the 9,000 cures in England and Wales at not less than 70*l.* appears *primá facie* too extensive, and perhaps unnecessary ; but when you couple with this plan a further idea, absolutely necessary, of meeting the increased population of manufacturing counties by *new* ecclesiastical establishments, to prevent the poor from being forced by want of room into Methodist meeting-houses, I am convinced that the sum wanted from the sinking fund will be very large ; but whatever it may be, I am sure we shall agree in thinking that it ought to be raised and paid if we mean that any good government should exist in times more quiet, and consequently more relaxed than the present. But I contend most strenuously that the Bishops have shewn themselves not, as a body, fit to be trusted with the uncontrolled liberty of allowing non-residence, in the cases in which you seem inclined to give them this discretion. Such a licence ought to be controlled certainly by the Metropolitan, and, if given for more than 12 months, by the Crown. I would propose to you the system of coadjutors to Bishops when infirm or incapable, and possibly some arrangement for the care of dioceses too large or populous. I will likewise put into your hands some clauses drawn for a Bill which I prepared in 1797, for the establishment of a provincial or deanery commission for managing and leasing the parochial lands given in exchange for tithes ; a system that now operates to the ruin of the land (of which no lease can be given) and to the scandal of the Church, by the wicked frauds practised by the clergy in the management of their land ; but, above all, you will strike at a great source of idleness and perversion of

character amongst the parochial clergy, if you will enact that no clergyman shall be qualified to kill game, or to keep dogs, or hunt, or fish, or do anything under the game laws by or in respect of any lands, tenements, tithes, or other property arising out of any ecclesiastical cure or benefice whatsoever. You will easily see that I care not for game; but I do abhor and utterly detest a hunting or shooting parson. You would likewise probably limit in future the dispensation for two livings to a shorter line, and to one more distinctly ascertained than the present, which is most fraudulently uncertain; and it would be wise to put by that distinction of value in the King's books that enables a man to hold three, four, or indeed an indefinite number of livings, and of (what ought to be made real cures) non-cures. But you are doubtless aware what a nest of hornets you are stirring, and of the thankless labour you undertake; but if you do not move in it I am confident no one else will, and I am most willing to work with you *ostensibly*, or in any possible mode in which I can help what, I solemnly protest, I think essential to the being of our Government, independent of other considerations which I know do weigh (and I bless God for it) very much with both of us.

"I have now only to beg that, in some way or other, you will let me *know* or *see* the details of Irish union. I am persuaded that no intention exists on the part of Mr. Pitt to put me wholly out of that question; but I think it possible that the plan may be arranged and sent to Ireland without any further communication with me, which from every reason you would not like, and which I should be sorry for. Remember I do not want to trouble you; but, as my interest and that of my family is now so large in that country, as my residence down to a very late period gives me much the means of judging, and as I have the most anxious wish for the measure, I should like to consider the ideas now under arrangement, and I cannot write to Lord Auckland for obvious reasons. Do not imagine that I am peevish on this subject; but remember that I am most anxious upon it."

#### COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, November 9. Harley Street.—"Vous observerez sans doute que je ne parle pas de l'expédition sur Majorque. C'est qu'en revenant chez moi, et ayant songé sur ce sujet, je trouve qu'outre l'incertitude de la réussite (et il ne faut pas multiplier les non-réussites) cette expédition ne sera pas une diversion pour la France, qui ne s'embarasse pas de l'Espagne. Il faudra laisser une garnison dans l'isle, il faudra par conséquent diminuer l'armée de Souvorov, et ça devient une diversion en faveur de la France. C'est contre cette dernière qu'il faut redoubler nos efforts. Je soumet ces considérations à votre sagesse, et j'attens ce que vous me direz sur ce sujet."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT WORONZOW.

1799, November 9. Cleveland Row.—"Je vous restitue le

brouillon que vous m'avez envoyé. Je l'ai trouvé parfait à l'exception peut-être de quelques expressions de la première page. Je suis parfaitement d'accord avec vous que ce sont les idées militaires du M. Suwarrow et nullement celles du Baron Thugut qu'il faudra suivre. Mais je crois, en vérité, qu'il y aura un avantage très réel à demander au dernier son plan pour les opérations de la campagne, avant qu'il connoisse celui du maréchal.

“Si on lui propose un plan, au lieu de déférer aux lumières et aux talens supérieures de ce grand homme, il ne manquera certainement pas d'y trouver des objections. Il y soupçonnera des vues cachées (quand on les a, on les soupçonne toujours aux autres) et il s'y refusera; ou, ce qui seroit encore pis, il mettra des entraves à l'exécution de ce qui seroit convenu. En lui laissant l'initiative, on soumettra ses idées à la considération du Maréchal, on se réservera le droit de les discuter ici et à Petersbourg, on pourra même y faire des changemens, ou des modifications essentielles, mais ce sera toujours la proposition de la Cour de Vienne qui en fera la base, et le Ministre Autrichien n'aura plus de prétexte pour en contrecarrer l'exécution.

“J'apprends que Lord Mulgrave est parti de Vienne. Cela dérange un peu nos plans. Peut-être qu'en rencontrant mes dépêches il y retournera, mais en tout cas, Lord Minto aura les pleins pouvoirs, et il suivra, comme de raison, les conseils du Maréchal, dans la probité duquel on peut avoir autant de confiance que dans son génie.” *Copy.*

*Private.* The EARL OF ELGIN to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, November 10. Constantinople.—“I was very sorry on stopping at Palermo to find Sir William Hamilton in a very bad state of health; so much so indeed as to render it most probable your Lordship will soon be called upon to appoint a successor to the mission he now holds; and as this accidental visit has suggested some observations which, in the event alluded to, may probably have some interest with your Lordship, I cannot withhold them under circumstances where no view of my own can by any means exist.

“Your Lordship should have before your eyes the universal confusion occasioned in Italy by the French invasion, and the opinion universally entertained of British greatness and British integrity of character, to understand the importance which the mission of Naples has acquired in the present conjuncture. The want almost of a form of constitution and the weakness of the executive government did, upon the appearance of the French army, carry over to them a greater proportion of persons of family in this, than in any country where the French have hitherto penetrated. And, on the other hand, Cardinal Ruffo in Calabria, and the partisan called *Il Gran Diavolo* towards Rome, used no means of preventing the further progress of the enemy but that of giving to their adherents the pillage of all the country they could get possession of. Accordingly, there exists scarce any family of property in the country some of whose members are

not involved in the crime of rebellion, and whose estates are not materially damaged. Meanwhile the King, who owes the deliverance of Naples solely to the aid of Foreign Powers, and in particular to the operations of the British fleet, has, by remaining 37 days in the Bay without landing at Naples, and prosecuting with the utmost vigour during that time the punishment of those who had assisted the French, shown to his enemies a vindictive and unconciliatory disposition, and to his friends the utmost distrust and pusillanimity. I protest I had no opportunity whatever of knowing enough of what has passed to form a judgment of the propriety or impropriety of the part that has been taken in the name of Great Britain in those late occurrences. But undoubtedly the Court of Naples depends wholly on the countenance of England; the British Minister, as well as the naval officers, are continually called upon to act where it is impossible for them to have the benefit of instructions from home. Whether one considers the spirit which appears to animate the councils of this Government, or the popularity and influence of Great Britain in these countries, I cannot conceive a situation where more steadiness, experience, and independence is requisite than in the British Minister at the Court of Naples."

*Private.*

LORD MULGRAVE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, November 10. Cuxhaven.—“On my arrival here yesterday I was informed that Captain Foster had left this place the day before on his way to Vienna with dispatches for me. I have sent an *estafette* to recall him, and shall therefore not set off with this day's packet, as I had intended; and I shall wait a short time in the hope of seeing the dispatches he carries for me. I shall, however, not wait beyond a day or two, as I am nearly certain there is nothing in them to detain me.

“Lord Minto and I had felt so convinced that I could do nothing more at Vienna, that I had desisted from accompanying him to Baron Thugut's; and we at length agreed that the best thing for me to do was to return to England, and give you such information as you might require on the subject of my mission. I left Vienna on the 24th of October, and was overtaken a few days afterwards on the road by a very pressing letter from Mr. Wickham requiring my presence in Switzerland. Had I received his letter at Vienna I should have taken the route of Switzerland to gratify that excellent and zealous Minister, although I knew that no measures could be adopted there that did not originate in Vienna, or at least receive a sanction from thence; and although the state of my health would have rendered a lengthened journey very inconvenient, the inflammation of my blood from previous exertions having filled me full of boils and troublesome sore eruptions, I wrote to him from Prague to inform him of the impossibility, from the state of the roads as well as my own, of my arriving in time to concert measures for active exertions in Switzerland, even if there were any discretion or disposition there to adopt my opinions.”

## THE EARL OF ELGIN TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1799, November 11. Constantinople.—“I feel quite ashamed on finding my correspondence of this day so voluminous, but the difficulty of my situation is peculiarly great, as your Lordship will readily admit, when you consider that removing the French from Egypt (which I conceive of the most important consequence) will leave the Turks entirely at peace, and open to the intrigues of France whose influence here is, I am informed, still very great. But I trust to hear from your Lordship as fully as the case appears to require.

“I enclose, in this private conveyance, copy of a letter I have just received from Tamara. His present idea is inconsistent with the consent he gave to the Turks in his conference. Nor do I see how the allies can deny protection to the French leaving Egypt on capitulation, any more than disregard any other stipulations made by either power in the course of the war.

“I can have no doubt it is your Lordship’s intention that my mission should be the only one, during its continuance, accredited at this Court. Sir S. Smith calls himself still Minister; and although there never can be any misunderstanding between so intimate a friend as he is, and myself, still business may be impeded unless your intentions are known.”

## SIR CHARLES WHITWORTH TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, November 13. St. Petersburg.—“After having taken up so much of your Lordship’s time, there remains little to trouble your Lordship with in a private letter. I have the honour to acknowledge that from your Lordship of the 15th ultimo. No one can be more sensible than I am of the truth of what your Lordship alludes to in that letter. The infamous conduct of Essen exceeds, in my opinion, the imprudence of that of his predecessor. I have been obliged, notwithstanding this conviction, to treat this matter with the utmost delicacy; and if your Lordship could be as sensible as I am of the danger, you would approve of my reserve. It certainly cannot be our wish to alienate the mind of one so irritable as his Imperial Majesty; and the less so as he has perhaps but too strong an inclination to give every effect to his ill humour. My dispatches will prove to your Lordship how fruitless have been all our endeavours to prevent the adoption of the fatal measures which have been pursued; and I am well aware that it will require all our attention to prevent those troops which have been employed on the expedition against Holland from being recalled, as are those under the command of Marshal Souwarow. We are in a dreadful crisis, and I scarcely see how we shall be able to calm the Emperor’s mind. His indignation against the Court of Vienna is carried beyond all bounds; and indeed so much so, that one would almost be tempted to suspect it was affected; or at least fomented and made use of as a pretext for withdrawing his troops, and returning to that passive system which we so long

lamented. It is a dreadful consideration to reflect that all these misfortunes are to be attributed entirely to the character of the sovereign, in whom, I am sorry to say, vigour of mind, and patience under adversity are so much wanting as they are necessary. If Baron Thugut is considered, as in truth he may, as dangerous to the cause, those who govern the councils of this Court are certainly but too liable to the same imputation.

“I have this moment heard that General d’Essen is dismissed the service. I cannot vouch for the truth of it; but if this act of justice has not been already done, it most certainly will shortly.”

#### The BISHOP OF CHESTER to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, November 13. Oxford.—“I have the favour of your letter, with copies of letters to Bishop of Lincoln, Mr. Pitt, and the Marquis of Buckingham which I shall enclose with this.

“I have not seen the paper to which your letter to the Bishop of Lincoln refers, but upon the subject of that paper I have already submitted to Mr. Pitt, by Mr. H. Browne, the evil as it exists in my diocese, and what I conceive one important means of remedying it, namely, the subjecting by Act of Parliament all *tolerated* teachers or ministers, upon the number of which there is not any restraint by law, to those restrictions to which the Established clergy are now by law actually subjected, namely, to bring a certificate of their moral lives, to certify what doctrines they profess to teach, and to be confined in their function to *certain* districts, and in buildings *distinct*, and appropriated to divine worship only.

“At present they hurt the community by immoral lives, by indefinite doctrines, by itinerant functions, and in *secret* conventicles, in buildings not separated from dwelling houses. Their congregations are indefinite, they have often *none*, when they begin to profess dissent.

“I am much flattered with your approbation of my charge; when requested to print it, I could say with truth ‘it would be more to the credit of my clergy than that of their bishop.’

“I have little to correct in the conduct of my clergy. To the exception of pluralities in non-residence, I have added only that of schoolmasters; but I have everywhere resident, in those cases, curates upon a fair stipend. The power of the bishops is not inconsiderable, but their authority is weakened by the delays of the courts. I have been seven years in enforcing the residence of an incumbent, at the hazard of much expense had I failed of success; but their power is most impeded where it should be most easy in its operation, in punishing flagrant crimes in the clergy.

“But in an increasing population, the want of churches and of clergy is lamentable. For every thousand pounds expended in gratuitous accommodation of the poor, I could save a thousand persons to the Establishment who now dissent, if the money were managed skilfully, and find a stipend for the clergyman into the bargain.

“The detail of duties you mention are now all strictly incumbent

upon the clergy by law, and though in practice they fail us miserably, they never, I believe, since the Restoration were better enforced on the part of the bishops. The truth is, the connection between the bishops and the clergy is not enough considered except in cases which call aloud for redress in the public opinion. In the ordinary course of duty, the one does not consider himself as responsible to the other. It has not been unusual to reside, or leave residence, indifferently, without notice to the bishop. 'Upon my honour,' said one to me whom I had called back to residence, 'I did not know that a bishop had anything to do with me until upon receipt of your letter I looked into Burn.' Whether that general sense of superintendence ever existed in either party to the degree which is requisite, and which you look for, I cannot say. It gives me singular satisfaction and comfort in the state of mind in which I delivered my charge to find the subject in your contemplation. All who know me know that I unwillingly foresee anything unpleasant; but, without some aid from the Legislature, and without some means of exciting a stronger zeal in the clergy *throughout the kingdom*, for I cannot complain of the clergy in my own diocese, the established religion cannot exist much longer in the country; and I think the line from Manchester through Yorkshire to Richmond, the extremity of my diocese, will convince anyone of this truth who shall pass it on horseback. I wish the Dissenters may not now be the majority in that tract. But I will trouble you with no more on this subject at present, purposing to avail myself of your kind invitation to Dropmore on the 23rd or 24th of this month, if that time shall happen to suit you. The 24th is indeed Sunday, but I in that case shall sleep at Beaconsfield, at the house of Mrs. Cleaver's mother on the Saturday.

"I am glad to find your ingravings so forward. I have written to Porson in hopes of his collation of the valuable MSS. of the Odyssey in the British Museum in due time; as it would greatly add to the value of the book."

#### W. WYNDHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, November 14. Florence.—"The kindness which your Lordship has at all times shown to my family, and the particular favour and indulgence with which your Lordship has honoured me both in recommending me to His Majesty for the situation in which I now am, and during the whole period that I have had the honour to serve His Majesty, encourages me to entreat your Lordship's further protection towards me, and that you will not abandon me under any difficulties which may occur from the intrigues of Vienna, or the consequent necessary dispositions of the English Court. It is therefore to request your Lordship's interference in my favour, and even for promotion at this Court, that I venture to trouble your Lordship with this letter. I can pretend to no claim to your Lordship's intercession in my favour, beyond what may be allowed to real zeal and attention to the duties of my office, my abilities being such as rather to require your Lordship's indulgence

than support ; but I can venture with truth to state to your Lordship that, during the six years I have had the honour to serve His Majesty in Tuscany, I have held a dangerous, expensive, and irksome post, and have maintained and supported the rights and dignities of His Majesty and the British subjects with zeal, perseverance, and unremitting attention.

“ His Royal Highness the Grand Duke has often confessed that I have preserved his State for near three years by prudent and judicious conduct, and I have at various times had the repeated satisfaction to receive the honour of His Majesty’s approbation through the obliging medium of your Lordship’s despatches ; and your Lordship’s indulgence has proved that my conduct has had the good fortune to be countenanced by your Lordship.

“ His Majesty’s subjects composing the factory of Leghorn have on all occasions demonstrated their fullest approbation of my services, and have favoured me with the highest marks of their gratitude and esteem.

“ Your Lordship knows that I have at all times been solicitous to obtain intelligence, and have sometimes, I flatter myself, been so fortunate as to have been useful to His Majesty’s service. I have acted with firmness and strict obedience to His Majesty’s commands, and to the duties of my office upon all occasions, particularly during the two different periods of the invasion of this country by the French, epochs which necessarily involved me in danger and considerable expense. In the latter case your Lordship knows that, in strict conformity to my duty, I was made a prisoner and sent to a distant country, from whence I returned at the earliest intelligence of the insurrection of the Tuscan people, much instigated in its commencement by myself, and afterwards stimulated by the active part my zeal for the cause induced me to take with the army of Arezzo ; in which I not only had a principal share and influence, but, being favoured by the confidence of the Tuscan senate, the Aretin deputation, and the army, I contributed by the exertions of my mind and body to expel the French from the Tuscan territory, and was the first to enter Florence, escorted by only a few dragoons, to deliver the prince and the people from the tyranny of the French yoke.

“ I will venture to assert to your Lordship that every rank of Tuscans from the prince to the peasant acknowledged my services and confessed themselves grateful and indebted to me. The plan of the Austrians, confessed to me by their generals, was not to have entered Tuscany by two or three months so early as they did, had not the rapid progress of the Aretins insured them a complete success ; and their progress would certainly have been much less rapid, had I not taken the part which I conceived it my duty to my king and to mankind to embrace. But this was also undertaken with expense and danger, and I beg leave to represent to your Lordship that, as the youngest brother of my family, I have a very small income, incumbered with debts unavoidably accumulating, and have a numerous family of children to support, which, with my present means, is nearly impossible.

“ Were I to state my losses and expenses of journeys, voyages,

ruin, and plunder occasioned by the arrival of the enemy in Tuscany, my return to my mission and re-establishment here, I should do myself an injustice were I rate them at less than near three thousand pounds, and I am now in a state of real want of resources.

“This city, though certainly less expensive than many other Courts, and particularly Naples (where no person but of a considerable private fortune can well sustain the character of His Majesty’s minister), is infinitely more expensive in every point of view than it was in the time of my predecessors, or even at the commencement of my mission; and I do not exaggerate when I state from demonstrated proofs that the necessary articles of life are more than double since Lord Hervey’s ministry at this Court; yet my predecessors, even in time of peace and inactivity, enjoyed the honour of the title of His Majesty’s Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary with the salary annexed to it, infinitely greater than that which I now receive after six years hard service.

“I am aware that the present proposition of the Court of Vienna for Mr. Jackson’s and my recall may be considered as an obstacle to my request, even should there exist no other; but, if your Lordship should kindly agree to espouse my request, and render me your valid assistance, that obstacle may be got over by various ways; by a temporary residence near the Grand Duke’s person, by occasional absence from the capital, or any other means by which I may still have the honour of giving your Lordship intelligence in Italy, and by which the cunning intent of the Baron de Thugut may be done away. Your Lordship must be possessed of more than usual indulgence to pardon this letter, and the boldness of this request, but I flatter myself that I shall at once receive your Lordship’s pardon and support. Your Lordship has too much goodness to refuse entering into the circumstances of my case, and it is in that presumption that I dare to recur to your Lordship’s generosity to entreat some indemnification for my losses; and, above all, as the primary object of my ambition and happiness, to beg your Lordship to recommend me to His Majesty’s gracious favour to obtain the same rank at this Court with which my predecessors were honoured.

“When I first entered into this line of profession, I looked up to your Lordship as my patron and protector, and with the view of meriting your Lordship’s future favour I have unremittingly studied to deserve your countenance and esteem.

“I am apprized of the sentiments of my own family, and how anxiously they look up to your Lordship to confer this favour upon me; confident in this and in the tried friendship of my brother Lord Egremont, I have likewise entreated him to join his request to mine that your Lordship will be pleased to advance me here, and I fully rely in your Lordship’s kindness and my brother’s friendly intercessions to obtain from His Majesty my additional rank at another Court. The expenses attending the journey and removal of effects, the dress and luxuries of other Courts would involve me in new dilemmas, yet, as my whole dependence is on

His Majesty's bounty and your Lordship's protection, and my whole ambition is to serve my King in this capacity, I supplicate your Lordship to interest His Majesty for the post of Naples in my favour, whenever it may become vacant, unless it should be possible to continue me at this Court with the additional rank enjoyed by my predecessors, which is of all other favours that which I covet and desire.

"Besides, without vanity, I may venture to say that the esteem I have acquired at this Court and with the Tuscan people, my knowledge of the laws, the customs, and politics enables me to be of more service here than I could elsewhere, and perhaps more so than many other persons (even of much superior abilities) who might succeed me.

"The salary which the other Ministers at the higher Courts enjoy, though infinitely greater than mine, bear no proportion with the small salary and expenses attached to my mission, for the difference of expenses, for example, between Vienna and Florence are by no means so considerable as the disparity of the amount of the salary, since Florence attempts to copy and rival Vienna in luxury and mode of living, and is a place of passage, both going and coming, for innumerable English and other travellers of distinction, whom the Minister resident from custom is obliged to receive and to treat.

"I therefore entreat your Lordship to recommend me to His Majesty's bounty for promotion in my mission to the Grand Duke in preference to any other Court whatsoever; but, should that be impossible, which I hope and trust will not be the case, I would then request your Lordship's goodness to allow me to succeed Sir William Hamilton whenever the mission to the Court of Naples may become vacant, it being the nearest to this residence, and somewhat similar in point of climate, which is necessary for me on account of repeated complaints on my breast and lungs, which would render it dangerous in the extreme for me to inhabit a cold climate.

"Mr. Jackson, having lately been appointed to the Court of Turin, even whilst the Court is not there, and Mr. Drake and others having enjoyed their rank and salary when absent from the seat of their mission, makes me hope and flatter myself that the Grand Duke's temporary absence will not be considered as an obstacle to my appointment should your Lordship be otherwise inclined to comply with my petition; particularly as every act here is transacted in His Royal Highness's name, His Royal Highness's arms and colours are on all the fortresses and public edifices, His Royal Highness's government continues in his name, his commands are received weekly by the senate, and his seal is affixed to every act throughout the Grand Duchy.

"The sovereign consequently is always present on the throne of Tuscany. I could act, if it met with your Lordship's approbation, as Mr. Jackson has done recently, by paying my respects to His Royal Highness in Germany, and return here for the winter to procure information of all public events, and on account of my health, since my health on account of my breast in winter time

would not permit me to reside in a cold country ; and I am now sure that a residence in a northern climate, and even in England, would very soon terminate with my existence.

“ I will not trouble your Lordship any further, nor occupy your time on my account except most fervently to entreat your Lordship’s pardon and kind acquiescence in my request, and to believe that I shall never be ungrateful of your Lordship’s protection and support.”

AFFAIRS OF THE NETHERLANDS AND FRANCE—REPORT BY [MM. D’YVOY AND DE LA PALUE].

1799, November 15. Emeric.—“ Bientôt le sol Hollandais va être entièrement évacué des Anglais ; on assure qu’il ne reste pas à embarquer 2,000 hommes de cette nation, et que le reste consiste en Russes. Les forces maritimes Anglaises ne diminuent pas sur les côtes de Flandres et celles de Hollande. Les dernières nouvelles du Brabant disent qu’on a eu des inquiétudes pour Ostende, où on a aperçu à différentes reprises un nombre considérable de vaisseaux, dont plusieurs sont même entrés assez avant la rade. Le Général Tilli en a été averti par un courier, et s’est rendu à toute diligence à Ostende. On est persuadé maintenant que les efforts des Anglais se dirigeront contre la France, et qu’ils sont résolus de secourir efficacement les insurgés de l’intérieur ; au moins c’est l’opinion des Français qui sont en Hollande ; ils sont persuadés que la moitié de leurs troupes va rentrer dans l’intérieur, et qu’ils n’iront pas sur le Rhin, ainsi qu’on l’avoit annoncé.

“ On ne sait comment expliquer le motif de l’ordre envoyé, il y a huit jours, au commandant du Nimégué, celui d’inonder les approches de cette place ; on a repris aussi les ouvrages du Greve, et on va les prolonger jusqu’au Wahl ; on ne conçoit pas le motif de cette précaution qu’on n’avoit point employée dans le moment le plus critique, et qui parait dans ce moment-ci entièrement inutile ; il est difficile d’appliquer les variantes de la politique.

“ L’espoir d’une neutralité pour la Hollande commence à s’évanouir ; on se raccroche à de prétendus articles secrets de la capitulation entre le Duc d’York et Brune. Des personnes sensées assurent qu’il en existe, et qu’ils compensent les avantages que les Anglais ont paru céder. Je sais qu’un membre du Directoire Batave s’est plaint que dans un traité qui regardait spécialement la République Batave, on lui eut fait un mystère de certains arrangements. Nous savons que plusieurs membres des Conseils avoient préparé des discours sur ce sujet, et qu’on leur a fortement imposé silence. Il existe donc, d’après cela, quelque clause particulière entre le général Français et le général Anglais.

“ On parle du prochain départ des troupes que nous avons ici et environs. On dit que la ligne de démarcation va s’étendre dans le pays de Berg jusqu’ à la *Vupere*, et que le régiment qui est ici ira occuper Erbfefeld. Il est certain que les troupes ne peuvent demeurer où elles sont, elles ont déjà un grand nombre de malades ; le Général Staden doit en avoir rendu compte au Duc, et les officiers s’attendent à une dislocation prochaine.

“ Si on en croyait tout ce qui se dit et s’écrit, les Chouans seraient dans un nombre effrayant, et leurs progrès très rapides. On prétend qu’un de ces matins on apprendra qu’ils sont maîtres de quelque place maritime importante. Lorsqu’ils ont entré à St. Brieux, on a cru que de là ils marcheraient à St. Malo : leur système de guerre est maintenant regulier, et il régné parmi eux la plus grande discipline. Ils ont la confiance des pays qu’ils occupent ou qu’ils traversent. Si on pouvait ajouter foi à ce que m’a dit un prêtre arrivé des environs d’Angers, et même réparti pour y rétourner, tous les membres sont liés par un serment religieux, et les plus utiles ne sont pas ceux qui sont sous les armes. Ils sont répandus partout, et dans tous les états. Ceux-là ne se connaissent pas, et se surveillent mutuellement sans le savoir. Ce même prêtre m’a assuré que dans l’affaire du Mans, ils avaient des leurs [leurres] parmi les troupes républicaines. ‘ Si nous avions de l’argent’, me disait cet homme, ‘ nous aurions pour nous la moitié de ceux qu’on enverra pour nous combattre. Il me tarde que les réponses que nous attendons arrivent pour avoir des renseignements certains sur tous ces objets, et sur bien d’autres qui doivent être importants. Si on répond affirmativement, alors j’entrerais dans les détails qui nécessiteront mon déplacement. D’ici là, ce n’est pas la peine de s’en occuper ; en attendant ma tête travaille sur les moyens de tirer parti de la circonstance. Si une fois j’ai le pied bien fixé dans l’étrier, on peut compter sur mon zèle et mes soins.’ Je ferai gagner l’argent de mon homme ; cet article est le *sine qua non* ; il demande, et cela est juste, qu’on tienne exactement les conditions du traité, et promet de tenir fidèlement ce qu’il a promis.”

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, November 17. Stowe.—“ I have not lost any time in considering the first papers transmitted by you to me ; and I will fairly own that I do not yet see my way to my satisfaction through the *principle* by which you are to applot the compensation to the several holders of borough interest ; for, in point of fact, a committee meaning to act equitably on this subject would be much embarrassed ; and as the buyers are to negotiate or to arrange with some of those who are the most hostile, I see less daylight in the possibility of settling any general rule ; and many of the difficulties that disgusted me at last with my own ideas apply almost as strongly to this ; and I fear that, as the last defeat arose from the too great sacrifice of *county-interest*, this plan may suffer from pressing too heavily on the *boroughs*. I agree fully with you that you cannot avow and abide by the principle of paying to borough holders as in contra-distinction to electors ; but I do not see how you can satisfy the holders by giving the compensation to the electors. I likewise agree most fully that the very semblance of these two Houses should be so destroyed that you should alter the clause that assembles the Lords for elections in the House of Lords, and of the Commons for their ballot in the House of Commons ; and you should assemble the Lords in the Court of Chancery, and Commons in the Court of Exchequer, and

make some of the executive officers of those courts the returning officers; and I am sure you will agree with me that the Lord Lieutenant should be instructed to convert the present buildings into some more useful office or to some better purpose than the present, as soon as may be; which cannot be the case if you order by law that they shall meet in the present House of Lords for the next or all future elections. I wish however to think over these points more fully, for I am not satisfied with any ideas that I have yet collected. I have sent you some observations on your first resolutions; those which have occurred to me on the 1st and 2nd appear material, particularly the 2nd if you are not as sure *as you ought to be* of carrying the question triumphantly in the course of the next three months. You have not sent me any thing on the subject of the Catholics. You know that they are your sheet anchor (in this project) with the lower ranks of people, and that every care must be taken to knit them both now and for the future with Government. Their ecclesiastical situations should be now arranged, as well as their schools and seminaries, which ought to be carefully attended to; and I trust that these arrangements will be so far an article, or part of the union, that they may assist in carrying it through, and in upholding it after it is completed. I know the importance of this matter, and am therefore anxious to see the proposed resolution and article respecting it.

“Another very serious difficulty still hangs upon my mind respecting the appeal to the House of Lords. I fear that the expense and distance of such a tribunal would be a very serious inconvenience, even if the accumulation of so much legal business was indifferent. Might you not make the words so general as to admit of a committee, named from our House of Lords, of *Seigneurs Trieurs*, to whom the appeal might be referred upon petition of either party, if the House should approve; and I should see no objection to the same thing for Edinburgh, though there would be probably fewer resident peers there than in Dublin, where the Chancellor and chiefs would always be resident in term time. My father’s bill would likewise be wholly defeated by sending the electors of the county of Galway to a Committee of the House of Commons in London; and I protest that this appears the most difficult of all the doubtful points.”

AFFAIRS OF THE NETHERLANDS AND FRANCE—REPORT BY [MM. D’YVOY AND DE LA PALUE].

1799, November 17. Emeric.—“Les Français n’envoient pas leurs troupes d’Hollande sur le Rhin, ainsi qu’on l’avait dit. 5 à 6,000 hommes sont déjà rentrés dans le Brabant, et vont, dit-on, marcher dans l’intérieur pour être employés contre les Chouans. On mandait hièr, mais comme un bruit, dans une lettre d’Amsterdam, que cette ville ne serait plus désormais gardée que par des Français, et qu’un corps Batave marcherait en France: on ajoutait qu’on craignait qu’on ne prit des conscrits Bataves pour les incorporer dans les troupes Françaises. Toutes les conditions que ceux-ci exigèrent, seront désormais implicitement remplies. On ne doute pas qu’incessamment le ministre Français soit chargé de donner au

Directoire Batave le mémoire des indemnités pour la campagne, et on sait que ces marchands de liberté tiennent leur denrée un peu haute.

“Tous les rapports confirment qu'on a dessein d'établir un modérantisme mêlé de surveillance, qu'on n'en voudra plus aux opinions, mais aux actions. Il est clair que ce nouveau système de conduite est dirigé contre les Jacobins, qu'on veut réprimer, sans cependant les anéantir. On espère par là diminuer le nombre des mécontents, et les accoutumer à l'ordre actuel de choses. Ils ont beau faire; ceux qui veulent avoir part au gâteau trameront sourdement, jusqu'à ce qu'un nouveau 18 Fructidor vienne leur donner des places à remplir.

“Toute la sollicitude Directoriale se tourne en France du côté des Chouans, et on se prépare à leur faire une guerre régulière; on cache avec soin leurs progrès et les avantages qu'ils ont déjà remportés sur des troupes républicaines. On assure qu'ils attirent à eux de vieux soldats par l'appas de l'argent. On parle de 400 hommes qui ont passé de leur côté avec armes et bagages: on dit que cette désertion jette de la confusion parmi ceux qu'on leur oppose, et qu'on redoute de nouvelles trahisons, très difficiles à empêcher et à découvrir dans un genre de guerre où il n'y a point d'ensemble, et où il faut combattre par petits corps. Tout ce que je viens d'écrire m'est transmis par la voie de la Belgique, où il paraît déjà des signes de chouannerie, et qui se manifesteront encore d'avantage, si les Français n'y envoient pas troupes; on assure que le nombre de ce qui y existe actuellement n'excède pas 6,000 hommes.

“Si tous de l'expédition d'Holland, les 15 mille hommes que le Duc d'York disait avoir de trop, parcequ'il ne pouvait les employer, si on les ait jettés sur les côtes de la Belgique, on eut soulevé dans un instant tous les peuples de ces départemens. Il est inutile de revenir sur le passé; il nous reste à souhaiter que l'expérience du passé serve pour l'avenir. On a vu les Français obligés, pour parer au danger, dégarnir des postes importants; si on en eut été instruit comme on pouvait l'être, on eut pû en profiter.

“Il n'y a rien de nouveau dans la situation de ce qui nous entoure; on parle toujours, mais vaguement, de changements.

“Je resterai à mon poste, jusqu'à ce que les réponses soient arrivées, et qu'on m'ait donné mes instructions; il faut me rendre utile; sans quoi, c'est du temps, de l'argent, et de la peine perdus.”

#### COUNT PANIN to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, November 17. St. Petersburg.—“J'ai reçu exactement la lettre que Votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire le 8 October dernier. Les sentimens dont j'ai toujours fait profession pour vous, par la haute opinion que j'ai conçue de la manière éclairée dont vous dirigez le département qui vous est confié, ont dû me faire ajouter beaucoup de prix à cette marque obligéante de votre attention. J'ai cherché à témoigner à monsieur votre frère, pendant notre commun séjour à Berlin, combien j'étoit pénétré

du désir d'acquérir quelques droits à votre confiance. Les qualités respectables de ce ministre lui avoient acquis toute la mienne, et je ne voyois dans l'union de nos vues et de nos principes qu'un résultat naturel d'un de mes vœux les plus chers, celui de consolider l'alliance et l'heureuse harmonie de nos Cours respectives. Je ne mérite donc point toutes les choses obligéantes que Votre Excellence daigne m'adresser à ce sujet.

“ Je désirerois beaucoup de pouvoir, dans le nouveau poste que j'occupe, donner à ces sentimens et à ces principes toute l'étendue dont ils sont susceptibles, et que mes moyens pussent répondre à mon zèle. En attendant je vous prie d'être bien assuré que je me ferai toujours un devoir de justifier votre confiance, et de ne pas me juger en qualité d'homme public sans avoir approfondis les causes. Tout ce qui pourra me venir de sa part aura toujours les droits les plus fondés à mon empressement.”

#### FRENCH AFFAIRS.

##### *Secret Report from Paris.*

1799, November 17. [Paris.]—“ Le lendemain que j'ai reçu votre lettre, j'ai été de bonne heure chez la personne qu'elle indiquait ; je lui ai remis le billet qui était pour elle, et je lui ai montré la lettre que j'avais pour son amie de la rue St. Dominique, que j'ai deviné de suite. Elle a lu sa lettre, a désirée voir la mienne, et en me la rendant elle m'a promis de faire son possible pour que je puisse remettre l'autre moi-même. Pendant quatre jours, j'ai été tous les matins la voir pour en presser le moment ; mais je n'ai pu être admis qu'aujourd'hui. J'ai été introduit par un domestique qu'on m'avait prescrit de demander : après avoir attendu une heure et demie, j'ai été conduit dans une chambre où j'ai trouvé la personne que votre lettre m'avait fait deviner (*et chez laquelle votre amie m'avait prévenu que j'allais*) en me nommant le domestique auquel je devais m'adresser. J'ai, suivant votre expresse recommandation, employé toute mon attention à bien retenir tout ce qu'on m'a dit, à bien examiner son visage pour lire dans son coeur.

“ ‘ Vous avez ’ m'a t'elle dit (en fronçant un peu le sourcil) ‘ une lettre d'une personne de mon pays à me remettre ’ (elle m'examinait avec attention).

“ ‘ Oui Madame, ’ et je lui ai présenté votre lettre sans adresse ; elle s'est retournée vers la cheminée, elle a examinée le cachet de la lettre un moment, puis elle l'a ouverte avec des ciseaux, elle l'a lue lentement, après elle a encore plus examiné le cachet, se retournant vers moi elle m'a dit. ‘ Depuis quand avez—vous cette lettre ? ’ ‘ Je l'ai reçue depuis peu de jours. ’ ‘ L'avez vous reçue cachetté ? ’ ‘ Oui Madame. ’ ‘ Vous ne savez rien de ce qu'elle contient, ’ (me regardant très fixement). ‘ La personne qui me l'a envoyée me mande dans celle qu'elle m'écrit, qu'elle désirerait avoir une permission pour exporter des grains, et qu'elle reclame vos bontés pour cet objet ; me recommandant exprèssement de remettre la lettre moi-même ; ’ ‘ avez vous ici cette lettre ? ’ Je lui remis la votre du 9 Novembre, que j'avais apporté, ayant

pensé que peut-être elle désirerait la voir : elle examina d'abord le cachet avec beaucoup d'attention, elle en fit la lecture assez vite, puis elle examina les cachets des deux lettres qui étaient très semblables, et bien marqués, sur le pain à cacheter le *c* en était très distinct, et entouré de points très profonds ; elle tint les deux lettres à la main quelque tems regardant son feu en réfléchissant. Tournant la tête vers moi, elle me dit ; *'Je serais bien aise de rendre service à la personne qui vous a écrit, mais il faut qu'elle vienne promptement ; je suis étonnée qu'elle ait perdue son activité, elle devrait être ici au lieu de sa lettre : elle devrait savoir que ses affaires ne peuvent se traiter que par elle ; mandez lui de suite qu'elle ne m'écrive plus, et ne cherchez plus à me remettre de lettre de son part.'* Sans me donner le tems de répondre elle ajouta, *'vous n'avez pas besoin de votre lettre, je vais la bruler ;'* et de suite, elle a jettée au feu les deux lettres, et sans cesser de les regarder bruler, elle a ajouté, *'vous l'avez sans doute vue à son passage il y a quelques mois, c'est-elle bien changée ?'* Je lui dis que vous aviez fait plusieurs voyages en Amérique, que vous aviez essuï beaucoup de fatigues, mais qu'ayant conservée votre gaité, vous jouissiez d'une bonne santé, et que vous étiez moins changée que je ne l'avais imaginé. *'C'est ce qu'on m'a dit ; j'en suis charmée, mandez-lui, le plutot possible, que je serai bien aise de l'aider dans son projet, qu'elle vienne promptement, avec les pouvoirs de ses associés. Surtout recommandez lui la plus grande prudence ; qu'elle aura des frais nécessaires à faire ; mais qu'il y a beaucoup de grains dans ce pays, et que sa spéculation est très bonne ; écrivez dès ce matin.'* Alors elle m'a salué légèrement, et je me suis retiré par la porte par laquelle j'étais entré ; j'ai retrouvé le même domestique qui m'a conduit jusqu'à l'escalier.

*'Je rentre dans le moment chez moi ; je ne vous parlerai pas de toute l'inquiétude que cette visite me cause ; je me bornerai à répondre, suivant ce que vous me prescrivez, aux questions de votre lettre, n'entrant dans aucuns détails sur tout ce qui est arrivé ici depuis peu de tems.*

*'D'abord la personne que j'ai vue est très changée. J'ai trouvé son air naturellement mélancolique augmenté ; je crois qu'elle met beaucoup plus de blanc qu'autrefois, ses dents sont plus mauvaises, elle parle aussi plus lentement, sans doute pour moins ouvrir la bouche ; elle a toujours beaucoup de graces et son même air de bonté ; elle doit m'avoir reconnu, car elle m'a beaucoup examiné, mais elle ne m'a pas parlé de ses enfans quoiqu'elle ait vu dans votre lettre que vous désiriez que je vous en donnasse des nouvelles. Je lui aurai fait part de votre désir si elle n'avait pas lue ma lettre : mais ne m'en parlant pas elle-même, j'ai craint de lui faire de la peine par mes questions ; elle est très réservée ; elle n'a pas, ni moy, prononcé une seule fois votre nom : c'est encore une très belle et aimable femme. Je ne crois pas qu'elle soit heureuse : mais je crois qu'elle prend encore à vous beaucoup d'intérêt ; je pense que vous pouvez compter sur son amitié pour le succès de vos spéculations. Elle doit être satisfaite de la reserve que j'ai mis dans ma conduite pendant ma visite.*

*'A présent, mon bon ami, permettez—moy de vous dire que je*

suis tourmenté par les plus vives inquiétudes, car s'il faut que vous veniez vous-même suivre vos affaires ici, telles avantageuses qu'elles puissent être à votre fortune, vous devez y renoncer. Les événements arrivés nouvellement ici ne vous présentent pas plus de sûreté qu'auparavant : et malgré les puissantes protections que vous pourriez avoir, vous y courriez de très grands périls. Au nom de Dieu, ne renouvellez pas les mortelles inquiétudes que vous nous avez causées. Je dois d'ailleurs vous observer qu'une affaire sur les grains n'est plus aussi avantageuse, car beaucoup de négociants étrangers, même de chez vous, ont obtenu la permission que vous sollicitez ; il y a beaucoup de blés et d'autres grains achetés pour être exportés, et que les prix en sont déjà considérablement augmentés ; ajoutez qu'il faut beaucoup dépenser en présents.

“ Si la personne qui promet de vous aider vous tient parole, vous pouvez certainement faire de bonnes affaires, mais un de vos associés, un commis entendu, peut les faire de même. Je lui donnerai de bon cœur tous les conseils et les soins que mon âge et mon connoissance des affaires de ce pays pourront me dicter pour vos intérêts.” *Copy.*

#### COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1799, November 18.] Twickenham.—“ J'ai l'honneur de vous joindre ici un mémoire et les pièces justificatives, le tout très peu intéressant, mais qui m'ont été envoyés d'Italie pour vous les remettre. De grâce, permettez à votre ami de vous prier d'éclairer son ignorance sur des objets qui doivent l'intéresser. Je ne sais rien au fond de ma tanière, où je pleurs non pas mes péchés mais ceux d'autrui. J'ignore ce qui se passe dans le monde.

“ Est-il vrai que Buonaparte, Moreau, et Siéyès gouvernent la France, et qu'ils parlent de paix ? Vous m'avez promis de me mander aussi si vous receviez des nouvelles qui vous satisfaisoient ou déplaisoient au sujet de notre calomnie en Suisse ? Savez vous l'objet de l'envoi du Prince Esterhazy en Suisse ? Pardon, pardon de toutes ces questions, mais vous êtes trop juste pour ne pas comprendre ma curiosité. Je ne vous demande pas de secret d'ailleurs. Je sais que, vu les circonstances, ce n'est pas le moment d'en exiger, mais n'oubliez jamais, je vous supplie, que quelques soient les torts des autres, mon caractère personnel ne variera point, et que le pauvre petit représentant de la malheureuse Autriche sera toujours aussi bon Anglais, et surtout *Grenvilliste* de cœur et d'ame, que ceux qui peuvent l'être par devoir, indépendamment de leur sentiment.”

#### COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, November 19. Harley Street.—“ Il m'est arivé un maudit courier avec des dépêches qui me mettent au désespoir.

“ On n'agit chez nous que par passion et violence. Avec les intentions les plus pures, et les plus généreuses, on n'a pas le moindre brin de la prudence la plus ordinaire. Vous verez par les pièces que je vous communique la manière brusque et imprudente avec laquelle on a rompu chez nous avec la cour de Vienne, et la résolution

qu'on a prit de rappeler l'armée Russe qui est en Suisse ; sans considérer qu'on n'étoit pas le maître d'en disposer, et que cette armée vous appartient, et sans considérer qu'on invite la cour de Vienne par nos incartades à faire sa paix avec la France. On ne sauroit assez se presser d'envoyer d'ici un courier pour faire des représentations très fortes, et un autre à Mr. Wickham pour l'engager à faire son possible de retarder la marche rétrograde du Maréchal ; car il se pouroit bien que la cour de Vienne pourait être intimidé, et chercher à apaiser l'Empereur, ce qui remettrait les choses dans leurs assiete naturelle, et on pouroit alors faire un plan plus fix pour les opérations futures. Je n'ai pas eu le tems de metre au net les traductions du Russes que mon fils a fait, ni de faire copier les copies des lettres de l'Empereur au Roi et à l'Empereur d'Allemagne, c'est pourquoi je vous supplie de me les renvoyer demain. Quand serez vous en ville, et quand pourai-je vous voir pour concerter ce qu'il y a écrire à Petersbourg ? Je ne doute pas que vous ne soyez persuadé qu'il n'y a pas de tems à perdre pour réparer tout ce qu'on gâte chez nous."

*Enclosure :—*

PAUL I., EMPEROR OF RUSSIA, to COUNT WORONZOW.

1799, October 15. Gatchina.—“ Vous verrez par les copies incluses du rescript au Maréchal, Prince Italique, et des lettres à l'Empereur des Romains et au Roi de la Grande Bretagne, que la conduite de la Cour de Vienne m'a forcé d'en venir à la fin à une tupture avec elle. Son obstination à ne pas s'ouvrir sur ses intentions pour ce qui regarde le rétablissement du gouvernement monarchique en France, l'avidité de faire des acquisitions prouvé déjà par le fait, mes troupes en Suisse sacrifiées par l'envie et la méchanceté, tout cela m'a fait voir que sans le secours et la coopération sincère de la Cour de Vienne, mes forces et celles de l'Angleterre ne sont pas suffisantes pour arriver au but qui a uni ces trois puissances, et que tous nos efforts ne serviront qu'à l'avantage de la cour de Vienne ; et, sans avoir exterminé le gouvernement Français, ils serviront à établir une autre puissance tout aussi dangereuse pour le bien public.

“ Quoique mes intentions et mon plan proposés au Roi d'Angleterre sont déclarés dans la lettre que je lui écris, cependant, pour vous diriger dans vos conférences et dans les affaires que vous aurez avec le ministère Anglais, je vous informerai de mes intentions plus en détail. Ma situation envers le Roi de Prusse est telle que, malgré le désir que j'ai de me lier de plus près avec lui, je ne veux pas risquer de recevoir quelque réponse désagréable ; ainsi vous direz à Lord Grenville que la retour de son frère à Berlin peut être très utile dans la situation actuelle des choses, et peut accélérer le succès désiré, en dirigeant sa conduite de manière que ne demandant aucunement au comencement des démarches actives du Roi de Prusse, et à mesure du consentement du Roi de Prusse aux propositions du M. Grenville, ou de quelque autre plénipotentiaire Anglais, de lui découvrir tout notre plan contre la Cour de Vienne, le faire entrer dans les mêmes vues pour mettre des obstacles à la Cour de Vienne, et l'empêcher d'exécuter son intention de s'emparer

du Piémont, de Gènes, et des trois Légations, au lieu de rendre ces pays à ceux à qui ils appartiennent de droit. Si le Roi de Prusse consentira à ce plan, je suis prêt à lui écrire une lettre pour s'appeller au secours de l'empire Germanique, et pour délivrer l'Italie des l'avidité de l'ambition sans bornes de la maison d'Autriche. On peut faire sentir au Roi de Prusse que dans un tel cas, ni moi ni le Roi d'Angleterre nous ne l'empêcherons pas de faire quelques acquisitions sur le Rhin, en lui laissant à lui-même le choix des moyens. Notre plus grande attention doit être sur la maison d'Autriche, et tous nos efforts pour faire une alliance avec le Roi de Prusse, lequel, joint à la Russie, à l'Angleterre, à la Porte Ottomane, à la Suède, et au Danemarck, fera une très grande force dans le nord, capable de donner la loi à toute l'Europe. J'ai envoyé ordre au conseiller d'état actuel Baron von Krüdener, rappelé de Copenhagen, de rester à Berlin, et d'avoir de là une correspondance avec mon ministère, sans prendre sur lui aucune capacité officielle.

La Cour de Vienne, sentant l'impossibilité de résister à la France sans mon secours, conclura certainement une paix qu'elle a déjà entamée, pour qu'en finissant la guerre, elle puisse s'assurer la possession des pays conquis. Il reste à savoir à présent jusqu'à quel point la France consentira aux propositions de paix faites par l'Autriche ; surtout quand elle sera informée de la rupture qui a eu lieu entre moi et l'Empereur des Romains, et de l'ordre donné à mes troupes de revenir en Russie.

“ Cependant comme, malgré les moyens, les forces, et la résolution du gouvernement Anglais de continuer la guerre contre la France, on ne peut pas combatre éternellement, si la position interne de la France ou l'inclination du ministère Anglais tend vers la paix entre la France et l'Angleterre, vous saurez que cela me sera indifférent, et je préférerois même de voir l'Angleterre en paix avec la France plutôt que la Cour de Vienne, si les conditions de paix étoient les suivantes.

“ 1. De joindre les Pays—Bas à la Hollande, et d'établir le Stat-houdre sur les dix-sept provinces.

“ 2. De borner la France à ses anciennes limites.

“ 3. D'établir le *statum quo ante bellum* en Italie, et,

“ 4. La même chose dans l'Empire Germanique.

“ 5. De laisser au Roi de Prusse quelques acquisitions sur le Rhin.

“ 6. De laisser à l'Angleterre ses conquêtes aux deux Indes.

“ Ma propre position envers la France est telle qu'après avoir été dans le courant de cette guerre une puissance auxiliaire contre elle, en quittant l'alliance je rentre dans ma situation antérieure, et je n'ai pas besoin de traiter directement avec elle. Je serai le dernier en Europe à la reconnoître pour République, et je ne le ferai qu'après que l'Angleterre l'aura fait. Vous connoissez les ordres que j'avois donné en 1797 au Comte Panin, et pourquoi ses négociations avec Caliard ont été rompues.

“ Le changement que j'occasions dans le système politique en rompant l'alliance avec la Cour de Vienne est d'une telle espèce qu'il ne faudra pas perdre du tems à s'arranger avec Berlin. J'espère donc que vous emploierez tous vos efforts pour que le ministère Anglais entre le plus-tôt possible dans ces vues.

“ Depuis le tems que la Cour de Vienne a refusé d’aller en avant contre l’ennemi commun, et qu’elle s’empare de tout pour elle-même, j’ai comencé à perdre l’espérance d’arriver à mon but, ayant pour règle que les intentions intéressées ne peuvent s’accorder avec des affaires honnêtes et justes, Je suis persuadé maintenant de l’hypocrisie de la Cour de Vienne, et j’aurois honte de rester plus longtems son allié. J’attends les succès des bonnes dispositions du ministère Anglais, et de votre zèle pour mon service, qui est aidé par l’estime que vous vous êtes justement attirée dans le pays dans lequel vous remplissez depuis si longtems et si honorablement la place importante qui vous a été confiée.” *Copy.*

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, November 19. Wimbledon.—“ I have this morning received the enclosed, and consider it is a question too delicate to be decided upon without mature consideration. If this Russian is delivered up to their General, there can be no doubt that he will be punished with the utmost severity, but that creates the very difficulty. In the case of subjects of any country committing crimes in their *own* country, it is a matter of discretion in the country to which they may fly for refuge whether they will deliver them up on a requisition made to them for that purpose. But here the crime committed is against the civil law of this country, and if you listen to the requisition which is made, you deliver the culprit to be punished in a manner unknown to the laws of the country. Let me know what Mr. Pitt and you feel upon it. I have desired Mr. Huskisson to call upon Count Woronzow, and to state to him that I had difficulties upon the subject, but that I would send an answer without much delay.”

#### COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, November 20. Harley Street.—“ J’aurois voulu pouvoir venire demain chez vous, mais il m’est impossible, ayant la tâche pénible à parcourir toute la correspondance entre son altesse Royale le Duc d’York et le Général Essen. Son Altesse Royale m’a promis de me l’envoyer demain. Il faut que je la parcoure, et que je marque à mes secrétaires les pièces importantes qu’ils doivent copier, et que je dois envoyer à l’Empereur pour prouver la mauvaise foi et la mauvaise volonté de ce maudit Général Almand qui avoit pour but visible de broniller les deux pays. Cette besogne m’occupera toute la journée, mais je ne manquerai pas de venire à Dropmore vers les trois heures après demain, vendrédi ; nous causerons avant dîner ; Lady Grenville me donnera, j’espère, de cet excellent puding qu’on ne fait que chez elle : après le café nous faisons avec vous deux parties d’échecs, où, je vous prie, de ne pas faire les honneurs de votre maison et de perdre exprès des parties comme l’autre fois ; et entre sept et huit heures, vous me permettez de vous quitter, car je suis continuellement bombardé d’affaires courantes et fastidieuses, mais que je dois expédier continuellement et sans retard, relativement aux troupes qui reviennent du

Helder dans différents ports de ce pays ; et tous ces détachments s'adressent à moi, à tort et à travers, pour tous leurs besoins réels ou factices."

LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT STARHEMBERG.

1799, November 20.—Cleveland Row.—“ J'aurois du répondre plutôt à vos questions, mais en vérité vous en savez autant que moi. Les papiers publics vous auront annoncé la révolution Française. J'espère qu'on n'aura pas la mal adresse de s'y laisser tromper. Pour les autres objets il n'y a absolument rien. M. Thugut nie de la manière la plus formelle, sur son honneur personnel, et avec toutes les protestations imaginables, qu'il y ait négociation ou armistice avec les Français, ou qu'on ait même songé soit à l'une soit à l'autre.”—*Copy.*

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, November 21. Wimbledon.—“ Dundas was not returned from town when I arrived here, and we had not much opportunity to talk over the subject till after dinner. He concurs entirely in the idea that the Russian force can not be employed on the Continent but as auxiliaries, and in every part of the memorandum we formed this morning, except what relates to bringing 30,000 Russians to act with our troops from hence. I am very unwilling to give up that additional chance for making an impression from hence, or to diminish the general mass of force which our plan proposes to employ in the whole against France. But I am not sure that the real defects in the discipline and management of the Russians, added to the deep prejudices which seem to have taken root against them in our service, would not make them rather an incumbrance than an aid. If, on these grounds, we do not ask for any Russian force in this quarter, we might propose to augment the number to be employed in the Mediterranean to 15,000 or 20,000 ; and perhaps (if we succeed in producing a right understanding on the future arrangement of Italy) 10,000 or 15,000 more might be garrisoned in Italy, and so much more Austrian force rendered disposable. On the whole, I am quite confirmed in the opinion that the general outline of this plan promises better success than any attempt to employ any great body of Russian force in operations on the Continent ; and that it is much the best plan we can propose. It is also much the most likely to be satisfactory to both the Imperial Courts, and I should therefore wish to state it with a decided preference, though not to the exclusion of the former plan of Continental operations if, contrary to any probable expectation, those Courts should prefer the latter, and can agree upon it. There occurs to me only one point which did not make part of what we talked of. It is that, even if Russia should refuse to give any troops to act with Austria, or Austria should refuse to receive such a succour, or even if Austria should make its separate peace, still we ought to press to the utmost for Russian troops to be employed in the Mediterranean. Perhaps if they are trained and brought into service there by such an officer as Stuart, it may

be worth while afterwards to augment their numbers; and when we have exhausted all that can be done against Spain, to bring them against other points.

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, November 22. Wimbledon.—“I have seen Popham who enters very fully into the spirit of the proposed new instructions, of which I explained to him the general outline, subject of course to such variations as may arise in completing them. Before they are finally arranged, or at least before they are actually sent away, it seems, I think, almost indispensable that they should be seen by such of our colleagues as are within reach. Perhaps it might be sufficient (if you wish to avoid a Cabinet) to send the instructions, and the despatches on which they are founded, to the reading-room, and to send a circular notice that you have done so, meaning to dispatch them without delay if no objection occurs. If any is stated, I am afraid the Cabinet can not be avoided, and I shall be ready at whatever time you fix. In the meanwhile I am going to Hollwood to stay till Monday or Tuesday, if I have no summons in the interval.”

*Postscript.*—“Popham mentions again an anxious wish (strengthened he says by Woronzow’s opinion) to be furnished, if possible, with a letter from the King to the Emperor, stating that, in consequence of the good opinion the Emperor before expressed of him, he has sent him back for the purpose of stating fully to the Emperor many important particulars of which he has been an eye-witness, and also of explaining confidentially the ideas entertained here on the late extraordinary events, and on the whole of the present situation of affairs. I rather think something to this effect may be useful, and in some degree necessary.

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, November 24. Downing Street.—“In consequence of a communication made to me this morning from Compté Woronzow I have come to town for an hour, and I would not feel at ease if I did not call your attention to a circumstance I think it material to be adverted to before Sir H. Popham goes away. You have seen the false and injurious statement made by D’Essen to the Emperor of the affair of the 19th in Holland. This, stated publicly in the Petersburg papers, ought not in my judgment be passed over in silence, if nothing else called for a public interposition. If we acquiesce in it without a becoming remonstrance, the Emperor of Russia is entitled to consider it as all true, and to feel with regard to us accordingly. Whatever defects there might exist in other respects from the general construction of a Russian army, it is certain that, so long as General D. Herman remained at the head of the Russian troops, there was a perfect cordiality between the armies, and a perfect zeal for co-operation on the part of the Russian general; but, from the moment of D. Herman being unfortunately taken, the very reverse has been the case in every single instance, and the same spirit at this moment remains and is operating.

Through a confidential channel in D'Essen's family, Woronzow knows all he writes, and the whole tendency of it is to create ill blood between the two Courts. Is this to go on? or if we do not publicly state to the Emperor our dissatisfaction with the conduct of this general, are we not responsible for all the mischievous consequences likely to result from it? I truly think we are, and in my judgment nothing short of a distinct remonstrance to the Emperor through Popham against General Essen remaining in this country, is adequate to the purpose. Popham will feel no difficulty in supporting by the most unequivocal statements, founded either on his own personal knowledge or on authentic information, the remonstrance I wish to be made, and which I have reason to believe Woronzow wishes to be made. I flatter myself you will give to what I have stated a serious and candid consideration, for I feel much impressed with the force of my statement, and I do not think that with such an officer at the head of the Russian troops, or at all serving with them, you can for a moment be at ease with regard to the consequences either here or in Russia."

*Postscript.*—"Upon looking over my letter I observe that I have omitted to mention to you that Woronzow does not know that I am aware of his being in possession of General D'Essen's correspondence with the Emperor, and that in no conversation with him or otherwise will it be right for you to allude to that circumstance."

#### HENRY DUNDAS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, November 24. Downing Street.—"In reading over your despatch to Sir Charles Whitworth of the 19th November, I confess I was struck with a part of it, which I have caused to be copied out and enclose to you. I would be uncandid if I did not state to you the serious alarm I feel from seeing upon how low a tone you take the future prospects of this country at the close of the war, whether longer or shorter. I don't say that there is an absolute necessity for this discussion at present, but when I think I have reason to perceive that you, and probably Mr. Pitt, have sentiments with regard to some of the most substantial interests of this country so very different from what I entertain, I do not feel it possible for me to be silent.

"In reading this enclosed paragraph, it is impossible not to feel that, if the war should end satisfactorily in your view with regard to the internal situation of France and Holland, you have made up your mind to restore all the colonial possessions of those countries except the Cape and Ceylon. *My* feeling is that no end of the war can justify such a resolution, for if Martinico in the Leeward Islands is given up to the French, under any circumstances, the knowledge we must all now have of the relative situation of the colonies in the Leeward quarter of our colonial possessions, must convince us those that remain with you are not worth keeping, and you must hold them by the tolerance of France; and if, in addition to this, Holland is to have restored to it *without any reservations* the colonies of Surinam and Demerary, Domingo at the same time an open colony, surely nobody will then seriously maintain that any part

of the colonial trade (that of Jamaica excepted) will remain with this country. It will all pass into the hands of France, of Holland, and of America. In other words these countries will return at once into a situation which will enable them to revive rapidly all their commercial and maritime resources, and proportionably rob us of all the means of strength and pre-eminence by which we have been enabled to perform those miracles of exertion which have distinguished Great Britain in the course of this arduous contest. And I cannot help feeling the more sensibly on this subject, when I perceive that there is no disposition on our part to avail ourselves of the means in our power to open to the manufacturers of this country the market of South America, which might serve as a substitute to the contingent loss of others of which, in the course of events, we may be deprived.

“Upon a further perusal of this paragraph, my alarms do not rest here. It is only stated that we are not *likely* to give up Ceylon, the Cape and other places. I really flattered myself we had all felt for a long time that such a cession was *impossible*. If we do not manfully make up our minds to some determinate stand for the preservation of *British interests* involved in this contest, we are playing the part of spendthrift bankrupts, who for the sake of a few years’ brilliant *éclat*, have made up their minds to terminate their career by a desperate suicide.

“This leads me to ask what is all this for? We were drove from necessity into the war from the best and the wisest motives, because, if we did not then interpose, the frenzy of the principles which reigned in France would have extended itself to this country, and overturned every chance we had of preserving our own constitution. I likewise feel as much as anybody that if, by the continuance of the war and the great exertions we are making for that purpose, we can contribute to the restoration of the French monarchy it is a most desirable event for the future tranquillity of this country and of Europe; but, if the consequence of having successfully contributed to do so is to be an abandonment of all those possessions and all that consequent power upon which our future greatness must rest, I beg to wash my hands of such a system, and I would much rather never see either the King of France or the Stadtholder restored than submit to such consequences, if it is understood to be possible that such consequences can result from it.

“I will likewise frankly own to your Lordship that, although I do most cordially and conscientiously go along with you in the exertions which are proposed to be made in order to take the chance of the best possible termination of the war, I do not feel the same alarm of danger to this country from the situation of France that I once did; nor do I think the contagion of its example, in any material degree, longer dangerous to us. When the delusive and intoxicating system of liberty and equality and the natural rights of man were in full fashion, and uncontrolled either by external power or their own consequent misfortunes, the neighbourhood of France to this country was seriously dangerous and justly alarming; but I am not afraid of any set of men in this country being captivated by a military despotism, or wishing to exchange the mild and happy

government of this country for the cruel, unprincipled and ignominious slavery and oppression which reigns in France. Every nation on the continent of Europe have just cause to dread a great concentrated military power existing among them, and threatening devastation and military achievement in every quarter; but of all others, Great Britain is the last that has reason to tremble. While our countrymen retain their love of their country, and by industry and commerce administer to our naval superiority, we have little to dread from the military enterprise of any continental power.

“I have troubled you with perhaps too long a letter, but I feel the subject most deeply; and, if the leading members of his Majesty’s Government have made up their minds to a different view of the subject, I am sure they act most unwisely in keeping me among them.”

HENRY DUNDAS to [W. PITT].

1799, November 24. Wimbledon.—“I have very great doubts upon those parts of Lord Grenville’s despatch, No. 102, as suppose and wish the employment of so large a body of Russian troops in the Mediterranean, or *any where* in conjunction with our troops. In so far as 30,000 men to act under the Archduke, I have no doubt. In so far as any further addition to that number can be made to place in any garrisons in Italy or elsewhere to relieve Austrian troops for active operations, I have no doubt. In so far as either Minorca, to the extent of 2,000 men, or Gibraltar to the extent of 2,000 men, may by Russian troops relieve our own for offensive operations in the Mediterranean, I have no objection. But I am perfectly clear that no Russian troops can, with any good effect, be employed on this side of Europe in conjunction with British troops; on the contrary I believe they would be productive of mischief. Upon the whole therefore I am of opinion that the 15,000 Russians we already have are all that we can beneficially employ as British troops and as we have an opportunity in course of the winter to habituate them to the habits and intercourse of British soldiers, they appear to me preferable to any other new Russian troops that could be brought into the Mediterranean. My opinion therefore upon the whole subject is that if we subsidize Russian troops *to act with British* beyond our present numbers, we will act unwisely. If there is room for acting upon a more extensive scale in the Mediterranean, *offensively*, than can be done by an union of ten thousand British and ten thousand Russian, I would endeavour to form the remainder by series in the island of Sicily, where, I have reason to believe, under British officers, very efficient corps might be formed. It is impossible for me not to advert on the present occasion to the total forgetfulness we seem to labour under with regard to Egypt. We seem to look upon that as a point totally over both in our naval and military arrangements. While there is one thousand French troops any where in Egypt, I cannot concur in viewing the question in that light.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1799, November 24. Stowe.—“Be not alarmed at the size of

the packet which I enclose to you ; you know that my habit is to send to you everything which relates to your business, and that I never insist upon your reading more of it than your own curiosity and leisure may induce you to do. Stamford's letter suggests the same destination for himself which you had already thought of, and therefore the sooner you confirm him in it the better it will be for your business, and the easier for his arrangements.

"The report which he encloses from La Palue, under his fictitious name, is curious enough because he appears at a very early period to have been informed of the new stress which the politics of Paris were about to give to the discussions of peace, and if you are as well satisfied as I am with La Palue's communications from Emerick, you will not hesitate to desire General Stamford to renew with him the same engagement for six months more, that which I had made having ended on the 1st of October, although I ventured to promise Stamford that October should also be paid to La Palue ; I apprehend that your easiest mode of settling this business will be by putting it into the hands of Garlike at Berlin, who can remit to General Stamford there as well what will be due for himself as what will be due to La Palue. You have likewise to decide upon the proposal made by La Palue for establishing his French communication ; if you approve of it you have only to say so in your letter to General Stamford, and I presume this payment may likewise best pass through Garlike to Stamford, and through Stamford to La Palue's correspondent. The danger of frost interrupting your communication makes me presume that no time will be lost by you in answering Stamford upon these subjects ; and as I cannot foresee your determination, I shall not write to him until I hear from you, in order that I may refer him to your more regular and official letter to him, my own correspondence with him being only now of a private and unauthorised description.

"I am making out a small bill of extraordinaries due since the last which I presented ; as it will include the rest of Fisher's payment, I wish to know to what day I am to charge it ; I presume his establishment as well as mine limited by the day on which I had my audience of return, and therefore I propose to charge it to that day.

"With regard to the Homerick title-page ; the only books which I have examined have 'εν Οξωρια 'εν 'ετει ; but I am content to leave out the second 'εν, and I will write for that purpose if it be not already too late to change it without beginning a new plate.

"I have some letters in concealed ink from Garlike, which I cannot yet decypher till I have made the *producing liquid for them*. I am sorry to see that several from him have miscarried to me through the stupidity, as I conjecture, of my old friend at Hamburgh.

"I know not what answer to send to Stamford about his young *protégé*, nor do I know in what manner he looks to have an English brevet supply the place of that which he had expected from the Stadtholder ; as this however is an application to me, tell me what is to be said upon it. This is fine planting weather, and I hope that you are active among the young beech in spite of all the old politicians."—3 *Enclosures*.

*Enclosure 1 :—*

GENERAL DE STAMFORD TO THOMAS GRENVILLE.

1799, October 31. Brunswick.—“ J’ai fort bien reçu les lettres dont vous avez eu la bonté de m’honorer en date du 12 et du 20 de ce mois. Si les informations contenues dans le dernière, qu’en partie j’avois déjà reçues d’autre part, m’ont profondément attristé, les tendres assurances que vous m’y avez donnés de votre bienveillance et de votre précieuse amitié ont été pour moi une source de consolations qui a été cause que je n’ai pas éprouvé toute l’amertume qui se fait ordinairement sentir à une ame sensible, quand elle se voit ravir une espérance qu’elle avoit longuement et fortement nourrie.

“ Je ne me permettrai aucune réflexion sur ce qui s’est passé en Hollande. Je ne suis pas de ceux qui, lorsqu’un projet a échoué, font d’abord sur bout des doigts l’énumération des causes qui ont contribué au mauvais succès.

“ Tel événement heureux ou malheureux peut être produit par des causes si cachées qu’il est impossible qu’elles parviennent à la connoissance du public ; et en fait de causes, qui est en état de discerner toujours celles qui ne sont dues qu’au hazard, de celles qui ont été ou qui ont pu être prévues ?

“ L’expédition sur la Hollande est une opération manquée. C’est un grand malheur assurément ; mais je partage votre opinion que ce n’est pas une malheur irréparable. En effêt, je ne vois rien qui puisse empêcher que la même expédition ne soit reprise, ou qui doive faire douter d’un plein succès si l’on veut agir d’après un autre plan où moins de choses soient laissées au hazard, que ce n’a été le cas dans le premier. Les apprêts qu’elle exigera la seconde fois seront moins longs and assujettis à moins d’inconveniences ; ils demanderont par conséquent moins de tems ; et, si l’on en cache l’objet à l’ennemi le plus long tems qu’il sera possible, on le tronvera dans la même proportion moins préparé à la défense. Au reste, je ne puis vous cacher que je n’ai remarqué qu’avec une peine infinie que dans la convention faite avec Général Brune, on n’ait pas transigé pour les malheureux Orangistes qui se sont montrés ; moins le nombre en a été grand et plus il falloit songer aux moyens de les sauver, parceque leur exemple seroit devenu un encouragement pour les plus timides.

“ Je ne puis attribuer qu’à un oubli l’omission d’un article qui eut été en leur faveur, et cet oubli coutera probablement cher à ces pauvre gens.

“ Vous aurez, sans doute, fait sur les campagnes de cette malheureuse guerre une remarque également applicable à la campagne actuelle ; c’est que, quelque brillants qu’aient été nos succès an commencement, les fins en ont toujours été funestés aux puissances alliées. Si nous avons essuié des revers en Hollande, ceux qu’on a éprouvé en Suisse n’ont pas été moins grands, puisque nous y voyons Massena, par la reprise du St. Gotthard et de Domo d’Ossolo, en état de prêter, par Bellinzone. la main à Championnet ou à Bonnaparte, qui probablement va lui succéder.

“ J’attends avec impatience des lettres de notre cher Comte de Panin qui m’apprendront, peut-être, quelque chose de l’effet

qu'auront produit sur l'esprit de son souverain les nouvelles de tant de désastres. Il m'a écrit trois fois pendant son voyage à Petersbourg, où je sais qu'il est arrivé le 26 du mois passé, et il peut avoir reçu déjà deux de mes lettres, mais qui ne lui annonçoient encore rien de sinistre.

“ J'ai vu par votre dernière du 20 de ce mois que celle que j'eue l'honneur de vous adresser le 11 ne vous étoit pas encore parvenue. Elle vous auroit appris qu'une indisposition assez grave me retenoit à Brunswick. Cependant, comme je me sentois mieux lorsque je reçus votre lettre de Emden en date du 12, je me préparois à exécuter mon projet de voyage quand, tout à coup, je reçus la nouvelle de l'armistice en Hollande qui me fit changer de résolution, quoique d'abord je voulusse pas croire à cet événement.

“ Ma lettre du 11 renfermoit aussi une note du Marquis de la Palu, contenant tous les renseignemens que vous m'aviez demandé précédemment sur le correspondance à établir à Paris. Je vous adresse avec celle-ci un double de cette note, en vous priant instamment de me faire savoir aussitôt que vous le pourrez, si je dois donner, ou non, suite à cette affaire, dans le cas où la chose seroit encore possible, ce dont je ne suis pas encore informé.

“ M. de la Palu est toujours à son poste, comme vous verrez par son dernier rapport dont je joins ici une copie. Je pense qu'il nous y sera plus utile que jamais dans les circonstances actuelles où il s'agit de ne pas laisser refroidir les bonnes dispositions partout où il s'en trouve. Mais, quoiqu'on décide à son sujet, je désire d'être mis à même de pouvoir le satisfaire pour les services qu'il a rendus jusqu'au moment présent. Vous vous rappelerez qu'il lui a été accordé 40 Frédéric's d'or par mois. Or, comme il a reçu depuis le mois de juin dernier 200 Frédéric's, dont 40 étoient pour son voyage de Brunswick à Berlin et de là à Emmeric, il lui revient encore 40 Frédéric's pour qu'il soit payé jusqu'à la fin d'Octobre.

“ Je suis fâché de me trouver dans le cas de devoir vous entretenir d'affaires d'argent, et ce qui plus est, de finir cette lettre par vous parler sur le même objet pour mon propre compte, ce que je ne ferai cependant que pour ménager la délicatesse de M. le Prince d'Orange, qui devoit en parler lui-même par ce que la chose le regarde.

“ Vous n'ignorez pas que la dépense occasionnée par ma mission à Berlin a été aux fraix du gouvernement Britannique, qui a bien voulu s'en charger. Sentant plus que personne combien ces fraix surpassoient l'utilité que ce gouvernement en recueilloit, j'en fus d'autant plus empressé à quitter cette mission; qui, pour cette seule raison, me peinoit plus que je ne puis dire. Par la tournure fâcheuse qu'ont pris les affaires en Hollande, je me crois obligé d'aller la reprendre au moins pour quelque tems; car, comme je n'ai quitté Berlin que sous le prétexte d'aller faire une absence de quelques semaines, pour que le Roi ne s'imaginât pas que M. le Prince d'Orange m'eut rappelé par humeur, il me semble que je ne puis guères me dispenser d'y faire une nouvelle apparition.

“ J'ose, en conséquence, récourir à votre intercession auprès du Gouvernement Britannique, pour qu'il m'accorde durant le court séjour que je me propose d'y faire encore, le même faveur dont il

m'a fait jouir ci-devant ; si toutefois vous ne jugez pas plus convenable que je renonce à mon dessein, en passant par dessus les considérations qui me l'ont suggéré, et qui, vis-a-vis d'une Cour qui se conduit comme fait celle de Berlin, ne sauroient être d'un grand poids.

“ Le Duc de Brunswick, dans un billet qu'il m'écrivit hier, me dit, 'à Berlin on paroît aussi tranquille sur le sort de la Hollande, que sur celui de Seringapatam ! On dit que le Roi de Prusse s'est fait auprès de la République Française un mérite de son inactivité. Sûr est-il que s'il avoit agi c'en étoit fait, au moins quant à la conquête de la Hollande. A-t-il bien ou mal vu ? L'avenir ne tardera probablement pas à éclaircir cette question.' En attendant, il est une considération frappante qui échappe à ce roi philanthrope et pacifique ; c'est que si la paix se fait comme la République Française la veut, c'en est fait des trônes quelsqu'ils soient. Dieu veuille les préserver de ce malheur. C'est là mon vœu de tous les jours.

“ Adieu ; conservez moi toujours une part dans votre amitié ; les tendres sentimens que je vous porte au fond de mon cœur ne s'éteindront qu'aux bornes de ma vie.”

*Postscript.*—“ Dans le moment que j'allois fermer cette lettre, je reçois une pressante sollicitation de M. Rivière en faveur de son fils. Je prends la liberté de vous l'adresser telle qu'elle est contenue dans la lettre ci-jointe, qu'il m'a écrit à ce sujet.

“ Je crois que ce qu'il demande peut lui être accordé, et j'ose hardiment assurer que le père et le fils méritent qu'on s'intéresse à eux.

“ Nous ne sommes pas plus attachés à la bonne cause, qu'ils le sont l'un et l'autre. Le père me sert à sonner le tocsin à Dresde, pour éveiller, s'il est possible, l'Electeur qui dort toujours sur le même sofa, ou pour mieux dire, sur le même volcan que le Roi de Prusse. Quoique nous n'ayons pas réussi encore dans cette entreprise, nous nous sommes cependant aperçus à différens symptomes que le sommeil du premier n'est pas une léthargie. Pardonnez—moi la liberté que je prends de vous importuner déjà pour la troisième fois par des sollicitations qui me sont adressées. Je sais combien cela est désagréable, et c'est pour cette raison même que je ne sollicite jamais rien pour moi.” *Copy.*

*Enclosure 2 :—*

LE MARQUIS DE LA PALUE to GENERAL DE STAMFORD.

1799, October 9. Emmerick.—“ L'homme que l'on proposoit offroit de procurer des connoissances de l'intérieur de la France, la force des armées, les renforts qu'elles pourroient recevoir, soit en vieilles troupes soit en conscrits, les plans du Gouvernement, les ressources des finances, les moyens ou le manque de moyens pour les subsistances, le nombre des troupes dans chacune des provinces maritimes, les dispositions du peuple de Paris et celles de divers departemens, le but des deux factions qui divisent le Gouvernement, le motif pour croire que l'une ou l'autre l'emportera, le caractère d'une partie des généraux qui sont employés aujourd'hui ou destinés à l'être, la facilité ou la difficulté de les corrompre, ou même ceux qui occupent les premières ou secondes places.”

“ On ajoutoit que ces offres étoient très étendus, mais que les raisons qui engageoient à croire qu’il étoit en état de les tenir, c’est que cet homme étoit par ses moyens au-dessus de la classe de ceux qui se chargent ordinairement de ce métier, qu’il étoit attaché à une personne qui occupoit une des premières places qu’un agent de la République puisse y remplir ; qu’il étoit son homme de confiance, qu’il avoit beaucoup d’intelligence et d’activité, et surtout cette connoissance des intrigants, qu’il étoit en général lié avec les Directeurs et le Secrétaire-Général du Directoire. L’ami qui m’avoit fait connoître cet homme, ne me repondoit pas de sa délicatesse, parcequ’il est impossible d’en croire beaucoup à un homme qui se charge du vil métier d’espion, mais il lui en croit plus que n’en ont ordinairement les gens de cette espèce. Mon ami lui avoit fait remarquer que le Gouvernement Anglois désiroit être bien instruit, mais qu’il avoit peut-être plus de raisons encore de souhaiter que les généraux des armées coalisées le fussent autant que lui ; on offroit d’établir une double correspondance, une pour l’Angleterre et l’autre pour le quartier-général de l’Archiduc.

“ Les événemens ont prouvé l’utilité de cette proposition, parcequ’il a été visible que les Autrichiens ont été prévenus, et notamment dans la dernière tentative des François sur la Souabe, faute d’avoir été avertis des desseins de leurs ennemis. Qu’il me soit permis de faire une réflexion, c’est qu’en général le Gouvernement Anglois dépense beaucoup d’argent pour avoir des agens éparses, dont la plupart sont ou infidèles ou ignorans ; il seroit beaucoup mieux servi s’il réunissoit tous ses moyens sous l’inspection d’un homme capable et intègre, en état de juger les différens rapports et l’exactitude ou la vraisemblance des faits qu’on lui transmettroit. Cette besogne seroit encore mieux faite, si des instructions précises enjoignoient les différens objets sur lesquels on voudroit être principalement instruit ; et s’il avoit à sa disposition des fonds à employer pour telle ou telle occasion ; alors on auroit des notions moins vagues, moins isolées, et rien d’inutile. Le Gouvernement Anglois plus qu’aucun de ceux de l’Europe, sait combien les demi-moyens sont souvent nuisibles.

“ Cet homme en question demande pour pris de ses services 125*l.* sterling par mois ; on observoit que cette somme pouvoit paroître forte, mais qu’on devoit songer (1) qu’il courroit les risques du supplice s’il étoit découverte, (2) qu’il étoit impossible d’acquérir les connoissances nécessaires et de former des liaisons sans des sacrifices d’argent.

“ On peut essayer cet homme, s’il n’a pas pris un autre parti pendant l’intervale qui s’est écoulé, en s’en assurant pour un trimestre. La dépense sera de 300*l.*, et de 50*l.* pour le voyage qu’il seroit obligé de faire pour s’aboucher avec moi et recevoir les instructions. On insiste expressément sur la nécessité de recevoir des ordres pour qu’on puisse les exécuter. On conçoit que si on ne limitoit pas cette correspondance sur les objets importans on auroit des remplissages inutiles.

“ On propose donc de confier à la personne qui écrit les fonds nécessaires pour cette correspondance, et de l’autoriser en même tems à ne payer cet homme que par quinzaine, pour s’assurer de

sa fidélité ; d'autant qu'il a demandé à être payé d'avance, et qu'il a insisté sur cette condition.

“ On se croit obligé de prévenir encore que le défaut de moyens a empêché qu'on ne rendit des services plus importants pour le Brabant, et qu'on a été forcé de renoncer à y entretenir des correspondances parcequ'on ne pouvoit se les procurer qu'au poids de l'or, et que d'ailleurs le défaut de réponse les rendoit inutiles ; si on croit nécessaire de les continuer, on demande quelques fonds disponibles pour cet objet, et on espère mériter assez de confiance pour être sûr qu'ils ne seroient employés qu'avec économie et intelligence.

“ On n'a jamais vu ni entendu parler d'un Colonel Malcolm employé en Brabant, et on rendra compte si le successeur qu'on lui donne, M. Maitland, suit l'ordre qu'on lui a prescrit de s'aboucher avec moi.

“ On restera à son poste dès que les services qu'on a pu rendre ont été agréables, et on peut être assuré qu'on redoublera de zèle d'après cet encouragement. On va écrire à l'homme en question pour se mettre en mesure d'entamer la correspondance dès qu'on aura reçu les fonds qu'on y destine. Ce préalable est absolument nécessaire.” *Copy.*

*Enclosure 3 :—*

LE MARQUIS DE LA PALUE TO GENERAL DE STAMFORD.

*Rapport de T. Knout.*

1799, October 26.—“ Vous êtes maintenant instruit de la capitulation des Anglois avec les Français ; je ne crois pas qu'elle vaille au de grands éloges, lorsqu'il reparoitra en Angleterre. Il vous paroitra singulier que les Français ayant pu donner la loi et, sans doute, obliger leurs ennemis à la recevoir, on se soit contenté de l'Amiral de Winter, et des 8000 prisonniers, et qu'il n'y soit parlé ni de la flotte ni des magasins du Tével enterrés. L'époque où le débarquement doit être effectué est encore bizarre, puisqu'on donne jusqu'au 30 Septembre. On persiste à croire qu'il y a des raisons secrètes et une intervention de la Prusse, dont on ignore l'issue. On parle toujours de comprendre la Hollande dans la ligne de la neutralité qui serait reculée jusqu'à la Meuse, et un gouvernement provisoire sous l'autorité Prussienne jusqu'à la paix. Cette opinion, peut-être dénuée de vérité, est universellement répandue en Hollande, et console tous les partis. On espère à ce moyen voir les ports se rouvrir, et le commerce se revivre ; si cela est, les négocians Hollandois vont être les facteurs de l'Angleterre, qui gagnera peut-être plus à ce marché qu'aux succès que ses armées auroient eus dans cette expedition. S'il n'arrive pas quelque événement de ce genre, la Hollande est perdue, et elle va devenir onéreuse même à la France. On sait de bonne part que le Directoire Batave a fait à celui de France les représentations les plus sérieuses, et n'a pas dissimulé l'impuissance où il alloit bientôt être de faire aller le gouvernement sans user de moyens spoliateurs qui seroient le complément de la ruine du pays.

“ Croyez qu'en France, tandis qu'on annonce avec emphase des victoires, qu'on proclame avec enthousiasme le retour de Buona-

parte, que bien des gens voudraient peut-être en Egypte, les gouvernements passent de mauvais quarts d'heure à cause de l'épuisement du trésor national. On a été contraint d'articuler pour l'an 7 un déficit de 130 millions. Je sais de bonne part qu'un membre du Comité des Finances a dit que dans six mois il ignorait comment on s'y prendrait pour payer même les armées.

“ On accoutume le peuple à entendre parler de paix. Boulai de la Meurthe a fait un discours qui ne vous aura sûrement pas échapé. Vous allez voir cet hyver les négociateurs en campagne, et peut-être bientôt une cessation d'hostilités, suivi d'un nouveau congrès, si on n'est pas dégouté de celui de Rastadt ; en deux mots, croyez que la France cache un squelette sous des habits dorés et boursofflés. Si on n'en est pas la dupe, si la lassitude, l'épuisement de l'autre côté ne fait pas perdre patience, si on se persuade que la resistance seule équivaudra à des victoires, et si on favorise et aide puissamment les troubles de dedans, enfin si on réduit la France aux ferments renfermés dans son sein, on recueillera le fruit de cete salutare politique. Ce que je vous mande n'est point le fruit de mon opinion ni de mes réflexions ; il appartient à un observateur éclairé, qui voit et suit les choses de près.” *Copy.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

1799, November 25. Dropmore.—“ I have this morning received your two letters of yesterday's date. With respect to the first I am sincerely obliged to you for pointing out to me any passage in my drafts to Sir C. Whitworth which struck you as liable to doubt or objection. It certainly was not my intention to take the prospects of this country for the termination of the war on any limited or confined scale. In the course of the negotiations we have hitherto had on that subject, I have more than once found my ideas of the claims and pretensions of this country very much above those of my colleagues, but never once, I think, at all lower.

“ I have altered the last sentence of the passage you refer to, by leaving out the word *now* and substituting *induce* for *enable*. If you had suggested any other alteration, I see no ground to think that I could have objected to it. You have not I think (judging from the tendency of your remarks) observed that, in the first sentence, I do not confine our objects to the security of our eastern territories, but have included the maintenance of our naval power and commerce (in the West Indies as well as in the East).

“ These words would, as I construe them, be consistent with our retaining every conquest we have made or shall make out of Europe, over any of our enemies. In Europe we have made none but Minorca, the possession of which is expressly reserved to us in the stipulations proposed by another of this very set of drafts. Whether, when the time comes to treat for peace, it will be expedient to put our claims so high as to the keeping all our conquests, or what part of them we may safely offer to restore, it is surely now very premature to determine, except as to the Cape and Ceylon ; on which, you will know, my mind was made up, when that opinion was far from general even among our colleagues.

“Where I most differ from you is, first perhaps in your view of colonial acquisitions *on the continent* of America, which I am inclined to think prejudicial to the interests of your old established sugar colonies, and also very dangerous (as indeed they have already proved themselves) to our commercial interests at home, by the field they open for wild and ungovernable speculation. On this point however, if I am wrong, I am open to conviction. But, secondly, I differ greatly with you in your view of the diminished danger from the present state of France. In all these revolutions in that country I have always seen the particular acts of cruelty and oppression soon forgotten and overlooked, while the Jacobin principle has remained unshaken, the centre of all the hopes and wishes of the adherents to that principle in every other part of Europe; and so it will be, as I believe, for a hundred more such revolutions, till the principle itself be attacked and subdued in its citadel at Paris.

“After all, these points are every one of them dependant for their right application on time, circumstance, or degree; and I have meant no more (I think I have done no more) than to leave the King’s Government open to provide as they shall judge best for the interests of our country when the moment of decision arrives.

“On referring back to my drafts to Sir C. Whitworth you will find that I have already made some complaint against General Essen, which I did from myself, and with no other knowledge of the subject than I gathered from scraps of private letters. I own I think, if the Duke of York does not mean to acquiesce in General Essen’s statement, there is but one manly line for him to follow, which is either to write himself to the Emperor of Russia, to state the truth, and to demand justice for the misrepresentations; or, which I think would be better still, to address to you an official despatch to the same effect, which you would transmit to me, and which I would direct Whitworth to communicate *in extenso* at Petersburg.

“If, for any reason which I do not know, he is unwilling to do this, I am very ready to send, in the same manner, any other statement of facts, prepared and communicated to me in such official form as may be preferred.

“We may daily expect the arrival of General Koutousow. Nothing is more important than that his mind should be conciliated by attentions which, I am afraid, without very special directions, it is not the practice of our officers to shew to foreigners.

“I transmit to you officially a proposal of the Emperor of Russia for conferring orders on some of our officers. I hope it will not escape your attention on this occasion that nothing of this sort has yet been done for any Russian officer, military or naval, except the swords given to Tchitchagoff and another admiral who retired from the command.” *Copy.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT WORONZOW.

1799, November 26. Dropmore.—“Popham n’est pas encore parti, mais j’espère bien qu’il ira demain. Hammond vous enverra demain la copie de la réponse du Roi à l’Empereur, aussi bien que

le précis que vous demandez si je puis trouver le tems de le faire aujourd'hui, et je ferai l'impossible pour cela. Je ne puis pas encore vous envoyer de réponse à votre lettre, étant un peu embarrassé à cet égard, ni trouvant pas convenable que les officiers du Roi reçoivent des marques de grâce de la part de l'Empereur données avec profusion, sans qu'il y ait quelque réciprocité. La première fois que nous nous verrons nous en causerons.

“La victoire du fou et du chevalier n'est due entre mes mains qu'à un heureux hazard. Je ne sais si un joueur plus habile que moi ne pourroit pas obliger le Roi de se réfugier dans le coin fatal, mais c'est une leçon pour tous les Rois de se tenir en avant avec fermeté et courage.”

*Postscript.*—“Buonaparte a insisté que tous les soldats prisonniers ici fassent partie des 8000. Il ne sera relâché aucun marin jusqu'à ce que tous les soldats l'aient été. Nous y consentons (comme vous le jugez bien), mais le trait est singulier.” *Copy.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO COUNT WORONZOW.

1799, November 28. Downing Street.—“Je viens de recevoir votre lettre, et je ne puis assez vous remercier de la communication de vos idées. La nôtre a été de donner à notre ministre à Petersbourg toute la latitude possible pour faire quelque bien, s'il ne peut pas faire le mieux. Il est impossible de douter un instant que le seul vrai plan qu'un homme d'état, ayant à sa disposition les armées Russe et Autrichienne, ferait pour la campagne prochaine ne soit précisément celle de votre lettre. S'il y entroit quelque possibilité de succès, le Chevalier Whitworth est autorisé de s'en occuper. Mais je doute très fort qu'il y réussisse, et même si le traité étoit fait et conclu, je douterois encore plus de l'exécution d'un plan où les progrès du maréchal Souvorow et de son armée dépendroient toujours de la co-opération effective (et pas simulée) de deux armées Autrichiennes sur sa gauche et sa droite.

“Je conviens, et je sens parfaitement bien, que le second plan n'offre pas la perspective d'un succès qui soit par lui-même également décisif que seroit l'entrée d'une forte armée en Franche Comté sous les ordres du premier général du siècle. Mais ne pouvant y réussir, il s'agira de voir ce que l'on pourra y substituer; et, en vérité, je crois que l'effet des opérations projetées dans la Méditerranée, et dans le canal, réduira d'abord l'Espagne à la nécessité d'une paix séparée, et puis mettra le Directoire (je dois dire le Consulat) dans l'impossibilité de se soutenir contre les Jacobins de l'un coté et les Royalistes de l'autre, et l'obligera d'avoir recours au rétablissement du Roi comme seul moyen de unité pour eux-mêmes.

“Les nouvelles d'Italie par la malle d'aujourd'hui sont très bonnes. Les Autrichiens ont battu les François à deux reprises près de Tessino, et leur ont pris 4,000 prisonniers. Mais ce qui est plus important c'est qu'ils ont enfin reconnu la nécessité de faire ce qu'ils auroient dû faire il y a trois mois, de reconstituer l'armée Piémontoise en ne lui exigeant aucun autre serment que celui de fidélité à leur propre souverain, de reconnoître le Comte de St.

André dans sa qualité du Lieutenant-Général du Roi de Sardaigne en Piémont, et de donner même des espérances à ce Roi pour son prompt retour à Turin.

“Les nouvelles de chez vous ne sont pas également consolantes, mais avec le tems on peut, ce me semble, espérer que la nécessité de se tenir réuni contre l'ennemi se fera sentir.” *Copy.*

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, November 29. Harley Street.—“Je vous envoie le brouillon de ma dépêche que j'envoie ce soir par mon courier. Je ne sais si vous pourrez déchiffrer ce mauvais barbouillage, et je vous prie de me le renvoyer par le même homme qui porte cette boîte.

“Vous verrez que je vous fais parler, et j'espère que vous ne me désavouerez pas. Je connois le caractère de l'Empereur et comment il faut se prendre pour le faire revenir de ses mesures violentes, mais je ne puis le faire de mon propre cru. Il faut que je me serve de votre nom, et je l'ai fait dans les termes les plus mesurés et le plus flateurs pour lui. Au reste, ce ne sont que des vérités, et vous pensez sur ce sujet conformément à ce que je pense. Vous verrez que j'indique le grand plan d'opération, mais à son défaut, je fais mention de ceux que proposera le chevalier Whitworth, en cas que tout est rompu entre nous et l'Autriche. J'espère que vous écrirez au Chevalier sur le grand plan, si nos affaires s'accrochent avec l'Autriche, et que vous songerez aussi à l'envoi de mylord Mulgrave auprès de Souvorow. Je serois venu vous voir si je n'étois pas encore tourmenté de mon rhumatisme.

“Pouvez-vous me dire de quelle date sont vos lettres de Vienne, et si la terrible missive de mon Empereur à celui d'Allemagne a fait quelque effet, car elle devoit être arrivée à Vienne entre le cinq et le six de ce mois.”

THE EARL OF MORNINGTON to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1799, November 29. Fort William.—“I have received your letter of the 1st of June, and return you many thanks for your kindness to Lady Mornington and Richard. I am quite satisfied with the reasons which the former has given against undertaking the voyage to India; and Richard's progress is a great source of comfort to me. My health continues excellent, and indeed rather improves; and I begin to conform to the place, and to take great interest in the success of a variety of plans which I have in contemplation for the security and improvement of this magnificent empire: which *now* does not depend on the *thread of opinion*, but is as firmly fixed as any root of the British power in any quarter of the globe, with the single exception of the Island of Great Britain.

“You seem surprised at the earnestness with which I spoke of honours, and you tell me that I must ultimately look to *English effect*. But I must look to English effect through *Indian effect*; and I feel every hour that, *for the latter*, the highest rank and honours are indispensable. This is so much my conscientious opinion with regard to this Government that (if I am deemed unworthy of such

distinctions) my decided judgment is that some person should be sent here who either actually possesses them, or may receive them soon after his arrival. I thought this essential when I wrote to you by the *Eurydice*; but after what has passed, if I am left without such distinctions, it will be imputed either to disapprobation, or indifference towards my late measures, or to neglect of my just claims; and, in any case, my authority will be shaken both with our subjects and allies.

“The opinion of the public here is indeed an honour to me such as I can never receive in the shape of title; unless in as much as that form shall express to me the approbation of my friends and country. But the public opinion here will be affected by any coldness in England—and am I to expect to see my claims undervalued at home? or can I bear, without the most poignant regret, the idea that more justice is done to me here, than by those whom I quitted with so much grief?”

“Give my best love to my Lady; I mean to send you a menagerie of birds by the next ships.

“Your Mr. Spenser Smith has not written to me more than once since I have been in India; I wish you would direct your new ambassador to be more communicative. I beg you will not allow any of your tribe to interfere in the affairs of Persia or Candahar without instructions from me; this is a point of great importance.”

2 *Enclosures.*

*Enclosure 1:—*

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GEORGE HARRIS to THE EARL OF MORNINGTON.

1799, November 12. Madras.—“The army which by your Lordship’s directions, proceeded to the capital of the late Tippoo Sultan, and achieved the conquest of Mysore, resolved upon the plains of Seringapatam to request your Lordship’s acceptance of a star and badge of the Order of St. Patrick, made from the jewels of the Sultan, as a mark of their high respect.

“In the name and by the desire of that army, I have now the honor to present your Lordship with the star and badge.

“In performing this pleasing duty, I am proud to feel and to acknowledge, that the splendid success of the late campaign must, under Divine Providence, be in justice referred to the instructive wisdom and characteristic energy of your Lordship’s councils. Those councils have formed a memorable era in the history of India. From their effects the Company has gained a new source of increasing prosperity; and in their operation the wide-spread interests of the British empire in the East, being consolidated and raised on a firm and durable basis, have attained an eminence of elevation and security hitherto unknown.

“The glory of having been made by your Lordship instrumental to the acquirement of some of these inestimable advantages, excites in my mind feelings of satisfaction and gratitude which no language can adequately convey.

“A copy of the letter to me from Major-General Floyd, President of the Prize Committee, I have the honor to enclose.” *Copy.*

*Enclosure 2 :—*

MAJOR GENERAL J. FLOYD to LIEUTENANT-GENERAL HARRIS,  
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

1799, November 9. Choultry Plain.—“The army that under your command achieved the conquest of the empire of the late Tippoo Sultan, in the spring of this year, being anxious to offer the Earl of Mornington, Knight of St. Patrick, Governor-General, whose wisdom prepared and directed that event, some marks of its high esteem, has caused a star and badge of the Order of St. Patrick to be prepared, in which as many of the jewels as could be found suitable were taken from the Treasury of Tippoo.

“I have now the pleasure of sending you the same, in a gold box, and wooden case.

“I have the honor to request you will be pleased to present the star and badge to the Earl of Mornington, in the name of the army, as a mark of its respect.” *Copy.*

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, November 29. Wimbledon.—“Although the letter you read to me yesterday does not add a great deal to the apprehensions formerly entertained of the improbability of a co-operation of Russian with Austrian troops, it certainly does not diminish them, and we ought to keep the circumstance in view. If it turns out so, it would be wise to make some variation in our plan. In that case, if the troops now under Sovarrow were to come straight to Leghorn, and from thence to join our force in the Mediterranean, the junction would take place months before we could expect any force from the Crimea, and it would relieve us from a difficulty which, I am much afraid, will be found nearly unsurmountable, I mean that of finding transports for conveying troops from the Crimea to the Mediterranean. Russia has no trade, and therefore I don't well see how there can be ships to carry troops in that part of Russia. There is very little in the Baltic, but as the Dardanelles are shut up against them at all times before the present junction of Turkey and Russia, I don't well see how there can be any trade in the Black Sea to give us the expectation of any transport for troops beyond what may be got from the ships of war the Emperor of Russia may have in those seas. Of all this however others may be able to inform you better than I can. If we bring Sovarrow's army down to the Mediterranean, we will then keep the troops now with us to act in the North seas and the Channel, in place of sending them as proposed to the Mediterranean. If we should be drove, from the implacability of Russia, to adopt this plan, it would have one advantage over all others. It would very much facilitate the obtaining and lessening the expense of transports in the course of next year, which I am afraid we shall find our chief difficulties if we are to be carrying on operations on a great scale from this country, whence every material and implement of warfare must be transported by sea. It strikes me to be very material to make demonstrations as early as possible in the Mediterranean, as it will tend very much to distract the enemy as to all our views next campaign, and probably prevent them

from sending as much as they would otherwise do against the Austrian armies."

*Postscript.*—"You are aware that the above is meant only in the event of our not being able to reconcile the Russians and Austrians to act together."

LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

1799, November 30. Dropmore.—"I received your letter here yesterday, and I have in consequence of what you there state, in which I fully concur, written another despatch to Whitworth, of which Hammond will send you the draft, which I trust will meet your ideas.

"According to the former plan, shipping would no doubt be extremely difficult to be procured, and as we want to use Popham for the service in these seas, it would be very important to send with him or after him some naval officer capable of doing in the ports of the Black Sea, what he did this year in the Baltic. Where you are to find such a one I know not, but perhaps his recommendation would be the best. If not, you will perhaps apply to Lord Spencer on the subject."

*Postscript.*—"If Knox does not return immediately from Paris he may be hindered by frost from going. Why should not some active military officer of inferior rank go in the first instance? But do not detain Popham for him. He ought now to be there if it had been possible, and every hour is of great consequence as to his arrival."

LORD GRENVILLE to WILLIAM WICKHAM.

1799, November 30. Dropmore.—"It would require another volume as large as that which I now send for your amusement, if I were to enter into any discussion of the eventful scene to which you have been a witness, or were to express to you the infinite obligations which I feel myself under to you for the whole of your conduct in these trying circumstances. Your letters have been throughout the whole my chief guide and direction, and they have, in this last instance, prevented my falling into a very great error. It was very reluctantly that I abandoned the hope that Suwarow was really the instrument destined by Providence to rescue us from all the mischief to which we have been exposed. But this delusion like others is dissipated, and it is plain that the issue of a last effort cannot be entrusted to his hands. When I speak of a last effort you will not understand me to speak of the separate exertions of this country for its own defence. Those, I am persuaded, in spite of difficulties could be continued, and I trust, in spite of discouragements and disappointments, would be continued for several years more, if it could be shewn to the country that it was necessary. But for continental exertion, if the time be not already past, you see enough to be convinced that one more campaign is its utmost limit.

"I am confident that with the Russian auxiliaries, or even without them, the means of Austria are abundantly sufficient to make that campaign decisive. Enough so, I should think to force the restoration of monarchy, but certainly enough to drive France

back to her old limits. Whether Austria will see the thing in this light, or will act for this purpose, depends on the windings of a policy so perverse and crooked that my mind is utterly unable to follow them.

“ We are making quietly preparations for an immense effort next year against France itself in support of the Royalists. We are obliged to speak with reserve on this point both to Vienna and Petersburg, that our schemes may not be known long before they are ripe for execution. You can much assist us by your activity and judgment in opening communications with the Royalists in the middle, east, and south of France, and by giving them every degree of encouragement and aid. The insurrection broke out in the Vendée and Normandy sooner than we wished, but, being once on foot, we must endeavour to support it. Our first disembarkation of money and arms has been very happily made. Our second is arrived off the coast, and seems likely to be landed without any difficulty. The situation of affairs at Paris appears to be in the highest degree favourable to the establishment and progress of the Royalist cause.

“ Bonaparte’s object is understood to be the establishing a sort of American constitution with himself for President. The success of this must evidently depend upon his influence with the army, and on his keeping the Jacobins in subjection by employing the troops in sufficient force in the interior. How this is to be done consistently with the prosecution of an Austrian and Vendée war I cannot conceive, nor, in all probability, has he any such hope. He must therefore look to negotiations of peace. But if there is a grain of common sense in the councils of Austria that resource will fail him ; and he will then have no alternative but to prepare for his voyage to Cayenne, or to throw himself upon the Royalists.

“ All these hopes, however, are dependant on the co-operation of Austria and Russia for another war, and on our succeeding, first, in establishing the Vendée insurrection in force enough to maintain itself during the winter, and, secondly, in the enterprises which we have in view for supporting and seconding their efforts. It is in these respects that I look with anxiety for your assistance. You will see by my despatches how great a latitude I have thought myself justified in giving you on that subject. We have had experience enough of each other to make us both feel secure, I in giving it, and you in using it. You will, I trust, do so to the very utmost extent of your own judgment. Consider how long a time it requires to ask and to receive instructions in Swabia, especially when our communications with the Continent are often suspended for weeks and fortnights at a time. You see what our object is. It is to find employment for the French Government in the interior, so as to prevent their crushing the Vendée during the winter. It is also to procure active and efficient co-operation for the Vendée, and for ourselves, in the spring and summer. For this purpose we are willing to make large sacrifices. We are doing much on the side of the north-west provinces, and all you can do elsewhere will be highly useful, and acceptable to us.

“ Some of our projects point, as you will see, to the south of

France. We are defective in that quarter even as to a general knowledge of the dispositions of that part of the country ; and still more as to any means or projects of co-operation. And indeed, speaking generally, your ideas of the internal state of the whole country, though they would often come late, would always be acceptable to me." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MINTO.

*Private.*

1799, November 30. Dropmore.—“ My packet will be so uncommonly large, that I will not add to it by writing much to you in this form. I see with great pleasure that necessity is doing more than reason or justice could to bring my old friend Thugut to some explanations and advances towards a good understanding with those who are fighting his battles for him. Whatever be the motive, it is clearly our business to make the best of it ; and it is a curious circumstance that, while Sir Charles Whitworth is apprizing us of the failure of an Austrian intrigue to supplant us at Petersburg, we are instructing him to use our influence there to the utmost to support the interests of Austria herself. I really fear it is too late. Far from blaming the Emperor of Russia, I must say if I were a Russian Minister, I should be very deaf to the remonstrances of England on the subject.

“ I will however hope the best ; and you will see that we shall not be discouraged by failing in one or two instances, from making every exertion to obtain from him all the aid he will give, and in whatever shape we can get it.

“ We have a report here that Starhemberg is to be sent to Russia, and that Deitrichstein is to come to replace him. I have no reason to be very fond of Starhemberg, nor is his character one which it is possible to speak of with much respect. But, on the whole, I see no reason to think we should gain by any exchange, unless we could have here a man of sense and candour and probity, and who was in Thugut's confidence sufficiently to undeceive him in many of the points in which he (I trust very erroneously) judges of us by himself. This we certainly should not have in Dietrichstien ; and there would be something so offensive in his nomination after his infamous falsehoods in Switzerland, that I could not but object to it in the King's name, and that most decidedly. It would however be much better to prevent such an *éclat* ; and if the thing be really intended, which I still think very doubtful, I trust to you for preventing its ever coming to the point of a formal notification and refusal.” *Copy.*

INTELLIGENCE FROM BERLIN.

NOTE [FROM H. FAGEL].

1799, November.—“ Le Général de Stamford a écrit au Prince d'Orange, le 28 Octobre dernier, que lorsqu'il étoit arrivé à Berlin M. de Luchesini en étoit déjà parti pour Paris, et que quelqu'un qui se flatte d'être dans sa confiance l'a assuré que sa mission en France

n'a aucun but déterminé ; que ses instructions sont vagues, remplies pour les trois quarts d'éloges de sa personne ; que ce sont ses rares talents et ses profondes connoissances, joints au zèle qu'il a constamment manifesté pour le bien de l'état, qui ont décidé le Roi à le charger d'une mission délicate, où il s'agit d'éclairer les démarches de la cour de Vienne, de s'instruire à fond de la situation intérieure de la France, et de découvrir, s'il est possible, les vues secrètes et les projets que couve le consul, et de sonder ses intentions à l'égard de la Prusse.

“ Que la même personne lui avoit observé que le Marquis, quoique haïssant la maison d'Autriche, étoit parti de Berlin dans des sentimens plus modérés et plus favorablement disposé pour la cour de Vienne qu'il ne l'a été autrefois ; et que voyant, on ne peut mieux, le danger qui menace l'Europe, et la Prusse en particulier, il étoit à presumer que cette vue le rendroit prudent, circonspect, et moins susceptible de se laisser emporter par l'impetuositè de son caractère.

“ Le Général de Stamford y ajoute que, d'après son opinion sur cette mission et celui qui s'en trouve chargé, il voit trop le mal qu'elle produira pour espérer qu'il pourra être balancé par quelque avantage, soit en faveur de l'intérêt général, soit en faveur de de l'intérêt particulier de la Prusse.

“ Il ajoute encore une anecdote qu'il tient de M. de Luchesini, pour faire voir jusqu'où va l'ascendant du Sieur Lombard sur l'esprit du Roi ; c'est que quand Luchesini a pris congé de sa Majesté, elle lui a dit, 'je suis d'autant plus charmé que vous ayez bien voulu vous charger de cette mission que mon secrétaire du cabinet Lombard en est au comble de la joye, et que je sçais que mes intérêts ne sçauroient être en des meilleures mains que les vôtres'.

“ Dans une seconde lettre, en date du 15 Novembre, le Général Stamford écrit : 'il est arrivé hier un courier de Francfort sur le Main, expédié par M. Formey, Résident Prussien en cette ville, portant la nouvelle au Roi que le General Augereau a reçu ordre, le 9 de ce mois par le télégraphe, de dénoncer l'armistice en Allemagne, et qu'il a exécuté cet ordre vis-a-vis de M. d'Albini et du Général Simbschön.' Augereau doit avoir dit qu'il croyoit que la négociation dont se trouvoit charge M. de Cobenzl n'avoit eu pour but qu'une prolongation d'armistice, mais que c'étoit la paix, et une paix séparée avec l'Autriche, que vouloit la France, et non une simple trêve d'armes.

“ Les troupes Prussiennes, dit-on, prendront poste à Cuxhaven le 23 de ce mois, et M. de Schulz, ministre du roi à Hambourg, quittera cette ville le 20 pour se mettre, comme commissaire civil, à la tête du detachment destiné à occuper ce poste. M. le Duc de Brunswick est chargé de l'exécution pour ce qui regarde la partie militaire. C'est aujourd'hui le ton à Berlin de crier contre ce qu'on appelle la tyrannie Angloise, ton qui fait rire sous cape la tyrannie Française.”

#### H. FAGEL to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1799, November-December]—“ I forgot to mention this morning that I had been expressly desired by the Hereditary Prince of Orange

to deliver to your Lordship, with His Serene Highness's compliments, copies of the letter and proposals he sent a few days ago to His Royal Highness the Duke of York, and to Mr. Dundas, respecting the formation into regiments of the Dutch loyalists now at the Isle of Wight. I have the honour of enclosing those papers."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, December 1. Stowe.—“The post which brought me your letter announcing a copy of what you had written to General Stamford, did not keep that promise for you, and I have therefore written to Hammond to ask for it.

“I enclose to you copies of two more letters which I have received from Brunswick, the first of which will testify to the disinterestedness of my correspondent, and the second to the zeal and industry of his active mind. I would have waited till I had seen your letter to him, before I enclosed these to you, if I had not thought it useful to send you this picture of his own speculations, before you should finally send to him what is to constitute his instructions for Berlin. I must very fairly own that I cannot feel extremely sanguine as to the success of our old project for detaching Hesse, Cassel and Saxony from Prussian neutrality; but while we feel the inconvenience of this Berlin system, we must either resist it, weaken it, or turn it to our advantage by deriving at least from it such benefit as we may. If we had succeeded in Holland, we might perhaps in that success have found the means of resisting it, not by open hostility, but by the more near and immediate pressure of the confederate armies of Russia and England, strengthened by their joint possession of The United Provinces. We have failed in Holland, and that hope of resisting Prussian neutrality is no longer open to us. General Stamford's attempts to undermine it would seem therefore to be all that is left to us to try in that quarter, unless you agreed with me, as you probably do, that 40,000 Russians may do better active service, if the war continues, than by ranging themselves in the body of an army of observation. If indeed the Emperor of Russia should be so far disgusted with the events of Swisserland as to refuse himself to more active measures in the next campaign, then I should much incline to think that he might be at least persuaded to adopt this idea, and take his share of the northern influence rather than abandon it entirely to the Cabinet of Berlin.

“It is likewise in the same sense that I have talked of the possibility of our deriving some benefit at least from the Prussian neutrality, and as this part of the question depends upon the good or bad hopes for the next campaign, I cannot well judge of it without knowing more than I do of the grounds of your hopes. Be that however as it may, the difficulty of Holland is one which I fear your most sanguine ideas promise no good solution to in the next campaign; if then you look there for nothing good through the course of hostility, is it clear that it might not become prudent to consider whether England and Russia, not able to liberate Holland by themselves or to engage Prussia in hostile measures

against France for that object, might not blend themselves with Prussian neutrality, and obtain through those worse means a better situation for Holland in the moment, and such a share for themselves in the northern neutrality, as may lessen the preponderant influence which the King of Prussia now holds by it in the north of Germany? I am far from being blind to the inconveniences which would result from this, and they are in some lights such as to be extremely discouraging; but if they flag at Petersburg, if they negociate at Vienna, our choice is the choice of evils only, and in that view only it is that I would discuss the question which I suggest to you. You will be soon tired of the letters to me and from me. I hope to see you on Saturday or Sunday, probably Saturday."

*Enclosure:—*

GENERAL DE STAMFORD TO THOMAS GRENVILLE.

1799, November 11. Brunswick.—“ Depuis la tournure facheuse qu’ont pris les affaires tant en Suisse qu’en Hollande, je ne cesse de réfléchir aux moyens d’en prévenir les suites pour que nous ne perdions pas tout le fruit d’une campagne dont les heureux succès sembloient nous présager la fin de cette guerre désastreuse qui, depuis huit ans, désole l’Europe. Je vais soumettre à vos lumières les moyens que je crois propres à nous procurer cet avantage, et que je fonde sur les dispositions actuelles des cours d’Allemagne, qui, jusqu’ici, ont adhéré au système politique, ou pour mieux dire, impolitique de la Prusse.

“Après l’espèce de schisme que la paix de Basle a établi entre nord et le midi de l’empire—Germanique, les princes du nord de l’Allemagne avoient considéré le roi de Prusse comme le noyau de la confédération que devoit assurer leur neutralité, et autour duquel ils devoient se rassembler pour cet effet. Tant que les armes des puissances coalisées ont été couronnées par les brillants succès, ils ont pu espérer de la conserver, et de voir même renaitre, malgré l’inconcevable inaction du Roi de Prusse, l’intégrité de l’Empire—Germanique qui sembloit perdue par le Congrès de Rastadt. Mais, aujourd’hui tout a changé de face.

“Les revers que les puissances alliées ont éprouvés en Suisse, et en Hollande, l’ascendant décidé que les François semblent avoir pris à Berlin, qui ne permet plus de considérer le Roi de Prusse comme le noyau autour duquel le nord de l’Allemagne peut se tenir réuni, la déclaration de l’Empereur de Russie aux princes Allemands, et le besoin où les François se trouvent d’exploiter et de piller ce nord pour nourrir leurs armées, et fournir à leurs déprédations, désir qui les a dévoré depuis longtems et qu’ils satisfairont aussitôt que les circonstances leur en fourniront le moyen, toutes ces causes réunies ont inspiré le plus justes craintes aux princes du nord de l’Allemagne et les ont mis dans des dispositions propres à leur faire goûter enfin les seules mesures dont ils peuvent attendre leur salut. Outre le peu de sûreté que donne pour la neutralité du nord de l’Allemagne la Prusse qui, pendant que la ville de Hambourg contribuoit fidèlement à sa quotepart des fraix pour la ligne

de démarcation, souffroit que le Directoire François extorquât à différentes reprises plusieurs millions à cette même ville, sous les pretextes les plus frivoles ; outre le peu qu'il y a à attendre pour les princes du nord de l'Allemagne d'un Roi qui se croit le plus heureux des monarques s'il peut s'isoler politiquement au point que son influence soit aussi peu signifiante que celle de la Suède et du Dannemarck, et qui ne veut tirer l'épée que lorsqu'il se verra attaqué dans ses propres foyers ; outre, dis-je, ces considérations, il en est d'autres encore d'une conséquence aussi majeure qui dans l'état actuel des choses n'échappent plus à ces princes qui se sont adossés à la Prusse. Ils sentent que si les Cours de Londres, de St. Petersbourg, et de Vienne venoient à conclure une paix avantageuse pour elles, sans l'intervention de la Prusse, ces mêmes Cours pourroient s'accorder à leur imposer des taxes, comme n'ayant pas partagé avec le reste de l'Empire Germanique les dépenses de la guerre, quoiqu'ayant joui de la neutralité la plus lucrative. Ils comprennent qu'il y auroit de la justice à les traiter ainsi, à les décimer pour ainsi dire, et à faire en quelque sorte la paix à leurs dépens ; et ils prévoient que, dans un cas pareil, cette Prusse jalouse de son repos jusqu'à sacrifier ses propres possessions, sa gloire, sa considération en Europe, sa famille, et le respect de sa propre nation, ne prendroit pas les armes pour les défendre. D'après les dispositions que ces diverses considérations ont fait naître chez ces princes, il me semble qu'il ne s'agiroit donc plus que de leur présenter un moyen sûr de parer aux inconvéniens et aux dangers qu'ils redoutent, soit que les Cours alliées sortent victorieuses de cette guerre, soit que la Cour de Vienne quitte la lutte par une paix séparée, ce qui attirera inmanquablement le fléau de la guerre sur ce nord d'Allemagne qui, envisagé par son côté moral, est déjà plus qu'à demi révolutionné. Ce moyen, à ce que je crois, se trouveroit dans une coalition de ce même nord, laquelle, laissant le roi de Prusse dans son inaction et sa nullité politique, garantiroit d'une invasion de la part des François non seulement cette partie de l'Allemagne mais peut-être l'Allemagne entière. Une armée de 40 mille hommes Russes, à laquelle se joindroient 20 mille hommes de troupes des maisons de Saxe, 16 mille des maisons de Hesse, et, s'il étoit possible, 12 mille hommes Hanoveriens, formeroient de 88 mille hommes, qui se portant entre le haut et le bas—Rhin sur le point de Mayence, tandis que les autres Puissances agiroient sur les autres points, changeroit bientôt la face des affaires, et conserveroit intacte toute cette partie de l'Allemagne qui seule encore n'a pas servie à assouvir la rapacité des François. Je sens que cette coalition du nord de l'Allemagne seroit insuffisante pour remplir le but pour lequel je la propose, si la Cour de Vienne sortoit de la lutte ; mais, pendant qu'on est incertain de ce qu'elle fera, je me persuade qu'il seroit à propos qu'on essayât du moins de la former. Vous vous rappelerez, sans doute, que j'ai souvent désiré qu'on cherchât à depouiller la Prusse de tous ces princes qui se sont mis sous ses ailes, parceque je m'imaginois, qu'en y réussissant, on la rattacheroit par ce moyen à la coalition. Mon opinion à cet égard est encore la même, et je suis presque sûr que l'Electeur de Saxe et les Landgraves de Hesse accédroient volontiers à la mesure dont

je viens de parler si la proposition leur en étoit faite par les Cours de Londres et de Petersbourg. Depuis que nous nous sommes quittés, et que je m'afflige, plus que vous ne pensez, de ne plus vous voir et de m'entretenir avec vous, j'ai cherché de tous côtés à travailler pour la bonne cause, autant que ma position et la pénurie de mes moyens pouvoient me le permettre. En conséquence je n'ai pas cessé depuis mon retour à Brunswick de faire représenter à la Cour de Dresde par son Chargé d'Affaires qui réside ici, le Conseiller de Légation M. Rivière, les dangers auxquels l'expose son adhésion au système Prussien ; et comme je sais par le Duc de Brunswick, que le Duc de Wiemar est venu fortement à l'appui de mes représentations, sans que ni l'un ni l'autre soit informé de mes démarches, j'attribue à celles de ce dernier le changement dans la manière d'envisager l'état des choses qu'on remarque chez l'Electeur de Saxe. Au reste, si le plan dont je viens de vous entretenir avec cette confiance que m'a inspiré l'indulgence avec laquelle vous avez si souvent écouté mes idées, venoit à être goûté, il faudroit nécessairement qu'on mit la main à son exécution sans perdre un seul instant ; car les distances où les Cabinets se trouvent, les uns des autres, et que les vents contraires doublent et triplent souvent, mettent une telle lenteur dans les communications qu'ils ont à se faire, que la marche rapide de l'ennemi et des événemens les trouve presque toujours hors de mesure, quand celui—là porte déjà les premiers coups.

“ J'ai reçu une lettre de notre cher Comte Panin, en date du 19 du mois passé, dans laquelle il regrette de ce que, par un mésentendu, il lui est échappé, pendant qu'il étoit à Gatschina chez l'Empéreur, une occasion sûre de m'écrire fort au long sur les grandes affaires, ainsi que sur celles qui le régardent personnellement. Il me fait espérer que cette première lettre sera bientôt suivie d'une seconde. Il en a de moi déjà trois très-volumineuses ; et si vous trouvez que celle—ci le soit trop, vous devez savoir gré à une violente toux qui me déchire la poitrine de ce qu'elle ne l'est pas davantage, car j'aurois encore mille choses à vous dire.”

*Postscript.*—“ Le Sieur Knout m'a mandé dans sa dernière lettre que tout sera d'abord en règle pour correspondance à établir, dès qu'il en aura reçu l'ordre. Ainsi je n'attends plus que celui que vous voudrez bien me faire parvenir à ce sujet.”

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, December 2. Wimbledon.—“ Along with this you will receive for your perusal a letter I last night wrote to Mr. Pitt, with the reason why I did so. I think you mentioned your intention not to be in town this week, and therefore I thought of our all meeting here to-morrow forenoon this week. I don't think there is any chance of having a serious conversation on that or any other subject in town on Wednesday, interrupted by a levée and a Trinity House dinner ; and therefore a meeting either on Thursday or Friday at Wimbledon (unless you are to be in town otherwise on those days) will answer the purpose better. Be so good as

return me the papers when you have done with them. Mr. Pitt does not take the difficulty I feel. I need not say either to him or to you that, of all the ideas that ever entered my head, none can be so favourite a one in every view as a successful enterprise on Brest, and shall be truly sorry if it cannot be attempted on a scale which promises success. It is not on the score of expense that I am alarmed. But I have my serious doubts if all the maritime resources of this country can be so brought and concentrated together in the execution of the details necessary on such an occasion as that of sending to sea *at once*, and directed to *one point*, an army of 70 thousand men, with all its necessary accompaniments."

LORD GRENVILLE TO SIR CHARLES WHITWORTH.

*Private.*

1799, December 2. Dropmore.—“I have long been a collector of maps, and have lately been arranging and completing my collection. Among them in which I am most deficient are the maps of Russia. These I am informed cannot now be procured without the special permission of the Emperor, and it seems to me more respectful that I should request you to submit that application to him in my name than that I should take any other mode of applying for it.

“May I further trouble you, if you succeed in obtaining the permission, to undertake for me the commission of procuring the maps, so as to form as good an atlas as can be put together of the Russian Empire, and its different provinces, and to send them to me by a messenger—whenever one happens to be going—secured in such a manner as to be free from danger of spoiling by the sea or rain.” *Copy.*

COUNT WORONZOW TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, December 6. Harley Street.—“Je vous rend mille grâce de la communication que vous avez bien voulu me faire des dépêches du Chevalier Whitworth. Vous savez vous-même combien je désaprouve la rupture violente et inpolitique de l'Empereur avec son confrère de Vienne, mais que puis-je faire autre chose que de continuer écrire comme je le fais, me servant toujours de votre nom comme vous l'avez vue par le brouillon que je vous ai communiqué. J'ai écrit avec plus de liberté à Rastopchin, et je le ferai encor par un courier que j'enverrai exprès mardi prochain. Vous verrez par la copie de la lettre du Comte Stakelberg que je vous envoie, que si la cour de Vienne fait quelqu'instance auprès de Souvorow, il y a possibilité à le retenir et gagner par là le tems à rapatrier tous les différens. S'il y avoit auprès du généralissime un militaire en qui il auroit de la fiance comme dans mylord Mulgrave, il auroit pu l'engager à aller si lentement qu'au moins il auroit fait si peu de chemin que le contre-ordre arivé de Petersbourg le ramèneroit bientôt sur le même point d'où il étoit parti. Souvorow ne peut pas désirer de ne pas achever ce qu'il a toujours ambitionné, c'est-à-

dire de rétablir la monarchie en France. Il n'est amoureux que de la gloire, et ce n'est que par là qu'on le gagne et qu'on peut le mener."

*Enclosure:—*

COUNT DE STACKELBERG to COUNT WORONZOW.

1799, November 18. Augsburg.—“ J'adresse à votre Excellence la présente uniquement afin d'avoir l'honneur de lui accuser la réception de la lettre qu'elle a bien voulu m'écrire le 1<sup>er</sup> Octobre. Sachant votre Excellence parfaitement instruite de tout ce qui a trait à la détermination du retour en Russie de l'armée de Monsieur le Maréchal Prince Italique, je n'entrerai dans aucun détail à ce sujet. J'ai le projet au départ des troupes de me rendre à Munich pour y attendre des instructions ultérieures de la part de la Cour. La marche de l'armée est jusqu'à ce moment déterminé sur deux colonnes, passant l'une sous les ordres du Maréchal par Prague et la Bohême, l'autre sous le commandement du Général Rosenberg par Lintz et l'Autriche. Le départ des troupes est fixé aux derniers jours de ce mois, *mais il ne serait pas impossible que leur marche fut retardée ou ralentie en conséquence d'instances vis-à-vis de Monsieur le Maréchal de la part de la Cour de Vienne.*” *Copy.*

GENERAL DE STAMFORT to the PRINCESS OF ORANGE.

1799, December 6. Brunswick.—“ Quoique je sois très éloigné de me flatter que j'opérerai aujourd'hui plus de bien par ma présence à Berlin que je n'ai fait précédemment, en m'y trouvant dans des circonstances infiniment plus favorables à mes vues, je ne me suis pas moins déterminé sur le champ d'y retourner, sur ce que votre altesse royale m'a fait le grace de m'écrire ; et je me serois déjà mis en route, si ma voiture, non moins détraquée que ma santé par toutes mes courses antérieures, n'avoit pas besoin d'une forte réparation. Le seul bien que je pourrois espérer d'effectuer par mon séjour à Berlin, ce seroit, si je trouvois occasion d'approcher du roi, de faire entendre à sa majesté que le bien ou le mal qui résultera nécessairement pour elle et pour l'Europe de l'événement que vient de se passer en France, dépendra absolument du parti qu'elle prendra. Mais il y a bien peu d'apparence que le roi, dont le répugnance pour tout ce qu'on peut appeler *mesure vigoureuse* va chaque jour en augmentant, veuille écouter des personnes qu'il sait d'avance vouloir lui conseiller des mesures de ce genre. D'ailleurs on commence déjà à croire à Berlin que Buonaparte désire sincèrement le paix ; le Duc lui-même, quoiqu'il s'en cache, vis-à-vis de moi surtout, n'est pas éloigné de cette opinion, come votre altesse royale le remarquera dans la lettre qu'il m'adressa ces jours passés et que je joins ici en original, où cette opinion perce, quelque soin qu'il ait pris de la voiler. Cela n'a fait que m'engager à lui dire d'autant plus franchement la mienne, qui est que rien ne sauroit mieux prouver l'anarchie qui régné en France que l'instabilité de son gouvernement, d'où résulte pour un gouvernement sage et éclairé l'impossibilité de traiter avec un gouvernement pareil, avec lequel il n'y a pas de sûreté à transiger, qu'il n'est lui-même sûr de existence

“ ‘ Buonaparte, aujourd’hui le chef phisque de la République dont Seyès est le régulateur métaphisque, va faire jurer encore attachement inviolable à ce nouveau tripotage, ‘qu’on assurera être tout ce qu’il y a de plus parfait sur le terre. On n’en croira rien ; et peut-être que le jour n’est pas éloigné où nous verrons renverser cette statue de boue que dans ce moment on est occupé de dorer depuis la tête jusqu’-aux pieds. Voilà ce que me répondit hier un émigré François à que je demandois son opinion sur l’évènement qui vient de se passer en France, que beaucoup de personnes regardent comme un événement heureux qui donnera la paix à l’Europe. Mon opinion, je l’avoue, ne diffère du sien, qu’en ce que je crois que le dictature de Buonaparte peut durer assez long-tems pour occasioner le renversement de notre nord de l’Allemagne qui jusqu’ici a été si fier de sa neutralité. Si jamais ce héros aventurier se présente devant ce nord à la tête d’une armée, il sera étonné du nombre de partisans de la révolution qu’il y trouvera ; car après ce qui vient d’arriver en France, on doit s’attendre à voir grossir de jour en jour leur nombre actuel. Le gouvernement qui se forme en France, et qui présente des idées d’ordre, de justice, et de paix, montre le révolution sous un aspect bien plus attrayant que n’étoit celui qu’elle offroit quand toutes ses traces étoient teintes de sang ; c’est une reflexion que les souverains éclairés doivent faire, et que beaucoup ne feront pas.

“ Le Marquis de la Palu est toujours encore au poste où M. de Grenville a souhaité qu’il restat. En attendant que M. de Grenville trouve un moment favorable pour répondre à mes questions au sujet de M. de la Palu, craignant de l’importuner en revenant à la charge, et me confiant en ses bontés qu’il voudra bientôt me tirer d’embarras à ce sujet, j’ose supplier votre altesse royale de lui faire parvenir le mémoire et les deux lettres ci-jointes que ce correspondant vient de me faire remettre par M. Riviere, conseiller de légation de Saxe. J’ai trouvé ces pièces si intéressantes que je me permets de prier votre altesse royale de les lire et de les faire lire à Monseigneur le Prince avant de les envoyer à M. Grenville. J’ai accepté l’offre des deux autres mémoires dont il est parlé dans la lettre No. 2, et s’ils sont aussi intéressants que l’est ce premier, je ne manquerai pas de les faire également parvenir à votre altesse royale aussitôt que je les aurai reçus.”

(The *Memoire* referred to as accompanying this letter has not been found.)

*Enclosure* :—

M. DE LA PALUE TO GENERAL STAMFORD.

1799, November 30th. Emeric. —“ On me confirme de France le meme jugement que je vous ai déjà annoncé sur la révolution du 18 Brumaire. On commence à revenir du premier enthousiasme : on ne voit qu’un changement de personnages, et Buonaparte occupant le Luxembourg, n’a guères plus de valeur que n’en avoit Barras. Je vais vous transcrire litteralement ce qu’on me mande.

“ ‘ Cette révolution est aussi loin que toutes les autres de donner aux Franocis un gouvernement stable. On doute même, d’après

quelques simptoms qu'on a déjà observés, que Seyès et Buonaparte puissent faire leurs trois mois de Consulat sans que l'un des deux soit chassé ou assassiné par l'autre. On est revolté de la lacheté avec laquelle les tirans, jusqu'à Barras même, se sont laissé chasser de leur place sans essayer la moindre résistance, sans s'exposer au moindre danger pour la conserver : il faut s'attribuer au mépris qu'inspirent tous les gouvernans à la nation et aux soldats, pas un seul homme ne s'est armé pour leur défense.

“ ‘ Buonaparte, malgré son impénétrabilité ordinaire, n'a pu être assez maître de lui pour n'avoir pas donné occasion d'être déviné. On a remarqué son penchant vers le pouvoir unique, et le désir qu'il a de lui assurer l'initiative ; travaille-t-il pour lui ? On ne le croit pas assés fou, ni assés éniuré pour se laisser aller à cet espoir ; on presume qu'au moyen du mouvement qu'il a imprimé, de l'enthousiasme qu'il a causé, il va essayer des ressources qu'ils lui procureront.

“ ‘ La paix sera offerte avec ostentation, mais en même tems on va tacher de frapper un grand coup en Allemagne : c'est de ce côté que vont se tourner tous les efforts, et c'est l'emploi reservé aux 133 millions mis à la disposition du ministre de la guerre. On ne croit pas que ce soit Masséna que soit chargé de l'exécution : on pense quelle est déjà concertée entre Buonaparte et Moreau, et que ce dernier va bientôt prendre le commandement de l'armée d'Helvétie. Si le plan échoue, on est persuadé que l'on fera paroître une poupée constitutionnelle, et c'est au Duc d'Orléans que cet honneur est assigné. On se flatte que cet arrangement conviendra à plus d'un cabinet, et que plus d'une puissance y a déjà songé.

“ ‘ L'intérieur ne se pacifiera pas malgré les offres que l'on fait aux Chouans, si l'Angleterre continue à les aider ; on sait que les Consuls sont mécontents des réponses qui leur ont déjà été faite : ils espèrent leur enlever des partisans par les loix rapportées, et celles qu'on est prêt à rapporter ; on travaille à semer entre eux la division, en gagnant et séduisant leurs chefs ; mais aussi on ne doute pas qu'ils ne fassent d'importantes et nombreuses recrues dans la foule de mécontents et d'opprimés par cette dernière révolution.

“ ‘ On écrit d'Hollande que les soldats Francois ont fait en rechangeant le serment ordonné aux armées : ils ont dit qu'ils croyoient la constitution de l'an 3 invariable, et que le nouveau serment qu'on exigeoit d'eux seroit sans doute remplacé dans six mois par un autre. On remarque que les addresses de félicitations des armées et des départemens sont rares, et que l'enthousiasme n'a guère dépassé l'enceinte de Paris. On reserre et restreint les autorités en réunissant un plus grand nombre sous une seule personne : ce sont autant de partisans que la révolution s'enlève à elle-même.” *Extract.*

#### COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, December 7. Harley Street.—“ J'ai reçu une lettre du Comte Rastopchin dont je vous extrais quelque passage pour votre propre information—‘ Tant que Thugut reste en place jamais l'Empereur ne renouera avec l'Autriche. Razoumoukoi n'étoit pas instruit du mauvais succès de la mission de Didrichstein, a

voulu, malgré l'ordre qui lui enjoignoit de remettre la gestion des affaires à Kalitcheff, rester à Vienne, et prétendoit qu'il ne profiteroit pas de la permission de six mois qui lui étoit accordée de s'absenter, qu'après avoir arangé toutes les affaires relatives aux explications avec le Baron de Thugut. (*Nota bene*, c'étoit Kalitcheff qui étoit spécialement chargé de ces explications). Vous pouvez bien penser comme l'Empereur a pris ceci. On lui a envoyé des lettres de rapel, et intimation de se rendre chez le Maréchal son père. Je crois vous avertir quoiqu'avec répugnance, sachant que vous me paraissiez avoir bonne opinion de la personne, que le Comte Starhemberg a écrit dernièrement à Cobentzel par votre courier *que vous êtes soufflé par Grenville, que vous étiez tout Anglois, et que l'Empereur n'y gagnera pas beaucoup*; or, c'étoit pour être lue ici, et je l'ai lue à l'Empereur, qui a dit, il paroît visible que l'écrivain est aussi de la race des Thugut et des Cobentzel.' Je suis fâché pour Starhemberg qu'il ay prit si décidément le plus mauvais parti possible. Il y a plus de six mois que m'étoient aperçu qu'il s'éloignoit du droit chemin, je lui ai parlé en ami, le prier de rester en pavé; d'imiter la sage conduite du ministre d'Amérique qui, depuis que son gouvernement agit mal, reste tranquille sans chercher à faire des affaires, ni à provoquer des discussions pour justifier des choses injustifiables; mais au lieu de suivre cette marche qui lui auroit fait conserver l'estime et la confiance de ceux qui le connoissoit, il a donné telle baissée dans des intrigues, dont il ne pourra jamais se débrouiller sans perdre de réputation. J'attens avec impatience l'arivée du courier de Mylord Minto, et je vous supplie de me faire part de ce qu'il apportera sur l'état qu'a produit la lettre fulminante de mon Empereur."

#### D HAILES to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1799, December 9. Stockholm.—“As I have not, I think, troubled your Lordship more than once on the subject of my personal affairs since I left England, I will not offer any apology for the few words this letter conveys to you concerning them, before I speak of other matters.

“I have not received a single line from Mr. Talbot either before or since your Lordship was so good as to direct Mr. Hammond to announce to me his almost immediate departure from London, some months ago: a circumstance which I have to regret on both our accounts, as it has not only exposed me to great inconvenience, but will also probably put it out of my power to be of service to him on his arrival, if that should ever happen; people who inhabit this place finding it necessary to make all their provisions for the long winter season in the autumn, to avoid a double expence, and which I have not been able to do, on account of the uncertainty in which I have remained here. As I ascribe this entirely to the course of public affairs, and to some fresh cause of business which may have arisen to delay Mr. Talbot, I do not complain; but when your Lordship considers what my situation is in other respects, from the frowns of the Court and the discontent of the people, you will, I

am sure, agree with me that it is not a little probationary of a man's patience. I will say nothing of the increased expence of this capital, for if I were to send you a list of the prices of many of the common articles of life, you would scarcely think it credible. Every Swede however will tell you that Stockholm from the cheapest is become the dearest place in Europe.

"I am growing old in the King's service, without having attained to independence; and I confess I have not seen without mortification younger and richer people advanced in this calling before me. Without interrupting you with a recapitulation of what I said on this subject before I came hither, at a moment when I know your mind must be preoccupied by matters of much more concern; and without specifying any particular wish or view, allow me to recall myself to your remembrance, and to hope that my claims on the justice of Government, from eldership at least, will, at length, be allowed.

(*Secret.*)—"It is a very delicate matter to attempt to delineate the characters of kings and princes, and a very difficult one too, when one has not the honor of approaching their persons habitually. For this reason I have foreborne to touch upon that of the young King of Sweden, in any of my public letters; but writing to your Lordship confidentially as I now do, I will venture to give you my idea of him as formed from what I have been able to observe and collect. His mind is far from having been opened by education. I rather think it has been narrowed by it. And the kingdom he now governs, living (if I may say so) on its ancient reputation, is believed by him to be equal to any on earth; so little knowledge has he acquired either from books, or conversation, respecting other countries. His temper is extremely haughty, and he seems unfortunately to think that the science of government has descended to him hereditarily with his crown. No minister, no favorite, nor any intimate counsellor that I have heard of. In matters of finance he recurs to a man (*M. Ugglas*) who is said to be much less able than interested. In foreign politics he seems to act chiefly from himself, and I am afraid with a great deal of passion; as has indeed been evinced by the detail of his measures transmitted in my public correspondence, such as appointing an ambassador to the Congress at Rastadt, the granting convoys to the trade, his letter to His Majesty, his Declaration as Duke of Pomerania. On the other hand, this young prince (for his youth ought to be taken into the account) is highly commendable for his love of justice, his attention to religion and morals, and his strict observance of order and decorum; while in his economy, by which he hopes, perhaps, to restore, in great measure, the finances of the country, he shews much laudable self-denial and steady perseverance. His Swedish majesty's person is uncommonly slender, although his constitution has gained considerable strength since his adolescence; his deportment is extremely stiff and grave; and, upon the whole, as well in body as in mind, he appears to have more of the Castillian than the Swede in him.

"I shall always speak with reluctance, and certainly with great diffidence, whenever I have to throw blame on the conduct of any

of the Ministers of His Majesty's allies ; but I think I have great reason to be dissatisfied with the Russian ambassador here ; and I think it right to mention it in this private manner, although I have said nothing of it in my despatches, nor have taken any notice of it to Sir Charles Whitworth. M. de Budberg, with whom I lived formerly on a good footing, and when he did not stand well with this Court, on resuming the functions of his embassy after the expiration of his leave of absence, was willing to improve his situation here, and therefore did not think fit to give me the countenance he ought to have done on finding me *in disgrace*. Much, I am sure, he might have done in co-operation with me for the common cause, and which he omitted. He is an honest man, but haughty, illiterate, and without experience in business, which lays him entirely at the mercy of an intriguing secretary. Whether it was because he thought, last spring, that I was really returning home I know not ; but he did not chuse to confide to me any thing concerning the negotiations then going on at Petersburgh, and to which he was made privy by the King of Sweden at the time. I suspect, however, that he has lately had some injunctions from his Court to endeavour to bring people here to a sense of their respect towards us.

“I am sorry to be obliged to add to the length of this letter, by the recital of a very shocking story. It is briefly this : the Baron de Taube, a gentleman of good fortune, and as much in the esteem and favour of the King of Sweden as anybody here can be said to be, went, some time ago, into Germany, and was accompanied or immediately followed by the Countess of Piper, sister to Count Fersen, the head of the great house of that name ; a lady long distinguished by her intrigues both amorous and political, and with whom M. de Taube, already advanced in life, was well known to cohabit. Before the Baron left Stockholm, he informed one of his several nephews and nieces that he had made his will, and left his fortune between them. M. de Taube afterwards being at Berlin with the lady above alluded to, and frequenting the house of the Swedish Minister, M. Engeström (formerly in England), one evening, on his return home to his lodgings, told his *valet de chambre* that he had drank some wine at Engeström's which he was sure had poisoned him. The physicians whom he consulted, advised him to go to Carlsbadt for the waters ; he followed their directions, went, and shortly after died there. The faculty, on the opening of his body, were unanimous in declaring he had been poisoned ; and it was thought with the *acqua tofana*, which, as your lordship knows, has the property of destroying at a more or less distant period, according to the strength or weakness of the dose administered. Since the Baron's death, stories have been industriously propagated both at Berlin and here, imputing to Engeström the murder of his guest. Nobody there has given credit, I believe, to such an improbable falsehood : but Engeström has many enemies here on account of his politics, the whole of the Russian party who are ready to believe any ill of him ; and besides these, there are many candidates for his place. No one who has as thorough an acquaintance with that gentleman as I have, can entertain the smallest suspicion of his guilt. But besides a very warm testimony lately given at this

Court in his favour by that of Prussia, one of the nephews from whom I derive the whole of these particulars (although not directly) asserts Engeström's innocence in the most unequivocal manner. The nephew of whom I speak is come hither from Denmark where he was the *Chargé d'Affaires* of this Court, on leave of absence, and he is now employed in collecting with great discretion from his late uncle's *valet de chambre*, and others, such legal evidence as he can procure; but how strong and against whom the presumptive proofs must appear I leave to your Lordship to judge, when I tell you that this young gentleman has found the whole of his uncle's fortune transferred by will to Madame de Piper, except some inconsiderable legacies left to the nephews and nieces. Baron Armfeldt, a friend of the late Baron Taube, now in Germany, writes to this nephew, to continue to act with great circumspection, *assuring him that he shall shortly come into power*, and that he is determined to sift the matter to the bottom.

"I know not whether I ought to congratulate your Lordship on the event of the last of the French revolutions. That Proteus-like republic is for ever eluding your grasp under some new metamorphosis. I pray heaven that the noble and unexampled efforts which you and your great friends have made, and are still making, may, however, at last succeed in destroying the monster which one may now almost say: *Non anni domuere decem, non mille carinae.*"

#### COUNT WORONZOW TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, December 11. Harley Street.—"Je compte d'envoyer après demain un courier. Ne voudriez vous pas profiter de cette occasion pour vous débarasser, une foi pour toute, de cette profusion d'ordre et de cordon que l'Empereur envoi aux sujets du Roi, m'écrire une lettre avec les phrases polies que vous savez si bien employer, que Sa Majesté ayent pris la résolution de ne pas permettre que ses sujets portent les ordres étrangers, ne s'est dévié de cette résolution deux foi que pour complaire à l'Empereur, son ami et allié, en permetent que Lord Duncan et la Chevalier Popham portassent les ordres que Sa Majesté Impériale leurs a envoyé. C'est pourquoi il seroit agréable à Sa Majesté, si l'Empereur voudroit bien, au lieux des ordres qu'il avoit destiné à plusieurs autre de ses sujets, leur donner quelqu' autre marque de sa bienveillance, puisqu'il les juge digne de ses bontés.

"La même chose écrite au Chevalier Whiteworth co-opéreroit à merveille, et vous seriez débarassé de tout embaras futur."

#### M DE CALONNE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, December 11, Hamilton Street—"Depuis que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous voir jeudy dernier, j'ai revu la personne, et ce qu'elle m'a dit ajoute beaucoup aux motifs de proffiter de son zèle, ainsi qu'à la probabilité du succès d'une demarche qui, dans tous les cas, seroit utile, et ne pourroit rien compromettre, étant, comme elle doit l'être, infiniment secrette. Mais son avis est, (et plus j'y

reflechis plus j'en suis convaincu) que la plus grande promptitude est nécessaire, et que l'occasion échapperait si on attendoit que les choses eussent pris une certaine consistance. Si la mesure paroit bonne il faut la presser, sans quoi elle cesseroit de l'être, ou le seroit beaucoup moins. J'ay cru devoir vous présenter cette observation, sans vous importuner de la demande d'une nouvelle audience. Si vous voulés parler directement à la personne, elle est à vos ordres ; j'y suis aussi en cas que vous jugiés à propos de lui transmettre par moi une partie de vos intentions. Mais je suis persuadé que si vous acceptés son offre, vous trouverés nécessaire de l'entendre, et j'ose vous répéter que le plutôt seroit le mieux."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, December 11. Stowe.—“The Bishop of Chester is here ; he brought with him the Greek title page which the Delegates have determined upon, and for which, as to the phrase of *κοίνοις ἀναλώμασι τῶν ἐγγενῶν ἀνδρῶν*, they have authority in one of their old printed books.

“This phrase makes it unnecessary to add any words to our plate but demands the addition of the University arms. We have all thought the present sketch perfect, and, if you have no objection, pray send on my letter to Lady Spencer.

“I think I shall probably be persuaded to stay here a few days longer, and therefore look to Saturday se'nnight for Dropmore, if you should be there then.”

*Enclosure :—*

THOMAS GRENVILLE to COUNTESS SPENCER.

1799, December 11. Stowe.—“Do not laugh at the labours of the learned and the unlearned. The Bishop of Chester is this day arrived here, and has brought with him the title page which the Delegates of the Press have determined upon for our Homer. This Greek title page, taken from an old 1400, expresses the printing of the book to be at the common expence of the three brothers and of the University. By this arrangement it becomes on the one hand unnecessary to disturb our plate by the addition either of *Adelphi* or any other words, but on the other hand it becomes necessary to add also the University Arms. It strikes me that this can easily be done without damaging the upper part of the plate by occupying so much of the page (as had been destined to the words) with a pedestal to the column, upon which the University Arms will stand ; and putting two short columns under the little altars. By this device the present plate may, as I am told, easily be altered, and I have therefore desired Lord B[uckingham] to sketch it out as well as he could do it from my recollection. It is again upon your patience that I must trespass to beg to know whether the engraver or you see any practical difficulty that we are not aware of ; if there is no difficulty, I think you will agree with me in considering the plate as improved by removing all words from it. The crests will no longer be applicable to the little altars,

which will be entirely plain. Pray excuse the hurry in which this is written, because I am anxious to hear your opinion upon it, and therefore am hurrying it away by this post. I shall still stay here another week or ten days, and shall then soon hope to see you in London."

COUNT ST. MARTIN DE FRONT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, December 11. Hampden House, Bucks.—“ Retenu à la campagne, où j'étais venu passer quelques jours avec Monsieur Trevor, par un gros rhume de poitrine, j'ai l'honneur de vous transmettre confidentiellement la copie d'une lettre que M. le Comte de Chalembert, Secrétaire d'état du Roi mon maître, a écrit à son Excellence le Baron Thugut, le 14 Novembre, de Florence. Votre Excellence qui prend avec tant de générosité l'intérêt le plus vif au sort de mon malheureux souverain, et à celui de l'Italie, verra sans doute avec regret combien les espérances que nous avions sur un changement de conduite et de mesures de la part du Cabinet de Vienne à notre égard, ont été illusoire. Comme la continuation d'un tel système de la part de M. de Thugut ne pourrait qu'aboutir non seulement à notre propre ruine, mais à celle de l'Italie, je laisse à la haute sagesse de votre Excellence, *surtout* à ses vues généreuses pour la délivrance de l'Europe, de prendre les déterminations qu'elle croira les plus propres à le faire changer. Je me rendrais en ville aussitôt que mon rhume me le permettra ; et j'ose la prier de vouloir bien ordonner à un de ses secrétaires de m'accuser la réception de cette lettre, uniquement pour être sûr qu'elle est parvenue à votre Excellence.” *Copy.*

*Enclosure:—*

COUNT DE CHALEMBERT TO BARON THUGUT.

1799, November 14.—“ J'ai déjà eu l'honneur de prévenir votre Excellence par ma lettre du 25 Septembre, que M. Spagnolini, Consul-Général du Roi à Livourne, doit lui avoir remise, que sa Majesté avait nommé Monsieur le Comte de Vallaise pour résider de sa part auprès de sa Majesté Impériale et Royale, dans la persuasion que le choix d'une personne distingué comme lui à tous égards, aurait été agréable à sa Majesté Impériale et à votre Excellence. Dans l'incertitude si ce Ministre sera déjà arrivé à Vienne, le Roi m'a ordonné de m'adresser directement à votre Excellence pour une affaire dont l'importance n'admet point de délai.

“ La haute réputation que les talents supérieurs de votre Excellence lui ont si justement acquise, me fait espérer qu'elle verra dans l'exposé que j'ai l'honneur de lui soumettre, non des réclamations intempestives, mais des preuves de l'intention sincère de sa Majesté de concourir à tout ce qui peut être utile à sa Majesté Impériale et Royale en lui proposant les moyens qui y conduisent plus sûrement. M. le Général-en-Chef Baron de Melas a fait proposer, il y a quelque temps, au gouvernement de sa Majesté de réorganiser les troupes Piémontaises sur l'ancien pied. D'après les intentions et les ordres de sa Majesté, le Gouvernement est allé

au devant d'une mesure si salutaire, avec l'empressement qu'il devait y mettre. Il proposa à son Excellence le général Melas les moyens de mettre en exécution ce projet ; mais ensuite monsieur le général a demandé que le nom de sa Majesté ne parût en rien, en alléguant que le Roi serait rétabli dans ses états, mais que, pour le présent, ils devaient être gouvernés comme des pays de conquête. Le roi a fait tous les sacrifices qui lui sont personnels. Il fera tous ceux qui peuvent être utiles à la cause commune pour prouver sa reconnaissance à sa Majesté Impériale. C'est à ces titres mêmes que sa Majesté m'a ordonné de représenter à votre Excellence les conséquences funestes de la désorganisation qui résulterait des changements que M. le général Melas fait appréhender dans toutes les parties du gouvernement et de l'administration du Piémont. Ce pays a déjà prouvé bien de secousses. Cette dernière acheverait d'y porter la trouble et la confusion, et de ruiner le crédit de l'état. Les suites peuvent en être terribles. Quant à l'organisation de l'armée Piémontaise, le Roi connaît que cette opération ne peut avoir l'objet désiré, qu'autant que le zèle et l'amour de ses sujets seront soutenus et excités par la certitude évidente de servir leur souverain. Dans une guerre dont l'origine remonte aux opinions, ne pouvant toutes les réunir, il est bien essentiel de ménager celles d'un peuple dont le courage peut être rendu utile ou non.

“ Le roi n'ambitionne dans ce moment d'avoir de l'autorité en Piémont que pour la rendre utile à la cause commune. Il désire consacrer à ce but l'existence d'une armée Piémontaise sous la direction suprême du général en chef de sa Majesté Impériale.

“ Sa majesté n'a aucune crainte que ses malheurs aient rendu ses droits moins sacrés auprès de sa Majesté Impériale ; mais elle verrait avec autant d'inquiétude, que de douleur, que l'on s'éloignât des seules mesures qui peuvent remplir l'objet qu'on se propose ; et sa Majesté m'ordonne de dire avec franchise à votre Excellence, qu'elle redoute pour la cause commune les conséquences du plan qui a été communiqué par le général Melas. Au contraire, en alliance que le roi attend de la magnanimité de sa Majesté Impériale, avec ce que son véritable intérêt lui présente, on parviendra au but salutaire que sa Majesté Impériale et le roi ont en vue. Si l'organisation de l'armée Piémontaise est confiée au gouvernement du Roi, qui a les connaissances indispensables des choses et des personnes, l'effet sera aussi prompt et aussi étendu que possible ; et la soumission de cette armée aux ordres du général-en-chef de sa Majesté Impériale ne laissera lieu qu'à une émulation noble et utile.”

#### COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, December 12. Harley Street.—“ J'envoie mon courrier demain. Par un malheur auquel je ne m'attendais pas, j'avois une lettre depuis huit jours pour le Général Bauer, et que, par négligence, j'avois oublié de lui remettre jusqu'aujourd'hui. Il se trouve que c'est un ordre de l'Empereur qui lui ordonne de rejoindre son régiment, qui est au corps de Condé. Cela m'ôta tout espoir dans le

maudit comendement du corp qui m'est confié, et qui est dans le plus grand désordre par la stupidité et la mauvaise volonté de ce gieux d'Essen. Bauer, en qui j'avois toute confiance, et qui étoit parfaitement calculé pour rétablir tout, est obligé de partir, ruiné par ces courses qu'on lui font faire, sans lui donner un sol pour ça, parcequ'on croit à Petersbourg que le voyage de Suisse en Angleterre et de là en Suisse est comme d'aller de Petersbourg à Gatchina. Il me laisse seul sans assistance. Je ne puis pas confier le comendement à Essen, quoique je n'ai pas encor de l'Empereur la nouvelle qu'il est congédié du service, parceque s'il n'étoit pas même congédié, je lui ôteroie le comendement du corp. Je le garde donc auprès des malades à Portsmouth; mais aucun des généraux qui sont après lui ne me sont pas connus, et je ne puis avoir confiance en eux comme en Bauer que j'ai connue dès son enfance, ayant été ami de son père. J'ai perdu tout courage et tout espoir, et je suis à maudire cette expédition de la Hollande, qui me met sur mes épaules des embarras sans fin, et dont aucun travail et peine ne me fera sortir avec honneur.

"Bauer part mardi. J'écris à l'Empereur pour le supplier de me le renvoyer.

"Je vous prie, je vous conjure, d'écrire à Whitworth qu'il en parle aussi sur ce chapitre, qu'il dise ce qui est vrai, et ce que le Roi a dit hier en ma présence à ce général, qu'il a conu son père, qu'il l'a aimé, et qu'il est bien aise de voir le fils ici, qu'il a toute confiance en lui."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT WORONZOW.

1799, December 13. Cleveland Row.—"Croyez vous qu'il ne seroit pas possible, si je vous en fisse la prière au nom du Roi, que vous puissiez detenir le Général Bauer ici jusqu'à nouvel ordre de l'Empereur; surtout puisque Whitworth me mande officiellement que l'Empereur avoit destitué le Général Essen de tout rang militaire, en lui défendant même d'en porter l'uniforme. Si vous croyez que cette démarche pût être utile, je m'y prêteroie d'autant plus volontiers que Sa Majesté, en me parlant mardi au sujet du Général Bauer, m'a témoigné sa satisfaction particulière de le voir employé ici, et que M. Wickham m'a écrit les plus grands éloges de sa conduite et de son caractère.

"En tout cas je souhaiteroie vivement de faire sa connoissance avant qu'il partît, et je vous prierai de me marquer quel jour vous pourriez le mener ici à dîner, puisque je reste en ville toute la semaine, et jusqu'au vendrédi de la semaine prochaine." *Copy.*

#### OFFICIAL NOTE:—

[GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE].

[1799, December. Downing Street.]—"I have sent your Lordship a note from Dutheil. He says that *Monsieur*, agreeably to the rule which he has prescribed to himself, immediately complied with

your Lordship's decision, and wrote to the persons whom he had proposed to employ to acquaint them that the late change must be looked upon as putting an end to the plan; he is however (Duthiel assures me) convinced that everything which has happened at Paris is in favour of our views for the restoration of monarchy, and that if things are rightly managed now, we may consider ourselves as standing in the same situation which we should have done if the first attempt (in the character of a reaction, of the 18th Fructidor,) had succeeded. This revolution has appeared nearly in the same character, and might, he thinks, without much difficulty (considering the known principles of several of Bonaparte's confidants and assistants, as Berthier, Andreossi, Bournonville, Le Fevre, and others) be converted to the same end. The accounts which Swinburne brings over of the total want of money, of the unsettled state of Bonaparte's authority, and of the tone which his assistants assume with him, give additional weight to this opinion. Berthier (your Lordship knows) desired to have a letter from *Monsieur*, which was sent him by return of the two persons who came here. Andreossi and Le Fevre are in good principles and well known to them. Bournonville was the person whom, in the original project, it was proposed to make minister of war. I have ventured therefore to send for your Lordship's signature two letters to the Treasury for 20,000*l.* in order that no time may be lost in case your Lordship should be of opinion that the business ought to be followed up. If it should be determined to relinquish it, there would be no inconvenience beyond that of having a larger balance than usual in the bankers' hands."

#### COUNT WORONZOW TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, December 13. Harley Street.—“ Il m'est impossible absolument de retenir le Général Bauer, quelque besoin que j'ai de lui, et malgré que ma situation devient afreuse en le perdant. C'est à lui que l'ordre est envoyé, et je vous l'envoi en traduction. Il est obligé de s'y conformer, et il ne peut pas suivre mes avis quand ils sont contraire à la volonté de son souverain. Je suis malade, corp et d'esprit. Je ferai l'impossible pour pouvoir me rendre à votre obligeante invitation, et je vous amenerai à dîner le Général Bauer dimanche prochain, si cela vous convient.

“ J'écris par le courier de ce soir pour prier qu'on me renvoi ce général, et je fais voir la nécessité absolue pour qu'il vienne rétablir le désordre introduit par ce maudit Essen.”

#### WILLIAM WICKHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private and confidential.*

1799, December 13. Augsburg.—“ On account of the immediate importance of my dispatch on the subject of the German levies I send off Ruff the messenger, without waiting to finish what I had to say on the subject of Pichégru and Willot. I will therefore only mention to your Lordship that due preparations are making for the

latter to put himself at the head of the conscripts in Provence, with a number of excellent officers under his orders ; that M. de Précý is preparing to second him ; and that Pichégru will act with the armies here in the manner stated in my dispatch No. 48. That all their plans suppose the continuation of the war, support given to the Royalists in Brittany and Normandy, and a Declaration on entering the French territory, renouncing all intention of conquest ; and besides, an assurance that the King will be acknowledged as soon as the royalist standard shall be fairly hoisted, with an army to support it, and a Prince of the Blood at its head.

“ With respect to the subject of my long dispatch, there can be no doubt now but that the question is fairly reduced to this, and it is as such that I mean at once to present it ; ‘ are you prepared to throw yourselves into the arms of the House of Austria, or no ? If not, renounce at once every idea of a continental war against France ; for you can neither carry it on without Austria, nor force her to carry it on in any other than her own way.’

“ If this position be true, as long and dear-bought experience has taught me that it is, you must have recourse to another method ; try to flatter and cajole as much as possible, and assume, *if possible*, an appearance of confidence. Your weight and influence will still be great, and it may be usefully employed in directing where it cannot control. I can give your Lordship no idea of the pride and high spirit that now prevails in the Austrian armies, and we must remember that they are now acting with Thugut. This is an instrument on which you may certainly work with advantage, that is when the success of the war alone is considered, independent of political questions ; for instance, the adding these recruits to their army, when presented to them as a mark of confidence in the skill and talents of their officers, will have the effect of making the army consider the British Government as the most discerning, and the best judge of merit in Europe ; and will make them fight better and grumble less about the price of sugar and coffee, when they consider that the profits arising from the sale of those articles are employed in giving them the means of increasing directly the honour and glory of the Austrian arms.

“ Follow this method, consider them only as instruments employed to fight the French (though in their own way), and do not either cross them at head quarters, blame their operations, or submit plans to their consideration, and I think I can answer for your securing the army in such a way as that, perhaps on some very delicate and important occasion, it might not be impossible to engage them in a decisive operation, without the authority, and even against the orders of the Court. I am confident, if I had seen as much of them in the month of August as I have now, that I could have carried the passage of the Limmét or the Aar on more than one occasion.

“ A few pensions to some of the staff-officers, if well and judiciously applied, will do the rest. This indeed is an instrument by no means to be neglected. Weyrother, as the price of colonel’s pay whilst with Suwarow in Switzerland, and of two horses given him to make up what he lost on the march, keeps no

secret whatever from me, and will give me copies of any the most important paper or plan I may want. An acquisition of this kind will be without price at head quarters. Eckhardt, in consideration of the same service, is equally communicative, and the other night, when he set out for Vienna, he sent me the original letter I had written to Suwarow in August last, treating the Court of Vienna rather roughly; saying that he supposed I might wish to have it, as, in the hands of the Russians, it might be turned to bad purposes.

"I do not enlarge upon this subject, but your Lordship may be persuaded that there is a large field to work upon.

"As to the Court, your Lordship will hardly believe after all that I have seen that I am one whit more than I ever was a *satellite of Thugut*. I fully expect that we shall be tricked, and teased, and tormented as we have ever been, as long as that man shall remain in place. But there is no one to succeed him; and besides, the Russians have played their part of the game so shockingly ill that they have fixed him on his throne for ever. He had no two more avowed and deadly enemies than the army and the lesser States of the Empire who are now, and will ever be, his determined friends, as long as the contest shall be between him and the Russians.

"What a game have we not lost by the stupid obstinacy and misconduct of these allies?

"I will only add that, if I have any powers to treat with the Circles, they should be extended so as to include the Emperor's Minister, and the Commander-in-Chief, general officers, or other persons having due authority on the part of His Imperial Majesty to treat on subjects relating to the Imperial and Austrian armies. And I think that your Lordship will find no difficulty in wording it so as that it may extend to the powers I have already received to treat with the Court of Munich.

"I will say nothing about Switzerland till another occasion, excepting that the recruiting goes on to the satisfaction of all parties, and that before the spring you will have an excellent body of 5,000 infantry fit for service.

"If a change of system with respect to Austria be adopted, I should strongly incline to say that it would be better to have no Commander in Chief for these corps, but leave all arrangements respecting them to be settled with the Arch-Duke.

"I fairly own to your Lordship, in confidence, that, independent of the enormous expense, I dread a combined army here worse than a Russian one. I think it impossible that the Commander should not quarrel with the Austrians (were he an angel he could not avoid it) in less than a month. If, however, such a thing be determined on, rely on my making the same exertions in every respect to further your Lordship's views and wishes, and the interests of my country, as if I had as warmly approved the project as I certainly should have done when I left England, or even at a later period, had it been proposed to me."

W. WINDHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, December 14. Park Street, Westminster.—"In looking

over to-day the draft to Lord Elgin, I did not see any mention of Acre, and of means which it might seem right to take for putting it into a state of defence.

"I mentioned the circumstance at Cabinet the other day, and talked about it afterwards to Mr Pitt, who promised to speak of it to you.

"Acre is certainly a place of great consequence, and one which the enemy have shown that they do not care to leave behind them. It is likely, therefore, to become, as before, the very hinge of the war in those parts should the enemy remain in force; though it may not have the effect of turning things the same way if trusted merely to such miraculous exertions, and such good fortune, as saved it in the former instance. The Turks must now be sensible of its importance, and might, I should think, be brought to accept of offers for putting it in a respectable state, notwithstanding the difficulties which may arise from their present dissensions with Ghezzar. At least it seems to be our duty to do everything for that purpose that depends upon us.

"Have you seen Sir Sydney Smith's letter of the 2nd August, giving an account of the *land* battle of Aboukir? It would surely be right that, in some way or other, this letter should be published; and it does not occur to me, judging upon recollection, that there is much that need be altered or suppressed. People are very anxious to know what has been passing in that part of the world, and the narrative seems to be necessary to place Sir Sydney's merits in their proper point of view."

*Postscript* — "Might not an arrangement be made for placing Koehler at Acre with a small corps of artillery men to be put under his command, to be paid, if necessary, by us, and formed out of the men now raising for Villette and Broderick? A man of the name of Daniels, whom I have named at the recommendation of Lord Minto as agent and paymaster to those corps, and who is now at Corfu, assures me that, by a little management, as many men may be had there as could be wanted. He is an active, intelligent man, highly thought of by Lord Minto in respect of honesty, and well acquainted with countries under the Turkish Government. I should think that such an arrangement as that above proposed might possibly become acceptable to both parties; to Ghezzar as strengthening his capital both against the enemy and the Turkish Government; and to the Porte, as furnishing a security against the use which Ghezzar might make of the strength so acquired.

"Another matter, not much connected with the above and which I forgot to mention the other day, was the taking some means, even now, to retrieve the time lost with respect to Malta. You know that, for want of an order from here, Nelson has been disappointed of the means which he wished to employ for the reduction of that place, Sir James Sinclair having refused to furnish the assistance required. Malta, which is in all respects of great consequence, may now become of more so as a means of keeping in good humour our violent friend Paul."

## THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, December 15. Stowe.—“I return you your *very Turkish* correspondence, from which Tom and I collect (saving always your better information from Lord Elgin or Mr. Smith) that the army of Egypt is probably embarked for Toulon. But if Nelson’s or Sir Sydney’s ships should intercept them, we beg to protest against your orders to carry them back to Alexandria, which we conceive is not consistent with the very clear, and, to our ideas, very proper line of disavowing this capitulation. That disavowal should consider French troops taken at sea whether in French or in neutral ships as enemies, prisoners of war, and as such they should be brought to our ports; but cannot with any justice or law be landed at Alexandria, rather than at Trieste, Naples, or any port of our allies in those parts. Besides this, which we consider as the strict *law and right*, we think that your Turk, who would be content if you either drowned them or carried them to England or to the devil, will be most outrageous at finding them again landed without their leave in Egypt, or any part of their dominions. Why should they not be carried through the Dardanelles to the Crimea and delivered as prisoners to the Russians, who might exchange them at their leisure?”

“I shall certainly not attack your criticisms upon my drawing very roughly, in two minutes, and from Tom’s description (for I never saw it) *your* column and *your* two smoking pots. All that I have proposed is to put your column upon its due proportioned pedestal (and you will not find one insulated column standing upon a plinth in any one book of architecture) in order to fill that lower space which was left for letters, which cannot be inserted in that plate if the delegates persist (as they do) in their title-page. I should prefer the omission of *your* smoking-pots; but if they must stand, they are placed upon truncated columns which (with every submission be it spoken) were *always* and *invariably* adapted to them. As to the Gothic shield of the University arms, I had put them in an oval till I was overruled; and am now ready to be overruled back to my oval, which will leave the *bordure* as much Grecian as that of our arms; and as to the Gothic emblems in *alma mater’s* coat, I think that her crowns and book may pair off with our *tourteauxes* and cross, and that *Dominus illuminatio mea* is not much less Grecian than *Honi soit qui mal y pense*. The Greek description of the three brothers is not *our* account of ourselves, but the description given by the University of us in *their* title page, which *their* delegates claim the right and duty of composing. My modesty therefore is at ease, notwithstanding Madam’s anathema against us; and, if all this is not satisfactory to you, I shall, in the words of Gil Blas’s Archbishop of Grenada, wish you *toutes sortes de prospérités et un meilleur goût*.”

## THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, December 15. Stowe.—“It is with the Bishop of Chester that you must discuss the subject of the title page, and I have no

doubt but that if you express to him your objections to the form of words which he and Randolph have recommended, they may easily be induced to change them. I stated to him very fairly that I thought the allusion to us overcharged, and that it might appear to make us parties in our own praise; but to the first of these objections as well as to the last, he answered that the title page being that of the Delegates, the criticisms upon it could only attach upon them, and that the three brothers are neither 'art nor part in it.'

"Pray let Councillor Charles explain this phrase of Scotch law to Lady Grenville when she supposes that I have been writing myself *noble* and *illustrious*; if *noble* is applied to the three brothers the other two have more of it to answer for than I have, and though I might say the same of the word *illustrious*, yet in truth I consider *ευδοκιμος* as being merely a Greek version of the common and undistinguished word *honourable*, as marking one degree of rank higher than *esquire*. Let it at least be understood that I have no partiality to the wording of this title page, and that I have no doubt but that if you urge your objections to the Bishop of Chester, they will change it to any that you may like better. With these remarks upon the title page, I must proceed to say that, if the Bishop's title page shall stand, it appears to me that it would be a ridiculous and ostentatious piece of vanity, after describing in one sheet the joint partnership of the university and of the brothers, to blazon out the arms of the 3 brothers, and leave unnoticed those of the chief partner in the firm, and I am still of opinion that, with the Bishop's title page, we must either unite with the university arms or not introduce our own. The same remark applies to the word *Αδελφοι* which succeeded very well in our first project, but becomes, as Cleaver calls it, tautologous, after the Bishop's title page. As to the column, you do not yet appear to have understood that the original column was to remain untouched, and the slight sketch which was sent, was sent merely to explain better than in words, the idea of placing a pedestal under the former column, with the university arms upon that pedestal; and with respect to the Gothic deformity of those arms, I do not see that *Honi soit que mal y pense* is purer Greek than *Dominus illuminatio mea*; or that the tassels which hang from the book are less classical than the half moon, the star, and the spiked balls, whether they be two or four in number. Of the shape of the scutcheon I say nothing, because it was intended to take any such shape as should be found to suit best with the lines of the pedestal. You equally misconceive the rest of the hasty sketch which was sent, and you do not appear to see that all which was intended by it was to give a general idea of filling up the bottom of the plate by introducing pedestal or plinth under the vases or altars which stood in the original drawing. A continued plinth of the height of the main pedestal looked heavy; a small pedestal to the two vases was more perhaps to my fancy than the smaller columns, but little importance was attached to this part of the drawing, which might easily and perhaps better be omitted. The plain case is, if the Bishop's title page stands, I hold it to be impossible to write *Αδελφοι* . . . . a second time, and I think it highly exceptionable in that case to use the column

of our arms without those of the University. I see no better way than by the pedestal which I think will be no blemish to the drawing, as in fact the most celebrated columns do stand upon pedestals, the proportion of which is as much established as is that of the column itself. In this state of the question I think that the best thing which I can do will be to desire the plate to be continued as far as regards the column, without finishing the plinth or any of the words; by this arrangement it will still be open to consider how it can ultimately be made to accord best with whatever shall be the Oxford title page, upon which matter you had better say what you wish to Cleaver. He knows from me that I am not partial to the words in question, but if they are used we must make our plate accord with them, and there is no objection which I feel more strongly than that of following *κοινοῖς* . . . with the exclusive ostentation of the Grenville scutcheons.

“I will not end this long disputation without reminding you that if we retain our original column either with or without a pedestal, we should be forced to incur the expence of engraving a second plate for *ΟΔΤΣΣΕΙΑ*, if you engrave *ΙΑΙΑΣ*; which cannot be worth while to do; we should therefore not use these words, or if we do, they should be printed on the plate or not engraved; but my own predilection is still for the column upon a pedestal and no words in the plate.

“I have this moment received from Garlike an ample explanation of the electrical lamp which I enclose to you for the evening amusement of Dropmore. Its cost, including packing, is five louis d’or all but three dollars; but as the Silesian glass account is still unclosed, I think we had better not pay Garlike till the whole bill is made out. The last time that I wrote to him I desired him to order two vases for the corners of the library, *analogues* to the larger one, at 40 dollars each, by which means the whole expence of the three will, as I understand, be 120 dollars = 20*l*.

“Stowe is alternately filling and emptying, or rather is successively filling without emptying. The weather is still fine enough for exercise, and when I do not walk I collate Homer all morning, and play at German back-gammon all evening. They assure me that I grow fat and lusty by rubbing against my brother, and as corpulence is a symptom of good health in one’s old age, I am better pleased to be one of the round-bellied than of the *ευγενων και ευδοκιμων*.

“I am told in a London letter that my old friend Dietrichstein, who arrived at Petersburg with the Palatin, was quickly sent to the right about when he arrived there; and this is explained by the circumstance of Suwarrow’s having intercepted a letter written by Dietrichstein to M. de Chastelar, during the siege of Turin, in which he tells him not to push on too fast; ‘*que l’on ne se soucioit pas à Vienne que ce spadassin Russe vint faire l’important avec ses conquêtes rapides, et encore moins que son maître s’avisat de se mêler de leurs affaires d’Italie.*’

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF ELGIN.

1799, December 16. Cleveland Row.—“As the messenger is

waiting, and I am anxious not to delay him, I have only time to acknowledge your private letters. The grounds, in point of policy, of our determination respecting the Egyptian army are sufficiently obvious, and had, I observe, not escaped your attention. The principles of the laws of nations, and of war, are perfectly clear, and indisputable; and they are proved by a bare reference to the constant practice of all capitulations where combined forces are employed. When the Neapolitan forts capitulated, the articles were signed by Neapolitans, English, Russians, and Turks. What pretence then can there be for the latter to claim to capitulate solely with an enemy whom we alone have reduced to the necessity of capitulating at all? If the Turks are our allies they cannot act without our concurrence; if they are not, they cannot bind us by their act.

“These points will be discussed more at length hereafter, in a separate dispatch, but it was important to lose no time in doing the thing, and we may assign the reasons for it afterwards.” *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to W. WINDHAM.

1799, December 17. Cleveland Row.—“I did not add any thing to my dispatch on the subject of Acre because it seemed to me evident that the attention of our officers there is very much alive to it, and because, in the present state of things (as far as we know it) between Ghezer and the Grand Vizir, there seems great delicacy in the mode of our interference on that subject, which therefore I think it better to leave to those on the spot.

“Keates’ account seems highly satisfactory.” *Copy.*

[GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.]

[1799, December. Foreign Office, Downing Street.]—“Dutheil has been with me by *Monsieur’s* direction to acquaint me for your Lordship’s information with his intention of passing into La Vendée some time towards the latter end of next month—he says that his sense of honour and duty will not permit him to remain in London while his friends are fighting his battles in France, that he wishes to know what force or what means [ministers] might have it in their power to assign to him; that he is very sensible that circumstances may make it impossible for them to afford him assistance of the nature or to the extent which they might wish; but that his determination is fixed, and that he considers the motives upon which it is grounded to be such as do not admit of any compensation.

“*Monsieur* proposes to send several persons into Guyenne and Languedoc; they will go in the first instance to Bourdeaux—he wishes them to be allowed 1,000*l.* for their expenditure, and that 4,000*l.* more should be put at the disposal of the *Commissaire du Roi* for the service of those provinces.

“I have written to Mr. Pitt upon the subject of *Monsieur’s* proposed departure.”

The MARQUESS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, December 18. Stowe.—“The arrangement of Grand

Consul does not promise much more permanence than the nomination of Grand Elector ; and hitherto we have not been alarmed by symptoms of any very increased vigour, not even at their new Admiralty Board, notwithstanding the admirable device of giving the French Lord Spencer 3 votes at his Board. The *Chouans* appear to be gaining strength, and I see with pleasure that you have lost no time in supplying them ; but still I fear that the Austrian Mannheim-armistice will grow (particularly if they take Coni) into a general armistice, which will enable France to move her force into the *Chouan* country early in the spring. Did you ever see the *Guerre de la Vendée, par le Général Turreau* ? It is well worth your reading at this time, though I take it for granted that you have looked into it formerly. You will observe how much he dwells on the difficulties which the Vendéens found in supplying themselves with powder ; and as this partial armistice gives you the means of sending such supplies, I am sure you will consider powder as your first article ; and unless you contrive to employ the Consulate there, I have little doubt but that they will employ you in Ireland."

LORD GRENVILLE TO SIR CHARLES WHITWORTH.

*Secret.*

1799, December. Downing Street.—“There is still one case which is not provided for in my other dispatches of which Captain Sir H. Popham is the bearer : and this letter is therefore intended to supply that deficiency.

“It is possible that the Emperor of Russia may finally persist in his determination not to leave any auxiliary Russian troops in Germany, but may agree to place the army now under Marshall Suvarow at His Majesty’s disposal, and to reinforce that of General Koutousoff by ten or twelve thousand men, which would make two armies each of about thirty thousand men to act in the British Channel and in the Mediterranean in lieu of the two of twenty thousand supposed in the other plan. If this arrangement should take place, to which His Majesty would not be unwilling to consent if it should be found really impossible to obtain the auxiliaries for service in Germany, but not otherwise, the shortest mode of executing it in that case would be to march Suvarow’s army to Genoa and Leghorn, with directions there to place themselves under the command of General Sir Charles Stuart (for this point is considered as indispensable to all Mediterranean operations) and to leave Koutousow’s Army here during the winter with power to that general to concert with His Majesty’s Government for the attack of the island of Walcheren (for which its present force is undoubtedly sufficient) as soon as the season of the year will permit. The detail of this last point will be better explained to the Emperor by Sir Home Popham than by any one else, but I apprehend such an attack would, in any ordinary season, be very practicable *before* the setting in of the vernal equinox. Whatever assistance in artillery, engineers, and gun-boats, such an enterprize would require would of course be supplied by His Majesty, and even if it was necessary, a small body of troops for the first disembarkation, that

being a service to which His Majesty's officers and troops are peculiarly accustomed. But the object would be, after that, to keep the two armies quite distinct, to avoid the disputes and jealousies inseparable from joint expeditions. But you will not fail to observe that, according to this plan, a reinforcement of not less than 10,000 men to Koutousow's army would be absolutely necessary to be made as soon as the season would allow it." *Draft.*

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, December 19. Stowe.—“The moment that the University adopt for their title page the common and ordinary imprint, there can be no objection to the pursuing the project which we had agreed upon for our engraving.

“I have no partiality for the words *Homeri Ilias* (Odyssea), but that they will distinguish the plate from that of an ordinary set of coats of arms, and that, as the space is left for some words or drawing, it will look awkward if it is left blank. Upon this however, as upon the genitive of *ΑΔΕΛΦΟΙ*, if you please yourself you will please the rest of the brotherhood; and I can offer no opinion as to the page which you refer me to, because the Oxford *Cyropædia* is not here. If my drawing would not reconcile you to a pedestal, no other means were likely to succeed; pray send however through Lady S[pencer] whatever directions on this matter you may determine to give to the engraver.

“It is something to hear that your Austrians talk stoutly, though in truth, whatever be their projects whether of war or peace, it is equally necessary for them to bluster or to vapour upon all that they will do. If the weather of Piedmont is like that of Buckinghamshire, Coni is besnowed as well as besieged. Will they succeed there, and at Genoa? If they do, will it give them courage to go on and turn Swisserland, or will they make out of their success there a claim only to a better line of defence in a peaceable division of Swisserland between themselves and the great nation? If your navy could make a Vendée war in Provence and Languedoc to assist that of Brittany, it would perplex the Grand Elector in the moment of his power, and perhaps expedite his absorption.”

LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

1799, December 19. —.—“An application was made to me some time since in behalf of Sackville Hamilton, whom I knew as Under-Secretary in Ireland, and for whom I have a very real regard, to endeavour to get his son sent out as a writer to the East Indies. Hamilton's public merits are a strong claim for success in this request, independently of my good wishes for him. But as I do not know one of the Directors, I have no other way of forwarding this request than by troubling you with it. If you can assist him I really should be much obliged to you to do so.” *Copy.*

LEGISLATIVE UNION OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND.  
1799, December 21. London.—

*Answers.*

Done as to the 7th.

Yes.

To be submitted to the Lord Lieutenant's consideration, with an expression of preference on our part.

*Points upon which Lord Castlereagh requests to be instructed previous to his return to Ireland.*

“A more detailed explanation of the Articles of Union, particularly of Articles 6 and 7, in which are comprehended Commerce, Revenue, and Debts.

“The principle for settling the representation as suggested by the Lord Lieutenant, seems approved, and the mode of obviating the inconvenience of bringing over evidence to Westminster in the case of controverted elections and Private Bills, has been considered, and a remedy proposed.

“The mode of choosing the Peers who are to sit in the United Parliament, is detailed in a note; query, whether this arrangement is finally decided on?

“It certainly would be desirable that Lord Castlereagh should be in possession of the opinion of the Cabinet on all these points in detail, previous to his return. If the measure is to be submitted to Parliament, in the shape of propositions, it is requisite that the resolutions should be drawn here; as there will be hardly time after his return to have them prepared in Ireland, and sent over for consideration.

“If the treaty is to be managed by Commissioners, it will be sufficient that Lord Castlereagh should be instructed on the general outline; the detail need not be absolutely concluded on till the conferences are held, and Ministers see what shape the Irish claims or opposition assume.

“An explanatory sketch particularly on Articles 6 and 7 wanted for publication.

“Instructions as to the mode

Irish Parliament meets 22nd,  
and 14 days to be allowed for  
the call.

Done.

Certainly.

Ditto.

of proposing the subject to Parliament.

“A paragraph for the Speech to be prepared here.

“Whether the Crown may not be authorized by address, instead of bill, to appoint Commissioners.

“Where shall the Commissioners first hold their conferences? In Ireland immediately after their appointment, or in London after the Irish Bills are passed?

“A call of the House will be desired—this necessarily postpones the question on the address, if complied with, for about 10 days.

“A dispatch to my Lord Lieutenant which should enable him to state to individuals, in the strongest manner, the serious purpose of the English Cabinet to persevere in the measure till accomplished, and to support it with all the weight of Government.

“Query—Whether the Lord Lieutenant should not be directed, if he meets with difficulty in the present Parliament, to consider whether a dissolution might not be expedient.

“Whether Lord Castlereagh should not be authorized to bring the leading members of the Administration to a point on the question before it is brought into discussion.

“Whether Sir John Parnell should not be spoken to before he leaves London.

“An intimation to the Lord Lieutenant, that engagements made with a view to this measure, and approved of by ministers here, will be given in charge to subsequent Governments to have precedence of other claims.

Secret Service.  
Amount and Restrictions.

## W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Secret.*

1799, December 22. Bromley Hill.—“ I had a very satisfactory conversation yesterday with *Monsieur*. He entered exactly as one should wish into all our notions respecting Brest ; and promised, under the strictest obligation of secrecy, to employ De la Rosiere in giving us full information on the subject. He seemed also extremely satisfied with the prospect of our being possibly enabled to send him, accompanied by fifteen thousand men, to the coast towards the beginning of March ; but he understands clearly that nothing of this sort can be engaged for until we are perfectly satisfied, by a detailed account of the port in question, that it can be occupied with the strongest probability of maintaining it, and with a certainty of being able (in case of necessity) to re-embark without material loss. In the meantime I agreed that he should write immediately to his agent in Brittany to communicate to the Royalists his earnest desire to join them in person, and *his own hope* (but so as in no degree to commit us) that he may soon be enabled to fix a time when they may expect to see him accompanied by a considerable regular force. I am to see De la Rosiere again to-morrow, and expect to receive from him his detailed statements of the grounds on which he represents the port as a secure one ; I mean to lay it immediately before Sir Charles Grey and Lord St. Vincent for their opinion, both on the military and naval part of the question. One of the points on which I am most apprehensive is the difficulty from the season ; but, if this can be surmounted, and the plan in other respects seems fit to be adopted, I am not sure whether we should not do better to send at once from thirty to forty thousand men, which I am sure we should have no difficulty in collecting by the time proposed, or even sooner. And we should then have a reserve of about twenty thousand (exclusive of cavalry) to follow whenever it is thought expedient. On this plan our army, aided only by the Royalist force already in arms, would be clearly superior to any troops the enemy could collect without detaching from the frontiers ; and, in the interval before such detachments could arrive, the confidence which our superiority would inspire would probably have produced a general rising in all the provinces on the west and north-western coasts ; and I should hope there would be a chance that we might also be commencing our operations in the south from the Mediterranean. I have written very fully to Dundas on the general view of the subject, and will send him the further particulars as soon as I obtain them. I will write to you from town to-morrow about the Dutch ships and troops, and will endeavour to take care of all the other points you mention in your note.

“ Pray send me a copy of your ecclesiastical paper for the Bishop of Lincoln, who is in town. He talks of staying till about Tuesday or Wednesday sen'night, and as you will probably not be in town in the course of that time, will be very glad to come with me for a day to Dropmore if you think it will be of use. Either Saturday or Monday sen'night, as far as I can judge at present, would I think be most likely to suit me best.”

*Postscript.*—“ The new constitution is a more undisguised con-

trivance for giving absolute power to Buonaparte than I expected, and, as such, must I think do good."

W. PITT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1799, December 23. Downing Street.—“I have had a second conversation with De la Rosiere which seems to me to promise most favourably with respect to both the means of retaining, and the power of retreating from the port he has suggested. And he has drawn up a paper on the subject which is good as far as it goes, but not so full or convincing as the statement I collected from himself. I will send it you as soon as it is copied, and will immediately see Sir Charles Grey and Lord St. Vincent on the subject.

“De la Rosiere proceeds on the supposition that, in addition to our own force of 15,000 men, we may depend on 25,000 serviceable Royalist troops to assist in defending this position, which, he undertakes, would in that case have nothing to fear from an enemy with 60 or 70,000 men. I think it very possible that in a very short time a Royalist force might be regularly formed to the number he mentions, or perhaps more; but it does not seem wise to count on this for our security; and I am therefore strongly inclined to think that we ought to endeavour to bring our own force, if not in the very first instance, at least by very speedy reinforcements, to between thirty and forty thousand men; and, with proper exertion, I am much in hopes this may be done. I am sorry however to observe that Lord Spencer, as far as I can judge from the conversation I have had with him to-day, is strongly inclined to imagine difficulties against the whole plan from our naval force being chained down to support an expedition of this nature, and from an apprehension (for which I see very little foundation) that the French fleet might make use of the opportunity to come up the channel or threaten Ireland. And this notion, with a sort of general prejudice against any operations combined with the Royalists, seemed to make him not much disposed to give the project a fair consideration. I think it very possible that this is only a first impression which will subside on reflection; but I mention it because, without taking any notice of what I have said, there is a channel through which you may perhaps be able to inspire him with more enterprising ideas. The conversation I have had respecting Brest nearly puts that project out of the question in the mode to which Sir Charles Grey looked to it, but suggests another which is well worth examining, and which if it turns out as well as on the first statement, may be combined with the operations from [illegible] and not require more than what will be our disposable force in the course of the summer.”

EARL SPENCER TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1799, December 24. Admiralty.—“When Paget called here the other day to apply for a passage in a frigate, he said positively that he could not be ready by the time the *Cormorant* was to sail, which

is the only frigate which can be appropriated at present to this service, and is destined to go with a convoy as far as the Streights, after which she will be at liberty to make the best of her way to any part of Italy. It is very unfortunate that the urgency of his departure did not occur three or four days ago, because the frigate which was sent with your last despatches to the Mediterranean could have carried him out with as much expedition as could be wished; and I should suppose that a day or two will not make much difference to him, which is all that probably could arise from his going with a convoy, if they sail with a fair wind. As to Popham, I saw him to-day, and he said he was going back directly to Harwich; so I concluded he had given up his scheme, which I continue to think a very wild one; for, the moment there is any southerly or westerly wind, he will be able to go over to some part of the coast, though he may not perhaps get into the Elbe or Weser; and the very great uncertainty of going through the Streights and up the Mediterranean at this season makes it most probable that his passage that way would be much longer delayed than through Sweden or the north of Germany.

“We have no frigate to spare that is now ready but the *Cormorant*, and, if she is sent away, all the Lisbon and Mediterranean trade must be stopped for want of convoy. The damages sustained by our frigates in the Dutch expedition, and the increased demand for them off Brest and in the bay in consequence of the supplies sending out to the Royalists, occasions this scarcity at present; otherwise I should be equally desirous with you to attain the object of placing an active person at Naples, of which the necessity has long since been very evident.”

SIR W. SCOTT, Judge-Advocate General, to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, December 27. Easley Court, Reading.—“I have now perused the plan which your Lordship transmitted to me, and have considered it as well as I am able. I entirely agree with your Lordship that the mischief is great and requires a remedy, and I likewise think that it is very fit that some remedy should be tried in practice; but I cannot say that, in my judgment of the matter, this plan is at all entitled to such an experiment; on the contrary, I think it so fundamentally wrong in many respects that, as a sincere friend to the Church of England, I should be extremely concerned to find that it attracted any respectable patronage.

“My objections to it are numerous, and therefore might be better stated in conversation than within the compass of a short letter; but I shall take the present opportunity of mentioning a few of them, though briefly and without regard to order.

“I object to it that it does most materially alter the constitution of the church by taking the care of it in a very great degree out of the hands of the bishops, and putting it into the hands of a set of trustees, who are to have an unlimited power of dividing large livings and uniting small ones as they think fit, and compelling the bishops as well as the patron to submit to those alterations

however they may disapprove them. These same trustees are to have a power of making augmentations of livings, and to have a power of purchasing advowsons, thereby creating a new estate in the Church independent of the bishops, and controlling the bishops in the exercise of their own proper episcopal authority, and possessing means of increasing influence and authority to a very dangerous extent. The author of the plan [Dr. Paley] has not stated what the fund is which he calls unappropriated. It is impossible that he can mean the *Bounty Fund*, because that is appropriated by many Acts of Parliament, and is very honourably and usefully employed, although improvements might certainly be made in its application. What other fund it can be I cannot conjecture; but if it is to be so vested and employed, I think it will give a mortal blow to the episcopal constitution of the Church of England.

“I object to it, that this unlimited power of clipping large livings and uniting small ones, without the consent of the patron in either case, is not only grossly injurious to the rights of lay patrons, but has a dangerous tendency to introduce that parity in the provision for the clergy, which has been deemed by no means desirable for the interests either of Church or State. Large livings are family provisions for the sons of the nobility and gentry of the country, who are invited by them into the church, and, by holding preferments in it, connect the safety of its interests with those of the other great establishments of our ancient Constitution. They are likewise provisions for men of superior ability and attainments. It is on all accounts a fit thing that there should be a disparity in the parochial provision of churches; whereas the effect of this will be in time to produce a Presbyterian equality, fit enough to answer the purposes of a democratic establishment of Church and State, but very incompatible with the peculiar nature of our own.

“I object to it, the impropriety of laying down as an inflexible rule for plurality that no man shall hold more than two benefices, when the fact is notorious that in many parts of the kingdom a man may hold two benefices, and even three, without receiving £40 a year from them.

“I object to it, that it proposes to lay down certain fixed legal rules for residence, which no discretion is to relax under any circumstances whatsoever. In my opinion this is a matter which *must* be left to a proper constitutional discretion—that of the bishops,—from the very nature and necessity of the thing. The cases that occur in the variety of circumstances under which so numerous a body as the clergy is placed (particularly in times of severe pressure upon the fortunes of individuals) makes it unavoidable that this subject shall, in all instances, be under the control and management of a prudent personal discretion, attending to the general interests of the Church, and with some humane consideration of the indulgence which may be due in particular cases, impossible to be foreseen and provided for by any rigid rule of law. I am not unaware of the complaints which have been occasionally indulged against the ecclesiastical superiors for undue lenity in this matter, and of the little expectation that can be, in the judgment of those

who make these complaints, entertained of a vigorous administration of the laws of the Church ; on which I have only to observe, that I have always found those complaints to come from persons entirely unacquainted with the existing difficulties that obstruct the exercise of authority at present. Strengthen the hands of authority, and, by so doing, take away not only the present excuse for doing little, but the present impossibility of doing much. If these are taken away, and after that nothing is done effectually, it may be then time enough to proceed to a violent alteration of the constitution of the Church.

“ I object to it, that whilst it diminishes in a great degree the already too feeble authority of the bishops, it loads them with new duties, incessant, and painful, and productive of expense for which no fund whatever is provided. He is to hold by himself or his commissary a visitation *every year* in certain places of his diocese. He is there to receive the reports of rural deans, who are entirely to supersede, as it should seem, the offices of the archdeacons of the kingdom, containing (amongst other things) complaints of *any general misconduct* of the clergymen of the several parishes from *any reputable parishioner*, that is from any man whose private enmity or conceitedness may lead him to misrepresent his minister. He is then, forthwith, to enquire into the same, taking these same deans to his assistance, and may censure or suspend, with the consent of these deans, and he is then, if occasion requires, to prosecute them to deprivation. For all these purposes of visiting, of enquiring, (let these purposes require ever so much time and expense) and afterwards of prosecuting (perhaps through three courts of justice by appeal) the bishop is to have no consideration whatever, not even in the simple reimbursement of the enormous charges which the execution of such a business must unavoidably throw upon him.

“ I object to it, that it does not appear in this scheme that it has at all occurred to the author in what manner the bishop is to exercise the powers of enquiry on which sentences of suspension or of other censure is to be founded. How is he to compel the attendance or the examination of such witnesses as may be necessary to support charges that are to lead to such serious effects ? or how is the person charged to compel the attendance of his witnesses ? Who is to pay the expenses of these witnesses, if they attend ? or is the bishop to act merely upon the reports of these deans, as conclusive upon all matters contained in them ?

“ I object to it, that whilst it lays down as indispensibly necessary that the ecclesiastical superior should notice not only immoralities but slighter deviations from that decency of conduct which belongs to the sacerdotal character, it supplies no new rules by which so delicate an inquiry is to be conducted or determined. The rural deans are to receive reports to this effect from churchwardens, *or any parishioner*, and they are to transmit them to the bishop. How the bishop is to act in cases of this nature otherwise than at present, no information whatever is given.

“ I object to it that it extends the attention of these deans to the places of worship of Dissenters. Everything which they can

collect by information respecting such places is to form a part of their report, although they have no power of direct enquiry to be addressed to the members of such congregations, nor the bishops any authority to proceed upon their reports respecting them.

“I object to it, that it imposes a most unjust and impracticable condition on Dissenters respecting their registries, by requiring that the householders who apply for them, shall give security not only for their own conduct but also for *that of other persons resorting to the same*, as if any man could be expected to stipulate for the good behaviour of other persons who might think fit to go to the same place of worship, from which it is not in his power to shut him out. Similar to this is another provision by which they are required to give security for the *good principles* of their minister.

“These are *some* of the objections I feel to this scheme; you will excuse my having thrown them together in a very rough way, conceiving that you wished to have what occurred to me, as if we were conversing on the subject. If I knew how to send the paper safely to Dropmore, I would return it immediately; but, for fear of accidents, I will keep it until I return to town the latter end of next week, unless I should understand by a line directed here that your Lordship wished to have it before.

“I really think that no small proportion of the mischief complained of might be remedied in an easy, natural, and constitutional manner, and I should very seriously lament that violent and new measures should be resorted to, before the inefficacy of methods more congenial to established laws and usages was fairly demonstrated upon a just experiment.”

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, December 29. Wycombe.—“I send you Dundas’s letter which I received yesterday evening, and likewise one from Sir Charles Grey. The former is upon the whole very satisfactory, as it shews that Dundas’s mind is open to a fair consideration of the subject, and his suggestion with respect to Bellisle, and also with respect to the time of the operation, falls in a great measure with the plan we talked of yesterday. Sir Charles Grey’s letter is very loosely written and bears strong marks of prejudice with respect to the Royalists, as well as of perfect ignorance with respect to the composition of their force. No real inference can be drawn with respect to the safety or prudence of the project from his opinion till it is given on a more deliberate view of the subject, and the grounds of it explained. In order to bring the business to a point as soon as possible, I think it best to return to town to-morrow instead of Tuesday, and will call on you soon after breakfast.

*Postscript.*—“Dundas’s geography, you will observe, is as accurate as his language.

“The account from Italy and the Rhine and, in most respects, the Archduke’s proclamation promise well.”

#### THE EARL OF ELGIN to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1799, December 29. Constantinople.—“Nothing short of in-

dispensable necessity could have induced me to place Mr. Smith's conduct in an unfavourable point of view, as I have this day done in my public correspondence ; nor have I done it before I had employed every effort of friendly persuasion to put matters on a footing by which business could be properly carried on. I have been the more disappointed that I had looked forward to much useful co-operation with him. I had found him remarkably clever, and, with proper management, he might, I doubt not, be brought to be exceedingly useful. But unfortunately his habits have been acquired in this country, without any guide. And having been known to the Turks in situations very inferior to the diplomatic character he now holds, he has imagined it requisite to adopt a peculiar degree of haughtiness in his demeanour, which has drawn upon him the ill-will not only of the Turks, but equally of all descriptions of persons with whom he has to do. I have been repeatedly enjoined in the conferences not to mention to him what has been communicated for your Lordship's information ; and very serious remonstrances have been made to me by persons who, though in public situations, have received private directions from him limiting their correspondence. In a word, never having had the advantage of observing at home the principles and the mode on which affairs are conducted, and having been always acting at this great distance from responsibility and immediate direction, he has acquired a tone of superiority which prevents his submitting to aid me. He admits the utmost degree of personality in his selections and in his judgment in public matters, and is involved in the miserable intrigue of this country.

“ I will cite one occurrence which I select the rather as my silence upon it, in my public correspondence, must have appeared striking to your Lordship. Above a fortnight ago, accounts were received from Aleppo of Vice-Consul Barker's having proceeded to the violent arrest of a quantity of goods and letters found in the possession of one of the express Tartars. Mr. Smith told me of his having received a quantity of papers on the subject ; I begged to see them as well as the public correspondence to that date from Aleppo. After several days' delay, he sent me a packet, accompanied by a note stating that what I then received was the whole of one side of the question, and, when I had done with that, he would furnish me the remainder. Notwithstanding my having explained to him verbally the absurdity of this proceeding, I am yet without what I have asked for, although the *Internonce*, the Danish and Swedish *Chargés d'Affaires*, and others have sent in the strongest remonstrances and reclamations against Mr. Barker, which I am, of course, still unable to take into consideration.

“ I wish I could point out any mode of remedying the inconvenience I complain of, consistent with your Lordship's very natural wish of not altering the nature of the mission here during my extraordinary embassy. But I confess nothing does occur to me on that subject unless your Lordship should think proper to send to Mr. Smith a temporary leave of absence, instructing me to superintend the business of the company during that period, and to receive all the public papers. Some such arrangement would meet the exi-

gency of the case, without any interruption to Mr. Smith's present emoluments or future prospects. But whatever is done, ought to be done very positively. Notwithstanding your Lordship's instructions, he still employs a dragoman in daily communications with the Porte as before my arrival, and never has once mentioned to me the business he is carrying on.

"I need say nothing to your Lordship about Sidney Smith. The error he has fallen into will very easily be remedied. That must come from your Lordship; though I was very sorry to hear from Lord Nelson at Palermo that the tone Sir Sidney assumed had drawn upon him some unpleasant remonstrances. In a vessel of his which came lately here, his orders to the commanding officer (a midshipman of the *Tigrè*) were signed by S. S. *Minister Plenipotentiary*.

"I have had a most unpleasant reconciliation to manage between the Reis-Effendi and General Kœhler. The latter having called of his own accord on the Minister, and complained, in strong language of being detained some little time before admittance, it was highly resented. Unfortunately General Kœhler, who styles himself *commanding His Majesty's land forces in the Ottoman Dominions*, really claims to himself the respect paid to a Buonaparte or a Suwarow. On the other hand, he has disgusted all his officers. Seeing Englishmen in authority in Turkey, takes away all delight in reading *Don Quizote*."

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1799, December 20-31].—"I have received with all due humility the Dropmore criticisms upon the productions of Stowe; the Bishop of Chester was already out of the reach of them, being returned to Oxford well satisfied that the joint result of our labours was too perfect to admit of change or amendment. To him it is that you must address yourself in respect to the Greek title-page, because you will observe that the form of it is already decided upon by them, and that they certainly do not in any way admit that the large paper books are separately printed by the *Αδελφοι*; they consider the whole as one joint adventure, and they justly maintain it so to be, because by their profit upon the large paper copies, which we consent to take; they will be enabled to sell the small paper at a much lower rate than they otherwise could; but they distinctly mean to say that the title-page is and must be the act of the University Delegates of the University press, and that the phrase to which I objected as well as you, if we were parties to it, is the act of the University Delegates only. When I found that this title-page was already fixed, I doubted at first whether any arms or emblems of ours should appear; but Cleaver, wishing to retain our arms as the best way of naming the *Αδελφοι*, and agreeing with me in thinking the University arms should appear with ours in a work which their title-page describes to be at common expense, the only question to decide was how the Oxford arms could best be added to the plate on which ours are engraved; and with all due deference to your spectacles, and to the little woman's unglazed eyes, I still think

there is no better way of accommodating this new device to the old column than by a pedestal to receive the arms of the University. With respect to other columns or pedestals or plinth on which the little altars stand, it is perfectly useless to have any, if it is not thought that the same or a greater necessity exists for them when the main column is raised, as when it stood upon a low plinth.

“Having now shewn you, what you seem to have overlooked, that the title page is and will be the act of the University, and that some such alteration as that proposed is necessary to make our plate accord with their title-page, I must refer you to fight that battle with the two bishops who have determined it upon their own judgment and upon antient precedent; reminding you however, for your better understanding of this controversy, that they consider themselves as bound to make their own title page, and that they do not regard the large paper as a separate adventure which is our separate property and concern. In truth one of their chief motives for the title page which they have chosen is to hold out, by the shape of it, a temptation to other *illustrious characters* to engage in similar undertakings for the encouragement and advantage of the University press. *Ohe, jam satis est.* Begin now your battle with the bishops when you please; the imagination of the Stowe Committee is completely exhausted in the proposal of the pedestal, but the drawing was a rough sketch without any regular proportion being sought for in it. What is most material is that, upon a very close examination of the first six books, I am beyond measure delighted in proving to myself the merit and accuracy of the new edition; it only waits for the plate.”

#### H. FAGEL to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, December 31. Duke Street.—“I communicated to the Hereditary Prince of Orange what you desired me, the last time I had the pleasure of seeing you at Dropmore, to mention to him respecting the getting in readiness as soon as possible the Dutch corps now at the Isle of Wight, so that it might be fit for active service. He assured me nothing would be wanting on his part to accomplish this object. He had been informed that the convention, by which these troops are to be taken into British pay, was to be signed on the part of this Government by your Lordship; and, in the supposition that this information was correct, he desired me to write these few lines, and to beg that you would have the goodness to let him know as soon as possible at what time and place it will best suit you that this should take place.”

#### LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, [December]. Palace Yard.—“The enclosed accounts give the state of our commerce according to the true value of all the articles. They are of a kind entirely new, and have been prepared in the Offices with much labour.

“I shall probably try to explain some considerations which

they present to me as affecting the Irish question, and as tending forcibly and necessarily to an union. But I am not likely to find a proper occasion in the first debate.

“In the meantime, you may wish to cast your eye over the statements, and will, at your leisure, direct them to be returned to me.

“I apprehend that we are proceeding with the Royal bills, and that you have not delivered the Royal message.

“The Chancellor cannot attend till after the holidays; I presume, therefore, that, after the Tuesday’s debate, your Lordship will adjourn the Irish question for ten or twelve days.”

*Enclosing a general statement of imports and exports prepared by order of the House of Lords, dated March 6th, 1799.*

#### M. DE LA PALUE to GENERAL DE STAMFORT.

1800, January 1. Emerick.—“Le dernier courier de France n’a apporté en événement remarquable que l’annonce du mécontentement qui régné dans les armées, et la desertion qui en est la suite. Les soldats se plaignent que Buonaparte les a trompés, et qu’on ne leur teint point parole, que ne sont ni payés ni habillés; ils disent qu’ils vont aller à la Vendée, où on ne les laissera manquer de rien. Avant hier à Cleves, un bataillon allant sur le Rhin y a passé, 160 hommes ont déserté dans la nuit, et leurs hôtes ont rapporté une partie de leurs armes à la municipalité. On ne doute pas que le même esprit ne régné dans l’armée du Rhin; on sait l’effet qu’il a produit dans l’armée d’Italie. Cette disposition pourroit nuire aux projets de Moreau qui doit être arrivé à Strasbourg, et qu’on assure être chargé de tenter une expédition dans le cas où la rupture entre les deux cours Impériales n’ait pas lieu, comme on s’en étoit flatté en France.

“Je vais vous transcrire une partie d’une lettre que j’ai reçu hier de Paris par la voye de la Hollande; quoiqu’elle ne contienne rien d’absolument neuf, elle confirme plusieurs notions que je vous ai transmises dans mes précédentes. Il n’est pas aisé de répondre à toutes les questions que vous me faites, parcequ’on n’a jusqu’à présent que des conjectures à former. Je vais vous tracer l’opinion la plus reçue sur Buonaparte. Il n’a tenu qu’à lui d’envahir le pouvoir; des gens sages le lui ont conseillé; mais soit qu’il ait été effrayé par les obstacles, soit qu’il ait cru nécessaire de préparer la nation à une transition aussi subite, il a affecté le système de modération, et il n’a retenu du pouvoir que ce qui est nécessaire pour faire marcher le gouvernement. Le but est de rallier tous les républicains sous le même drapeau, de ne donner qu’une impulsion. Voilà la pierre philosophale en politique. Il existe en France des élémens incompatibles, des partis ennemis, qui ne peuvent jamais traiter de bonne foi. Nos gouvernans font un rêve philanthropique dont le reveil sera funeste. L’habitude de l’indépendance, de l’intrigue, de la cupidité ne sera comprimé que par des mesures rigoureuses, dont le Gouvernement ne connoit que trop les effets. Il sera, malgré lui, entraîné dans des mesures dont il ne peut prévoir ni l’étendue ni les résultats. Voilà ce que les gens instruits apperçoivent, et ce qui n’échappe pas même à quelques—uns de

ceux qui tiennent les rênes de la République. Il en est même parmi ceux qui conviennent que ce que l'on fait, n'est qu'une expérience. Un d'eux disait avec naïveté : *Si elle ne réussit pas, il faudra revenir au point d'où l'on est parti, et alors, sauve qui peut.* L'état actuel a donc pour objet de tout niveler, de tout rapprocher, de réparer quelques injustices. On est persuadé que les Fructidoriens seront réhabilités, et rappelés. On auroit bien voulu en faire autant d'une certaine classe d'émigrés, mais la vente de leurs biens est une barrière impossible à franchir ; ils n'ont, et ne peuvent avoir d'espérances que dans le renversement total de la République. Vous me demandez ce que je pense des Chouans. La conduite de Buonaparte avec eux vous servira de réponce. Les soins qu'on prend de les désunir, tout ce qu'on fait pour gagner leurs chefs, les avantages qu'on leur offre, à eux et à leurs familles, aux quelles on promet de rendre l'état de citoyens, leurs biens, tout doit vous prouver l'importance que l'on met à détruire ce ver rongeur. On craint l'argent de l'Angleterre ; on ne se dissimule pas que la moitié de l'armée se rangeroit sous les drapeaux de celui qui aura une caisse militaire réglée ; si on ne réussit pas à pacifier l'intérieur, on espère que les troupes qu'on rassemble suffiront pour donner la loi aux insurgés. On fait reparoitre des idées de fédéralisme, comme une ressource à opposer en cas d'échecs. En tout, on vit au jour le jour. Le sujet de toutes les sollicitudes sont les finances. On succombe sous le poids des charges ; on convient généralement que cet état ne peut durer, et que la paix est le seul remède à nos maux ; mais on ignore par qui, comment, cette paix si désirable peut se faire ; en tout. le moment paroît manqué pour certaines gens, et le restaurateur n'a point encore paru. Voilà tout ce que je puis vous dire au milieu des ténèbres qui nous environnent." *Copy.*

#### COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, January 2. Harley Street.—“Je vous suis bien reconnaissant pour la communication intéressante que vous venez de me faire, et pour la promesse que vous me faite de me communiquer la réponse négative qu'on fera d'ici. Je n'aurois jamais pu croire, tel impertinent que soit Bonaparte, qu'il eût pourtant l'audace d'écrire de pair à compagnon au Roi de la Grande Bretagne. La tête de cet aventurier Corsse est tournée. Ses proclamations comencent par *nous*. Il tranche du souverain, et il est probable que, dans très peu de tems, il périra comme Cezar qu'il semble vouloir imiter, sans avoir les grand talents de ce tyran de la république Romaine.”

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, January 2. Downing Street.—“These papers, which come from *Monsieur*, seem to shew that there is still a considerable want of arrangement and communication in the mode of sending succours to the Royalists. Pray bring them with you to the

Cabinet to-morrow, as we may be able then to speak to Lord Spencer and Windham.”

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, January 2. Stowe.—“Your new year’s gift is indeed most curious, and perhaps, as a diplomatic piece, is unique. The first paragraph is the only *real communication*, namely, a notification to King George of the accession of King Bonaparté; the 2nd is a tirade of general observations on war; the 3rd is a civility which is in truth a great concession, in as much as it grants that the King, at the head of the conspiracy of despots, has one only object of making his nation happy; and the 4th styles the aforesaid communication, tirade, and concession, an *overture to a general pacification*. All this may be answered by a tirade as general, and by repeating all that has been constantly said by the British Ministry for the last eight years. But the result of any answer you may give will most certainly be a second letter, proposing Lord Malmesbury’s terms as a basis for negotiation; and exactly in proportion as Bonaparté sees or thinks he sees your disinclination to entertain a negotiation, he will hold out facilities, whether his ultimate object be peace or war. Your precautions therefore in thinking over such an answer as you state, cannot be too carefully considered, as it is most clear that, from conceiving the danger less immediate, and from the pressure of the taxes, the tribe of those who, though well inclined to Government, will clamour for peace will be very great indeed. I who see no safety but in a peace made with the restored French monarchy, should personally not dislike a very short answer to this overture; but as I well know that there is not one man in a hundred who thinks with me, I must hope that your answer will be moderate, because I am persuaded that you will be forced to negotiate (at least to entertain a negotiation) and that the opinion of the country will compel you to hear *what Bonaparte has to propose*; and that you will stand upon stronger ground for the ultimate breaking off the negotiation, by humouring the first impressions that will undoubtedly arise on John Bull’s mind for peace. I am well aware of many reasons that should urge you to endeavour to prevent France from proposing Lord Malmesbury’s terms to you; but I feel persuaded that you cannot prevent this obvious difficulty by anything you can say in answer to this letter without risking too much of that popular opinion that can alone carry us through the war; and that Bonaparte will even, if necessary, offer to negotiate on such points *beyond Lord Malmesbury’s propositions* as may have taken a new shape from the altered state of the confederacy, and of the war. You will observe that in all these observations I argue against the line which *personally* I should prefer. Pray send me a copy of your answer *en toute confiance*, for we are most anxious to see it. Tom suggested an idea that seems worth attention, namely, that of sending back this courier with a verbal answer that the answer would be sent by a courier of our own; which courier, if he was well chosen, might find means to forward a short ciphered note to Berlin, and, at all events, would bring you back the French papers and his observations.”

## HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, January 3. Wimbledon.—“I send you a despatch I received last night from St. Helena, from which you will perceive to what an extent the Portuguese flag is carrying its cover of Spanish property. I hope our cruisers will catch those ships, and prevent so much treasure getting into the coffers of our enemies. I have wrote to Lord Spencer that he may take every precaution he can.”

## COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, January 3. York Farm.—“J’ai été, on ne peut pas plus, sensible à la nouvelle preuve d’amitié, d’estime, et de confiance que vous venez de me donner, et il est en vérité bien doux et bien satisfaisant pour moi de pouvoir me rendre justice à moi-même en osant vous assurer que je n’en suis pas indigne. Mon attachement à la bonne et vraie cause, et mes sentimens personnels pour vous doivent me mériter la continuation de vos bontés, qu’en tout état de choses, l’honnête homme que vous avez honoré du titre de votre ami, réclamera toujours. Soyez assuré que je ne ferai usage de votre communication que pour mon instruction particulière, et que je n’enverrai la pièce curieuse de *diplomatie consulaire* à ma Cour que lorsque vous m’y aurez autorisé et par courier. Daignez ne pas oublier de m’envoyer votre réponse que vous avez bien voulu me promettre. Je me flatte de connoître assez vos principes pour la deviner. Adieu, j’aime les anciens usages et je ne puis en conséquence m’empêcher de vous prier d’agréer mes vœux à l’occasion du renouvellement de l’année. Pussions-nous réunir enfin à écraser tous ensemble l’anarchie, et à rendre le repos et la paix à l’Europe en rétablissant le *vrai Roi véritablement* sur son *vrai trône*.”

## W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, January 3. Downing Street.—“Canning has suggested, and I think rightly, that it would be a great improvement to put your answer in the shape of a note or declaration in the King’s name in the third person, beginning with the second paragraph; and to put the first sentence into your separate letter to Talleyrand, or rather substitute it for that you have written. If you approve this, the alteration is easily made. I am clear it will be much for the better.

*Postscript*.—“You avoid the awkwardness of two letters to the same person, and yet do not directly address Bonaparte. And the paper will be in a simpler and more dignified form, and fitter for publication as a manifesto.”

## VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private*.

1800, January 5. Dublin Castle.—“I have to acknowledge the honour of your Lordship’s letter of the 27th, which, with its enclosures, has been communicated to Lord Cornwallis.

“ His Excellency’s opinion perfectly coincides with your Lordship’s—that it is by no means an object to follow up Lord R. FitzGerald’s suggestion; and considers your Lordship’s answer as likely to produce every good effect that can be derived from his interference.

“ I have learnt that the Duke has, within these few days, received a very long letter from his brother on the subject: and that, at *the moment*, it produced a strong impression; but Mr. Ponsonby has since been with him, and, as his Grace generally takes his impression from the last person with whom he communicates, I conclude whatever opposition it is in his power to command, which, I believe, is altogether confined to his single vote in the House of Lords, and to considerable local influence amongst the disaffected in Kildare, will be given to the measure. I return Lord Robert’s letter.”

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, January 12. Stowe.—“ Tom and I could not avoid smiling at the eagerness with which you speak of the publication of your Egyptian interception, as your new year’s gift to *Sa Majesté très Corse*; in which measure though there is a proper mixture of sense of duty, yet possibly there may be a little malice such as you will not disavow. We only beg that your publisher may not *for his own job* keep it as long in the press as he did the first Cairo-mail; but that you will contrive to have it published in weekly numbers, till the public curiosity is exhausted; as we agree that it is very essential to put down the character of *Sa Majesté* aforesaid as much as possible (even before Parliament meets) in the mind of John Bull; and much of the effect will be lost if your publisher keeps this collection for six or eight weeks in the press. All this will facilitate your decision of not suffering the Turk to export their wretched remnant of army, and may possibly end in another chelink for Sir Sydney’s cap. I begin to grow uneasy about Keats’s *Chouan* convoy. It ought to have arrived on the coast on the 23rd or 24th, having sailed on the 19th; and we have in the Paris papers accounts from Hedouville, dated the 29th, which do not speak of any embarkation being on the coast. And I am the more uneasy about him and Captain Riou’s convoy as Gardiner is returned with the fleet to Torbay, and three or four ships from Brest might overthrow all your arrangements. In the course of a late correspondence with Simcoe he presses warmly for an attempt in the spring on Brest, which he considers very practicable with 25,000 men, and quotes Sir C. Stuart or Sir C. Grey as persons equally persuaded of this, and as most proper for such a command. He speaks from very late enquiries, and so confidently, as to claim some attention; for the object is in every point of view so essential. Would you wish me to pursue this *as from yourself*, or shall I say nothing more about it to him. You know how much I should be delighted in seeing a war carried on upon its *true principles* of doing as much mischief as you can; not being at all more reconciled to your new rights of war, than to your new rights of men.”

## COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, January 14. Harley Street.—“ Je vous suis bien obligé de la communication des papiers Egiptiens que Mr. Hammond m’a comuniqué par votre ordre. Vous avez bien raison de ménager les Turcs, et de soustraire à la connaissance du public la conduite louche de ces pauvres gens. C’est leurs faiblesse qui les fait agire de cette manière, et il ne faut pas la dévoiller ; mais il me semble qu’il est bon d’en avertire ma Cour afin qu’elle ordonne à Tomara de les surveiller, et de leurs inspirer plus de fermeté et constance ; car je le crois un peu mou, témoin la facilité avec laquelle il avoit consenti à donner des passeports à l’armée de Kleber.

“ Avez vous lu l’ouvrage Jacobin intitulé *Coup d’œil politique* ? Il est attribué à un certain Saladin, Génévois, qui semble l’avoir écrit sans la dicté de Sa Majesté corse. Croyez vous qu’il convient ou non de pourssuivre cet ouvrage composé, quoiqu’ indirectement, contre le système suivi par le gouvernement Britanique et ses alliés.”

## GENERAL SIR CHARLES GREY, K.C.B., to W. PITT.

1800, January 16. Hertford Street.—“ Herewith I have the honour to return the answers given by Monsieur Rosière to the queries put relative to his memoir on an expedition to *Rhuis*, and which indisposition has prevented my doing until now.

“ Monsieur Rosière, answers by no means give me a more favourable opinion of the plan than I have uniformly had, but on the contrary, I cannot avoid remarking that the very replies he makes to the queries tend, in a great measure, to prove the futility of such an enterprise. He admits there are hardly any, or rather no resources on the peninsula for such an army, and even on the quality of the water he is silent. That *Vannes and Auray* are not tenable by the Royalists ; and with respect to *his proposed redoubts*, the very landing of the fascines, gabions, and other materials wanting, require more time than he proposes to allow for perfecting them. It is not here necessary to form any supposition as to his abilities as an engineer, but if a line is to be forced by an enemy of superior strength, there can be but little resistance expected by a chain of redoubts 400 yards asunder. In fact many of the queries remain unanswered, and such as are, except relative to the supposed numbers of the Royalists, militates most completely against such an enterprise. And with respect to the Royalists themselves, if they are in such force in the field as he wishes to represent, it cannot be the situation of *Vannes and Auray* that creates the difficulty of possession, but the actual inferior force of the Royalists, compared with the Republican troops in this part of the country. In this situation of matters, it may be very fairly concluded, that if such a body of 15,000 men are landed on the peninsula, they would very shortly be obliged to retire, or surrender without effecting any one purport of the expedition.

“ I have taken the freedom to speak fully out on this occasion, having been indulged by you to do so on every military question you have honoured me by a reference to ; and allow me truly to

add that wishing from my heart, as I have ever done, every honour and success to attend your plans, I earnestly hope you will not embarrass yourself with this enterprise ; for what dependance can be placed upon a force composed of *sailors, conscripts and deserters* ? most assuredly discomfiture and disgrace."

*Enclosure* :—

ROYALIST INSURRECTION IN BRITTANY.

*Réponses.*

1. L'arrondissement de *Vannes* et d'*Auray*, y compris le *Morbihan* qui en fait partie, est au moins de 30,000 hommes, dont 17,000 sont armés : *Georges*, qui commande dans cet arrondissement peut porter le nombre des Royalistes jusqu'à 70,000.

2. Ils sont bon Royalistes ; On en ignore le nombre.

3. La masse peut se monter à 150,000 ;  
Leurs points de rassemblement varient, selon les circonstances.

4. Sans aucune doute ; ils se montrent de jour, ayant la cocarde blanche au chapeau.

5. La formation est composée de divisions, commandées par un Colonel, un Lieutenant Colonel, et un Major. La division est de 3 ou 4 bataillons, selon la force ; le bataillon de 8 compagnies. A chacune de ces divisions est attachée une troupe de cavalerie, et une d'artillerie. La discipline est maintenant fort bonne et fort exacte.

6. L'espèce d'hommes dont ils sont composés sont habitants du pays, matelots, conscrits, et déserteurs, dont le plus âgé à 30 ans ; ils sont susceptibles de sa'croître beaucoup en leur en fournissant les moyens.

*Questions.*

1. Quel serait le nombre des Royalistes ou de Chouans bien décidés dans un arrondissement de huit lieues d'*Auray* et de *Vannes*.

2. Les habitants de ces villes ainsi que ceux des isles dans le golfe de *Vannes* sont-ils Royalistes ? quel en pourroit être le nombre dans chacun de ces lieux ?

3. Quel est le plus grand nombre des Royalistes qu'on ait jamais vu rassemblé ? et quels sont ordinairement leurs points de rassemblement.

4. Les Royalistes sont ils assez en force pour paraître le jour, ou se bornent-ils à des opérations nocturnes.

5. Quelle est l'organisation de ces rassemblements, et à quelle discipline sont-ils assujettis.

6. Quel seroit l'accroissement ou la diminution de leurs forces selon les derniers rapports, et de quelles classes d'hommes sont ils composés.

7. Pas une.

8. *Vannes* et *Auray*, y compris le Morbihan et environs.

9. *Vannes* et *Auray* sont des ports de Marée, où il ne monte et ne peut monter que des bâtiments marchands de 100, et au plus de 200 à 300 tonneaux.

10. On ne connaît pas le nombre de ces bâtiments, mais quelqu'il soit, les habitants de *Morbihan* étant tous Royalistes, il serait très possible de s'emparer de ces bâtiments, de les conduire dans la rade de Quiberon, ou de les détruire.

11. Les frégates peuvent entrer et mouiller dans le golphe, mais peu de distance de son ouverture. Il n'y a aucune batterie sur la côte, qui ne puisse être soumise, soit par les Royalistes, soit par les chaloupes canonnières, dès que l'escadre sera mouillée dans la rade. Les Royalistes étant maîtres de toutes les isles du golphe, et la plûpart de ces isles devant être fortifiées et armées pour protéger au besoin la défense de la presqu'isle, il ne peut y avoir rien à craindre de leur part.

12. Les Royalistes, pourvus de quelques pièces de canon, s'empareraient sans difficulté de *Vannes* et *d'Auray*; ils auraient le temps de faire évacuer de ces ports les bâtiments qui s'y trouveraient, ou de les détruire; mais, attendu la position dominée des deux villes, il ne leur serait pas possible de s'y maintenir.

7. Ya-t-il parmi eux des personnes qui ont figuré avant la Révolution? qui sont-ils et quelles sont les communications qu'on a eu avec eux.

8. Est-ce dans le voisinage de St. Briaux ou celui de *Vannes* et *d'Auray* que les Royalistes sont le plus nombreux? Ou bien dans quelle partie de la Bretagne?

9. Jusqu'à quel point les rivières de *Vannes* et *d'Auray* sont-elles navigables, et pour quelle espèce de bâtiments.

10. Quel est le nombre de vaisseaux ou de bâtiments d'une moindre force dans les rivières et le golfe? serait-il possible de s'en emparer ou de les détruire. Les habitants seraient-ils disposés à les offrir pour notre service.

11. Quelle est la force des plus grands bâtiments qui pourraient entrer et rester à l'ancre dans le golfe de *Vannes*. Ces bâtiments ne seraient-ils pas exposés au feu des canons et de mortiers en entrant, ou même tandis qu'ils restaient à l'ancre, dans le cas qu'on ne s'en emparât pas des isles les plus proches de la presqu'isle.

12. Le débarquement fait, les Royalistes seraient-ils assez en force pour tenir les villes *d'Auray* et de *Vannes* contre le nombre de troupes réglées qui est actuellement dans le pays, sans autre secours que ce qu'on leur fournirait en armes et munitions de guerre.

13. La longueur de la presqu'île de *Rhuïs* [Ruys], depuis la hauteur de l'est de *Sarzeau* jusqu'au *Port Navale* est d'environ 3 lieues, et sa plus grande largeur de 2 lieues; son pourtour, excepté les anses qui s'y trouvent, est presque partout élevé et escarpé; et son intérieur offre des plaines assez espacieuses pour faire manœuvrer des troupes. En cas de retraite la presqu'île d'*Arzon*, qui tient à celle de *Rhuys* et qui en fait partie, doit être fortifiée de manière à favoriser et à assurer le rembarquement.

14. Des redoubtes distantes l'une de l'autre d'environ 200 toises selon que le terrain le permettrait. On estime qu'il faudra les construire tant pour le camp retranché que pour la presqu'île d'*Arzon*, 13 ou 14. Chacune de ces redoutes devant être occupée par cinq ou six cents hommes, elle exigerait 400 travailleurs, et deux ou trois jours au plus pour être mise en état de défense, mais il faudrait que les fascines et les piquets fussent préparés à l'avance, et portés sur le terrain.

15. Le camp retranché en avant de *Sarzeau*, entre la mer et le golphe, y compris les flancs, aurait environ 1,700 toises d'étendue, c'est à dire une digue de 8 ou 9 redoutes.

16. Les inondations seraient pratiquées dans les valons en avant du camp, par la retenue des eaux des marais et des ruisseaux dont cette partie de la presqu'île est coupé. L'escarpement naturel ou celui qu'il y aurait à faire sur les bords de la presqu'île du côté de la mer, joint aux rétranchements qui y seraient construits, mettraient cette partie en sûreté.

17. Les chemins de la presqu'île, comme ceux de la province

13. Quelle est la nature de la presqu'île, est-ce que la cavalerie y pourrait agir? y a-t-il des positions près du lieu de débarquement dont on pourrait se servir pour couvrir la retraite?

14. Quels sont les ouvrages qu'on se propose de construire non seulement pour couvrir la retraite, mais aussi pour la défense de la presqu'île? quel serait le temps et le nombre d'hommes qu'ils exigeraient pour leur construction?

15. Quelle est l'étendue de terrain du côté du golphe et sur l'isthmus sur laquelle il faudrait construire des ouvrages?

16. Quelle portion de l'isthmus pourrait-on inonder du côté des salines. Cette inondation resterait-elle toujours pendant les marées basses. Dans le cas contraire, est-ce que les Républicains ne pourraient pas en détruire l'effet en rompant la digue?

17. Quel est l'état des chemins sur la presqu'île? Convient-

en général, ont besoin de quelques réparations pour être praticables aux troupes et à l'artillerie ; mais ce travail ne saurait être difficile ni long ; on y emploierait les habitants. Les ressources en fourrages sont à peu près nulles, ou du moins peu considérables. Quant au bois, il s'en trouvera près du château de Sucinis, et l'on sera toujours à portée de s'en procurer soit par le golphe, soit par la côte.

18. Tout le pays étant peuplé de Royalistes et les ports de Vannes et d'Auray ayant été évacué de la manière qu'on a indiqué ci-dessus, il n'y aurait aucun débarquement à craindre du côté du golphe. Au reste, il n'y a pas de mauvais temps qui puisse empêcher les bâtiments de guerre de tenir en dedans de l'ouverture du *Morbihan*.

19. Excepté les vaisseaux de ligne, les bâtiments de guerre et ceux de transport peuvent être mouillés assez près de la côte, pour que la communication avec la presqu'isle soit aussi facile et aussi prompte que le temps le permettrait.

20. Il n'y a sur la presqu'isle aucun ouvrage de fortification, et les batteries établies sur la côte au *Port Navale* et ailleurs, ne sont pas susceptibles de défense contre bâtiments de guerre.

21. On peut mettre à terre autant d'hommes à la fois qu'on le jugera à propos, ou que les bateaux plats pourront y en porter ; et comme il est très vraisemblable que le débarquement se fera sans opposition de la part de l'ennemi, on aura le temps et la facilité de le faire par divisions.

22. Il y a sur le pourtour de la presqu'isle, soit du côté du *Morbihan*, soit du côté de la

elles à l'artillerie ou à la cavalerie ? et quels sont les ressources pour la forage et le chauffage ?

18. Dans le cas que les bâtiments ne pourraient rester dans le golfe, et qu'on ne s'emparât point des petits bâtiments de ce côté-là, ne serait-on pas exposé à des débarquements par l'ennemi ?

19. Quand les bâtiments ne seraient pas dans le golfe, à quelle distance du lieu de débarquement pourrait-on placer les vaisseaux de guerre et de transports, et quelle seroit la facilité de communication ?

20. Y a-t-il maintenant de batteries ou d'ouvrages quelconques sur la presqu'isle ? de quelle espèce sont-elles, et en quel état ?

21. Quand on aurait le nombre de bateaux nécessaire et un vent favorable, quel nombre d'hommes pourrait-on débarquer à la fois ? et en quel temps pourrait-on débarquer une seconde division avec les mêmes bateaux ?

22. Les vaisseaux chargés de vivres étant à l'ancre dans le golfe, et l'armée postée près de

*rade*, plusieurs anses où le débarquement des vivres et d'autres objets pourra se faire sans difficulté.

23. La presqu'isle est arrosée par plusieurs ruisseaux ; il y a d'ailleurs des fontaines et des puits : on ne prévoit pas qu'on puisse y manquer d'eau, ni qu'elle soit de mauvaise qualité.

24. Il est possible qu'il se trouve sur la presqu'isle et dans ses environs quelques bois propre à faire des fascines, des piquets, mais il est plus sûr d'y porter ces objets, d'autant que pour les 13 ou 14 redoutes qu'il y aurait à y construire, il ne faudrait pas moins de huit à neuf mille fascines, et trois fois autant de piquets. Au reste, c'est un calcul à faire avec exactitude, et qui regarde l'ingénieur qui devra être à la tête des travaux.

25. La petite ville de *Sarzeau*, chef lieu ; *St. Gildas* et *Arzon*, bourgs ; et plusieurs villages. La population du tout, y compris quelques isles voisines, peut être de 4 or 5,000 âmes des deux sexes et de tout âge. On ne le sait pas positivement

26. La presqu'isle étant généralement bien cultivée, on peut assurer qu'il y a des bestiaux, mais on en ignore le nombre et l'espèce.

27. Il y a de *Sarzeau* à *Vannes*

4 lieues,	
de <i>Vannes</i> à <i>Auray</i>	4 lieues
de <i>Vannes</i> à <i>Brest</i>	45 „
de <i>Vannes</i> à <i>Rennes</i>	24 „
de <i>Vannes</i> à <i>Nantes</i>	30 „
d' <i>Auray</i> à <i>Brest</i>	41 „
d' <i>Auray</i> à <i>Rennes</i>	28 „
d' <i>Auray</i> à <i>Nantes</i>	34 „

En général les chemins de la *Bretagne*, surtout depuis la *Révolution*, ont été négligés : mais avec quelques réparations, ils seront toujours praticables pour les troupes et l'artillerie.

l'isthmus, trouverait-on des facilités pour débarquer des vivres près des salines ?

23. Quelle est la qualité de l'eau sur la presqu'isle ? En trouverait-on assez pour les troupes et pour la cavalerie ?

24. Y a-t-il du bois suffisant pour les fascines ? quelle quantité faudrait-il nécessairement faire venir d'ici ?

25. Quel est le nombre de villages et d'habitants dans la presqu'isle ?

26. Y a-t-il beaucoup de bétail dans la presqu'isle et dans les isles ? Quel jugement pourrait-on former sur le nombre ?

27. Pourrait-on procurer une liste des villes et des chemins qui conduisent à *Vannes* et *Auray*, jusqu'à quinze ou seize lieues de rond, en marquant l'état de ces chemins et des forces républicaines dans les villes ? Serait-il possible de procurer les mêmes renseignements pour une étendue de soixante lieues ?

On compte dans cette province mille lieues de grands chemins ou de chemins royaux, et beaucoup d'autres pour différentes communications : tous ces chemins sont généralement connus. Suivant les derniers rapports arrivés de *Bretagne*, le nombre des troupes Républicaines employées dans les places fortes, dans les isles, et dans les postes de la côte est de 30,000 hommes des deux armes ; on n'a pas l'état de l'emplacement de ces troupes.

28. Ou trouvera parmi les Royalistes tous les pilotes, et tous les guides dont on pourra avoir besoin.

28. Quels seraient les moyens de procurer les guides et les pilotes ?

#### COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, January 16. Harley Street.—“Mille grâces pour la communication de la lettre de Lord Nelson. Elle est intéressante parce qu'elle est postérieure aux dates sous lesquelles le papiers Français anonçoient des soulèvements à Naples et en Sicile.

“Quand à Saladin, c'est moins à le punir qu'à le réfuter qu'il faut s'ocuper. On traduit déjà l'ouvrage en anglois, et il fera un malheur efet sur ceux qui, quoiqu'attaché au gouvernement, ne soupirent que pour la paix, parcequ'ils n'aiment pas les taxes de la guerre, et n'ont pas assez de jugement pour comprendre l'impossibilité de cette paix dans les circonstances où est la France.

“Il fera aussi efet sur ceux qui, par indolence ou ignorance, n'ont pas d'opinion à eux, et prenent pour oracle la dernière brochure qu'ils lisent, ou le dernier propos qu'ils entendent débité ; et malheureusement le public est composé au moin de trois quarts de cette espèce de gens. Il seroit donc bien util qu'une plume comme celle de Mr. Canning réfute, *ex professo*, le venin du Genèveis Jacobin.”

#### The EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, January 16. Dublin.—“The House is just up. The numbers for the amendment 96, against it 138. Grattan took his seat late in the debate, and made a wretched speech. I did not stay it out, but I am told Government had the advantage in debate as well as in number. Corry, the new Prime Sergeant, and the Attorney General spoke remarkably well. I think the union may now be looked upon as certain, though you must not expect to retain your majority to the last without paying pretty handsomely, in addition to what it has already cost. Every one I have talked

with agrees that the people in general are well inclined to the measure, and that, even in Dublin, the spirit against it is much softened. Not a syllable was said in the House of Lords. Mr. Butler, Lord Ormonde's brother, voted in the minority. David Latouche spoke strongly and well for union, but all his family voted against.

"The two lines you sent me were excellent. My only objection is that they are too good for the rest, and perhaps that poetical cast of expression . . . is not quite suited to the epigram. Watkin objects to the mention of Ierne, as the monument is to serve for those also who are to fall in the next expedition you send abroad."

#### E. COOKE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, January 16. Dublin.—"Our debate on the address terminated at  $\frac{1}{2}$  past eleven this morning with a majority of 42—138 to 96. Sir L. Parsons opened with an amendment declaring the House would maintain the constitution. Savage, Lord Downshire's member, seconded. The debate was warm and personal—well maintained on our side in excellent spirit and tone. The galleries quiet; the Speaker very correct; no clamour in the House. Lord Castlereagh, the Attorney General, Mr. Fox and the Prime Sergeant spoke very well, and carried the war into the enemy's quarters. Ponsonby was not so good as usual; Bushe very inflammatory and declamatory; Plunket sharp and bitter; and Sir J. Parnell was in earnest. Grattan, who had been elected for Wicklow at midnight, came in about 8 o'clock in the morning, feigned illness for some time, but, being allowed to speak sitting, he gave us a declamation in his old style of two hours. Corry replied to him with excellent animation and effect.

We have moved all our writs, which exceed 30.

Lord de Clifford's members seem against us. We shall have a severe struggle; all depends on the tone of the country; if we can keep that right I believe all may do well."

#### COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, January 19. Harley Street.—"On vient de me dire que les trois fils du dernier Duc d'Orléans sont arrivés dans ce pays. Si le fait est vrai, ne se pourroit-il pas que ce soit Syès qui les a fait revenir de l'Amérique en Europe pour qu'en cas que si la République croulle, il puisse placer cette nouvelle dinastie au préjudice de celle à qui le trône appartient de droit, et de la quelle cet infâme prêtre apostat a tout à redouter.

"Il me semble aussi que par l'affectation de ne citer que l'exemple de Guillaume trois, au lieu de la réstoration de Charles deux, Talleyrand n'a eu en vue que d'excuser d'avance ce qui est peut-être projeté en secret entre lui et Syès. Si ces trois princes sont arrivés, il n'y a pas de doute qu'ils se tiendront cachés, et passeront au plus vite sur le continent, ou ils resteront à Hambourg ou dans les états du roi de Prusse jusqu'à ce que le chemin du trône leurs

sera facilité en France. Ne croyez-vous pas qu'il seroit prudent de s'emparer de ces prétendents et de les tenir au centre du pays, loins des côtes, et sous très bonne gardes, car, dans tout événement, ce sera des bons ôtages à garder.

"J'enverrai, mardi prochain, un courier avec les nouvelles propositions, et votre réponse que vous avez eu la bonté de me promettre de me donner. Je ferai cette expédition pour me presser de détruire les faux bruits que le France propagera en Europe d'une négociation existente entre elle et ce pays."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, January 19. Stowe.—"I feel how unreasonable I am in pressing upon time so fully employed as yours is, but my insatiable curiosity for your intercepted correspondence must be gratified; and therefore I depend upon your giving one moment to the task of sending to me by the post of to-morrow a copy of this interesting publication.

"I am not surprised at seeing (in the papers) that the courier *de Sa Majesté très Corse* is returned; and I think it almost an equal wager whether the aforesaid Majesty will sing to you a song *très Gasconne*, or *très mince*. But it seems clear that his game is to press the peace as much as possible, whether he looks to his French or to our English politics. Lord Holland at the Whig Club seems to have spoken the text of the party, and I have very little doubt but that this same text of 'peace' is well settled with their French friends. Pray send me the copy and answer as soon as it is fitting, and let me know your day of motions either for peace or for Dutch enquiry, as I may be tempted to partake of those delights, though not of the joys of your first day.

"As to the attempt on Brest, I am satisfied that it is good, and it is very right that you should tell me that it is good for nothing; so we are both satisfied."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, January 20. Stowe.—"Many and most cordial congratulations to you on the Irish division, which promises all that you could wish. I hope and trust that you will not suffer this iron to cool, and that no time will be lost in pressing the union to its conclusion. I wish you to let Tom state to you my ideas respecting a tribunal for trying Irish controverted elections, which, from every day's reflection, I am convinced cannot be tried at Westminster; and which, for every reason, cannot be changed *after* the union is formed; though I can see no difficulty that ought to prevent a different arrangement of tribunal to be made by Ireland as a step previous to her union. Pray think this very well over, for the consideration haunts me as one that will be very important, and I know that many quiet people in Ireland feel the objection to a Westminster trial very strongly.

"I am very sorry for the primate's death, because it will make

serious difficulties in arranging his successor. I have not a wish or thought distinct from that which I ought to feel on a subject so interesting to the Church of Ireland; but I do earnestly put it to your duty and conscience to resist archbishop Agar's succession; and I will fairly own that I think archbishop Beresford's nomination would (though not so objectionable on the score of his moral character or conduct) be an improper choice. As to the other Irish bishops they are, I am persuaded, out of everybody's thoughts; and of the English on the Irish bench, Jones, Lord Bristol, Hawkins, Percy, Law, and Bennet, you cannot look upon one of them. The enclosed will shew you that Euseby Cleaver is in contemplation, and I verily believe is very decidedly the most fit; but I very much wish it were possible to find an English Bishop who would undertake it. I do not think that *our* Cleaver would; and if so, I verily think Euseby would be the best."

*Postscript.*—"Remember the intercepted correspondence.

"Since writing this, I understand from another letter that the Duke of Portland's bishop O'Beirne talks confidently of succeeding. I do hope and trust that a nomination so very highly improper is impossible."

#### HENRY DUNDAS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, January 23. Tunynghame.—"I should not have thought it necessary to write to you if I had any certainty of getting away from this even to-morrow; but I am shut up here by a hurricane of wind and a storm of snow which is still as violent as it was in the morning, when my post boys, declaring their inability to proceed, obliged me to return from the carriage. I have desired Huskisson to send you a despatch I have received from Colonel Grant at Jamaica respecting St. Domingo. It appears to me that you ought to lose no time in speaking to the American Minister on the breach of faith so marked both on their part and that of Toussaing. If they conceive that they are to colleague together to take care of themselves exclusive of us, we have no choice but to declare the island of St. Domingo in blockade, and to prevent any supplies going to them from America. It is not from the value I attach to the commerce in the present state of the island that I entertain that idea, but the honour of the country seems to require that we should not submit to such a violation of faith."

#### Report on the AFFAIRS of the NETHERLANDS.

1800, January 25. Emeric.—"J'ai eu hièr une conversation assez longue avec un ancien chef d'insurgés de Brabant qui en arrivait pour y conserver, m'a-t-il dit, ses amis et ses intelligences. Il prétend qu'on y est très disposé à suivre l'exemple des Chouans de la France, et qu'ils ont fait faire des propositions à l'Angleterre, auxquelles on n'a pas encore répondu, ou du moins pas d'une manière satisfaisante. J'ai aperçu à travers tout ce que m'a dit cet homme, que les choses sont au même état que l'année dernière; que les gens aisés s'accoutument à leur état, que tout ce qui a

quelque chose à perdre ne prendra aucun parti s'ils n'ont pas une armée qui vienne à eux. Si on excitait quelque mouvement parmi eux, ce ne serait composé que de bandits détestés des deux partis ; que les chefs seroient des gens sans avœu, sans principes, et prêts à piller amis et ennemis. Il est certain que si une armée marchait sur le Rhin et menaçait la Belgique, alors la position des Français y serait très mauvaise, et nul doute que le pays ne s'élevât contr' eux ; mais à moins de cela, tout ce qu'on fera ou tentera sera à pure perte. S'il se trouve des personnes qui promettent d'avantage, il sera prudent de n'y pas prendre confiance.

“ On fait sur les côtes d'Hollande des préparatifs de défense, comme si on croyait être menacé d'une nouvelle expédition de la part de l'Angleterre. Semonville n'a encore rien mis au jour. On ignore quelles sont ses intentions ; il a la même figure, le même langage pour tout le monde. On se flatte qu'il n'y aura point de changement dans le gouvernement, quoique bien des personnes assurent le contraire. Les neutres ont donné un peu de mouvement au commerce ; il se fait quelques affaires à la Bourse ; avec cela la pauvreté et l'abattement sont à leur comble, et les Français peuvent trancher et décider comme ils le voudront. Les départemens sont beaucoup moins soumis en France que ne le sont les Bataves. Il faudrait de grandes secousses pour les relever de leur abattement ; ils n'ont à présent d'autre sentiment que celui de la peur. Voilà tout ce que notre horizon nous laisse apercevoir jusqu'à présent, et ce calme doit bientôt cesser. Nous attendons ce qui va sortir des écritoires et des portefeuilles : on les dit fort occupés de tous les côtés.”

#### COUNT WORONZOW TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, January 27. Harley Street.—“ Comme ce n'est pas l'envoyé d'une Cour étrangère, mais votre ami, et votre tout dévoué serviteur qui vous écris ce billet, il vous parlera à cœur ouvert et sans reserve.

“ Je suis désespéré de la manière plus que bizarre dont on traite chez nous les affaires politiques. Je suis honteux et humilié de notre diplomatie. Votre courier m'a apporté la détermination malheureuse qu'on avoit prit chez nous, et au sujet de laquelle vous devez avoir eu tous les détails par le Chevalier Whitworth, car il m'en a écrit. Aussi, un moment après, un de mes courier arivat avec une dépêche de cinq jours plus fraîche que la première, avec un apendix par lequel on m'ordonne de vous en dire le contenu. Cette dépêche est un peu moins alarmente que la première, mais néanmoins il se trouve tant d'incohérence qu'il est impossible de pouvoir la redire de bouche sans être soupçonné de l'avoir estropié en ôtent ou ajoutent quelque chose pour la défigurer exprès. Je vous l'envoi donc en traduction, et je vous envoi d'ami à ami, afin que vous n'en fassiez que l'usage le plus indispenssable, et en ne comuniquant à vos confrère que ce que vous ne croirez pas être capable de refroidire la bonne intelligence entre les deux pays ; car, quoiqu'on agit mal chez nous, on est dans des bons principes,

on aime l'Angleterre ; mais on n'a pas le jugement de voir qu'on la choque sans le savoir. Comme tout ce fait avec précipitation et par l'impulsion du moment, je crois que dans peu on reviendra à d'autres mesures. J'espère aussi que l'arrivée de Popham produire un changement plus heureux. J'espère aussi que la dépêche que j'ai écrit au sujet de la lettre de l'Empereur à celui d'Allemagne, dépêche dont je vous ai montré le brouillon, fera aussi quelque effet. Je ne cesse d'écrire à Rastopchin pour lui représenter le malheur de ces résolutions précipitées et l'incohérence d'une conduite toujours passionnée et contradictoire ; et quoique, jusqu'à présent, je pers mon Latin avec lui, je ne discontinuerai pas de lui écrire sur le même sujet, et le même ton.

“ Pour ne pas vous faire attendre, je vous envoie la traduction en brouillon pour ne pas perdre du tems à la copier. Vous ne sauriez assez vous représenter combien je suis affligé et honteux de la conduite de ma cour. Brûlez ce billet je vous supplie.”

*Enclosure :—*

PAUL I., EMPEROR OF RUSSIA, to COUNT WORONZOW.

*Secret.*

1799, December 2. Gatchina.—“ Par les copies ci-jointes de mes rescripts au généralissime, et au général de cavalerie le Comte de Viomenil, vous verrez le changement survenu dans mes intentions à me détacher de la coalition, en faisant rentrer toutes mes troupes dans les limites de l'empire de Russie. Je les laisse encore à présent en Allemagne jusqu'au printems, afin de voir pendant cette intervalle quelle tournure prendront les affaires en Europe, de sauver l'Allemagne, et de recommencer la guerre à condition qu'il me sera donnée une parfaite satisfaction par l'Empereur des Romains, dont la principale sera l'éloignement du Baron de Thugut, et le rétablissement du *statu quo ante bellum* en Italie au commencement de l'année 1798. Quant aux troupes qui hivernent en Angleterre, je les y laisse de même jusqu'au printems, dans l'intention qu'elles puissent être ensuite employées ensemble avec l'escadre du Vice-Amiral Macaroff dans une tentative sur les côtes de France, en fixant leurs opérations dans la distance de Bordeaux jusqu'aux Sables d'Olonne. Je demande à l'Angleterre de surveiller la flotte Française, et de co-opérer dans cette entreprise, comme on vous a déjà fait l'offre, sans soumettre toutes fois mes troupes à leurs chefs, et exigeant, nommément, qu'on n'emploie pas à cette expédition comme commandant le Duc d'York. J'écris sur tout cela au préalable, mais vous communiquerai tout ceci au Ministère Anglois, en l'assurant que je n'accéderai autrement à la coalition qu'après le changement total du ministère Autrichien, et de la conduite de la Cour de Vienne ; mais lorsque je commencerai à agir, ce sera indépendamment des autres. C'est pourquoi vous devez prendre des informations, quels subsides l'Angleterre pourra donner et pour combien de milliers d'hommes ?

“ Par la copie du rescript à l'Amiral Ouchakoff vous verrez quelle destination aura son escadre. De tout ce qui vous est écrit ci-dessus, il en a été fait communication ici au Chevalier Whitworth

par le Conseiller Privé actuel Comte Rastoptchin ; et le Conseiller Privé Comte Panin en a fait part à St. Petersburg à l'Ambassadeur de Suède et aux Ministres de Naples, de Dannemarc, et de Portugal.

“Après avoir terminé sur ce sujet vos entretiens avec le ministère Anglois, vous me communiquerai leurs idées et leurs intentions là-dessus. Ce que je fais à cet égard, je le suppose comme le seul et le dernier moyen de sauver l'Europe, de détruire le Gouvernement François, et d'empêcher la maison d'Autriche de doubler sa puissance par les acquisitions injustes.” *Translated into French.*

#### COUNT BENTINCK-RHOON TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, January 27. Morres's Hotel, Lower Brook Street.—“J'ai l'honneur de vous envoyer cy-joint un extrait de la lettre que j'ai reçue de M. Charles Bentinck, dans l'incertitude si par l'irregularité des postes, vous avez eu quelques nouvelles de la Hollande ; étant charmé de voir par là les confirmations des bonnes intentions des habitants qui m'ont été affirmées par d'autres canaux, les Patriotes mêmes désirant plus que jamais de pouvoir réunir leurs efforts pour se delivrer des François.

“J'ose me flatter que vous êtes persuadé que ce n'est uniquement par discretion que je ne me suis pas présenté depuis longtemps à votre porte pour avoir l'honneur de vous voir, sachant les affaires nombreuses qui vous occupent ; je serois cependant charmé d'avoir l'honneur de vous voir un moment, à la fin de cette semaine ; et je passerai à votre porte pour m'informer quand cela pourra vous convenir.”

*Enclosure :—*

#### COUNT CHARLES BENTINCK TO COUNT BENTINCK-RHOON.

1799, December 3. Varel.—“Je me flatte que les événements ne refroidiront pas le bonne volonté de nos amis en Angleterre vis-à-vis des personnes avec qui j'entretiens une correspondance, si suivie depuis tant d'années. *Elles sont toujours à leur poste, et nous sommes prêt d'un moment à l'autre de remplir nos engagements vis-à-vis de l'Angleterre,* pourvu que l'on s'en tienne aux donnés, sur lesquels nos assurances de co-opération sont fondés, et dont nous ne pouvons absolument pas nous départir. Jusqu'à présent, ce n'est que l'arrivée d'un corps de troupes étrangères, *envoyées par l'Angleterre,* qui peut réunir tous les partis contre les François, dans les provinces de ce côté de l'Yssel.

“Nous avons les assurances les plus positives de la constance et de la bonne volonté de l'intérieur, qui, autant que nous pouvons en juger par nos relations, n'ont pas souffert du contretemps que nous avons essayés.

“Et vos amis à Leer, ainsi que dans tous les endroits où il s'étoit formé des rassemblements, *ne se sont séparés qu'après avoir donnés, et reçus, toutes les assurances qui peuvent faire espérer de recommencer, avec fruit,* à la première occasion favorable.

“En attendant, l'on est fort curieux et fort impatient de voir

l'effet que la nouvelle révolution de Paris produira sur les opérations militaires.

“ On dit que la grande partie des troupes Françaises qui doivent quitter la Hollande ont reçu contre-ordre.

“ On s'attendoit aussi à une révolution à la Haye. Daendels doit y jouer le rôle de Bonaparte ; *Ermerins* et *Verbeck* sont les consuls désignés. Je ne vous garantis pas cette nouvelle, quoiqu'il y aye plus de 3 semaines qu'on nous l'écrive de tous côtés.

“ Jusqu'à présent le changement qui a eu lieu à Paris, et l'avènement de Bonaparte ne paroissent pas avoir produit tous l'effets que bien des personnes en attendoient sur les armées Françaises. Leurs efforts sont bien foibles, du moins en Italie, et en Allemagne. Ils ont de nouveau été battus en Italie par le Général de Melas, et une partie de l'armée Autrichienne *est, dit-on, entrée dans le Dauphiné.*

“ En Allemagne les paysans armés, réunis aux troupes de l'Empire, ont de nouveau eu des avantages—qui ont fait lever le blocus de Philipsbourg pour la quatrième fois. Je crois que vous connaissez le Rhyngrave de Salm, qui se distingue si fort dans la défense de cette place.” *Extract.*

#### THE EARL OF MORNINGTON TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, January 27. Fort William.—“ I received your very affectionate letter of the 27th September on the 13th instant with most cordial satisfaction. The reception which you have all given to the news of the fall of Seringapatam and of Tippoo surpassed even my expectations ; I thought it reasonable to expect that you would have waited for the settlement of our conquests. Before this period I trust in God you have seen Henry, and that my treaties have not disappointed you. It would be vain to attempt to describe my sentiments under the idea of your being the person to move the thanks of Parliament to me for the greatest event ever accomplished in this quarter of the globe. I can truly assure you that one leading consideration in my mind was the pleasure which I know your heart must have experienced on such an occasion. Nothing can exceed the happy consequences resulting in this country from our late war and peace ; I meet and feel them in every branch of our affairs ; in our internal tranquility, in our foreign relations, in our revenue, commerce, public and private credit, and, above all, in the general tone and spirit of the whole Government. The whole of this vast machine now bounds to the slightest touch of the main spring. I cannot express my gratitude for Lord Buckingham's kindness ; what a fortunate circumstance for me that he should have moved the address !

“ I anticipate glorious news from Holland, and am anxious on every account for the arrival of the packet under dispatch when the overland express left London. I continue very well, and the better because I am very busy.

“ I hope you will like my plants and seeds ; I know Lady Grenville will be perfectly happy with her birds, if they should arrive safe. Pray be civil to Major Davis.”

1 *Enclosure* :—

The EARL OF MORNINGTON to LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARRIS.

1800, January 7. Fort William.—“ Any mark of the respect of that gallant army which achieved the conquest of Mysore, must ever be esteemed by me, as a distinguished honor.

“ The Resolution now communicated to me by your Excellency, having been adopted by the army in the hour of victory, and on the field of conquest, affords a most satisfactory testimony of their intention to associate my name with the memory of their unexampled triumph.

“ Under this impression, the sentiments of public zeal and the just sense of honorable ambition concur to render me sincerely desirous of accepting the gift of the army, and of wearing it, as an emblem of their glory, and of their good will towards me.

“ I am satisfied that it never was in the contemplation of the Legislature of Great Britain to prohibit the acceptance of such honorary marks of distinction. But an attentive examination of the laws relating to the government of the British possessions in India will convince your Excellency that I could not accept the gift, which you present to me in the name of the army, without violating the letter of existing statutes, and without creating a precedent which might hereafter become the source of injury to the public service.

“ I must therefore request your Excellency, in assuring the army of my high estimation of the honor which they design to confer upon me, to signify that my acceptance of it is precluded by the positive letter of the law.

“ I return your Excellency my thanks for the obliging expressions of your letter ; it is the unfeigned wish of my heart that your Excellency may long enjoy the grateful recollection of your eminent public services ; and that you and the unrivalled army employed in the late glorious war, may receive from your King and country every public demonstration of the same sentiments of admiration, gratitude, and affectionate respect which your conduct has excited throughout the British empire in India.” *Copy.*

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, January] Sunday morning, 7 o'clock.—“ I send you Mr. Grant's observations, which were put into my hands just as I stepped into my chaise. I have looked them over ; they contain all that caution suggests ; at the same time I am free to confess that the only serious apprehensions I entertain from the quarter of America is what is contained in the three first pages of the paper. But that cannot be prevented by treaty, and must depend on the *economical* conduct of the commerce of the East India Company, and a ready facility given to bring home the fortunes of India directly to Great Britain. But even this mode of preventing the Americans from having a trading capital will not be effectual to retard their commercial progress unless some means can be fallen upon to discourage British merchants affording their aid of capital

either as creditors to or co-partners with the Americans in the Indian trade. All this however is perhaps foreign from the present business of the treaty, and belongs to internal arrangement."

COUNT RASTOPCHIN to COUNT WORONZOW.

1800, February 1. St. Petersburg.—"Voici un courrier avec une nouvelle inattendue. Je n'ai pas besoin de vous dire ce qui a attiré ce mécontentement de l'Empereur à Monsieur Whiteworth. Vous le devinerez sans que je vous le dise, mais pour conserver la bonne harmonie si nécessaire entre la Russie et l'Angleterre, il faudrait un homme qui fût plus sur ses gardes, et ne se permit pas de suivre des impulsions de colère, provoquées par des personnalités. Le Chevalier Whiteworth en servant sa Cour, exécutait naturellement ses ordres, en désirant que la guerre fut continuée contre la France ; mais il s'est trop oublié vis-à-vis l'Empereur, et ce n'est pas en donnant des idées aussi bizarres sur le compte d'un souverain que l'on peut le faire servir de pivot dans les crises journalières du moment.

"Je vous écrirai peu. Je suis malade d'esprit bien plus que de corps. La Cour de Berlin saisit avec empressement tous les moyens qui peuvent opérer un rapprochement avec l'Empereur. Ils ont nommé Lusy ministre à notre Cour, et Monsieur Krüdener est accredité à celle de Berlin. Mais ce désir ne peut être bon que pour nuire à la maison d'Autriche, qui, petit à petit, s'isole d'elle-même, et sera un jour victime des grands projets de son petit Ministre.

"Haugwitz avait glissé à Krüdener que Bonaparte désirait s'entendre avec l'Empereur, et que lui, Haugwitz, aurait été charmé d'un rapprochement quelconque. Mais l'Empereur a défendu à Krüdener de traiter cet objet, et de ne se permettre aucune liaison avec le ministre Français ni ses agents. Le Roi de Suède ayant témoigné à notre maître quelque inquiétude sur l'issue de la Diète qu'il est obligé de convoquer à Narköpping, l'Empereur lui a offert, si le cas pouvait l'exiger, les troupes qui se trouvent à Jersey et Guernsey, et on lui a envoyé des ordres pour vous, pour le Comte Viomenil et Monsieur Macaroff ; mais je ne crois pas que les choses viennent à cette extrémité, et il faut que le Roi de Suède se voie déjà abandonné et obligé de fuir de son royaume pour appeler à son secours des troupes étrangères. Thugut compte trop sur Bonaparte pour se désister de ses profits, et à peine le seul royaume de Naples peut-il rester intacte, car il paraît que la Maison d'Autriche veut s'emparer de toute l'Italie, en créant un phantôme de Pape, et en dépouillant le Roi de Sardaigne.

"Dumourier est ici à ne rien faire, car ses projets de descente en France ne peuvent avoir lieu, vû la resolution décidée de l'Empereur à reprendre toutes ses troupes : ainsi prenez ceci pour règle dans ce qui pourra arriver dans l'intervalle. Je soupire après une vie tranquille, sans quoi je créverai. C'est dans un village que je puis être utile à ma famille et peut-être à l'état, en soignant l'agriculture et mes hôpitaux.

"Hier est arrivé un courrier avec la nouvelle du départ de Prague

de l'armée avec le généralissime. Elle va revenir en Russie. Son entrevue avec Bellegarde était une formalité, et on n'a rien arrêté.

"Thugut désire que nos troupes quittent la Bohême, et il ne les aurait employées que séparément pour se défaire du Prince Italisky. Le pauvre Koch est mort hier d'une fièvre bilieuse, nerveuse.

"Je vous renvoie ci-joint une lettre que vous m'avez communiquée."

*Postscript.*—"Les ordres dont je vous ai parlé ont été envoyés au Roi de Suède pour en faire usage s'il le jugeait nécessaire. Ainsi, le cas échéant, c'est déjà Sa Majesté Suedoise qui vous communiquera les ordres de l'Empereur en vous instruisant de la marche à suivre, et en vous indiquant le lieu qu'il destinera pour le débarquement de ces troupes, ce qui regardera Messieurs Macaroff et Vioménil." *Copy.*

#### ROYALIST INSURRECTION IN FRANCE.

##### *Verbal communication from Count D'Autichamp.*

1800, February 1. [Downing Street.]—"Left his brother 31st December 1799; went on board Captain Keats's ship 5th January 1800; quitted France 21st January, arrived at Falmouth 28th January, arrived in London 31st January.

"Monsieur de Suzannet the elder left D'Autichamp 11th January. Sailed the same day for La Baj's D'Aiguillon, which is a point not tenable till the end of April.

"Monsieur de Suzannet the son was to meet his father with 2,500 infantry and 600 cavalry. The Royalist chiefs, so far from intending to make peace, had given their words of honour to commence hostilities on the 18th January if any of them were attacked; if not, they were to wait till the 21st January. There is reason to think that hostilities recommenced on that day.

"The peace, if any, that has been made, can only be with the Abbé Bernier, who with Monsieur Forrestier and one or two others, *particularly Monsieur de la Garde*, have for a long time been separated from the other Royalist chiefs. Bernier did not send delegates to Pouançé.

"The delegates at Pouançé were  
 D'Autichamp.  
 Frotté.  
 Chatillon.  
 Bourmont.  
 Georges.  
 Prévalaye.  
 Le Leroux.

"Georges had 24,000 armed men. The regicide forces against them did not exceed 6,000 men. The whole of the regicide force from Havre to Sables d'Olonne is about 30,000 men.

"The Royalists had obtained or intercepted Bonaparte's correspondence with Hedouville, in which he says, 'I send you Brune who is himself an army. I have not a man to dispose of I want 200,000, on the frontiers.'

“Travelled from Angers to Quiberon openly.

“The principal towns the Royalists occupy are—

Le Grais	..	2,500	Inhabitants
Machecoul	..	5,000	„
Candé	..	2,500	„

“Georges and Bourmont would be the first attacked, as the first communicates with the sea, and the second intercepts the communication with Paris. Hedouville had made no difficulty to promise that the Royalists should be allowed to keep their arms. The 11th January, the conference at which an aide-de-camp of Bonaparte’s attended was broken off.

“A great desertion in the Republican forces.

“Royalist troops which can be marched into other parts of France.

Infantry	18,000	}	D’Autichamp.
Cavalry	600		
Infantry	7,000	}	Chatillon.
Cavalry	195		
Infantry	10,000	}	Bourmont.
Cavalry	400		
24,000			Georges.
3,000			Prévalaye.
3,000			Frotté.
1,800			Mercier.

Infantry	66,800.
Cavalry	1,195.

“Howitzers the most useful kind of ordnance.”

#### CHARLES PHILIPPE COUNT D’ARTOIS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, February 2. 55 Welbeck Street.—“Le Comte d’Artois accepte avec plaisir la proposition de Lord Grenville pour mercredi 5 du courant ; il se rendra à Cleveland Row ce jour-là sur la heure après midi.

“Le Comte d’Artois remercie Lord Grenville des pièces qu’il lui a envoyés avant hier-au-soir, et il le prie de recevoir l’assurance de tous ses sentiments de haute estime et de considération.”

#### LORD MINTO to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1800, February 4. Vienna.—“I have omitted in my despatch to mention the arrival of Mr. Wickham on the 29th January. We have seen Baron Thugut twice together, and every thing that Mr. Wickham had to treat with him seems likely to be settled pleasantly. Mr. Wickham has definitely settled the treaty with Bavaria for 12,000 men, who will be ready at a very short notice indeed. The treaty is not signed, but all points are agreed. Mr. Wickham will himself write on this and other subjects by Hunter in a few days. Wiffin and two of my servants arrived on the 31st January ; Hunter arrived by the way of Augsburg yesterday. The story of Rheinhart’s mission to Swisserland is hitherto without foundation. Something, however, has certainly passed between Paris and Vienna

on the subject of peace, which I am sorry to say Baron Thugut does not as yet choose to communicate. He declares, however, that no negotiation exists at present, and that the Emperor will listen to none until the answers expected on several points from England arrive. Much will turn on those answers ; and although I expect them with impatience, I confess I shall not open them without some anxiety."

H. FAGEL to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, February 5. Duke Street.—“ Enclosed you will find the two *mémoires* I mentioned to you yesterday morning, and the decyphered letter of which you wished to have a copy.

“ You are certainly informed that Baron Stackelberg, whom the Emperor of Russia had sent some months ago to the Prince of Orange, has been recalled by that monarch. He took leave of His Serene Highness a few days ago.”

*Enclosure* :—

M. MOLLERUS to H. FAGEL.

1799, December 4. Hague.—“ Je vous ai écrit dans ma dernière de Lingen les motifs qui m'ont déterminé à me mettre en route pour retourner chez moi. J'y suis arrivé sans rencontrer la moindre difficulté en route, et, au moins pour à présent, je ne crois pas avoir à craindre des poursuites ou désagrémens. Je ne sais pourtant ce qui pourra arriver au cas que l'autorité qui doit me protéger (et c'est principalement celle de Van der Goes) aye moins de force, et c'est ce qui doit me rendre ma conduite très circonspecte, surtout par rapport à la correspondance. J'ai tardé quelques jours après mon arrivée à vous écrire, non seulement parceque j'ai cru avoir alors une occasion sûre pour l'envoi de celle-ci hors de la république, mais aussi parcequ'il a fallu avoir plus d'une conversation avec Van der Goes, et prendre quelques renseignemens avant de pouvoir vous marquer dans quel état j'ai trouvé les choses.

“ Le résultat est, qu'après tout ce qui s'est passé, les esprits (représentatifs) ne sont pas moins aigris contre la France, et qu'on a encore la même et peut-être plus de désir d'être delivré de ce joug ; que lui, Van der Goes, et plusieurs membres, aussi bien de ceux qui appartiennent au pouvoir exécutif que de ceux des deux chambres, sont persuadés que l'ordre actuel des choses ne peut subsister, qui même voudroient bien concourir aux moyens de le faire cesser, mais, qu'au moins pour le moment, les individus ne sont pas en nombre suffisant ni assez d'accord pour (raisonner), on peut les envisager comme parti avec lequel on pourra entrer en négociation. C'est surtout leur situation vis-à-vis, et leur entière dépendance de la France, qui fait qu'ils n'osent se prononcer, ou hazarder la moindre demarche qui, connue, pourroit déplaire au gouvernement François. Au reste, après tout ce qu'on m'a dit, je puis vous informer que je ne me suis pas trompé dans l'opinion que, supposé même les meilleurs dispositions, on croit se trouver, dans l'état actuel des choses, dans l'impossibilité de concourir à

des mesures qui auroient pour but de chasser les troupes Françaises de la République. On a dit ceci très-décisivement : vous savez que je l'ai prévu, et je puis encore moins en disconvenir après l'état dans lequel j'ai trouvé les choses ici.

“ On m'assure même que pour le Gouvernement actuel, et même pour ceux qui seroient plus disposés à co-opérer à des arrangemens ou changemens, il seroit non seulement très-dangereux mais d'une impossibilité absolue d'entamer à present quelques négociations avec le gouvernement Anglois, quoique concertées de la manière la plus secrète : qu'eux ne peuvent que s'adresser à la Cour de Berlin, que, quant à eux, tout doit se faire par l'entremise de la cour de Berlin, qui pourra se concerter avec ceux-ci, et de telle manière qu'elle jugera à-propos.

“ Quant à la mission de Vos Van Steenwyk à Berlin, je suis fondé à presumer que, pour autant qu'il est entré en matière en s'expliquant sur les points qui pouvoient faire les bases d'un arrangement, cela est venu de lui, sur la demande de developper ses idées : qu'ici on n'avoue pas cette note ni le mémoire y joint; qu'au contraire l'intention de sa mission n'a été que de faire des instances auprès de la cour de Berlin pour qu'elle voulut se interesser à la situation de la république, et concourir aux moyens qui pourroient la preserver de sa ruine totale; qu'ils sont encore dans les mêmes sentimens que les propositions ou moyens d'arrangement ne doivent pas venir de leur part, mais que la Cour de Berlin doit leur proposer ces moyens ou conditions, sous lesquelles elle voudroit se mêler des affaires de la république. Vous voyez par tout ceci que le cas supposé dans la note de Lord Grenville n'existe pas, et qu'ainsi il n'a pas été question, au moins jusqu'ici, d'en faire le moindre usage. C'est (disent-ils toujours) la Cour de Berlin qui, quant à eux, doit arranger l'affaire, et c'est par ce canal que les négociations (quant à eux) doivent être entamées; qu'en cas que l'on voulut seconder cela de notre coté, peut-être il pourroit en resulter quelque chose de bon.

“ Voilà tout ce que j'ai à vous écrire pour le présent. Je tacherai de ne pas rompre entièrement ces liaisons, et quand je saurai quelque chose de plus, je vous en ferai part. Je soupçonne qu'il y a des circonstances qui font que pour le moment ils sont plus réservés. J'ignore pourtant quelles sont ces circonstances. Je ne puis supposer qu'ils ont lieu de craindre d'être culbutés par les révolutionnaires.

“ Je répète que je ne puis être assez prudent, et vous concevez cela aisement.” *Copy.*

#### E. COOKE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, February 6. Dublin Castle.—“ Lord Castlereagh opened his budget to-day with an excellent and impressive statement of two hours and three quarters. He was not quite well, but he excited himself. His plan was received with satisfaction by our friends, and I think it had real effect on the moderate.

“ We had a good and favourable debate, and our friends were hearty, and we had really the best of the debate considerably.

"I am sorry, however, to say that the activity, the intimidation, the subscription purse of the enemy has been employed with effect.

"Bagwell and his two sons went off; Martin, Sir R. Butler, and Sir Thomas Fetherstone, all country members, left us. Whaley and Sir R. St. George were decoyed from us; and they had several recruits, so that, on a division, they had 115 to 158. The question was to take the message into consideration in a Committee of the whole House, on Wednesday next.

"We are a little alarmed at this increase of Opposition, and the means used to increase it of money and terror. And, certainly, all our friends are not hearty, though we have many firm and resolute.

"There was a little tendency to mobbing, but nothing of real consequence.

"We did not break up till past 12 to-day."

#### The EARL OF CARYSFORT to [LORD GRENVILLE].

1800, February 6. Dublin.—"The House of Commons divided about noon, 158 to 115. The majority falls very far short of the sanguine expectations which had been formed. But I still think it is sufficient to ensure success, provided the public is early impressed with a conviction of the determination of Government in England to persist. Three gentlemen (Bagwells of Tipperary) who voted against the amendment the first day of the session, and who had pledged themselves unequivocally, deserted; and two more who were not present before, but who were considered as decidedly for Government, voted in the minority. On the other hand, I know of four staunch and honourable friends to the cause, who have not yet taken their seats, namely, the member for the County Kerry, one for Tuam, one for Maryborough, and one for Donegal. There is another brought in by Lord Landaff to support Government, but some doubts, I hear, are entertained about him. Of the seventeen that remain, many are known to stand out upon terms. I have, therefore, no doubt but that they will be secured, and I am told, and believe, that there are very few indeed of the majority who may not be relied upon in future. I cannot but express my earnest hopes that you will not relinquish the attempt. I honestly believe the measure may be carried through, and am confident that the country will acquiesce, the moment it is no longer doubtful that it will pass. But, if it should be given up, the consequences would probably be most fatal. The present system is shaken to its foundations, and will never again possess the confidence or respect of the people, or the crown. The Government will have exhausted, in this great effort, all the means of influence, and cannot rely upon a continuance of support from those who have been bought for the present occasion; nor would a dissolution procure any additional support. There is one point which I am sorry Lord Castlereagh touched upon, as he was not prepared to state any outline of a plan that would be palatable, or even practicable. I am speaking of the mode of trying controverted elections. He talked of committees being ballotted in the usual way, to consist wholly of Irish members,

and to sit in Ireland. It would be very dangerous to have even a committee of the House sitting in Ireland, though empowered only to try one question; and to make a distinction of English and Irish members would be still more impolitic. Besides that, four petitions would be sufficient to employ nearly the whole of the Irish representation, and abstract them wholly from public business. Lord Buckingham is justly solicitous upon this point. At his desire I have thought a little upon it, and have a plan which I will write out and send you to-morrow, which, though I am not quite satisfied with it, I think not so objectionable as what was stated by Lord Castlereagh. It is a subject of great importance to which, I hope, you will apply in good earnest, and settle it for us, for it will never be done here."

LORD GRENVILLE TO LORD MINTO.

*Private.*

1800, February 8. Cleveland Row.—“My dispatch, though its contents are little more than heads of the plan to be pursued, will however, I think, enable you to keep Thugut steady to his warlike system till the full powers and the more particular instructions arrive. I hope I have not neglected any thing very material, but twelve mails coming at once overwhelm all one's ideas both with the multiplicity of the points to be attended to, and with the vexation of seeing how much time has been lost by these unfortunate frosts, and how many advantages are irrecoverably gone by.

“I am assured, but it is through the medium of Sardinian and Prussian ministers, that Bonaparte has actually offered to Vienna, through the channel of the Spanish mission there, to give up to Austria all Italy except Genoa and to make an equal division of Switzerland. If it be true, I should much fear that the bait will be found too tempting to be refused, and that all our negotiations will end only in our enabling Austria to make a better separate peace than she otherwise could. If we do no more than this, it is so far good, but we must not despair of doing better. The delay of this ratification has however an ugly aspect.

“Our latest accounts from the Royalists seem to leave little room to doubt that they must be forced to a pacification. If they can contrive to keep their arms either by express stipulation, or by contrivance and concealment, all may do well.

“If that cannot be, we must not hope much assistance from them in the course of the campaign, but we shall still, I trust, be able to strike some important stroke with our own force. It was contrary to our wishes and representations that they originally rose at this time. We wished to have kept them back to the spring.

“Pray let Lord Elgin occasionally know how things are going on in this world, for, by his dispatch which I have received to-day, all his ideas are two or three years behindhand.” *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE TO WILLIAM WICKHAM.

*Private.*

1800, February 8. Downing Street.—“With the strange uncer-

tainty of our communications with the Continent, it is possible that this may reach you before the messenger who will leave this place the beginning of next week. He will be the bearer to you of full powers to execute the ideas contained in your No. 52 and 53. We have also entirely adopted the opinions of the enclosure B. in 54; and think ourselves fortunate in the circumstances which render that line the most practicable which we are convinced is also the most eligible. You shall have the person as assistant whom you mentioned to me last year, the younger of the two brothers who were abroad.

“You neither do yourself or me justice when you conclude your despatches with apologies for doing us the most essential service we can receive, giving us your opinions fully and in detail on all the interesting objects which are in question. The value of your suggestions has been inestimable to me, and whatever be the result, I shall never forget the obligations I owe to you for them.” *Copy.*

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, February 8. Dublin.—“I enclose my plan for the trial of controverted elections, which may be liable to many objections which I do not discern, but which, in my present view of it, might, I think, be adopted with good effect, even in England.

“Since I wrote last, the House of Lords met to receive the Lord Lieutenant’s message. The Chancellor came down at four, and the moment prayers were over, not ten Lords being present, without a word of comment or observation, put the question that it should be taken into consideration on Monday; and none of the Opposition being there, it passed of course, and the House adjourned. I was very sorry for this, for by it an opportunity was lost of publicly declaring the resolution of Government to persevere, and their confidence in the numbers which divided for them in the House of Commons. Such declaration, I assure you, is necessary; for the high language of Opposition has impressed many, even of our best friends, with an idea that the Ministry are terrified. I am sure there is not, as yet, any reason to doubt of success. I looked over the list of the House of Commons with a person who is well informed, and we could make out but eight on the side of Government, about whose steadiness we entertained any doubt. We know that they are all standing out for terms, and therefore we think we may reckon upon retaining four, at least, of them; of the twenty-two members unaccounted for, eight are elected but not returned as friends to the measure. Upon one only of these we have some doubt, four we are morally certain will be absent, two are friends of Lord Downshire, not returned; so that there remain only eight, the greater part, if not all, of whom we think it probable will be with us. But if we divide them equally, there will still remain a majority of 40.”

*Enclosed:—*

A new plan of trying cases of disputed election to the House of Commons of the United Kingdom.

## E. COOKE to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Most private.*

1800, February 10. Dublin Castle.—“A debate on the first British resolution, which contains the principle, is going on in the House of Lords. The Chancellor spoke for four hours historically and argumentatively, and, in great part, very forcibly, and with great effect.

“I thought he was rather too anti-Catholic. He said the Catholic question could only be debated without danger and with impartiality in an Imperial Parliament; but he stated, as his confirmed opinion, that a Popish ecclesiastic could not be an attached subject, from conviction, to a Protestant monarchy. He abused the consular Government, and their stock purse, and bribery, with great effect; and appealed to the consuls.

“Lord Charlemont got up, and merely said he had never offered a bribe.

“The Chancellor said the noble Lord had mistaken him; he had not asked whether his Lordship had given a bribe with his own hands, but whether his Lordship did not know of a consular exchequer, and whether he did not know the uses to which it was applied.

“Lord Charlemont said nothing. Lord Downshire, the first consul, followed. He was much agitated; he disavowed fully the stock purse, and all knowledge of it, and complained of being nicknamed. He then complained of the harsh manner in which he had been treated; but said he was happy to think his conduct was now coming into a course of trial. He talked much of loyalty, his attachment to his sovereign, and Mr. Pitt's government. He made an attack on Lord Castlereagh, and read a string of instructions which Lord Castlereagh, when he first came into Parliament, said he would obey.

“On the subject of Union, Lord Downshire said he had been a friend to it before 1782. If it had been proposed at the time of the Regency, he would have supported it; if, hereafter, in a time of peace, when it could be coolly investigated, it should be proposed, he would give it his best assistance. But he thought the present time bad; that it was taking an improper advantage of Ireland when she was weak. He disclaimed faction and any idea of going beyond constitutional opposition.

“I think the numbers in the House may be 55 to 28, and proxies will make them 95 to 33. The numbers might have been greater, but there has not been so great an exertion as there would have been had there been less security.

“Opposition stick at nothing to bring down our majority; intimidation, direct bribery, promises of seats in future Parliament, and of places and employments; for they think themselves certain of driving away Lord Cornwallis.

“If we can maintain our majority (and the point is precarious) I fear, not the country. It will remain quiet. The City will grow turbulent. We hope to increase our numbers by eight in the next division, which will be on Wednesday; but I have my fears.

“I see so much unsteadiness, so much rascality, that I cease to

be sanguine. The Speaker continues very hostile; but pretends to be only personally hostile to the present administration. I think Lord Downshire's conduct has been pique. Parnell's has been timidity; he is, I know, disgusted with opposition; but so pledged he dare not retract."

ADMIRAL LORD KEITH to HENRY DUNDAS.

1800, February 10. Palermo.—"I have the honour of sending you some heads of a letter which was read to me in confidence. It was believed to be genuine, and from high authority. It was impossible to obtain a copy by reason of the means used to procure a sight of it. The person who read the letter to me is well apprized that you are in possession of some parts of it, but was so extremely anxious that the subject should be impressed on your mind, that I was desired to repeat certain parts of it.

"It began by a general review of the state of Europe, and the interests (as the writer supposed) of the various states therein. It seemed to glance at a separate negotiation with France, either pending, or intended to be entered into. He mentioned Prussia in a doubtful state, and betrayed the strongest jealousy of Russia; hoping however to divert that nation, by sacrificing part of the dominions of the Turks. Switzerland was spoken of as being essential to the interest of the Empire; but if not possessed by the Empire, to be restored to its antient constitution, rather than to be allowed to remain in the hands of France. On the subject of Italy, it ran nearly thus.—'Your Majesty is in possession of Turin, Alexandria, Tortona, all of them strongholds, and it will be difficult to drive your forces from them. The King of Sardinia is too feeble to protect his own dominions against France, and he must not return there, whatever equivalent may be assigned to him elsewhere. The dominions of Genoa, when reduced, it may be difficult to dispose of; but there must be no Genoese. The Duke of Modena has not behaved well in some cases. He must take the fate that is determined for him. The Grand Duke of Tuscany is here, and here he must remain; but he is contented to do so. His towns are garrisoned by Austrian troops, which is a sufficient security against the discontents of the inhabitants. There must be a Pope, and he must be in possession of Rome, but by no means to possess Civita Vecchia, or any of the sea ports, and to pay 8,000 Austrian infantry and 2,000 cavalry to be employed on his frontiers. The only obstacle that presents itself to those regards seems to be the kingdom of Naples that has shaken off all its natural connections, and blindly thrown itself into the arms of England. The negotiation with that country must be gently managed, and its consent obtained if possible; but at any rate, one stronghold must be acquired on the Apennines; and one of its sea ports on the Adriatic, and one upon the Mediterranean, must be garrisoned by Austrian troops. Naples is too feeble to protect Rome, whatever the queen or general Acton may think, and it is from them that your Majesty will meet with the greatest opposition. The little state of Ragusa must either become Turk or Austrian, therefore it will serve to satisfy

some of the Powers who may think they have cause to complain. The English have no right to interfere in this arrangement; and if they do, they cannot prevent it.'

"This paper is supposed to have been a general advice from Monsieur T[hugut] to his master, the Emperor, and is dated the 13th December, 1799." *Copy.*

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, February 11. Harley Street.—"Je suis surpris et fâché d'apprendre la confirmation du séjour de Dumourier à Petersbourg. Je m'empresse à présent d'écrire à l'Empereur pour le supplier de ne donner aucune croyence à cet aventurier.

"J'espère de pouvoir sortire dans deux jours, et je vous prie de me donner un quart d'heure après demain, jeudi.

"Si vous êtes dans le cas d'envoyer un courier à Petersbourg un de ces jours, je vous supplie de m'en avertire deux jours d'avance."

LORD GRENVILLE to WILLIAM WICKHAM.

1800, February 11. Cleveland Row.—"I cannot so well put it into official language, but you will, I hope, understand the real meaning of my dispatch of this date to be this. We can appropriate a million to procure reinforcements for the Austrian army. You are on the spot, and best understand how to apply this in the most beneficial manner; to make the money go as far, and to derive as much benefit from it as possible. Do so according to the best of your judgment, and be persuaded that what you shall think best, and shall do accordingly, will be approved and adopted here. We are delighted at the signature of the Bavarian treaty, and, if one could feel quite secure that Austria would not bite at a hook baited with Italy, I should really think our success ensured, as far as human calculations can ensure it.

"The Landgrave of Hesse will, of course, not act till he sees Mayence either blocked or taken. But if that were done, and his dispositions continue the same as they were a few months ago, you may easily conclude with him in the manner I have mentioned; and the idea of his lending us the money was suggested by himself.

"I was sorry to hear you had been so ill; every thing now hangs on your activity and exertions; but do not overwork yourself, for, if you are forced to stop, the whole machine must stand still." *Copy.*

E. COOKE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, February 11. Dublin.—"Our packet not sailing last night, I have the pleasure to say that the general principle was carried in the Lords this morning, by a majority of 49."

LOUIS PHILIPPE DE BOURBON, DUC D'ORLÉANS to MONSIEUR,  
(COMTE D'ARTOIS.)

1800, February 13. London.—"Mon premier soin en arrivant

dans le lieu où vous résidez, est d'avoir l'honneur de vous en faire part. Oserais-je, en m'acquittant de ce devoir, prier Monsieur de vouloir bien fixer le moment où il daignera permettre que j'aie lui présenter l'hommage de mon respect et celui de mes frères, ainsi que l'expression du profond regret qu'ils éprouvent de ne le pouvoir pas faire en personne. Ils sont retenus à Clifton par une incommodité assez grave survenue au Comte de Beaujolois, le qui a retardé de plusieurs jours mon arrivée ici, et a obligé le Duc de Montpensier à rester auprès de lui pour le soigner. J'ai lieu de croire, d'après le mieux marque qu'il éprouvait lorsque je l'ai quitté, que son rétablissement est prochain, et qu'il pourra incessamment se remettre en chemin. Je me joins à mes frères pour prier Monsieur de vouloir bien être convaincu de leur respectueux empressement à lui faire leur cour." *Copy.*

LOUIS PHILIPPE DE BOURBON, DUC D'ORLÉANS, to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, February 13. 6 Sackville Street.—“ Je me proposais de passer chez vous, et je regrette infiniment de vous donner la peine que vous voulez bien prendre ; je resterai chez moi toute la matinée, et ne recevrai personne jusqu'à ce que j'aie eu l'honneur de vous voir.”

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MINTO.

1800, February 13. Cleveland Row.—“ It is no small satisfaction to me to reflect that I shall have no more to write, nor you to read, on the subject of the eternal dispute about the ratification. We are now to begin a new score with our Austrian friends and we must hope the best.

“ I am seriously alarmed at what is going on between Petersburg and Berlin. They are venting themselves to each other in mutual complaints against the ambition of Austria, and a very little more of Thugut's peevishness and obstinacy would be capable of turning Suwarrow's army against the Austrian dominions, either in menace, or even in actual hostility. You know how they would catch at any chance of this at Berlin, and I am sure they have begun to conceive some hopes of it.

“ It is a delicate subject to touch at Vienna ; for if they are not a little alarmed about it they will do nothing to prevent the mischief, and if they are too much alarmed it will distract their efforts against France.

“ Lord Elgin's dispatches, received to-day, give me fresh occasion to beg you to keep him a little *courant*, for he is playing exactly our adversary's game at Constantinople.

“ I have not explained to you in my dispatch my whole idea about the Netherlands. I thought things were not ripe for it, but you will judge better how to act in it by looking at the whole together.

“ I take it for granted that Austria will take one of the two last of the three modes I propose, and, in truth, the difficulties of the first are so numerous that I hardly think it worth struggling for :

especially as, in that case, whenever the seventeen provinces were connected with France, which would be as often as they had an incapable Stadtholder or a weak Government, we should, in case of war, be as much shut out from the continent as we now are. Whereas the existence of two separate governments, one in the Netherlands, the other in Holland, will always give us a double chance of keeping at least one communication open.

“In either of the other alterations the government will be that of a weak Prince, dependent more or less on Austria for his support ; but having an extensive military frontier to guard with comparatively small means of raising or recruiting an army.

“If we throw upon him by the treaty of peace the whole burden of the Austrian loans—of which we may perhaps never get any very satisfactory payment from Vienna—we shall compel him to have recourse to us for relief. Why should not this be granted on conditions something resembling those of the old barrier treaties ? Why should we not agree to accept as payment the maintenance of a considerable body of British troops to be stationed in time of peace as a garrison to the frontier of the Netherlands ? We should by these means correct one of the greatest difficulties which belongs to our situation in Europe, that of the great deficiency of our military force in war owing to the constant reduction of it at the first moment of peace to skeleton regiments, which train neither officers nor soldiers, and drive us on the breaking out of war to numberless expedients for sudden augmentations, which incur generally an enormous expense, and give a fresh blow to the composition of our army.

“Any constitutional question—if indeed times and circumstances have not changed the nature of such questions as applying to such an augmentation as I speak of—but, any constitutional question, if such there be, might easily be solved by stationing the regiments in the Netherlands according to some fixed rotation, and by absolutely prohibiting the bringing any of those troops into the King’s dominions which should be voted for that service. It might even be enacted that neither the Mutiny Act nor the votes of payment should apply to them if so brought.

“In this manner we should maintain at all times the foundation of a solid military force, without any other expense than that of taking upon ourselves what is too likely otherwise to fall upon us. We should always retain a certain possession and hold of the Netherlands, which would at least prevent their being suddenly overrun by France. And the sovereign of those provinces would apply to their protection and defence those sums which he would otherwise be obliged to pay to us without any return whatever.

“This is my project, which innumerable accidents may defeat, but which I really think, if it could be executed, offers us the best solution of any that has yet occurred for this difficult question. You will easily see that it is not of a nature to be as yet fully opened to Thugut, but by keeping it in your mind, you may gradually prepare the way for it.

“You will have seen the account of the two debates in Ireland on the union. Our friends are disappointed at not having had a

larger majority the second day, but they seem pretty confident of final success." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT STARHEMBERG.

1800, February 14. Cleveland Row.—“ Je vous restitue la lettre du Directeur de la Poste en vous plaignant du malheur arrivé à vos lettres. Lord Minto me renouvelle l'assurance de la ratification *incessamment*, en disant même que l'Empereur l'a signé. D'ailleurs rien de nouveau—toutes nos mesures sont conditionnelles. Si cette éternelle ratification a été donné, Lord Minto pourra conclure des arrangements pour de nouveaux secours pécuniaires, Si non, il n'en sera rien, comme de raison. Bonaparte paroît n'avoir fait aucune ouverture à Vienne, et on nous repète que l'on n'en écouterait rien, jusqu'à ce que l'on a de nos nouvelles.” *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH.

1800, February 14. Cleveland Row.—“ In the copy of your resolutions, as published in the papers, there is a verbal error which had been corrected here, but has probably been retained by some mistake of clerks in copying. Though a mere question of words, it is not without its importance in point of principle, and I trust, therefore, this will reach you in time for its being set right, unless there is some reason for the present form of which I am not aware.

“ It is in article 4, in the first sentence, where the Irish commoners in the United Parliament are called *Representatives* of Ireland in the House of Commons. Instead of this, we had put *members to sit and vote* in the House of Commons, on the *part of Ireland*. This last is the phrase observed, I believe uniformly, in the Scotch Union, and the reason is obvious, because, though each Irish member is, in Parliamentary language, the representative of the county or borough for which he sits, yet the aggregate of all the Irish members will not be representatives of *Ireland*; but, in common with the British members, representatives of *the whole United Kingdom*.

“ The phrase, *on the part of Ireland*, being used in every other part of this resolution, I conclude that the first is an error.

“ A little lower down, *such Peers who have*, should be, *such Peers as have*.”

E. COOKE to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Most private.*

1800, February 14. Dublin Castle.—“ We had a good night in the House of Commons.

“ On the motion to quit the chair for going into the consideration of the message relative to union, a debate commenced against the Speaker leaving the chair. All the minor poets of opposition vented themselves till twelve o'clock. Nothing could be more stupid or uninteresting. Mr. Balfour then said he had not received the union papers, and Mr. Ponsonby suddenly moved the question of adjournment. On a division for adjourning, 98 against 123.

Delay was again attempted, and it was moved to adjourn the debate till Monday. This was on a pretence that several members had not received the papers. On a division, at two o'clock, we divided against adjourning, 157 for 110. Our object was attained, which was to shew that our phalanx was firm and increasing. And as several members whom Lord Castlereagh wished to conciliate, and has hopes of making friends so soon as the main question is decided, prayed for delay, his Lordship agreed to a compromise, that he would agree to adjourn if it were clearly agreed to by Opposition that no further attempt shall be made to prevent the decision of the main question. This was accepted unanimously, and your Lordship may, I think, reasonably expect that we shall carry the main question on Monday by a majority of from 47 to 50. I am confident we shall increase in our numbers rather than diminish. If our debate had lasted till morning, we should have had 163 or 164.

"I own I was much alarmed on our last division. I thought an impression was made against us, a run commencing. Lord Cornwallis's decisive and prompt conduct against Lord Downshire, gave a turn in our favour. It marked the determination of Government, and gave our friends spirits. I lament Lord Downshire's imprudence, which, I dare say, was not meant; but, when he embarks in any measure, he is apt to be headstrong. His Lordship has been always kind to me, and, before he took his ultimate decision, he conversed with me. He promised moderation; but it is singular that I told him that he would commit himself, and be brought into a scrape, in five days. He is very much distressed. He considers my Lord Lieutenant's conduct as severe; but it was unavoidable. Had not his Excellency taken it up as he did, his administration might have been ruined. The measure of Petshining might have run through both militia and yeomanry, and it was considered as the trial of the pulse and nerves of Government.

"The decision in the Lords came next to our assistance. The Chancellor's and Lord Kilwarden's speeches were most impressive. The debate was entirely on our side; and the division, so respectable for numbers, ability, and property, has given a turn to sentiment.

"The City then addressed—Latouche, Sir W. Newcomen, and Mr. Neville. Their answers are decisive.

"We have prevented our friends from being seduced, and taken off two or three from the enemy.

"Last night gives us consistency and solidity. Opinion begins to attach to us.

"The terms are reckoned fair and liberal; and I think there is a disposition to submit, in parts of the opposition.

"They have had several meetings in order to plan future operations.

"They wanted to try a short money Bill, but they could not get unanimity.

"They have failed in the plan of defeating the measure by vexatious delays.

"They have failed in the plan of exciting popular resistance.

"I do not think that we shall have an insurrection in the city,

as my Lord Lieutenant has marked his determination to put down mob ; but I fear there may be attacks on individual members. And I shall think myself very lucky if I escape with whole bones. Some manufacturers have turned off their men ; and there are several desperate Committees.

“One of the plans of Opposition has been to secede after the principle is carried, and to make a great protest, but that is not determined upon.

“Lord Cornwallis is reconciled with Lord Enniskillen as to his personal quarrel relative to the court martial of which Lord Enniskillen was President. This will have good consequences.

“If we could get the Coles, Wynne, Fortescue, the Kings, and others who are well disposed to break off, it will be of much consequence.

“The Rowleys have written to Lord De Clifford to allow them to support the details.

“I think we shall see more light before Monday.

“I have been so harrassed with long nights, and looking after friends, that I have not been able to attend to business.

“The delay which has taken place as to the delivery of the papers was owing to a paltry manœuvre of the Speaker. All the accounts were printed before Lord Castlereagh made his speech. I ordered them to be sent to the House. The Speaker privately sent for the printer, ordered him not to send out a single account, but to print a fresh set. Of this I was not acquainted. The resolutions were also sent to the House for delivery. They were kept in the Journal Office, and the Speaker would not let them go out with the votes. This was also concealed from me. What *petitesse* ?

“I had much conversation with him some days ago. He acknowledged a union might be salutary, but not now, not under Lord Cornwallis. I know that it was once the great object to make a run at the Administration ; for he cannot bear that the union should be carried without him.

“I should think he has done every thing in his power to distinguish between his opposition to the English, and the Irish administration.

“We have difficulty on the article of calicoes. They have duties at present of 40 *per cent*. The reduction to 10 *per cent*. will be strongly opposed.

“Compensation merely makes a clamour.

“I write in spirits, and trust I shall not alter my tone, but the Irish climate is most uncertain.”

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH.

*Private.*

1800, February 14. London —“As I do not accurately recollect whether I had an opportunity of saying any thing to you, before you left London, on the subject of the trial of controverted elections of members of the House of Commons on the part of Ireland in the united Parliament, and as it is a point on which I feel naturally

a particular anxiety, I take the liberty of troubling you with a few lines on the subject for your consideration

“The article, as it now stands, I hold to be clearly right, and that there would be the utmost danger in any attempt at any further specification on the subject, previous to the Union. The measure of union itself would, I think, be unnecessarily embarrassed by clogging it with any details on this question, which is, undoubtedly, one of some difficulty. And as the point is not one on which the wildest imagination can suppose that a majority of British members could have an interest in making any provisions injurious to the fair trial of Irish elections, it does not seem to be naturally an object of previous stipulation on the part of Ireland, but one which would more properly to be left to be regulated by the wisdom of the united Parliament. While, on the other hand, many inconveniences, and those of the most serious nature, would result from making these regulations any part of an irrevocable treaty. We have already seen occasion to introduce more than one alteration into the law on the subject here; and there is still more reason to think that this might hereafter become necessary as to the object now in question.

“Trusting, therefore, that you will be successful in resisting any attempt to make provision on this subject beforehand, otherwise than as it now stands in the resolution as opened to the Irish Parliament, I should think it unnecessary to break in upon you in the present moment with any discussion of future regulations upon the subject, if it were not that I feel much anxiety that, even in debate, no ideas should be held out, either of Committees to sit in Ireland, or (still less) of Committees to be wholly composed of Irish members. The former, as it seems to me, would be destructive of the principle of the Union, and totally inconsistent with any form or principle of Parliamentary proceeding. Nothing could be more dangerous than to have, during the recess of Parliament, bodies of that description sitting in Ireland, with no check over them to control any proceedings they might adopt; for, what other power could be allowed to interfere with the proceedings of a Committee of the House of Commons, acting as such, however unwarrantably or illegally? The other idea, that of composing Committees exclusively of Irish members, would be useless if they were not to sit in Ireland. It is therefore liable to all the objections which I have already stated, and it is, besides, inconsistent with the principle of the present Act, and calculated, in effect, to destroy all hope of impartiality in the trial, when the jury, instead of being chosen from among 558 or 658 members, would be confined to so small a number as 100, and those, too, the most influenced by local prejudices and connections.

“All that I can think necessary to be done on this subject, and I have thought much upon it, is that the United Parliament should give a power to the parties to examine witnesses, in presence of counsel on both sides, and liable therefore to cross-examination before some commission duly constituted for the purpose, and to produce that evidence, reduced to writing and properly certified, before the Committee here. Even in this case, I would not preclude

either party, if he chose to incur the expense, from the benefit of producing his oral testimony before the Committee; but I would simply make the written evidence, taken as above, *admissible*.

“This point may, however, I am aware, admit of some doubt, and I am far from taking upon myself to decide upon what may ultimately be found right on this subject; but, seeing much danger in any ideas founded on the principle of any greater change than this, I was anxious to submit to your consideration these thoughts upon it. I trust we shall have full opportunity to consider them in a moment of more leisure to yourself than this can be.”

SPENCER SMITH to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1799 [1800?], February 15. Constantinople.—“I have been for some weeks past alike disabled either from replying to your Lordship’s last letter officially, or what I have desired still more, to address you a few lines in private, till at length, after getting the use of my limbs by slow degrees, I am all at once called upon by a sudden opportunity to take my pen in hand, but under circumstances which will not admit of my getting through a quarter of all I have to say. Amongst other things my brother had charged me to make some confidential extracts, for your Lordship’s sole eye, of his private correspondence, but all I can do is to get a copy made of a public letter he has sent a duplicate of through my hands to Lord Nelson, and get a dispatch (the annexed) intended for last post, but which could not be ready in time, copied for this conveyance, which is of a peculiar hurrying kind.

“Undoubted information has reached this place in a variety of ways of the successful termination of the negotiation on foot for the evacuation of Egypt. I am without a scrap from our Commodore since the 18th December, but I know him to have been *well employed* ever since. At length the Internuncio, in whose house I happen to have passed my tedious confinement for the sake of a little motherly care and nursing, has received such a positive proof of the advanced stage of the arrangement in question, that he is going to send off this night to his Court, and allows me, *sub sigillo*, a place in his packet for as much as I can get ready within such a limited time. The Porte has demanded of the Austrian mission a state of their shipping trade, in order to know how many sail can be chartered immediately to rendezvous to Alexandria to carry the French home, in consequence of the *signature* of their capitulation. Besides this, he has received an express from Cyprus by which I have had some letters of different dates, of which I have had some copied for the Levant company; but the last and most important I have reserved for your Lordship, and annex to this hasty scribble; for what with the agitation produced by such good news upon a convalescent constitution, which has lately sustained a long trial of vexation of various kinds, and what with the real fatigue of galloping through so much writing as if it were for a wager, I must confine myself to thus much, and reserve my brother’s communications for another moment. As it is, they contain reflections and

explanations so far superceded by the present salutary tidings, that they become only necessary as an historical guide for your judgment on certain recent occurrences.

“With respect to myself, I meant to unbosom myself to your Lordship in a more becoming and respectful form, but I have no chance even of getting at you at all with the truth in time to keep pace with so much ingenuity as I have to cope with, that I venture to make your Lordship the unreserved confidence of a memorandum I made some time ago to refresh my memory (in the midst of such a heterogeneous succession of subjects as occupy one’s mind in this situation) against I should be able to take up my pen in a leisurely way. I trust your Lordship will peruse such a crude text with the indulgence of a friend, and good will of a patron, as my object is limited to the getting my bread in the least offensive way to anybody. As I find it impossible to cultivate Lord Elgin’s confidence by the most persevering trial, I neither wish to exist a constant object of jealousy, nor to deprive him of any of the honours, patronage, or emoluments he thinks ought to be concentrated in him only. And as it is impossible for me to maintain my ground upon the present equivocal footing, without more support than I can pretend to hope for, I trust your Lordship will allow me to revert to my official demand of a leave of absence which my health really needs, with the eventual contingency of returning here with credit, or else a change of situation to any southern station. I wish much to have an opportunity of preparing myself by a few weeks of the air of Naples for an English winter, and if I can combine my journey home with any object of public utility, I shall be proud of the honour of any of your Lordship’s commands to execute by the way.”

*Two Enclosures.*

*Enclosure 1:—*

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM FOR LORD GRENVILLE.

“When Lord Elgin arrived he seemed to feel his dignity, and contenting himself with the general superiority reserved to him by the nature of his appointment as explained in your original notification, by declining any interference in the current affairs of the post which he referred to me as the acting magistrate; till; all at once, he manifested a spirit of encroachment and monopoly that no detail of business whatever could escape; and losing sight entirely of the grandeur of his situation, augmented if anything by having a minister to transact business under his direction, treated the solemnity of his representative mission quite as a secondary consideration, and attributing to himself the entire and *exclusive* management of all sorts of business, such a collision of necessity ensued between us as brought on an explanation, wherein his *verbal* definition and commentary upon his official character with reference to this residence differed so widely from every syllable of your Lordship’s clear and explicit notification of the temporary change in my situation, and demarcation of our respective duties, than which nothing could be more easy than to adhere to, that

though I, of course, declined anything like resistance of his authority, or even the appearance of a difference between us before the public, yet I reserved to myself the right of appeal to the proper quarter, and to solicit those whom we both depend upon to make good their own meaning. Your Lordship condescended to tell me that, except the correspondence with your Office, (and political negotiations included) no change was to take place in my situation except the agreeable one of a step of promotion. His Lordship, on the other hand, has informed me in every possible form that his appointment has effaced every atom of my public character except that of corresponding with the Levant Company; for that, as to carrying on their affairs, *he found it impossible* to make the Porte understand that the king should preserve here any other accredited agent than himself, and still less to carry on the business of a corporation *of whose existence the Ministry was utterly ignorant!* and that for his own part he could not receive the explanation I gave of my situation as quoting your correspondence with me, nor wait for, nor abide by any other rule of conduct than his full power and instructions, which he has *more than once sent* me to read over in a significant way. Indeed I may say these two instruments form the *sum total*, the alpha and omega of *all* his communications either official or confidential to me of any one act or transaction of the embassy he informs me I am secretary to, when it becomes a point with him to obliterate my past character in the eyes of the world here. But when my services are, as they have been often, respectfully and earnestly tendered in that capacity, I am then tauntingly entitled the Levant Company's Minister; and am desired to confine myself to their correspondence. All my conduct under this treatment is comprised in endeavours to avoid collision or even the air of rivalry, and still less of schism, so as to furnish a topic of scandal for the society we live in. I seek to hide my diminished head as well as I can while this cloud is passing over it, trusting that the wisdom, equity, and delicacy of my superiors will not suffer any perversion of their intentions to exist unnoticed and uncorrected; and still less that an appointment meant as a reward to one servant of the country should operate as a punishment or penance to another."

*Enclosure 2 :—*

JOHN KEITH (Secretary of Sir Sidney Smith) to SPENCER SMITH.

*Private for Lord Grenville.*

1799, June 20. Beyrout. *Extract.*—"Here we have been for some days in order to get water, but finding the operation so very difficult and tardy, I believe we shall proceed this night to Cyprus to complete our stock, and if we meet the Ottoman fleet under the Patrona Bey, we shall in all probability tow them down to the scene of action. What a terrible thing it is to have to do with such dilatory wretches! They cut us up, and if Sir Sidney is not invested with a regular supremacy over them, they will ultimately swindle us out of all the important advantage to be reaped from the miraculous blow your brother, and him only, has struck against the astonished

enemy ; but if they again have time to fill their bellies, and heal their sores, we shall just find ourselves as far advanced as over your fire last January.

“Allow me therefore [to say], in your brother’s name, while he is resting his wearied limbs asleep by me, although mid-day, that we must *be fully* empowered, and that from all quarters, or you must hope for nothing from us analagous to our late herculean labours. It is of the utmost importance that what you can do in this way be done, and that speedily.

“Jezzar has informed Sir Sidney that he will not admit for the future but *British born* subjects as consuls within his pashalik. He says, all other mercenary foreign agents and deputies are a set of miserable intriguers, and all more or less partisans of an intriguing enemy. And that after a given time he shall clear the coast of any remaining persons of that description. (This comes in full consonance with all you have done to purge the Levant mission of such stains.) The pasha has expressed a wish that I should remain with him in that capacity in Egypt, and Sir Sidney says that I ought to postulate for such a situation when our present warfare be over. I certainly think I could make myself useful in that way, and that under Jezzar Pasha I could perhaps do better than another. I mention the matter now to have your sentiments upon it, and shall perhaps, hereafter, call upon you for your support.”

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, February 16. Stowe. *Extract*.—“I find from Dick that you are very sanguine on the subject of the union. I should personally think unfavourably of it from the last division, if every letter that I have got from Ireland did not assure me that Government may depend always on a majority of 50. I own that I do not understand Lord Cornwallis’s acquiescence in the writs of citizens Downshire Charlemont and Ponsonby for calling together all the counties of Ireland ; a measure with which, in my judgment, he ought to have grappled instantly, for it could obviously lead only to intimidation of county members, and to general outrage and violence. As little can I understand the wisdom of giving to the Irish colonels of militia the means of recruiting their numbers at a moment when, most fortunately, you were enabled to weaken that very disaffected force. Surely some *delay* can be found in the issue of this money.”

#### THE EARL OF CARYSFORT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, February 17. Dublin.—“I am very happy that our ideas tally so exactly upon the subject of the trial of controverted elections. Your plan of leaving it open to either party to bring the witness at his own expense, obviates a material objection to mine. The mode by Commissioners I certainly prefer to that by Assistant Barristers, as giving a better chance of impartiality [not only] from the quality of the judges, but from the greater solemnity, and

publicity, of the proceedings, which, considering the nature of Irish evidence, are very necessary checks. Lord Castlereagh suggests, as an improvement to my plan, that the Committee should be struck in the first instance, in order to preserve more entire the jurisdiction of the House. My reason for proposing it otherwise was merely that such a number of members, who might be wanted on other Committees, might not be kept idle while the evidence was taking in Ireland; but I do not think it at all material. I perfectly agree with you that this matter is not to be made an article of Union, and, indeed, it seems to be that from the very nature of it, it is impossible that it should; but, you will observe, it was much insisted upon by Ponsonby in the debate, and it is prudent to be prepared with some rational plan to remove the scruples and fears which many, even among our friends, entertain concerning it.

“I take for granted that the House of Commons will not divide before to-morrow evening, but I think I may safely assure you that you may be perfectly at ease as to the event. The majority will in my opinion be about 50. The Government expect more, but I have now no doubt of complete success, and believe the struggle will be over to-morrow, nor do I apprehend any serious tumult in any part of the country.

“Lord Downshire’s folly happened most opportunely, and the decision with which Lord Cornwallis acted on that occasion, prevented the mischief that might have followed from false impressions, before the determination of the British Cabinet to persevere in the measure could be authentically known. Your promptness in dismissing from regiment, governorship, and Privy Council, has had all the effects you could wish; and the reconciliation which has taken place between Lord Cornwallis and Lord Enniskillen will, I think, have an immediate tendency to dissolve the connexion of the Opposition; many of whom will absent themselves after the first question is voted, and many will not refuse their assistance to Government upon the details.

“The Chancellor made a most able speech when he moved the first Resolution in the House of Lords. Though great expectations were formed of the impression it might make upon the public, Messires Cooke and Company neglected to take effectual means to have the speeches of their friends reported, so that no full or authentic account of it has yet appeared. But, I believe, the Chancellor himself is preparing it for the press.

“I hope to get away in the course of next week. There will be no struggle upon the details in our House, and I think it cannot be necessary for me to stay merely to go up to the Castle with the address and resolutions. I think they will pass in a little more than a fortnight, and I shall return when the Bill is brought in.”

#### VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1800, February 17. Dublin Castle.—“I am to acknowledge the honour of your Lordship’s letter of the 13th, with many thanks.

The observations contained in it, relative to the inexpediency of involving the treaty of Union with any regulations on the subject of controverted elections, are unanswerable, and your Lordship may rest assured that nothing shall be either said or done on that subject which shall commit either Governments, much less fetter the United Parliament on a point of such delicacy.

“I threw out an idea of Mr. Pitt’s in debate on this question, but in such a way as to make it clearly understood that a regulation on this subject was not in contemplation as connected with the treaty; and I stated it, at the same time, to be merely one of many suggestions that had occurred for obviating an inconvenience which it was desirable, if possible, to diminish, but which, even were it to remain, no person who approved the Union on other grounds, could feel as an obstacle at all fundamental.

“The first resolution will this day be proposed in a Committee of the whole House. I hope to be enabled to send your Lordship a favourable report.”

#### THOMAS LANGLEY to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, February 17. Taplow.—“The flattering manner in which your Lordship did me the honour of answering my last letter demands my best thanks, and the encouragement your Lordship gave me induces to enter more fully into the subject of pluralities.

“The extent to which this abuse of church preferment was carried previous to the Reformation is well known, many of the reformed churches, particularly Scotland, corrected it. The Statute of 33 Henry VIII. was intended to curtail the privilege, but the poverty of the greater part of the parochial benefices were such as to offer no restrictions as to livings under £8 *per annum* other than those which existed in the Canon law, namely their becoming voidable but not absolutely void. Many livings of very considerable value were not returned in the *Valor* of Henry VIII. as producing any income; and the re-appropriation of tithes, inclosures, and other arrangements have rendered the *valor* wholly inconclusive, and, in consequence, dispensations for pluralities are founded upon the most irregular principles. In one instance a heavy charge is incurred to hold two small contiguous livings; in another, two very considerable livings at any distance may be held without any license. All other ecclesiastical preferment, whether prebendal or sinecure, may be held with any livings under charge, and even with one living above charge, without any dispensation. Your Lordship is of course in possession of the accounts of the present revenues of the faculty office. I have no data to form any correct idea of the amount, but there can be little doubt they might be improved very considerably and with great satisfaction to the country at large, and if pluralities are allowed to continue, there surely can be no objection to Government availing itself of the principle to extend the duties to all preferment so held. Were no person enabled to hold more than one benefice with cure of souls, I presume the Church of England would approximate to the primitive times, and yet the inequality of livings with the present establishment of prebendal

dignities would be a sufficient counterbalance to the very just objection of destroying the principle of emulation and laudable ambition. If this appears to your Lordship to be pressing the point farther than the age in which we live will allow, still the necessity of extending the obligation of dispensations may be attended to in a financial point of view. There can be no possible justice in subjecting a parish to the inconvenience of a non-resident rector when the revenues are sufficient, merely because the value in the *Valor* of Henry VIII. admits of some subterfuge. Even the present mode of granting dispensations by the Archbishop is founded upon positive falsehood. The pluralist gives a bond to the Archbishop that he will perform certain duties in his second parish, which I believe very rarely occurs, and the bond is never acted upon. I refer your Lordship to the statute of dispensations and the test of experience. I should trespass too much on your Lordship's valuable time if I were to enumerate the incredible subterfuges which this *Valor* and Statute of Henry VIII. occasion. Livings under charge, no charge, donatives, peculiar jurisdictions so interfere with the wholesome laws of residence, that the Curates Act will do little to remedy the evil. The experience of seven years convinces me how little the power of the substitute can avail in the regulation of a parish. He cannot feel the same responsibility, he cannot stifle the hopes of acquiring some permanency in his profession, and therefore his attentions are rather with immediate views of temporary assistance than with settled plans of solid arrangements for the benefit of his poorer parishioners. Your Lordship will observe that I am deviating into parochial concerns; but my mind is at present so much engaged in the administering to the wants and combating the prejudices of my parishioners at this juncture, as to be diverted from my immediate subject. I may again presume to enter into further details of the present state of our church, from a firm conviction that the regulations proposed are consonant to her true interests, and in no degree calculated to cherish any enquiries which, from the woeful experience of the present day, are productive of dangerous schemes of unnecessary reforms. Your Lordship's superior judgment will act upon these *data* in that correct and comprehensive manner as cannot fail to distinguish your Lordship's administration as peculiarly beneficial to the true interests of religion."

#### E. COOKE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, February 18, Dublin Castle.—“This day, after 18 hours debate, the principle of Union was carried in the Commons by 161 to 115. The question was that the Chairman should leave the chair. The main question then passed without a division.

“A great altercation took place, early in the debate, between Corry and Grattan. Nothing could be more abominably personal. Corry was forced to send him a message forthwith by General Cradock. They went out: fired a case of pistols each; Corry was wounded in the arm, but not badly; and the affair terminated in the usual manner.

“ This altercation suspended attention to the debate for some hours. Sir John Parnell and the Speaker then entered fully into the whole detail of the measure, which they endeavoured to prove as ruinous. Lord Castlereagh was excellent in reply to both.

“ The rest of the debate went off as usual ; nothing remarkable.

“ I do not think there was any ill humour in the House after the division. No threat of appeal to the people, no wish for improper delay, but rather a contrary feeling.

“ I think all looks promising.

“ Parnell debated goodnaturedly ; the Speaker wickedly and ably.

“ I am very much fatigued. I will write to-morrow if I find any turn in things.

“ The objections are levelled chiefly against reducing the duty on cottons, the peerage regulations, and the compensation idea.

“ Altogether it is a most important day. We had three or four members absent ; but you must consider how difficult it is to keep men together [when] the heart is not completely in the cause.

“ We go on upon Friday.”

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, February 21. Stowe.—“ I wished to turn over very fully in my mind for one day the proposition in contemplation for the Bishop of Chester, and I am most clear that neither his health nor his habits ought to permit him to accept it. The situation in question will doubtless be ameliorated by the Union ; but to be useful in the way that alone can give him satisfaction, or contribute to make him happy or respectable, he ought to be able to ensure longer life, and more vigorous habits than, at his age and under his state of health, he can hope for. I should therefore, if he asked my advice, dissuade him, but it is most fit that he should speak from himself only on such a question so deeply interesting to him. If you wish me to go over to Oxford to sound him, or to offer in your name this arrangement, I will do it ; but I see no advantage in such a step over the more obvious mode of a letter. As to Bangor, when I last saw him he was decided against it, as not worth the expense of a removal, and the fatigue of new arrangements from which he would still hope to be to move to Wells or Worcester ; but when I tell you this, I only mean to give you my impressions of what he may determine, not his resolution.

“ I return you the letter to Lord Castlereagh, and join most cordially in your view of the impracticability of an Irish House of Commons committee, which I am satisfied must never be permitted to meet in Dublin, or even in London as a distinct body ; but I am not sure that your ideas go quite the length of mine as to the ‘ Court of Enquiry ’ to whom I would refer the investigation of facts previous to the formation of the usual committee, to be formed in the usual manner at Westminster. This Court of Enquiry ought to be ballotted out of a body of twenty-four commoners to be named by the Crown, out of two lists of twelve from the English and twelve from the Irish bar, given in at each new Parliament by the two

chancellors, to be presided over by one of the three junior judges of the Irish courts, and to have nominees from the parties. The examinations and arguments all to be taken down and certified; together with a case for the appellant and for the sitting member signed by counsel, as in the case of appeals to the House of Lords; but to this I would add the signed opinion of the Court of Enquiry on the facts at issue, and on the result of the whole. From these opinions the House of Commons committee might differ if they saw grounds; but it is obvious that the parties would in most cases be much guided in their proceedings, and consequently much litigious discussion saved by a knowledge of those opinions. I am not clear that in *any case* would I allow a rehearing of witnesses at Westminster.

"I am delighted at hearing this morning from Tom the division on the resolutions, as I take it for granted that the *Bill* will be very short and very rapidly carried through. I am sorry for Corry's rencounter with Grattan; '*qui zonam perdidit.*' What is your next step of proceeding in this business? I trust that you do not mean to suffer the Irish Commons to cool by delay."

*Postscript.*—"So far from blaming what is done against Lord Downshire, I blame you very much for not going further. I understand that there is distinct proof of his sending to the head-quarters of his regiment resolutions, with *an order* to his adjutant to procure as many signatures as possible. You will remember that when this regiment was serving against the rebels in 1798, and in the field with Lord Cornwallis, the colonel never went over to Ireland."

#### LE DUC D'HARCOURT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, February 22. London].—"J'ai reçu la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire le 20 pour m'informer que Sa Majesté a agréé que Monsieur ait l'honneur de lui présenter, au palais de la Reine, et de la même manière que Sa Majesté a vu Monsieur, les princes de la branche d'Orléans; et dès que vous aurez bien voulu m'instruire si ce sera mercredi ou jeudi, j'aurai soin de les en avertir.

"Monsieur m'a chargé d'avoir l'honneur de vous mander qu'il accepte avec empressement votre invitation pour samedi. Dès que Monsieur m'aura donné la liste que vous désirez avoir des Français qui partageront l'honneur de l'accompagner, j'aurai celui de vous la communiquer."

#### E. COOKE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, February 22. Dublin Castle.—"The three first Resolutions, after some speeches upon the principle, were last night carried, about eleven o'clock, without a division. Some members being ill, and others absent, they did not like appearing with diminished force; not that I yet see any real separation in the party.

"Lord Corry, who is an *élève* of the Speaker, and has been put forth on former occasions to speak his sentiments, said he would not

interfere in the details, or mix in the responsibility of the measure ; he would, however, attend the Committee, and oppose the principle in every stage, and particularly when a Bill should be brought in upon the subject. He thought the British Ministry would never press a measure so much against the sense of the country. This last sentiment the Speaker has frequently expressed to me.

“G. Ponsonby gave notice that, on Thursday next, he would make a motion upon my Lord Lieutenant’s message, which alludes to the signed Declarations, in order to ascertain the sense of the people.

“I think they seem to despair of impairing our majority by debate.

“They have no point in the articles but cottons, which I always knew would act unfavourably against us. The duties are now from 30 to 50 *per cent.* The reduction to 10, might make a revulsion in the trade.

“The scarcity of provisions, which in these last ten days has become sensible, is to our disadvantage.

“The politicians of the party are also endeavouring to make a handle of the alledged return of the Russians from the Rhine, and of a probability of a peace between France and Austria, and of the pacification of the Chouans. If any solid comforting intelligence could be transmitted to dissipate those stories it would be useful.

“I think there will be efforts at delay ; attacks against Government for using unfair means to carry the measure ; and unceasing attempts to stir up the people. Our adversaries are old political actors, and they know that any attempt to move Government, without a general cry of popular discontent, is folly.

“I do not see any decided break in Opposition ; perhaps their not dividing is through fear of it.”

#### LORD MINTO to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1800, February 23. Vienna.—“You will naturally believe that the interval since the date of my last private letter has been a very uneasy one to me. With a certain knowledge that this Court was in a state of communication with the enemy, and a refusal to acquaint me with the purport of it, I had nothing to diminish that anxiety but the knowledge that I should very soon be furnished with the means to bring this Cabinet to an explicit and unreserved declaration on this particular point ; as well, I hope, as to engagements that will prevent the future danger of reserved secrecy. I have nevertheless been very little diffident of the favourable result of all these proceedings, being satisfied, first, that Austria cannot get such good terms from France by a peace as she can force by the war ; and in the next place, that she cannot obtain the same security for her acquisitions by the guarantee of France in opposition to her present allies, as by the course we wish her to pursue. Being refused the regular and authentic information to which I was entitled on the subject of the overtures from France, I have had recourse to the private and irregular channels that are to be found here ; and I have received a great variety and quantity of that sort of intelligence concerning

secret negotiators who visit Baron Thugut privately and other occurrences of that nature ; but I confess I have little faith in this species of information ; and I already possessed internal evidence of the thing to be assured that a secret communication existed, which made me less anxious concerning the particular form it assumed. I am the less disposed to believe in these mysterious proceedings on such evidence, as I found my friend Monsieur de Kalitcheff doubting on similar grounds whether Baron Thugut had not come privately to my house at eleven o'clock at night, and stayed till one in the morning ; and I frequently find that the most improbable falsehoods concerning my correspondence or conversation are carried to Baron Thugut, who generally mentions them. On the whole I did not think this sort of matter deserved a place in my dispatch, and I should perhaps have done better to save your Lordship the trouble of reading it even in this form. At the same time I cannot positively assure your Lordship that no other communications concerning peace have passed than those ostensible, and, one may say, circular ones mentioned to me by Baron Thugut. I am however on the whole inclined to think that they have never arrived at a disclosure of *conditions* ; and I am certain that at least none have ever been intimated in any way, public or private, that have been thought either admissible, or likely to afford a basis of negotiation. My expectation certainly is that, on learning the acquiescence of His Majesty with the most essential propositions transmitted by me, Baron Thugut will enter into particular engagements for the campaign, and general ones for future connexion if it is thought proper. However, your Lordship knows the character I have to do with, and that certainties elsewhere are not more than probabilities here. Your Lordship's speech on the 28th January has made the greatest sensation at Vienna amongst all classes ; and I am happy to find a disposition to draw their opinions from such sources prevail amongst the Austrians, as well as the French and others more personally concerned in the accomplishment of the English system. It is most fortunate and providential that Buonaparte's proceeding should have furnished the opportunity to England to take the lead, and to settle the public mind of Europe on the complexion of the present critical period."

HENRY DUNDAS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, February 23. Wimbledon.—“I shall certainly see Sir Watkin, and have for that purpose wrote to him to call upon me to-morrow ; at the same time I confess I feel little hopes of being of any use to him in what he very naturally is anxious about. It is only two days ago that Sir Charles Stuart communicated to me the enclosed copy of a letter he had received from the Duke of York. It is in answer to one he wrote to the Duke immediately on his return from the Mediterranean, arising from his own feeling of the real pretensions he had to it from his military skill and exertions. I never saw the sentiment so distinctly avowed before as that no circumstance of military merit or service could gain a man admission into the British army, unless he had got his first entrance

in the shape of an Ensign. If the rest of his Majesty's servants are of opinion, that in a free and commercial country, insular in its situation, and where of course every incentive to keep up its military spirit is of essential consequence, such a proposition is to be acquiesced in, I certainly shall not singly stand forth, but the proposition is a perfectly new one, and in my opinion not more new than pernicious.

"If I can dine any where next Tuesday, I am engaged with Nepean, and I take it for granted the Bank business in the House of Commons will at any rate prevent Mr. Pitt from being with you at dinner. I should wish you to put down on paper any suggestions that occur to you on the subject of Sir Charles Stuart's instructions, and we could talk over the subject on Wednesday morning. Sir Charles is anxious to get away and I am as anxious to send him."

*Enclosure :—*

FIELD MARSHAL FREDERICK DUKE OF YORK to LIEUTENANT GENERAL SIR CHARLES STUART.

1799, August 30. Horse Guards.—"I do not delay acknowledging the receipt of your letter of the 27th instant, and assuring you that I have ever felt disposed to give Colonel Graham the greatest credit for his zeal and courage.

"I am however exceedingly sorry to be under the necessity of declining to recommend your recommendation in his favour for permanent rank in the army, which I have uniformly felt it my duty to resist upon the grounds of the utter destruction it would be to his Majesty's service, and the grievous hardship to meritorious officers who have devoted their lives to the army to allow that door ever to be opened again to persons who have not made the army their profession; particularly as, should this be granted, there are others whose pretensions are fully as great in my opinion as Colonel Graham's, and who would naturally expect, and with reason, to have the same mark of favour extended to them." *Copy.*

SPENCER SMITH to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

[1800], February 25. Constantinople.—"The state of my health not yet allowing of my frequenting Lord Elgin's society, I am unable to pick up what he may have received worthy of communication concerning the grand affair on foot in our neighbourhood, which occupies us all so much, but, as may be supposed, me more particularly, whether considered as the consummation of my own past labours in this country, or with reference to the arduous and critical share that has fallen to the lot of my brother. I therefore make no apology for trespassing upon your Lordship's attention a few moments, in order to lay before you another more circumstantial confirmation which has just come to hand of the advanced stage of what I alluded to in my last letter.

"Baron Herbert, my wife's father, has a confidential correspondent in the Vizier's camp, and in an advantageous situation for knowing *all* that passes. Baron Herbert, witness to the extreme

anxiety which my brother's long silence (since 18 December) occasioned me in an irritable state of health, has been good enough not only to administer the first remedy by the unreserved communication of the first positive authentic intelligence he has received from the quarter in question relative to pending affairs, upon a private footing, but moreover, with the sole restriction of not making any use of this secret intelligence here upon the spot to any soul breathing, to permit me to convey it home for the use of our family and friends. Your Lordship standing in some degree in the first relation, and having certainly proved your right to the latter title, in addition to the priority due to your place upon our official footing, I heartily avail myself of the Internuncio's permission to transcribe his *Argus's* letter, which being in Italian *pâtois* I annex a translation, and have omitted nothing but the signature, for obvious reasons; but I have seen the original, and the writer is known to me, and I place a good deal of dependence on all he says.

“The other four enclosures of this packet relate to my brother, whose subject I meant, as I mentioned to your Lordship in my last, to take up in rather historical detail; but not being able to execute that task, I simply send forward some papers I had from him to show Lord Elgin, and then to lay before your Lordship. You will find a copy of one of his letters to that *frondeur*, General Koehler, together with one from the General to myself, which Sir Sidney has sent back to me with marginal notes by himself, concerning which I have only to say that *eodem animo scripsit quô bellavit*. There is besides the translation of one of his Turkish dispatches to the Porte; and lastly I annex what may not prove uninteresting, namely a more distinct plan of the relative position of things at the commencement of the siege of Acre, taken from a very rough pen and ink sketch, by which Sir Sidney elucidated his first dispatches from thence, which I kept a traced copy of till I could have leisure to make it out fair.”

*Enclosure 3:—*

BRIGADIER-GENERAL KOEHLER to SPENCER SMITH.

*Note* [by Sir Sidney Smith].— 1799, August 3. Bouyouk-dere.—“Sir Sidney Smith having informed me by letter of the intention of a *corps* of land troops being employed against the enemy in Egypt, on a land operation; and having received a similar communication from Hadgi Ibrahim Effendi, the Turkish Minister at War, I think it my duty to report to you, what I have so frequently, formally, and verbally urged, both to yourself and the Turkish Government, the anxious and earnest desire of the whole, and

“Sir Sidney Smith made this communication to General Koehler as an incitement for him to come to the scene of action where, if on inspecting things on the spot he had seen any necessity of changing the mode of attack proposed, the matter could have been discussed much more to the purpose than by folios of correspondence, which those who are actually opposed to the enemy have not time for; and as General Koehler had it in his power to join us on the

theatre of operations as easily as Major Faed, it was thought he would do so, although the Turkish Government might not chose to commit themselves by a requisition to that effect which might be construed into a promise to give additional emoluments to the detachment of artillery offered gratuitously to the Porte by his Majesty's Ministers-Plenipotentiary in conference with the Ottoman Ministers on the projected military operations of the campaign. These conferences being held before the arrival of General Koehler at Constantinople, he could not be present at them; and as to the combined forces opposed to the enemy, *proceeding in the execution* of what was then concerted according to the article of the treaty, without further 'consultation' or communication with Constantinople, it is presumed that it was their duty to defend a besieged place, and also to pursue a beaten flying enemy, and to precede his van if possible without the delay requisite for such consultation upon the obvious thing to be done. As to naval officers arranging and 'actually commanding military operations on shore' it is done daily, and to the great advantage of his Majesty's service, either in combination with his Majesty's land forces, and in that case subordinate to them according to their ranks, or as in the present case, where there is not *a single land officer* on the scene of action, and this in compliance with a positive article of war which subjects 'every person in the fleet' to the pain of death if he does not 'relieve and assist a known friend in view to the

every individual of the military mission, to be employed upon that, or some similar actual military operation against the enemy. I conceive it incumbent upon me to represent to you the impropriety of military officers, sent by his Majesty and Government to this country, for that purpose, being laid aside, totally unemployed and not even consulted, or the least communication made to them of land operations being in contemplation until after they are actually commenced; and of such operations being combined, arranged, and actually commanded by naval officers assuming to themselves the title of military rank, and conferring military promotion at a time when the military mission sent by his Majesty is totally unattended to. Such arrangements as these, so totally irregular and disrespectful to the commands and intention of his Majesty's Ministers, as well as the military officers themselves composing the mission itself, so unnatural and in every respect contrary to the established rules and customs of our service, I hope you will not refuse on this representation to rectify; and exert every influence you might be possessed of that the obvious intentions of his Majesty's Ministers in the destination of the military mission to this country might be accomplished; and by that means allow the naval department full liberty to act in the more important operations of their natural and appropriate service, in the prosecution of which the military mission by land will not fail to co-operate and contribute by every means in their power in

utmost of his power.' Now though it may not be in the power of a land officer to command a ship, it is in the power of a naval officer to command a battery or regiment on shore, since there is no part of that duty but which enters into his education as Lieutenant at Arms of a man of war, and this without any pretension to any knowledge beyond his naval duty as such. As to the idea of banishing his Majesty's naval forces into the ocean where their early successes have deprived them of the chance of meeting an enemy, they will not acquiesce under it readily; and however great the confidence they may have in the abilities of land officers, they have never yet failed to prove themselves emulous to perform their parts of all operations on the sea coast, whether *on shore* or afloat, and have repeatedly received the thanks of his Majesty's most distinguished general officers for their performance of those duties, which, it was acknowledged, their peculiar mechanical talents qualified them for, instead of being *censured*, as in the present case, for '*irregularity, disrespect, and acting unnaturally and contrary to the established rules and customs of the service.*' As to the conferring military rank, the indispensable necessity of a particular promotion in the *marine* service has been reported to the Admiral Commander in Chief of his Majesty's fleet in the Mediterranean, for the information of the Lords of the Admiralty on whom the marine forces depend. The foreign auxiliary officers in the service of the Porte have proved their ability to fill the ranks they hold, and the right of the Porte to employ whom it pleases cannot be disputed. As

the most faithful and zealous manner.

"Zeal for his Majesty's service, and the honour and success of his arms, which I hope stimulate and equally influence us all, are the only motives for my making this representation and request; that whatever your better information might, upon the consideration it merits, think proper to urge, or recommend to the Porte or elsewhere, might be, in proper time, done." *Copy.*

to naval officers assuming to themselves the title of military ranks, there is no instance of it unless a Greek dragoman so applying the French term *général* may be so called."

#### E. COOKE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, February 25. Dublin.—"The three first articles passed the Committee in the Lords last night with little debate; the division, 48 to 20.

"In the Commons, the 7th or contribution article was debated. The Speaker had left an impression that, if the Union had taken place before the war, we should have been, on the terms proposed, ten millions more in debt.

"Lord Castlereagh well exposed and refuted this fallacy, and forced the Speaker to give up his ground; and we had some interesting altercation in good parliamentary style.

"Corry made a good speech of detail; he is pretty well, but his arm is uneasy, and I fear his exertions last night have done him no good.

"Our debate soon grew desultory, and upon every point but the question. At 12, Colonel Barry moved that the Speaker should leave the chair; ayes 108, noes 150. We then went through the whole article without amendment.

"J. C. Beresford moved that the proportion should be two-twentieths, instead of two-seventeenths. On this, Plunket, in the name of Opposition, begged him to withdraw his amendment; that he and his friends opposed principle; that no terms could make it palatable; that they never would sanction terms by amending them."

"Beresford's motion was negatived, and the article passed.

"We go on, upon Wednesday, on commerce.

"I think Lord Castlereagh was clearly master in the debate. The numbers prove that no variation in party has taken place. We had several invalids, whom we left in bed; the Opposition had a few.

"It will be still very hard work to get through with an Opposition of 120, gross. I think their not fighting the detail a great advantage to us. It abridges delay.

"Lord Corry sent a proposal to Lord Castlereagh that, if he would postpone the Union measure to next session, Opposition would support the administration; and, if the people should then be for it, they would assist the measure.

"Lord Castlereagh gave the civilest dissent in his power.

"Their chance is to operate on the people and produce resistance.

"I cannot hear of any thing wrong in the country. The town is cross; but no tumult. I walk from the House every night."

## LORD GRENVILLE TO R. LISTON.

*Private.*

1800, February 28. Cleveland Row.—“I have not been able as yet to form such a judgment on the different points in Mr. King’s paper, as to say any thing officially to you on the subject. But I perceive, at the first view, that it is subject to very great and serious difficulties: and my hopes of its leading to a satisfactory issue can be grounded only on the persuasion that his instructions must have been framed with a very considerable latitude of concession from these demands. I confess, however, that the whole system of the American Government seems to me to be tottering to its foundations; and, so far from being able to enforce upon the country good faith towards foreign powers, I much doubt their power of maintaining internal tranquility.

“In this state of things it may become very necessary for us to reconsider our system as with respect to that country, and I am therefore far from being averse to the wish which Mr. Hammond informs me you have expressed to him of returning home. I conclude you do not wish to undertake a voyage across the Atlantic with the prospect of going back again to America, nor is it desirable that you should. I deeply regret the course which affairs are taking there, as considering it highly injurious to our interests both there and in Europe; but where we cannot control events, we must, as well as we can, regulate our conduct according to them.

“I send you with this a provisional leave of absence. You will, however, exercise your own discretion with respect to its being made use of; and I am very confident you will not come away under any circumstances in which you think your doing so may tend to aggravate the evils which I apprehend.” *Copy.*

## ANGLO-RUSSIAN CO-OPERATION WITH THE ROYALISTS OF FRANCE.

*Memorandum* by GENERAL COUNT DE VIOMENIL, *Commanding the Russian Troops in Jersey and Guernsey.*

1800, February 27.—“1. Comme on ignore quel sera le plan des opérations, et sur quel point elles se dirigeront, on ne peut établir de question que sur le genre de guerre que l’on sera dans le cas de faire, soit offensive ou défensive. Dans la première supposition, le corps de troupes Russes n’ayant point de cavalerie, il est probable que la Cour de Londres sera disposée à lui en donner, et que ce même corps aurait aussi une augmentation de forces en infanterie, soit de la Cour de Russie, soit de Sa Majesté Britannique. Il est important de savoir quel est le nombre de régiments de chaque arme dont le dit corps Russe devrait être composé, et quelle serait la quantité de pièces d’artillerie de position, ou appartenants aux régiments, qui lui serait affectés. On joint ici un état de celles que l’on croit nécessaires, et qui seraient augmentées en proportion de la force à laquelle cette armée serait portée. Il est sous-entendu, que les caissons, munitions de guerre, et les chevaux de service pour cette artillerie, seront également fournis par la Cour de Londres.

“A l’égard d’une guerre défensive, qui ne serait d’aucun avantage, on présume que toute question sur cet objet devient inutile.

2. " Le petit nombre de Cosaques et de huzards qui se trouve au corps russe, n'est point monté, parceque le capitaine Popham a exigé qu'on laissa leurs chevaux à Revel, promettant qu'on leur en donnerait en Hollande. Il est donc urgent de les monter le plus tôt possible, afin d'accoutumer les chevaux au service avant l'ouverture de la campagne.

3. " Y aura-t-il un corps de troupes Anglaises dont les opérations seront séparées, et indépendantes de celles du corps Russe ? Dans ce cas il faudrait en connaître la force, et que les commandants de ces deux corps fussent parfaitement d'accord sur l'exécution de leur plan de campagne, afin de s'entr'aider mutuellement, et en parfaits alliés lorsque besoin sera.

4. " La cour de Londres ne fournira-t-elle pas au corps Russe la quantité de pontons nécessaires pour jeter trois ponts sur les rivières que l'on aura à passer dans les provinces de France où se portera le théâtre de la guerre ? Il faudrait aussi une quantité de pelles, de pioches, de haches, et d'instruments suffisants pour les travaux des fortifications de campagnes, ainsi que les chariots et chevaux nécessaires pour les opérations de guerre. Tous ces objets manquent au corp Russe.

5. " La cour de Londres fournira-t-elle aussi les voitures, et les chevaux nécessaires au transport des hôpitaux, et des bagages des officiers et soldats ? Fournira-t-elle encore un hôpital ambulante, ainsi que les médecins, chirurgiens, et médicaments indispensables. Monsieur Beaujean, docteur en médecine, et excellent chirurgien, qui a déjà été employé par le gouvernement d'Angleterre, serait très capable de diriger en chef ces hôpitaux comme Inspecteur-général. Il pourrait aussi procurer quelques chirurgiens français pour compléter le nombre nécessaire qui sera fourni par la Cour de Londres. Si cette proposition était acceptée par le gouvernement Britannique, le Comte de Vioménil en serait fort aise, par la confiance qu'il a dans les talents du dit sieur Beaujean.

6. " La Cour de Londres donnera-t-elle un commissaire pour les vivres ? Les troupes Russes auront-elles leur nourriture habituelle, et aura-t-on des moyens assurés pour la subsistance des hommes, et des chevaux lorsqu'on pénétrera dans l'intérieur de la France ?

7. " Y aura-t-il un nombre suffisant d'officiers du corps du génie et de l'artillerie Russe ? On pourrait attacher au corps Russe quelques officiers Français de ces deux armes qui connussent parfaitement les côtes de France.

8. " La Cour de Londres fournira-t-elle des fonds pour les dépenses secrettes, ou grands services rendus par les habitants des provinces de France où l'on pénétrera. Dans cette supposition elle fournirait un commissaire pour cette administration.

9. " Dans le cas où quelques régiments républicains déserteraient de leur armée pour passer à l'armée alliée, serait-on autorisé à les recevoir, et quelle serait la capitulation qu'on pourrait leur promettre ?

10. " Les Royalistes agiront-ils avec le corps Russe, ou séparément ; et, comme my lord Grenville le fait entendre, y aura-t-il un prince Français débarqué en France ? Dans cette supposition quelle sera son existence ?

11. " Les troupes Anglaises qui sont en Portugal joindront-elles le corps Russe, et en quel nombre seront-elles en infanterie, et en cavallerie ?

12. " Doit-on compléter les régiments Russes qui ont fait la campagne d'Hollande. Ce corps recevra-t-il quelque augmentation ?

13. " La Cour de Londres fournira-t-elle les bâtimens de transport, et une escadre pour protéger le débarquement ?

14. " Si l'embarquement doit se faire, il est nécessaire que les officiers attachés à l'artillerie de position, ainsi que ceux qui seront employés à celle des régiments, procèdent à l'embarquement de cette artillerie, de leurs affûts, des caissons, et boulets, et munitions de guerre qui lui appartiendront, afin que le débarquement puisse se faire avec autant d'ordre que de célérité.

15. " La Cour de Londres fournira sans doute une quantité suffisante de fusils de remplacement, pour suppléer à ceux qui manqueraient.

16. " Il serait instant de donner le plus tôt possible des cartouches, et des balles de calibre aux troupes Russes qui sont à Jersey et Guernsey pour les exercices à poudre, et pour les exercer à tirer au blanc.

17. " Ya-t-il en Angleterre des officiers Français qui ayent une connaissance parfaite de la partie des côtes de France où devra s'opérer le débarquement.

18. " Il serait essentiel que les royalistes pussent se rendre maîtres de quelque place qui put servir d'entrepôt pour les subsistances, et le dépôt des armes ou munitions de guerre, peu de temps avant l'instant où l'on pourra marcher à leur appui.

19. " La Cour de Londres donnera sans doute tout l'argent nécessaire pour fournir aux besoins urgents du corps Russe.

20. " Indépendamment des moyens indispensables demandés ci-dessus, et qui devront être proportionnés à la force armée qui sera employée, si l'on veut attaquer la France par la Bretagne, on croit que le Morbihan serait le point le plus favorable, mais l'on est persuadé que, pour assurer le succès de cette entreprise, il faudrait y porter 35 ou 40,000 hommes de troupes réglées ; 30,000 d'infanterie, et 8,000 de cavallerie ou troupes légères. Si cela est possible une telle armée inspirera de la confiance aux royalistes qui s'y réuniront, et les déterminera à faire les plus grands efforts. En entreprenant avec moins de forces, le moindre échec qu'éprouveraient les royalistes pourrait les décourager, et les décider à abandonner l'armée.

" Il est encore à observer que ces 35 ou 40,000 hommes de troupes réglées sont jugés nécessaires pour soumettre la Normandie, dont les fermiers ont acheté toutes les terres de leurs seigneurs ; et quoique la plupart soient de bons royalistes, il est vraisemblable qu'ils défendront autant qu'ils le pourront leurs propriétés. Ce n'est donc qu'avec une force imposante, et la plus exacte discipline, que l'on pourra espérer de pénétrer jusqu'à Paris, où doit se faire la contre-révolution de la France.

#### *Résumé.*

" Il faudrait faire toutes ses dispositions pour que l'armée qu

doit pénétrer par la Bretagne put commencer les opérations dans les premiers jours du mois de juin, époque à laquelle les forces des républicains seront occupées en Italie, et sur le Rhin. Il faudra beaucoup de biscuit, de riz, et de légumes secs pour les approvisionnements de la dite armée, dont la composition devrait être comme il suit—

“ Infanterie, y compris	..	..	..	2,000.
“ Chasseurs à pied	..	..	..	30,000.
“ Cavallerie	..	..	..	6,000.
“ Huzards ou Cosaques	..	..	..	2,000.
“ Les canonniers nécessaires pour le service des pièces	ci-après.			
“ Artillerie ; pièces de position ou obusiers	..	..	..	24.
“ Pièces de régiments ou artillerie de petit calibre	..	..	..	36.
“ Il faudra que cette artillerie ait des grenades, des pétards, et des fusées, pour les employer lorsque besoin sera.”				

#### E. COOKE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, February 29. Dublin Castle.—“ I do not find that the disposition to contest the Union resolutions is yet materially relaxed ; and we are to have another fierce battle on the principle upon Friday. I hope, however, and expect that their number will experience some diminution.

“ Opposition are making efforts to work upon the city, and to bring forward the mass of the people. I hope in vain.

“ All is reasonably quiet hitherto. I am sorry to say that dearness of provisions begins to increase alarmingly.

“ The Speaker still holds determined language, and says the measure cannot pass. His argument, on Monday, was well adapted to inflame ; and it happens unluckily that his authority is of great and universal influence.

“ Lord Downshire is in low spirits, and quiet, and in no state of exertion.

“ Grattan, in his own vindication from Corry's charges, made, I think, his situation worse than before. He said he never would condescend to defend himself against public accusation ; but, to any gentleman who requested in private an account of his conduct, he would prove that the truth of the evidence against him was physically impossible. He then read part of a letter from Nelson to him. This letter stated that Nelson considered his evidence before the Secret Committee to have been mis-stated, though it was signed by himself. He writes to Grattan that the Committee asked whether he had been with Mr. Grattan at Tenehinch ; he said yes ; whether he had sworn Mr. Grattan ; he said no ; what had passed between them ; he replied that he had asked Mr. Grattan to take a part and come forward, but Mr. Grattan refused, saying, he did not think it would contribute to the peace of the country.

“ In replying to Corry's charge of flying from the country when the rebellion broke out, he stated, that he had not fled ; but the reason he did not come back was that he found, on one side, there were rebels in the camp, and, on the other, traitors in the Government.

“The duel and his wounding Corry will, in this duelling country, give him some éclat. Corry was well enough to come to the House to-day.

“Lord Castlereagh rises daily in reputation and talent.”

WILLIAM WICKHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1800, March 1. Munich.—“My wish to pay due respect to the memory of the poor Avoyer de Steiguer had nearly cost me dear. A cold that I caught at his funeral fell on my nerves in the shape of a slow fever, and has rendered me unfit for business of any kind. I never indeed knew what it was to be seriously ill before.

“I have contrived, however, at some intervals to get through all that was most important and pressing, but I might as well have thought of flying in the air as of writing a line to England. The quantity of subjects upon which I had to write, and the importance of many of them, quite overpowered and frightened me, and, whenever I attempted, it always brought on a return of my fever. I have now broke the ice, and in the course of a few days your Lordship will receive, besides several public despatches, the particulars of my journey to Vienna, which are not without curiosity and interest. I only write a line to-day to ask your Lordship's indulgence a few days longer. In my public despatches I have stated all that presses the most, the rest, which is more matter of curiosity, will probably reach England nearly as soon as this letter.

“I once again beg your Lordship to excuse me. You know my zeal, I hope, sufficiently to be persuaded that I should not defer writing now if I did not feel that forbearance in that respect was for a few days longer absolutely necessary.”

E. COOKE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, March 1. Dublin.—“After the Budget yesterday, which was not opposed, we went into the Union Committee. Altercations took place on the propositions of 1785, and the settlement of 1782, between Beresford, the Speaker, Grattan, and Lord Castlereagh, till  $\frac{1}{2}$  past nine. We then examined cotton manufacturers till two in the morning. I enclose to your Lordship the Speaker's speech. The table at the end will disclose to your Lordship the line which is probably intended to be pursued, which is to examine men to every article the duty on which will determine, or be diminished. And, on such a question, it is absolutely impossible to resist examination. The object, I fear, is delay; so we may have more work on our hands than we imagined.

“I think Opposition very steady. Grattan's tones were loftier last night than before. A successful duel does wonders in Ireland.

“Your Lordship must not think us out of danger. 120 minority makes us liable to surprise.”

## LORD GRENVILLE TO WILLIAM WICKHAM.

*Private.*

1800, March 4. Cleveland Row.—“ We send out to you by this mail Colonel Clinton with the character of military assistant to your mission ; and Mr. Booth, appointed by the Treasury Assistant Commissary of Accounts. Both are directed to follow your orders in all things. We are in so strange a state of ignorance respecting the Russian army that I know not how to instruct Mr. Booth otherwise than by putting him under your orders. You will set him, according as need may be, to overlook Russian, Swiss, Bavarian, Condé or Imperial accounts ; and, if you see he wants aid, you must authorise him *provisionally* to employ it ; for it has taken four months and more to get him named and sent off, and it would not take less to get him any assistance from hence.

“ This frost is cruel. I am ignorant of all your operations, except as I collect them from the French papers, from which I learn that you are not idle. Whatever you have done I am confident I shall think it right, for so I have always found it hitherto.

“ We know nothing whether we are to have more Russians here, or to lose those we have. Of course all our plans (or nearly all) are at a stand, except what relates to General Stuart, whom you will shortly see in person.

“ I have, I think, settled that Proby shall be employed, in one way or another, with that army ; probably as aide-de-camp to Simcoe who is likely to be named second in command. If he is at a distance from you, it would be a kindness if you would contrive for him the means of repairing to Minorca as soon as he can. But perhaps the best thing would be to talk with Stuart about it. I send a formal leave for him to quit his present situation.

“ Every thing depends on the struggle of this year. I hope the example of the Vendée will not discourage in other quarters. The whole thing was ill contrived and worse conducted. We tried in vain to keep them back till the spring ; but although it is certain they broke out some months too soon, yet they failed not so much from that cause as from their own divisions and jealousies.

“ The submission and reconciliation of the Orleans Princes is, I think, useful, as it cuts off all hope of any other monarchy than that of the lawful King.” *Copy.*

## LORD GRENVILLE TO HENRY DUNDAS.

1800, March 4. Cleveland Row.—“ I have just put your paper into Mr. Pitt's hands. I am sorry that I cannot meet you at the time you mention, but if  $\frac{1}{2}$  past 10 on Thursday will suit you equally well, we shall both be at your orders. Let me know whether here or at your Office will suit you best.

“ In the mean time, as it would not be right that we should omit to return some answer to Viomenil's paper, I have put down a note of a paper for that purpose which Mr. Pitt has seen, and which, if you approve of it and will return to me, I will get put into French to-morrow morning, so that we may give it to Viomenil when we

see him to-morrow. They would, I think both of them, be offended, if they have not some answer then, and I trust you will think this does not preclude any final decision we may take on the main question." *Copy.*

#### E. COOKE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, March 5. Dublin Castle.—“G. Ponsonby made his motion last night respecting the sense of the nation.

“He asserted that, in the message upon Union, the King had appealed to the sense of the people; that, from the petitions before the House, the sense of the people was against the measure; that it was the duty of the House to lay the sense of the people before their sovereign, as he had appealed to it.

“He moved an abstract principle as to the right of petitioning, intending to follow it with a declaration of fact as to the number of petitions before the House, and an address for laying them before the King.

“He did not make an impressive speech; but Lord Castlereagh made an admirable reply, which put our friends in complete spirits, and he moved the question of adjournment. Our debate lasted till  $\frac{1}{2}$  past six this morning; 155 for adjourning, 107 against.

“I think the whole of the evening was favourable to us. It was the Opposition’s great question, and they made no impression. The House was in ordinary force; our friends very steady. We had 166 members in town; nine ill, but I think we have no *malingers*.

“If the public out of doors can be kept quiet, I think we may now do well.

“I hear the Consular exchequer is running dry.

“We had some bold doctrines last night by Saurin and Plunket on the competence of Parliament, but they were well exposed by Fox.

“I think our friends like arguing the general question.

“Lord De Clifford’s members did not divide against us last night; nor did G. Knox.

“The Speaker will plague us upon cottons and other details.

“The Lords are growing discontented as to the power reserved to the Crown of creating new Irish peers after Union.”

#### SIR W. SCOTT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, March 5. London.—“I received the honour of your Lordship’s letter, and shall be very happy to attend your Lordship’s summons and Mr. Pitt’s to converse upon the subject of the proposed bill. I should, however, be glad to have the opportunity of looking at it again, as I have lost the recollection of several parts of it, having not taken any notes either of it or of the last letter which I troubled your Lordship with respecting it. The objection with respect to the fund is certainly removed by what is stated in your letter, and to which I do not recollect that any explanation was

printed in the draft of the bill itself. Neither do I see any objection to the management of the fund being vested in the trustees, but, if the application of it to the consolidation of livings is to be independent of the Bishops and even compulsory upon them (which I recollect was the expressed intention of the Act) I cannot but think, with great deference, that that will be an alteration of the law subject to great doubt as to its expediency.

“I beg your Lordship to believe that I feel most fully the propriety of making the attempt to correct the growing mischiefs which threaten the religious establishments of the country; and shall be glad to give my humble assistance to it in any way in which I can be instrumental to its success. Your Lordship will excuse my adding, by way of apology if I should happen to detain the draft of the bill for a day or two longer than might otherwise seem proper, that I am at present engaged in daily sittings upon some very long and laborious causes in the Admiralty.”

#### ANGLO-RUSSIAN CO-OPERATION WITH THE ROYALISTS OF FRANCE.

LORD GRENVILLE TO GENERAL COUNT DE VIOMENIL.

*Most Secret.*

1800, March 6.—“The means of carrying on any successful operation in France must depend on a consideration of the state of the country at the time of the proposed expedition, and of the amount of force to be allotted to it, as well as of the general situation of the allies. At present therefore the whole question can be considered only provisionally, and the answers given on particular points must all be subject to the great question whether the enterprise itself shall be undertaken. And even the separate points may be liable to be in some degree varied at the precise moment of acting, from the same considerations by which the main question is to be governed. Subject to these remarks the separate articles in the memorandum may be answered as follows.

1. “The force of the army to be employed entirely depends on the result of the present negotiations at Petersburg. The inconvenience of acting with a combined army composed of the forces of two nations, whose troops, though equally brave and faithful to their respective sovereigns, have yet never been accustomed to cooperate together, and have in no respect the same rules or habits of service, has led to a persuasion that no plan resting on that basis can be adopted with a prospect of a satisfactory issue to either of the two Powers concerned. The mass of the army to serve under M. de Viomenil must therefore be Russian, and its operations must be calculated principally on the amount of Russian troops which the Emperor of Russia’s zeal for the common cause may induce him to furnish for these operations, by treaty with His Majesty, in consequence of the negotiations now carrying on at Petersburg. This principle, which applies irresistibly to any plan of acting on the same point by a combined force consisting of large bodies of the troops of each nation, with their respective general and staff officers, does not however, by any means, exclude the possibility of furnishing to a small amount, and as accessory only,

any particular description of force which it may be thought peculiarly necessary to add to the Russian army. The emigrant corps now in Portugal come under this description, because their services must be of particular value in any expedition undertaken for the support of the Royalists in France. They are, besides, represented to be perfectly well disciplined and in every respect fit for service. Their number may be put at 3 or 4,000 men. A small corps of foreign chasseurs now in Ireland may, in like manner, be added to the army. Whatever dismounted cavalry the Emperor may be induced to send here from Russia, measures might easily be taken for mounting them, without the smallest delay, immediately on their arrival; and this will probably be found the most satisfactory mode of providing for the service of such a body of cavalry as will unquestionably be required for any offensive operations on the coast of France. For it does not seem compatible with the principle above stated, nor is it a measure which in itself promises to be productive of solid advantage, to attach to such an army a body of British cavalry; who are accustomed only to act with their own infantry, and according to a system of service essentially different from that of the Russian cavalry; and who are besides, from many circumstances of local and national character, totally unfit to form the only cavalry of a foreign army, especially of one acting in France. The same remark might perhaps be less applicable to a corps of British artillery to do the service of such a park of British artillery as it may be necessary to attach to the Russian army, with a view to those operations, whatever they may be, which shall ultimately be determined on.

*Article 2.* "There will be no difficulty in mounting the Cossacks here mentioned, and M. de Viomenil is desired to send to Mr. Dundas an account of the number and description of horses required.

*Article 3.* "Before the expedition is finally resolved on a communication will be made to M. de Viomenil of such plan as shall ultimately be adopted here for the employment of His Majesty's troops in the next campaign. But the aid which the expedition now in question will derive from their exertions will, in all probability, be more in the way of diversion than of direct co-operation.

*Article 4.* "There will be every disposition to afford to the Russian troops to be employed on any such expedition as is here spoken of, all such supplies and succours as are mentioned under this and the following article, to the very utmost extent of our means. But this demand cannot be answered in detail unless a specification be made of the quantity and nature of each article required. For which purpose a statement should be made out, applying to the different amount of force of which, under different suppositions, the expedition may consist, it being impossible to settle this point with precision till after the receipt of the next despatches from St. Petersburg. The greatest embarrassment which we shall have to encounter will probably arise on the subject of horses; not from the difficulty of the supply, but from that of the means of transporting them. And all the operations which are in view would be greatly facilitated if, by understanding with the Royalists, or in any other manner, horses, to any considerable amount, would be found in the

country. And the comparative resources of different provinces in this respect should be considered as a very material article in the choice of the point of attack.

*Article 5.* "Same answer.

*Article 6.* "It being wished that the whole expense of every kind of the Russian troops should in future be defrayed by His Majesty, and that this arrangement should stand in lieu of all other engagements of subsidy, His Majesty could in that case name a Commissariat to serve with them, and the persons so employed would be instructed to furnish as nearly as possible the rations of food to which those troops have been accustomed, both as to quality and quantity. But if the army should advance into the country, the Government to be established there will naturally be expected to provide in a considerable degree for this object.

*Article 7.* "The measure of attaching to the Russian army a number of French engineer and artillery officers seems highly proper, and if M. de Viomenil will make choice of proper persons for that purpose, His Majesty will willingly agree to any reasonable arrangement to be proposed by M. de Viomenil for their pay and subsistence while so employed.

*Article 8.* "Provision will be made by His Majesty for the supply and management of a secret service fund under the direction of the general commanding the army, and with such mode of administration and account as may be most satisfactory to him.

*Article 9.* "This has already been in great degree provided for by the communications made through *Monsieur* to the Royalists; but all necessary latitude will be given on this subject to M. de Viomenil.

*Article 10.* "The presence of a French prince seems indispensably necessary to every hope of success from such an expedition. All the necessary arrangements respecting his situation, and also relative to the means of rendering the force to be raised in the country entirely subordinate to the same direction with that of the Russian army, would be settled with him and the general of the Russian troops previous to the expedition. This last point is deemed essential, and His Majesty's government sees no better way of its being accomplished than by M. de Viomenil receiving from *Monsieur* a commission to command the Royalists, with such reserves only as are due to the personal situation of any prince of the Royal Family of France, who may be serving with them.

*Article 11.* "Answered above.

*Article 12.* "Yes, if the Court of Petersburg consents to it.

*Article 13.* "Yes, but the assistance of the Russian ships now here may perhaps be wanted for the purpose of transporting the troops and articles necessary to accompany them. The continuance of a British squadron on the coast after the debarcation must depend on the place chosen for that purpose, and on other considerations by which all naval operations must be regulated.

*Article 14.* "Yes.

*Article 15.* "Ditto.

*Article 16.* "Will be attended to, and M. de Viomenil is desired to send to Mr. Dundas a note of the quantity required.

*Article 17.* "M. de Viomenil will exercise his own discretion and knowledge in this respect: he being well acquainted with the character of the different French officers of that description now here.

*Article 18.* "This must be concerted with *Monsieur* whenever the plan is determined on.

*Article 19.* "Answered above.

*Article 20.* "M. de Viomenil's calculation of the force necessary for the success of either of the two plans here mentioned, is not considered by His Majesty's Government as in any degree overrated. Perhaps even that number would be found incompetent to act with success in those provinces, unless assured of powerful co-operation on the part of the Royalists, whose dispositions, however, appear to be such (even after their late disasters) as to afford a strong ground of hope in this respect. If then the number mentioned by M. de Viomenil be taken as a basis for the adoption of either of those plans, the decision in that respect must depend on the possibility of collecting, transporting, and feeding so large a force as 40,000 men, with all the various articles of supply which are necessary to enable them to act. This still appears to be extremely uncertain, and it is hardly possible to form even a conjecture in this respect till the answers from Russia are received. If the force shall (as is perhaps more probable) not be carried so high as the amount here stated, or if, on a detailed examination of the transports, provisions, and supplies required, they should be found to exceed the disposable means which this government can command, even with its utmost exertions (taking into consideration the various and multiplied calls for other services equally pressing and important,) it will then remain to be considered in what other mode such Russian force as may be destined to act against the enemy on this side can be employed so as most to promote the benefit of the common cause, and the attainment of those ends which the two sovereigns have in view. And on this point M. de Viomenil's opinion would justly be considered entitled to the greatest weight and consideration." *Draft for translation into French.*

#### THE EARL OF CLARE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, March 6. Dublin.—"I send you a statement as correct as I have been enabled to furnish from a vile note sent to me of what fell from me on opening the subject of Union in the House of Lords. And have only to request you will be assured I do not insist upon your reading it. Will your Lordship have the goodness to excuse me for troubling you with a copy for my friend the Marquis of Buckingham."

#### DUTCH AFFAIRS.

##### *Official Minute.*

1800, March 6 Admiralty.—"Mr. Nepean has been desired by Lord Spencer (who has been obliged to go out upon some business) to acquaint Lord Grenville, that the step most adviseable to be

taken under all the existing circumstances will be to order the four Dutch frigates to proceed to Portsmouth and land their crews on the Isle of Wight, where sufficient accommodation can readily be provided for them, and where they may remain until they may be called upon to serve. Mr. Nepean understands that the four frigates are not at this moment in a condition for service, and if continued in commission, after they shall have been purchased from the captors, will occasion a very considerable expense to the public.

“The ships which surrendered with Admiral Story are all intended to be libelled, one of them indeed has already been libelled. The removal of the crews of the four frigates to new ships will therefore be attended with great inconvenience, as no regular establishments are at present, or can as they are now circumstanced, be sent on board them.

“Lord Spencer will be ready to meet Lord Grenville on the subject of these ships at any time his Lordship may be likely to be at leisure.”

*Enclosure :—*

The PRINCE OF ORANGE to [H. FAGEL].

1800, March 5. Hampton Court.—“Je vous envoie une lettre du Lieutenant Froent au Capitaine-Lieutenant Van Vos. Vous y verrez que l'on veut s'emparer des frégattes, le *Hector*, le *Heldin*, la *Venus* et la *Minerve*. Ceci n'a rien de commun avec les vaisseaux qui ont été commandés par l'Amiral Story. Il seroit à souhaiter que ceci n'eut pas eu lieu, car la prise de ces vaisseaux ne fera pas autant de bien aux capteurs que la nouvelle de la prise fera du tort au bon parti en Hollande, mais il s'agit de savoir que faire des équipages de ces frégattes si les Anglois en prennent possession. La chose presse ; pourroit-on obtenir un ordre de l'Amirauté pour que l'on diffèrât la prise de possession de quelque temps, ou que quelques-uns des vaisseaux de l'Amiral Story puissent venir à ma disposition pour y placer les équipages de ces quatre frégattes, en attendant que le sort de tous les vaisseaux soit décidé. Je vous prie de me faire savoir si vous vous portez mieux, et si vous pouviez recevoir demain dans la matinée MM. Van Vos et Grengler. Il y a encore un point sur lequel ils demandent des ordres, c'est au sujet d'une revolte qui a eu lieu à bord du *Heldin*. Ils demandent s'ils peuvent tenir conseil de guerre et les punir. Je ne puis rien dire sans savoir ce que l'on veut ici. Si vous vous portez mieux je serai charmé de vous voir demain ; mais, en attendant, je vous prie de me faire savoir si vous pouvez voir ces Messieurs demain matin, et ce que vous croyez que je devois faire en ceci.”

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, March 8. Harley Street.—“Ayant reçu votre billet avec la réponse en Anglois aux questions par écrit que le Général Comte de Vioménil vous a rémises à la conférence qui a eu lieu entre vous, M. Pitt, M. Dundas, lui et moi, je l'ai fait traduire en François, et je l'ai tout de suite communiquée au dit général.

“ Nous n'avons pû être que très satisfaits de cette réponse, qui toute préliminaire et éventuelle qu'elle soit, puisqu'elle dépend de tant de circonstances futures et indépendantes de notre volonté, nous prouve certainement le zèle éclairé que le Ministère Britannique met dans une entreprise qui peut décider du sort de la France, et, par conséquent, du repos de l'Europe.

“ Il est mutuellement reconnu par vous et par nous que l'entreprise ne peut s'effectuer que par une force imposante, et telle que nous n'avons pas ici actuellement ; ainsi il faut attendre quelle sera la résolution de l'Empereur à cet égard. Il est également reconnu que si on aura cette force, il seroit bien imprudent de la hasarder avant que la guerre ne soit bien vivement allumée sur la frontière de la Provence, du Dauphiné, de la Franche Comté et de l'Alsace, où Bonaparte seroit forcé de porter ses armées, ce qui affoiblirait ses moyens de résistance en Bretagne et en Normandie ; et, par conséquent, l'époque de notre expédition ne peut être mieux fixée que vers la fin de Mai, ou au commencement de Juin, comme l'a très judicieusement marqué M. le Comte de Viomenil.

“ Il reste à répéter le besoin de quelque cavallerie qui nous manque, et sans laquelle on ne pourroit rien faire, si même l'Empereur envoyoit deux régimens d'huzards démontés, car pour cette espèce de troupes on pourroit trouver des chevaux en Bretagne ; mais pour des dragons on n'en trouvera pas, parceque, suivant M. le Comte de Viomenil qui connoit le pays, la race des chevaux y est d'une taille très petite. Nous espérons donc que le Gouvernement Britannique, accordant tous les autres points, ne refusera pas aussi de donner quatre régimens de cavallerie légère avec leurs montures.

“ Pour ce qui est de la réponse au 13<sup>m</sup>e article, je dois observer que les vaisseaux de guerre Russes, ainsi que des vaisseaux Anglois de la même espèce, ne peuvent servir pour le transport des troupes, parcequ'ils ne peuvent même aller aux isles pour prendre les troupes, vû que les ports de ces parages ne peuvent recevoir que de petits batimens et des frégattes. Nous n'avons pas des premiers, et fort peu des secondes. Il faut donc des batimens de transport qui seront protégés par les escadrons combinées ; et cette combinaison d'escadres est d'autant plus nécessaire que nos amiraux et capitaines ne connoissent pas les côtes de France, et qu'il faut, d'ailleurs, être en grande force pour ne courir aucun risque de la part des flottés combinées de France et d'Espagne à Brest, et qui peuvent sortir par les mêmes vents qui empêchent à vos escadres le blocus de ce port. Voici ce que j'ai crû devoir soumettre à votre considération, et à celle de M. Pitt et M. Dundas, auxquels je ne doute pas que vous ne communiquiez ces observations.” *Copy.*

The EARL OF MORNINGTON to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1800, March 9. Fort William.—“ Newspapers have reached me from England containing your speech on the 4th October upon

moving the vote of thanks to me. I read it with stronger emotions than I can describe, and not without many tears of joy, gratitude, and affection.

“By the same dispatch I learnt the state of affairs in Europe to the date of the new French revolution (with the exception of the effect of that event in England, my English intelligence not being later than the 25th October).

“Your difficulties are again increased, but I am certain your courage will not abate, and I still trust that you will be able to rally the allies. One effort more would accomplish the business.

“I have written to Dundas earnestly pressing to be allowed to return home in January, 1801; I shall then have been above three years absent from England, and above two and a half actually in India. It will be nearly six months, in all probability, from the time of my embarkation to that of my arrival in England. With regard to the public service, I really believe that I shall be more useful by representing to Dundas the true state of these countries, and urging proper measures, than I can be here; and with respect to fortune, if I am satisfied, who is to complain?

“The truth is that I cannot support a longer absence from my family and friends. In one of my letters to you I thought I had reconciled myself to my splendid exile; but with the sound of triumph and honor all around me, and with the affectation of satisfaction and happiness, this proud Governor General

*Spem vultu simulat, premit altum corde dolorem.*

“You cannot conceive the state of society here; how entirely devoid I am of all resource of conversation or relaxation of any kind; although the climate requires long intervals of repose from business, that repose is,

‘A deathlike silence, and a dread repose.’

Many circumstances too have contributed to aggravate my melancholy; although my own health has not been touched, I have lost many valuable friends, and the best of my companions, poor Hunt Cooke, a very worthy officer, one of my aides-de-camp; others are returned to Europe; and at this hour, a most excellent and amiable young man, whom I brought from the coast with me, is in a state nearly approaching to desperate. In this country the cry of death is for ever in one’s ears; and it is too shocking to stand long when it proceeds from friends and companions, and when no voice of comfort is to be heard.

“For God’s sake release me; and let me embark, *emeritus*, in January 1801.”

#### E. COOKE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, March 10. Dublin.—“The Representation article passed this night after a short debate. As nothing about compensation was introduced, the Opposition reserved themselves.

“The Committee was thin when the division took place; the article passed by 81 to 62.

“G. Ponsonby gave notice that, on Thursday, he would take the sense of the House on the principle of compensation; and some

squibs on the subject were thrown out by Goold, Plunket, and H. Osborne.

“Lord Castlereagh will move, to-morrow, the Church and the last article ; on Friday, commerce.

“The Opposition still hope to inflame the country ; but they have not effected their purpose yet. The Speaker still maintains his language, that the measure cannot pass, and that England will not force it.”

The BISHOP OF LINCOLN to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, March 11. Buckden Palace.—“I return the heads of a plan with the few remarks written in the margin which have occurred to me upon a very careful and attentive perusal. I also take the liberty of enclosing some observations relative to the necessity of some bill upon this subject, which were written immediately after I had the honour of receiving your letter concerning the parishes in the neighbourhood of Dropmore, and before our meeting in Downing Street in the beginning of December.

“I cannot but hope that your conference with Sir W. Scott will end in making him favourable to the plan. I now begin to be anxious about time. It is but a month to the Easter recess. The heads are to be communicated to ten or twelve people, and then formally to the Bishops through the Archbishop ; and the Bill itself is to be drawn. It appears to me desirable that the heads should be given to the Archbishop next week, and that in the following week the Bishops should meet upon the subject. I am going into Suffolk upon the 17th and shall return hither on the 21st, after that I shall be ready to go to town every day, or even before if it should be necessary.”

The EARL OF ELGIN to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1800, March 12. Constantinople.—“Having heard from Lord Minto of Mr. Paget’s going to Naples, I have written to him by Donaldson (and for the information of the admirals) on every circumstance before me which could at all enter into consideration in regulating the destination of any squadron we may have to send into these seas, this summer. And I have done it on the belief that the appearance of an English fleet, under the command of a steady and respectable officer, will go a great way towards increasing our influence, and checking the superiority and unfair advantages which others find the means of assuming only because they are relativeley the strongest. Any commercial arrangements we may have in view would be more recommended by the mere sight of an English squadron, than by any argument that could be used ; and it is singular that no English squadron was ever in company with the Turks, or cruising in this neighbourhood. The differences, and (if my information be right) the scandalous proceedings of the Russian agents at Corfu, would thereby be suppressed, and, in general, a degree of harmony maintained which it undoubtedly was the intention in the alliance to establish.”

## HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, March 13. Somerset Place.—“A few days ago I received a copy of a letter from Lord Elgin to you on the subject of a land communication between this country and India by Constantinople. Do you mean that I should take measures for the execution of it through the means of the East India Company? I like the suggestion much, and I think so conducted the communication would be much improved. The Court of Directors have prejudices against communications between India and Great Britain by land, but they are perfectly unfounded, and cannot be regarded.”

## ARTHUR PAGET to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1800, March 13. Florence.—“I had prepared, and it was my intention to send to your Lordship a detailed letter upon a subject which has occupied my mind very much of late, but the treaty concluded under the auspices of Sir Sydney Smith having created so total a change in the affairs in that country, it appears to me almost superfluous to trouble your Lordship with it. I will however just state that my idea was to *gain General Kleber and his whole army, and to send them to co-operate with General Willot in the south of France.*

“Though I say to gain, I meant to be understood that I thought the business ought to be done with little or even without money, that is for the purpose of corruption; as from the information I have been able to obtain with regard to the character of General Kleber and the principal officers under him, such as Desaix, Menou, and upon a reference to Kleber’s letters in the last intercepted correspondence from Egypt, I was induced to believe that he and his whole army are so completely disgusted with their late and present rulers, that they would gladly enter into a league to overthrow the existing French Government.

“I had a person in my eye, and within reach, whom I had proposed to employ in this business. He was formerly intimately acquainted with Kleber, and also with some of his officers; he is to have a command in the south of France under General Willot. I should have wished him to have been accompanied by some English officer, that they should have landed on any part of the coast of Egypt, have proceeded to the French head-quarters, and then have made such favourable overtures to General Kleber for delivering France from its present tyrants, as I am induced to think he would have accepted.

“I will not conceal from your Lordship that I communicated this plan to Lord Keith, so that had things been in such a situation that it might have been approved by your Lordship, there would have been no time lost in making the necessary preparations by sea for the execution of it; for, I presume, no difficulty would then have been made to it by the King of France, or by the

Ottoman Porte to the evacuation of Egypt by the French on those terms.

“Such is the outline of the plan, and I think I could have answered for the complete success of it under the circumstances then existing. Whether there is sufficient merit in it to make it worth considering as to the practicability of executing it now, is what I most humbly submit to your Lordship.

“I am just returned from Leghorn, for which place I set off the day after my arrival here, in order to concert with Lord Keith about the return of the King of Naples to his capital; to-morrow morning I shall proceed without delay on my journey thither.”

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, March 14. Downing Street.—“In the box which I sent to you with the military memoir there were two papers as an appendix; one a letter from an officer on the expedition to Sir Ralph Abercromby; the other a small Dutch map with some manuscript observations and intelligence respecting Walcheren. Mr. Pitt has returned the memoir but not the other papers, and he says they were not sent to him by you. I hope that is the case, for I have looked over his table carefully and cannot find them, and I should be sorry if the intelligence had gone astray.”

#### E. COOKE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, March 14. Dublin.—“We were in the House last night till near four. Ponsonby had been obliged to give up his motion as to the compensation to boroughs by the borough proprietors, and he feigned sickness. Sir J. Parnell took his place, and, by a manœuvre of the Speaker, got possession of the House. He moved an address to the King to dissolve Parliament; we divided, after a long debate, 150 to 104.

“Mr. Saurin, having broadly laid down the doctrine of resistance if a law were passed against the sense of the majority of the people, was warmly attacked by our friends. Since we have established our majority and shown its steadiness, the lawyers, in despair, have been bringing forward violent appeals to the people. Saurin, who is a man of real ability as a lawyer, and a smooth, artful, plausible speaker, with an excellent private character, takes the lead. It is insinuated that he would never utter what was not strictly constitutional.

“Lord Castlereagh thought it right to check these attempts; and he made, at the close of the debate, a most pointed and eloquent attack upon Saurin. He accused him, broadly, of acting the Jacobin game; of endeavouring to establish the position that the sense of the people was not to be found in Parliament; of preaching the doctrine of resistance on the ground that any Act passed against what any man chose to call the majority of the people was a nullity.

“He said these doctrines went to excite and justify rebellion.

He called on Saurin, if he did not mean rebellion, not to lead on the people to their destruction ; if he did, to come forward, avow himself, and place himself at their head.

“ I think good effects will follow, for Saurin was not supported. Even Grattan declined his doctrines, and kept himself strictly constitutional.

“ We hope to pass all the resolutions but commerce to-day. That is put off till Tuesday. I hear the different guilds of the city are going to petition to be heard against the Union by counsel, as their petitions go to the principle. I suppose they cannot be heard.”

SIR CHARLES WHITWORTH TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1800, March 14. St. Petersburg.—“ I have the honour to acknowledge your Lordship’s private letter of the 18th November on the subject of the Russian maps, which you wish to procure from hence. I am much afraid I shall not be able to satisfy your Lordship’s expectations, as I most ardently wish to do. I have myself all those which have been published here, but in the whole number there is not one set which can be called a good work. I will however select the best, and forward them by the first opportunity. The Emperor, it is true, has some very curious ones, but they are more so from the beautiful manner in which they are executed, *à la main*, than for their accuracy. They are regarded as curiosities, but never referred to. They have however never been published, neither is there any other copy than that in the possession of His Imperial Majesty. Your Lordship may however depend upon having the best which can be procured.”

E. COOKE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, March 15. Dublin Castle.—“ We went through, yesterday, the article respecting the church, and the last article, almost without observation. The Opposition did not attend.

“ I send your Lordship the evidence which has been given at the bar.

“ The power to be retained of creating Irish peers after the Union is much disrelished by the Lords, and I [am] a little apprehensive on that subject ; and my Lords the Bishops seem to affect squeamishness as to voting upon that point.”

*Enclosing :—*

A copy of the evidence taken by a Committee of the whole Irish House of Commons in regard to the injurious effects of the Articles of Union upon Irish trade.

WILLIAM WICKHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private and confidential.*

1800, March 17. Munich.—“ Since my last I have been again confined to my room with this vexatious fever that has never ceased

to torment me more or less for more than two months, nor do I believe that I am yet cured, though infinitely better within these last five days.

“I promised your Lordship an account of some of my Vienna observations, and I will now be as good as my word ; only premising that I learnt nothing there of which your Lordship as well as myself had not very tolerable notions long before I undertook this journey.

“My first interview with Thugut lasted an hour and a half. Nothing could have been more awkward than the first half hour, after which he left off squinting, and looked me full in the face. The conversation became animated, a few ill-natured things were said on both sides, but we parted very good friends, with a very pressing invitation on his side to return again whenever I should find a moment of leisure.

“The Bavarian treaty made the principal subject of our conversation, but as it was a subject connected directly or indirectly with a great many others, I had an opportunity of hearing him descant on almost every topic on which I could have wished to have set him a-talking. Amidst some occasional sneers at the *disinterested* policy of England, expressed in a way that left me no doubt of this subject being the one that had made the deepest impression, he launched out against Russia, Marshal Suwarow, General Mack, Lord Nelson, and Sir Sidney Smith, particularly Marshal Suwarow, in a manner that marked more of passion than discretion ; and confirmed at once all the impressions I had received of him, particularly from the Avoyer de Steiguer, that he was a man whose conduct was very much governed, even in the most important occasions, by the personal opinion he entertained of individuals with whom he was called on to act ; and that his opinion was very often formed on no other ground than the readiness or unwillingness of those individuals to act according to his own wishes and inclinations.

“He refused peremptorily (though very strongly pressed by Lord Minto) to give any account of what had passed between the Emperor and Buonaparte, until he should have the assurance that his Majesty would engage not to make a separate peace ; but was frequent and earnest in his declarations that, if the two Courts could come to an understanding, his Majesty should have every reason to be thoroughly satisfied with the conduct of the Emperor, particularly with the efforts that would be made by the armies both in Italy and Germany. I trust I should have been one of the last persons who would have become the dupe of such declarations unaccompanied by facts tending to make me believe that they were sincere ; but I own that I left his room thoroughly satisfied that his whole object, at this moment, was to retrieve, still more effectually than had been done by the victories in Italy, the disgrace which the Austrian arms had incurred before the treaty of Campo Formio, and that he saw no mode of arriving at this object but by the conquest of Germany and Switzerland, both of which I am persuaded that he considers as perfectly feasible. I am persuaded also that Mentz and Ehrenbreitstein are uppermost in his mind, and that he thinks that both the one and the other may be conquered on the

upper Rhine and in the Bishopric of Basle. I know at least that this is the military opinion of the very men whom he is about to employ in this campaign, though having a personal dislike to them all; I mean Schmidt, Weyrother, and Chasteler. The latter, your Lordship probably knows, was the author of Marshal Suwarow's proclamation to the Piedmontese, nor do I believe it possible for a man to have committed a greater fault in M. Thugut's opinion than to have written that paper; excepting it be Schmidt, who has expressed on every occasion a strong personal attachment to the Arch-Duke, whom M. Thugut hates most cordially.

"Your Lordship will probably observe that his conduct on this occasion is directly contrary to that which might have been expected from the character I have given of him but a little way back, and I admit that it is. But it is not at our time of life that we are to learn that these contradictions are as common in great men as in little ones; nor do I believe them less frequent on the banks of the Danube than on those of the Thames.

"Be that as it may, there escaped from him, and *that* in moments of warmth, enough to satisfy me that my information from Paris was correct, and that Bonaparté would make no sacrifices but such as M. Thugut now thinks that he can obtain without the consent of the Consul. I found in him too, when talking of the army, all that pride and conscious superiority which I have often told your Lordship that I had observed of late in the Austrian officers; which has always appeared to me, if rightly managed and directed, the safest and surest instrument for insuring the continuation of the war. It appears to me something like the sensation one feels on gaining two or three games at chess of a person who had been accustomed to beat you for three or four months before. Your Lordship knows very well, at least did know, that it is not in human nature to resist a fourth game if offered by the person you have beaten.

"I do not mean to say that if terms were offered such as would insure to the House of Austria a continuation of peace for five or six years, and *an increase of power such as would enable it to fall upon Prussia in the interval*, that they would not be readily accepted. But, short of this, I think in my conscience they would be rejected, provided Great Britain enters firmly and cordially into the alliance, is liberal in her pecuniary assistance, and does not interfere *too much* in political or military direction.

"I am besides persuaded that the M. Thugut of to-day is a very different man from the M. Thugut of the month of April, or even of the month of July last, when the decided superiority of the Austrian arms was still problematical; and that it is his opinion *now* that the chance of war may be risked without much danger, which was certainly not the case at either of the two periods I have last mentioned, when he was more afraid of M. de Suwarow's victories than of any defeat that could have befallen the Arch-Duke.

"In one point I do not think it possible for me to be mistaken, I mean his extreme and eager desire to succeed in obtaining assistance from England. Had I been ever with him alone, I should certainly have ventured to have applied the touchstone more closely than

Lord Minto has done ; as it was, I put him two or three times in a passion by contradicting him, purposely to put him off his guard and make him say ill-natured things, which nobody is more apt to do than this good minister ; and I regularly observed that he took great pains to check himself, and to avoid saying anything that might give offence. On the other hand whenever I talked of the power of England and Austria united, and of the days of Queen Anne and Maria Theresa, I observed his eyes brighten up in a way that could not have been assumed for the purpose of deceiving me, and he launched out immediately on the ambition of France under whatever form of government she existed, and the necessity of reducing her within proper bounds. If all this be trick, I own I am grievously deceived ; the more so as I have left Vienna with the impression that though M. Thugut is unquestionably a cunning, intriguing man, and one who will occasionally sacrifice his opinions and his prejudices to carry some great point, yet that his general character would be more correctly given if I were to call him an obstinate, self-willed old man, full of spleen and passion. Such at least is the opinion I have formed after four very long conversations with him, and it is upon that opinion that I should act if I had a point to carry with him, being persuaded that many parts of his conduct which had hitherto appeared to me inexplicable, may all be cleared up by referring them to the above principle.

“ He was very clear and explicit on the subject of Switzerland, and his whole language and promises such as I could most have wished. But I thought his manner of explaining himself on the subject very clumsy, as he did not conceal his intention of having his conduct on this occasion considered by me as a personal favour to myself ; at which I should have laughed had it not been my principal object to keep him in good humour. Besides, it was something for me to know that he wished to keep well with me.

“ We sat with him every night for near two hours, sometimes more, and he was always unwilling to let us go ; and, when we parted, he gave me a kiss on each cheek which I shall long remember. Had I been alone with him I should have learnt a great deal more, as I saw him once or twice disposed to enter into explanation on the subject of Dietrichstein’s mission ; but he checked himself each time as if he were afraid of talking before Lord Minto, to whom he had told so many lies.

“ His contempt and hatred for the French Princes and the Royalists in general is unshaken, and nothing but his conviction that *France* cannot be reduced but by their assistance, will ever engage him in any measure tending to give them support or consideration.

“ In all matters of business with which he was acquainted I found him very clear and able, but rather slow in comprehending a new subject, or understanding any complicated fact.

“ I believe upon the whole that my journey to Vienna has done good, as, whatever his real principles and views may be, his instructions to Kray and Lehrbach certainly are to communicate on *many subjects*, fairly and confidentially, with the British Minister. The latter would not have left Vienna but for the King’s message

to the House, on the subject of the negotiations with the German powers, which has reached us through France. As soon as M. Thugut read it, he ordered M. Lehrbach away immediately, and told him (as the latter assures me) that he might now communicate with me *confidentially* on *all* subjects, as our interests were the same.

“After M. de Thugut, I saw all the other ministers at Vienna, after which I was the less astonished at the credit and influence which the former enjoys. Much as I had heard on the subject before, they were all very much below what I had expected to find them. It is really not possible for your Lordship to figure to yourself a more poor, contemptible set, or to form an idea of the thorough indifference and contempt with which Thugut treats them all.

“I found at Vienna a number of officers with whom I had been acquainted at the army. I saw, besides Bellegarde, Chasteler, Dietrichstein and many others who have been at times the favourites and the instruments of the Minister. I saw a great deal of the old Prince de Ligne, and of Gallo; in short I saw and heard, as much as possible, every body that was worth seeing and hearing. The human face divine was all that I allowed myself to run after, having seen literally nothing of what strangers go to Vienna to see; not even the palace, the arsenal, the opera, nor even the Prater. The sum of my observations is that Thugut stands unshaken, and irremovable; and that this Russian tempest has served no other purpose but to make his old roots strike into the earth ten times deeper than before.

“This was the only point in which both his friends and enemies agreed, and concerning which no possible doubt can now be entertained. This therefore is the only key to Vienna politics, and, rusty as it is, I am afraid your Lordship will be obliged to have recourse to it if you want to open any doors in that quarter.

“If this letter were not already extended to so very unreasonable a length, I would add something of what I conceive to be the real views of this extraordinary man; but I will reserve all this for another occasion, the more readily as I shall learn much from Lehrbach, in the course of a day or two, of the history of the Arch-Duke’s retreat, the real test of Thugut’s strength.”

*Postscript.*—“I find that the poor Arch-Duke is loudly blamed for having communicated to Tolstoy the original letter he received from the Emperor by the hands of Dietrichstein, ordering him to withdraw his *whole* army from Switzerland. Your Lordship will recollect that M. Thugut always declared that the Arch-Duke had discretionary powers on that subject. It was Gallo, to whom this secret was disclosed at Petersburg, who communicated it only whilst I was at Vienna to Thugut.

“It does not appear that they know that his Royal Highness made a similar communication to me.”

#### COUNT WORONZOW TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, March 17. Harley Street.—“Je vous avois promis de vous communiquer des renseignements sur le Comte Viomenil; je vous les envoie en toute confiance, en vous priant de ne pas en tirer de copie

de les lire vous seule, et de me les renvoyer. La première de ces deux pièces est un écrit qu'il m'a donné pour que je lui fasse des réponses. Vous verrez par la première question qu'il avoit des préjugés contre ce pays ; mais je dois lui rendre justice qu'il en est tout à fait revenu, et qu'ainsi, comme je vous l'ai assuré la dernière fois que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous voir, vous pouvez compter sur les bons principes et les talents de ce général. Je l'ai vue tous les jours pendant plus de trois semaines, et je puis vous assurer que c'est le Français le moins Français que j'ai vue de ma vie, et qu'il est parti pour les isles convaincu de la bonne foi du ministère Britannique.

“ L'autre pièce est mon rapport à l'Empereur sur le plan du Général Comte de Viomenil, en conséquence de l'ordre que Sa Majesté Impériale m'avoit donné de revoir les plans du général, et de lui envoyer mon opinion.

“ Est-il vrai que les négocians Holandais qui s'étoit chargés de faire venir de France des grains ont retractés leurs promesses ? ”

LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT WORONZOW.

1800, March 18. Cleveland Row.—“ Je vous renvoie les pièces que vous avez eu la bonté de me communiquer. J'y vois avec plaisir toutes les précautions que M. de Viomenil croit devoir prendre pour ne pas s'engager dans une entreprise hasardée. Son ignorance sur tout ce qui regarde ce pais-ci ne doit pas surprendre, puisqu'il n'y avoit presque pas de François sous l'ancien régime qui se donnoit la peine d'être mieux informé à cet égard.

“ Je n'ai montré ces papiers à personne, ni n'en ai tiré aucune copie.

“ Je n'ai rien appris de plus au sujet du bléd que l'on avoit cru pouvoir exporter des ports François en droiture pour l'Angleterre, mais je doute toujours que cet entreprise réussisse ; et dans mon opinion particulière, nos besoins ici ont été bien exagérés par des spéculateurs qui se proposoient d'en profiter.

“ La dernière des propositions pour l'Union a dû passer en Irlande aujourd'hui Nous les aurons ici immédiatement après Pâques.”  
*Copy.*

The EARL OF ELGIN to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1800, March 18. Constantinople.—“ I am really sorry to have been obliged to bring *Spüring's* elopement forward in a public letter, and particularly in so far as regarded Mr. Smith. But the transaction was, it seems, public before I had made any enquiries about it, and known to have been purposely concealed from me, owing both to Spüring's ill-placed confidence, and the stupidity of the people about him. My intercourse with Smith must now, of itself, draw to a close after these letters. I can and must say to your Lordship I never knew such a man in my life. But I trust, long e'er now, your Lordship will have found some other destination for him.

*Postscript.*—“ I wish you to keep in mind the transaction of M.

Tomara, as mentioned in my No. 34. I believe he wished me to refuse him, in order to throw odium on me, and to curry favour. That I shall know."

WILLIAM WICKHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1800, March 18. Munich.—“After waiting all night I have but this instant received the ratification of the treaty which I hope to be able to dispatch in the course of an hour. I need not point out to your Lordship all the difficulties I have had to encounter; you know enough of this Court to be satisfied that everything that Prussia says and does is attended to here in preference to whatever may come from any other quarter. I believe your Lordship is also informed that old Goertz, who is considered as the saviour of Bavaria, was sent here on purpose to dissuade the Elector from entering into any engagements with England after the Russian troops were withdrawn. I know that he told the Elector, and assigned as a reason for his not engaging in the coalition, that France would *necessarily* give the law to the south of Germany this campaign. On being asked, however, officially whether the King of Prussia would take Bavaria under his protection, he first gave a doubtful answer, then, on being more closely pressed, said that Bavaria being in the *south of Germany*, and on the way to Vienna, the King could not possibly in any case have it included within the neutrality which he had had the good fortune to obtain for the north.

“This answer fixed the Elector in his determination to conclude the treaty, but left him a prey to all manner of doubts and suspicions, and added to the dilatoriness of all his measures and resolutions.

“The only person whose conduct is quite inexplicable is Montgélas. That he was a leading man among the *Illuminés* is certain; that he has filled the offices with *Illuminés* is equally so; and it is no less true that he is not only Prussian but even French in his politics; and yet he is the man who has engaged the Elector to go on with, and finally to conclude the treaty. His animosity against the Austrians is implacable, as considering the Court of Vienna to have been the cause of his former disgrace and banishment, and he lives entirely with Prussians, *Friends of Humanity* and Anti-Austrians.

“There is no doubt but that the *first* project of this treaty was conceived in hatred to that House, and that the guaranty without the interference of Austria was the great object and inducement. That hope however being at an end, I am persuaded that there is *now* some project fermenting in the Minister's brain of making his sovereign master of the country and of *the States* by means of the army. In the meantime the army is paid and maintained by Great Britain, and the revenues appropriated to its maintenance by the States are applied to the wants of the Government, which are pressing beyond all example. At least this is the only explanation I can give of his conduct that has even the appearance of probability.

“Sooner or later Austria must have Bavaria, or dwindle herself into a power of the second order; but I do not think that she has any views of the kind at this moment; her present project being most evidently to provide by her acquisitions in Italy the means of conquering Germany under more favorable auspices.

“In the meantime by this treaty she acquires a formidable acquisition of power and strength which, do what we will, she must and will employ to her own purposes.

“I have endeavoured, and I believe not *quite* without effect, to make the Elector and the Minister feel how important it is for their own interests, as well as for those of the common cause, that they should be somewhat more circumspect, at least during the existence of this treaty, in their language on the subject of the Court of Vienna. But I fear they will be better only for a day or two, and then they will fall into their old habits again; such, at least, has been the tendency of their conduct during these last two days..

“I shall write to your Lordship in a day or two on the subject of France, where affairs have changed but little, as far at least as I have been able to observe, within these last two months.”

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800 [March 20]. Downing Street.—“A Cabinet has been summoned to-morrow, at the desire of several of our colleagues, to discuss further our military plans and prospects. It will be very desirable that you and Dundas and myself should have some previous conversation; particularly on the circumstance (which you perhaps have not heard) of Stuart’s having relinquished his command, from dissatisfaction at his treatment at the Horse Guards. Dundas will be here at eleven if you can meet him.”

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1800, March 20. Downing Street.—“I understand that after I left the Duke of Portland’s yesterday evening, the subject of the Mediterranean expedition was started with doubts of the propriety of it going on, and it ended in wishing for a meeting of Cabinet. I have accordingly summoned one for to-morrow at 12 o’clock. I hope it will be convenient for you to meet me at Mr. Pitt’s at eleven, that I may have some serious conversation with you and him. I feel very unpleasant in the prospect of the next campaign so far as our force may be concerned, and my own situation is become more irksome than I can describe. Of this however no more at present. From some misunderstanding between the Duke of York and Sir Charles Stuart, the latter has resigned his command. If the operations are to go on there, others may, I don’t see how he is to be replaced.”

E. COOKE to [LORD GRENVILLE].

1800, March 21. Dublin.—“We last night went through the

Commercial Article, giving the existing duties to the cotton manufacturers *in quinquennium*: yet the cotton manufacturers are discontented.

“There was no resistance to the article after it was gone through. Grattan made a speech against Union *in toto*—not impressive; but he will of course print *editio auctior et emendatior*.

“After some debate the Speaker made an impressive and able speech *ad captandum*, and in the close of it, professing moderation, he introduced an historian giving an account of the transactions of the Union, and he turned his historian into a most virulent declaimer against the present administration. Lord Castlereagh thought his conduct so violent and mischievous that, at the close of a very able reply, he made a very severe attack on the Speaker. The Speaker answered in passion. Grattan supported him, and attacked Lord Castlereagh by reading some proceedings of a Northern Whig Club of which Lord Castlereagh had been member, but which he never but once attended when he came of age; which proceedings were, as stated by Grattan, very reprehensible. Ponsonby followed Grattan, and soon after Saurin, and, in the course of the night, Plunket made personal attacks on Lord Castlereagh.

“It seemed as if there had been a plan of general attack; but although there was a good deal of animated invective, no point was attempted to be made against Government; so that, although I think Opposition made a good rally, they shewed they had no real charge to bring forward, no real point to depend upon.

“The Prime Sergeant made a very good speech at the close of the debate.

“We divided on the question for the Chairman to report the Resolution to the House, 154 to 112.

“In the House we divided for going into the report on Friday, 154 to 107.

“Opposition made their best exertion, all their members present but 3. We had 16 absent, 7 in their beds.

“To-morrow we shall carry up the report to the Lords, or at least vote to do so.

“The debates are now made to produce popular effect.”

#### SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1800, March 22. Palermo.—“After the kind assurances your Lordship has been pleased to give me in your private letter of the 20th of December last, of the King’s approbation of my long services, and that His Majesty had been graciously pleased to permit your Lordship to assure me of his favour on my retreat, I shall return home with much satisfaction, and with a thorough confidence in His Majesty’s goodness, and relying on the continuance of your Lordship’s friendship towards me. I only beg leave to remind your Lordship that it was not my retreat but a leave of absence for a short time to look after my private concerns that I begged of your Lordship to apply for me to His Majesty’s goodness.”

## E. COOKE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, March 22. Dublin.—“The Opposition did not choose to risk another division, as they conceived we should divide eleven more than had appeared on the last night, and they could not produce another vote. None of the leaders came down, their benches were thin, they announced their intentions through Sir L. Parsons. Five or six of the inferior speakers made their declamations, and we got through the Report by ten. To oblige the northern members and to satisfy the cotton manufacturers and obtain their good will, Lord Castlereagh consented to let the present cotton duties remain for 7 years instead of 5. It seems immaterial to England, and will, I hope, produce the best effects here. To-day the Resolutions have been carried up to the Lords, and I feel myself quite relieved.

“The Lords are debating the Representation article. They are sore on the subject of making peers after the Union, very sore; but I hope will acquiesce in the proposed modification.

“I hear the object of Opposition is to procure addresses to the King.”

## THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, March 23. Stowe.—“Sincerely do I congratulate you on the Irish prospects. The sketch of the Bill sent to me from Ireland for regulating the representation is strangely imperfect; for, as the clause now stands for the election of the first twenty-eight Lords temporal, all proxies and all bishops are excluded from voting, and the right of election is confined to the Lords temporal *actually present*; the consequence of which will be that the anti-Unionist Lords will, if they stick together, elect the twenty-eight Lords temporal, for they actually have the majority of Lords temporal *present*. Add to this the risk and unnecessary deviation from your general rule in assembling this body, *en corps*, after the Union, and you will, I am persuaded, lean with me to the idea of conducting this election in the same manner as you direct all the subsequent elections, namely by signed lists. No provision is made by this Bill for permitting Irish peers to sit in the House of Commons for British seats; and the clause which directs peers to qualify (for future elections) in the Irish Chancery or before an Irish Justice of Peace, will exclude all those who usually reside in England, even though they may have property in Ireland.

“I see in the foreign papers a Constantinople account of some French ships of war and twenty transports being seen off Candia. I hope that *Sa Majesté très Corse* has not been able to slip out his Toulon ships to the relief of Egypt, for I am very anxious that ‘Memphis shall cover them and Egypt shall bury them.’ As to the rest I really think that our prospects are better now than at any period of the war; but I sincerely hope that you will not find it necessary to wait for any further reinforcements of Russians before you strike some blow, as I cannot conceive that you can

get any troops from Revel or Riga sooner than the end of June. As to your Downs embarkation I think I see as far into that milestone as you do."

E. COOKE to [LORD GRENVILLE].

*Private.*

1800, March 24. Dublin.—“On Saturday the Representation Article was carried in the Lords. They divided on the numbers of temporal peers, 52 for, 17 against. My Lord Lieutenant had been obliged to make a compromise that the Crown should only retain the power of making one peer for every three extinct after the Union, until the number should be reduced to 100. This was necessary to prevent both a division of friends and a defeat on the point. Your Lordship cannot conceive how averse the peers were to any modification on the subject.

“Lord Yelverton made a most able speech on the general question, but he rather interlarded too much exculpation and praise of Grattan.

“He also denied that any propositions were ever made to him by the Duke of Portland in 1782 of any measures which had the tendency to a Union or were to be the substitutes for it. I understand however that the proposal on this subject was at his house, but that both his Lordship and Fitzpatrick were so drunk that they might well have forgotten what passed. This, at least, is the Bishop of Meath’s account of the matter.”

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, March 24. Harley Street.—“Si vous voulez bien me permettre, je viendrai chez vous demain, mardi, à une heure avant dîner. En attendant cette entrevue, je vous envoie ce que j’ai reçu par vos couriers de Vienne et d’Augsbourg. *Primo*, une lettre du Comte Stakelberg, et comme sa main est peu lisible, je joins une copie que vous pouvez garder en me renvoyant l’original. *Secundo*, un *postscriptum* de Kalitchef, dans lequel il y a aussi des choses assez intéressantes, et auquel sont joints deux annexes, une sur le conclave, que je vous prie de me renvoyer avec l’écrit de Kalitchef; l’autre est un prétendu recueil d’anecdote sur Buonaparte, fait par M. D’Antrague à la réquisition de Mr. Drake, et qui doit être remis à Mr. Hammond; je vous prie de le remettre à son adresse.

“Si vous n’avez pas de meilleure nouvelle que celle que j’ai reçue de différents côtés, autant valoit-il ne pas recevoir les postes que nous attendions avec tant d’impatience. Je suis encore moins content de ce que j’ai reçu de mon pays, et c’est sur ce sujet que je voudrois vous voir demain.”

*Enclosure :—*

M. DE KALITCHEFF to COUNT WORONZOW.

1800, February 11. Vienna.—*Extract.* “La réponse de l’empereur des Romains a été très insignifiante. Il s’efforçoit de démontrer assez mal qu’on avait eu une nécessité absolue de faire

retirer l'Archiduc Charles de Zurich avant l'arrivée des Russes d'Italie, et finissait par des regrets de ce que le tout a mal tourné. Depuis, dans des réponses subséquentes, cette Cour n'a rien dit de satisfaisant à la nôtre, ni sur les prétentions et désirs qu'on a ici de dépouiller le Pape, de démembrement le Piémont, ni de faire rentrer le roi de Sardaigne dans ses états. Le B[aron] de Thugut a articulé quelque chose de vague à Lord Minto des modifications à l'égard du démembrement du Piémont, en disant qu'on pourrait indemniser le roi de Sardaigne en lui donnant une partie du territoire de Gènes, et en gardant le reste de ce territoire pour l'Autriche. Mais ce ministre ne s'est point encore engagé envers le plénipotentiaire Anglais que son maître l'Empereur ne ferait point de paix séparée ; et il ne veut pas le faire avant d'avoir la certitude que l'Angleterre lui garantira le nouveau emprunt de deux millions de livres sterlings que l'Autriche veut lever à Londres comme auparavant. Il exige aussi que l'Angleterre paye les intérêts de l'ancien pendant la guerre, et je crois toujours.

“ Le B[aron] de Thugut a nié jusqu'à hier que Bounaparte s'est adressé à cette Cour-ci, quoiqu'il n'y eut nulle doute que la même proposition ne soit arrivé ici comme elle a été faite deux fois à Londres. On dit même, et le bruit court depuis trois jours, qu'il se trouve ici un émissaire Français arrivé de Berlin, de la part de Bournonville, pour traiter de la paix ; que cet émissaire voit le B[aron] de Thugut dans sa propre maison au fauxbourg, et qu'il y va à onze heures du soir.

“ Quant au Pape, rien n'a été décidé. Le B[aron] de Thugut, qui veut faire Pape le Cardinal Mattei, a gâté lui-même cette election. Il le désire, parcequ'il a signé le traité de Tolentino, espérant qu'il sera plus facile à lui céder les trois légations. S'il ne réussit pas à le faire Pape, ce sera Valente ou Bellisorni. Voici un extrait de ce qui s'est passé au Conclave. C'est le prélat Albani qui me l'a donné sous le sceau du secret. Je supplie v[otre] E[xcellence], de me le renvoyer par occasion ; il me faut cet écrit pour l'archive, ayant envoyé l'original à Petersburg.

“ Mr. Drake a écrit au Comte d'Antraigues, neveu de St. Priest [qui] est pensionné par notre Cour, de faire un pamphlet sur Buonaparte. D'Antraigues vient d'en faire, et je vous l'envoie ci-joint. Il faut le rendre à M. Hammond, parceque M. Drake l'a demandé en son nom. J'ignore quel mérite a cet ouvrage. D'Antraigues est un homme d'esprit, connaît Bonaparte. Mais il exagère souvent. Quelques fois il a de bonnes notions, et m'a été utile, mais en d'autres temps inconséquent, et inconsideré, et peu sûr, comme tous les émigrés. Tout cela est entre nous, parceque cet homme m'est souvent utile, et il a des correspondants à Londres, et il brigue vos bontés et votre suffrage. J'ai vu Thugut ce matin ; il n'avoue pas qu'il eut une proposition, mais il ne le nie pas. Il ne répond rien à cela, mais il assure que sa Cour n'a jamais fait de proposition aux Français, comme on le débite, dit-il, à présent à Berlin.† *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MINTO.

1800, March 25. Cleveland Row.—“ His Majesty has been

pleased to destine Lord Carysfort to the mission at Berlin. I lose no time in apprizing you of the circumstance, in order that you may communicate it to M. Thugut, so as to obviate any suspicion which his jealousy on the subject of Prussia may excite in his mind of a disposition on the part of this Government to cultivate, at this precise moment, a closer connection with Berlin. We have certainly no such intention ; and the strongest proof you can give M. Thugut of this is that Lord Carysfort will not set out for Berlin till towards the end of June.”- *Copy.*

REPORT FROM PARIS OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE FRENCH  
GOVERNMENT.

1800, March 26.—“ L’on veut sans doute un tableau complet de la France sous ses rapports actuels avec l’Europe. On ne veut rien de ce qui est sù ou de ce qui peut aisément l’être. Le secret, rien que le secret, et autant que possible tout le secret de l’état. L’expérience prompte et facile sur plusieurs points donnera entière confiance et pour le présent et pour l’avenir. En peu de lignes sera tracé le tableau de tout ce qui s’est fait diplomatiquement depuis le gouvernement de Bonaparte. Nous finirons par quelques mots sur la situation intérieure. Nous suivrons pour plus de clarté l’ordre géographique, en commençant par les rapports de la France avec les puissances du nord.

“ On sait que Bonaparte a écrit en même temps à presque tous les Rois, entre autres au Roi de Suède, au Prince Royal de Danemarck ; il a chargé aussi ses agents de faire surtout entendre à ces deux gouvernements que s’ils ne préféraient pas l’alliance de la Russie, on leur rendrait justice sur le point dont elles se plaignaient avec le plus d’amertume, la prise de leurs vaisseaux. Quant au Danemark qui se trouvait à la même époque plus menacé par la Russie, et en même temps assez mécontent de la Prusse, sur laquelle il avait le plus compté, cela ne l’a pas empêché d’ordonner à son ministre à Paris, Monsieur de Dreyer, de quitter cette résidence.

[\*] “ Il est même à observer que Monsieur de Dreyer qui a beaucoup de crédit à sa Cour, et qui a un désir extrême de rester en France, a fait les plus grands efforts pour obtenir cette permission de sa Cour.

[\*] “ Avant hièr, dans l’audience donnée aux Ambassadeurs, le premier Consul a spécialement chargé le Secrétaire de la Légation Danoise d’écrire à sa Cour, que la restitution des prises et la satisfaction sur tous les points de mécontentement du Danemarck dépendait exclusivement du retour à Paris non seulement d’un ministre quelconque, mais de la personne même de Monsieur de Dreyer ; il a prié à la même audience le ministre de Prusse d’écrire à Berlin dans les mêmes termes.

“ Tout cela tient à ce que Bonaparte est convaincu que Monsieur de Dreyer, l’un des plus anciens diplomates de l’Europe, peut lui rendre les plus grands services pour les communications de toute espèce avec le reste de l’Europe. [\*] Monsieur Dreyer a fini par être aussi extrêmement lié avec le ministre [\*] Talleyrand ; ce vieux Danois, extrêmement attaché aux intérêts de son pays, a

\* *Marginal note by Lord Grenville*—“ This is certainly true.”

été pendant 3 ans à Paris le ministre étranger le plus roide, le plus inflexible, le plus libre dans ses propos contre les hommes et les [\*] choses de la révolution Française ; mais quand il a vu que la Russie voulait forcer la main à son pays et le faire sortir de la neutralité qu'il lui croit extrêmement salutaire, tout a changé ; il a devenu éminemment pacifique et presque Français.

“ Quant à la Prusse, le ministère Britannique en sait probablement plus sur ses intentions secrètes que l'on n'en sait à Paris même ; mais voici les faits : Bournonville a été tout-à-fait capté par les recherches vraiment extraordinaires de politesses et d'attentions qui ont marqué son arrivée. Un homme plus fin que lui, et qui est avec lui, a cependant découvert assez promptement que tout cela avait pour but d'abord de se dispenser de rien faire de réel, et de payer la France en simagrées, et, de plus, de faire contraster par les succès du nouvel ambassadeur Français la solitude, la misanthropie de Syéyès, qu'on déteste cordialement en Prusse.

“ Quant à l'Empire, plusieurs princes du second ordre, et même l'Électeur de Mayence, ont fait faire des ouvertures indirectes.

“ L'Électeur de Bavière a envoyé plusieurs fois auprès du ministre Français à Francfort pour faire valoir son refus de terminer le traité des subsides avec l'Angleterre, et pour s'excuser du passé sur l'influence et la présence des Russes.

“ Voici le point essentiel sur l'Empereur.

“ Il est certain qu'il y a à peu près 2 mois, Bonaparte fit écrire à Monsieur de Thugut qui avait déjà répondu évasivement à la lettre de Bonaparte à l'Empereur lui-même. [\*] À cette seconde époque Bonaparte proposait le traité de *Campo Formio*. Monsieur de Thugut répondit presque sur-le-champ que cela était trop vague, et que d'ailleurs les positions étaient changées ; c'est alors qu'on voulut aussi tenter du côté de la Prusse, et lui demander de se prononcer afin de régler d'après sa réponse les offres que l'on ferait à l'Empereur. La Prusse n'ayant rien répondu, on a fait en effet à la Prusse [Autriche] des propositions plus avantageuses ; en voici certainement le sens, presque les mêmes termes. On propose à l'Empereur de garantir à la France la barrière du Rhin, on lui offre en retour presque toute l'Italie à l'exception de quatre principales places fortes du Piémont, dans lesquelles la France veut au moins garder garnison jusqu'à une certaine époque ; et à l'exception aussi de la ville de Gênes, que la France veut garder ou pour elle-même ou sous sa main.

“ On voit qu'il y a ici quelque louche dans ce qui concerne le Piémont ; c'est, qu'en effet, on fait à cet égard une proposition alternative en offrant plus à l'Empereur, si la France garde elle-même la ligne militaire du Piémont, et moins si ce pays est rendu au Roi de Sardaigne. Mais dans tous les cas on stipule la garde des places fortes jusqu'à la paix. On attend tous les jours la dernière réponse de Monsieur de Thugut, et il est possible qu'un *Postscriptum* vous l'apprenne. Quant à l'opinion du premier consul et de ses alentours, il disait encore avant hier qu'il parierait pour la paix quatre contre un. Tout en effet a l'air arrangé par lui dans cette opinion.

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\* Marginal note by Lord Grenville—“ This is certainly true.”

“ Il ne faut pas oublier quelque chose d'assez important aujourd'hui sur ce qui concerne les négociations en général. L'opinion la plus récente de l'ambassadeur Français à Berlin (il s'agit de lettres arrivées hièr [\*] est que cette Cour est plus disposée à s'entendre avec la Russie et le Danemark contre les prétensions exagérées de l'Empereur ; il va même jusqu'à dire que le ministre Russe à Berlin a fait des insinuations à cet [\*] égard en demandant toutefois qu'on restraignit ses prétensions du côté du Rhin.

“ Nous passons au midi de l'Europe. D'abord, quant à l'Italie, Bonaparte ne parle qu'avec mépris de la prétension de l'ancien Directoire qui a sacrifié la possibilité de la paix générale à la folie de maintenir des républiques ; il a l'air de les abandonner tout-à-fait ; aussi a l'on vu pour la première fois avant hièr au dîner diplomatique du mois, les trois seuls envoyés de Milan, de Gênes, et de Rome non invités.

“ Pour la Turquie, voici le peu qu'on n'a pu apprendre par la correspondance interceptée.

“ Il est bien vrai qu'on a fait semblant de négocier avec l'ambassadeur Turc, mais il n'avait pas de pouvoirs. L'envoyé à Constantinople, Descorches, est toujours à Toulon ; restent donc les seules instructions données à Klèber.

“ Nous arrivons à l'Espagne, qui est la puissance avec laquelle nos relations sont aujourd'hui plus intimes.

“ On sait que le rappel d'Azara, le retour de Talleyrand au ministère qu'Urquijo n'avait rien négligé pour [\*] empêcher, les soupçons donnés à Bonaparte contre ce ministre, tout cela ensemble avait causé, il y a environ trois mois, un refroidissement assez sensible ; mais depuis Urquijo a senti qu'il fallait céder, il a multiplié [\*] les complaisances, les promesses de dévouement, et on est absolument en rapports assez amicaux.

“ Le prétendu rappel de Musquitz et son remplacement par Massaredo n'était qu'une ruse de guerre, et une fausse nouvelle publiée par Bonaparte lui-même, afin de faire croire que Gravina se trouvant à Brest commandant en chef la flotte Espagnole, les escadres combinées allaient sortir.

“ On a fait à l'Espagne depuis quelque temps plusieurs demandes de piastres à concéder sur ses établissemens de la rivière de la Plata et de Lima. C'était surtout destiné à alimenter des expéditions coloniales, mais en accordant ce qu'on voulait à Lima, elle a toujours refusé pour la Plata sous prétexte qu'elle n'était pas sûre qu'il s'y en trouvât, et, en effet, parcequ'elle les fait venir elle-même de là beaucoup plus facilement.

“ On vient aussi de lui faire une espèce d'injonction qu'elle parait avoir éludée. On exigeait d'elle qu'elle fit déclarer au conclave que sous des prétextes Catholiques, comme l'influence des puissances schismatiques ou hérétiques sur l'élection du nouveau Pape, elle ne le reconnaîtrait pas actuellement ; mais elle a répondu que ses instructions pour le Cardinal Lorenzelca étaient parties, et elles portent [\*] la reconnaissance du Pape pourvu qu'on approuve

\* Marginal note by Lord Grenville—“ This is certainly true.”

le nouveau décret royal qui donne aux évêques les dispenses dans beaucoup de cas réservés autrefois au Pape.

“ Un autre objet important, récemment demandé à l'Espagne, a été l'emploi de son influence sur la Cour de Lisbonne pour la forcer à la paix ; et des nouvelles arrivées extraordinairement, il y a trois jours, portent qu'en effet la Cour d'Espagne a déjà fait avancer plusieurs régiments d'infanterie et de cavalerie sur les frontières du Portugal, et menace la Cour de Lisbonne si elle n'entame pas les négociations.

“ Des maisons de commerce de Portugal avaient fait faire par des maisons de commerce de Paris quelques ouvertures indirectes, il y a à-peu-près deux mois, et alors on s'était hâté de Paris d'y faire répondre qu'on était tout prêt à partir de l'ancien traité. [\*] Le fait est qu'on exigerait même une moins forte prestation d'argent, et aucune espèce de concession territoriale aux colonies Portugaises.

“ La France souhaiterait particulièrement que l'ancien négociateur Portugais d'Aranza fût chargé de la négociation, mais elle serait loin de tenir à lui, parcequ'on met beaucoup de prix à traiter pour donner ce déboire à l'Angleterre.

“ Nous avons oublié dans leurs places deux faits assez importants ; l'un est le système préféré aujourd'hui par Bonaparte, et auquel il tentera par tous les moyens d'amener l'Espagne et même l'Empereur, pour l'existence future d'un Pape, et qu'il ne soit plus à l'avenir que salarié par les puissances Catholiques en non-souverain.

“ L'ancien état du Pape serait destiné soit au Roi de Sardaigne, si la France garde une partie du Piémont, soit au Duc de Parme dont les intérêts futurs sont un grand moyen de tenir toujours en échec et en complaisance l'Espagne, et surtout la Reine d'Espagne.

“ L'autre point oublié est la situation actuelle de la France avec Hambourg. Bourgoïn, en passant par cette ville pour Copenhagen, y fera un séjour de cinq ou six semaines, et plus s'il est nécessaire ; il est chargé d'y négocier une sorte d'arrangement. On ne veut pas demander tout simplement de l'argent, mais bien un emprunt, en sauvant le plus possible l'honneur du demandeur.

“ Sur l'intérieur on sait presque tout. Il est sûr que le gouvernement de Bonaparte, très fort, très vigoureux, n'est ébranlé que par la guerre, et plusieurs revers dans la guerre ; il le sent, il sacrifiera tout à la paix.

“ La nouvelle s'était répandue, il y a trois jours, du départ de la flotte ; elle était destinée à débloquer Gênes, Malthe, et à rester dans la Méditerranée ; mais on a su hiér par le télégraphe que la vue de 36 vaisseaux Anglais devant Brest l'avait empêché de sortir.

“ Bernadotte devait être fait commandant-général ; on voyait un grand accord entre les Jacobins, proprement dits, et le parti des anciens Directeurs, comme Treilhard et Merlin.

“ — indiquait le lieu où se préparaient les écrits qui devaient être publiés. Tout a été trouvé en effet. Deux pamphlets étaient même déjà imprimés ; l'un intitulé ‘ *Adresse aux Français* ’ ; l'autre, ‘ *Réflexions sur le 18 Brumaire* ’ ; on y criait à la tyrannie, à l'envahissement des droits du peuple, à la nécessité de lui rendre ses élections, sa majesté souveraine avec la constitution de '95.

\* Marginal note by Lord Grenville.—“This is certainly true.”

“Comme on a vu que l'on était sûr de disposer du Général Lefèvre, homme borné et instrument docile, le premier Consul s'est hâté de le présenter au Sénat Conservateur, et il agit avec beaucoup de chaleur sur tous ceux qui lui sont dévoués dans ce corps, pour que la nomination ait lieu.

“Murat commandera à Paris à la place de Lefèvre, Berthier ira à Dijon, et à dater de la découverte dont nous parlons, Bonaparte a résolu de n'y point aller lui-même, et de ne sortir de Paris que pour un coup de main indispensable à une armée ; mais pardessus tout, comme nous venons de le dire, à ne rien négliger pour la paix.”

SUPPLEMENT AU RAPPORT PRÉCÉDENT.

1800, April 2.—“D'abord l'homme en qui le Gouverneur a plus de confiance que dans son ambassadeur à Berlin est un nommé Bignon, secrétaire de légation, qui est chargé de faire des dépêches contradictoires et particulières.

“On a sù hièr par un courier que l'ambassadeur d'Espagne à Vienne a adressé à son collègue à Paris, que malgré les prétendues bonnes nouvelles d'Egypte publiées avec affectation dans les journaux, il y a quatre à cinq jours, Kléber avait été obligé de signer une capitulation, en vertu de laquelle il s'embarque avec à peu près 7,000 hommes, seuls restés de l'armée d'Egypte, qui doivent être conduits en France sur des vaisseaux Turcs.

“Le prétendu courier Espagnol que tous les journaux d'Allemagne ont fait arriver à Vienne, il y a quinze jours, n'était autre chose qu'un courier Turc auquel l'ambassadeur d'Espagne à Paris avait donné un passeport. Il portait en même temps de nouveaux chiffres pour la légation d'Espagne à Vienne, qui lui permettront de communiquer aussi avec l'ambassadeur d'Espagne à Paris, selon le voeu du gouvernement Français.

“La Cour d'Espagne a aussi consulté la France pour le choix, et pour le moment du départ, de son nouvel ambassadeur pour Constantinople.

“L'agent Français Descorches, qui va secrètement à Constantinople pour y déployer dans l'occasion le caractère de ministre Français, a écrit de la rade de Toulon une lettre reçue avant hièr, par laquelle il dit que le commandant d'armée ayant pu donner à sa corvette les matelots qui lui manquaient, il va mettre à la voile.

“On peut ajouter quelque chose à ce qui est dit sur le Portugal.

“Le Cabinet de Lisbonne paraissant très récalcitrant à la paix, l'Espagne vient de promettre de faire approcher de ses frontières jusqu'à 18,000 hommes. L'ambassadeur Français est chargé de faire entendre que c'est là le point capital qu'il faut obtenir de la Cour de Madrid, et d'exprimer même à la reine d'Espagne que la bienveillance de la France pour le Duc de Parme, à qui elle s'intéresse vivement, sera le prix de ce qu'on fera dans cette occasion pour déterminer le Cabinet de Lisbonne.

“Il y a à-peu-près trois jours qu'il y eut une discussion vive et contradictoire devant le premier Consul sur la question de savoir s'il importait beaucoup à la France d'avoir la barrière du Rhin.

\* Marginal note by Lord Grenville.—“This is certainly true.”

C'est là le seul point auquel Bonaparte tient jusqu'ici opiniâtrement ; car, en lui laissant Gênes, il renoncerait même aux places fortes du Piémont.

“ Le fameux Carnot a été appelé pour dire son opinion, et il a prouvé avec beaucoup de chaleur que la barrière de la Meuse, meilleure militairement parlant, l'était aussi politiquement, en ce qu'elle abrégait les difficultés interminables qu'entraînerait toujours le morcellement des trois Électorats, et la nécessité des indemnités et des compensations. Bonaparte a dit avec humeur après cette discussion, que Carnot n'était pas un homme aussi distingué qu'on avait bien voulu le prétendre.

“ Voici l'anecdote importante et sûre qui a encore rabattu les prétensions de Bonaparte, et qui l'a décidé à répondre de nouveau à l'Empereur avec de nouvelles propositions plus avantageuses, si le courier qu'on attend à tous les moments apporte une réponse négative ou dilatoire.

“ Une lettre anonyme, mais qui portait des grands caractères de vérité, lui indiquait qu'un plan assez vaste et assez bien combiné devait être exécuté par le parti Jacobin le lendemain même du départ du premier Consul pour Dijon ; Lucien Bonaparte y jouait certainement un rôle, mais le premier Consul n'a point lu son nom aux personnes de confiance à qui il a lu tout le reste. Au reste Bournonville lui-même, il y a déjà plus de trois semaines, a écrit que du moment où il avait entamé les affaires sérieuses, et proposé indirectement l'alliance, on l'avait éconduit ; il écrivait même déjà *ab irato* qu'il n'y avait rien à tirer de la Prusse, et qu'il fallait traiter avec l'Allemagne.

“ Il est vrai, cependant, que, ne sortant jamais de son système d'obligeance insignifiante, le Cabinet de Berlin a consenti à faire faire à la Russie des espèces de propositions qui n'ont pas été accueillies. Il y a précisément un mois qu'on a fait partir pour Bournonville un courier avec des ordres de demander à la Prusse une réponse précise sur la part qu'elle voulait prendre à la pacification de l'Europe. Au bout de quatre jours Bournonville a renvoyé le courier en disant que le moment n'était pas favorable, et qu'il le saisirait s'il se présentait.

“ Depuis quinze jours le ministre de Prusse à Paris a donné à sa Cour beaucoup d'inquiétude par tout ce qu'il a écrit sur les soupçons que lui donnent les bruits à Paris d'une négociation très avancée avec Vienne ; tout cela a contribué à refroidir. Pour l'Angleterre, le Roi et *Monsieur* doivent savoir tout ; seulement ce qu'on peut ignorer, c'est que rien n'a irrité et mortifié Bonaparte comme le peu de succès de négociation, parcequ'il n'y avait rien à quoi il mit plus d'importance. La pensée actuelle du gouvernement Français est un vif regret du mode choisi pour cette négociation ; c'est la seule volonté de Bonaparte qui a prévalu à cet égard contre l'avis des ministres. Ils aimaient mieux un agent secret sans rien d'écrit, et l'on est encore convaincu que, si l'on avait pris cette voie, et si l'on n'avait pas exposé le cabinet d'Alexandre à l'éclat d'un refus, après lequel il est toujours difficile de revenir sur ses pas, on aurait aujourd'hui quelque chose d'entamé avec le cabinet de St. James.

“ On a discuté, il y a trois jours, si l'on permettrait tacitement à des maisons de commerce de la Belgique de faire des envois de grains en Angleterre, et on a fini par adopter la négative pour deux motifs ; l'un présenté par des administrateurs habiles qui ont dit que la France, n'étant jamais sûre d'avoir trop de blés, on s'exposait dans l'année où il fallait le plus éviter les troubles, à de grands inconvénients, si, en effet, on en manquait. L'autre motif, qui certainement a été le plus déterminant, est la prétendue certitude que la disette en Angleterre est ou deviendra telle qu'elle influera sur les déterminations politiques, et l'amènera à traiter.

“ Quant à la Hollande, on est froid avec cette république. D'abord on est resté convaincu qu'à l'époque de la descente, le Gouvernement actuel n'avait jamais été très sincèrement effrayé de son succès. De plus, ils se sont toujours montrés moins complaisants pour les demandes de toute espèce du gouvernement Français depuis qu'ils ne craignent pas, comme sous le feu Directoire, d'être chassés, et révolutionnés pour le moindre refus.

“ Le gouvernement Hollandais a aussi un vif sujet de mécontentement dans la confiscation de ses vaisseaux injustement pris par nos corsaires, et d'un surtout qui est à Bordeaux depuis six mois, et dont on leur promet tous les jours la restitution. On leur a demandé la somme exorbitante de 25 millions pour le port de Flessingue ; ils ont dit alors qu'ils n'en voulaient pas à ce prix. Enfin on vient de leur expédier le [\*] Conseiller Marmont, gendre du banquier Perrégaux, ami et confident de Bonaparte, pour demander, non pas précisément à la Hollande mais au commerce particulier d'Amsterdam, une somme de 13 millions à emprunter ; il propose pour garantie une partie des forêts de la Belgique et des diamants, entre autres le fameux diamant *Le Régent* que Marmont porte avec lui.”

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, March 26. Downing Street.—“ I forgot to ask you this morning what progress you have made in your ecclesiastical paper. The Bishop of Lincoln writes to me with some anxiety to know when he will be wanted in town ; and it is material to him, as he has a visitation and some other arrangements to settle. I imagine the next steps must be, our seeing the Archbishop, and his calling a meeting of Bishops. If you can let me know what time you think this will take, when we meet to-morrow morning, I can write by to-morrow's post.”

#### The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, March 27. Stowe.—“ As far as a superficial observer can collect from newspapers, English and foreign, I certainly like our prospects ; for if the Austrians (including our subsidized troops) are stronger than the French everywhere save on the Rhine, I think it must be very much our fault and that of our friend Paul if we do not, by diversion or direct attack, find full employment for

\* Marginal note by Lord Grenville.—“ This is certainly true.”

the French on the lower Rhine. The march of General Brune's force from Bretagne to oppose us in Holland, and the return of the same army to Bretagne to oppose the *Chouans*, is a decisive proof of the real weakness of France in that part of their line; and I trust that we shall profit by our experience of last year so as to combine our attempts with a view to the operations of the interior of France. As to Sir Sidney, I am out of all patience with his insanity; but I hope and trust that *no consideration* will induce Government or Lord Keith to ratify a convention so mad and so entirely beyond his powers and instructions. I hope that, long before this, Lord Keith has sent Captain Louis of the *Minotaur* or Captain Ball of the *Alexander*, who were both at Aboukir, and are both in the Mediterranean, and seniors to Sir Sidney, to supersede him and his convention. Troubridge is at Malta, and would be the best of all if he could be spared. I cannot help likewise mentioning to you that Sir James Saumarez, who was second in command to Nelson at Aboukir, is just come into Causand bay with the *Cæsar*, and if he was ordered to Alexandria with instructions, he might be there in twenty-five or thirty days at furthest, and would be in time to block the port, and to send Sir Sidney to explain his conduct to Lord Keith, and to receive his orders upon it. I see that this must be subsequent to the 10th of February (the day of the storm of El Arish) so that I think that Saumarez would be in time. You will I know excuse all this, but for God's sake give me the satisfaction of knowing that every thing will be tried to stop this cursed blunder. I am very happy to hear of the *Généreux* and her convoy in Lord Nelson's hands, for this was the identical squadron that *Sa Majesté très Corse* was fitting at Toulon, and which I feared might get to Egypt.

"I am sorry that you should still think it right that the Lords temporal should meet *en corps* for the election of their twenty-eight, for whatever may be the reasons good or bad for confining the election to Lords qualifying in Ireland, there can be no good reason for deviating from your wise principles of never suffering them to *assemble* after the Union. But if you should persist in this plan, for God's sake maintain your proxies or you will risk the election of your list. It has come to my knowledge that Ponsonby has been negotiating with great exertions for a large force in the United House of Commons by arranging for the first seat in the boroughs that will be to send one, and he has succeeded to secure *nine* members; and I fear that, of your Irish one hundred, you must look to full two-thirds as voting with Opposition; which at present is immaterial, but which eventually may be very unpleasant. There is no provision in your Bill for the overslaugh in your episcopal roster of duty when the turn comes to a bishop who may be a peer of Great Britain, as in the case of Lord Bristol, though there is for a bishop who may be one of twenty-eight peers of Ireland.

"You say nothing about your Irish primacy. I hope and trust that it will end in Euseby Cleaver. You know how anxious I am for a proper man in that station, and my full persuasion that there is not an Irish bishop fit for it except him; nor do I believe that

you are better provided from the English bench, at least of those who will accept it.

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private and confidential.*

1800, March 27. Augsburg.—“I have little to add to my publick dispatches but the assurance of my firm belief that we have force enough to beat all that Buonaparte can bring against us. I cannot say how much I am pleased with Weyrother's promotion. Of all the staff officers I have yet seen with the Austrian army he is by far the most intelligent, and has the largest views. He is besides, if possible, more bold and enterprising than Chasteler, and, without at all despising his enemy, he is penetrated with the opinion that the French may be beaten even with inferior forces when skillfully attacked by troops *that will stand*. Your Lordship knows that he is the author of the plan of attack at Rivoli; acknowledged by Buonaparte himself to be a *chef d'œuvre* of military skill, and real talents *of the mind*. The Count le Lehrbach tells me that Buonaparte frequently spoke to him on the subject at Rastadt, advising him to preserve the man who had framed the plan of the battle of Rivoli as the most precious possession of the Austrian Empire. Between Schmidt, Chasteler, and Weyrother there is at this moment a re-union of talents at the Austrian head-quarters such as has never been assembled before. If all this is destined to be beaten, I can only say God's will be done, for in such a case (if ever) we may be allowed to say His hand was there, and that He has some great object in view beyond the reach of our faculties, of which the Consul is to be a leading instrument.

“I have no doubt but that all will do well in this part of the world, and I trust that your Lordship will be satisfied with the extent to which our levies will be carried, and with the promptitude with which they will be brought into the field. I am even not without hopes that the Austrians will, on this occasion at least, do us full justice.

“The contracts are most unquestionably made on most advantageous terms, and with people of undoubted responsibility. It is really scarcely possible, nor could I have believed it possible myself (till tired out with the imperfect manner in which my business was done by other people, and the unsatisfactory information I received, I determined to undertake the business myself, and to go through with it in its most minute details) that in the midst of the present scarcity of grain, with every article of life risen twenty-fold within these last three or four years, and in the very centre of such numerous armies regular and irregular, I could have contracted for the subsistence of cavalry at only two and twenty pence a horse per day, one with the other. Still less could I have believed, scarcely knowing the value of beef at market, that I could have done what is unquestionably the case, reduced the contracts of the whole Austrian army. I have said in my public dispatch that the reduction will be 7 per cent. only; but I am persuaded it will be still greater. The enclosed letter will show

your Lordship that the ration last year (and I am sure the prices have not diminished during the winter) was 1 florin 14 $\frac{1}{2}$  k[reutzers]. This sum, mentioned in Count Colloredo's letter, was the real price paid by the Austrians themselves. There are sixty kreutzers in the florin; the florin is worth nearly 1s 10d English, as, at par, eleven florins make a pound sterling. The Austrian ration is throughout the army the same, namely 8 lbs. of oats and 10 lbs. of hay. The Bavarians have two different rations, one rather larger, the other smaller than that of the Austrians. The average according to the new contract is about a florin; the average under the Elector was about a florin, twenty kreutzers. In short I have thoroughly satisfied myself that there is, in every administration of every army, a great deal of indolence and inattention, or a great deal of roguery. Your Lordship will hardly believe that yesterday morning, before I concluded the contract, the Count de Lehrbach sent to me his confidential secretary to advise me to recede something from the terms I had insisted on, which I peremptorily refused to do, and the whole was concluded at ten o'clock.

"I say nothing about the Swiss levies, because at last, and upon the whole, all will do well; but I have sworn never to have anything to do with your military men again unless they will learn their own business better before they come abroad, or have a more moderate opinion of their own knowledge and suffer themselves to be instructed. Besides, it is not to be conceived (bravery and presence of mind in the field excepted) how very, very cheap we are holden upon the Continent.

"With all this I pass many pleasant hours with Ramsay; and I shall be truly happy to see Clinton, who will be well received at head-quarters, where I am sure that, in consideration of his real merit, we shall establish rather a better opinion of British military talents. But of the other gentleman caricatures are drawn when he goes to inspect a regiment.

"I have not given my note to the Archduke. Have I done right or wrong? If wrong, my fault is a greivous one. But I trust, under all the circumstances, that the lie direct already given to M. Thugut by Lord Minto will be thought sufficient."

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO SPENCER SMITH.

*Private.*

1800, March 28. Cleveland Row.—"I have received your letter of the 15th of February with its inclosures. I very sincerely regret on your account what has passed since the arrival of Lord Elgin at Constantinople. I can answer for it that he went there with a desire to live well with you, and even that his first letters to me from thence expressed that hope. The failure of it I cannot with truth or justice impute to him, as far as I am able to judge from the papers which I have seen. And indeed I must fairly own that if I had no other information on the subject, the memorandum inclosed in your letter of the 15th of February would be sufficient to satisfy me upon it. It is extremely unfortunate that you have not had the opportunity, previous to your being engaged in the foreign line

in Turkey, to see the manner in which that business and his Majesty's service are carried on at other Courts. If you had, I am perfectly certain that the present misunderstanding could not have arisen. You would have seen that the relative situation of an Ambassador, and of the Secretary of Embassy at the same Court with the rank of Minister-Plenipotentiary, is a thing as well known, and as clearly defined as the respective subordination of rank and command of the king's military or naval officers. And so far from apprehending any degradation by finding yourself in the same situation in which men of your own standing in life and of the first families in this country are so frequently placed, by the appointment of Ambassadors or Ministers to those Courts where they have resided as Secretaries of Embassy or Legation with the rank of Minister, or without it, you would have seen in all the arrangements which I have made on the subject the same uniform desire of preserving to you the means of finding at Constantinople a permanent, secure, and honourable station, requiring only on your part diligence and temper, and that due subordination which belongs to every profession and line of life in which any man seeks advancement.

"I have on a former occasion written to you as my official duty required, to explain to you that, of which I am persuaded you were unapprised, but which you would at once have seen if the course of events had thrown you sooner into the foreign line, or given you any opportunity of observing it elsewhere than in Turkey. The present is a letter strictly private, in which I write to you with the openness of one who has sincerely endeavoured both from good wishes to you, and from regard to your brother, to promote your interests. The best and indeed the only advice I can give to you is that where you have been under a misapprehension and error, very naturally to be accounted for, you should apply yourself with cheerfulness to set it right. With respect to your request of leave of absence, I have before explained to you the motives which have led me not to lay it before the King; they are motives of kindness and good will to you. Coming away under the present circumstances, your return to Turkey, or your appointment to any other southern mission, are points which I neither could nor ought to recommend, for such a line of conduct on my part would be directly subversive of that subordination which it is my duty to require and enforce in this line of service; nor have I indeed, under any circumstances, ever held out to you the expectation of a removal to another Court, seeing no probability of my being able to gratify such expectations if I had raised them.

"It would have been far more agreeable to me not to have been under the necessity of writing to you at all on these subjects, but when that necessity existed I feel that I could not better prove my good wishes towards you, than by writing to you fully and without reserve." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MINTO.

*Private.*

1800, March 28th. Cleveland Row.—"You will easily suppose the impatience which we have felt while the ice has locked up all

communication with the Continent; especially as the French have been all the time spreading continual reports of negotiations with Austria, the death of the Emperor, and other fables.

“The thing which strikes me as the worst in the whole of our present situation is Thugut’s obstinacy in removing, from private pique and jealousy, the Archduke Charles from his command. It is impossible to hope that Kray will create the same confidence in the army, or that he will dare to act with equal energy against the French, or against the factions in his own army. I conclude, however, that the step is now irrevocably taken, and we must make the best of it.

“The Egyptian capitulation is a most mortifying event, and may well put a less peevish man than Thugut extremely out of humour with his allies. I am almost as much grieved at the discredit which this affair throws on Sir S. Smith, as I am at the thing itself; for he had deserved so well of the country by his conduct at Acre, that it is a cruel thing to have to condemn and to disavow him. Thugut will, I doubt not, be very angry that we do not break the capitulation. I really think that, very *strictly* speaking, we have a right so to do; but I am sure you will agree with us that for such a country as this, the bringing the public faith even into any sort of question is a thing not to be done even for such an object as this would have been.

“What we are doing in the Mediterranean, as well as the powers which you and Wickham have received for pecuniary exertions in the Empire, must at least prove to Thugut that we are heartily bent on assisting his efforts. But I fear it will all end in a separate Austrian peace, whenever Bonaparte feels himself sufficiently pressed to think it worth his while to give the conditions, whatever they are, which Thugut means to require.

“We have received the account to-day that the Union resolutions have passed the House of Lords in Ireland. Nothing now remains but the address, which was expected to pass without a division. We shall have the whole here before Easter, and proceed upon it immediately after.” *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to WILLIAM WICKHAM.

*Private.*

1800, March 28. Cleveland Row.—“I am grieved at the account of your two illnesses. What you have done has been done in the same masterly style which distinguishes your work from that of all other artists in the same line. But do not forget how much more remains for you to do, and how much depends on you. Manage yourself therefore, and save your strength, for without you the whole will be at a stand. Your excuses and your assurances of zeal and exertion to the utmost of your strength were more than unnecessary after the experience of so many years.

“Our Union labours are drawing to their close. We expect the resolutions here before Easter, and shall proceed upon them immediately after. Little or no opposition is to be apprehended here. Speeches and declamations of course, but that artillery has lost its effect.” *Copy.*

## E. COOKE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, March 28. Dublin.—“The Union Resolutions and Address go over this night. I trust they will be found correct, and I have no doubt they will come back unaltered. It occurs to me that the best mode for inserting the countervailing duties will be to move a separate schedule, and resolve that it will be fit to propose that the said schedule should make part of the schedule No. 2 of the 6th Article of Union, and then Ireland will incorporate it.

“There was little opposition of consequence in the Lords, the majority for confirming the report was 50.

“We passed yesterday the amendments of the Lords and the address in the Commons with little opposition and remark. Opposition did not attend in force, the policy of which I cannot conceive. They rely solely upon their exertions in the country.

“There are some disturbances in Tipperary owing in a degree to tythe. The introduction of that question by Sir John Macartney was very insidious, and if Lord Castlereagh had not taken the decisive step of quieting the subject of agistment tythe by a bill, there is no calculating the mischief which might have ensued. I hope all is now right, and that we shall be able to prevent any general flame of opposition spreading through the kingdom.”

## HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, March 29. Wimbledon.—“Mr. Pitt seems to entertain the same idea you have as to the propriety of continuing the levy of the Albanian corps, and, in truth, my doubts were of so slender a nature it is not worth giving you the trouble of discussion upon it, and I shall therefore immediately write to direct the levy to be continued

“From your information on the views and politics of Russia you are much better qualified to combine the different informations respecting them than I am, and I think it right to send you the enclosed extract of a letter which William Broderick of the India Board has received from his brother Colonel Broderick. Considering the eagerness they seem to have for the sovereignty of Malta, I cannot comprehend how they should industriously withhold their force from giving any aid in the reduction of it. If it falls by our means alone, they are perfectly at our mercy whether we will allow them to put a garrison into it.”

## H. FAGEL to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, March 29. Duke Street.—“I am not quite certain whether in mentioning to you this morning some of the circumstances of Baron Spaen's mission I did not omit one which is material. It is that both M. de Spaen himself and his family have always been and still are steady and zealous adherents of the House of Orange. Some family connexions with M. de Haersolte, one of the Directors, who is also of a noble family in Gelderland, have occasioned his taking this commission upon himself.”

STATE OF THE MILITARY FORCE OF GREAT BRITAIN, EXCLUSIVE  
OF THAT ALLOTTED FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN.

1800, April 2.—Regiments of the Line in Ireland, after allotting  
the 26th, 46th, and 82nd to the Mediterranean :—

15th Regiment.	1st Battalion	-	-	834
	2nd „	-	-	897
16th „	-	-	-	847
20th „	1st Battalion	-	-	742
	2nd „	-	-	723
62nd „	2nd „	-	-	800
56th „	-	-	-	792
				<hr/>
Two Brigades of Guards	-	-	-	5,635
				4,000
				<hr/>
				9,635

Regiments of the Line which will remain in England (after the  
expedition to the Mediterranean, and after sending the 65th to the  
Cape, and the 60th and 69th to the West Indies), first ready for  
service :—

63rd Regiment	-	-	-	646
1st „	2nd Battalion	-	-	624
2nd „	-	-	-	568
23rd „	-	-	-	600
25th „	-	-	-	472
27th „	-	-	-	1,243
29th „	-	-	-	566
49th „	-	-	-	470
55th „	-	-	-	460
79th „	-	-	-	376
85th „	-	-	-	1,346
92nd „	-	-	-	706
				<hr/>
				8,077

Regiments come from Ireland, and which may be supposed ready  
for service by the 1st June :—

1st Battalion.	Royals	-	-	883
13th Regiment	-	-	-	806
54th „	-	-	-	1,241
64th „	-	-	-	913
68th „	2 Battalions	-	-	2,013
				<hr/>
				5,856

To which may be added from the Irish Militia - 3,000

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8,856

Expected in June and July from Gibraltar and North America :—

28th Regiment	-	-	-	660
24th „	-	-	-	639
26th „	-	-	-	616
				<hr/>
				1,915

These by recruiting may, it is supposed, be augmented on their arrival to 3,000.

Recruiting, or expected from the West Indies :—

21st Regiment	-	-	-	-	246
32nd	„	-	-	-	96
38th	„	-	-	-	373
43rd	„	-	-	-	251
71st?	„	-	-	-	219
72nd	„	-	-	-	173
Suth <sup>d</sup>	-	-	-	-	400
					1,758

These regiments by recruiting may probably be brought to between 3 or 4,000 men and be fit for home service in the course of the summer.

The Guards it is supposed may be carried in an early part of the summer to their establishment, and may then furnish 3,000 men, in addition to the two brigades at present allotted to Ireland, which it is also hoped may then be withdrawn (leaving 5,600 of the Line in Ireland).

This will furnish an addition of - - 7,000

The result is, that there are in the first instance

left disposable for active service about	-	8,000
By the 1st of June an addition of about	-	9,000
In July, (or as soon after as the regiments from Gibraltar and North America are completed)	-	3,000
When the Guards are completed and two Brigades recalled from Ireland	-	7,000
Making in the course of the year a force applicable to active Service	-	27,000
And leaving in Great Britain about 2,000 Guards, and Six Regiments recruited to 3 or 4,000 men	-	5,500
And in Ireland Regiments of the Line to about the same number	-	5,500
		11,000
		Total, 38,000

#### H. FAGEL to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, April 4. Duke Street.—“As it will be necessary to give some account of your conversation of this morning with M. de Spaen to the Hereditary Prince, M. de Stamford, Mollerus, and others, I take the liberty to send to you the substance of what I mean to write, and shall be much obliged to you to send it back to me with such alterations as you may think proper, in order that I may be sure of saying nothing more than what you stated.”

*Enclosure*, endorsed by Lord Grenville :—*Minute to be given to M. DE SPAEN by M. FAGEL.*

1800, April 9, London.—“ Le Gouvernement Britannique voit très peu d'apparence que l'accord projeté puisse se réaliser d'une manière satisfaisante. N'ayant aucune connoissance des dispositions de la cour de Berlin à cet égard, il ne peut y en faire la proposition. Si les gouvernans actuels en Hollande désirent de donner quelque suite à cette affaire, c'est là qu'ils devraient s'adresser en premier lieu, pour que le ministère Prussien en parle au ministre du Roi à Berlin, et en s'expliquant clairement sur les sûretés que l'on pourroit donner en pareil cas pour les intérêts de l'Angleterre, et ceux du gouvernement légitime des Provinces-Unies.

“ Ce n'est que dans ce cas qu'il pourroit être utile que le ministre du Roi entrât dans la discussion d'un arrangement fondé sur les trois bases suivantes, c'est à dire.

1. “ Garantie expresse et positive du Roi de Prusse que, soit à la paix, soit auparavant, le gouvernement Stadthoudérien doit être rétabli dans la personne du Prince d'Orange.

2. “ Engagement également exprès et positif de maintenir vis-à-vis de la France la neutralité des Provinces-Unies pendant toute la guerre, et même de la soutenir en cas de besoin par les armes : et de s'entendre avec l'Angleterre sur les sûretés ultérieures que l'on pourra donner à cette dernière sur ce point essentiel.

3. “ Un arrangement propre à empêcher que la France ne profite du masque du commerce Hollandois pour rétablir pendant la guerre le sien, maintenant détruit par la supériorité de la marine Angloise,

“ Tout en donnant ces explications le gouvernement Britannique, jaloux d'éviter jusqu'à l'apparence la plus éloigné de mauvaise foi, croit devoir déclarer qu'il n'entend contracter par là aucune espèce d'obligation de s'abstenir, soit pendant le cours de la discussion qui pourra avoir lieu, soit, à plus forte raison, dans l'état actuel des choses, des mesures qu'il pourra juger avantageuses à l'Angleterre, et propres à assurer le succès de la présente campagne et à délivrer la Hollande du joug François.”

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, April 6. Wimbledon.—“ After a very fine ride of two hours, and the enjoyment of a very fine day, I can assure you I have no disposition to go to town sooner than Tuesday when I must go, and therefore I withdraw my summons ; but if I find a further conference necessary, you must lay your account with riding over to breakfast to Wimbledon, where I would summon Mr. Pitt to meet you. In truth it is not so pressing by a day or two, as Sir Charles Stuart, who meant to set out on Tuesday, will be detained a day or two by the death of his uncle Mr. Stuart Mackenzie.”

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, April 7. Stowe.—“ Many thanks to you for your Austrian detail, which is indeed very gratifying, if we did not know how

uncertain the result of Vienna operations always must be whether for war or peace. The whole of that system is so crooked that I shall dread very much the consequences of any escapade of your Russian; and the impression on the public mind from any separation from him will be very discouraging. I trust therefore that, though he may snort and throw the bit out of his mouth for a moment, yet that you will ultimately bring him back to his curb. Most sincerely do I deplore your resolution to allow the return of Kleiber, and though I think I see your difficulties, yet I cannot conceive them of sufficient magnitude to induce such a decision. It was necessary that the example of the total loss of that execrable army should have been held out to all posterity as a signal and terrible warning; and it did not require the pen of Bonaparte to tell you (as he does in his letter to Kleiber) that if he can get this army safe out of Egypt for the present he should think the reputation of the French arms saved. As far as I understand the Vienna account of this treaty, the ships (of which there are two Venetian 64's) remain to France, and are to be navigated under Turkish colours; and if they are to embark within three months, they will arrive at Toulon about the beginning of June, exactly at the most critical moment of the campaign, with no tie of them save an engagement not to serve; the breach of which promise your allies nor you never can detect, and at all events they can serve in the Vendée or any disturbed part of France. I sincerely wish that I could guide Paul's head, with the bridle between his teeth, to this object, and I should forgive much of any other escapade. I conclude (though you do not say it) that you expect Malta and Genoa to fall immediately. I am very uneasy that the first holds out, for I think it most material to every Mediterranean view (in peace) that this should be out of French hands as soon as possible. What a heart-breaking disaster is this of Lord Keith's ship and crew! I have very little doubt but that the newspaper account of the cause of the accident is true; and I have been often astonished that accidents have not more frequently arisen from the same cause, on which I have had so decided an opinion that I have a contrivance fixed to my guns to avoid this very accident of the sparks flying from the lighted match.

"I am very uneasy about your twenty-eight Irish peers, for I have already been written to in confidence to solicit my vote for one who is not to be one of the Government twenty-eight, though he votes with them. The number of Lords temporal voting with Government, including proxies, is only fifty-two; consequently a combination of any twenty-eight (even if they should be unassisted by Opposition) would return the election against the Government list; and *this idea has been in circulation*. All that can be done is to endeavour to secure the election by means of proxies; and indeed there does not seem any reason for complimenting away the influence of Government (through proxies) in the first election, though you may be disposed to this sacrifice in the subsequent elections. If this cannot be, you must send over every Lord you can influence to assist in the election, or you will lose it; and I do not fancy that you will much like the addition of twenty-eight

wrong-headed men in the House of Lords superadded to those who are already there.

“I am very glad that you are pursuing the idea of preventing the marriage of adulterers; but I wish you would consider the idea of punishing by imprisonment, as a misdemeanour, the seducer, by criminal prosecution; for the compromise of damages is now, I believe, *always* a preliminary proceeding; at least I can name to you three or four late cases in which I know that it has been done.

“As to your ‘*Heads of a Church Bill*,’ they certainly do not come up to my expectations, for there is no sort of check or control upon the bishops; and I am persuaded that in very many cases the fault, from various causes of timidity, weakness, indolence, and job, is to be ascribed to the *custodes*; and I think it is obvious where you are to look for the *quis custodiat*. If you look to the present Bench you will see how few there are upon whom these various causes do not operate, even in instances where the law at present gives them full powers. Upon the same principles I cannot approve of repealing the statute for lay prosecutions for non-residence, because, though I agree with you as to the *animus* of the prosecutor, the defaulter whom the bishop will not punish is thereby brought to trial. But I very much [wish] you to consider the idea of suffragan bishops, for, upon comparing the numbers of these very essential commanding officers with the similar establishment in every other Christian Church, it is astonishing how very inadequate the number appears; and I am persuaded that even Chester (well as it was administered by bishop Cleaver) would have been assisted most usefully by a subordinate rank of bishop. Many things please me very much in your plan, but I doubt whether the present establishment of our universities is adequate to the immense supply that would be required, certainly not less than 8,000. You take no notice of my idea respecting the leases of the lands given in lieu of tithe to our parochial clergy.”

#### W. PITT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, April 8. Hollwood.—“I enclose you a letter which I have received from Cooke with a draft of the proposed Act of Union, and also of that for settling the Irish elections, both of which it will be very useful if you have time to look over and to correct. Whenever you have done so have the goodness to send them me back.”

*Postscript*.—“There is also a letter from the Bishop of Ferns, on the subject of the precedency of bishops. I think I ought to show it to the Archbishop, but I should like first to know what you think.”

#### EARL TEMPLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, April 8. Stowe.—“I see by the papers of this day that Stewart Mackenzie, Lord Privy Seal of Scotland, is dead. As this event may probably occasion a step in the Scotch ladder of promotion which may remove Silvester Douglas from the Treasury, I am sure I need not remind you of the very great kindness with

which, when I last saw you in town, you expressed your wishes to assist me in my future objects. I therefore do not lose a moment in sending a servant with this letter, and in putting this business entirely into your hands. If you think it necessary for me to come up to town, or if anything is to be done, I will beg of you to send back the servant immediately, as I can in that case be in town by to-morrow evening. The servant has directions in case you are out of town to leave this letter in Cleveland Row, to be forwarded to you by the messenger."

LORD MINTO to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1800, April 9. Vienna.—“I shall dispatch a messenger to your Lordship to-morrow; but I will not omit the opportunity of a Turkish messenger passing through Vienna to say merely that, since the date of my last, I have had an interval of considerable anxiety, as the delay in acquainting you with the effect of your Lordship's late instructions may have led you to imagine; but that I am now happy in being able to assure your Lordship that the prospect is as good as ever. I have had recourse to strong language, and to considerable warmth, which appear to have operated; but a *little time* is an ingredient necessary in all measures whether of persuasion or coercion, and it was not till last night that I obtained the satisfaction which I wished. Colonel Ramsay is here. The *corps de Condé* begins its march this day, and I have apprized Lord Keith of its destination. I flatter myself every thing will be ready for its embarkation about the first week of June. I have also requested Lord Keith to communicate the same information to the commander in chief at Minorca.”

*Postscript*—“Captain Proby is here with Colonel Ramsay and in good health. I acquainted him with Lord Carysfort's appointment. He is under great alarm on account of the *Danae*, as we have heard no particulars. I confess that I share his anxiety, having conceived a real regard and affection for Lord Proby.

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, April 9. Somerset Place.—“Agreeable to your permission I have stopped your despatches, and return them to you. Mr. Pitt came to Wimbledon on Tuesday forenoon and, however averse he was to relax from his former opinion, he was at last satisfied it was impossible to send any thing more of the force to the Mediterranean than that already embarked without hearing from Sir Charles Stuart after his interview with Mr. Wickham. I send you the note from Sir Charles Stuart which I mentioned to you in my note on Sunday, and I send you likewise the explanatory note which, upon my desiring it, he sent to Mr. Huskisson. Upon the perusal of these you will immediately perceive the impression they made upon me. It is shortly this; if the Emperor will give us upon payment for them the assistance in horses, waggons, provisions, which an army of 15,000 men or more will require, there is then

the possibility of being prepared to take advantage of circumstances, if favourable ones occur, to enable such an army to proceed within land; but, if the army is not furnished with these essential requisites, it never can be above a day or two at most from its ships, which in that case must answer the purpose of horses, waggons, magazines. Is there any thing in the conduct of Austria, in the despatches recently received, or in your own conviction as to justify us in the belief that these essential requisites will be supplied by Austria? We have no reason to suppose any such thing, and, under a state of such absolute uncertainty, it would really be madness to put the best part of the force of the country so totally out of the way of being at all employed. This matter will be cleared up by Sir Charles Stuart proceeding to head-quarters and learning what the dispositions are. If the supply is to be forwarded, the additional troops may be sent. If it is not, Sir Charles must content himself with having a moveable force and squadron to make as material diversions as he can. For this purpose the force already in the Mediterranean, or going there, is perfectly sufficient. And in the meantime, till we hear from Sir Charles, the transports and troops most ready may be without delay employed in the attempt on Belleisle, which certainly, in every view, would be the preferable object at this precise moment."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, April 10. Downing Street.—“I certainly would give you the trouble of coming to Wimbledon if I thought any good would arise from it, but I do not think there would. I have had another full conversation with Sir Charles Stuart, and I am perfectly positive that unless he feels from his conversation with Mr. Wickham that the Austrians are sincere and zealous to the full amount of the service on which he is sent, it must end ultimately in his disgrace and consequently in that of his country. He seemed astonished and staggered at my recital of your doubts that the Austrians would give him any cavalry, of which they have more than they can have any use for. He is clear as to impropriety of bringing the cavalry from Portugal without knowing a precise point to which they can be brought. There is neither accommodation nor food to keep them at Minorca. I send you back the despatch for Mr. Wickham in the manner I think, under the present circumstances, it can go; you will see however that I go upon the supposition of your likewise writing to Lord Minto, and, if he makes any communication to Mr. Wickham, which he should be authorised to do, I don't think the loss of time will be longer than, at all events, those necessary measures would create. I had almost forgot to mention that General Stuart hopes you will give no encouragement to the idea of having a number of new-raised Piedmontese put under his command in the Mediterranean.”

LORD GRENVILLE to SIR CHARLES WHITWORTH.

*Private.*

1800, April 11. Dropmore.—“This letter and the accom-

panying dispatch are sent by a Russian messenger. It is probable that he will very soon be followed by one whom I have it in contemplation to send. By this occasion, therefore, I shall only mention to you that your leave of absence is sent in consequence of a desire conveyed to me through Count W[oronzow] that there might be a new minister appointed to the Court of Petersburg.

“I reserve all details on this subject, and on those which relate to your own situation here, and will only assure you of my sincere and invariable regard, founded, as you know, not in personal acquaintance, but in a long course of upright and meritorious public service.” *Copy.*

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1800, April 15. Louisburg.—“I should be quite spoiled by the three or four last private letters which I have received from your Lordship if I had not been so long accustomed to your kindness and indulgence. As long as I shall continue to receive the same approbation of my labours your Lordship may be assured that I shall think myself more than sufficiently rewarded.

“Your Lordship had given me the devil of a mission here; between the violence of the one and the mildness of the other I thought I should inevitably have gotten into some awkward scrape. I feared at first indeed that I should at least have been hanged, drawn and quartered. But it was soon perceived that I was not to be taken in that way, and milder methods were attempted; to which I answered immediately with all possible fairness and openness, but in a firm and decided manner, to the effect stated in my public note A; and from that moment I cannot say too much in praise of the manner in which the whole business has been conducted. Notwithstanding that a distinction, and I trust a proper one, has been made between Ludwisburg and Munich, yet your Lordship will not fail to observe that I am still greatly within the discretionary powers granted to me, and that we are a long way within the Cassel treaty of 1793. Mayence and Wurtzburg, as still more deserving, must be treated in the same manner, and we must, in fact though not in words, allow to each of them to carry a small portion of their contingents to the account of the subsidiary troops, otherwise the treaty will really bear too hard on them, and they will be obliged, from absolute necessity, to do their utmost to cheat us. Upon the Bavarians I would have no mercy, for, God knows, they deserve none from anybody.

“I hope your Lordship will not be too much alarmed at Lord Minto’s No. 16, of which I have this instant received a copy. Were it not for the great political example so very necessary to give to the world at this moment, I should say that you are all wrong about Piedmont, and that the most desirable thing that could happen for us would be the delivering the guard of the French frontiers into the hands of the House of Austria. This has been uniformly my opinion, and is not the consequence of any new hopes created by the present prospect of renewing the Austrian

alliance. If you could obtain the Milanese for the King of Sardinia, with Parma and Genoa, I should then think otherwise. Short of that he will ever remain *the little King that lives on the road from Venice to Paris*.

“Thugut’s ill-humour arises principally from bills coming in upon him faster than he can pay them ; and indeed, when I witness the enormous expenses incurred for the support of this army here, it is matter of astonishment to me how they can possibly go on as they do with their finances in so very disordered a state. I verily believe they have not advanced less than £450,000 this winter to the different States of the Empire who have been in want of assistance to enable them to keep up their troops, and to the different levies of militia and armed peasants that have been made between Basle and Mayence.

“Surely Lord Minto was authorized to pay the first £200,000 forthwith. I fear that this delay and the history of the Legations will cause a material delay in the opening of the campaign. Their hopes on the side of Italy have been grievously disappointed. Bad administration and unwise political conduct have prevented their drawing from that country the half of the resources which it would otherwise have furnished. In one word, money you must give them ; for, without money, they cannot possibly go on, and without them we can do nothing.

“Proby is gone with Ramsay to Lintz. On his return I will execute your Lordship’s commission which will give him the greatest pleasure and satisfaction. I shall myself be sincerely sorry to lose him. He is a very good and a very clever lad, but he passed here a life of idleness. He liked Ramsay very much as a pleasant companion, and a gentlemanlike man, but he had a very mean opinion of his military talents, and therefore the sooner he is taken away from him the better.

“I wait General Stuart’s arrival with great impatience. I wish he were already in the Mediterranean, as our operations here must be guided and determined by those of Italy.

“I do not much like the state of things in the interior at this particular moment. In spite of everything, many people are fools enough to believe that Buonaparte means to restore the royal family.”

*Postscript.*—“I am obliged, though sorry for it on many accounts, to suffer the Baron de Roll to go away. He is so terribly anti-Austrian and so impenitently French, that he does serious mischief without intending it. I wish much however that your Lordship would give him to understand that I see him go away with regret. He had been foolish enough to imagine that I should give him the command of the Swiss corps for which he is totally unfit, and because that cannot be, and because I cannot, with every wish in favour of such a measure, displace Bachman, he says he cannot remain here any longer with honour.

“I hear to-day that Lord Carysfort is going to Berlin. Without knowing much of his Lordship’s means or talents, I am heartily glad of this appointment, as the Minister will act under your Lordship’s immediate and confidential direction.

"This point becomes every day more and more important, as the French are doing everything in their power to get at Petersburg through Berlin, the mischievous consequences of which attempt, should it succeed, are beyond calculation. And they have now so many points of contact with all manner of countries and all manner of persons in Europe, that the utmost vigilance of the ablest and most quick-sighted Minister that ever was employed on a foreign mission would not be sufficient to discover half their secret intrigues and negotiations.

"I think, as I have had occasion to say before, and my opinion is the result of much observation and reflection, that the *disinterested* proclamation offered by M. Thugut is better than a *royalist* one, and will be more serviceable to the Royalists themselves.

"Clinton and Booth are arrived. I will acknowledge their arrival by the first occasion.

"I shall be very glad to know that I have got into no scrape *at home* by my conduct here, and shall be truly thankful to your Lordship for a line to tell me the real truth on that subject.

"From everything I can observe and collect, the Duchess appears to be satisfied and happy here. The Duke is certainly full of attentions to her, which those who live constantly in the family (and I have among them a very old friend and acquaintance) assure me are not assumed on this occasion."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Secret.*

1800, April 15. Hollwood.—"You will probably have learned by this time from Dundas, that he abandons the idea of hanging up the Mediterranean plan for the issue of Stuart's mission, and wishes to decide at once on sending no more than 5,000 men thither, and keeping the rest of our force in a state to avail itself of openings nearer home, in a way very conformable to what you seem to have in view. This remaining disposable force he counts upon only as 25,000 infantry in the first instance, but it certainly in the course of the year will furnish not less than from 34 to 37,000, and may, I think, give great means (if well applied) of harassing and distracting the enemy, and perhaps (under very favourable circumstances) of striking some important blow. On the whole I think we have nothing better now in our power.

"I had at last on Saturday a very long conversation with the Archbishop, who enters warmly into our plan as far as relates to the augmentation of livings, and the summary power of suspension to enforce residence; but he seems to think the line of residence too strictly drawn, and is full of apprehensions as to the system of inspection and report. I fear we cannot proceed further, till I have an opportunity of talking over with you all he stated."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, April 17. Downing Street.—"Two on Saturday will suit perfectly for me, and I will be ready for you at half-past one. I

am ashamed of having forgot the Condé army, on which I had only to say that I quite agree with you in the obvious necessity of countermanding their march to Leghorn, and that I now see no use to be made of them so good as joining them to Wickham's Swiss, to act under the best conditions he can make for them with the Austrians.

"I have unluckily a slight bilious attack which has obliged me to defer our business in the House till Monday."

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, April 19.—"Il y a bien longtems que je n'ai eu l'honneur de vous voir. Je n'ai rien eu de ma cour si ce n'est la nouvelle de l'arrivée du courier retenu si longtems à Yarmouth. Je voulais vous demander si vous aviez reçu quelqu' information ; et comme M. Frere m'avait averti qu'on expédioit un courier ce soir, je craignais que vous n'eussiez peut-être quelque communication à me faire, et que le tems ne vous le permit pas. Vous savez que Thugut me soit mauvais gré quand vos couriers ne lui apportent point de renseignemens de ma part.

"Savez vous que notre ambassadeur en Espagne est mort. Comme l'esprit de vilainie d'argent dirige toujours ma cour dans ses dispositions vis-à-vis de ses employés, pourquoi ne reformeroit on pas l'ambassade d'Espagne pour l'établir ici ? Que dites vous de cette idée ? Elle me paroît digne de nos deux cours et de leur intimité actuelle. Si vous l'approuviez, je crois qu'il seroit à propos que vous vous hâtiez d'en donner *le hint* ; ce seroit bien le moment ou jamais."

LORD LOUGHBOROUGH to [LORD GRENVILLE].

1800, April 20.—"Mr. Erskine states that, upon his last arrival at Lisbon, a rumour prevailed there of the intended hostility of the Court of Spain. Mr. Walpole had told him that Pinto appeared to be very much alarmed at the last dispatches received from Madrid. This led Mr. Erskine to make such inquiry as his former connections at Lisbon enabled him to do. The Portuguese Commissary of War informed him that there was not the least movement on the side of Spain which indicated a preparation for war ; and, from the scarcity in Portugal as well as in Spain, it was not possible on either side to collect any respectable force before the month of June ; and from that time to September, the want of water on all the frontier to the south of the Tagus renders the approach of a Spanish army almost impracticable. The northern part of Portugal continues to be in a very good state of defence owing to the activity of a General Calder, who has commanded there for a considerable time, and the zeal of the Archbishop of Braga. By their united efforts, the country to the northward of Oporto is armed and in a condition to repel any attack which the force that Spain could collect in that quarter might attempt. The Portuguese Commissary had received no directions to form any magazines, but said he should be provided much sooner than the Spaniards could

be; which, Mr. Erskine observes, is not a vain boast as the Portuguese paper is only 16 per cent. below par, and the Spanish 46. He adds that Pinto is always disposed to exaggerate every alarm, as the great object of his own alarm is the Duke de la Foens, who at present has excluded him entirely from the military department, which would necessarily revert to him if there was such an appearance of danger as should bring a British army into Portugal, for no British general could act with the Duke de la Foens.

“Though this statement does not affect the measure proposed yesterday in any respect, I thought you would not dislike to receive it.”

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, April 20. Wimbledon.—“I have this morning been furnished with the drafts of instructions to Sir Charles Stuart, together with your notes, all of which I shall attend to; only I think it right to mention to you that it is never the practice to send orders about the civil government till we hear of the surrender and the conditions under which it is made. From the particular circumstances of this case it was necessary to take care that nothing in the first instance shall be done to interfere with the ultimate arrangement that may take place, and accordingly Sir Charles Stuart is particularly instructed on that point. I have not the treaty with Russia by me as to Malta, but, if my recollection is right, neither the Grand Master of the Order of Malta or his deputy, *as such*, under the agreement have any thing to do with it, until the island is restored to the Order *at a general peace, or at such earlier period as may be agreed upon by mutual consent*. So that I am sure we are acting accurately within both the words and the spirit of the treaty. I hope in God you will be able to make such an arrangement with Russia as may secure to us, *as a naval power*, all the advantages which the island of Malta possesses. I send you the perusal of a few sheets extracted from a French publication. They are of course wrote with the view of colouring highly the importance of the new acquisition, but, in truth, the exaggeration is very small. To France its value is incalculable.”

#### WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1800, April 22. Louisburg.—“I am much hurried to-day by pressing messages from General Kray to hasten the equipment, march, and arrival of the Bavarian and Wurtemberg troops. I am therefore obliged to write less both of public and private letters than I could have wished.

“I will not however omit this opportunity of strongly recommending to your Lordship, in case I should be able to send you some very good accounts from hence, to procure some honourable testimony of satisfaction and favour either directly or indirectly from the King. I should much wish also, in case I should have it in my power to speak handsomely of the services of any of the

subsidiary troops, that they may be acknowledged to their respective Courts. These are instruments that in times like these ought not to be neglected, though I should be as sorry as any one to see them used with prodigality.

“Another thing I wish to mention is, though I believe I should also do it openly, that the Elector of Bavaria and the Duke of Wurtemberg have given each of them a very handsome watch to Major de Varicourt, the Swiss staff officer whom I have employed to regulate with persons respectively appointed by the Elector and the Duke for that purpose; namely the Baron des Deux Ponts on the part of the Elector, and Colonel Varenbuhler on the part of the Duke.”

LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

1800, April 23. Cleveland Row.—“I return to you the paper you sent me about Malta. I received long ago the French pamphlet from which it is extracted, and which, to say the truth, never appeared to me to be entitled to the least attention.

“It is unquestionably true that, in the hands of France, Malta might prove a naval station of some, but I conceive not of very great, importance in time of war; though it is little likely that a naval war will ever hereafter, as it has now happened, be carried on between Great Britain and France in the seas of the Levant.

“In time of peace it is, I think, demonstrable that Malta could be of no use to us or France, for we have both of us direct access to all the ports and countries of the Mediterranean and want no emporium; and, if we did want any, Minorca is for that purpose as well situated, and is, for a naval station, much better situated than Malta.

“As for arrangements with Russia, I own that I despair, and when you read the despatches you will probably do so likewise, of being able to conclude any thing with that Court just now; but especially on the very point on which the Emperor is most sore.

“My opinion therefore clearly is to leave the thing as it is; to satisfy ourselves with the advantage of having Malta rather in the hands of Russia than of France; and not to attempt to open any fresh negotiation at Petersburg on the subject.” *Copy.*

The EARL OF DARNLEY to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, April 23. Berkeley Square.—“I feel it my duty to submit to your consideration the following observations on the 4th article of the Union with Ireland before the discussion of this most important subject is again renewed in the House of Peers on Friday next. In conformity to what appeared to be the general sense of the House when we went into the committee and voted the 3 first articles, I forebore to express in the strongest and most decided terms my general approbation of the measure as I had intended, and, at the same time, to take the opportunity of suggesting to Government before the discussion itself took place, the objections which strike my mind very forcibly to one particular point, I mean the

*continuance of a limited prerogative of creating Irish peers.* It appears to me that of the 3 choices which presented themselves, the Irish Parliament have chosen the worst. If the prerogative is to remain, does it not afford a dangerous precedent to limit and circumscribe it, and is it not an innovation in this part of the Constitution which nothing short of absolute necessity can sufficiently justify? In this case nothing like necessity appears. The precedent of Scotland points out the natural and obvious course to be followed. Ireland by the Union is to be extinguished as a distinct and separate kingdom, and, therefore, plain constitutional analogy prescribes (if I mistake not) that distinct and separate peerages for that kingdom should cease to be created. After the Union the king himself will cease to be king of Ireland as a separate kingdom, and therefore might with equal propriety create peers of Scotland or Wales as of that kingdom which will merge, as the others have done, in the British empire. Peers of the British empire are the only constitutional peers of whom I can have any idea after the Union shall have taken place.

“If there be any weight in what I have advanced, I do not think the reasons which have been given for this deviation from former precedent will be sufficient to counterbalance it. It is true that the circumstance of many of the Scottish peerages descending to heirs general, while the Irish are all limited to heirs male, makes the probable extinction of the latter much more rapid and certain than of the former. Considering however the present numbers of the Irish peerage, it is not probable that they will be reduced very low before the Union shall have taken the full effect reasonably to be expected from it in identifying the two countries; and then, whether peers are sent from Ireland or not will, as it appears to me, be of little or no consequence, or rather it will be better that they should not, and that every trace of separation or distinctness should, even in this comparatively immaterial instance, be obliterated. In a word, why should we introduce a great constitutional innovation without necessity or (as I conceive) even expediency to justify it? If any such can be proved to exist, and you will take the trouble to point it out to me, I shall be most happy to acquiesce in this part also, as I do most cordially in every other of this great and important arrangement. If not, I shall be obliged in this particular point to withhold the approbation I am so anxious to give to this measure; and trust you will agree with me in thinking that, by making this previous communication of my ideas on the subject, I act the most fair and friendly part to you and the other members of Administration.”

#### COUNT WORONZOW TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, April 23. Harley Street.—“Après que nous nous sommes séparé hier, j’ai vue le Général George [Georges Cadoudal] et son compagnon. Il n’a cessé parler de l’effet que le séjour des Russes aux isles faisoit dans l’intérieur de la France, et même sur Bonaparte, et que l’attente de leurs débarquement étoit incomode au Consul, et que s’il s’effectuait, pouvoit être très décisif. Comme ni

vous ni moi nous ne pouvons rien faire sur ce sujet, j'ai cru devoir conseiller au Comte d'Artois d'envoyer ces deux personnes à Mittau auprès du Roi, en priant sa majesté de les expédier à l'Empereur pour lui donner tous les détails de l'état des choses en France. Qui sait si cela ne réveillera pas le zèle de l'Empereur, n'exitera de nouveau son enthousiasme d'être un des principaux instruments pour le rétablissement de la monarchie en France ; et comme nos troupes ne peuvent être habillées que vers la moitié de juin, et par conséquent ne peuvent pas partir avant on auroit le tems d'avoir la réponse, je suis sûr que *Monsieur* vous consultera. Ne découragez pas, je vous supplie, cette idée, en cas que ce prince l'approuve. Faites moi l'amitié de me dire votre opinion sur ce sujet, et renvoyez-moi, je vous supplie, une de mes boîtes."

LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT WORONZOW.

1800 April 23. Cleveland Row.—“ Je vous envoie les deux lettres que je viens de recevoir de Petersbourg. Elles m'annoncent rien que de mauvais, et je vous avouerai que, quelque attaché que j'ai toujours été à l'alliance de la Russie, je ne pense pas qu'il nous convienne de jouer le rôle du Comte Cobenzl et de sa cour, en n'opposant que des bassesses à toutes les humiliations qu'on lui a fait éprouver.

“ C'est là ce qui me fait douter de l'envoi des deux François, puisqu'il sera censé venir de notre part quoiqu'au nom de *Monsieur*. Il faudra que je consulte mes collègues là-dessus.

“ Je suis bien éloigné de vouloir desservir la grande cause que nous soutenons par des mouvemens d'humeur, quelque provoqués qu'ils soient, mais, de l'autre côté, l'honneur et la dignité d'une nation sont ce qu'elle doit avoir de plus cher.” *Copy.*

RUFUS KING to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1800, April 24. Great Cumberland Place.—“ I take the liberty to send your Lordship an extract of the report of our last conference that I have sent to Colonel Pickering, in order that I might be enabled to correct any misconception, that I may have fallen into, of what passed on that occasion.”

*Enclosure :—*

RUFUS KING to TIMOTHY PICKERING.

1800, April 22.—“ The written answer of Lord Grenville having intimated a disposition to accede to certain regulations which it was supposed might facilitate the execution of the treaty, I yesterday asked a conference with his Lordship for the purpose of obtaining a precise idea of the nature and extent of these regulations. This was immediately granted, and afforded an opportunity for a free conversation upon the general topic, as well as respecting the particular subject that brought us together. Many things were

said on both sides which it would be useless to repeat ; these therefore are omitted in this report.

“ His Lordship observed that the object of the delay that took place at London was to allow time for the Court of Appeal to decide the several prize cases before their examination by the Commissioners, and that a like arrangement might be made in respect to the cases before the Commissioners at Philadelphia. With regard to the questions of impediment, solvency, insolvency, and some others of equal importance, Lord Grenville said their decision must be left to the provisions of the treaty, to the particular circumstances of each case, and to the sound discretion of the Commissioners ; adding that, upon a full investigation of the subject, he was convinced that no new and general rule upon these points could be made without affecting cases and claims that ought not to be affected ; and that even with respect to an agreement to delay the cases before the Commissioners at Philadelphia, in order that the claimants should have an opportunity first to obtain the decision of our Courts, it would be difficult, not to say impossible, for him to form any satisfactory idea of what would be a convenient time, unless he had a more adequate knowledge of our judiciary proceedings, and a particular instead of a general acquaintance with the claims. Upon this point, as on most others, there seemed to be wanting a discretionary power always present, and ready to act as occasions arose, and according to the nature and circumstances of the particular question ; that the persons whom he had thought of as two of the Commissioners to be appointed by the King, were men of prudence and discretion, and with whom, he thought, we should be satisfied ; that Mr. Liston having repeatedly asked and lately received leave of absence on account of his health, might not be at Philadelphia ; and he saw no preferable course, in case we acceded to the suggestion, to that of sending these two persons to Philadelphia, to concert with us such analogous regulations, in respect to the commission there, as were agreed to with regard to the commission here. We should by this means have an opportunity of knowing the character and disposition of the persons sent to prepare and agree to these regulations, and who would afterwards be appointed to assist in the execution of the treaty.

“ Lord Grenville asked me in what time I supposed the Courts would be able to go through the whole of the cases. I answered that this must chiefly depend upon the diligence of the creditors, and that I could not form any satisfactory estimate of the time that might be necessary. On the one hand it should not be so short as, with a disposition in the Courts to avoid delay, would defeat the object of the regulation ; and on the other it should not be so long as to afford any ground from the delay to infer that there was a denial of justice. No precise time was settled here, and perhaps none should be at Philadelphia.

“ His Lordship asked if there could be no means found to accelerate the trials. I repeated the observation that more would depend on the diligence of the creditors than upon the Courts, of whose disposition to give the greatest dispatch there could be no doubt : that a law requiring extraordinary sessions of the Courts, or pre-

scribing a more summary proceeding would not only interfere with the established course of our judiciary, but give birth to other and still more difficult questions which it would be unwise to agitate.

“His Lordship asked whether the cases before the Board are any of them in a state for the new Commissioners to take up; suggesting that it would be desirable that the new Board should, at their commencement, have something to do. I replied that though I could not then answer the question with any degree of accuracy, I was inclined to believe that many cases were in a situation that, without recourse to the Courts, might soon be prepared for the Commissioners to decide, and that the progress of the trials would be constantly furnishing additional cases.

“Lord Grenville expressed his opinion that the new Board ought to proceed in a different manner from their predecessors, by deciding cases singly one after another, instead of attempting to decide them by general resolves, and in classes.

“I observed that it was possible that new difficulties might arise in the course of future proceedings; and should Mr. Liston be absent, there would be no one with whom we could confer for the purpose of removing them. Lord Grenville replied that, in this case, he must endeavour to find out a proper character to supply Mr. Liston's place.

“I then asked Lord Grenville if he had formed any idea of the gross sum on the payment of which they would engage to compensate the claims of the British creditors. His Lordship replied that he had not; adding that he thought the creditors had not been wise in swelling, as they had done, their claim to four or five millions sterling; though it might have no influence upon our Government, it would be likely to have some upon the people; that he himself did not like the idea of the payment of a gross sum, and that he had mentioned it to me in compliance with the opinion of his colleagues; but that, on the supposition that the debt due to British creditors did not exceed two millions, that they might be willing to accept a gross sum of between one and two millions.” *Extract.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO RUFUS KING.

1800, April 24. Cleveland Row.—“Your report seems perfectly accurate. One question is however omitted, the discussion of which seems to me likely to be material. It is whether there may not be means of classing the cases, so as to give to the creditors the benefit not only of applying to the Commissioners for redress when the existence of an impediment actually applying to their class shall be ascertained by trial in one case; but also the benefit of speedy and effectual redress from the Courts where, by the decision of one cause, any question affecting a class shall be decided. If this is not done, debtors who profit by delay may oblige the creditors to try each disputed question over again, as often as it occurs through the whole class of cases to which it applies.

“You must also allow me to remark on the last point mentioned

in your letter, that, though I permit myself to speak with freedom to you of my personal opinions, I should be unwilling that any expression of doubt, however slight on my part, respecting the opinions of those with whom I am so happy as to act in all business, should get into an official correspondence." *Copy.*

The EARL OF DARNLEY TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, April 24. Berkeley Square.—“I cannot help troubling you again to thank you for your very obliging and detailed answer to the hasty and undigested communication which I took the liberty of making to you, and to observe that, on one great point, namely, that the arrangement of the Irish peerage as it stands at present in the 4th Article of the Union is by no means the best in principle or policy that could have been devised, we appear perfectly agreed. That we should differ on this subject in the smallest degree I sincerely lament, and am really diffident of my own opinion; but I should not act with that fairness and candour which your letter demands, if I did not confess that I cannot bring my mind to assent entirely to some of the conclusions which you have drawn.

“The election of the Irish peers for life is undoubtedly a considerable improvement on the plan of the Scotch Union, and obviates in a great degree the probability of intrigue and cabal; but I really do not understand why in either case the reduction of the number so low as to admit of no election at all, and still less why the total extinction of the separate peerages of either country should be likely to produce the smallest inconvenience. In their progress and near approach to the first of these points some inconvenience might indeed be felt, but it must necessarily be in its nature temporary. Whenever election ceases there is an end of intrigue or cabal; and the constitution of the whole peerage of the empire would then rest upon its only true basis of hereditary succession. As it appears to me, the sooner such an event takes place the better, and the more complete the Union will be. In the first instance the constitutional anomaly of a separate and elective peerage is (I agree with you) indispensable in any plan of Union; but why should not the gradual and certain hand of time be suffered to take its course in producing the natural remedy of the evil?

“In my view of the subject therefore the best arrangement would have been the extinction of the prerogative of creating Irish peers altogether; but, if it is to remain, I agree with you in thinking that for various reasons it had better have been unlimited. But this also is liable to the objection you have stated of the probable diminution of the value of the peerages themselves. On the other hand the present arrangement seems calculated not only to form, but to perpetuate also, the sort of close corporation you have described. In short, I see many objections to a continuance of the prerogative of creating Irish peers after the Union, whether limited or unlimited, but none to the total extinction of it.

“Having thus stated to you my opinion with freedom and candour I shall forbear to urge in my place in the House of Lords anything which might be construed into hostility to any part of this measure,

for the final accomplishment of which no one can be more anxious than I am. At the same time, however, when the subject shall come regularly before the House, it will be my duty to offer the same suggestions in public which I have taken the liberty of thus communicating to you in private, and your's to treat them as you may think they deserve. At all events, I shall acquiesce in your decision whatever it may be."

The MARQUIS DE CIRCELLO to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, April 25. 1 Mansfield Street.—“Le Duc de St. Teodoro, ministre du roi mon maître à Madrid, m'écrit une lettre, que je crois pouvoir mériter votre attention ; c'est pourquoi j'ai l'honneur de vous en soumettre une copie, et, en rappelant à votre souvenir ce dont dans le temps passé vous m'avez chargé de représenter à ma cour au sujet de celle d'Espagne, et les réponses que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous communiquer, j'attends vos instructions pour régler d'après elles ma réponse à mon collègue. Vous connaissez les intentions du roi mon maître ainsi qu'il est superflu de vous dire qu'il ne négligera rien de ce qui peut contribuer au bien général, et à la satisfaction particulière de son allié la Grande Bretagne.

“Permettez que je vous réitère mes instances au sujet des espérances que Lord Keith a donné à ma cour de la possibilité que la Grande Bretagne accorde un secours en troupes et officiers, dont elle a un besoin positif. Vous m'avez fait espérer que vous en parleriez à Monsieur Dundas. Veuillez me mettre à même de pouvoir donner à ma cour une réponse sur un objet aussi intéressant pour elle.”

*Enclosure :—*

The DUKE OF ST. TEODORO to the MARQUIS DE CIRCELLO.

“Questa monarchia non puo non considerarsi come strettamente legata alla nostra per rapporto ai vincoli del sangue dei due Sovrani. E vero che ci ha indegnamente e vilmente abbandonati, ed offesi ; che si è condotta infamemente : ma tuttavia converrebbe salvar la se si potesse. L'interesse generale lo domanda, tanto pui se vi fosse modo di persuaderla a tenere altra condotta.

“Questa Corte, mediante la corruzione che esiste in Parigi malgrado il governo di Bonaparte, ha avuto il mezzo di procurarsi la copia delle segrete istruzioni date al nuovo ambasciatore Alquier, ed ha conosciuto quanto poco deve contare sulla buona fede della potenza alleata, per la quale ha fatto e fa tanti sacrifici.

“Alquier deve riunirsi segretamente al Principe della Pace, e procurare di far cadere Urquijo. Questa scoperta ha molto nociuto al Principe della Pace, e ha dato maggior credito ad Urquijo. Non comprendo perchè i Francesi non vogliano Urquijo, il quale si è sempre mostrato propenso per essi.

“Alquier deve far comprendere che la Francia, non pui soggetta al governo rivoluzionario, va a prendere una forma stabile e forte : che l'idea di rimettere i Borboni sul trono è inesequibile, poichè la nazione tutta non li vuole : che l'Inghilterra non ha altro in mira

che la distruzione della Francia, e di tutte le altre potenze marittime; che la casa d'Austria mira al suo ingrandimento: che la Russia delusa si ritira; sicchè la Spagna deve restare unita alla Francia, e per suo particolare interesse, e per la bilancia.

“Alquier deve far capire che qualunque passo darà la Spagna per separare la sua flotta dalla francese, sarà riguardato come *une atteinte* all' alleanza. Deve insinuare alla Spagna d'indurre il Portogallo alla pace, ed in caso di rifiuto (come è stato fatto per il canale stesso della Spagna) accordare il passaggio ai Francesi. Deve finalmente far comprendere che dagli sforzi che farà la Spagna in questa campagna decisiva, dipenderà il grado d'interesse che la Francia metterà in favore della sua alleata nella negoziazione di pace: che la Francia videndosi costretta a negoziare svantaggiosamente coll'Inghilterra per la restituzione del capo di Buona Speranza, proporrà in cambio le Manille che li Spagnuoli non hanno ancora perdute. Ecco la buona fede di Buonaparte, e dell' attuale Governo! Cosa se ne deve inferire verso le potenze nemiche, quando pensa a sacrificare l'alleata?”

“Queste istruzioni hanno allarmato qui sono in timore, e sono stanchi: ma non possono, nè osano. Tuttavia Urquijo ha avuto il coraggio di dare qualche rifiuto. La Francia desiderava che la Spagna non avesse riconosciuto il futuro Pontefice, qui si è risposto negativamente. Forse se la Coalizione agisse in un modo più chiaro, qui penserebbero a separarsi: ma temono di rimanere esposti.

“Qui poi si teme che gli Anglo-Russi non vengano a sbarcare in Portogallo, per attaccare la Francia traversando la Spagna.

“Mi è stato detto, che costà vi sia un negoziatore segreto di questa Corte.

“Vi ho detto tutto per vostra intelligenza e governo. Aspetto poi da voi qualche lume. Vi prevengo che ho su di questo delle intruzioni da farne; uso secondo le circostanze.” *Deciphered copy.*

HENRY DUNDAS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1800, April 25. Somerset Place.—“I have this morning received my answer from Sir Ralph Abercrombie, and I send you a copy of it in case the Portuguese minister should be as importunate with you as he was with me yesterday at St. James's.

“Sir Charles Stuart has resigned his command in the Mediterranean. I sincerely regret the loss of so valuable an officer, but it is impossible for me to call upon him again without departing from every principle of subordination. I am perfectly ready to listen to all military remarks, and to remove all professional inconveniences, but when he writes to me that he cannot obey his instructions in so far as they go to the restoration of the Order of Malta, or putting the island under the despotism of Russia although the King is bound by treaty to do so, there is no longer any opening for my interposing to smooth difficulties. I certainly regret as deeply as he or any person can the final disposal of Malta, but if our officers, who are to execute, are permitted to controvert our councils, there is an end of all government. If there should be

any serious movements against Portugal, it will be in that view so far fortunate as that, by giving the command of the Mediterranean force to Sir Ralph Abercrombie, and sending Sir James Pultney with him, Sir Ralph, remaining in Portugal, can send Sir James to the Mediterranean, or bring the troops from the Mediterranean to Portugal as he shall think best for the public service according to what he may observe in Portugal. Sir Ralph's seniority of rank makes this highly proper in every view of military etiquette, but, as General Fox now at Minorca is senior to Sir James Pultney, there might have been an awkwardness in sending him to Minorca to dispose of the troops there as he pleased ; but there is no such awkwardness when he goes in detachment under the orders of Sir Ralph, who is senior both to Fox and to him. I doubt if Sir Charles Stuart would have been disposed to go to the Mediterranean the moment he knew that he might at any time be called upon by Sir Ralph Abercrombie to send his force to Portugal if necessary. This, to a certain extent, consoles me for the loss of Sir Charles Stuart's services, which I am really sorry to part with if I could have retained them."

*Enclosure :—*

Copy of a letter from Sir Ralph Abercromby accepting a mission to Portugal to report on the military resources of that kingdom and the condition of its army.

#### COUNT WORONZOW TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, April 27. Harley Street.—“ En me parlant de l'affaire du passeport refusé, vous m'avez dis, avec votre amitié ordinaire pour moi, et dont je sens tout le prix, que vous ne voulez pas me donner des embarras, et que vous ferez porter vos plaintes et vos réclamations par Mr. Casamajor, et que je pourai seulement dire que vous m'en avez parlé. Après avoir réfléchi sur ce sujet, je pense que telle est la pusilanimité de ceux qui entourent l'Empereur, qu'ils n'oseront pas même lui communiquer les plaintes que votre chargé d'affaire présentera officiellement ; et comme il est d'une nécessité absolue que quelqu'un lui ouvre les yeux, et lui fasse voir le mauvais effet que doit produire partout ses violations du droit des gens, j'ai pris sur moi de lui écrire avant hier en chiffre la dépêche que je vous envoie, et que je vous supplie de me renvoyer dès que vous l'aurez lue. Il n'a qu'à se fâcher ; mais il est important qu'il sache que ce qu'il fait n'a été pratiqué nulle part, à moins que ce ne soit à moi—.

“ Je vous avoue que je commence à être las de servir une Cour qui se conduit d'une manière aussi étrange. Je ne puis la blamer publiquement, mais je n'aurai jamais la bassesse de la justifier, ou en faire l'apologie.”

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO WILLIAM WICKHAM.

1800, April 29. Cleveland Row.—“ I have not time to write at length by the opportunity of Lord William Bentinck, who sets off

to-night for Italy. The prospect opened to us in your dispatches which we received yesterday is highly favourable; but still doubt and uncertainty hang on the horizon at Vienna; and I know not what ground of confidence we can have that the campaign will open in good earnest, or, opening, will continue longer than till Buonaparte finds himself obliged to offer that, whatever it is, which Austria requires in Italy.

“Our speculations about Piedmont are not at all different from yours, but you see the reason of what we are doing on that subject.

“The project of acting on any large scale in the Mediterranean was renounced as soon as it was clearly ascertained that no Russian co-operation was to be had, either there or on this side of France. Stuart has resigned that command in one of those strange humours which belong to his character, and which nearly destroy all the advantage that might be made of his excellent talents and military skill.

“Sir James Pulteney will have there about 8,000 troops, of which not more than 5,000 will be disposeable for active service. These may occasionally co-operate in particular operations on the sea coast, or they may reduce Malta, or annoy the Spaniards if despair should drive Buonaparte into compelling the latter to attack Portugal; but I do not expect anything more from them.

“Here we may do better things if opportunity serves, but not otherwise. In this state of things Proby must remain with you for the present, and I will endeavour to do what I can to forward what I understand to be (and I think rightly) his object, that of service with British troops.

*Postscript.*—You will of course expect a messenger as soon as we hear the result of Lord Minto’s negotiation.” *Copy.*

THE EARL OF MORNINGTON TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, May 1. Fort William.—“I cannot allow this overland dispatch to depart without a few words of thanks to you for all your kind letters received by the *Mornington* and other ships arrived in the course of last month. I shall answer you fully by the return of the *Mornington* in a few weeks. In the mean while believe that I am most cordially sensible of your affectionate remembrance of me, and that I shall always retain my sincere friendship for you in full ardour.

*Quæ me cunque vocent terre.*

Pitt, Dundas, and Bernard will tell you how I have been distressed by my Irish honors, and what their effect is likely to be here; they will tell you that I must come home, if I am to continue an Irish Lord, and to receive no higher marks of the King’s sense of my services. But I shall return in perfect good humour with myself and my friends, and exactly in a disposition to become a Buckinghamshire or Berkshire freeholder, and to remain a country gentleman to the end of my days, talking over Indian politics with Major Massacre, and Mrs. Hastings, and the Major Majorum, not forgetting Major Aprorum, Rennell; and with your speech, and the votes of both Houses, framed over my parlour chimney.

“With respect to grants of money; I cannot accept any grant which shall be, or shall appear to be a deduction from the prize money of the army. Dundas has been most kind in the pains he has taken on this subject.

“I am tolerably well, but in bad spirits, and annoyed by feelings of mortification and disappointment which I shall soon forget, when I shall have shuffled off this mortal coil, and arrived on English, not *Breedish*, nor *Irish* ground.

“Dispatch the overland express; and for God’s sake bring me home, home, home; home first, home last, home midst. . . .

“No official letter has reached me respecting my *new brogues*; and it would not be correct to put them on *before I get them, by Jasus*.

“I forgot to thank you for your picture, with which I am delighted; the likeness is admirable, exact to a point, and perfectly alive. I never saw a better portrait; who is the painter? You cannot imagine what a satisfaction this picture affords to me in this dreary solitude.

“I send you a box of seeds. I hope my good-natured, old, silly aide-de-camp Major Davis brought my Lady’s birds in safety to her hand.”

*Equidem, haud dissimulo, me tuas, Cornwallisi, laudes non assequi solum velle, sed (bonâ veniâ tuâ dixerim) si possim, etiam exuperare. Illud nec tibi in me, nec mihi in minores natu animi sit, ut nolimus quanquam nostri similem evadere civem. Id enim non eorum modo quibus inviderimus, sed Repub: et penè omnis generis humani detrimentum sit.*

Recommended to Mr. Pitt’s attention by a poor *Irish* scholar.

#### LORD MINTO TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1800, May 2. Vienna.—“I have received your dispatches of the 19th April, by the return of one of my servants who arrived while I was preparing my dispatches of this day. I am under the necessity of postponing what relates to them to the next messenger. In the mean while I am sorry to say that I foresee the greatest embarrassments from the change in the destination of the *corps de Condé*. I have always been assured that the Emperor would not suffer them either in his armies or his dominions, and I know not how we shall dispose of them on one hand, and satisfy or fly from the clamour of this Court on the other for their departure. However, it will be time enough to fatigue your Lordship with these distresses when they arise.

“If you should approve of the conditions respecting Piedmont, it seems to be Baron Thugut’s wish that your Lordship should immediately open the matter to Monsieur de Front, as an arrangement which, we have reason to know, might be obtained from Austria; and to intimate that our support must be withdrawn if he should oppose so reasonable a settlement. I should also be authorised to communicate it to the Sardinian minister here. I have not yet acquainted Mr. Jackson with any part of this negotiation, which I feel to be unpleasant, but it seemed impossible to do otherwise without great inconvenience.”

## LORD MINTO to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private and confidential.*

1800, May 2. Vienna.—“ However delicate the subject certainly is, I feel it to be a duty that I ought not to decline to say a word or two, in the strictest confidence, concerning the choice of a person to administer the government of Piedmont. The intention being to establish something like harmony between the Imperial army and the Piedmontese government, without throwing the country into the hands of the Austrians, which would create jealousy and alarm of various sorts, I have reason to know that this Court would think the measure entirely frustrated if any person were named whose habits had attached him strongly and peculiarly to the Court of the King of Sardinia. In this view Mr. Trevor, however respectable in every other view, would not give satisfaction here; and I fear I am under the necessity of adding that Mr. Jackson could have no share in that system without exciting the greatest jealousy at Vienna, instead of inspiring the confidence which this measure is intended to produce. Some new man connected and in habits neither with Austria nor Piedmont, and not distinguished for anti-Austrian feelings, would be, in those respects, best qualified for that situation. In other respects it will require many very rare and eminent qualifications; for to mediate between two parties; and to exact from Piedmont, on one hand, all the sacrifices and exertions which the war requires, and, on the other, to resist with temperate and discreet firmness and impartiality the exactions that may be expected from the Austrians, will demand a strong judgment, and a strong character. The person employed should also have the habits of business, and a competent acquaintance with the science of finance, and all that belongs to what the French call administration.

“ I fear your Lordship will think this letter written like many others for the sake of the postscript, when I confess that there is a person in my mind whom I think made on purpose for such an employment; I mean Sylvester Douglas. Your Lordship may not have thought of him in that view; but all his talents, his acquirements, and his first habits point to foreign life and occupations; and he has, besides, acquired all the knowledge of other sorts that would be wanted. He is a master of French, Italian, and German, and indeed most other languages. I know he wishes for some foreign occasional employment. I feel that I am taking a great liberty, but I will endeavour to diminish my fault in some degree by assuring you, upon my honour, that I take this step entirely without his knowledge, and that he shall never know it except in the case of his nomination.

“ I think it still my indispensable duty to return, at all events, to the principles of exclusion mentioned in the beginning of this letter.”

## COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, May 6. Harley Street.—“ Il m'est arrivé un courier hier; son expédition datte du vingt-huit mars, vieux style, et je sais

qu'elle étoit faite dix jours avant d'être expédié. Elle contient un tas énorme de paperasses, dont une partie est en Russe qu'il faut que je fasse traduire pour vous les communiquer ; la plus part régardent les affaires d'Égypte, que je vois être le principal motif de l'humeur qu'on a chez nous. Les copies et les traductions ne pourront être prête qu'après demain, jeudi, matin, et je vous prie de me donner une heure de votre tems entre deux et quatre heures de jeudi après demain.

“ Je vous rend mille grâces pour le warrant, et pour la bonne nouvelle de la défaite de Massena. Je vous prie de me renvoyer quelqu' une de mes cassetes ; il en est resté quatre chez vous.”

LORD MINTO to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1800, May 8. Vienna.—“ I am so strongly urged by Mr. Tooke not to lose a single moment in forwarding the dispatches to the India House which this messenger carries, that I have had barely time, while his horses are ordering, to write the accompanying dispatch, and I must for the present content myself with adding in this form that, after conversing fully with Baron Thugut, and satisfying myself concerning the determination of this Court respecting the *corps de Condé*, I see that it cannot be employed with any of the Austrian armies. If it were, differences and mutual criminations *must* arise, in which we should find ourselves parties on account of the connexion we now have with the *corps de Condé*. But independent of all other reasons, the French principles of this Court are too little *prononcés* to admit of their placing a corps purely royalist, with the French king's uniform, cockade, and colours, in the front of their operations against France. On the whole, the only thing I could think of for the present, till your further instructions arrive, is to let them proceed to Italy, and to station them in the Pope's territories, as at Civita Vecchia, and perhaps Rome, to wait His Majesty's orders. If General Willot succeeds, and the southern provinces offer a fair prospect, the *corps de Condé* may be transported there from Civita Vecchia with little delay or inconvenience. If you should still wish to carry them to Minorca, they are equally at hand ; or if you take them to Portugal or to England they are still in a convenient situation for embarking. I have, in the meanwhile, written these ideas to Mr. Wickham, and till his answer arrives they will halt where they are, already within the Italian provinces ; and Baron Thugut has promised to make an arrangement for provisions which will enable them to do so for a fortnight. I should have wished for a little more leisure to throw out to your Lordship an idea that appears to me extremely worthy of attention concerning this corps. Nothing can be more noble, or in my opinion more becoming the liberal policy of our Government than the principle on which the *corps de Condé* is established. But the more that principle is to be commended in the liberal and generous view of the subject, the less favourable it is to a principle merely military. There are 7,000 mouths, and between 2,000 and 3,000 effective fighting men. If the liberal part were separated from the

military, some thousand individuals would enjoy the same relief which is intended for them, without the fatigues and changes of marches and voyages ; and all the extraordinary expenses of transporting them from country to country would be saved to Government ; while those really capable of service might then be usefully employed against the enemy. At present the train is so great that no army on actual service can conveniently accept of such a reinforcement. This reform might be executed while they are in the Roman territory, if your Lordship and His Majesty's ministers approve of it.

"Baron Thugut has begged a few days more for the *projet* of the treaty, but every thing continues secure and steady.

"General Melas was going in person, by the last accounts of the 24th April, against Suchet on the westward, and had begun to intrench his army round Masséna. They are bringing siege artillery against Genoa."

#### WILLIAM WICKHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Most confidential.*

1800, May 8.—"Let me very earnestly recommend to your Lordship's consideration what I have only hinted at in my public dispatch, the necessity of strong reinforcements in the Mediterranean. I am pretty confident that we shall not be beaten here, but, if we are, we must do as the Romans did with Carthage, carry the war to her very gates. Believe me that nothing else will save us. I write to this effect strongly to Vienna. The loss of the Austrian magazines is a most grievous calamity. I am persuaded that not less than five hundred thousand pounds will be necessary to enable Count Lehrbach to replace them.

"My opinions on subjects of that kind are, I know, rather odd, but I should strongly advise, if I durst, that the King should take this opportunity of saying and doing a handsome thing personally to the Emperor, and begging to bear a part of the loss. If he would give a hundred thousand pounds, I would engage to save them out of what you have assigned to me. But if you do the thing at all do it handsomely, and in a noble king-like way.

"We have conquered M. Thugut I verily believe. We must conquer also the good will of the army and of the nobility, which a generous action of this kind will surely do.

"Do not think me mad for suggesting such strange things. I now know the people well enough with whom we have to deal, and I am sure they have only been lost for want of sufficient attention being given to study their real characters. Proud as they are they are not above a bribe ; do not even dislike such a thing ; and would even willingly take one, provided it were given under any other form.

"The poor regiment of Roverea is almost destroyed. It is a sad history of which I will send your Lordship the detail another time. They have been sent into the field without the means of transporting their provisions or carrying away their wounded ; though I had received from Ramsay the most solemn assurances before he went

to the Condé army that they were actually provided with everything. But I cannot too often repeat it. Our officers, particularly those that call themselves staff officers, are totally unfit for anything of the kind; and it is only since I have meddled with military arrangements myself, in consequence of their evident incapacity, that I have been able to judge of the extent to which that incapacity is carried. Judge how heart-breaking a thing it is for me to have received personal reproaches on this subject from General Kray and the Archduke Ferdinand. Pray let me be authorized to give the King's thanks to the remains of the regiment."

LORD GRENVILLE to EARL SPENCER.

1800, May 9. London.—“I have, as I expected, received from Woronzow a heavy complaint against Sir Sydney Smith for his conduct in the negotiation of Kleber's capitulation.

“May I give him to understand in my answer that Sir Sydney will by this time have been withdrawn from that station? If this has been done, it will be a better proof of disavowal than all the assurances I could give.” *Copy.*

LORD SPENCER to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, May 9. Admiralty.—“Whether Sir S. Smith will actually by this time have been withdrawn from the Levant station I know not; but when we received the account of the capitulation, I wrote to Lord Keith suggesting to him the expediency of employing Sir Sidney elsewhere; and I think it most probable he may act on that suggestion. However, I will take an immediate opportunity which now offers, of repeating it.”

LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT WORONZOW.

1800, May 9. Cleveland Row.—“Mon premier soin ce matin a été de lire attentivement tous les papiers que vous m'avez laissés hier. J'aurai le plaisir de vous recevoir ce soir, mais je crois vous épargner quelque travail en vous envoyant une minute, faite à la hâte, de ce que j'aurai à vous dire sur les deux points principaux.

“Je vous ai exprimé hier que très faiblement l'étonnement et la douleur avec laquelle j'ai reçu l'autre nouvelle que vous m'avez communiqué. Vous rendez certainement trop de justice à mes sentimens pour ne pas être persuadé de ce que j'éprouve, tant pour la chose publique que pour moi personnellement, en voyant l'injustice inouïe que l'on fait à un homme dont on avoit paru apprécier le mérite et les qualités qui le distinguent d'une manière si éclatante. Ne croyez pas que je veuille vous flatter—c'est le vrai sentiment de mon âme. Je n'ai jamais connu personne plus fait pour inspirer tous les sentimens d'estime, d'amitié, et d'affection. Je vous ai voué ces sentimens depuis longtems, et plus je vous ai connu, plus j'ai eu à vous admirer et vous respecter.

“Recevez avec bonté ces assurances que la circonstance me met dans l'impossibilité de retenir, et croyez à l'amitié inaltérable de celui qui vous est dévoué pour toujours.” *Copy.*

## LORD MINTO to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1800, May 10. Budvitz.—“ I set out from Vienna the night before last in order to meet Lady Minto and my family ; I met them last night twelve posts from Vienna, and am now on my return, hoping to arrive to-morrow night. I received to-day by *estafette* the enclosed letter which may possibly contain the earliest accounts your Lordship may receive of the recommencement of hostilities in Egypt. Mr. Straton, in a subsequent letter written also yesterday, adds that Baron Thugut had informed him it was surmised—but merely surmised—that General Kleber had recommenced hostilities in consequence of orders from Buonaparte, and assurances of speedy succours from France.

“ By a letter from Mr. Tooke, accompanying the dispatches to the India House which this messenger carries, I learn that Lord Elgin had dispatched a messenger from Constantinople on the 22nd April with the Egyptian news. Mr. Tooke’s letter is dated the 25th, and on this account he says that he does not think it necessary to mention those accounts. Possibly Mr. Tooke may have written what he has heard on that subject to Mr. Ramsay, secretary to the East India Company, with the packet which I am now dispatching. Lord Elgin’s messenger may be expected every day.

“ Baron Thugut having desired to postpone our conferences on the treaty to Monday or Tuesday, I trust your Lordship will not think I hazarded any prejudice to His Majesty’s affairs by this short absence on an occasion so interesting to me.”

*Enclosure :—*

## ALEXANDER STRATON to LORD MINTO.

1800, May 9. Vienna.—“ In the answer to a note which I wrote last night to Baron Thugut for the purpose of learning where General Kray’s head quarters were, he mentioned the resumption of hostilities in Egypt as a fact with which you were probably acquainted. This not being the case, I called upon the Austrian minister this morning, and I think it right to send on an *estaffette* with the result of the intelligence he gave me on this important subject. He told me that Kleber, on hearing of the renewal of the blockade of Alexandria, and of the difficulties made in England respecting the convention, had announced to the Grand Vizer that the armistice was at an end, and that he would immediately recommence hostilities. The Grand Vizer wished to send to Constantinople. But Kleber would not consent to the delay which this step would occasion ; and attacked and completely routed the Grand Vizer’s army. On the other hand, one of his, the Grand Vizer’s, lieutenants, who was in the neighbourhood of Cairo, fell upon a body of French that was there, put it to the sword, entered the city and massacred all the French of every denomination that were in it. Some of the Beys had joined the Grand Vizer’s lieutenant. Baron Thugut did not exactly recollect, but he thought that the armistice had been broken on the 17th or 18th of March.

He also informed me that his letters, which came by *estafette* by the way of Belgrade, mentioned Lord Elgin's having dispatched a messenger by the way of Bucharest, who may be hourly expected and who will, of course, bring a detailed account of what has happened in Egypt. Upon the whole Thugut seemed satisfied with the news."

COUNT WORONZOW TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, May 10. Harley Street.—"J'ai reçu hier tard les papiers que vous avez eu la bonté de me communiquer. J'étois occupé de l'expédition de mon courier que j'ai fini à trois heures de ce matin. Je n'ai pu donc les lire qu'aujourd'hui; je les ai renvoyé à Monsieur Hammond, et en vous remerciant de cette communication confidentielle, je vous prie d'ordonner qu'on fasse de ces papiers l'extrait que vous avez promis pour que je puisse l'envoyer à ma cour.

"J'ai écrit à l'Empereur pour avoir mon congé du service, et pour pouvoir rester ici en particulier loin de Londrès, désirent de m'établir dans le sud-west de ce pays où le climat est plus doux pour un homme dont la santé est aussi délabrée que la mienne. Je lui parle de cette santé et de celle de ma fille, qui sont tels que c'est autant que de nous condamner à la mort que de nous obliger d'aller vivre en Russie.

"Je ne vous ennuierois pas de ces détails, si je ne connoissois votre amitié pour moi.

"Je vous envoie la copie de ma lettre officielle ou réponse sur les affaires de l'Égypte, et le mésentendue au sujet des subsides. J'ai tâché tant que j'ai pu d'adoucir l'aigreur qui comence de chez nous sans aucune raison.

"L'article qui me régarde personnellement est fait pour ôter tout soupçon qu'on pouroit avoir que je cherche à me rendre nécessaire, et garder mon poste; et, en vérité, je régarde comme un bonheur de le quitter quand je vois que tout vat à la renverse chez nous, et qu'il n'y a que honte et humiliacion à récueillir en servent une cour qui, définitivement, otte toute espérance de se conduire plus sagement."

*Enclosure* :—

COUNT WORONZOW TO COUNT PANIN.

1800, May 11. London.—"J'ai communiqué hier à Milord Grenville les deux lettres que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser par le sous-lieutenant des chasseurs Neüman, arrivé ici depuis cinq jours; l'une desquelles contenoit des annexes sur l'étrange capitulation que cet extravagant Sidney Smith a fait faire au vizir; et l'autre qui traite des difficultés survenues au sujet des comptes pour les subsides. Toutes ces communications étant très volumineuses, et Milord Grenville étant pressé d'aller à la Chambre haute, me pria de les lui laisser et qu'il me reverroit le lendemain (aujourd'hui). Ce matin il m'envoya le papier ci-joint que j'ai l'honneur de transmettre à votre Excellence, et en me l'envoyant, il m'a prié de passer chez lui. Il m'a dit que personne ne pouvoit

être plus blamable que ce fou de Sidney Smith, qu'il a été hautement désapprouvé ; et à cette occasion il m'a lu l'ordre qu'il a écrit aux Lords de l'Amirauté par ordre du Roi le vingt-huit mars, où il leur est adjoint de témoigner à l'amiral qui commande en chef dans la Méditerranée d'exprimer au capitaine chevalier Smith l'extrême désapprobation du Roi, d'avoir osé négocier ou se mêler des négociations pour les quelles il n'avoit autorisation ou pouvoirs quelconques ; et d'avoir pu compromettre son souverain envers ses alliés. Il m'a ajouté que Smith est rappelé de sa station où il étoit commodore, et aura l'humiliation de servir comme simple capitaine dans une flotte où plusieurs de ses camarades sont plus anciens que lui, et où il sera souvent sous leurs ordres. Que quoique sa conduite est très répréhensive, le vizir n'en est pas moins coupable à son tour, car le commodore Anglais n'avoit aucune force ou moyen de le contraindre ou de l'intimider à faire cette convention, qu'il a signé seul ; car Smith n'y a pas mis son nom et ne le pouvoit pas. Qu'après la prise d'Alarish, où le découragement et l'insubordination des troupes françaises étoient si visibles, qu'il auroit pu, en trainant la guerre en longueur sans écouter les folles représentations de Smith, détruire l'armée de Kleber, mais c'est qu'il étoit pressé d'éloigner les Français de l'Égypte pour jouir des richesses du pays, et de ne pas donner le tems aux Beys de se reconnoître, et de s'unir entre eux pour reprendre leur autorité passée. C'est pourquoi il souscrivit à tout, et pour se disculper vis-à-vis de la Porte et de la Russie, il jetta tout le blâme sur le commodore Anglais, qui certainement avoit fait des démarches extravagantes, mais auxquelles le vizir ne devoit pas se conformer. Que quant à l'idée de détruire les Français en violation d'une capitulation accordée librement, c'est une perfidie qui ne peut venir que dans une tête turque, que cela doit répugner à l'âme élevée de Sa Majesté l'Empereur, et que le Roi son fidèle allié a le même horreur pour une perfidie pareille. Que pour ce qui regarde la Sicile, le royaume de Naples, et les isles jadis Vénitiennes, les flottes Anglaise et Russe sont plus que suffisantes pour les protéger. Qu'enfin pour me prouver plus complètement que l'extravagance de Smith n'a jamais été autorisée d'ici, il fera faire un extrait de tous les ordres qui ont été donné à Milord Elgin, qu'il me donnera après son retour de la campagne, où il va pour quelques jours, et que je pourrai l'envoyer à Petersbourg.

“ Nous sommes venu après à parler des méseutendus survenues sur le sujet du paiement des subsides, au sujet des quelles il m'a répondu aussi par l'écrit ci-joint ; il n'a fait que répéter la même chose en me disant qu'aussitôt qu'il reviendra en ville qu'il quitte aujourd'hui, il tâchera de voir Monsieur Pitt, sans lequel il ne peut rien faire en matière d'argent, qui est du ressort de la Trésorerie.

“ Il auroit fallu que je fus bien sot et un fat des plus impertinens, si je ne vous faisais observer, que ce que Milord Grenville dit dans son écrit qu'il sera charmé de traiter cette affaire avec moi de préférence, n'est qu'un pûr compliment, et que si nous n'étions pas même liés d'amitié, il n'auroit pas pu se servir d'autres termes sans manquer à cette politesse qui doit régner entre des personnes bien nées. Je supplie votre Excellence de croire que Monsieur le conseiller d'état actuel Lizakevitz traitera cette affaire aussi bien et

mieux que moi, et que ma présence ici pour suivre et discuter cette affaire est tout à fait inutile.

“ Je puis aussi assurer positivement que qui que ce soit qui sera envoyé ici pour me remplacer trouvera toutes les facilités possibles ; car toute personne employée par Sa Majesté Impériale sera traitée avec estime, égard, et confiance, puisque le Roi et le ministère restent toujours inébranlables dans le système de l'étroite union entre la Russie et la Grande Brétagne. Le rapprochement actuel entre ce païs et l'Autriche est une mesure forcée par les circonstances. L'Angleterre ayant refusé solennellement deux fois de suite de traiter avec l'usurpateur Bonaparte, et ayant déclaré qu'elle ne négociera jamais qu'avec le concours de ses alliés, elle se trouve obligée d'aider la Cour de Vienne tant pour faire voir à la nation qu'elle a des alliés qui la soutiennent, que pour donner des moyens à celui qui fait une diversion si puissante en faveur de ce pays contre l'ennemi commun de tous les trônes. Cela n'est pas un garant certain de la fidélité du Baron de Thugut, mais il y a des circonstances impérieuses qui obligent à se servir de tous les moïens et à risquer bien de choses.” *Copy.*

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, May 10. London].—“ The enclosed letter from Garlike is worth your reading, because I think it probable with him that your expressions to Jacobi may have been mis-represented, and that, at any rate, you will think they ought to learn at Berlin to distinguish their application for Napper Tandy, from our application not to furnish contributions to our enemy to enable them to make war upon us.

“ By some conversation that I have had with Windham, I find him informed that ‘ *without* the reserve of the house ’ the treasurer-ship is destined to Ryder, and he has written to Pitt to claim for himself the option of that which was offered to him, if it be unlogged with the reserve of the house. I tell you this only for your own information, because you will easily be sensible for myself that I can have no intention of looking for a claim of six years to the leavings of Ryder, Steele, and Canning. When I mention the word claim, I could easily enough establish it beyond any doubt or question, but that it is not in my temper to intrude any pretensions of mine where they are in any degree reluctantly admitted. I write this instead of saying it to you, because I have been all morning at St. James's with my good little niece, and I doubt whether I should be able to find you this evening.”

*Enclosure* :—

B. GARLIKE to THOMAS GRENVILLE.

1800, April 28. Berlin.—“ If the wind should have served well, a Russian courier will have arrived a day or two before you receive this letter, and I hope that he takes with him (to be communicated to Lord Grenville) a copy of a project sent to Baron Krudener for the renewal of the Russian treaty of defensive alliance with this country which was concluded in 1792, and will expire in July. As far as I

can recollect from once looking over the project it is the same treaty with some slight alterations, making Ievern among the places to be guaranteed to the Emperor by Prussia, and stipulating a treaty of commerce ; but I know not what separate or secret articles there may be. Count Lusi will take the project with him to Petersburg where the treaty will be concluded.

“ I scarcely know why I should have started on hearing of this measure, unless it were from the suddenness of its appearance here. It is a plain and ready way of shewing the two Courts to be on a friendly footing, and leaves the ground-work of future co-operation. If neither of them will fight against France, it may be that they incline to each other without France ; but as to a system of active war, which we want, and want now, I fear that this very treaty shews that Russia means to retire from it and to fall into Prussian neutrality. It is remarkable that Baron Rosenkrantz (the Dane) is ordered from hence to Petersburg on a temporary mission. The circumstance is perhaps unconnected with the present crisis at Petersburg, but as these things happen in that crisis, it is possible that there may be some notion between Russia, Prussia, and Denmark, and perhaps Sweden, of a scheme of neutrality for the north of Europe, to be extended as circumstances may require it ; but I have no facts for the supposition except those I have mentioned, and one I mentioned some time ago, stated by Count Haugwiz from Baron Krudener, that Russia was adopting the Prussian system. There is, I believe, but little doubt of Baron Krudener's having been anxious on the measure of the renewal of the treaty ever since December, but he never mentioned it to me, nor have I ever seen an allusion to it.

“ It does not appear that M. Bourgoing has ventured to ask the senate of Hamburg for money. Count Haugwiz happened the other day to renew this subject and to mention the instructions which had been sent to M. Schultz and which I had before noticed to the Office. I thanked him and said that if the demand was made by the French minister, I feared I should trouble him (Haugwiz) with a note on the subject. This was in a sort of unofficial whisper in company, when he recollected himself and took me aside to say, *‘ qu'à ce sujet là, il avait quelque chose à me conter préalablement : qu'à l'occasion de l'emploi des bons offices du Roi en suite des instances de la Cour d'Espagne, en faveur de Napper Tandy, Lord Grenville avait répondu à M. de Jacobi que premièrement la demande qu'il venait de faire au nom de Sa. Majesté Prussienne ne pouvait pas être portée à le connaissance du Roi d'Angleterre. Et, en second lieu, qu'une pareille demande montrait un désir de s'immiscer dans les affaires intérieures du pays. ’*

“ I appealed to Count Haugwiz's knowledge and experience of Lord Grenville's mode of doing business against such an answer, and asked if the words were in his recollection. He said, *‘ oui et le Roi en a été fort surpris. ’* I said it could not belong to me to give explanations of what Lord Grenville has said to Baron Jacobi, and asked if no explanation had occurred to him that there was an easy distinction to be made ; that Lord Grenville might have said *‘ que l'effet d'une pareille interposition serait nécessairement de toucher*

*aux affaires de l'intérieur, et que, pour cette raison, il ne pouvait pas en exposer la demande au Roi*'; but not that '*c'était montrer le désir de s'y immiscer.*'

"I should have thought it right not to notice this conversation to you but for the following reason. Count Haugwiz added that he had again written to M. de Jacobi on the subject, and that the subject would be renewed.

"I was afterwards near concluding that Count Haugwiz meant to say that if I applied for Prussian interference in favour of Hamburg, the answer would take a colour from M. Jacobi's report.

"I really do not believe he meant to couple the two things in that sense; but while I justify him on that score, I must attack his awkwardness, for to that alone do I impute his mentioning in that manner to me a report of Baron Jacobi's, which may have been twisted by Lombard in his *précis* reading to the King."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, May 11.—"Having occasion to write to the Duke of Portland yesterday, I told him that in conversation with you I had quoted the Duke of Portland for having announced, in express terms to me, that in 1794, upon his naming to Mr. Pitt the names of Mr. Pelham and myself for Privy Council offices, Mr. Pitt had said he could have no difficulty upon that subject, Lord Mornington being the only person who had any such claim upon him.

"I only added in my letter to the Duke that I did not think it fair to quote his words without apprising him that I had done so, and without wishing to know from him whether I had been accurate in my statement.

"I enclose to you his answer which confirms every word that I have said; and Lord Spencer, to whom I named it yesterday, said that not only the Duke had told him so in 1794, but that in conversation the Duke had again repeated the same words ten days ago.

"I was anxious to shew you by this variety of evidence that I had made no mistake, and that our principal friends had all precisely the same impression as that which I had received of an engagement from Mr. Pitt upon this subject.

"You will not wonder at my solicitude to clear up this point, as it was not fit that it should stand alone upon my assertion.

"The Dutch ship is a 54, claiming to be a cartel, but improperly stored and laden, and therefore brought in. Lord St. Vincent has just written to say that he has ascertained that nothing has stirred from Brest, and that he hopes to keep them on the alert.

"Be so good as to return the Duke's letter. Pitt has told Windham that the report which he had heard is not correct, so that at present there is no question but that of Treasurership of the Navy, which is certainly of equal rank and distinction as to business with that of Secretary at War."

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, May 11. Stowe.—"Many thanks for your communication

of the Irish documents which do you so much credit both in the precision and in the extent of the measure, which I really think is better worded than the precedent on which it is founded. The only objection I have to it is that Ireland is too well treated; but as I well know that she will not from various causes profit by one-tenth of the advantages you have given her, my fears for cotton and wool will not break my rest. I trust that you are well aware of the cabal now going on for securing to Opposition in Ireland the greater number of the returns both of Lords and Commons into our limited Parliament. What the object can be of such an exertion I cannot imagine; for all real hopes of forming an efficient Opposition against Government at Westminster must have vanished from the moment that Mr. Fox, after his speech at the beginning of winter, again seceded. But I should be sorry that Irish Government should be careless on this subject, and I wish you to take care that they are properly warned upon it. I repeat that I know of such a cabal for directing the elections in the House of Lords; and unless proxies are allowed for the first election, that cabal will name the twenty-eight Lords. In the House of Commons I know of two instances where friends of Government holding places are to receive money to waive their seats to opposition members. As I find Lord Carysfort does not return to Ireland, I send you a blank proxy which you will send to Cooke, requesting him that, if it is wanted, he will give it either to Lord Clare or to Lord Carleton, for I am very anxious that Government should not lose their *House list*.

“So then Genoa is not taken, and Massena is not killed. Will you promise me that the Austrian will not sign a convention on the plan of Sir Sydney’s *chef d’œuvre*, for enabling this army to return to France? or will you promise that the inflexible Cabinet of Vienna will not be bought by French offers to an immediate peace arising out of this Italian success? You will certainly promise no such thing, and I own that I very much dread such an event, particularly if the advantage gained by the French in Swabia is not immediately repelled. But as you allow me to be a *Frondeur*, my great complaint now (and most violently am I indignant) is at the reappointment of Sir R. Abercrombie, of whom I was in hopes that you had all seen and known enough from dear experience to have secured the country against the employment of such a man. I fear likewise that this expedition to the Mediterranean will have clipped your wings for the only object where you can really strike to advantage; I mean the coast of Normandy; for I have no faith that the force *now ordered to encamp* ever will embark for France, and a defensive campaign is now ten times more than ever ruinous to us. Have you any hopes of your angry Paul? I fear that he is irrecoverably gone, and I wish his Russians were well gone out of our islands.

“Many congratulations on the *Guillaume Tell*. I have long looked for her to complete the set of the Aboukir volumes, and I hope that her capture will be followed by that of Malta, and of the little Aboukir duodecimos now in that harbour (the *Diane* and *Justice*) which will entirely account for every French ship that sailed out of Toulon on Bonaparte’s expedition.

“Can nothing arise for our dear Tom out of Dundas’s vacancy?

Dick would, I am sure, forego every view for such an object, and I should be sorry to see poor Tom put by for such animals as Steele and Rider and Canning. His labours of every sort (beginning with labours private as well as public in 1794) for Government do give him pretensions, which I have sometimes thought Mr. Pitt disinclined to admit as fully as you and I feel them. Pray think this over. I did not say one word upon the subject till I found from report that no other use was likely to be made of such an opening than to give it to Rider or Steele, and to move Canning; and I have not named it to Tom. Let me know if you see light on this subject."

LORD GRENVILLE to WILLIAM WICKHAM.

*Private.*

1800, May 12. Dropmore.—“Being anxious not to delay this messenger, I am obliged to postpone replying in detail to your private letters; but I will not fail to do so by the next messenger, whom I must of course dispatch whenever I receive the long expected dispatches from Lord Minto. Be assured that I feel in all respects satisfied with everything that you have done, and that I trust you will be so likewise with my answers to your different questions.

“It is just now a very anxious moment with us here in the expectation of your next dispatches, especially as the Paris accounts give room for much uneasiness. We must however hope the best, and the affairs of Genoa seem to promise a speedy conclusion, such as may set free at least a part of Melas’s army to act in aid of Kray’s operations, whether of offence or defence.

“I defer, for obvious reasons, till the receipt of your next letters, writing anything to you as to our plans in this quarter. I trust they will not be without their effect even on the state of affairs with you.” *Copy.*

VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, May 12. Dublin.—“I am sorry Lord Farnham has opened upon your Lordship; he is a most indefatigable correspondent; your Lordship’s answer ought to satisfy him.

“The Resolutions were presented this day, and the consideration of your amendments appointed for to-morrow without much opposition. The introduction of the Election Act was resisted as premature, and a division suddenly took place at 7 o’clock, 135 to 80, many absent on both sides. I believe Opposition will muster within 2 or 3 of their former numbers. I like, upon the whole, the complexion of the House.”

E. COOKE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, May 12. Dublin.—“All the necessary documents arrived to-day. Messages were sent to both Houses. In the Commons Lord Castlereagh moved for the message to be considered to-morrow and for a committee of comparison, which were agreed to upon question. He then moved for leave to bring in the Representation

Bill, which was opposed by O'Donnell, Sir J. Parnell, Colonel Barry, Mr. G. Ponsonby, and Mr. Moore, on account of the precipitation, of such a step. Ponsonby called for a division, and we divided 135 to 80; this happened before six o'clock.

"Lord Castlereagh then presented his Bill, moved to have it printed, and that it should be read a second time on Wednesday. These motions were carried. Delay and opposition were threatened, but I do not think that real delay and effective opposition are determined on. All is tranquil; the effect of the assizes and of the management in England has been great.

"In two or three days, it is probable a judgment may be formed on the line Opposition may take.

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, May 12]. Downing Street.—"From what Long has just told me, I am not sure whether you are aware that the man who fired the pistol last night, is actually committed by warrant of the Secretary of State on a direct *charge of high treason* in compassing the King's death. This fact intimated to the House by yourself, or the Duke of Portland who committed, added to the notoriety of the pistol having been fired is surely sufficient ground for all your proceeding, without calling for any statement from the Lords attending the King, which would be less precise, and (if not wanting) ought to be avoided on a subject which must be tried in a court of justice. The evidence of firing *at the King's person* will turn out quite direct; and I conclude therefore you will not describe the act in your address as any thing short of a horrid and treasonable attempt against his Majesty's sacred person. The description will not be the less true, even if the plea of insanity should (as it probably will) be hereafter established; and therefore all reference to that point seems as well avoided.

*Postscript.*—I have this instant seen Dundas, from whom I imagine your ideas already correspond with those I have here stated, but I may as well send them."

#### ARTHUR PAGET to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private and confidential.*

1800, May 13. Palermo.—"Although I arrived here in the beginning of the second week in April, it was not in my power to present my credential letters to their Sicilian Majesties till the 21st of the same month. It is painful to me to state the reason of this to your Lordship, but I feel it my duty to do so. It seems that Sir William Hamilton was *worked upon* to consider his recall, and my almost immediate appearance after it at Palermo, as extremely abrupt; my first wish therefore was to place the matter in such a point of view as would be most agreeable to Sir William's feelings, which I am confident I should have succeeded in had I not been counteracted. Finding at the end of two or three days that he said nothing about presenting his re-credential letters, I mentioned the subject to him, and said that my only motive for doing so was

(which I did in the most delicate way in my power) that I might be enabled to proceed upon the business with which I was charged. Sir William then said that he should keep his letters in his possession, till it was convenient to him to present them ; that he could not be guided by what I said *en l'air* ; that he did not wish to remain here as a private individual after so many years service ; and that, without I shewed him my instructions and that they contained anything which obliged him to present his letters of recall immediately, it was his intention not to do so till the day before his departure, for which he was only waiting for the *Foudroyant* from Malta which was to convey him there. As to shewing Sir William my instructions, it was a thing which I decided at once within myself not to do, for he certainly would have been obliged to communicate them to Lady Hamilton, who would have conveyed them the next moment to the Queen. I therefore without taking any further notice of the business, remained quietly till the arrival of the *Foudroyant* and the departure of Sir William, which was about ten days afterwards. But I must acquaint your Lordship that General Acton, with the utmost readiness and civility, received me as Minister during the whole of the interval from the day Sir William presented me to him, which was about six days after my arrival at Palermo.

“Your Lordship did me the honor to talk so confidentially both about persons and things previous to my departure, and allowed me to do the same, that I feel it incumbent upon me to act in the same way now.

“It is not to be told the pains that were taken by Lady Hamilton to set the King and Queen and the whole Court against me, even before I arrived. I was represented as a Jacobin, a coxcomb, a person sent to *bully* and to carry them *bon gré, mal gré*, back to Naples ; and it is enough to know the character of people here to be sure that all this jargon had its effect. I must indeed except General Acton *in toto*. But her Ladyship’s language in general has been extremely indiscreet, representing Sir William as an illused man. She has however persuaded herself and others that I am only sent here for an interval, and that Sir William will resume his situation at Naples next winter. On the other hand Sir William says that nothing shall induce him to accept it again unless a sort of second Minister is sent under him to do the business and represent. I am sorry to say that Lord Nelson has given more or less into all this nonsense. His Lordship’s health is, I fear, sadly impaired, and I am assured that his fortune is fallen into the same state in consequence of great losses which both his Lordship and Lady Hamilton have sustained at Faro and other games of hazard. They are expected back from Malta every day, and are then, I understand, to proceed by sea to England.

“I really believe that there is no other object in the Queen’s journey to Vienna than that which I have stated in the dispatch. She will not venture to act contrary to General Acton’s wishes, and I am almost sure that he will not consent to her doing anything that would not be perfectly agreeable to England.

“I have heard a good deal lately about General Acton’s retiring to England ; at length he told me confidentially the other day that

such was his intention. I immediately took upon me to endeavour to dissuade him from it, I told him that, under the present difficult circumstances of the country, I was sure that it was wished in England that he should, at least for the present, remain where he is. I could not get him to promise me that he would do so, but I think I may venture to say that he will not go away so soon as he says. There is one person who knows him very intimately, and who assures me that he has no such intention, and that it is to answer his own purposes with the King and Queen that he declares this to be his resolution ; but still, he talked of it in such a way to me, that I ought hardly to doubt of the truth of what he said. He appears to me to be thoroughly disgusted with his situation. The state of this country is in fact melancholy, and though I do not think that much improvement will be made in it under him, yet, on the other hand, I am convinced that bad would become worse if it were governed by any man or set of men that I know of here at present. I therefore really think that his remaining here is a most desirable object. He is very much attached to England, and has more means of doing good, with a better disposition to act according to those means, than anybody I know in this country. Although we quarrel a little now and then, we are nevertheless upon the best terms possible, and I know from facts that I enjoy his confidence in some measure ; for these reasons I should be disposed to do anything in my power to prevail upon him to remain here, and, in so doing, I hope that I shall meet with your Lordship's approbation. I know that his idea is, in case of going to England, to have credential letters with him, but as there appears to me to be a great degree of analogy between General Acton's and Count Rumford's situations, I should feel it my duty not to allow the former to leave this country with the idea of appearing in England in a public character from this Court.

“ They are certainly very uneasy here about the Court of Vienna. It seems that the Austrians have entered the principality of Piombino, which is a detached state, but belonging to the Crown of Naples, a circumstance which does not fail to increase their alarms. It seems also that an Austrian General (whose name is I think Mercanti) arrived at Naples a short time since under another name, and in a sort of disguise, and upon being recognised the said General disappeared. It is likewise supposed that there are two Austrian officers in disguise here, after whom the strictest search is making ; these circumstances give rise to unpleasant surmises here. I do all in my power to quiet them.

“ Your Lordship will, no doubt, remark that I have dwelt a great deal upon the wretched state of this country. I, of course, include the Neapolitan dominions particularly. The more information I gain upon the subject, and the more I reflect upon it, the more dependent I feel. I really do not know whether any good is to be done with the present generation, so corrupt and so insensible to all principles of honor and morality do I think it. A total reformation upon the largest and most comprehensive scale ought to take place. The code of laws, which is not in itself a bad one, but which from perversion is become execrable, ought to be revised ;

but there is not a man in the kingdom who combines sufficient honesty and talents to be equal to the undertaking. Seminaries of all sorts ought to be instituted, but the same obstacles present themselves. The military, to whom in these times and in these countries the security of the whole in great measure depends, is in a deplorable state. As to religion, I do not pretend to a competency of giving an opinion upon the nature of the changes necessary to correct this most essential of all Christian establishments, but it must strike the observation of the most common understanding, that this branch of society in this country calls for reform.

“Leaving therefore this latter subject to itself as a delicate subject for a Protestant to touch upon, I am, with respect to the former, of opinion that nothing useful or good can be effected but by the introduction or direct interference of foreigners; but I will not trouble your Lordship more upon this, till it is in my power to enter more in detail upon the business.

“I forward by this opportunity a letter to Mr. Dundas from General Graham, by which everything interesting from Malta will of course be learnt. The general, in his letters to me, seems to expect a sortie, but I cannot imagine that the French will make a sortie now, when at a time the garrison was much stronger and when our works were only manned by Maltese peasants they never attempted one. I have, however, obtained H[is] S[icilian] Majesty’s consent to send the three companies of British now at Messina to Malta, which will be an acceptable reinforcement.

“I wish I could say more exactly when we were to return to Naples; I scarcely think before July. I can assure your Lordship that this has been a very difficult matter to manage, and it will still give a good deal of trouble, and require constant attention. Nothing, I find, but fair language will do. I must mention rather a singular thing to your Lordship. I was conversing upon the subject the day before yesterday with General Acton; I remarked to him the disastrous situation in which the King of Naples would find himself if the French should succeed in landing eight or ten thousand men in Sicily, four [thousand] for instance here, and four thousand at Syracuse, which would absolutely cut off retreat. This, of course, was admitted. But it is rather singular that an English officer (Colonel Callander) who arrived here yesterday, having left Lord Keith off Genoa the 4th instant, submitted word for word the same remark to me. I learnt from him also that there are from ten to fifteen thousand Italian malcontents on the coasts of France ready to be employed on this service, if it should be determined upon. If, therefore, upon examination and further inquiry this fact turned out to be authentic, your Lordship would hear of the King being at Naples within the shortest possible space of time.

“I fear that your Lordship will think the interval from the time of my writing to the Office from Naples to the present extremely long; but I have, for some time past, been in daily expectation of having it in my power to send off a servant with what I have now the honor of communicating; and, in not having done so sooner, I have been entirely guided by circumstances. Nothing can be more irregular and uncertain than the arrival and conveyance of the post

from this place, for which reason it is extremely discouraging to send anything at all interesting by it. I shall be extremely anxious for your Lordship's answer."

WILLIAM WICKHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1800, May 14. Donawerth.—“ I can add little or nothing to my public dispatches but the intelligence, which has just been received for the third time, of the capture of Genoa. For this time I am inclined to give credit to the report.

“ The accounts from the army are good. Kray is regaining the affection and esteem of the troops at Ulm, and I trust that all will go on well. I cannot imagine what the French are about ; either they are sickened by the resistance made by the Austrians, or they are really detaching a large force to Italy unknown to Kray. I wish this may be the case, as, if they weaken themselves here, Kray cannot well fail to beat them. I trust he will be able to resume offensive operations the day after to-morrow.

“ The conduct of the Bavarians has excited general admiration in the Austrian army, where no one would believe till they saw them in the field that a Bavarian soldier would ever have appeared. By the next messenger I will send some of the correspondence I have had on the occasion, from which some slight opinion may be formed of the difficulties I have had in bringing them up. But now that they are once engaged, all the resources of the country are at our disposal. I trust that his Majesty will take due notice of their conduct either through me to the army or by Count Haslang to the Elector.

“ If Genoa be taken, things cannot fail to go on well here ; and this check, severe as it is, will only serve to make the turn of affairs be more sensibly felt in France.

“ There has certainly been mismanagement, but I only desire that the man who would have acted better than Kray, *in every point*, under similar difficulties, may be the one who shall throw the first stone. The Prince of Lorraine merits the severest punishment. Prince Reuss is not without blame, but he is a brave soldier and a gentleman, and the fault is thrown entirely on his staff, who ought to have had better intelligence of the motions of the army which was opposed to him. I think in my conscience that Kray was justified in supposing Stockach safe with 10,000 men under the Prince of Lorraine in and about the place, and 25,000 under Prince Reuss in the enemy's rear.

“ It is impossible to give too much or even sufficient credit to the French for the manner in which this able manœuvre was conceived and executed ; but they have only succeeded by risking the safety of their whole army ; whilst Kray is censured and has been beaten for risking his, because his plan did not succeed.”

ROYALIST INSURRECTION IN BRITTANY.—MEMORANDUM BY LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, May.—(1) On tiendra prête une armée de 25,000 hommes.

avec les transports nécessaires, pour opérer un débarquement en France.

(2) Trois ou quatre mille hommes seront rassemblés à Douvres pour pouvoir prendre possession du Calais, dès l'instant que l'on en recevra l'invitation ; ce qui devrait avoir lieu le plutôt possible après le 20 Mai.

(3) Après l'occupation de Calais, et vers le milieu du mois de Juin, l'armée de débarquement profitera du premier vent pour se porter sur les côtes de France. On aura déjà pris des mesures pour l'occupation de l'isle de Houat pour servir de point de communication avec les Royalistes.

(4) Arrivé sur les côtes, le général commandant l'armée jugera d'après les communications qu'il ouvrira avec les Royalistes, et d'après les notions qu'il pourra recevoir de la disposition des forces républicaines, si l'état des choses lui permettra d'opérer le débarquement, avec la certitude de pouvoir se rembarquer en cas de nécessité avant que des renforts, envoyés soit de Poitiers soit de Dijon, puissent mettre les Républicains en état de lui opposer des forces supérieures.

(5) Si même, par l'effet de quelques circonstances imprévues, il jugerait ne devoir pas débarquer son armée, il aurait l'ordre de fournir aux Royalistes toute sorte de secours dont ils auraient besoin en armes et argent ; de protéger, s'il était nécessaire, le débarquement d'un prince, et, dans ce dernier cas, de faire sur toute l'étendue des côtes de France les démonstrations les plus menaçantes afin d'opérer une diversion efficace.

(6) Il paraît que dans tous les cas le mouvement à Paris ne devrait s'effectuer qu'après que l'on y ait reçu des notices, de la part de Général Georges, de l'arrivée actuelle des Anglais sur la côte, et de la détermination que l'on prendra alors, soit d'y agir avec l'armée Anglaise, soit d'y protéger le débarquement d'un prince de la manière ci-dessus mentionnée.

#### LORD GRENVILLE to the MARQUIS OF CIRCELLO.

1800, May. London.—“ M. de St. Teodoro aura pu se convaincre combien on est d'accord avec lui sur les points principaux de son mémoire. On a ménagé l'Espagne dans la guerre actuelle parcequ'on a cru que rien ne serait plus contraire aux intérêts de ce pays-ci que de voir la Revolution s'étendre jusqu'en Espagne, ou dans ses possessions Americaines. On se prêteroit volontiers à tel arrangement qui mettrait la cour de Madrid en état de se défendre efficacement contre le danger imminent dont elle est menacée.

“ Le Prince de la Paix est, sans doute, celui qui par son influence et ses moyens pourrait déterminer le Roi à prendre le seul parti qui lui reste pour la conservation de sa couronne, et même pour sa sûreté personnelle. On donnerait pour cet effet toutes les garanties qui seraient désirées, et on se prêterait aux arrangements nécessaires pour amener, et pour consolider cet ouvrage.

“ M. de St. Teodoro rendrait à la cause commune le plus grand service si, en présentant à l'esprit du Prince de la Paix ces con-

sidérations dans leur vrai point de vue, il pourrait le décider à se charger de cette entreprise.

“ Dans ce cas-là il serait très facile de traiter dès à présent avec le Prince, pour un arrangement éventuel que l'on conclurait en secret, et qui n'aurait son effet qu'au moment où les succès des alliés sur la frontière, ou de grands mouvements dans l'intérieur, décideraient le Prince à se mettre en avant. Les détails d'un pareil traité pourraient être négociés avec plus de facilité et de sûreté en Angleterre qu'à Madrid. En y envoyant une personne sûre le Prince de la Paix ne serait exposé à aucun risque, puisqu'il ne dépendrait que du Gouvernement Anglais de tenir parfaitement secret l'arrivée d'une pareille personne, et, bien plus encore, l'objet de son voyage. Pendant que l'arrivée d'un négociateur Anglais à Madrid attirerait toute l'attention et d'Alquier, et d'Urquijo, et pourrait entraîner les conséquences les plus funestes.”

#### COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, May 15. Harley Street.—“ La part que vous prenez avec tant d'amitié à ma malheureuse circonstance me touche infiniment. J'aurois bien voulu suivre votre conseil ; il épargneroit bien de fatigue et de souffrance à moi, et à ma pauvre fille surtout. Mais cela est impossible. Despote est soupçonneux à l'exès, il ne verroit en moi qu'un rebel qui, malgré son ordre, s'obstine à rester en Angleterre. Je sais que depuis quelque tems il s'est mit dans la tête que j'aime mieux rester ici qu'autre part, parcequ'il croit que je suis tout dévoué à l'Angleterre aux dépens de mon propre pays. Son caractère soupçonneux est tel que quand même une calomnie qu'on lui fait contre quelqu'un ne fait pas d'effet, et qu'il la répousse pour le moment, il le ressouvient après, et au premier mécontentement, quelque léger qu'il soit, contre la personne qu'on vouloit perdre, il croit alors à la calomnie qu'il avoit répoussé auparavant. Je le sens à mes dépens, et je sais que quoi qu'il n'avoit pas cru dans le moment qu'il lisoit la lettre du Comte Starhemberg à Cobenzel dans laquelle il disoit de moi que je suis soufflé par vous ,que je suis tout-à-fait Anglais, et que par là mon souverain est très mal servi, à présent il le croit.

“ Si mon collègue auroit écrit que je ne suis pas admirateur de la probité de Thugut il n'auroit dit que la pure vérité ; mais me faire passer pour un sujet infidel dans l'esprit de mon souverain, qui est despote et connu pour soupçonneux à l'exès, c'est une trahison abominable. Mais elle a été suivie par une suite de bassesses inouïs, car je possède plus de vingt billets de la main du calomniateur, écrits postérieurement à la calomnie, dans lesquels il ne cesse de me répéter l'attachement le plus tendre ; et ce qu'il y a de particulier c'est que le billet par lequel il me prioit d'envoyer sa lettre où il me dénonçoit à Cobenzel, et que devoit être lue par l'Empereur avant que de parvenir à celui à qui elle étoit adressée, étoit le billet le plus tendre.

“ Si je reste ici sous prétexte d'attendre sa réponse à ma lettre je suis perdu ; ainssi je suis résolu de partire, coûte qui coûte. Si je n'avois pas deux enfants qui me sont chers, j'aurois pris

autrement mon parti ; mais c'est pour ne pas les voir victimes innocentes du ressentiment qu'on auroit contre moi que je me soumet à tout ce que voudrât de moi mon malheureux sort. Recevez mes remerciements et ma profonde reconnaissance pour l'amitié dont vous m'honorez. Je la sens plus énergiquement que je ne puis l'exprimer, et je vous serai attaché tant que durera mon existence. Excusez ce grifonage ; je ne sais si vous pourrez le déchiffrer. Ce soir je vous enverrai ma lettre officielle pour vous demander à vous présenter M. de Lyzakewitz demain. En vous nomment ce dernier je serois injuste envers lui, je n'agiroit pas en ami envers vous, si je ne vous assuroit que c'est un parfaitement honnête homme ; qu'il aime ce pays où il est depuis trente-six ans ; et que, sur le système politique de l'union entre nos deux patries, il pense comme vous et moi."

#### E. COOKE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, May 17. Dublin.—“Yesterday and this evening the Representation Bill went through the committee of the House of Commons with little opposition. The enclosed paper will shew the grounds on which Lord Castlereagh supported his selection. His speech was very clear and gave general satisfaction.

“We are threatened with a debate on the Report, but I believe it will not be serious.

“In the Representation Bill a slight alteration is made with respect to the Clerk of the Crown returning the 28 peers who shall be elected, so as to obviate the case of 28 peers being not *completely* elected by reason of an equality of votes ; and a provision is added to the Bill that a copy of the writs and returns of election shall be kept in the Crown Office of Ireland, attested by the Chancellor ; which copy, in case the original writ and return should be lost, is to be deemed evidence.

“The Speaker asked me what had the Chancellor to do with it ? I said the writ was a Chancery writ and that the Clerk of the Crown was ministerial. He said the Clerk of the Crown was a servant of the House, and had a seat in the House, and that the House of Commons would not recognise the Clerk of the Crown as an officer of the Chancellor.

“I said, the Chancery was the Office of Writs ; that though the House of Commons made their order on the Clerk of the Crown he was still the ministerial officer of the Chancellor, and that the writs were in the custody of the Chancery. He then said, cook it your own way, I have nothing to do with it ! I believe I am right.

“I think the Speaker is growing more reconciled. He told me he was against delay and he is in tolerable good humour.

“There was some cross conversation to-day respecting the difficulties of framing a Bill to try Irish controverted elections.

“On Monday we hope to get through the countervailing duties. I asked, to-day, one of our most active opposition merchants what he thought of them and he said he approved the arrangements.

“The Union Bill will be moved for on Wednesday, and it is understood Opposition will on that day make their effort.”

## THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, May 18. Stowe.—“ I do not know anything that could have shocked me more sensibly than the account you gave me of the danger from which Providence has saved us by the King's almost miraculous escape. I feel in common with every good subject, the deep and anxious stake which we all hold in this invaluable life ; but my sensations of private personal affection and respect are paramount to every thing that I can feel as a public man. I sincerely hope and trust that the nature of this offence will be fully considered ; and I feel that my mind is not sanguinary nor impetuous on this subject, when I urge you to consider what I have so often said to you in discussing the former attempts upon him ; namely the legal and political propriety of admitting the plea of lunacy in such cases. And you will recollect how much my ideas on this matter are strengthened by Lord Mansfield's argument on this plea tendered by one unfortunately too clearly entitled to the benefit of it, I mean Laurence Lord Ferrers. By that argument it seems clear that a jury are bound to consider, not the general habit and repute of lunacy, but the precise and actual state of the culprit's mind at the precise and actual moment of the treason ; and to enquire whether he was then *capax doli*, that is whether he knew the nature of his offence, and the consequence of it. And if the facts stated in the papers were stated on oath to me as a jurymen, namely, that he said ‘ he meant to kill the King because he was tired of his life, and would not destroy himself, but expected to be torn to pieces by the people, or to be hanged for it,’ I should convict him of the treason, without the slightest consideration of his prior or of any subsequent lunacy. In truth I have some doubt whether a man so left at large on his usual and constant occupations is not fully answerable for all his acts, unless he can prove the hand of Providence afflicting him in the precise moment of the act for which he is arraigned ; and the extent of that affliction should be examined very fully, unless you are prepared to say, on a less interesting matter, that Lord Ferrers was foully murdered by the judgment of his peers. I urge all this, not because I doubt your inclination to do all that can be stated to be your duty, but because I think the practice of our courts, in the cases of the former attempts, has encouraged mischievous frenzy to take this course ; and will, I fear, inevitably encourage Jacobinical treason to avail itself of a means so obvious as this which is put into their hands. Pray give every attention to this matter, and if any thing can be done upon it in Parliament, I will, lame as I am, attend, and urge on my one leg all that can assist you in any step that can be taken to avert a calamity so heart-breaking. I must likewise beg you, in justice to my feelings towards the King, to tell him that I should have put myself into my chaise immediately to have taken the first opportunity of paying my duty to him (duties God knows founded on the truest affection and respect) if it were possible for me to support myself at his levée ; but being still tied to my stick, and my wheeling chair, and unable even to get on my horse, I beg he will give me credit for all I feel on this occasion.”

## W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, May 19. Hollwood.—“It is not from idleness, but because another morning here will be of great use to me, that I much wish not to return to town till dinner to-morrow. That wish would however give way, if I saw any material purpose to be gained by my coming sooner. With respect to the Mediterranean, I do not see how we can send any more force from hence, without giving up all prospect of acting (if events should be ever so favourable) on this side France; and without departing from our provisional engagement with *Monsieur*. At all events no useful discussion could take place at a Cabinet on this part of the subject, without previously arranging it with Dundas; and I should have no chance of seeing him in time for to-morrow. The two other points (the Condé army and the free gift to Austria) do not seem to me to require a formal Cabinet, especially as you will probably see most of our colleagues at the Queen’s House to night. With respect to the first of the two, what you propose is the only thing left to do. For the second I am persuaded that, on so strong an authority as we all hold Wickham to be, no one will hesitate to risk another 150,000*l.* for an additional chance of turning to account all the rest which we have given or are to give. I conclude however your generosity will be so far conditional as to depend on your instruction finding Lord Minto still relying on the disposition of Vienna to act fairly.

“I wrote about Leveson, and find Lord Stafford is to be in town to-morrow, which I hope will enable him to decide.

“There can surely be no objection in trusting Wickham with a discretion to give such a gratuity to the unfortunate regiment as he thinks adapted to the case.”

## LORD GRENVILLE to ARTHUR PAGET.

*Private.*

1800, May 19. Cleveland Row.—“I have received your private letter of the 13th March, and by this conveyance can only say that the plan there mentioned would, under the circumstances that then existed, have been highly useful. Subsequent events have probably rendered it much less practicable, but if you should see any opening for it, its execution might still be highly advantageous to the common cause; and Lord Keith would, I doubt not, readily co-operate in it.”  
*Copy.*

## LORD GRENVILLE to WILLIAM WICKHAM.

1800, May 20. Cleveland Row.—“I received yesterday your dispatches of the 8th, with your private letter. I have immediately complied with your suggestions, which I think excellent, as I am always very apt to think your suggestions are. To-morrow night a messenger sets out for Vienna with orders to Lord Minto to make the Emperor a present, in his Majesty’s name, of £150,000 extra beyond the loan; and as a mark only of the share which the King takes in the events of the campaign on the Continent, and of his disposition to consider its mischances as well as its successes, matters

of common concern. All this is necessarily subordinate to this condition, that, at the arrival of my dispatch, Lord Minto shall be as well pleased with Thugut as he is by his last letters. You are therefore fully authorized to make such confidential use of the circumstances as your discretion shall point out, and as you may think useful for obtaining confidence and good will at head-quarters.

"I have long seen reason to judge as you do of the capacity of our officers. Something may be allowed for want of opportunity to learn; but if, when that is thrown into their way, they will not learn, they are incurable.

"I do not wish to turn you into an accuser, but I must say to you fairly that I shall not think you do your duty if, charged with the whole superintendence of that business, you do not find some way of letting the neglect you mention to me in your private letter come officially before me. And if it does, I shall not do mine if I leave the individual in question there one hour afterwards.

"I have been on the point of sending you one or more military assistants, but I have hesitated from the fear of burthening you with inefficient and sometimes troublesome instruments. I heartily wish you had pointed out to me some others, as you did H. Clinton, whom you wished to have. I would have sent them immediately.

"Shall you want more now? The Condé army is going far wide of you, and you have always at hand Swiss and Austrians whose services you can command. I should be glad to give some of our officers such an opportunity of learning; but if they profit by it no better, what good does it do?

"If Ramsay is recalled, who do you wish to replace him?

"Abererombie and his convoy are as usual blown back. If I were a seaman, with half the superstition which belongs to them, I should certainly throw him overboard as a second Jonas. If ever he gets to the Mediterranean he will have ten or twelve thousand men under his orders, of whom, after garrisoning Minorca as much as it can require to be garrisoned against the Spaniards, and after providing something for Malta, he may still have six or eight thousand disposeable troops. Were he there now, such a body would most certainly be of great value, when aided by our decided naval superiority in that sea. But I much fear before he arrives all chance of his being of use will be over, unless Willot (of whom neither you nor Lord Minto have lately written to me) has carved out some work for him. He is ordered, if possible, to correspond with you on that subject, and to pay the greatest attention to your suggestions. I guess that the Dutch business does not sit very easy upon him, and that he would not be sorry to do something brilliant; but I doubt whether his character is naturally enterprising enough to give fair chance to royalist plans.

"As to the Brest fleet, do not let that disturb your dreams whether sleeping or waking. We shall find full employment for them here, and in the meantime, they have brought seventeen of their line of battle ships back into the inner harbour, and have landed and marched away the troops who had been embarked. This is said to be because of the sickness which prevailed on board. And how can it be otherwise. Whoever heard of a fleet continuing healthy

while lying at anchor in its own roads. Your plan of beating Moreau in Savoy, Dauphiné, and Provence, is excellent, but I have no expectation that it will ever be understood much less approved of at Vienna.

“ You mention to me the watches given to M. de Varicourt, but not the supposed value. If you will let me know it, I will send corresponding presents of rather more value for the Baron de Deux Ponts and Colonel Varenbuhler, unless you can procure them where you are, and give them, which would save time and trouble.

“ I have in my dispatches done what you recommend about compliments to the Bavarians and to the poor Swiss. But I felt the latter demanded something more, and I have done accordingly. Whatever you propose, with much more *connoissance de cause* than we have, will, I undertake for it, be immediately done.

“ I am, besides, about ordering a medal, silver for the officers and copper for the men, for the remains of the regiment Roverea. If any particular idea strikes you on the subject, or any inscription better than another, let me know it. My present idea is the King's head on one side; reverse, Valour, or Fame, or better, Britannia inscribing a shield with the words *Möskirk Maii 5° 1800*. Legend, *Virtuti militari Helvetiorum*, and round the rim “ *Régiment de Roverea*. This is but a just distinction to these poor men, and is an example useful in all armies. Would it be too much to put round the king's head, instead of his names and titles, ‘ *Vindex Europæ* ’ or ‘ *Europæ libertatis Assertor*. ’

“ Your purchase of plate was abundantly justified by the occasion, and I shall not feel the smallest difficulty in recommending to you an allowance on that head.

“ I have sometimes spoken occasionally on your situation to the Duke of Portland. I have never perceived in him the smallest disposition to be impatient for any new arrangement. At the same time I fairly own to you that my mind has carved out work for you where you are, such as will not soon be finished. But I think the whole had best remain as it is just now. Your services are such that I trust you can entertain no uneasiness as to your future situation.”

SIR CHARLES WHITWORTH TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1800, May 20. St. Petersburg.—“ I should perhaps apologize to your Lordship for having in my dispatch of this date alluded to the private letter with which your Lordship was pleased to honour me of the 11th ultimo; but I could not forbear expressing the strong sense I entertain of your Lordship's goodness, and my gratitude for the consolation which you so generously afford me. I beg leave to bespeak a continuance of the same favourable disposition when I shall have the honour of making myself personally known to your Lordship; my respect and my attachment to your Lordship's person shall best prove how anxious I am to deserve it.

“ May I venture to hope that your Lordship will so far enter into the difficulties of my situation here as to become my advocate with

his Majesty, and to obtain his gracious pardon for the liberty I have taken in trespassing upon the confidence reposed in me. I have done it only on the strength of the solemn engagement to refund should my claim be deemed unreasonable. But I give your Lordship my word of honour that, without such assistance, I should not have been able to maintain the character which I deem it under the present circumstances more essential than ever to preserve; and that every shilling of the debt which I must otherwise have left behind me, has been contracted on the public account, in which I include those extraordinary expenses necessary to keep up the dignity of His Majesty's mission, and my own personal independence. I trust that on this ground your Lordship will not refuse to plead in my behalf.

"I do not see any probability of my being under the necessity of remaining here longer than I have mentioned in my dispatch. But if things should take an unexpected turn, and nothing of that nature is impossible with the Emperor, I shall, notwithstanding His Majesty's permission and my own inclinations, think it incumbent upon me to remain at least until I shall be able to ascertain what advantage is likely to be drawn from such a change."

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, May. Downing Street].—"When I desired to dine with you to-day, I had quite forgot an engagement which I cannot well put off. Dundas will meet us here at twelve to-morrow. Perhaps you could call so as to walk for half an hour first, as there are one or two points I wish much to talk over with you before we see him."

*Postscript.*—"I saw my brother, and wrote to Westmorland, and I rather hope nothing awkward will happen to-day, but I see we shall have much difficulty and vexation."

#### EARL TEMPLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, May 20. Wotton.—"Upon my arrival at Aylesbury, where I met my uncle Tom, he informed me that he had heard it stated very generally about town that Mr. Ryder was to be the Treasurer of the Navy, that Canning was to succeed Ryder, Mr. Wallace to succeed Canning, and *that I was to have the seat at the Admiralty vacated by Wallace.* When he stated this he distinctly said that he had had no conversation with you on the subject, but he also stated to me the authority from which he heard the story, which appeared to me—as it did to him—sufficiently good to induce me to pay some attention to it. I wrote in consequence to my father a simple state of the story as I heard it; I received from him the enclosed answer. Deeply hurt as he seems to be by the slight which he conceives to have been put upon my uncle Tom, and by the implied breach of engagement to me by this arrangement, I shall add nothing to his letter, neither shall I make any comment upon it. My feelings are naturally as strong on both the points mentioned as his can be; at the same time, knowing how reports get about

and how erroneous those reports sometimes are, I reserve the expressing those feelings till I distinctly find the facts assumed by my father are confirmed. I know your affection for me too well not to be convinced that every thing you can do you will do. Thank God I am not influenced in this business by any indecent or improper haste for office. My only object in proposing myself as a candidate for it at all is a very earnest desire on my part to try my fortune in the line in which so many of my family have distinguished themselves so much, and in which I hope I shall not disgrace either myself or them.

“As Lady Temple is not well, I should feel loth to leave her to go up to town unless it be absolutely necessary. If, however, there are any points which you wish to discuss with me, I will certainly come up; or I will, if you will give me leave, call at Dropmore if you are there in the course of the week; on this subject however I hope to receive your orders at Aylesbury.”

#### HENRY DUNDAS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, May 20. Downing Street.—“I return your letters, and Wickham’s private one certainly proves that things are in a critical situation in more places than one. There has certainly been great military errors in the arrangement of the Austrian army, and Moreau has taken the advantage of it. It seems perfectly right both to reform the Condé corps, and to send them to Civita Vecchia, but may it not be a question for further consideration, especially under the pressure of the late letters from Wickham, if the corps, reformed as it will be, might not be sent to Minorca in place of being brought round to Belle Isle in the event of our success in that quarter. It would not be improper to write to Sir Ralph Abercrombie on that subject, more especially as I am sorry to say there are too ready means at present of communicating with him, for, by a letter I have from him this morning, his convoy seems to be dispersed, and the *Seahorse*, in which he is, has been blown back to Torbay. He writes *urgently* to have other two battalions sent to the Mediterranean, if we expect him to be able to do what he wishes, and what is expected of him. I think the two battalions ought to be sent as soon as we can. Beyond that I am sure it is impossible to send more till the business of Belle Isle is decided one way or other. This return of the fleet to Torbay is very unfortunate in that respect. I don’t think our friend Wickham always recollects that it is not so easy to move an army as it is to write a dispatch. It is not a month since distracting the enemy on this side of France, with a view of keeping them weak on the Rhine, was the favourite object; and, with that view, our ideas with regard to Belle Isle have been regulated; but it is altogether impossible, supposing every other difficulty removed, to have an army such as he points at in the Mediterranean without abandoning our ideas as to Belle Isle, and all the consequences resulting from the possession of it.

“I had proceeded so far when Huskisson put into my hands the proposed dispatch to Lord Minto. You’ll observe what I have stated above contains no idea incompatible with that dispatch. Although

the Condé army, from the feelings of the Austrians, could not be employed in any operations with them, still, by strengthening the force at Minorca or Malta, it would liberate and render disposable more of the army under Sir Ralph Abercrombie in the Mediterranean. Have you any objection to send a copy to Sir Ralph Abercrombie of your dispatch, and I would direct him to communicate it to Lord Keith."

LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

1800, May 21. Cleveland Row.—“When Stuart resigned the command of the Mediterranean expedition, and there appeared a probability that little if any active operation would be undertaken in that quarter, I wrote to Captain Proby to remain where he was. But as these circumstances are in great measure again changed by Sir Ralph Abercrombie's appointment and by the plans which are in agitation, I should esteem it a very great advantage to Captain Proby if I could place him for this campaign under Sir Ralph Abercrombie's protection and attach him to his family.

“I am perfectly aware that Sir Ralph Abercrombie must, long before this, have provided himself with his regular *aides de camp*, and that I cannot therefore reasonably expect that he should place Captain Proby in that situation; but, if he would allow me to write to him to join the army at Minorca, and if he would then consider him in the light in which Sir Charles Stuart had promised to receive him as a supernumerary attached to him, and employ him in any manner that would give him the opportunity of learning his profession, and particularly becoming acquainted with the practice of the service of his own country (he having hitherto seen nothing but the Austrian service, to which he has been attached through almost the whole war) all my wishes and that of his friends would be fully answered; their object being not pecuniary advantage for him but military instruction, which certainly they cannot better obtain than by placing him under Sir Ralph Abercrombie's orders.

“If you think I might venture to presume upon Sir Ralph Abercrombie's acquiescence in this request, I would, by the messenger who goes to-day to Wickham, order Captain Proby to make the best of his way to Minorca. If not, we must wait till the next messenger goes.” *Copy.*

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, May 21. Downing Street.—“I have no hesitation in advising you to take the first moment of writing to Captain Proby to proceed to Minorca. Your request seems a very reasonable one, and, if it was less so, the accommodating disposition of Sir Ralph Abercrombie would induce him to embrace any recommendation coming from either of us.”

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, May 21. Stowe.—“I was prevented yesterday by unexpected business from answering your letter. In the first place I

am to thank you most warmly for your intimation of giving me a few days at Stowe, for you can give me nothing I prize more ; and in the next place I must desire you to leave orders to receive within your doors a guest that I have negotiated for your cellar, namely, a hogshead of golden pippin cider from Somerset, now ordered to march from Taunton to Cleveland Row.

“ I fear that Wickham’s friend Kray will have been forced to fall farther back, and I do not quite understand how it happened that, with such a force as you sent me a list of, he has been obliged to fight with such inferiority. The moment is very anxious, and the Vienna account of Melas *entrenching* before Genoa does not appear to promise any immediate termination of that contest, so as to enable him to help Kray by the obvious move into Switzerland and into Lower Provence, where I had hoped to have heard of them before now.”

E. COOKE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, May 22. Dublin.—“ I received your Lordship’s note with Lord Buckingham’s proxy enclosed, which I have delivered to the Chancellor. Opposition made their effort last night when Lord Castlereagh moved for leave to bring in the Union Bill. The leaders did not debate. The debate came from the dregs of Opposition : much abuse and more nonsense. The House was sometimes disgusted, sometimes in roars of laughter, never serious. We divided at eleven, 160 to 100. Every effort was made by Opposition to collect their forces.

“ I hardly think we shall have any serious debate hereafter. Many of our opponents are on the wing. There is no sensation on the subject in town or country, and, unless affairs take a new and unforeseen turn, I shall not think of troubling your Lordship any further with my scrawl upon this subject.

“ I consider the question really carried.”

CHARLES PHILIPPE, COUNT D’ARTOIS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, May 23. Welbeck Street.—“ Je m’empresse de vous instruire qu’en revenant de chez le Roi j’ai reçu des nouvelles de Paris, sur le contenu desquelles je désirerais beaucoup conférer avec vous le plus promptement possible. J’ai aussi à vous communiquer des idées que je considère comme tres essentielles.

“ Soyez donc assez aimable, je vous en prie, pour me faire dire si je puis vous voir demain, ou dimanche au plus tard, soit à Cleveland Row, soit à Welbeck Street, comme vous le préférerez.”

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, May 24. Wimbledon.—“ I herewith send you, as I promised, the correspondence which has passed between the Governor General of India and the Captain General of Goa relative to the propriety of admitting a British garrison into that important station. The garrison for the present has been admitted, and the expense of it is referred home to be settled here by the two Govern-

ments. The security of Goa from falling into the hands of any European enemy is certainly an important object, but it will be a great additional expense to our military establishments, already very expensive, if we are to be at the expense of maintaining so large a garrison. I wish they would give it up and confine themselves to as many factories as they please. It is of no use to them, and they are not able to defend it.

“The other claims they set up are very idle.”

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, May 26]. Downing Street.—“Smyth declines quitting the Treasury for the India Board, and as Wallace is therefore to go thither, my only vacancy will be at the Admiralty. I imagine from what passed before, Lord Temple will wish to succeed to it. Pray let me know. I would have come to you if it were not too hot to move. To-morrow I can be at leisure any time you please after one, if you are staying in town, which I can hardly suppose.”

LORD GRENVILLE to EARL TEMPLE.

1800, May 28. Dropmore.—“I had hoped in consequence of the arrangements I had made for a visit to Stowe this week to have seen you at Aylesbury or Wotton. This is put out of the question by a severe cold, which will not let me think of the journey to Stowe. Next week I hope to be more fortunate, if the union arrangements should not, as I think they will not, be sufficiently advanced to require my attendance in the House of Lords. I am however unwilling any longer to postpone communicating to you what has passed on the subject of official arrangements, and the state in which that matter now stands, which is shortly this.

“When the arrangements were finally settled respecting the Treasurership of the Navy and joint-Paymastership, the first thing that was done was to endeavour to make that arrangement conducive to your wishes, by offering the vacancy at the India Board to Smyth of Heath, whose acceptance would have opened the Treasury to you. After some consideration he declined this offer, principally, as I believe, on account of the inconvenience of a re-election. Douglas is already at the India Board, and there are obvious reasons to prevent the bringing Townshend or Pybus there, which, in the case of one of them, would also have been still more liable to the same difficulty of re-election.

“It remained therefore only to bring one of the Lords of the Admiralty to the India Board, and this has accordingly been done by the nomination of Wallace.

“About the same time an intimation was received from Lord Granville Leveson—the person whose name was last year mentioned to my brother as having a promise of being brought forward into the line of office—that the difficulty respecting his re-election no longer existed, and that Lord Stafford saw no danger in his vacating the county at this time, if he was appointed to the present vacancy.

“He was answered that I had already been empowered to offer

Wallace's seat at the Admiralty to your acceptance, and that the matter must therefore wait your decision.

"In this situation therefore it stands. If you think, on a consideration of all the circumstances, that it is best to let the Admiralty pass you, it will be given to Lord G. Leveson, and the effect of this vacancy will have been to remove out of your way a prior engagement, and one which it is the more desirable to remove since the difficulty respecting his re-election is no longer found to exist. And you will then stand first for the first vacancy to arise at the Treasury. If, on the other hand, you prefer accepting the Admiralty now, you place yourself at once in the line of office, and under the particular circumstances of the case, the engagement to Lord G. Leveson, though prior in point of date, will be postponed in order to make good the offer which I was empowered to make to you.

"I do not add any thing of advice respecting your decision, because I think it must in great degree depend on your own feelings; but if it would be at all more agreeable to you to talk the subject over with me before you finally decide upon it, I trust we shall next week have an opportunity of meeting." *Copy.*

#### LORD MINTO to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1800, May 28. Vienna.—"It was my intention to have written pretty fully to-day, but an unusual press of business and the arrival of dispatches from India, which it is necessary to expedite, oblige me to request that your Lordship will excuse me till the next opportunity.

"I confess I am disappointed to find that the construction put by Lord Elgin on the last orders (for allowing the capitulation) is likely still to send the Egyptian army to reinforce the enemy in Europe. I had imagined they were intended to take effect only in the event of the capitulation being, at the time of their arrival, in vigour, and in a state of actual performance.

"Baron Thugut continues staunch."

#### EARL TEMPLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, [May 31].—"I enclose to you a letter I have just received from my father. On the question of the *Admiralty* I must confess I retain the same opinions I did before. On *another point* discussed in my father's letter, I must confess I feel as warmly as he does, as I really think Mr. Pitt has hardly done fairly by me in offering to me the very lowest situation in office when, in Lord Hawkesbury's case, he had established a precedent for offering me a higher; particularly too when by chance the very situation to which he had before placed Lord Hawkesbury was become vacant. All this does not affect the question of Admiralty, but it does very much the main question of whether, under these circumstances, I can pursue my plan of office. Every thing must depend upon Mr. Pitt's conversation with you. I must again repeat, what I am

afraid I have troubled you with much too often, that my wishes are for a public life, and that to follow that object I am ready to sacrifice as much as my situation will allow me ; at the same time I cannot reconcile to my feelings the coming into office in a situation beneath that in which other young men of my own rank have been placed. These considerations, perfectly distinct from any we have discussed together, I must confess press upon me very much. What turn they may take entirely depends upon Mr. Pitt's language to you, and I preferred the expressing them to you by letter to the taking up your time by an interview. I cannot however conclude my letter without assuring you that, whatever may be the event of this business, my feelings of gratitude to you for the very affectionate attention you have paid to my objects, will remain always the same."

COUNT STARHEMBERG TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, May.—“ Permettez-moi de me plaindre pour la première fois de ma vie de vous-même à vous-même. J'apprends que cette éternelle convention pour laquelle j'ai écrit quatre-vingt sept dépêches, et cent deux lettres particulières, vient d'être ratifiée, et vous ne m'en dites rien. Comme mon courier n'est pas arrivé, et qu'on ne me le mande pas non plus, j'en doute encore. De grâce rassurés-moi, vous savez combien cela m'intéresse. Qui plus que moi vous a donné plus de preuves de mon attachement à l'alliance et à la persévérance dans les principes de l'honneur et de la probité. D'ailleurs je suis le seul ministre étranger qui puisse se glorifier d'être Anglais en même tems, et je vous assure que j'en suis bien fier. Quand vous me le permettez, je viendrai vous faire ma cour, et vous féliciter ainsi que moi-même de notre *re-réunion*. Il faut qu'elle soit éternelle.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, June 1. Stowe.—“ Upon a closer examination of Garlike's letter, I find that Krudener understands from Count Woronzow that no English Minister will for the present be named to Petersburg, and Garlike very justly quotes this as an additional reason against any such change as might add to the strength of this impression at Petersburg ; surely however Woronzow had better not promote this belief among his brother ministers, as it can only tend to make bad worse.”

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, June 1. Stowe.—“ Your letter to Tom of yesterday announces the capture of Nice ; but Lord Keith's promise of starving Genoa by the 20th is liable to so many accidents, that I fear the blockade by land will necessarily be abandoned, to enable Melas to meet Bonaparte or rather Berthier. It is however great consolation to reflect that the Egyptian army will be otherwise employed than in landing at Marseilles, precisely in the moment in which France would most want them. I fear however that Abercrombie

(even if he was all that I do not think he is) will be too late to save the Austrians in that quarter, if the fortune of the war should be against them. On the chapter of Swabia I am more at ease, for the *repose* given to French army after the battle of the 11th, is a clear proof that they cannot gather strength in proportion to the accession that must have joined Kray."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, June 1. Bromley Hill.—“ You will have heard the account received this morning of the sailing of part of the French fleet (probably for the Mediterranean). This combined with the state of things by the last accounts from Italy, brings me back to the idea, that we may still do more by sending eight, ten, or twelve thousand additional troops to the Mediterranean, than by any other application of our force. I am the more confirmed in it from finding this morning at Wimbledon, that the state of our preparations with a view to any enterprise on a large scale on this side of France, is so wretchedly backward, and the exertions for pushing them so languid, as to leave (in my judgment) little chance of our doing any thing in that way that can influence the fate of the campaign. We may *yet* be in time to send to Italy what may render success decisive, or retrieve disasters that might otherwise be irreparable. I think you are very likely to have anticipated the same opinion. At all events I am sure you will think the point well deserving immediate consideration.

“ I have written to Dundas to tell him what has struck me since I left him this morning, and to beg him to meet me in town at twelve to-morrow. Lord Spencer is in town, and I wish much that you would if possible meet us at that time, or as soon after as suits you.

“ If any thing is to be done, time will press in all respects; but particularly because the Bellisle scheme, must, on this idea be suspended for the present, and if so, we have not many hours to lose.”

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, June 2. Downing Street.—“ On coming to town I found that the squadron from Brest has returned to port, and that the blow at Bellisle is probably on the point of being struck. It must of course be followed up, and the only question now remaining, will be whether the part of our disposable force not necessary for this enterprise shall be sent (as we can get shipping) to the Mediterranean, or employed in expeditions or demonstrations here. I rather incline still to the former, to a certain extent, but it does not now press as I supposed it would, and I therefore see no reason to put off returning to the country for to-morrow.

“ I conclude you did not mean to go back before the birthday.”

*Postscript.*—“ I trust we have gained some thing since yesterday, in advancing preparations equally requisite for either service.”

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MINTO.

1800, June 3. Cleveland Row.—“ You are too well used to the

business of Parliament to be at all surprised at our extreme impatience under all my friend Thugat's delays. For my own part I really know not what we shall say or do if the *projet* does not arrive in the next week or ten days ; for, without it, we can hardly propose to Parliament to vote near three millions of foreign subsidies, the whole policy of which depends upon the engagements taken or to be taken with the Court of Vienna. Nor does my imagination supply me with any reasonable answer to the obvious question why our treaty has not been made weeks—I might say months—ago.

“ We had a considerable alarm here one day in the idea that the Brest fleet had availed themselves of Lord St. Vincent's absence to put to sea. They did actually attempt it, but the appearance of our fleet drove them back again immediately to their hiding place. If they had got a couple of days start of us, and run at once for Genoa, eight and forty hours might have done irreparable mischief. I trust, however, that Genoa is by this time in Melas's hands, and Lord St. Vincent, now that the French have shown the desire of getting out, will of course be doubly watchful to prevent it.

“ I think it is by no means to be regretted that Kleber has broken the capitulation. One cannot but be sorry for the Turks who have fallen victims to their own indiscipline, and the ignorance of their leaders ; but Kleber and his army can annoy us much less where they are than in almost any other possible situation. It is not yet finally decided what orders shall be sent to Lord Keith on this subject, and the question is indeed a very difficult one. In the meantime, the delay will prevent any mischief from that army being employed against the Austrians in this campaign at least.

“ I trust Melas will give a good account of the great Consul and his army of reserve, but its force will evidently be very different from the 10 or 15,000 men they talk of at Vienna. I should think it likely that a part of Moreau's army will be marched to support it, and, in that case, I trust Kray will be ordered to move forward again.

“ We are doing, and shall continue to do, every thing in our power to create diversions in their favour on this side.” *Copy.*

#### H. FAGEL to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, June 6. Duke Street.—“ I lose no time in transmitting to you a letter which I received yesterday, after I left you, from M. Mollerus. It fully confirms what I remember you mentioned to me some time since, with respect to an offer of 20 millions which had been made by the Batavian Government to the French. It also contains some other curious particulars, as for instance that of the ex-ambassador Brantsen (the same whom you may perhaps recollect to have been sent to Paris in the beginning of 1795, soon before the French invasion, to negotiate peace, and who, I think, is otherwise sufficiently known to you) being employed to collect information respecting a landing in Holland.

“ When you have perused this letter, I shall be much obliged to you to return it to me. I have already written to M. Mollerus that in consequence of the turn which this whole business has taken no

hopes can be entertained of bringing it to any advantageous issue.

“Enclosed you will also find an extract from one of the last letters of the Hereditary Prince of Orange.”

*Enclosure :—*

THE HEREDITARY PRINCE OF ORANGE to the PRINCE OF ORANGE.

1800, May 27. Berlin, *en chiffre*.—“Le chiffre du 9 Mai avec la copie de la lettre de Mollerus au Greffier m'est très-bien parvenue, et je puis assurer que nous allons bride en main, et ne ferons aucune démarche qui puisse compromettre. Haugwitz a recommandé que les Bataves fissent une démarche en France, et il a autorisé Sandoz Rollin à y sonder le terrain, ou faire une ouverture d'après les circonstances pour appuyer ou faire témoigner que le Roi désire la neutralité, et qu'il est prêt à se charger de la négociation et avec l'Angleterre et avec la France pour la procurer à la Hollande. C'est du 5, au 10 qu'il attend réponse ; jusque-là on ne fera rien. Je verrai Haugwitz encore avant mon départ, mais, du reste, les choses resteront *in statu quo* jusqu'à la réponse de Paris.” *Extract.*

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, June 1-7. York Farm.]—“J'ai l'honneur de vous envoyer ci-joint une lettre assez intéressante et très détaillée d'un seigneur Flamand, l'ami de mon enfance, et autrefois attaché à l'Archiduc. C'est le Comte de Moldeghem, le seul de la noblesse qui se soit toujours bien conduit, depuis qu'il a pu sortir des Pays-bas. Il est allé respirer à Munster où il se trouve actuellement. Vous serez content de l'ensemble des notions que vous trouverez dans sa lettre. Agréez mon hommage. Quand aurons nous donc quelque chose de positif de Vienne ? Ce Thugut est terrible avec *sa singularité dissimulée*. Je serois plus expéditif à sa place, et sûrement, aussi bien pensant.”

*Enclosure :—*

COUNT DE MOLDEGHEM to COUNT STARHEMBERG.

1800, May 23. Munster.—“Avant mon départ, qui n'aura lieu que le dix-huit de Juin, j'ai voulu vous assurer la reception de votre lettre du neuf mai, mais il est assez simple que vous ne soyez point informé de l'arrangement des bureaux de poste de cette partie d'Allemagne. Les lettres mise à la poste à Hambourg, au poste correspondant avec le conseiller Dûesberg de Munster, *qui est le tenant de l'Electeur*,—*cela est sure* quand l'on a la précaution à Hambourg de remettre les lettres à son bureau ; mais le poste qui est le bureau du Prince de Latour, qui a le sien à Hambourg, tous les secrétaires du nommé Hamm d'ici qui en est le Directeur, homme très riche et insouciant, laisse faire la besogne à des subalternes, qui sont absolument vendus aux Prussiens, qui sont très avides des nouvelles qui arrivent de Paris à Hambourg, de là plus loin, et le retour de votre ville par les

arrangements pris avec la France. Cette poste pour les intérêts des négociants va très vite, mais il y a de l'obscurité des Prussiens, ainsi qu'un parti de la noblesse qui croit que le séjour de l'Electeur à Vienne pourroit leur donner un coadjuteur, ils travaillent tous les esprits contre, et ne néglige rien des relations extérieures; à cette poste pour intérêts, actuellement vous voilà au courant.

“La campagne a été brillante en Italie, mais l'idée de secourir Gènes, passant par le Valais, est effrayante, sur tous avec la rapidité de ce qui est parti de Dijon, pour chercher à occuper le Simplon et prendre le Piémont à dos. Tant que Gènes ne sera pas pris, je ne serai pas tranquille sur la sécurité de l'Italie. Vous conviendrez que si l'on avoit laissé M. De Melas opérer devant Gènes, et Kray observer le Piémont, et le St. Bernard, les armées avoient des chefs qui avoient leur confiance, l'Archiduc en Souabe, qui auroit été forcé, également, de se retirer au Danube, peut-être sans autant de pertes, mais qui auroit repris l'offensive après la reddition de Gènes, car il étoit impossible de tenir, à moins d'être plus en force, contre les six attaques venant des villes forestières et le front du Rhin; plusieurs officiers blessés, qui sont ici chez leurs parents, m'ont démontré la chose.

“Dans la Belgique l'on presse la rentrée des contributions de tous les genres, ainsi que la réquisition, qui va très mal, malgré les soins des conseillers de la municipalité *Dursel, Lannoï, et Arconaty* l'on est honteux de voir des gens d'un tel état ne cesser de se déshonorer. Quand aux contributions l'on peut en ralentir la rentrée en occupant les troupes destinés aux exécutions pour les percevoir, inquiétant les côtes, des tems autres les menacer, cela m'est [met] les commandants des côtes en peine. Ils font rassembler, aller, venir les troupes, mais il faut que cela soit fait avec intelligence et adresse, car il faut laisser l'embouchure de l'Escaut occidentale tranquille, pour ne pas troubler les fraudeurs, qui vous apporte des grains de divers espèces; mais si l'on venoit à faire un entrepise sur la Zelande, vous avez à Flessingue un homme dont l'on pourroit venir à bout, qui s'appelle D'Hoost, fils d'un cabarétier de Menin, homme sans esprit en moyens militaires que l'audace de la témérité, ivrogne et crapuleux. Toutes les radiations venues de Paris, non encore compris aucuns Belges, tous porte sur des Français constitutionnelles. Si je n'ai pas obtenu la levée de mon séquestre avant la fin de Juin, puisque je ne suis pas émigré, et que j'ai l'ennui d'habiter la république, je veux au moins en tirer parti pour vendre. Je chercherai à avoir audience de cet infâme Bonaparte.”

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, June 8. Bromley Hill.—“The chapter of peers from Ireland is certainly full of difficulty. I rather think that if Lord Cornwallis presses Lord Ormond (who is I understand related to him) as a personal favour, it would not be unreasonable to state it to Lord Carysfort in the same light as Lord Londonderry. Lord Drogheda must certainly be rejected or Lord Carysfort included. I really believe the King would scarcely be brought to consent to

the whole, and it could not be agreed to without much inconvenience here. I state to you just what occurs to me now, but I hope to see you before the *levée* on Wednesday.

“With respect to Tuesday’s business, I begin to feel less anxiety. I thought it best to write to the King last night on the subject. I enclose you his answer, which you will be so good to give me back, when we meet. I returned his draft immediately which was as proper as it is possible to conceive, and will, I think, produce its effect. From a conversation I had with my brother after our meeting yesterday, I think he will endeavour, in earnest, to prevent any mischief.

“I do not however see any reason for your excepting Lord Poulett and Lord Macclesfield from the list to which you write. They ought on such an occasion to act with the Government, rather than with one individual member of it; and the distinction might be a troublesome precedent.

*Enclosure :—*

GEORGE III. to W. PITT.

1800, June 8. Windsor.—“I have this instant received Mr. Pitt’s note on the intended complaint of the Earl of Carlisle in the House of Lords against the printer of a newspaper, but in reality levelled against Lord Kenyon for his charge in a late action on account of adultery, when his language is supposed to have been aimed against certain expressions of that Earl and other objectors to the Bill lately debated in the House of Lords for extending the punishment on that crime against every religious, moral and social tie of society.

“It is certainly a duty of Administration to resist this attack, and Mr. Pitt does me but justice in supposing that my respect for the character of Lord Kenyon, as well as of decency, must make me feel the propriety of this line of conduct. I will therefore most willingly write to each of my three sons on this occasion, and though I have cautiously avoided pressing them on matters of politics, I feel this so much one regarding public decorum, that I cannot have any difficulty in pressing them to absent themselves on Tuesday, as a conduct that will gain them credit with the sager persons of this nation; but least I should not exactly express myself as Mr. Pitt would wish, I have made a draft of what I propose writing to them, which I desire he will, if he [it] does not fully answer his ideas, correct it, and on receiving his answer I will instantly send a fair copy to them.”

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, June 8. Wimbledon.—“I have wrote to Lord Aboyne to desire to see him. The Duke of York is in the country, but I have wrote to him to inform him that a reinforcement for the Mediterranean, not less than four thousand effective and good men, will be immediately wanted, and I have named the regiments which I think most suited to the purpose. I told him that there is another topic on which Mr. Pitt and I would desire to converse with him.

It is one in which I considered the stability of his Majesty's government and the honour of the royal family to be equally involved. He would perhaps anticipate (I have said) that I alluded to the appearance of the Princes of the Blood in the House of Lords on Friday, when notice was given of a proceeding intended to affect the credit and honour of the persons whom his Majesty had placed at the head of the Court of King's Bench; and, if his Majesty's servants were unable to protect a person of that description, they were unfit for the trust which his Majesty had reposed in them."

HENRY DUNDAS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800 [June, 10. Wimbledon].—"I think it material that I should have some conversation without delay with Mr. Pitt and you, and I have intimated to Mr. Pitt that I expect to meet you and him in Downing Street to-morrow at 12 o'clock.

"Mr. Pitt has mentioned to me yesterday your wish of Lord Temple being at the India Board. I would wish to say a few words to you upon the subject when we meet. You can have no doubt of my disposition to acquiesce in any proposition that will be agreeable to Lord Buckingham and you; at the same time you will feel that I owe it to myself, and to the public service, and also to the parties immediately connected with the proposition, that I should speak to you upon it without reserve.

"I send you a letter I have received from Governor Pownall, on which I must likewise have a little conversation with you and Mr. Pitt."

WILLIAM WICKHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, June 12. St. Veit.—"Though for many reasons I think it right and expedient not to send your Lordship any dispatch or letter from hence, yet I cannot refuse myself the pleasure of writing a single line merely to say that I have found all right and steady here, and that I am persuaded the Emperor will not be terrified by anything less than the *destruction* of one of his armies.

"I do not think, myself, the state of things by any means so bad as it is represented or supposed to be. But assistance from your side is very much wanted, and indeed may become absolutely necessary. Whatever success Buonaparte may have, short of complete victory, he cannot now detach a man from Italy or Germany, and I am persuaded that so fair an opportunity for an attempt from your side never yet offered itself.

"I ought not to disguise from your Lordship that complaints of the want of co-operation are not wanting either here or at the army; as it is generally understood that the army of reserve is almost entirely composed of detachments from the coasts of Brittany and Normandy. In general, however, I have found most people, and particularly M. de Thugut, more fair and moderate on that subject than I should have expected under their present severe reverses, and with the apprehension of much greater and more serious ones immediately before their eyes.

“Lord Minto transmits your Lordship accounts to-day of the capture of Genoa, which appear to me deserving of the highest credit though not yet official.”

EARL TEMPLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, June, 14].—“I have received a letter from my father approving of the new arrangement in terms more expressive of happiness than you can possibly conceive. I am going this morning out of town in order to settle Lady Temple in the country, and I will beg of you to send me a line to Avington to let me know when you will want me for Lord Camelford’s affair, and for the completion of the arrangement, which I will certainly obey immediately.”

*Postscript.*—“I cannot do better than to enclose to you my father’s letter which expresses most fully what I feel on the subject.”

OBSERVATIONS ON THE ISLAND OF MALTA communicated to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, June 16. Malta.—“I came to this island in the beginning of last autumn, and I have remained almost constantly until now. During this time I have often reflected on the advantages which may be derived from the possession of this island, and I now communicate my reflections to you. It is not necessary to mention to you the advantageous situation of this island for the commerce of the two Sicilies, the Adriatic, Morea, Archipelago, and the coasts of Syria, Egypt, and Barbary; and the excellency of its harbours and lazaretto. Whoever possesses Malta will have a decided superiority in this extensive commerce. If England retain possession of it, English merchants will establish themselves in La Valette, and have magazines of woollens, cottons, hardware. Merchants from the several countries I have mentioned will come to purchase these goods in barter for their own productions. English ships will have shorter voyages outward and homeward bound. In the excellent warehouses of La Valette they will find all the Levant goods ready to be put on board. They will sail immediately with clean bills of health, avoid the delays and expense of the present mode of performing quarantine in England, and deprive the Dutch of the advantage which they always derived from a different management, by coming to our market with Levant goods earlier than our own merchants. On this subject I refer you to Eton’s book on the Quarantine Laws.

“The States of Barbary are now certainly hostile to the French. The Bashaw of Tripoli has promised a reward of 500 dollars to the first who brings him news of the taking of La Valette, and the merchants of Tunis send now corn, bullocks, dates, and other produce to this island. If England were in possession of Malta I am persuaded that these states would desist in time from their piratical practices and find their own advantage in becoming industrious and mercantile. They would come to this island with their own productions, and exchange them for the goods they would find in English magazines.

“The late Knights of Malta were perfect Sybarites; they had lost the spirit of their predecessors, they lived luxuriously on the revenues they derived from the possessions of their Order in other countries, and paid no attention to the cultivation and commerce of Malta. Without asking a question, when I ride over the island I can discover the lands which are the property of the Order and those which belong to individuals by a difference of cultivation. But the lands of the Order, if they were properly cultivated, and their revenues from gardens, houses, and warehouses in La Valette, and from the duties of customs and excise, estimating them only at the amount paid to the Grand Master, would defray the expense of civil government, and likewise of the military establishment necessary for the defence of the island, by any power to whom the natives are attached as much as they are to the English.

“Besides, all these branches of revenue may be improved to an amount much more considerable, and this island by proper management would in a few years produce a surplus of revenue to any power who can protect its commerce and encourage its cultivation. The principal article of its produce is cotton. The exportation of cotton wool is prohibited; the natives manufacture it into coarse cloth for their own consumption only, but they export annually to Spain cotton thread to the amount of more than half a million sterling, and their exportations of oranges, lemons, and figs, anise and cumin seed, are very considerable. The sugar-cane, the anil, and the pepper tree grow in Malta; but they gain more by the cultivation of cotton and of various fruits than they could gain by making sugar, indigo, or pepper. They make no wine, though their grapes appear to be of an excellent quality; and they might make wine, at least for their own consumption, without interfering with any other article which they now cultivate. They export salt to the Adriatic. It is both very cheap and very fine, nay the very stones of Malta for paving, houses, and terraces, and for making conduits for water, are a considerable article of exportation.

“The Maltese under the government of the Knights were constantly at war with the Turks, and with the States of Barbary; they seldom carried their own productions to market, but they are good seamen, and in time of war would furnish excellent sailors for our fleet.”

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, June 18. Downing Street.—“I have just received your note on my coming to town. I left Mr. Pitt in bed this morning at Wimbledon. I shall see him the moment he comes to town, and it is my intention to fix us three meeting to-morrow at eleven, and the Cabinet precisely at 12. He stated to me last night that the business you mention would probably prevent our meeting to-day and, previous to your note, I had resolved to return to town for the purpose of a Cabinet in consequence of the accompanying note from the King. I am very strong in my opinion for sending the force to the Mediterranean as I proposed. Certainly I will not think of sending the force there which is now at Quiberon till we

hear again from Maitland. Perhaps you have not seen his despatches, either those received on Sunday or those received yesterday. I send them all to you, wishing you to return them as soon as you can. If you cannot read them before you go to the Cockpit, probably Dr. Lawrence's preamble may give you time enough to do it."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, June 19. Downing Street.—“On referring to Sir Ralph Abercrombie's instructions, they are strong enough to prevent him allowing the Russians to take possession of any of the strong forts of Malta. You know my sentiments on that subject; but I have thought it best to desire Huskisson to call upon you to take your directions how much more strict you would agree to make them.”

*Private.* LORD MINTO to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, June 19. Vienna.—“As I am to transmit the treaty so soon, I shall not trouble your Lordship with more on that subject at present.

“I am apprehensive that there is some mistake concerning the very generous present which His Majesty has made to the Emperor. Your Lordship's dispatch authorised me to say that 150,000*l.* should be sent to Hamburg. But Messieurs Vries at Vienna have only heard of 100,000*l.* from their correspondent at Hamburg. As I made the communication according to your dispatch, that sum is now expected, and it would be ungracious to make an alteration in a matter of this sort. May I beg your Lordship to order some enquiry to be made, and the mistake to be rectified as soon as possible at Hamburg, if there should prove to be one. It is very much the wish of Baron Thugut to receive the money in specie at Hamburg, and for that purpose it would be necessary that I should draw on Hamburg, payable to Baron Thugut's order, or to some one that he may point out, and give him the bills. There will certainly be a great economy in that method, for there can be no doubt of Vries charging very high for specie. I must therefore beg that your Lordship would be so good as to direct the house at Hamburg to honour my bills if I should find it necessary to draw.

“Baron Thugut has made no use of the bills on the Treasury for 200,000*l.*, which I gave him some time ago, but I shall have occasion to write to your Lordship officially by next messenger on the mode of remittance.

“Baron Thugut does not speak so confidently as I should wish about Italy; and Melas seems to have expressed a good deal of embarrassment in his last letters of the 8th. He is distressed for provisions, many of his magazines being in the hands of the enemy. Yet Buonaparte's situation must be infinitely worse.

“The Pope, who embarked at Venice on board an Imperial frigate, has been forced into a port in Istria by stress of weather. He is to land at a small port near Ancona, not choosing to go to the latter place.

“An alteration is making in the provisional government of Tuscany; the senate having given universal dissatisfaction. The regency is now to be composed of three Florentine members and the Marquis de Sommariva, the Austrian commandant, who is to preside.”

LORD GRENVILLE TO LORD MINTO.

*Private, in cipher.*

1800, June 20. Cleveland Row.—“The mails from Germany having lately arrived, to our great disappointment, without bringing, any dispatches from Vienna, I cannot help mentioning to you that even in the absence of any interesting intelligence, it has been always customary for the ministers resident at the great Courts to write by the opportunity of every post, if it were only to apprise us that nothing new has occurred. I can readily allow for your being much occupied, but you must, on the other hand, consider what our impatience is. The union will pass the House of Lords next week; and Parliament will then be kept sitting in June solely from the necessity of laying before them something from Vienna before the session can close.” *Copy.*

THE EARL OF FARNHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, June 20. Dublin.—“I had the honour of your Lordship’s letter, and shall once more intrude upon your time, for the purpose only of giving you information concerning the real state of the pecuniary circumstances of this country, in which be assured that I shall not in any particular misrepresent it. The reading this letter is the only trouble I wish to give you, as I do not desire that you should be at that of acknowledging it.

“The mode of ascertaining the relative abilities of the two countries by the comparative value of the imports and exports, and of the consumption of the enumerated articles, must be considered, and has been acknowledged, as extremely uncertain and inconclusive. Their respective balances of trade form the best criterion of their abilities, arising from *commerce*. Mr. Rose states that of Great Britain at 14,800,000*l.*; and, from the returns laid before us, the average balance of trade in favour of Ireland for three years ending 25 March, 1799, amounts to no more than 500,000*l.* This small balance has in 1799 declined to 200,000*l.* I do not know of any influx of money into Ireland save this small balance. Her annual remittances to Great Britain in discharge of the interest of her loan is £724,000, and Mr. Pitt states her remittances to her absentees at a million. From the best information I have received they *really* amount to two millions. Though Ireland borrowed in the last year 3 millions from Great Britain, the course of exchange was from three to five per cent. above par. You will observe that the interest of the late loan of two millions is not included in the said sum of 724,000*l.* At present her credit is supported upon paper wings, and every guinea which can be laid hold of is carried away out of this kingdom. This constant balance

of efflux must necessarily diminish her capital, and the produce of the taxes which arise from her trade. Compare her revenue with her expenses in 1799. Her then revenue was but about two millions Irish, out of which she paid 1,400,000*l.* in discharge of the *then* interest of her debt, and had a residue of about 600,000*l.* towards the support of her establishments. She has since greatly added to her debt, and has laid on additional taxes of about 600,000*l.* to discharge their interest. These are principally raised by internal taxation, as it was apprehended that additional taxes upon the imports would be not productive. According to Lord Castlereagh's computation, he states that Ireland is to contribute 4,400,000*l.* in time of war, as her proportion. I cannot understand how this is practicable. An experiment has been lately made in this kingdom to raise only one million and a half, and the undertakers have been obliged to forfeit their deposits. The aforesaid proportion considerably exceeds the expense that Ireland was put to, either in the year of rebellion, or the average of the last three years, of which an account has been laid before Parliament. This proves his assertion *that Ireland would be gainer by the apportionment*, to have been erroneous. In respect of the peace establishment of Great Britain, which in 1789 was about 6 millions, and which he states has to rise when peace shall return to 7,500,000*l.*, I shall observe that the increase of the pay of the army and navy, which in 1790 amounted to 4,666,000*l.*, would be found to produce more than that increase of expense. And here I shall state the numbers of which the army of the empire then consisted, the navy, and the expense of both. The whole army consisted of 48,000, of which 17,000 remained in Great Britain, about 12,000 in the East and West Indies, near 4,000 at Gibraltar, all which, amounting to about 32,800 men, were paid by Great Britain. The remaining 15,200 were paid by Ireland. The navy consisted of 20,000, so that Ireland paid 15,200 of the whole force of 68,000 men, that is nearly 2/9th. The whole expense of the navy and army paid by Great Britain was 4,666,000*l.*, and Ireland paid 579,000*l.*, being about 1/9th of the whole expense. This shews that Ireland, paying a fair proportion of the *whole* expense of the defence of the empire, was from her contribution justly entitled to the protection of the navy. Ireland was at that time well able to pay such contribution. The interest of her debt amounted but to 142,000*l.* The whole of her establishment was 1,153,710*l.*, and her revenue amounted to 1,190,684*l.* There must, in my opinion, be a great increase to the expense of the British peace establishment, and I cannot suppose that it will not be found necessary, to keep up an army in Great Britain of double the number of the former peace establishment. There is one criterion to judge of the respective abilities of the two nations which to me appears better suited to that purpose than either of those which have been resorted to; a comparison of the produce of their respective *permanent* taxes. That of Great Britain for the year ending the 5th of January, 1799, was upwards of 26 millions, and that of Ireland but two millions. In proportion as about 13 to 1. The balance of trade about 29 to 1. To me it appears impossible for Ireland to pay that sum which she takes

upon herself of 2/17th. The danger arising from such a failure must strike your Lordship. I wished that the United Parliament should be invested with a power of revision of the apportionment, and for that purpose proposed an amendment. Administration disapproved of it, and therefore I did not press it. I still think that as the adjustment of the proportion of contribution stands upon very doubtful data, that it would be prudent to put it in their power, if it should appear to them necessary, to alter that proportion without infringing upon one of the most material articles of the Union. Although my opinion is strong against this measure as injurious to both nations, I wish that, if it does take place, it may be permanent. I wish to guard against such discontent as may finally be productive of separation. I shall not apologise for the trouble I give your Lordship of reading this letter, as my object sufficiently justifies it."

HENRY DUNDAS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1800, June 21. Horse Guards.—"I saw Lord Macartney this forenoon. If you want his services at Verona send for him. If you do not, let him know as soon as you can, for he means otherwise to go immediately to Ireland. The conversation led to resume a little the last conversation I had with him. My opinion is that, if you wanted him for the American station he would not stand on the rank of ambassador. In short he does not like to be idle, and would certainly accept of employment in the public service in any creditable way.

"Be so good as order somebody in your Office to send me every day in my absence a bulletin of what intelligence arrives at your Office. Huskisson has mentioned to me that he finds a great shyness in Burgess and Aust to give him any communications. Put that to rights in any way you please, but don't let them know that he has made to me any complaint on the subject."

COUNT WORONZOW TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, June 25. Harley Street.—"Trop malade pour pouvoir aller à Windsor, j'avois chargé le Marquis de Circello de vous prier, de ma part, d'avoir la bonté d'obtenir du Roi pour que je puisse avoir l'honneur de prendre congé de leurs Majestés dans le palais de la Reine demain, jeudi, avant que leurs Majestés aillent au cercle à St. Jammes; je vous supplie de nouveau de m'obtenir cette grâce.

"Je ne puis vous exprimer à quel point je suis affligé des malheureuses nouvelles d'Italie qui doivent influer sur le malheureux sort de toute l'Europe, et consoliderent l'usurpation du trop heureux Corse, quoique la dispersion (tout à fait inutile pour le bien de la bonne cause) de plus de trente milles hommes dans les garnisons de Ferare, Bologne, Ancone, Urbino, Ravene, Orvietto et jusqu'aux portes de Rome, faisoit prévoir que les Français trouveroient des facilités à pénétrer par la Suisse dans le Milanois,

et ne trouveroient que des petits corps qui ne pouvoient les empêcher de déboucher par les Alpes, pour aller couper la communication de Méllas avec le Milanois, le Mantuan, et le Vénitien. Ceux qui connaissent le pays savent que Bonaparte pouvoit se maintenir dans cette prétendue plaine qui n'existe que sur la carte, car c'est le pays le plus coupé de l'univers par les rivières, les canaux, et les haies vines [vignes] dont tous les champs sont entourés ; mais je n'aurois jamais cru que Mellas, venant du territoire Génois, et faisant venir après lui de Gennes même le corp du Général Otto, fut aussi imbecil que de ne pas se joindre à ce Général pour aller ensemble et en forces attaquer l'enemi ; au lieux de cela il laisse battre Otto, et après se laisse battre lui-même. Où est donc le génie de ce prétendu excellent état-major de l'armée Autrichienne qui, d'après Thugut, faisoit toutes les dispositions de Souvorow, que Thugut proclamait ignorant, ivrogne, et sans courage.

“ Ce poltron n'a pourtant jamais été attaqué de sa vie ; il a toujours prévenu l'attaque en attaquant lui-même, et n'a jamais cessé de harceler l'enemi, jusqu'à ce qu'il ne l'ai détruit. Thugut a perdu l'Italie, et peut-être l'Europe.”

#### COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, June 25. Harley Street.—“ J'aurois été inconsolable de partir de ce pays sans avoir le bonheur de faire ma cour à leurs Majestés, et les remercier pour les bontés dont elles ont daigné de m'honorer, si je n'avois l'espérance de revenir ici dans peu de tems. Je vous supplie pourtant de me faire la grâce de me metre aux pieds de leurs Majestés, et d'ajouter celle de leurs exprimer que quoiq'elles sont justement adorées par leurs bienheureux sujets, il n'y a aucun parmi ceux-ci qui leurs soit plus attaché que moi. Après cette grâce que je vous demande, je vous supplie de m'accorder une autre que je voulois vous demander depuis longtems ; c'est celle de me donner votre portrait.

“ Honoré de votre amitié, ayant mérité votre confiance dont vous m'avez donné des preuves bien flatteuses, il me sera bien doux (que je sois ou ne sois plus dans les affaires) de posséder le portrait d'un ami aussi estimable, d'un ministre aussi éclairé que vertueux, et avec lequel j'ai eu le bonheur pendant près de huit ans de traiter les affaires avec une franchise et une confiance réciproque peu ou point usité autre part. J'ose me flater que vous ne me refuserez cette faveure qui m'est précieuse. Si vous pouvez me recevoir chez vous aujourd'hui, ou demain entre deux ou trois heures après midi, je serois bien aise d'avoir encor la satisfaction de passer un quart d'heure avec vous.”

#### LORD WHITWORTH to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1800, June 26. Stockholm.—“ Upon leaving Petersburg on Sunday, the 8th instant, I was in hopes soon after this to have paid my personal respects to your Lordship. My journey to Abo, and my passage from thence across the gulph of Finland were un-

commonly fortunate ; but not being able to procure a vessel at Abo sufficiently spacious, we were obliged to divide, and that on which my servants and carriages were embarked is still prevented reaching this port by a contrary wind which has prevailed since the first day of my arrival.

“ I need not say with what impatience I suffer this delay. My anxiety to reach England may be easily conceived, and will be a sure pledge of the expedition I shall use as soon as I am released from hence, which I am every moment expecting.”

“ I have taken upon myself to augment your Lordship’s collection of maps by some which have lately been published of part of this country, and which are well executed ; and I have requested the publisher, a Swedish gentleman of considerable fortune, the greatest part of which he devotes to the most patriotic purposes, to forward me the remainder as soon as the collection is complete.”

#### COUNT WORONZOW TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, June 26. Harley Street.—“ Je vous suis très reconnaissant pour l’amitié que vous avez de me promettre de me donner votre portrait, et de ce que vous désirez d’avoir le mien. Je désire depuis longtems de posséder le vôtre, c’est pourquoi je vous l’ai demandé ; quand au mien je me ferai un devoir de vous le donner, dès que je me trouverai dans des circonstances un peu plus tranquilles.

“ J’aurai la satisfaction de vous voir demain entre deux et trois heures après midi.

“ L’intérêt que je prens, et que je ne cesserai de prendre pour ce pays m’encourage à vous communiquer quelque réflexions sur l’état actuel des affaires. Il est probable que l’Autriche fera sa paix et que Bonaparte la lui accordera sur les bases de celle de Campoformio ; mais la paix du Continent ne restorera pas l’état de la France, et n’acompli pas la paix générale que le Premier Consul lui a promis, et qu’il doit lui procurer pour le meintient de sa propre puissance. Sans paix avec la Grande Brétagne la France, dans l’état actuel, restera toujours misérable, sans comerce et sans communication avec les colonies. Rouen, Nante, La Rochelle, Bordeaux, Marsseille languissent et languiront dans le désespoir de la misère. Il n’y a pas de doute par conséquent que Bonaparte sera obligé de vous faire des nouvelles avances, et elles seront d’autant plus pressentes que vous aurez la dignité, dont je ne doute pas, de ne pas être les premiers à demander la paix. Vous traiterez alors avec autant de dignité que d’avantage : mais pour cela il est d’une nécessité indispensable de proroger au plus tôt possible le Parlement, et d’écarter avec soin, en attendant, toute motion que pourra et voudra faire certainement l’Oposition pour entamer une négociation avec la France ; car pour peu qu’on parle de paix dans l’une ou dans l’autre Chambre, Bonaparte ne fera plus d’avance, prendra tout un autre ton, la négociation un tout autre caractère, et vous perdrez en dignité et en avantage.

“ Avez-vous quelques nouvelles de ma malheureuse patrie ? Lord Whiteworth a-t-il quitté Petersbourg ? Casamajor a-t-il reçu votre mémoire sur les passeports des couriers, et l’a-t-il présenté ? ”

7 p.m.—“Connaissent l'amitié que vous avez pour moi, je m'empresse à vous annoncer mon bonheur. Je reçois dans ce moment par estafette tout ce que je pouvois désirer de plus heureux pour moi. J'ai mon congé absolu du service, et permission de vivre où je veux avec mes enfans.

“Je suis maintenant sûre de laisser mes oss dans ce bienheureux pays.”

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MINTO.

*Private and Secret.*

1800, June 27. Cleveland Row.—“Having explained to you in my last letter the embarrassment in which we were even then placed by the unaccountable delay of the Austrian treaty, I need not use many words to enable you, who know so well the nature and course of Parliamentary business, to conceive how much those embarrassments are augmented by the late misfortunes in Italy. This letter will arrive too late to produce any effect; because if next week does not bring us the treaty which has been so often promised from three days to three days, it would I fear be much too sanguine for us to entertain any hope of receiving it after the account of the defeat and capitulation of Melas shall have reached Vienna. But it will doubtless operate as an additional motive to induce you, and as a fresh argument in your hands to enable you to persuade Thugut that, if he does not mean to play the game of France in this country, he must be contented to adopt a little more plain dealing towards us. We have had some discussion on the subject in the House of Lords to-day, and shall probably have more on Monday, and a considerable debate will probably take place in the House of Commons to-night.

“The people of this country have fortitude and public spirit to enable them to bear up even against such reverses as we have now experienced. But then they must see that they are treated with attention and confidence by those to whose aid they are called upon to contribute so largely.

“I hardly dare allow myself to hope that the Court of Vienna will feel what ought, most certainly, to be the conduct of a great country in such a crisis. If they negotiate, it is certainly an object for us, and it is perhaps still more an object for them, that they should do so with dignity and good faith; and should invite us to concur in the negotiation. If they do make such an invitation we cannot, most unquestionably, do any thing but accept it; but we should be very much embarrassed if the invitation were accompanied by a demand from France that we should, in the interval, join in the armistice, for that cannot turn to our advantage whatever the negotiation may do.” *Copy.*

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800], June 27. Stowe.—“*Quos Deus vult perdere, prius dementat*; but of all the possible demutations, surely none was ever more out of the ordinary course of things, than that of surrendering

without a stroke every point on which the Court of Vienna might be to lean, in case she did not agree to such terms as Bonaparte might wish to impose. This makes me imagine that the peace is in reality made; and that Mantua and Peschiera will be to form the new boundary to the Emperor; and yet it is difficult to imagine that Melas could be furnished with any discretionary powers applicable to so unlooked for an event. But if this story is true (and there seems no reason to doubt it) our peace must inevitably follow, and will (to my ideas) as inevitably sacrifice sooner or later the safety of this country, unless the internal state of France hereafter should break their power.

“If, in the mean time, it could be possible (by risking our last man, and by sacrificing largely in the attempt) to take or destroy Brest, I am persuaded that you will think it your duty to hazard, under these circumstances, what you would not ten days ago. No Frenchman will assist you to such an object, even if he clearly saw that it would replace Louis 18 on the throne; but I look to it as an *English* object; and if any personal sacrifice of mine could assist you, I am ready with one leg to add to the numbers of invaders, or I would lend myself to any other feasible exertion that could assist such an object. Including guards and dismounted dragoons, you ought to have a force applicable to such a move, from England and Ireland and included those gone to Bellisle, of above 40,000 men; and I know that those who have well considered the question think that such a force would *take* Brest, but certainly might *destroy* it. I write to you explicitly on this idea, because you have little time left to decide; and because I am clear that you will be obliged to make a peace which will eventually be ruinous, unless the hand of Providence that has smote us, interferes to save us.”

LORD MINTO to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1800, June 28. Vienna.—“I shall only add to a very long dispatch that the early ratification of the treaty may come to be important; and that, events having thrown the execution of the secret articles to a great distance, your Lordship will probably incline to withhold them altogether from the King of Sardinia, as well as every other power. Monsieur de Vallaise has told me that the King of Sardinia, observing the precarious state of those countries which are the subject of the proposals submitted to him, had thought there was nothing so pressing as to preclude him from submitting his objections to His Majesty. The thing will stand very well so, for the present.

“The Pope has landed at Pesaro and was on his journey to Rome. The Queen of Naples will be somewhat retarded by the late events; she must probably embark at Ancona for Trieste.

“On the grand question of the present moment, peace or war, I am afraid to give you any thing like a positive opinion, having in fact no solid ground on which to form my own. If I were to say what seems most probable it would be that nothing precipitate and disgraceful will be done, as in the case of Campo Formio; but

that, before the natural end of the campaign, an armistice may be made, during which negotiations may be set on foot that may terminate in an Austrian peace, in concert however with His Majesty. This I say seems at present perhaps the most *probable* issue, but I by no means *despair* of keeping them up to the war; and if Baron Thugut were sure of his *own ground*, I should have little doubt. The colour of the next event may probably decide the question."

WILLIAM WICKHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1800, June 28. Ratisbonne.—“I am so very unwell, and so worn down by fatigue and vexation of different kinds, that I trust to your Lordship’s goodness for making and receiving my excuses if I send the enclosed dispatches from Colonel Clinton and Mr. Frere without anything of my own. I only beg leave to make one single observation on the late unfortunate events and their consequences.

“The real strength of the House of Austria remaining untouched, it is impossible that any permanent or sincere peace can be made on this occasion between that power and France.

“I wish only to add that, as it seems impossible to deny that the Emperor, however he may have been mistaken in the manner of employing his force, had made preparations for this campaign, and incurred expences of such a nature as to leave no doubt of the sincerity of his intention to carry on the war with vigour, it seems of the greatest importance that as little as possible of dissatisfaction should be expressed, should the late unfortunate events oblige him to adopt measures which it will not be in his power strictly to justify.”

HENRY DUNDAS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800 [June]. Downing Street.—“The accompanying papers will show to you the unpleasant correspondence in which I have been involved, which, although ultimately His Majesty has given way, has lost already near a week. I don’t mean to communicate them to the Cabinet, and I have sent for the Duke of York, that there may [be] no further tergiversation. I expect him from Swinley at two o’clock.”

LORD MINTO TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private and Secret.*

1800, July 1. Vienna.—“I trouble your Lordship with a line in this form because, I believe, the subject I am to mention cannot with propriety be treated in a dispatch.

“Baron Thugut, amongst the means by which the Emperor might derive assistance from His Majesty, has mentioned of late with some anxiety a more friendly conduct on the part of Hanover. He quoted the other day a proceeding of Baron d’Ompteda, Hanoverian minister at Ratisbonne, as an instance of the hostile

disposition of the Regency. He gave in an official proposal that, as the country did not seem secure from an attack, every thing might be removed from Ratisbonne that could draw the enemy thither. The Austrian magazines were the object he aimed at. Baron Thugut considers Baron d'Ompeda as personally ill-affected to the cause, and thinks his removal would be useful.

“But he has also suggested another service that might be rendered to the cause. It seems possible that a question may be put to the empire on the expediency of peace. It would be extremely the wish of the Emperor that Hanover should vote against peace; and that the influence of His Majesty should be exerted to the utmost to obstruct any proceedings favourable to a peace on such conditions as would leave to France her acquisitions on the empire. A more direct and active part in the war would no doubt be still more acceptable; but a friendly neutrality at least, and the particular service which I have just mentioned, would be extremely agreeable and encouraging to His Imperial Majesty.”

#### COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, July 2. Harley Street.—“Je vous envoie sous le seau du secret, ce que j'ai reçu dans ce moment de Russie, par un homme qui vient d'arriver de Petersbourg, qu'il a quitté le vingt-neuf mai, vieux stil. Renvoyez-moi dès que vous aurez lue toutes ces pièces, et je vous conjure d'embrasser l'idée du Comte Panin, pour ne pas entretenir les deux pays dans une rupture inévitable en usant de représaille. On ne doit pas se fâcher contre des enfans, ou des gens en délire. Méprisez tout ceci, comme cela doit l'être, pour épargner aux deux nations des ambaras incalculables.”

#### LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT WORONZOW.

1800, July 2.—“J'allois vous écrire sur cette nouvelle extravagance quand j'ai reçu votre lettre avec ses incluses. Je ne vous les renvoie pas, désirant d'avoir votre permission de les montrer à M. Pitt, ce que je ne ferai qu'avec cette permission.

“Sans doute s'il est possible de trouver quelque moyen d'éviter les représailles, on doit y songer. Ce seroit trop absurde que de mettre plus de vingt millions d'hommes en guerre pour une pareille folie. Mais je crains bien que les mêmes impressions qui ont produit cette extravagance n'en mènent bientôt à de nouvelles et de moins supportables.” *Copy.*

#### COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, July 2. Harley Street.—“Sûrement vous pouvez montrer à M. Pitt ce que je vous ai communiqué sous le seau du secret, car je vous regarde tous les deux comme identifié dans un même corp et âme; mais je vous prie de ne pas lui laisser les papiers, car il ne pourroit pas lui-même les retrouver un jour après, vue l'imensité de paperasse qui lui arrivent de tout côté et encombrant toute ses tables et bureaux. Je suis enchanté que vous jugez comme le Comte

du Panin et moi sur cette affaire ; il seroit vraiment absurde si pour un *puntiglio* avec un extravagant vous alliez compromettre les intérêts de quatorze millions de vos compatriotes et de trente-deux des miens. Soyez persuader que quoique vous ferez vous serez blâmés. Si vous ferez ce que vous êtes obligé par votre bon sens de faire, c'est-à-dire de ne pas faire attention à notre extravagance, l'Oposition vous attaquera ; et si vous chassez, ou interdirez la cour à M. Lyzakewitz, toutes les villes manufacturières et de comerce se joindront à l'Oposition pour vous blamer, et vous citeront l'exemple de la Cour de Vienne et de Berlin, qui ont laissé, l'une à Vienne le chargé d'affaire de Russie quoique celui d'Autriche fut renvoyé de Petersbourg, et l'autre ne rapella pas de Russie Gruben son ministre, qui y est mort huit mois après que le Comte du Panin et toute sa mission quitterent Berlin. Si après cela on fait d'autres extravagances chez nous, vous serez complètement justifiés devant votre pays et le monde entier. Si vous avez du tems à me donner quand ce ne seroit que pour dix minute demain, jeudi, au soir, à quelque heures que ce soit je serai charmé de vous voir, et causer un peu sur toutes ces extravagances."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, July 3. Stowe.—“ Indeed you could not have made me so happy by any communication as by that of the arrangement made for our dear Tom. I know how much he must have owed on this occasion to your kindness, and to the activity of your attentions in not losing a moment ; but I feel likewise (and I am glad to feel) the kindness and grace with which Mr. Pitt has lent himself to an arrangement so interesting to us all, and I wish you to tell him how sensible I am to it, and how much I thank him. I hope and trust (as you do) that it is intended that the grant shall stand on the same footing as it has done almost invariably ; for undoubtedly the essential part of this grace is the security to our dear Tom of his comforts and independence.

“ I am sorry to be obliged to feel satisfied by your letter that Brest is out of the question. I am sure you would not abandon the idea if there was a chance of success with 60,000 men, for I think that number might be collected. I fear that the Austrian peace is too certain, for I hardly see the means to the Emperor of pursuing the war under such a check, even if his operations in Germany had been more fortunate. At the same time I should be anxious to send more force to the Mediterranean (if you give up all idea of operating in Normandy) for it is impossible not to recollect how much we lost of every sort from the want of 10,000 disposable troops in that quarter. How unlucky it was that Genoa had not been garrisoned by an English garrison ; and that Lord Keith, instead of quarrelling for 25,000*l.* ransom for the ships, had not found some adequate ground for blowing up the mole, and destroying (at least for maritime operations) a port which always has been used against us, and must, almost under any circumstances, be always hostile to us.”

## LORD GRENVILLE TO MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

1800, July 3. Cleveland Row.—“ I take the liberty of troubling you with two letters which I have lately received, the one from an old college acquaintance whom I formerly recommended to the favour of Lord Buckingham, and afterwards of Lord Camden ; and the other, in support of it, from General Nugent.

“ I am well aware how much you must be in all probability hampered with engagements in the line of ecclesiastical patronage as in every other, after the struggle which you have so happily for both countries brought to a successful issue ; but I could not decline troubling you with these few lines in Mr. Bisset's favour, and adding that I should be truly gratified by his success in any reasonable and proper request.” *Copy.*

## LORD GRENVILLE TO VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH.

1800, July 3. Cleveland Row.—“ Having within these few days received the enclosed, I can of course take no other step upon it than to send it to you, and to request to know what answer the Lord Lieutenant and you wish I should give to it. I guess from its contents that the Duke of Leinster supposes he shall lose the county if he attempts to contest it against a Government candidate, and has fallen upon this expedient to secure his family interest.

“ The prospect of a general election being somewhat remote, it may, I conclude, be best to refer the decision of the line to be taken by Government on this subject to a period rather nearer to the event in question ; but as there may be some circumstances of which I am unapprized, that might make a more specific answer desirable, I have judged it best to trouble you with this letter on the subject. I cannot conclude it without most heartily congratulating you on the final success of your labours, and on the great honour which is universally felt to result to you from them.” *Copy.*

## W. PITT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, July 3. Hollwood.—“ I return you Woronzow's letters and papers and am quite satisfied that we ought not, either in wisdom or dignity, to retaliate this act of extravagance, but that we should suffer the Russian *Chargé d'affaires* to remain here, without taking any formal notice of what has passed. I collected however from Hammond, that the true ground of what has given this offence was that Hailes, coming away without taking leave of the Court, of course made no visit of ceremony. If this be so, and the etiquette is correct or he supposed it to be so, might it not be worth while that this should be explained privately through Woronzow to Panin or Rastopsin, that they may turn it to account in any cooler moment, if such should ever come ? ”

## LORD GRENVILLE TO LORD MINTO.

*Private.*

1800, July 4th. Dropmore.—“ We are still without any news of the *projet*, and by the last mail I have no letters from you.

“It now seems probable that Thugut, having accomplished his object of hanging up our negotiation till the result of the campaign could be judged of, will enable us to make some communication to Parliament which is at this moment sitting in July for no other purpose whatever. At all events I trust that it is impossible but that we must hear from you decidedly what we have to trust to, as soon as the news of the armistice shall arrive at Vienna. Till then I can write nothing to you in addition to my last letters, but for God’s sake let him see clearly that we can be trifled with no longer.

“He may not understand enough of our Government to conceive it, but the fact is that the effect of these delays has been, and is at this moment, more, much more, prejudicial to the interests of Austria in this country than all their defeats and losses, were they twice as great as they have been.

“Certainly no man of ability ever played his game so ill as Thugut has done since the moment of their first successes last year.” *Copy.*

#### W. PITT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, July 4. Downing Street.—“The treaty you see is come *all but signed*, and if the bad news has not ruined every thing in the 48 hours which were to follow, we may expect it *actually* signed by Sunday or Monday. Should that be the case, I think we must immediately send a message announcing the public articles, and asking the subsidy. Luckily our debate is put off till Wednesday. I wish much to see you as soon as possible to settle provisionally what is to be done, and particularly how we are to manage as to the secret articles, which are certainly most of them become of little consequence.

“Can you come to Wimbledon either to-morrow an hour before dinner, or any time in the course of Sunday? If you can, be so good to let me know at Hollwood by breakfast time to-morrow, and I will meet you. Dundas will have no company, and we shall have time for a quiet discussion in an evening walk.

*Postscript.*—“I assure you I feel on every account the most sincere pleasure in the arrangement proposed for your brother. I wish I could relieve you by the proposal about the Treasury, but I will explain to you what makes it at present impossible.”

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO ARTHUR PAGET.

*Private.*

1800, July 4. Dropmore.—“In addition to my public dispatches I have to thank you for your private letter of the 13th May. I much regret that Sir W. Hamilton should have been induced to create any delay in your official reception. You certainly judged quite right, under the peculiar circumstances, especially of the persons by whom he is surrounded, in not communicating to him your instructions, which he indeed ought to have known was a proposal wholly irregular and unjustifiable.

“Sir W[illiam] is not yet arrived here, but when he does come

I shall explain to him without reserve the utter impossibility of his going back to Naples in any public situation.

“From a letter of General Acton’s which Circello lately shewed me, I guess that he has no real intention of retiring, but only means to hold that out as a threat in order to counteract the intrigues which are employed against him. I have no doubt from the picture you draw of the state of affairs there, that it is our interest he should remain.

“Long before this reaches you the result of the campaign in Italy will have been known at Palermo; and will, I doubt not, have been considered there as a reason perfectly decisive against the return to Naples before the actual signature of peace. It is lamentable to see how the avidity of the House of Austria on the one hand, and the jealousy of the Italian Courts on the other, have thrown the whole of Italy once more at the mercy of France, and have brought Europe almost back again to the state in which it was during the disgraceful negotiation at Rastadt.” *Copy.*

#### COUNT WORONZOW TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, July 6. Harley Street.—“Je vous demande pardon de vous importuner sur nos affaires au quelles, quoique je ne puis plus prendre aucune part officielle, je ne puis pourtant ne pas prendre un intérêt très vif. Ne croyez-vous pas qu’après avoir reçu de Mylord Whitworth la note étrange que le Comte Panin fu forcé de lui remettre, il est convenable que vous en doniez aussi une à M. de Lyzakewitz qui servi de réponce, et par laquelle, tout en consservent cette dignité qui convient à votre cour et à votre propre élévation d’âme qui vous distingue dans toutes les occasions, vous fassiez voir avec des expretions amicales combien on a été surpris et affligé de l’interprétation qu’on a donné chez nous à une chose tout à fait simple; que le Baron de Budberg devoit savoir que Mr. Heeles [Hailes] quitant Stokholm sans prendre congé de la Cour, ne devoit prendre congé et faire des visites de cérémonie à qui que ce soit, à moin que ce ne soit une visite particulière à quelqu’ami intime.

“Que jamais on ne s’est mêlé ici de prescrire aux ministres d’etiquette qu’ils doivent savoir, encor moins est on capable de prescrire à faire des inpolitesse, et que sans la note qu’on vient de recevoir, on n’auroit jamais connu cette affaire. Que Sa Majesté le Roi, ami constant et allié sincère de Sa Majesté l’Empereur, lui a donné assez de preuve de la noblesse de ses sentimens pour s’imaginer pour que Sa Majesté Impériale puisse croire qu’il a pu donner un ordre directe ou par son ministère à Mr. Heils, afin qu’il manque d’égard envers un ambassadeur d’un souverain pour lequel Sa Majesté a, et aura toujours, le sentiments d’amitié, et de confiance les plus sincères.

“Si vous sentez autant que moi la propriété de donner une note (car ne pas la donner du tout seroit la plus grande marque de mépris possible) vous l’arengerez mieux que moi, et vous saurez, suivent votre contume, la faire dans des termes francs, amicals, et acompagné de dignité.”

## COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, July 7-8.]—"J'ai passé au bureau pour essayer vous trouver. On m'a dit que vous ne veniez pas en ville aujourd'hui ; permettez que je vous demande un *appointment* pour le jour où vous y serez. Je suis content de ce que j'ai reçu de ma cour par le courier qui m'est arrivé, on y est inébranlable et bien décidé ; les revers affligent sans décourager. J'aurai à cette occasion plusieurs demandes officielles à vous faire, que vous trouverès trop justes pour n'y pas consentir. Au reste, M. Thugut me témoigne amitié et confiance sans bornes. On m'envoie les dernières instructions pour l'emprunt, et ordre de signer quand cela sera convenable. M. Müller, ci-devant secrétaire aux Pays-Bas, vient ici pour la partie financière ; il m'est recommandé, et subordonné. Cet homme est sage et sensé ; je suis bien aise d'être débarassé des détails toujours crasseux chez nous, en affaire d'argent ; je l'avois demandé. Quand il sera convenu de ses prix, cette partie rentrera dans la convention pour l'emprunt, que je suis autorisé de signer d'abord, *sub spe rati*, et pour les conditions politiques, duquel j'ai eu toutes les informations requises."

## The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, July 8. Stowe.—"If I have abused your confidence by enclosing your letter to Tom, as one that could not but add the greatest weight to the earnestness with which I urged him not to put by this opportunity of putting himself forward, I will balance it by a similar treachery towards him by enclosing to you his answer ; because it is possible that he may have explained himself more fully by letter than in personal communication to you, from that delicacy which he has always felt on points personal to himself ; and because this letter puts the proposition correctly on its proper footing, namely, the real wishes of Mr. Pitt, which, without any question of personal good-will, may, from many circumstances, be more or less disposed to an idea that, in all events, he will (naturally) be less anxious to promote than you are. There are various points of view in which I should imagine that Mr. Pitt might see great advantage from Tom's active and efficient co-operation ; and many events and contingencies in which he might want the talents and the means which Tom might hereafter bring with him into efficient office ; and I do not see that the confidential intercourse necessary for him in the immediate object of assisting Government in Parliament, will necessarily give umbrage to any thing of sufficient calibre to distress Mr. Pitt, or even to give him an uneasy thought. I cannot therefore but wish that whatever explanation (not of future views but of present wishes) may be necessary, may pass without loss of time through your hands between them. You who are individually to profit by any assistance that can be given to Government, super-added to the affection towards him that we share in common, cannot be more anxious that this moment should be the epoch of his public career than I am.

"Have you heard from Vienna since the book of Marengo has been opened to them ? Though I know not why I ask the question ;

for I am perfectly persuaded that, whatever they may feel, or whatever they may say either to England or to others, there will be peace; not because they ought to make one, but because that military system which we are endeavouring to teach to our army, exactly at the moment when the inefficiency of it has been shown to all Europe, must hang as a dead weight on all their councils. But unless the French newspapers are more grossly liars than usual, the Austrians seem as much pressed under Kräy as they have been under Melas; and if so, the peace will advance *au pas de charge*, as Berthier calls it, instead of the more phlegmatic Austrian step. Shall *we* too have peace? You have no secret yet to keep on that question, and therefore I put it to you; and say before hand, yes, for Bonaparte will find it his interest to offer such terms as you will not dare refuse, though you will be convinced (as I am) that it can only be an armed truce, ruinous to us in its consequences, unless Providence saves us by the internal quarrels of France two years hence, when she will calculate for her blow.

"I am very anxious that this session should not close, or rather that the new one should not open, without some permanent system for our militia and our yeomanry; both of them require much consideration. Have you turned your thoughts to it? Our internal tranquility must hereafter depend upon them, for our army is as little applicable to our civil, as they are to our military purposes.

"Our Bishop of Lincoln comes here this evening, and I shall endeavour to urge him to make his *concio ad clerum* to-morrow rather more peremptory upon points on which you and I agree rather more than we do with his Lordship. I am persuaded that much might be done with the existing powers, if the Right Reverend Bench were of a different composition; and your bill is, to my ideas, very defective in trusting too much to their Lordships' exertions, which you know before-hand they will not make."

VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1800, July 10. Dublin.—"The answer suggested by your Lordship, namely postponing all decision till a period nearer to the general election, appears both to the Lord Lieutenant and me the most adviseable to be given to Lord Robert's letter under all the circumstances. There could not be a more desirable candidate than Lord Robert, unconnected with the stipulation which the Duke seems to connect with his support; but there is an additional difficulty in deciding at present what line Government ought to take, as Colonel Keatinge, one of the present members, has claims for attention, having given his assistance on the Union, in opposition to both parties in the county, and it is impossible at this distance of time to decide in what way the principles of duty and policy can best be combined.

"I beg your Lordship will accept my sincere thanks for the obliging manner in which you express yourself relative to the result of our political campaign. I hope it will prove as advantageous to the

empire as it must distinguish your Lordship and the Administration who conceived the measure, and gave it in charge to the Government of Ireland."

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1800, July 11. Phoenix Park.—“You judge perfectly right in supposing me to be deeply engaged in every department in this country, and I think I am rather more embarrassed in the ecclesiastical line than in any other.

“Mr. Bisset however has been a zealous and useful friend in our late arduous contest, and has claims to the attention of this Government, exclusive of the weight of your Lordship’s interference in his favour. There has been very little patronage in the Church since I have been in Ireland, and there are some specific agreements which must take place of everything; but I hope that I shall have an opportunity, before I leave this country, of shewing my good disposition to Mr. Bisset, and my regard for your Lordship’s recommendation.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, July 12. London.]—“The forest arrangements by your assistance appear to be in a very prosperous state, and the question respecting the salary seems to be in the fittest shape by being left entirely to Mr. Pitt’s uninfluenced determination; all that I can wish upon the subject is that he should be informed upon the matter, but more than that would neither become you nor me, and I am too much gratified by all the circumstances which have attended the arrangement to look with any degree of anxiety into the *plus* or *minus* of it. I will willingly go with you to Dropmore to-morrow, and by sending on my curriole to Cranford Bridge we can go in your phaeton thither, and escape a dusty and hot road-ride, but I have no saddle-horse, as mine is in physick; if you have a spare one perhaps you can lend him me, or if not, I can hire one for my coachman to follow us at Cranford Bridge. Tell me at what time you dine and set out to-morrow, that I may take my measures accordingly.

“I shall have opportunities to talk to you of Fisher. My own mind would not hesitate a moment to take him for myself in a similar situation; you will easily understand that if I am to recommend him to you I may naturally feel more scrupulous towards you than I should to myself; yet in my conscience I believe that you cannot do better than to take him.”

The EARL OF ELGIN to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1800, July 12. Constantinople.—“I do assure your Lordship I never undertook so painful a task as writing my letters No. 65 and 67. In regard to Sir S. Smith, besides long habits of private

friendship, lately increased by family connection, I know him to be as good-natured a man as breathes ; and amply equal in ability to the duties of his situation. But his vanity is so insatiable, that no consideration stands before it. Private letters and private conversation are ever exposed to misrepresentation. And any story however fabulous is admitted, when to serve a purpose. He is at this moment fighting the battle of the builder Spurring ; and, even to me, writes that the only reason for my wishing him at Constantinople was to fit out a pleasure boat for my own use, when he knows that Spurring was the occasion of my getting that vessel, though of no earthly use to me, in order that he might have an opportunity of shewing his work, at a time when the Porte would not employ him. Mr. Carlyle, who has been long on board the *Tigre*, speaks with infinite regret of Sir S. Smith, whose errors he sincerely laments. Sir Sydney's principal folly is his attachment to Frenchmen. French is the only language in use in his cabin, and his commissions whether to me, to the Turks, or to the French, are for the most part entrusted to Frenchmen ; a system highly uncomfortable to myself and to his countrymen, injurious to our general influence in Turkey, and attended with much mischief in regard to the enemy. For while these confidants do undoubtedly endeavour to make private friends amongst the enemy, the Republicans are highly indignant at seeing emigrants thus employed against them.

“ I am sorry to see his naval conduct disapproved, for it appears that, since the commencement of the negotiation, and Buonaparte's quitting Egypt, Sir Sydney has not been six weeks in all off the enemy's ports. The Porte is, accordingly, angry at the loss not only of many transports, but also of four sloops of war, which his absence occasioned going into Alexandria after the renewal of hostilities. And I am afraid some very lucrative commercial speculations have been permitted with Alexandria, and much criticised on board the *Tigre*, as well as here. A Frenchman in particular of the name of *Lioron*, who is established at Neuchatel, is now here, having taken a very rich cargo of wine from Spain to Alexandria ; and, afterwards, brought a cargo from thence to Smyrna in virtue of a passport from Sir S. Smith.

“ Mr. Smith, on the other hand, has entirely disappointed the hopes I had entertained from his professions to me on the receipt of your Lordship's letter of the 7th of March. From that period I have been preparing the way for comfortable intercourse with him, in the way that I thought prudent, under the experience I had of him in business. And I had flattered myself that some progress was made. But still it was impossible for him to keep clear of intrigue ; going away privately to meet persons from Sir S. Smith ; concealing arrangements taken by him in public matters ; and encouraging absurdities in the factory, in order to make them appear independent, and inimical to me. I never did meet with an old politician to whom intrigue was equally habitual ; nor any one who managed it with so little regard to personal feelings. Mr. B. Pisani is at this moment really ill, owing to Mr. Smith's persecutions of him.

“ I conclude with giving your Lordship my positive conviction that Mr. Smith is totally unfit for any situation where discretionary power is to be exercised ; and that it is totally impossible for me to do justice to His Majesty’s service while he remains here.”

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, July 13. Hollwood.—“ If it were clear that next mail would either bring the simple ratification or the annulling the treaty, perhaps it might be as well to defer laying it before Parliament ; though even on the latter supposition I should be sorry to have lost the opportunity of shewing that we remained as ready as ever to fulfil our part of the engagement. But it seems a very possible case that we may receive by next mail some new proposal for modifying the terms of the treaty, combining it with negotiation for peace, or adding to the subsidy ; and we should then find it more difficult to lay the treaty than now, and yet there would be great embarrassment in suspending it. If you think I am right, you will probably be so good to order the copies to be made of the treaty ; and it may save time, as you are so much nearer, if you prepare the messages and send them to the King. Most of our colleagues (whom I saw yesterday) seemed to agree to this opinion. If you have any doubt, it seems material that you should come to town. Perhaps to-morrow evening would give you an excuse for Frogmore. Dundas and I return from hence to-morrow.”

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, July 13. Downing Street.]—“ I have just found your note, and can only say at once that room for doubt there is none in my mind, and that the line we have taken is the only one, in the main point, which I either could approve or even acquiesce in. I wish there were any refuge elsewhere for the person who differs from us. There is not, but although that makes obstinacy on our part more unpleasant, we must be obstinate (if necessary) where both his real interest and our own public duty are at stake. All the nasty words of the moment are of no consequence. I will take the first opportunity I can of letting him know in a proper manner what I think on this whole subject.”

GEORGE CANNING to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1800, July 14. Hollwood.—“ I cannot refrain from writing to you to say how much I feel all the kindness and delicacy of your conduct respecting Frere. What I heard yesterday from Pitt is, I am afraid, sufficient to shew that there can be but one remedy for the inconveniences and anxieties of which you complain. I will endeavour to prepare Frere for it ; but I think I shall be able to do so with less shock to his mind, and with better hope of either deceiving him (which I should almost think fair) or persuading him to deceive himself as to the real origin of the proposals to be made

to him, if I defer saying anything till I see him, than if I were to risk writing upon such a subject. I shall be in town, probably on Friday, but certainly before the beginning of next week. I hope the delay will not be embarrassing to you in any way. I should like also, before I speak to him, to have had an opportunity of knowing from you a little more precisely the nature of the Denmark mission, and the comparative merits of it and Lisbon, which latter (were it possible that anything like the same colour, of *temporary employment*, could be given to it) would, I should think, be the more tempting of the two.

“I am confident, in whatever light the proposal strikes him, and whatever his decision may be upon it, he will feel precisely as I do the kind consideration which you have shewn for him throughout.”

WILLIAM WICKHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private and confidential.*

1800, July 15. Amberg.—“I am afraid your Lordship will find my dispatches very jejune and uninteresting, but I begin to find myself literally worn down with fatigue, and I have the seeds of fever hanging about me to a degree which makes me fear that, sooner or later, I must undergo a new ordeal. In this situation I tremble every hour lest I should be taken ill with a load of public business on my mind, and immense arrears of correspondence of every sort to settle. I know not to what your Lordship looks when you say, in one of your late and very kind private letters, that ‘your mind has carved out for me work enough where I am, for some time to come.’ But, if there is an intention to employ me in any negotiations that may take place here in consequence of the late events, I must again renew my earnest request that Flint may be appointed to assist me. Where much time must necessarily be employed in giving and receiving entertainments, and where still more must and ought to be spent in conversation and apparent amusements, some one on whom the mind can repose with thorough confidence should always be left at home to keep things right and steady, and to prevent an accumulation of business which always distracts the attention, and is injurious to the public service. An arrangement of this kind will be the more necessary for me as my present mission alone will, in its nature, furnish a continuation of business, and a large portion of arrears for many months to come, supposing, what I cannot bring myself to believe, that we should arrive speedily at a *tolerable* peace; and nothing short of that will, I trust, ever be accepted.

“These, and particularly the real state of my health, will, I trust, be found sufficient reasons to render my demand fair and reasonable, and such as may be holden out to anyone. But there are two other points of view in which I wish to present the thing to your Lordship alone. First, I have really need of somebody on whom I can rely with that confidence with which I trust your Lordship can now rely on me, and which can only be the case where there are, at the same time, sentiments of gratitude, of affection, and of respect, all

of which I have received the most convincing proof that this young man entertains for me, as I do most sincerely for your Lordship. I have need of such a person because, being naturally over-anxious in public business, I can trust no one who does not think and feel exactly as myself; and, if business is not done quickly and to my mind and in my own way by those who are under me, I am apt to be impatient and express myself too warmly. I am sorry to say that I observe this growing upon me, though, on the other hand, as I trust your Lordship will have done me the justice to have observed, no one is more patient or more forbearing when he has only enemies or reputed enemies to deal with. *Secondly*; to speak out fairly and with as much modesty as truth will permit, you really want a somebody to supply my place should anything happen to me. Now I will engage, if you will give me Flint, to make him *your Lordship's own man*, that is, that in the course of four or five years he shall be thoroughly fit for any business with which you may think proper to intrust him; and I will add that whatever he does he will do without noise or bustle. Remember that our *old* foreign Ministers are either really growing old, or are too far advanced to be employed in any but missions of the highest *rank*; and among the younger ones will your Lordship, with your hand upon your heart, say that there are more than two or three *at most* to whom any business of real delicacy and importance, or any real state-secret can be intrusted with safety? If it were not so, it is clear that I should not now be here.

“I feel but two objections to what I propose. The first, that he is really useful to the public where he is; the second, that it would be no easy matter to give him a situation really equal to that which he now enjoys. For I cannot think, all things considered, the place of *Chargè d’Affaires* or a foreign mission (the best he could possibly have) at all adequate to the sort of home-employment which he now holds, as long as he fills it with real credit. I could only therefore advise him to go abroad on the certainty that he would make his way in a line that is really open.

“Should your Lordship enter into my ideas on the subject, I have opened a way for you to give them effect without the thing's exciting too much attention in the first instance. I have written to the Duke of Portland to ask leave for Flint to accompany my son (who is coming out to me) and to remain with me about three or four weeks to put my papers in order, as well as my accounts, a favour which I am sure, in consideration of the state of my health, the Duke will readily grant. I shall mention by this post my real views to Flint, who has expressed the strongest wish to come to me since he knew of my illness last winter, and, if your Lordship should think proper, you may inform him of your intentions, or you may permit him to come out and afterwards write to me yourself on the subject, as your Lordship may judge most expedient.

“I will only add that my own ability to serve your Lordship with the same zeal and activity I have hitherto done may really depend on the attention I pay to my health, and the care I take of myself for these next six months to come. I assure your Lordship that I am just now in such a state that I send for my son for no

other reason but because I feel that it is a duty in me to look out for objects that will interest me enough to divert my mind from public business at my meals, and other hours of leisure.

“I shall soon write about the regiment of Roverea. In the meantime, unless the thing be gone too far, I think the medal will be too much, and may be reserved for another occasion. The loss has turned out less than was supposed by the return of several officers and men who had been supposed killed, and is reduced to three officers killed and about fourteen wounded. The proportion of killed and wounded is greater among the private men, as many of them fell into the hands of the enemy from fatigue and inanition.

“It is too late to say anything about R[amsay]. He has, besides, felt his neglect, and I am averse to letting him go for the reason that the old woman of Corinth prayed for the life of Dionysius. He has, besides, many good qualities with all his faults, and is now doing the Condé business exceedingly well.

“To shew your Lordship however how perfectly unmanageable these officers are (even Clinton has slipped through my fingers) I refer your Lordship to a dispatch from R[amsay] inclosing a printed copy of the Swiss Regulations which you will have received by Mr. Frendenrich. Your Lordship will scarcely believe that he has published them, using the King’s name from one end to the other, notwithstanding the clear and positive injunctions he received from your Lordship to the contrary; though I told him distinctly that he ought not to do so, that by so doing he would really incur the King’s displeasure, and did actually sign the manuscript as follows—*approuvé au nom de Sa Majesté Britannique.*—W. W., which he declined to publish.

“As the fact of the publication of the King’s name appears in the book itself, transmitted by himself, it seems a fair opportunity for your Lordship to give a hint that these things ought not to be.

“Thugut will certainly play us some trick or other, and yet I am persuaded that we have nothing to do but to stand firmly by him. If we let go our hold, the whole machine falls to the ground, and the conquests of France are secured to her for ever. I presume you are now discussing the great question of negotiation or no negotiation; how you feel on that ground at home I of course can form no opinion; but, as far as continental reasons and the prospect of success in the campaign are to have their weight, I think I may safely say that all ought to depend on this one question, *shall we have the Archduke or no?* If we have him, we shall drive the enemy headlong over the Rhine in a week. If not, all the Emperors and Empresses in the world will make nothing of this army but what, I believe, our army in Ireland really was, though it was not very prudent in Sir Ralph Abercromby to say so, formidable only to its friends.

“Whatever Thugut may say, he is working at this moment at Bavaria with all his skill and cunning. I have a bad opinion of Montgélas in many points, but he has shewn himself throughout the whole of this business clear-sighted, firm, and steady. His game is a difficult one to play, and I think, upon the whole, that he manages it well. France can give nothing, and Austria wants

to take all that is left. He clings therefore to G[reat] B[ritain] to get what France cannot give, and to Prussia to prevent Austria taking what is left, but his views on Prussia go no further. He is bent on the exchange, but has not dared to mention it to Prussia. He gave Drake to-day one of the neatest reprimands I ever heard. I had long since obtained from him a secret promise that he would prevent the Elector from taking refuge at Anspach, by which he faithfully abides in spite of every opposition and temptation. D[rake] (who will be meddling, and to whom I had given an assurance, without stating my reasons, that the Elector would not go out of the Palatinate) though only presented the day before yesterday, began to lecture them all round, and, in particular, gave a long chapter on that subject to Montg elas, who, turning on his heel, said very coolly, *Monsieur, nous avons d'autres puissances   consulter   ce sujet, et d'autres int er ts   m enager que ceux de la maison d'Autriche.*

“Remember what I say, that they will quarrel before the month is over, and that M[ontg elas] will lead the other into some scrape. I shall however give everything over into Drake's hands, as it would be neither fair nor practicable for me to correspond with the Minister but through him. I am only afraid of some mischief happening with the Court of Vienna, which has but at present a weak, and is about to have an artful Minister here. M[ontg elas] will not suffer our friend to do any harm to the connection between London and Munich; but is very likely either to set him by the ears with the Austrian Minister, or to give him false notions of things, and false impressions, with the intention of exposing his credulity afterwards.”

*Postscript.*—“Your Lordship will see by the Swiss Regulations that the non-com[missioned] officers and privates who behave well are entitled to a medal, but, as in all other services, even in Russia, the medal must be of silver; this is an objection to giving medals to a whole regiment.

“I have written volumes to Lord Minto on the subject of the Arch-Duke, hitherto without effect, as his Lordship has not dared (and I think upon the whole he has been right, or rather I cannot say he has been wrong) as yet to bring the subject fairly forward. I have tried the thing with Lehrbach and Dietrichstein, but in vain.”

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, July 20. Wimbledon.—“I have this instant received a note from you dated the 16th. I suspect it has been travelling about in the circulation box. Sontag's papers were only intended for your and Lord Spencer's perusal, and I don't know how they got further. I had no other intention but that you might know all that I know.

“It is impossible to decide any thing relative to the disposal of our force without coming to a positive decision how far your operations are in any respect to be connected with or subservient to the operations on the Continent or of the Royalists. But the more immediate difficulty arises from the very contradictory opinions

entertained respecting Belle-Isle. Sir Edward Pellew and Colonel Maitland have never made a doubt either of landing or succeeding, and have never mentioned more than 10,000 men as requisite. Every person here and there who were at the last attack of that island insist that it would be madness to make the attempt with less than 20 or 25,000 men; and that we must lay our account with a very considerable loss of men and a long siege. Amidst this contradiction I thought it best to send for Maitland to come home and explain the grounds of his opinion; for, if it is to take a very large force, and to succeed only at a late season after any considerable loss of men, it alters the whole complexion of the business. I have formed my opinion as to other objects, but it is unnecessary to trouble you with details till this great preliminary is decided.

“I send you the perusal of the answer I sent to Lord Wellesley. I cannot think it possible he will come away abruptly; if he does I will never forgive myself for not carrying my own intentions into immediate execution.

“By the accounts received this morning from Duvergne at Jersey, it would appear that the French fleet will be obliged from absolute hunger to come out and fight. They have put their fleet on short allowance, and have nothing of any kind in their victualling stores.”

*Postscript.*—“I was just going to seal this letter, when a messenger has arrived to inform me that Colonel Maitland is arrived a few hours ago. I shall of course see him early to-morrow morning. Every thing is completely ready for any operation.”

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, July 21. Stowe.—“A letter which I have received from Ireland tells me that the new peers are to be created *immediately*, and that chapter closed. In the first place I take it for granted that no Irish duke is to be created, for you was so kind as to say that you would apprise me of such an intention if it came within your knowledge; and I equally take it for granted that the King would be adverse from the idea of giving me an Irish dukedom; and therefore having asked the question, I am perfectly satisfied on that subject. But having fully considered the many points connected with the question of a creation of an Irish barony to my second son, I am very anxious to receive that favour, being able to make such arrangements of my property there as will enable him to support his situation, independent of an eventual succession to which this creation may lead. Under these circumstances I hope that the King may be induced to give me this object, which, as you know, was within my reach when Lord Nugent pressed it upon me in 1788; and which, in consequence of the Union, is now more eligible than it could have been then; and if the thing could be arranged, I wish that the title of Baroness Nugent of Carlanston (Co. Westmeath) should be given to my wife, with reversion to her second and every other younger son and their issue male, and further reversion to the second and every other younger son of Lord Temple. Be so good as to let me know (after seeing Mr. Pitt)

whether any difficulty occurs on this matter ; and if not, in what way application is to be made to the King for it ; as I really cannot go to Court, or stand five minutes together for a much more important object. If however (as I expected) no batch is to be baked till December 31st, or a few days before the Union-day, I should wish that nothing should be *yet* said about it.

“ I do not make any apology for troubling you on this subject, for I know that you feel for me and mine all that I could wish, and that you will freely say all that could occur to your mind upon it, if you have any doubts upon it.

“ I am most happy in the prospect of our week at Wotton. How seldom could I have looked to the hopes of uniting four of us under that loved roof, and at a moment when our dear Tom is, by your care, so independent and happy !”

#### COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, July.] Brighton.—“ Mr. Frère a eu la bonté de me mander qu'enfin ce si longtems *wished-for* projet étoit arrivé de Vienne. Recevez-en mes complimens les plus sincères, et je me fais déjà à moi-même les vôtres par anticipations. Ce n'est pas le lendemain d'un arrangement semblable qu'on abandonne ses amis, d'ailleurs le ravitaillement de Mantoue et de Peschiera prouve qu'on s'attendoit à la possibilité d'un grand révers. On peut donc avoir été étonné, mais on n'a pas été surpris, et, selon toute apparence, nous tiendrons bon. Cela n'est que juste, il est d'ailleurs toujours de l'intérêt d'une grande puissance de montrer de la probité et de l'énergie. Je viendrai mardi à Londrès, d'où la santé de Madame de Starhemberg (toujours inquiétante) m'avait encore rappelé ici, et je tâcherai de vous trouver pour me réjouir avec vous de la certitude encore mieux fondée que nous aurons vraisemblablement alors de notre persévérance.”

#### COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, July 23]. York Farm.—“ J'ai l'honneur de vous envoyer une lettre assez intéressante que j'ai reçu des Pays-Bas, et que vous serez bien aise de parcourir. De grâce, mandez moi si vous avez quelque nouvelle de Vienne. Férons-nous la guerre ou la paix ? ”

*Enclosure :—*

#### COUNT DE MOLDEGHEM to COUNT STARHEMBERG.

1800, July 17. Brussels.—“ Me voici de nouveau dans la galère par une suite de la prétendue modération du moment. Je viens d'obtenir la restitution de mon bien, séquestré depuis trois ans sur une délation. J'arrive de la frontière de l'ancienne France. C'est en courant les chemins, et en passant dans les villes fortes, que j'ai appris de nos propres officiers prisonniers, les malheurs de l'Italie à Marengo et ceux du Danube. J'en ai été consterné et affligé à un point extrême ; les malheurs actuels pouvois peut-être amener

à des dispositions pacifiques, le hasard m'a procuré la pièce secrète *ici jointe, que je vous garantis authentique*. Il seroit trop long et ennuyeux de vous dire comment je l'ai eût. Vous y verez l'esprit de cette diabolique nation, comme sûrement votre esprit et vos talents, joints à votre état, vous metteroies sûrement dans le cas d'être consulté. Si il étoit question d'une paix, veuillé être favorable aux Belges, et soutenir les militaires et autres encore au service; et si la clause du traité de Campo Formio venois à être renouvelé qui donnerois trois ans à tous les Belges pour vendre et aliéner leurs biens, il faudroit nécessairement prévenir les taxes arbitraires, et autres déjà établis, que metteroies la nation envers ceux qui s'annonceroit pour quitter le pays. C'est pour cela, permetté moi de vous le dire, que si l'on exprimoit d'une manière claire que tous Belges, militaires, civiles, et autres, qui s'annonceroit en vertu de l'article du traité de paix pour quitter la République et vendre ses biens, partout où il seroit situé sur le territoire Français, ne seroit sujets à aucun droits de timbre et d'enrégistremens actuellement établi, et ceux qui pouroit survenir dans l'espace de trois ans; que la simple annonce d'un Belge, vendant ses biens partout où ils pouroit s'en trouver sur le territoire de la République, vendant à un habitant français, ou à un étranger, ne seroit sujet à aucun droits d'enrégistremens de transcriptions, et que les dites ventes auroit leurs effets sans être inquiété, une nombre de propriétaires, capitalistes, et n'aimant point le régime actuel, n'attendent que la paix pour transporter leurs fortunes dans les états de l'Empereur. Cela peut avoir des avantages pour un pays qui a souffert comme les pays héréditaires de voir arriver des individus et du numéraire, et de conserver des officiers moyennés à une puissance tout à fait militaire. Je ne sais si toutes ses réflexions vous paroîtront justes, mais il m'a parut, qu'en cas de paix, il est util de connoître d'avance les dispositions de son ennemi. Si cela est, en vous écrivant ceci, j'aurai rempli mon objet. Veuillé assurer la réception de cette lettre à la femme du dit Alexandre, actuellement de retour de Vienne à Munster."

*Postscript.*—"A exprimer aussi que les mêmes individus qui quitteroit la République, resteroit toujours dans leurs droits pour les biens qui pouroit leurs tomber, par succession ou autres événements."

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MINTO.

*Private.*

1800, July 25. Dropmore.—"I did not fail to lay before His Majesty your Lordship's letter respecting the conduct of his Hanoverian government in the empire. It does not perhaps belong to me to give an opinion upon the subject, but I do not think any impartial man would advise the Elector of Hanover, at this moment, to throw away the protection of Prussia, in the hopes of support from Austria. It is a thing to be lamented that such should be the local circumstances of the King's German dominions; but I do not see how his British ministry can hold out to him either means of security, or hope of indemnity, to Hanover, if that country should provoke the hostility of France

by following the course of British politics. Nor do I think we should much consult our own British interests, by exposing so large a part of the north of Germany to inevitable plunder and anarchy.

"I cannot persuade myself that M. Thugut will, as he has thrown out to you, send the Emperor to the army and go himself to Italy. At all events we could have nothing to gain by precipitating our measures. We do not expect that Austria should do any thing to make the terms of our peace better; we may be well content if the mode of joint negotiation, which on other accounts we prefer, does not, in this respect, operate to our disadvantage. I see therefore no inconvenience in suffering Thugut to do whatever he wishes to do by such a journey, if he does undertake it; reserving only to ourselves the means and the right of concurring in the more formal and public negotiation, or of beating out our own terms of peace, in our own way. The appearance and name of treating jointly is much more than the real aid we can derive in negotiation from our ally." *Copy.*

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1800, July 25. Alt-Oettingen.—"I have nothing to add to my public dispatches but the repetition of my persuasion that you cannot commit this army at present without risking its utter destruction; and, on the other hand that, with a proper choice of generals, and a Commander-in-Chief enjoying its confidence, it would beat the French army to pieces, even with Buonaparte at its head, and the ghost of Desaix to boot to direct and encourage it in battle.

"I am inclined to believe that the quantity of tobacco used by the Austrian officers, which is really enormous, has, at the last, an effect upon the understanding. This at least is certain, that all their old officers are stupid, and become so some years before old age alone would have that effect upon them.

"A young Swiss officer who was engaged for the first time at Möeskirch, being asked what he saw as he went into action, said that he remembered nothing but four of the fattest gentlemen he ever saw together in his life, and that somebody told him they were Austrian Generals; but, as they were keeping out of the reach of the fire, smoking their pipes and looking on whilst the soldiers went forward to be shot, that he was persuaded they were *bourgeois* of Möeskirch who came to see the action.

"This is so true a description of some of those fat-headed gentry, that I could not give your Lordship a better if I were to write a page.

"Lord Minto, M. Thugut, and Count Dietrichstein are all pressing me to go and reside for some time at least at Munich. I should say Amberg, but your Lordship, who knows Drake, will, I am sure, agree with me that the thing is not possible. I do not like anybody to meddle with my business, because I never meet with anybody that does it exactly in my way. Drake's fingers are always itching to be writing, and his tongue to be talking, and, as it will be often

impossible for me to make him understand exactly what I would be at, I am sure that, nine times in ten, he would undo the very thing that I was doing, as was the case when I was at Amberg on more than one occasion; and then, as I was very near doing on those occasions, I shall grow angry, and shall say something unpleasant, and then God knows what will happen. The truth is that I am very apt to be out of temper with my own friends, though no one is more patient when he has to deal with the King's enemies. I shall therefore content myself with corresponding with Montg elas constantly, and going there only on any emergency when my presence may be really necessary.

"I am really persuaded that the Elector has a personal confidence in me, as well as his Minister; and it is equally important for me to preserve that confidence, and to avoid giving any offence to Drake, which I must inevitably do, if I did my duty.

"By the bye, there is poor Walrond, who has really done his duty extremely well in these latter times, left quite to himself, though obliged to remain here to collect and give up the papers, part of which are gone to Vienna with my effects, the rest are at Munich. His salary ceases, and I believe he has not a penny of his own. If that cannot be continued a little time longer, it would be a great act of kindness in your Lordship to give him a line of approbation of his past conduct, through Frere. Such a testimony would really be a treasure to him, would be only what is due, and would cost nothing to anybody. I think he has been now eleven years in the service, and is very much liked and esteemed by everybody at Munich, though the strongest prejudices existed against him at first on account of his having been attached to Paget.

"The accounts from Vienna received to-night are warlike. It will not do, believe me, it will not do without a total change, and you will only witness a renewal of the scenes of Alvinzi and of Wurmser.

"I shall write all about Cond eans, Swiss Subsidiary Corps, and the rest before I leave this place.

"I do not think the Elector would resist a letter written in Buonaparte's own hand, and presented by Prussia, but, fortunately, the Consul seems to be violently angry with his Electoral Highness.

"I am persuaded that you must come to secularization at last; though I would fight against it to the last drop of blood if I could procure safe instruments to fight with. Something tells me, however, that we shall have no serious negotiations; and I am for the first time really afraid of continental war."

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, July 25. Downing Street.—"I was just stepping into my carriage this morning at six o'clock to go to Swinley to settle with the Duke of York the detail of our plan, but I was stopped by the note from the King, of which the enclosed is a copy. Most of you being of opinion that we ought not to send any force out of Europe (the reverse of which is my decided opinion), and the King and those in whose councils he confides being of opinion that our force is to

go nowhere (which is the plain English of all this), my situation is become too ridiculous to be longer submitted to. I have wrote to the King that, upon the receipt of his note, I had come to town to lay it before His Majesty's servants, but, as I could not collect them together, I must postpone it to a future opportunity."

*Enclosure* :—

GEORGE III. to HENRY DUNDAS.

1800, July 25. Windsor.—“ On returning from Swinley I have found Mr. Secretary Dundas's note, forwarding a minute of Cabinet; not having before heard of an expedition against Ferrol, nor on what grounds of supposed success it is to be undertaken, nor what force will remain in this country after sending so large a force out of it, I cannot give any answer till I have received the data on which to form an opinion.” *Copy.*

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, July 25. Altona.—“ We arrived here on Wednesday night, and are obliged to remain to recruit Elizabeth's strength. I trust we shall be able to set forward on Sunday, and I expect that we shall reach Berlin on the fourth day. My official correspondence will not begin till then, but I must inform you that I met here *Garret Byrne of Ballymanus in the county of Wicklow*, one of the most guilty, most mischievous, and most powerful of the Irish rebels. He claimed acquaintance with me as his neighbour, and I find he is extremely desirous of being allowed immediately to return to England. The pretence is private business, but his Irish estate may be managed as well by directions from Hamburgh as from England, and if what I heard at Yarmouth is true, that important papers have been seized there upon an agent of the Irish rebels endeavouring to get to France, it may be advisable to put the Duke of Portland's Office upon its guard against the application which will certainly be made for Mr. Byrne for a passport. The part of the country where his property and influence lies was by the last account in a state of great fermentation, and there is a gang of deserters and other rebels in arms there who have been under the command of Dwyer, a man belonging to Byrne.”

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, July 25. Downing Street.]—“ Pray see if you can apply the necessary corrections to the Lord Lieutenant's speech. It certainly wants many, but none occur to me that I am satisfied with.

“ I will try to-morrow to send you a draft for our own, unless you have already been at work upon it.”

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, July 26.] Hollwood.—“ I have endeavoured to put down a draft for the speech; and have told Carthew to send you a copy immediately. Have the goodness to return it with your corrections

to-morrow if possible, that I may send it to the King and have it circulated in the course of Sunday and Monday.<sup>24</sup>

*Postscript.*—“By a note from Dundas, I find the King chooses to hesitate about the expedition now proposed. He cannot mean to persist, but it is really provoking to find a disposition equally to object to all means of making peace or making war.”

MEMOIR ON THE STATE OF RUSSIA, BY LORD WHITWORTH.

1800, July.—“After the example of some of my predecessors, who, in times less important than the present, have felt it their duty at the expiration of their missions to collect under one point of view whatever might throw light on the events which have taken place in the country where they have resided, or on the characters of those who may be supposed to have an influence on public affairs, I venture to submit the following observations which, however deficient they may be in point of composition, are founded on experience impartially stated, and may at least answer the purpose of affording some insight into the character of the present Sovereign of Russia.

“In order to do this it may be necessary to look back to the latter period of the life of the late Empress, who, though she finished her reign without giving effect to the salutary measures which she had in contemplation, cannot be supposed to have differed in opinion with her contemporaries on those important points which have within these last few years convulsed the whole system of European politics.

“In justification of her backwardness to take a part in the war, it must be remembered that she had many serious domestic considerations which demanded her most anxious attention. Her accurate knowledge of the character of her immediate successor would certainly have made her desirous of interrupting the regular course of inheritance, had not the times in which she lived, when so large a body of men, and some perhaps even of her own subjects, were tinctured with revolutionary doctrines, deterred her from taking those steps which, under other circumstances, she possibly would have pursued; she felt that the moment was too dangerous to risk the dispute of a title to an absolute monarchy; and it is more than probable that the state of the newly acquired provinces in Poland was a point which had a considerable influence on her political conduct. The effects resulting from an apprehension of the uncertain tenure of those conquests have been felt to a very fatal degree by the combined Powers who, in the early period of the Revolution, were so nearly re-establishing the regular government in France. The same dread of revolt in Poland which divided the attention of those Powers, and hastened their retreat from the French frontier, deterred likewise the Empress of Russia from stepping forward, until a combination of circumstances rendered the progress of the French arms a more dangerous evil than any which possibly could result to the Russian empire from active operations.

“The death of the Empress suspended however for a considerable time the bringing into effect the resolution which was adopted, and

for the execution of which the necessary measures had been taken. The critical moment and sudden nature of her death occasioned an awful interruption to the new scene of politics on which Russia had so lately determined to enter, and called forth the present Sovereign of that country from almost exile and confinement to absolute power, and from his frivolous and favourite pursuit of drilling a garrison to wield the sceptre of this gigantic empire.

“In attempting to form a judgment of the character of this Sovereign, and to obtain a correct opinion of his actions, it is but just to call to mind the character of the father from whom he is descended, and to conclude that he inherited naturally many of those weaknesses which obscure his reign. If many defects were inherent in his nature, his education had but little tendency to correct them. Regarded by his mother with the jealous eye of an usurper, many of the most essential avenues which lead to judgment and experience were to him most circumspectly closed; and more pains were taken to encourage weaknesses, which by captivating his mind might at least tranquilise his indignation, than to sow those seeds which should blossom in the august character of a Sovereign.

“The sudden reverse of fortune which raised him to the throne took place in a moment when he was totally unprepared to meet the elevation which awaited him. If any apprehension existed lest the intentions of his mother (which her past conduct had given ample reason to suspect), should be brought into execution, the events of a few days were sufficient to appease every anxiety. The most perfect submission prevailed throughout every department of the Government, and those who attentively considered the effects of the change which had taken place, calculated certainly with very great precaution on the future events of the new reign, but regarded the regular succession which had taken place so quietly and the probability of the continuance of internal tranquility as likely to consolidate the general strength of the empire.

“A sentiment of indignation against the usurpation of his mother, cloaked under the mask of respect to the memory of an injured father, was displayed in the very first moments that the Emperor felt his power. The same scrupulous devotion to the minutia of military detail, and the same attachment to the Prussian dress, and to the Prussian discipline which had prevailed throughout the short and insignificant reign of Peter the Third, soon betrayed itself in the character of his son. The first idea that occurred to the monarch on whom the vast concerns of the Russian empire had devolved, was to change the dress of the military, and to reduce it to the standard of the old Holstein uniform. These little and inconsistent peculiarities were soon found to be united with a great degree of superstition and enthusiasm. An idea occurred to him, and was actually put in execution, not less extraordinary to the eye of an indifferent spectator than repugnant to the ancient practice and fundamental law of the empire. The body of Peter the Third, whose coronation had never taken place, was ordered to be removed a considerable distance, and deposited in the chapel destined only for those sovereigns of Russia who have actually

worn the Imperial crown. To obviate the impression so extraordinary a proceeding was likely to produce on the public mind, and which at that moment was an object too serious to be disregarded, the Emperor conceived the romantic idea of crowning the coffin; thus betraying the first symptoms of a character which has since proved the source of infinite public inconvenience as well as of domestic misfortunes.

“The love of military parade in the meantime displayed itself to an excess, the effects of which are scarcely to be credited.

“The town of St. Petersburg, situated at a very great distance from any frontier, inaccessible to surprise either by sea or land, was at once converted into a garrison town, piquets were planted in every street, the whole circumference of the city enclosed by pallisadoes, and the gates guarded to prevent any communication from without, with as much rigour as if an enemy had been at hand. The military establishment became in a very short time from one of the easiest, the most severe in Europe; the strictest conformity was required to frivolous and scarcely intelligible orders, and officers of the highest rank and most distinguished merit were either dismissed the service with infamy for the most accidental omission, or subjected to the direction of officers whom, in time of actual danger, they would with reluctance have commanded. The civil departments of government were exposed to the same irregularities; so much inconsistency prevailed in every transaction, so little respect was paid to past merit or solid worth, that terror and disgust universally prevailed, and even the individuals who had been elevated in a moment of favour, could neither contemplate with composure the proceedings of their Sovereign, or divest themselves of the apprehension of a sudden reverse.

“There were however considerations which, if the various details of the Emperor’s conduct had not given too much reason to suspect his sincerity, might in some degree have reconciled a thinking mind to the violent and absolute system he had adopted.

“It must be remembered that Russia is an absolute monarchy, and that the will of the sovereign constitutes the law of the land. It is necessary therefore that the throne should be entrenched with all the pomp of power, and all the terror of authority. The late Empress had, it must be allowed, betrayed in the early part of her reign too mild a disposition, too anxious a desire to extend to her subjects privileges which at present they are only capable of abusing. The error was soon detected by Catherine, nor were its effects at that time much felt. However, within the last few years of her life (such was the natural lenity and benevolence of that sovereign) she relaxed much from that distant conduct which the secure possession of her throne now rendered unnecessary. She suffered her subjects to approach her without restraint, and formed for herself a society where the dignity of the sovereign was absorbed in the kindness of the friend. The effect resulting from this condescension was certainly a diminution of that terror with which the Russian has been accustomed to venerate the seat of power. Catherine it is true lost nothing; but the throne of Russia was rendered less formidable.

“ It was but natural that the well-wishers to regular Government should cherish such ideas as might serve in any degree to justify or palliate the conduct of the Emperor. His conversation, although strongly tinged by singularity, gave evident proofs that, notwithstanding much reason existed to doubt solidity of judgment, this monarch was not deficient in a certain line of talent, of which quickness of conception or imagination formed the principal feature. His political conduct augmented this gleam of hope. Although the troops promised by the late Empress were, in the first moments of his reign, withheld, yet many considerations presented themselves which might seem to justify in some degree the necessity of such a determination. It was easy to conceive that a monarch scarcely seated on a throne, the accession to which had long been regarded as doubtful, would not at once engage in a laborious foreign contest, against principles which at such a time it might be extremely dangerous to agitate, or venture to deprive the empire of any part of its natural strength while it might be necessary for the maintenance of its internal tranquility. Every attention was however paid to the supporters of the good cause, although no immediate efforts were made in its behalf. The closest connection was cultivated with Great Britain, the strongest attachment demonstrated to its interests; and these demonstrations were accompanied by the renewal of a treaty of commerce on terms highly advantageous to the British nation, as well as by an augmentation of the auxiliary fleet; and the most confidential intercourse between the two Governments continued to exist.

“ A distant prospect of the empire of Russia might give, during the continuance of this period, a view sufficiently favourable of the principles and political conduct of that Government; and the hearty co-operation of the Emperor in expressing just indignation against the bad faith of the House of Austria was calculated to strengthen every hope. The expectations which must have been excited in the eyes of Europe by the measures hitherto pursued were still more fully confirmed by the accession of the Emperor to the general coalition, and the engagements entered into to undertake active operations in the campaign of 1799. It was certainly the interest of every foreign power, and the first duty of every Minister devoted to the service of the good cause, to profit by these favourable dispositions, and take advantage of the zeal which seemed to animate this Cabinet. But it was impossible for those who were anywise conversant with the details of administration, to avoid lamenting the inconsistency, the violence, and the ungovernable precipitation which, prevailing in many essential points of the Government, but too strongly marked the rash imbecility of the supreme power in Russia.

“ In this state of affairs a serious loss accrued to the Russian empire and to the good cause from the death of Prince Besborodko. His long experience, his solidity, and vast capacity for business rendered him almost of indispensable utility, and enabled him to retain a great influence over the department of affairs entrusted to his care. His opinion was ever listened to with respect, and he possessed an authority sufficient on many occasions to counteract

the violent inconsistencies which, originating in the petulance of the Sovereign, but too often threatened the derangement of the whole political machine. Useful to the State, because in a certain degree respected by the Monarch, the weight of his influence gave a solidity to the councils of the Emperor, which since the unfortunate loss of that statesman they have never been able to regain.

“ If however the general conduct of the Emperor had hitherto been consistent with the views of the combined Powers, and the strict observance of the principles of morality had rendered him venerable in the eyes of his subjects, a sudden infringement of them now almost extinguished the last rays of respectability which glimmered round the throne. An attachment to a lady who had attracted his attention during his coronation at Moscow was openly avowed ; and although platonic affection was asserted to be the basis of this partiality, still the Court of Petersburg had been too long accustomed to scenes of licentiousness to consider such eccentric principles as likely to limit the progress of the Emperor’s attachment. Connected with the same romantic system a circumstance occurred which exposed the weakness of this monarch but too publicly to the eyes of Europe. His wild and inconstant spirit at length burst forth, and proclaimed itself aloud in the enthusiastic protection he extended to the Institution of the Order of Malta. The insignia of this Order were received by the Sovereign of Russia with a degree of childish admiration ; affairs of the utmost importance were suspended to give time for the arrangement of the most puerile ceremonies ; and not only the great system of politics, but the dearest and most immediate concerns of this empire dwindled into objects of small importance when in competition with the empty concerns connected with the barren rock of Malta.

“ The capture of this island by the French gave rise to a new system of measures still more deeply tinged with enthusiasm and inconsistency. The Bailli de Litta whose influence and mission at the Court of Petersburg were thus threatened with dissolution, made no scruple for the promotion of his personal interests and particular views to take an unjustifiable advantage of the weakness which the Emperor of Russia betrayed, by a fatal insinuation of measures likely to flatter his vanity ; in the first instance by proclaiming himself sovereign of an island which, if it ever became him to possess, was now in the actual possession of his enemies ; and in the next instance to sanction by his consent to the marriage of the Bailli de Litta, a violation of the fundamental laws of that very institution which he stood pledged to protect.

“ A part of the Crown lands of Russia were now disposed in Commanderies and distributed amongst those who shared the favour of the Sovereign without regard to any of the qualifications, either of birth, or service, or even of celibacy which the Order requires. The light in which such an usurpation of dominion might be regarded by the different States of Europe, received not a moment’s attention, and in spite of every political connection which unites Russia to the great system of European politics, three instances were exhibited to the astonishment of every one accustomed to consider the political intercourse of nations, of

foreign ministers being banished the country, under every accumulated circumstance of inconvenience and disgrace, because their Courts had ventured to express the sentiments of surprise which such novel measures had excited, and their reluctance to acknowledge a sovereignty in so unprecedented and unjustifiable a manner assumed.

“The same weakness and violence which mark every detail of this transaction have unfortunately since betrayed themselves in every point of the administration of this empire. Not even the sacred claim of personal misfortune has been so far respected by the Sovereign as to give consistency to his actions. Neither the unfortunate monarch who, bereft of his own dominions, was compelled to end his days in the capital of his oppressor, or the prince whose high birth and active services, demanding every consideration, had entered into the service of Russia, have been exempted from the most cruel and unprovoked insults. And if the legal sovereign of France has escaped many an open provocation, more perhaps is owing to his fortunate or prudent absence from the Imperial residence, than to any sense of feeling for his melancholy fate.

“The trade of the country has been subjected to the most sudden and violent interruption, urged in many instances by those who, having access to the Sovereign, have taken advantage of his precipitation and incapacity to forward their private interests, and oppressed individuals unfortunately have not the possibility of appealing to an impartial and competent judge. Thus whole towns and provinces are ruined, their magistrates and governors perpetually changed, the regular channels of commerce interrupted, and confidence hourly diminishes. The discontents which these violent proceedings, both in the military and civil departments, have given rise to, cannot but have reached the ears of those whose power depends on the existence of the Sovereign; and they by alarming his mind, while they close every avenue through which more wholesome influences might enter, have annihilated almost every shadow of personal security. Timid, through a dread of those violent excesses, in which every sentiment but that of vengeance against the object of wrath is extinguished, they serve but to encourage the fatal inconsistencies which it is their most solemn duty to counteract. Thus the metropolis has in the most cruel manner been emptied of many of its most valuable inhabitants, every society where mere ordinary comforts could be found is scattered into banishment, and the common enjoyments of a civilised people are become matters of suspicion and indignation. A dread (fundamentally indeed but too justifiable) of Jacobinical principles has lately led to a prohibition of every source of information to be derived from foreign publications; and perhaps the best illustration of the present state of Russia, is a reference to the state of France while under the tyranny of Robespierre. Blood it is true has not yet streamed in this empire, but personal property, upon the most unwarrantable pretext has been seized, every other act of tyranny has been witnessed, and even the most sacred rights violated.

“If these circumstances collectively prove the little reliance to be

placed on a Sovereign thus deficient in every quality that can inspire confidence, and surrounded by a weak and timid administration, there are other considerations which make disgust against the monarch subside into pity for the man. It is impossible to witness the absurd and fanciful regulations which are daily enforced, to observe the particular forms of dress, the shape of a hat, become objects of Imperial edicts; to contemplate the various whims which in the course of a morning's ride become the subject of orders from the monarch, and without adding to the security of the throne, efface its dignity, and destroy all personal comfort, without concluding that it has pleased Providence to confer the sceptre of power on one incapable of the lowest office in which the exertion of sound reason is required. The public voice confirms this necessary conclusion, and those who approach nearest to the sources of information, feel most sensibly the painful conviction.

“Such is, upon a fair consideration, the opinion that must be formed of the present Sovereign of Russia. The confidential servant actually at the head of affairs, without abilities or knowledge to inspire confidence in himself, is the humble instrument of the caprice of his Sovereign, and if he be not distinguished by any enmity to those who are the firmest supporters of the good cause, he is characterized by no remarkable trait. He is enabled to retain his influence chiefly by cultivating the friendship and protection of a man who has raised himself from the capacity of a menial servant to one of the highest offices of state, and who by a long acquaintance with the weakness of the monarch has learnt to acquire that kind of influence over him to which beings thus unfortunate are ever found to be subject.

“Amidst all the regret which these afflicting truths excite, it is however a sincere consolation to every friend to the cause of Europe and humanity to find at least one man who, high in office and in dignity, has maintained so firm an adherence to the good cause, and exhibited, under circumstances of the utmost personal danger, such friendship to its faithful supporters, as no terms can express, nor any length of time efface from the memory. Although influence and even confidence is at present denied him, his efforts to render service are incessant, and although Providence has seen fit for a time to shake the foundation on which the true interest of Russia must rest, yet every hope may be entertained that, supported by such a statesman, the fabric may yet be preserved from crumbling into ruin.

“When these considerations are impressed upon the mind, the nature of the late secession from the Coalition, and of the incalculable indignities offered to the Government of Great Britain, can alone be fairly estimated. To violate the sacred law of nations, the rights of hospitality, and the most solemn ties which can make public transactions matter of public confidence, is perhaps more than a mere national insult; it is an injury to the general welfare of society, and considered under this point of view, a nation great and just as Great Britain must rear her head with indignation. But the ties which bind the British nation to the Russian empire are formed by nature and inviolable. England has reason to regret with

Russia that the Imperial sceptre should be thus inconsistently wielded, but it is the *Sovereign* of Russia alone who divides the empires.

“In every class of people oppression has at length excited disgust; the neglect with which Souvorow has been treated, who, whatever may have been his intrinsic merit, was deservedly a popular character, and the insult offered to his memory by almost denying him military honours, has tended greatly to increase it; whilst a numerous and harmless body of men, to the amount of several hundred, has been roused to indignation by an order for their indiscriminate expulsion from the metropolis, in the course of a few hours.

“The final issue it is almost impossible to calculate. Constant suspicion has excited such vigilance throughout every department of the police, that any combination of parties to produce a change in the government is almost to be considered as impossible. The eyes of all are fixed with inexpressible anxiety on the immediate successor to the throne, from whose general character of liberality and benignity the most sanguine hopes are justly entertained.

“But these sources of public approbation have drawn upon all his actions the most scrupulous suspicion, and as far as human foresight can at this moment penetrate, the despair of an enraged individual seems the most probable means to terminate the present scene of oppression, than any more systematic combination of measures to restore the throne of Russia to its dignity and importance.”

RUPTURE OF THE ALLIANCE OF GREAT BRITAIN AND RUSSIA.  
MEMORANDA BY LORD WHITWORTH.

1800 [July]. No. 1.—“On the 26th of May Count Panin gave me the most positive assurances that in the confection or rather the renewal of the treaty between this Court and that of Berlin, and which waited only the arrival of the new Prussian Minister for signature, there was nothing in the smallest degree inimical to the interests of Great Britain either individually or as connected with the cause. That the measures of precaution taken against the House of Austria are not of a nature to cramp its efforts against France, and are not to take effect till after the conclusion of the war. That the object in view is to keep the House of Austria within bounds, but not to refuse it a fair compensation for the losses it has, or may sustain.

“The idea is that Austria may, at the general winding up, be in the same relative state of power as she was before the breaking out of the war. For the rest Count Panin assured me that he could not take upon himself the exclusive merit of this forbearance, although the business had been chiefly entrusted to him, since the Court of Berlin had of itself suggested the importance of avoiding every measure which could at this moment divert the attention of Austria from the prosecution of the war.”

No. 2.—“According to the best information I have been able to procure, the Emperor's present animosity is to be ascribed: first, to the failure of the expedition against Holland, and to the mis-

representations of those who have availed themselves of that circumstance to excite his jealousy and mistrust.

“Secondly : To the idea of our good understanding with the Court of Vienna, at a moment when he conceives himself insulted by it ; and to an exaggerated apprehension of our giving in to all its views of ambition and aggrandisement.

“Thirdly : To the refusal of his Orders of Knighthood.

“Fourthly : To a latent jealousy of our successes by sea ; and this with all the other pretexts inflamed by the insinuations of French emissaries, and by the intrigues and constant lamentations of the Swedes and Danes, but more especially of the former.

“Fifthly : To the new policy of Count Rastopsin, totally in the hands of a party in Russia who style themselves economists, and whose great object is to separate Russia from the Coalition, not perhaps from any partiality towards France, but from a dislike to the war. In order to this, he has availed himself of his access to the Emperor, and rendered all those suspicious who on former occasions may have influenced his opinion. This he has, as I have reason to believe, succeeded in doing by the most unjustifiable means. He is Chief Director of the Post, and the organ of all communication from thence to the Emperor. Opportunities therefore cannot have been wanting, and it is well known that if they had, he would not have scrupled to supply the defect.

“And lastly : To a natural versatility of character, which bids defiance to every kind of calculation, and which, if it is in the present instance unfavourable to our interests, may, when we least expect it, bring the Emperor round to his former opinions, and to a sincere, though tardy desire to repair the mischief of which he may have been made the instrument.”

#### LORD SPENCER TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, August 1. Admiralty.—“We have ordered some bomb-vessels and gun-boats to accompany the Baltic squadron ; and it had before occurred to me that it would be desirable to employ Popham. I have therefore appointed him to the command of one of the fifty-gun ships, which fortunately I had the means of doing.

“I wish to suggest for your consideration whether it might not be as well to give some secret hint to our cruisers not to be very particular in looking out for neutral convoys for the present ; this may be done without compromising our principle, and it may be as well to run as little chance as we can of involving ourselves more deeply in this imbroglio at least for this year.”

#### W. PITT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, August 2. Wycombe.—“I shall go from hence to my brother’s quarters near Bagshot, and could come to you on Wednesday to dinner, and go to town with you on Thursday. If I hear nothing from you to alter this plan in the interval, you may expect me in good time on Wednesday. Meanwhile, I return you the Admiralty letters, and quite agree with you that things should be

left as much as possible in *statu quo*, avoiding to say decidedly whether they are prisoners of war or not, while the negotiation is pending. But if any circumstance of health or convenience requires either officers or men being put on shore, the latter might, I imagine, be put in some place of proper custody, and the latter [former ?] allowed to land on *parole* of delivering themselves up when called upon, to await our decision.

“ I think the power you have given to Whitworth highly advisable, and more likely than any thing else to avoid present extremities, and by gaining time, in substance to carry our point. I doubt about the other power you propose, which, in fact, would give our demand that summary and peremptory form which, in the result of our discussion on the subject, we inclined to think it wiser to avoid. This however, I suppose, may wait till we meet. I rather understand that you are gone either to Stowe or Wotton ; I have therefore ordered the messenger to call at Dropmore and take his directions from thence.”

#### COUNT WORONZOW TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, August 8. Harley Street.—“ Mon ami Monsieur Lyzakewitz, qui craint de vous incomoder, et qui d'ailleurs a ordre (entre nous) de demander le payement des subsside qui sont due à la Russie sans entrer dans aucune discution, mais de répondre au plus vite si c'est oui ou non qu'il recevra ici pour réponce, m'a prié de le tirer d'ambaras, car la maison Hop [Hope] le tourmente pour savoir s'ils auront ou non cet argent, parce qu'on leurs a assigné cette somme pour le payement des intérêts de notre dette d'état. Je vous conjure de prier Monsieur Pitt de faire donner une réponce claire et prompte à M. de Lyzakewitz sur cette affaire, car il craint que cela ne lui attire des désagrémens perssonel, et que cela ne servit de motif pour brouiller encor plus les deux pays.

“ Excusez, je vous suplie, cette importunité en faveure du motif qui m'engage à vous incomoder.”

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO LORD ROBERT FITZGERALD.

1800, August 11. Dropmore.—“ I have to acknowledge two letters from you, the one of the 23rd July, and the other of the 2nd of this month, enclosing a letter from the Duke of Richmond to you. They relate principally to the Lisbon mission, to which I should have had sincere pleasure in recommending you, if there were not particular circumstances which, as I thought, made it necessary for me to propose to his Majesty the different arrangement which is now on the point of taking place.

“ If I could, in this instance, have complied with your wishes I can with truth assure you that the doing so would have been a sincere gratification to me ; and that pleasure would certainly have been increased by my knowledge of the anxious interest which the Duke of Richmond has always expressed to me, in what relates to your advancement in the foreign line.

“ It would be quite unnecessary that he should trouble himself

to make a formal application on the subject. I well know his wishes respecting it, and it certainly would always be a pleasure to me to comply with them." *Copy.*

AFFAIRS OF FRANCE.

J. EDWARDS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, August 12. Pall Mall.—“ Having, through your protection, obtained His Majesty’s licence to go to France to enquire after goods belonging to me which have been laying there before the war, I conceive it my duty to relate to your Lordship the situation and disposition which I had an opportunity of observing in that country, as well as the conversations I had with several political characters in it.

“ The whole country through which I passed from Calais to Paris is in the highest state of culture, and the crops most abundant. The population appeared to me equal to what I had formerly seen it. The manners of the people peaceable and obliging ; the reverse of a disgusting perversity which I witnessed when I was last in France about 1791.

“ At every place where I stopped, an anxious enquiry for peace ; not the least expression of reproach to England or its Government anywhere, except that in all the Public Offices there is a printed paper ‘ *Guerre au Gouvernement Anglais ;* ’ and at a post-house near Amiens, a number of women sitting together in the street, one of them cried out, ‘ *Ah, Monsieur Anglais, vous nous avez donné assez de misère. Donnez-nous la paix.* ’

“ The posts are exactly as before the war, and the roads nearly as good. I saw no marks of republicanism or revolution at any town through which we passed except the demolition of churches, and the destruction of Chantilly ; nor any military except what might be expected to support civil order in times of peace.

“ At Paris instead of the devastation, disorder, and misery which I expected, the houses and streets in every quarter are in a most perfect state of decency and order. I saw very few private carriages, but they numbered more than 2,000 hackney coaches and cabriolets for hire. Though some of the monuments of art have been destroyed, *all the best* have been preserved, from St. Denis, the Sorbonne, the Mazarine, and every other public building, so as to make a school of French art in sculpture from its infancy ; all classed under their different ages, and placed with great taste in the college and gardens of the *Petits Augustins*. I saw them and have got an octavo volume of their description.

“ They have not been less careful of the monuments of art plundered from Italy, Germany, and other countries. The statues of the Apollo, Laocoon, and every other I saw have arrived as perfect as I saw them at Rome, except Michael Angelo’s part of the Laocoon which was not applied. The pictures of the Italian, French, Dutch, and Flemish Schools are about half placed in the uppermost story of the Louvre. The whole length of the room is 1,400 feet ; only half of it is yet filled, but I saw piles of pictures

for the rest (chiefly of the Italian school) not yet hung. Numbers of artists were employed in cleaning and repairing them. Those which are hung up seem to have arrived in perfect condition.

“The *Bibliothèque Royale* is preparing to be enlarged more than double, and the piles of books from foreign countries, as well as their own, ready to fill it.

“It is remarkable that the late Queen’s Library is preserved entire, and kept separate from all the rest.

“Every one of the *royal palaces* have been preserved, and in higher condition of repair than formerly. The Thuilleries is ornamented in front with fine Roman statues of senators and a number of modern statues of heroes are ordered at £1,000 sterling each—among which is our Duke of Marlborough.

“No gold coin has been struck during the whole Revolution, and the *louis d’ors* as well as *écus* of the ancient monarchy always permitted. At the few places where I saw the cap of liberty, it seems to have been ironically formed as a fool’s cap. The trees of liberty are almost everywhere suffered to decay, or purposely destroyed. The great statue of Liberty at the Champs Elysées was pulled down a few days after I arrived at Paris.

“About 16 days ago an order was issued that the *Décadé* was only binding to the Offices of State, that others were at liberty to use it on Sunday as their day of rest. The Sunday following I saw more than half of the shops shut, and the people going in parties to the country as formerly. I went into *Sainte Sulpice* on 2 or 3 Sundays, and saw mass performed as usual, but only attended by the lowest people. When I was in society where religion was mentioned, the infidelity of Voltaire seemed to have pervaded everywhere, so as to have made all but the lowest class a nation of Deists. Bonaparte appears to wish to restore Christianity. He ordered *Te Deum* to be performed in Notre Dame for the victory of Marengo, and has permitted the emigrant priests to return on condition they would live under the laws of the French Government. In the music at the *église des Invalides*, July 14, were passages addressed to the Supreme Being expressed as decently as anything of its kind. The country people in general are attached to the Christian sabbath, and have always observed it as much as they durst during the Revolution.

“The National cockade is still worn by the men, but diminished to the size of a half-crown, and even that but half exposed above the hat-band. I did not choose to wear it, and was never interrupted for the want of it except once in passing a *corps de garde*, *faubourg St. Germain*. The soldier stopped me and took me into the guard room for not having it. I asked to see the officer, and told him I did not conceive myself entitled to wear it, being an Englishman. He said ‘*Oh, c’est différent,*’ and very politely showed me to the door. I was never addressed as *citoyen* but by the lowest people, and seldom heard it among the natives; in good company it is *Monsieur* as formerly.

“In various companies I have spoken of the return of monarchy in the restoration of some branch of the family, and never found any repugnance from Frenchmen to the admission of it as the only

hope of stability. I saw nothing of democracy anywhere among Frenchmen, nor heard the word mentioned by them but with horror. On expressing my surprise at this change to some who had been most violent formerly, they seemed ashamed and lamented their error; they said it was impossible for an Englishman to conceive what they had suffered, and how they had been made to expiate their folly; that till Bonaparte had taken the reins of government, they had been in the hands of villains who knew nothing of regular government; that everything was disorganised and trusted to the effects of chance; that they even sought to increase the disorder to fill their own pockets more securely; that every fibre of government was relaxed and no confidence in anyone. All classes speak of Bonaparte with enthusiasm for having given them for 6 months past such security and calm as they have never before had since the change of government. They seem convinced that he only seeks their happiness. He appears to shun every kind of popular applause and ostentation, he is secret and decisive in all his operations, he consults but never argues, and nothing can be more absolute. He is a strong fatalist, and has inspired the nation with the idea that he is to give them peace; though he has preserved most of the old officers of government he has almost universally checked them by rivalry or jealousy.

“Fouchet [Fouché] (Minister of the Police at Paris) and Talleyrand are said to hate each other; indeed I had an instance of it in the refusal of the former to countersign Talleyrand’s passport to me. Again the *prefet* of the police at Boulogne is the friend of Talleyrand and enemy of Fouchet; on this account Fouchet has placed Mengaud, one of his friends, as Commissary of Police at Calais.

“Bonaparte has made a disposition for a succession in case of his death by means of the Conservatory Senate; ’tis supposed Carnot would supply his place, and Barthélemy one of the other Consuls, but this was considered by the people I conversed with as provisionary till complete order could be restored.

“I breakfasted twice with Monsieur Le Blond, the intimate friend of Sièyes. I asked him if it was possible Bonaparte could have an idea of establishing himself in the supreme authority. He treated the question with ridicule; that it was impossible any other than *some one of the ancient family* could be placed at the head. He said ‘*Vous Anglais nous méprisez assez hautement, mais vous ne nous méprisez pas la dixième de ce que nous méritons.*’ He said this when three others besides myself were at his table. In one of his apartments was hung up a very fine picture of the *Queen*, and on the other side a portrait of Mary of Médicis by Rubens.

“I was three times with Monsieur Talleyrand; he hoped I had found Paris in a different state from what it was represented with us, and begged that I would report it so.

“I was introduced to the Consul Le Brun, who is a very amiable man and good scholar; he was the principal instrument of the Chancellor Maupeou, and was placed by the late King in the Finance. At the time of terror he retired to his estates which are considerable, and was recalled from that situation by Bonaparte to fill the place

of 3rd Consul. He hoped I had a pleasant journey and found France in a different state from what it was represented in England. I told him I had come over in a merchant's ship laden with coffee, cotton and sugar; that I was happy to find the Governments on each side winked at an indirect commerce; that I hoped it was the prelude to more regular communications and peace; that we wanted their corn as much as our colonial produce was sought for by them. He said it has not been owing to France but your own Government that corn has not been supplied to England. We have twice been on the point of permitting a free exportation, but it has been prevented by the discovery of intrigues which do no honour to your Government. I answered it was very likely that the persons to whom he alluded gave themselves out as employed by Government, but without the least title to it; that I was totally unconnected with Government, but in such a situation as to communicate with every class; that knowing the character of my country I was persuaded they had nothing to do with anything dishonourable; that England was too powerful a nation to stoop to such means, and indeed the few English I had seen were more likely to be such as had quitted their country from discontent, and expressed with little regard to truth whatever related to England; that we might have agents for information, but I could not believe the extravagancies imputed to them. He said he did not allude to Englishmen but to Swiss. Blond asked him if the armistice with the Emperor was confirmed. He said it was, and now they had only to employ their strength against England *if she persisted in continuing the war*. This being directed to me, I said England had made ample provision for the war however long it was necessary, but desired peace, and was ready to make it whenever it could be done upon grounds of security and liberality. He asked me what I meant. I told him as an individual unconnected with any party I spoke the sentiments of the nation in saying England never could make peace with France but when it was separated from Belgium; that we were a nation so deeply engaged in commerce it was thought of importance by every individual that our trade should not be so endangered at the breaking out of a future war as by having such an extent of coast in their possession; that no Ministry could make a peace otherwise; that England did not demand for itself, but that it should belong to some power capable of supporting it against France, and would be ready to give its full equivalent in the surrender of some part of those possessions we had taken from them; that having lost nothing we had nothing to ask for ourselves, we were in the fullest exercise of commerce and protection but lamented the miseries of war, and were too just to treat for peace but upon the most honourable terms. He said if we insisted upon Belgium it was in fact to say we would have war; that we showed it both by spurning the offers of Bonaparte, and by the invectives we were continually throwing out against him. I begged leave to observe that at the time Bonaparte sent his message he had but just overturned in the most violent manner what had before been the Government; that he must allow it was *then* as natural to suppose Bonaparte might be as suddenly overturned; that as to the

invectives he complained of, they were as abundantly employed by Opposition to Ministers and Ministers to Opposition, and had no other personal meaning than as applied to the subject in debate; that it was impossible for men of great abilities not to respect each other in reality, whatever language policy might dictate to influence the people; that in the answer of our Government they looked forward to a moment when they could treat with France securely; that they did not pretend to dictate a government, but to advise what seemed most likely to bring about stability. Here he did not appear to wish I should go on, but said with great cordiality, '*Vous êtes un véritable Anglais; dites à votre Gouvernement ce que vous voyez de l'ordre, de la régularité, de la bienséance partout.*'

"I was several times with Monsieur Caillard, *Garde des Archives* (formerly minister at the Hague and at Berlin). I said as much to him on the subject of Belgium which he did not seem surprised at. He desired me to present his compliments to Lord Malmesbury and Lord St. Helens.

"I saw Barthélemy several times, and once dined with him. He expressed his disappointment at the reception he met with in England, but without bitterness; and said he had met with such kindness formerly as must always endear England to him. He wished to know the sentiments of the country for war or peace. I explained to him the readiness with which every loan was raised, the immense resource for the continuance of the war by the produce of the income tax, and the strongest proof of our prosperity by the gradual rise of the funds for the last two years; but that we all wished for peace when it could be had without danger. He wished me to explain what I conceived that to be. I said the restoration of Flanders, and a regularity of succession at the head of government. He made no observations upon it.

"I was introduced to the Chevalier Flicurieux of the Marine. He showed me a fine maritime atlas of the Baltic which was nearly ready, and, he said, would be of great use to English sailors. I told him we should receive it with great pleasure. He said though the nations were at war individuals were made to respect each other. I forget whether it was he or Monsieur Lescallier who told me they were meditating an increase of their navy by a ship from every department. I made a bow and answered that they were very generous. *Comment?* I said by saving us the trouble of building, unless they could build British sailors also. He exclaimed *diable!* and dropped the subject."

LORD GRENVILLE to J. H. FRERE.

1800, August 13. Cleveland Row.—"As I am not quite sure whether I have in our conversations on the subject explained to you as fully and satisfactorily as I should wish the grounds on which I have proposed to you to undertake the mission to Portugal; and as, at all events, I am desirous of doing this in a more precise and distinct manner than in a conversation which, where it relates to personal arrangements, is always more or less delicate and embarrassing, I have determined to state the circumstances to you in this form.

“ You have indeed yourself seen from the dispatches received from Lisbon since Mr. Walpole’s departure, how pressing and urgent it is that a person should be sent there, not only entitled generally as the King’s representative to respect and attention from that Court, but one who from his station here may evidently have been chosen as being in the full and intimate confidence of Government, and able, on every occasion that may arise, to speak with perfect knowledge of our sentiments, and to impress the Portuguese Government with the persuasion that he does so speak.

“ There certainly never was a more interesting crisis than that to which matters are now brought at Lisbon, nor could there be a fairer field for the exercise of your talents, not merely in carrying on the intercourse between the two Courts, for that will be the least of your functions, but in giving to them that energy and vigour which can be derived only from the presence and the exertions of a British minister, and of one known to be in the entire confidence of his Court.

“ Your delicacy about Mr. Arbuthnot could not stand in the way of such important objects. It ought not to do so even if there were more foundation for it. But there are many circumstances which would have made it impossible that he could succeed from the situation of Consul General to that of minister at Lisbon, even if the occasion had not been such as to call for the nomination of a person connected, as you have been, with the interior councils of this Government.

“ I entertain no doubt that your success in this mission will answer the expectations and warmest wishes of your friends, among whom I trust you will do me the justice to reckon me.” *Copy.*

#### LORD MINTO to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, August 14. Vienna.—“ I am sorry to acquaint you that Captain Proby has been taken prisoner carrying dispatches to Lord Keith. He sailed from Venice on the 18th July in a small vessel for Ancona ; and was forced by stress of weather into Casenatico. Mr. Consul Watson writes that the municipality sent by express for a party of French troops stationed at some little distance, who took him. It does not appear whether he had an opportunity of destroying his dispatches or not. Captain Proby, in a letter to Lord W. Bentinck, does not mention the circumstance of the municipality’s sending for the French ; but he says he had stipulated with the vessel on which he embarked that it should on no account put into any port except Ancona ; and that the sailors took advantage of his being asleep to run into Casenatico. He was carried to Milan, from whence he writes on the 1st August that he was well treated, and that he was to go in a few days into the interior of France.”

#### LORD MINTO to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1800, August 14. Vienna.—“ I must beg your indulgence if I delay for a few days more the account which I promised of some

of the particulars attending the negotiation of the treaty which I have signed. I wish also by next opportunity to say a few words on the treaty of Amberg signed by Mr. Wickham, especially as the tone of Baron Thugut is now much softened on that subject ; and I can already say that he withdraws all opposition to the measure, reserving only the Emperor's protest against *territorial indemnity* and *secularization*, and claiming the support of His Majesty in opposing those measures, when any occasion arises.

"I hope Baron Thugut will say no more concerning Hanover, and that it will not be necessary to give him any answer on that subject. He did not at all look to the Elector of Hanover's taking part in the war against France, or renouncing the support of Prussia ; but he expressed a wish that Hanover should act as friendly a part towards the Emperor and the cause as is consistent with the neutrality prescribed by Prussia. However, as Baron Thugut has himself changed his mind since he desired me to transmit his wishes on this subject, it is probable that we shall hear no more of it.

"I cannot help apprehending that when your Lordship wrote your dispatch No. 32, you was not entirely without suspicion that, in proposing to follow Baron Thugut to Italy, I might have some view of obtruding myself into the negotiation of the peace. If I am mistaken, which is extremely possible, in this apprehension, I must throw myself on your indulgence if a strong feeling on that particular point induces me to give you the trouble of reading a few lines more, and makes me perhaps more alive to a suspicion of that subject than I ought, or than I should be on many others. In the first place I am not conscious, in the whole course of my public life, of having taken or advised a measure with a personal view. When I have views which I think reasonable, and justified by what I consider as my fair pretensions, I take the liberty of stating them openly and clearly ; as it is natural to do while I am acting with a candid and friendly principal and Government. Your lordship will think that I have given a tolerably clear evidence of this practice in another letter which this messenger carries. Your Lordship may remember that I followed the same course on this very subject of peace, when I took the liberty of expressing the satisfaction I should have in being employed in the pacification of France and of Europe, if the events of the war should enable us to transact that business with the King of France. But I added that I had no ambition to treat with the Republican government of France. I continue very firmly in the same sentiments ; and even if the presence of Baron Thugut at the congress, and the habits of transacting business with him, had happened to suggest me to your Lordship's mind as a natural colleague to any minister whom His Majesty may happen to name, the repugnance which I feel to any avowal of this destructive and insolent government, and to the men who administer it, now as much as ever must have induced me to decline a service for which I feel myself, on these accounts, extremely unfit. To say the truth, I have felt an inclination to say as much ever since the battle of Marengo opened the prospect of negotiations. But I was restrained by the fear of incurring the ridicule of refusing what was not offered ; and by the

certainly that your Lordship was already apprized of these sentiments. Your Lordship will, I am sure, excuse me if I have seized, or as you may think, sought or imagined this opportunity for doing so. At the same time, I profess no opinion adverse to the measure of peace, relying on the wisdom and spirit of government in which I place an unfeigned confidence on this question; and I feel nothing which should render the part allotted to me at Vienna irksome to me; especially if, as I still cherish the hope, we may yet weather the peace, or only pass quickly through it to a more vigorous and more successful exertion in the same cause."

WILLIAM WICKHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private and Confidential.*

1800, August 15. Crems-Munster, near Wells, Upper Austria.—  
"I had determined for the sake of tranquility to have taken no public notice of my two colonels, but Clinton's application to your Lordship and Ramsay's official declaration left me no choice.

"I am not surprised at Clinton's demand, nor am I by any means without blame with respect to him, as I certainly have scolded him in terms to which he was not accustomed, and which I had better not have used, nor should I have used to anyone whose real good I had not most sincerely at heart; though, after all, my language on the occasion was by no means so strong as what the gentleman really deserved.

"The truth is, for there are secret histories everywhere, that he was foolish enough to bring out with him his new married wife, a daughter of Lord Elcho's, and still more foolish to hope and believe that she would remain quiet wherever he placed her. Instead of which she was always wanting to be running nearer and nearer to head-quarters; writing to her husband every day; expecting answers as regularly; miserable if she did not receive them; tormenting all the Austrian commissaries and commanders of depôts to death for news and for opportunities to write to her husband, till she became their laughing stock; and spreading the alarm in the rear of the army by communicating the intelligence she received from the colonel, which was always authentic, always bad, and often exaggerated in the hope of engaging her to remain further from the reach of danger.

"I am persuaded with all this, that she is really a very good sort of woman, but I was foolish enough and boyish enough to attempt to give counsels to the husband respecting the wife, which he, with equal lack of wisdom, disclosed to the lady. *Hinc illæ iræ*, and thus it is that I have brought the whole old house of Charteris on my back.

"I will leave your Lordship to judge how much Clinton must be altered from the Clinton of last year when I tell you that he was absent from the army and with his wife on three of the most important events of the campaign, the battle of the 5th June, the battle of Neuburg, and the armistice; and that his letter giving an account of the affairs of Memmingen and Biberach, though dated from Ulm, was written from his wife's chamber at Donauwerth.

"I had one other serious quarrel with Clinton, namely his writing

long detailed accounts of everything to Lord Mulgrave and to the Horse Guards, whilst to your Lordship and to me he scarcely gave a line. On this subject, after having remonstrated with him as a friend, I left him written instructions when I went to Vienna which he has frequently and openly disobeyed. To conclude, having now had my full lesson, and bought my experience very dear, and having no one to blame but myself, I hope I shall be wiser in future and keep out of all such scrapes, and that, by the time I shall have attained the age of forty, your Lordship will find me to be really a safe and steady servant of the public.

“To turn to another and more important subject, I am confident there is something more than has been disclosed now going forward between Berlin and Vienna, and that a general partition scheme is on the *tapis*; though I think, in the present state of things, that Berlin will be brought with difficulty to accede to it, and that fear of France and perhaps of Russia, and mistrust of M. Thugut, will prevent its being carried forward. But should I be mistaken in this latter conjecture, then *gare à nous*, for I am persuaded that the great Continental Powers will then look to nothing so much as the engaging England and France in a maritime war *ad internecionem*. I am confident that this is one of the projects now revolving in M. Thugut’s brains, though I do not think it by any means the favourite one.

“This however we may be assured of, that he is deserving of no confidence on our parts but *there* where we see evidently that his interests, his political views and speculations, or his passions and resentments lead him. And if his projects on France and on Italy fail, he will no doubt turn quickly somewhere else; and where else can he look with any hope but to a system of partition, at which if we are suffered to look at all before the thing be done, it will only be in the hope of preventing us from joining with France to oppose it.

“Your Lordship will perhaps wonder at my even starting such an idea as this last; but, such is the present state of things, that I consider an alliance between England and France as much within possibility now as it was in the year 1708, when appearances were to the full as strong against it.

“If your Lordship has a mind to know in a few words my whole present system of politics fairly and sincerely avowed, it is *this*, and I am persuaded it will not be very far from your own.

“*First, and far above all.* Continuation of the continental war, if it can be continued with a fair hope of only balanced success.

*Secondly.* Joint negotiation, and a partition scheme carried on during the negotiation in full and fair communication with Great Britain, provided it be of a nature to engage Prussia and Russia in the war, or at least to enable Austria to resume hostilities with increased power and means, and with Prussia and Russia really interested in her success.

“*Thirdly.* Separate peace for England, and France engaged in a continental war to prevent partition.

“*Fourthly.* Separate peace for the Continent, and a maritime war between Great Britain and France.

“*Last and worse of all.* A general peace, leaving France in possession of her conquests, and of her supremacy upon the Continent, and the rest of the Continental Powers where they now are.

“I should place the third system in the second place (being convinced that it is attainable) were it not too perilous to be hazarded but in a case of great necessity and immediate danger; for, every partition scheme is so decidedly hostile to our manufactures and to the sale of our colonial productions, as well as to our free communication with the Continent and our influence there, that it is never to be resorted to but as the lesser of two evils; and, in this case, as the only mode of preventing France from remaining without a Continental enemy, and perhaps with the means in her hands of shaking to the foundation our manufactures and colonies themselves.

“If, however, the Continental Powers should attempt to play us foul in any such scheme, I would most unquestionably resort to the third plan, for I cannot help considering the keeping France engaged in a Continental war as the only *certain* means of safety for us, and as a measure to be brought about by us almost *per fas et nefas*, if the pushing another from the plank to save oneself from drowning can in any case be called nefarious.

“I am not without due confidence in the result of a maritime war, yet, it must be remembered that any real failure at sea, or any important blow struck against our colonies, might now have such serious consequences as to force an ignominious peace, which must necessarily be followed by the ruin of our dear country, and of its dearer government and constitution.

“Still, however, I think this chance to be risked rather than the evils of a general peace with France, leaving her in possession of all her conquests and domineering over the Continent, and the continental powers confined to their present means of resistance. And I think a peace with France on the third system more feasible and more likely to be formed after a few months of maritime war and continental peace than before. For, partitions and other schemes of aggrandizement will certainly enter into the heads of Continental Powers, of a nature to give jealousy to France, and to make a maritime peace desirable for her; and to leave the option to England whether she will take part with the Continent or no according to the views, means, and intermediate conduct of the Continental Powers. These are all the glimpses I have been able to catch through the thick gloom which surrounds us. And I communicate them to your Lordship, not in the presumption of their throwing any new light on your Lordship’s speculations but, as mere *reveries*, to which however I have given as much of attention and consideration as became a mere speculator.

“If there is anything in what is said of Russia having shewn symptoms of hostility to Austria, we may rely on Thugut himself being the first to make separate peace on any terms, far from opposing such a system in others. I have good reason to hope that Drake will agree much better with Montg elas than I had at first believed. If so, everything will do well in that quarter.”

## ARTHUR PAGET to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1800, August 16. Palermo.—“I am infinitely obliged by your Lordship’s obliging private letter of the 4th July. I have already acquainted your Lordship of the particular aversion which the Queen of Naples took to me, and of the means she has employed of shewing her resentment. Under these circumstances I am unwilling to say anything in a public dispatch which may appear prejudicial to Her Sicilian Majesty.

“You cannot conceive the dissatisfaction which the whole of her conduct since her departure has occasioned here, nor has the circumstance of conducting Lady Hamilton with her to Vienna tended to lessen it; but I will forbear saying anything more about that woman, who has done more harm, not to the Queen in particular, but in general in this country than it can well be imagined.

“Long ere this reaches your Lordship, Prince Castelcicala will have probably arrived in England. It is now too late, but I perceive that General Acton is awake to all I said upon the subject previous to, and in time to delay the appointment. Prince Castelcicala is so thoroughly execrated at Naples that the Queen, for the security of the person of one of her favourites, insisted upon his appointment as Minister to England, more to get him out of the country than for any other reason. General Acton acquiesced at the expence of his friend the Marquis di Circello, which, I believe, he now thoroughly repents of.

“I cannot conceal from your Lordship the sufferings of my mind when I reflect upon your Lordship’s most friendly and flattering recommendation of me to His Majesty for this mission, and upon the very small portion I have fulfilled of the object for which I was particularly sent out. Indeed I hardly know whether I have rendered the smallest service whatever. I am become extremely intimate with General Acton (who certainly governs this country, if it can be called governing) and I really believe that I possess his full confidence. There are however certain subjects which even the General does not dare to press beyond a certain length upon the King, and his return to Naples is one of them. If we were once there, I am at moments sanguine enough to think that some good might be done; certain I am that the longer the Court remain at Palermo, the more disgraceful and desperate their situation becomes.

“I am most intimately connected with the Russian Minister, the Chevalier d’Italinsky, whom I took the liberty of mentioning in my last private letter to your Lordship. He has resided seventeen years at this Court, and from having one of the best understandings I ever met with, may be supposed to have acquired a tolerably accurate knowledge of these countries. I consider him also as one of the most just and honorable men I ever became acquainted with. He long ago told me, ‘you must not expect to get the King back to Naples as soon as you wish; you must not expect to do all the good in this country which you wish, for no good is to be done with the present generation of men.’ And I have every day the melancholy proof of the truth of these observations, which, however, do not spare me daily anxiety and grief. There is neither army,

navy, justice, religion, nor even roads ; and this was the state of the country when the Government was in full enjoyment of all its finances. The prospect therefore is at present truly gloomy.

“ I trust that your Lordship will do me the justice to believe that, notwithstanding the despair I am in at thinking it out of my power to render the services in this country which are expected of me, I shall not spare fewer pains in endeavouring to fulfill the object of your Lordship’s instructions to me.”

LORD GRENVILLE TO LORD MINTO.

*Private.*

1800, August 19. Dropmore.—“ There is one subject on which I wish to say a few words to you, and which comes more properly within the contents of a private letter than a public dispatch. It is what relates to the employment of our troops and ships in the Mediterranean. Our extreme and habitual indulgence to our allies naturally leads them to think that they have a claim to appropriate to their own objects, even to the most inconsiderable, the use of those efforts which we make with so much difficulty and expense, and to do this without even the usual returns of cordiality and confidence.

“ If, in the beginning of the present year, M. Thugut could have brought his mind to treat with us as allies, and to say distinctly that he might want our assistance in Italy, Sir R. Abercrombie and his army—at its present amount—might have arrived before Genoa as soon as the Austrian operations began there, and would unquestionably have saved Italy.

“ This Thugut would not do, and the troops were consequently not sent till the period which suited our plans, and this without any further reference to those of Austria than such a state of things seemed to require. Yet no sooner do they arrive than Thugut proposes, while Austria has signed an armistice which locks up her own force as useless, to allot our force to the protection of some Austrian interests, which their own general has overlooked in the conclusion of that dishonourable convention.

“ This cannot be. It is not reasonable or fitting for us ; it is not even useful for Austria. While the armistice continues we must, for our own safety, make the best use we can of our force to distract the operations of the enemy, whom a sudden treaty may, at any moment, leave at liberty to turn his whole power against us.

“ But although we must of necessity act in this manner, yet no resolution is yet taken for the employment of our force in any manner that shall prevent our being at liberty to appropriate it to bear our share in any concert for active operations that shall be proposed to us in the event of the renewal of hostilities. Nor do I think it probable that any such resolution will be taken, unless the accounts from Vienna should be such as to satisfy our minds that further active operations are not to be looked for from thence.

“ I may be too suspicious, but it is our experience of the Austrian councils that has made me so, when I add that the delay of three days from the 2nd to the 5th to give the Emperor time to sign the ratification, after he is said to have determined to ratify, looks

extremely like the three days—which were not less than six weeks—during which Thugut fed us with continual promises of receiving the *projet* of this same convention; being, in fact, all that time watching the course of events to see if he could not do without any convention at all. I am persuaded that the Emperor's signature will still depend on the answer M. de St. Julien brings. If Bonaparte's terms are judged acceptable, they will be accepted, and the convention not ratified. But if he asks too much, we shall then be desired to bear our part in the resistance to them.

“The misfortune is that against this crooked policy we have no defence but that—which would be ten times worse—of playing the same game against our allies, and alarming them by the fear of our making our own peace without them.

“We must therefore go on as we are; but all this is a reason for incessant observation and vigilance; and I cannot help adding that it is an additional ground for our impatience to receive from you constant and regular accounts of what is passing. I mentioned to you in a former letter the old Office rule of hearing from the great Courts by every post; and I cannot help referring to it again, because if we were only to learn that matters remain in the same state, *that*, so far from being uninteresting, would frequently be the most important intelligence we could receive.

“If affairs should take the turn of a congress or joint negotiation in any place on or near the French frontier, it may be useful that you should be enabled to apprise M. Thugut in confidence that His Majesty has destined Mr. Grenville to that mission. A more painful service cannot be allotted to any man, but his sense of duty would certainly lead him, in that case, to obey the King's orders; and although I should have hesitated long before I had submitted his name to the King for this purpose, yet the same reasons which actuate my brother on this occasion must also influence my conduct respecting it.

“A great facility to him in the execution of such a task will result from the means of constant and confidential communication with you.” *Copy.*

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, August 19. Cheltenham.—“Your not hearing from me on the subject of the Portugal command proceeds not from inattention on my part. I employed Mr. Nepean as the best *private* channel I could think of to learn whether Sir Charles Grey relished the command, before I should mention it to the Duke of York. I stated to you my reasons for this precaution. Sir Charles, I know, is in Northumberland, but I did expect before this time to have received Nepean's answer, but I have not. I have wrote to Mr. Nepean this day desiring him to communicate what the answer is, as soon as he receives it. It must not however, if he does accept, be stated as a thing fixed till I am enabled to write to the Duke of York.

“We have got remarkable fine weather here, and I am making as much use of it as I can. You need not feel any backwardness in writing to me on any subject of business, for I have time enough to do anything essential to be attended to.”

## CHARLES ARBUTHNOT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1800, August 22. Lisbon.—“ I am under the necessity of sending in a private letter the enclosed paper of intelligence from Madrid, as the Swedish Minister, who supplies me with information from that quarter, has made me promise solemnly that his present communication shall not be left in the Office with my public dispatches.

This caution indeed has on this occasion been so unusually great that, although the whole sense of the despatch which was written from Madrid to the King of Sweden, is given correctly to your Lordship, yet in one instance it has, to a trifling degree, been altered with a view to conceal the name of the person from whom the chief part of the information was received. In the original, which was read to me as soon as it had been deciphered, it appeared that Monsieur Urquijo himself stated to the writer of the despatch the inability of Spain even to commence a war; and it was he also that talked of the cession of Biscay as an alternative far preferable to the passage of a French army through the Spanish territories.

“ I certainly don't mean to enhance the merit of the intelligence that I am now communicating, but having reason to be convinced that there is literally no person in Portugal who is so well informed of what is going on in Spain as the Swedish Minister, I trust there is no impropriety in my having promised in your Lordship's name that secrecy which is so earnestly demanded. Since the sailing of the last packet, I have seen several letters from Madrid of a prior date to the extract I am now sending, but none of them appeared sufficiently interesting to be transmitted to your Lordship. I must only observe that in every one of them the dismissal of Monsieur Urquijo was mentioned as an event nearly certain, and this also has of late been written from various quarters; but it begins, I must confess, to appear very doubtful whether such a change in the administration as was pointed out is likely to be effected.”

*Post Scriptum.*—“ This letter having been detained, I have an opportunity of sending to your Lordship some more intelligence from Spain which is contained in the enclosure marked No. 2.”

*Enclosure (No. 1):—*

1800, August 12. Madrid.—“ Je vous conjure de me garder le plus profond secret sur l'extrait suivant de ma dépêche au Roi, car, sans cela, je risque d'être compromis, et de tarir mes meilleures sources.

“ Quoique toutes les lettres de Lisbonne en date du premier de ce mois annoncent la détermination de la cour de Portugal de ne point admettre les conditions que la France lui avait fait faire par le canal de l'Espagne, Monsieur Urquijo persiste cependant à ne pas regarder cette résolution de Portugal comme un refus formel, et il paraît encore espérer que cette dernière puissance se rendra finalement aux désirs de sa Majesté Catholique. Ce ministre d'état prétend même qu'il n'a jamais été question de fermer les ports aux Anglais, et qu'au lieu de trente millions, la France n'en a exigé

que sept ; sacrifice, auquel la cour de Lisbonne n'avait pas d'abord voulu se prêter ; mais qu'il croyait cependant qu'elle se déterminerait enfin à faire.

“ Quelque soit le degré de franchise qu'on puisse accorder à ce langage de Monsieur Urquijo, il est au moins permis de conjecturer que ce ministre, dont l'amour-propre doit se trouver blessé en voyant toutes ses démarches infructueuses, aimera à dissimuler le motif de son chagrin, aussi longtemps qu'il conserve encore quelque espérance de faire revenir le Prince du Brazil ; et j'ai lieu de croire que les instances redoublées du Duc de Frias (ambassadeur d'Espagne en Portugal) pour cet objet, sont bien vivement soutenues par l'ambassadeur du Portugal à cette Cour, qui, tout-à-fait d'accord avec le ministère espagnol, ne cesse dans ses rapports de représenter l'accommodement de sa Cour avec la République comme d'une nécessité impérieuse, si l'on veut éviter une attaque immédiate des forces espagnoles et françaises réunies. Une autre raison bien naturelle, qui aura pû dicter le langage que tient le ministère espagnol quant aux affaires du Portugal, se présente dans l'embarras extrême où il doit se trouver de réaliser les menaces dont la transmission des offres de Bonaparte avaient été accompagnés ; menaces qu'une complaisance aveugle aux volontés du premier Consul lui avait fait hazarder sans avoir consulté la possibilité de les soutenir. Connaissant le foible de la reine pour la maison de Parme, le Gouvernement français en a su profiter dans cette occasion, et l'agrandissement des états du duc par la réunion du Modénois devait être le prix des démarches vigoureuses que l'Espagne avait promis de faire vis-à-vis de la Cour de Portugal, pour la déterminer à la paix. Le temps fera voir si, effectivement, la France a les moyens et la volonté d'accomplir cette promesse ; mais, en attendant, quelque soit la nature des engagements contractés par cette Cour envers la France, relativement au Portugal, je puis assurer votre majesté que l'Espagne est absolument hors d'état de les remplir dans le moment présent. Déjà depuis longtemps on vit ici du jour à la journée, et c'est miraculeux et vraiment inexplicable comment on a pû jusqu'à présent subvenir aux frais ordinaires de l'état, qui montent environ à quatre millions de réaux par jour.

“ Si des moyens extraordinaires, tels que des emprunts forcés, des négociations ruineuses, et la saisie de presque toutes les caisses, ont pû faire aller la machine, tant bien que mal, jusqu'à ce jour, et que ces mêmes réponses, qui commencent cependant à tarir, pussent encore possiblement retarder pour quelque temps la chute des finances de cette monarchie, du moins seraient-elles insuffisantes pour les frais énormes qu'une nouvelle guerre entrainerait nécessairement. L'Espagne n'est certainement pas en état de mobiliser six mille hommes dans ce moment. J'ai vu le rapport d'un officier, chargé dernièrement de l'inspection des différents arsenaux ; il a fait un tableau effrayant de l'état où il les a trouvés réduits ; l'attirail de campagne, perdu presque en totalité pendant la dernière guerre avec la France, n'a pas été remplacé depuis : l'armée est sans tentes et sans utensiles : les magasins à poudre sont vides : peu de munitions de toute espèce ; il ne manque pas de canons, mais la

plupart n'ont point d'affats : point de chevaux de transport pour l'artillerie et les bagages de l'armée : [\* il n'existe pas un seul magasin, et le trésor n'est rien moins qu'en état d'en former, ni de faire l'achat des différents objets préliminaires qu'il faudroit pour pouvoir entrer en campagne : et, quant aux troupes auxiliaires de la République, votre majesté peut être bien persuadée, que cette Cour sent si vivement le danger de leur accorder le passage, que dans l'alternatif de devoir ou sacrifier la *Biscaye*, ou de voir une armée française traverser le royaume, elle se déterminerait sans balancer pour le premier parti.] C'est donc bien à tort que le Portugal a pris l'alarme, n'ayant absolument rien à craindre de ce côté-ici : d'ailleurs les menaces employés par déférence pour le Gouvernement français, ont si peu rempli les désirs du premier Consul, que l'ambassadeur de la République s'est encore plaint l'autre jour à Monsieur Urquijo de l'extrême molesse que l'Espagne montrait dans ses démarches contre le Portugal.' ”

#### NOUVELLES COURANTES DE LA MÊME DATE.

“ Le Comte de Saint Julien est parti de Paris le 30 juillet. Comme il n'avait ni pleins pouvoirs ni ordres de commencer une négociation pour la paix, il fut invité par le premier Consul de s'en retourner à Vienne, accompagné par l'aide-de-camp Duroc. Celui-ci porte avec lui *l'ultimatum* de Bonaparte ; il a l'ordre de demander une réponse catégorique en cinq jours, pour la porter sans délai à Paris. On ne connaît pas encore les conditions proposées ; seulement que les avantages du Duc de Parme ne sont point oubliés, et que Bonaparte ne veut point comprendre les alliés de l'Empereur dans la signature des préliminaires ; mais qu'aussitôt après il était prêt à négocier avec l'Angleterre. Les dernières nouvelles de Paris annoncent, que loin d'évacuer l'Égypte, il est actuellement question de renforcer Kléber. En conséquence il doit avoir reçu l'ordre de se maintenir en attendant ses renforts. Ceci ne paraît pas annoncer beaucoup de modération, ni beaucoup de désir pour la paix. Le froid entre la Prusse et le premier Consul va en augmentant depuis que celui-ci a commencé à se rapprocher de l'Autriche.”

*Enclosure (No. 2) :—*

1800, August 15. St. Ildefonse.—“ Vous saviez sans doute déjà par la voie du courier de l'ambassadeur de Portugal, dépêché d'ici hier, que la Cour d'Espagne est instruite de l'arrivée du Général Berthier à Madrid, qui aura lieu dans quelques jours. Le ministère n'est cependant pas informé de l'objet de sa mission, mais on craint que ce soit pour demander le passage d'une armée française pour attaquer le Portugal. Cette espèce de certitude a jété la Cour dans une consternation qu'on ne sauroit rendre. Soyez sûr que l'on fera ici l'impossible pour éviter la présence d'une armée

\* Note by Mr. Arbuthnot.—“ I have placed crotchets to mark the part which in the original despatch contained a speech of M. Urquijo's on the situation of his country, but for the reason mentioned in my private letter it is here delivered as if it were the writer's own opinion.”

française, qui, pour bouleverser le Portugal, commencerait par l'Espagne. On fera, soyez en persuadé, de nouvelles tentatives à Lisbonne ; on menaçera ; on promettra de nouveau : on essayera après à obtenir de se charger seul de l'exécution de cette expédition, quoiqu'on ne soit nullement en état de le faire, au moins que faiblement. Mais si toutes ces tentatives ne réussiront pas, soyez également sûr qu'on n'a ici ni le courage ni la force de s'opposer aux désirs du premier Consul, quoiqu'on tâchera de les éviter aussi longtemps que possible. On est ici très mécontent du Duc de Frias (l'ambassadeur d'Espagne en Portugal).”

1800, August 19. St. Ildefonse.—“ Le courier attendu depuis si longtemps de Lisbonne est enfin arrivé. Les dépêches qu'il apporte n'ont aucunement rempli l'attente de cette Cour, qui a vu avec un déplaisir extrême que le Portugal cherche toujours à gagner du temps, et qu'il ne veut se décider ni à accepter ni à rejeter pleinement les propositions du gouvernement Français. Monsieur de Pinto exprime ses désirs de voir les affaires s'arranger à l'aimable ; à cet effet il demande des éclaircissements sur différents points, qui étant préliminairement décidés, il assure que sa Cour s'empressera à entâmer des négociations, soit directement avec la France, soit sous la médiation de l'Espagne ; et il demande en conséquence l'avis de Monsieur Urquijo s'il croyait que le choix de Don Alexander de Souza pour se rendre ici, et même à Paris si les circonstances l'exigeaient par la suite, pourrait être agréable au gouvernements Espagnol et Français.

“ Le choix d'une personne que sa majesté Catholique a déjà refusée plusieurs fois à sa cour, en qualité d'ambassadeur, a confirmé le ministère dans sa persuasion que celui de Portugal n'a d'autre but que de temporiser jusqu'à voir l'issue des négociations pour la paix continentale, qui déterminera vraisemblablement le moyen que la France aura disponibles pour réaliser ses ménages. Outrée de cette conduite, et en même temps attirée par la crainte que les Français n'aient déjà commencé à rassembler des forces dans les provinces méridionales de la République, destinées à agir contre le Portugal, ainsi qu'on l'a fait entendre ici, la cour d'Espagne, malgré l'extrême détresse où elle se trouve réduite, et malgré le manque total de ce qu'il faut pour commencer une guerre, vient cependant de donner les ordres de mobiliser une partie de l'armée, et de la tenir prête à entrer en campagne. Je vous ai fait un tableau de l'état des finances et des arsenaux de ce pays ; il ne présente certainement aucune probabilité de succès en cas qu'une rupture devenait inévitable.

“ Je crois même qu'on en est convaincu ici ; mais cette mesure, quelque couteuse qu'elle soit, quelque difficile que soit son exécution, quelque peu qu'on prévoit d'avance qu'elle remplira le but, elle est cependant devenue indispensable lorsqu'on se trouve dans l'alternative accablante de devoir ou faire l'expédition soi-même, ou bien à souffrir que les Français la fissent. Il a donc été décidé de ne pas provoquer l'arrivée d'une armée française en restant ici dans une inactivité parfaite, et on s'est empressé de prendre ces arrangements avant l'arrivée du Général Berthier, attendu d'un moment à l'autre.

“C'est à Monsieur d'Urutia qu'on destine le commandement de l'armée qui, une fois réunie, pourra monter à près de 45 ou 50 mille hommes. Mais l'ordre de quitter les cantonnements n'est pas encore expédié, et il faudra d'ailleurs du temps pour former des magasins qui manquent encore de tout, excepté quelques dépôts de grains à Badajos et à Merida.

“Avant que les préparatifs indispensables puissent se faire, la saison sera déjà passée; les fortes pluies qui commencent en Septembre empêcheront toute opération, et il est bien probable, qu'à moins de quelques menaces fulminantes de la part de la France, l'année se passera en simples démonstrations de part et d'autre.

“Le Général Berthier est attendu à chaque instant. On se perd à deviner l'objet de son voyage. Quelque soit la part qui a le Portugal, il y a apparence que son voyage a encore un autre but, et on croit qu'il veut demander les vaisseaux qui restent encore aux Espagnols, pour mener des renforts en Egypte.” *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF CARYSFORT.

*Private.*

1800, August 22. Dropmore.—“I trust that what I have written to you and to Wickham is sufficient to put you in possession of our general ideas about mediation, which you had indeed already anticipated. I expect from Vienna the most decided opposition to any idea of Prussian interposition; and I think the apprehension of this more likely than anything else to drive them into concluding a sudden and separate peace.

“It is however possible that they may be captivated by the hope of getting Bavaria for the Netherlands, and may be induced for the sake of this project, which they can never hope to effectuate in opposition to Prussia, to try to reconcile the Court of Berlin to it by acceding to some extensive plans of secularization. It is not our business to make ourselves the instruments of such a negociation, but, if it should succeed, I should think a great point was gained for our interests; and I might, in that case alone, think we ought to give up a part of our conquests in compensation of whatever security we obtain on the side of Holland, and of the Netherlands.

“They have always affected at Berlin to feel with us an interest in these two points, but I have very little hope of their doing anything effectual to assist us in them. These are however, as I believe, the best topics to urge them.

“Paul was certainly coming round, and an able English Minister might have done much there at this moment in concert with Panin. But I am afraid as things now are, Denmark will succeed in creating there some interest in her favour, though in fact we are only doing now what he was urging us to do all last year.

“Pray remember, if ever we get upon good terms with Haugwitz, to let it be understood that all Balan's principles and conduct here are so hostile to Government that I can never treat or converse confidentially with him. I think it much the most likely thing that this foolish business about Prussian prisoners originates in some reports of his. I have always considered him as a complete Jacobin.”

*Copy.*

## COUNT WORONZOW TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, August 23. Harley Street.—“ Je vous suis bien reconnaissant pour la bonté et l'amitié avec lesquelles vous vous êtes intéressé auprès de Monsieur Pitt au sujet de le sœur de Mademoiselle Jardine. Je vous supplie de témoigner ma reconnaissance à Monsieur Pitt.

“ Tous vos procédés à mon égard depuis que j'ai eu le bonheur de me lier avec vous, sont ceux d'un vrai ami. Je serais bien heureux si jamais j'ai le bonheur d'avoir une occasion de vous prouver tout ce que je sens dans l'âme, et combien je vous suis attaché.

“ Quand à *l'office* que mon ami Lyzakewitz a eut ordre de vous présenter, je suis mortifié de vous dire que je ne partage pas l'espoir que vous paraissez avoir du rétablissement de l'amitié si chaude que l'Empereur avoit pour ce pays ; car j'ai la certitude malheureuse que tout se fait chez nous par humeur, par caprice, sans aucune suite de principes, et que la Suède a une grande influence dans ce moment chez nous. C'est le comble de honte pour la Russie que cette influence d'une Cour si méprisable et notre ennemie, jurée et naturelle. C'est elle qui a travaillé sous mains, mais avec assiduité, à nous brouiller, et qui continue à nous laisser dans cet état.

“ Il n'y a rien à espérer de solide et de raisonnable pendant ce règne, qui ne sera qu'une suite de contradiction et d'incartades ; aussi je regarderai comme un vrai malheur pour moi si je devois être pressé de nouveau, comme matlot sur un vaisseau, toujours prêt à échouer par l'ignorance et les caprices du capitaine qui s'amuse, en attendant, à maltraiter son équipage.

“ Il n'y a ni plaisir, ni honneur, ni gloire à être employé à présent. On ne peut faire aucun bien, on ne peut pas même empêcher aucun mal, et on n'a que des reproches et des réprimandes sans cesse, sans rime et raison.

“ Il y longtems que ma passience étoit épuisée ; j'ai eu enfin le bonheur de quitter ce travail pénible, et ayant obtenu de rester dans le seul pays au monde où l'homme est dans toute sa dignité, je vivrai tranquille, bien heureux d'être oublié dans mon pays natal par celui qui le gouverne actuellement. Si on voudra m'employer ici dans un autre règne, j'en serai bien aise ; mais je suis trop vieux pour voir ce nouveau règne.”

## THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, August 26. Taplow.—“ I found that the master of Billingbear was gone for three or four days to Brighthelmstone, and therefore I have taken up my quarters here ; I write only one line to say that I will certainly come to Dropmore on Thursday to learn the explanation of your foreign suggestions. Having passed the last fortnight in pleasuring I neither guess at the present state of your negotiations, nor at the chance which shall lead them to Luneville, or which shall have made that preferable to Strasburg or any spot more really frontier : but be the spot where it may, if there is any spot in which it is thought that I can be useful, I shall not be backward in following that course whenever I understand the means which are to be employed for that purpose. You find me however

stripped of the few accessories which remained to me of my Berlin mission ; and if I am suddenly called upon, I scarce know how to supply satisfactorily the loss of Fisher. If I understand rightly his last letter, he seems to think Frere's departure not likely to be very immediate ; in that case it might be possible that if you actually named him in order to secure his appointment as under secretary, he might without inconvenience be able to go with me for two or three months ; but I would not propose this to him unless I knew, first that you would not object to it, and secondly, that you could actually name him under-secretary before he went with me. Tell me what you think about this, and do not name it to him, because if he suspected that I wished it, he would not hesitate to put by his own interests to follow my wishes ; and yet you will easily believe that I would not consent to take him unless I saw that his situation was in every respect as completely secured to him as if he remained in England, which can only be done by his being named in your Office before there was any question of his going with me.

“ I have heard nothing from Lord B[uckingham] as to the visions of Wotton ; and therefore I continue to be quite abroad as to my domestic arrangements ; I apprehend that my brother wishes to know the result of the Treasury arrangements in order that he may judge of the means which may be in question for settling any new Wotton destination before he takes any steps in changing the present state of things ; in this view it would be very desirable for me to ascertain as soon as might be what is likely to be the decision at the Treasury. If therefore any opportunity presents itself to you by which this matter may be brought to any certain issue, I believe it would enable me to know with better certainty what future plans I should be able to invite Charlotte to look to with me. I should not have intruded this domestic enquiry with the Luneville dispatch if I had not thought it possible that, while you are in the neighbourhood of Downing Street, you might have better facilities for mentioning the matter, than in the more formal shape of a letter from Dropmore. But although I shew to you very undisguisedly the ground of my impatience, I do not in the least wish you to take any step in it that does not occur to you easily, naturally, and without effort or constraint.

“ If you see no difficulty as to Fisher, either on his account or your own, it would perhaps be useful that I should write for his assistance as to preparations of departure ; but if either your convenience or his interests could suffer in the least degree by this proposition, I will not entertain it for a moment.”

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MINTO.

*Private.*

1800, August 27. Cleveland Row.—“ I have carefully kept the secret of the transaction of M. de St. Julien at Paris, and have not even explained it to Count Starhemberg, as I found him ignorant of it. This must therefore be our justification if he complains of a want of confidence on my part, as I think he seems disposed to do.

“ I have however made one exception. Bonaparte is pressing the Court of Lisbon, through Madrid, to conclude a separate peace with him, paying him a large sum of money for it. They have really hitherto shown a great degree of firmness at Lisbon on this subject, but the course of the late events may well have its operation on stronger nerves than theirs.

“ The great argument that Spain uses is the certainty that Austria will make a separate peace, and that France will then turn all her armies against Portugal, to wound us through them, since she cannot do it directly.

“ In order to enforce this argument the Spanish ambassador at Paris wrote to his Court that Bonaparte himself had notified to him the arrival of General St. Julien charged with powers to conclude a separate peace ; and even this news had produced a great impression at Lisbon.

“ You will easily judge what it will be when they learn through the same channel the signature of St. Julien’s preliminaries, which it appears, was notified to the Batavian minister, and certainly therefore to the Spanish ambassador.

“ In order to counteract this, if it be yet time enough, I felt it absolutely necessary to state the truth of the case to M. d’Almeida, whom I know by experience to be capable of keeping a secret ; and I desired him not to communicate it to his Government but under the strongest injunctions of secrecy.

“ You will judge whether it be necessary to mention these particulars to M. Thugut. If you do, I am confident he is too reasonable not to perceive the absolute necessity of doing what I have done, for the sake of an interest very important to us, and which cannot be indifferent to Austria ; since the conclusion of such a peace in the midst of our negotiations would both raise the pretensions and augment the resources of the enemy.” *Copy.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE to B. GARLIKE.

1800, August 29. Cleveland Row.—“ In proposing to Mr. Grenville to undertake the mission with which he is about to be charged at Luneville, it became necessary to consider of the assistance which he was to receive from the persons to be attached to that mission. I felt that I could make no better arrangement in that respect than by proposing to you to accompany, or rather to follow him there, to act as the King’s Secretary of Legation to that mission.

“ In the persuasion that you will not decline a situation of such high trust and confidence, and in which your talents will be so advantageously employed for the public service, it is my intention, whenever I receive from Mr. Otto the passports for Mr. Grenville, to desire that one may be transmitted directly from Paris to Berlin to enable you to proceed without delay from the latter place to Luneville, where it is probable that Mr. Grenville will by that time be actually arrived.

“ I trust you will see in this proposition a proof of the very favourable opinion which I entertain, in common with my brother,

of your talents, character, and conduct; and it would afford me great satisfaction to learn that the arrangement was agreeable to you.

“If any person is sent to Berlin to supply your place, such appointment will only be temporary, in order that your present situation may at all events be kept open for you at your return from France, should none offer more acceptable to you.

“I authorize Lord Carysfort by this messenger to advance to you £300 to perform the journey, and to provide such articles as may be necessary for that purpose.” *Copy.*

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, August 31. Bromley Hill.—“In thinking over your proposal of writing to Count Panin, it has occurred to me that perhaps the measure might be rendered much more effectual if you could, at the same time, send privately some discreet person to Petersburg; who might appear to come there only as a traveller; but who might be furnished with dormant credentials, and be authorised to produce them in the event of the Emperor’s authorising Count Panin to express a wish for the renewal of the usual intercourse between the two Courts. I am aware that there may be some objection to allowing a person to appear with a public character there while there is no Russian minister here; but it is so important to save time, and to avail ourselves of the first moment of any returning favourable disposition in the Emperor, that I hardly think this consideration alone ought to stand in the way. Perhaps the point of etiquette would be sufficiently satisfied by an assurance that the Emperor would immediately appoint a new Minister here, or (what would be much better, and would perhaps not be unlikely if there is any disposition to good humour) would send fresh credentials to Woronzow. In the latter mode, every thing would be put at once into its proper course. Pray consider this and see whether you cannot make something of it.”

*Postscript.*—“If you think the thing itself desirable, would it not both save time and avoid observation here if you were to direct Garlike to proceed from Berlin. The only difficulty that strikes me is how to send him without the appearance, in the first instance, of a public character.”

LORD WHITWORTH to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, August. London.]—“It is only this instant that I received your Lordship’s obliging note proposing to me Mr. Williams as Secretary during my excursion to Copenhagen. I need not say with how much pleasure I accept your Lordship’s offer; and you may be perfectly assured that he shall experience from me every mark of friendship and of confidence which my desire to prove my gratitude to your Lordship, and my respect and regard for his family, so justly call for.

“I am to go by appointment to Mr. Hammond to-morrow

morning for the purpose of reading the instructions of which your Lordship has already given me the heads; and I shall be ready to set out as soon as I am required to do so."

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MINTO.

1800, September 2nd. Dropmore.—"It was really without any such idea as you mention that I wrote the dispatch to which you allude in your private letter of the 14th of August. What I have seen of your conduct since we have been engaged in business together has confirmed the opinion I always entertained of your character, which was and is totally opposite to any such suspicion.

"I can perfectly understand the motives which would have induced you, if the occasion had occurred, to accept M. de Thugut's invitation and to accompany him to Italy; and I really believe that I should myself, acting on the spot, have done the same.

"But we judged here that it might be the policy of Austria in such a negotiation to make that sort of use of your presence there which would very much have committed us without at all forwarding the interests of this country; and that, if such a scheme really existed, the distance of our communications with any part of Italy would give more facility to the execution of that project than it was our duty to allow.

"The task of treating for peace with the present governor of France is certainly not to be envied, either as to those who are to direct or those who are to carry on such a negotiation; and I am sure I can answer both for myself and my brother that no other feeling than that of duty could lead me to undertake it, or induce me to look with any satisfaction to its probable termination.

"But if the continental powers themselves, through folly or real inability, are content to sacrifice to France the most essential interests of the Continent, what can remain for us but to look to the maintenance of our own maritime strength, by consolidating our foreign possessions and securing our commerce.

"Lord Carysfort's sons are very unfortunate, but I trust that Captain Proby will not remain long a prisoner. We have now less than 200 British prisoners in France, and between 20 and 30,000 French prisoners here." *Copy.*

EARL SPENCER to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, September 2. Althorp.—"That I may not forget it, as I did when we last met, I trouble you with a line to say that I received letters from Sir Thomas Trowbridge and Captain Hallawell informing me that they had been apprized by Lord Nelson that the King of Naples had conferred on them the Order of Saint Ferdinand, and requesting me to tell them whether his Majesty would approve of their accepting it. I told them in answer that, I apprehended, the regular way of obtaining such permission was for the Minister of the Court bestowing the Order to acquaint you officially with it, desiring, in his Sovereign's name, that the King would permit them to accept the distinction. I, however, undertook to inform myself more accurately on the subject; and I wish much to know

your sentiments on it. Lord Nelson has himself been created (as I see by the papers, and by a letter he wrote upon it officially to the Admiralty) the first Knight of this order, and is coming home decorated also with various other Orders from the Porte and the King of Naples. Some other of the officers who have been employed in the protection of Naples and Sicily have also had it, as I understand ; therefore it will be necessary to come to some determination upon it."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, September 2. Cheltenham.—“The present state of Portugal and the danger to which our connexion with it is exposed, either by a war against it under the conduct of France, or by a peace dictated by France, naturally brought to my recollection the subject of the Portuguese settlements in the East Indies, two of which are certainly most essential to our interests, and, in the possession of a hostile or rival nation, might ultimately be used much to our annoyance. You'll anticipate me when I mention Goa as the first ; but I doubt, under all its circumstances of local situation and otherwise, if Diu, adjacent to the Guzerat which commands the Indies, is of less consequence if we look, as we ought to do, to an intimate connexion being sooner or later formed between France, the Marattas, and Zemaun Shaw. I have sent for the collection of papers on that subject and, having carefully perused them, I send them to you. Much of them is not material for your perusal, but I cannot separate them ; and, upon running them over cursorily, you will easily perceive what is worthy of your attention. D'Almeida has full powers, and the sooner you conclude with them the better. In a short conversation we once had on the subject, you hinted at our object being gained by their admitting a garrison of ours, and I was hopeful that expedient might have answered ; but on considering the state and viciousness of the Portuguese government of Goa and its dependancies, which is confirmed to me from various other quarters, I am afraid that expedient will not answer, and nothing will truly answer but their naming the highest revenue they ever drew from it after paying for their establishments, and that sum we ought to pay to them. Unless this plan is adopted, the country will remain in a state of poverty and oppression equally unproductive to both nations, and the necessary military establishment to be stationed there will be a large and very inconvenient burden on our finances, which, with a debt of not less than fourteen millions, and a large proportionate sum of interest, they are at present ill able to bear ; and must continue so, till by some salutary plan we can provide for a speedy reduction of the debt, which has been necessarily contracted at a high interest, from the pressure of the war, and the large investments which have been sent to Europe. If, on the other hand, the country comes totally into our hands, and we apply the same salutary principles of administration and government which we practise with regard to our own Indian territories, we may fairly hope that, ere long, the people will be rendered happy and prosperous, and the country produce at least adequate to its own defence.

Whatever arrangements are ultimately agreed, they will stipulate for some security to their religious establishments, which, of course, must be granted to them. If an arrangement takes place on the basis I have stated, it puts them in a situation infinitely better than they ever were before. They will have a pecuniary tribute paid to them which will serve as a provision for an investment to one or two ships which they may wish to send out to India annually; they will have the free use not only of their own present settlements in India, for the purpose of commerce, but they may have the same privileges extended to ours; and all their commercial interests and property will, of course, be under our immediate protection. Whatever arrangement is made, let it be by a treaty between the two Sovereigns, and there will be no difficulty afterwards in arranging every thing with our East India Company; but there are several particulars which would create some trouble to arrange if the stipulation took place as between Portugal and the East India Company. If every thing to be given up by them is ceded to the King, it is always in our power to give up to the Company whatever it is proper they should hold.

“It does not occur to me that I have any more to trouble you with; and as I have no copy of this letter, you’ll be so good as cause one to be sent to me, or else sent to Mr. Budge at my Office, and desire him to take a copy and keep it for me till I return. I have only further to recommend to you to conclude the business as soon as convenient. Mr. Wellesley is with me, and I have explained to him, for the information of his brother, the principles on which I hope this business will be arranged.

“The weather has been remarkably good since I came here, and, although it is soon to decide, Sir Walter Farquhar has almost persuaded me that the waters have done me good. I certainly feel more comfortable, but I am not sure if regular exercise and less labour and confinement have not their full share of merit in any change that has taken place.”

GEORGE CANNING to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1800, September 3. Putney Hill.—“You may remember my taking the liberty to mention to you what I thought I knew to be Lord Malmesbury’s feelings about his own situation, and his (supposed) claim to be employed in any new negotiation with France. I assure you upon my honour, that I have not let him know (nor have any thoughts of confessing to him) that I have ever said a word to you upon this subject. The occasion of my troubling you upon it again is a letter which I received from him two days ago, of which I cannot forbear sending you an extract. I hope you will not consider me as guilty of an impertinent interference in what is certainly no business of mine. But as I really apprehend that his disappointment (for as such he is prepared to feel it) will weigh very heavily upon his mind, and upon his health, I think you will forgive my wish to put you in possession of what he has disclosed to me of his anxiety and uneasiness, purely for

the purpose of enabling you to take whatever method may seem best to you, for softening the matter to him and reconciling him to himself. The passage is as follows. ‘I have been long meditating to write to you, under a strong desire to advise and consult with you as my private friend. I can speak to no one so freely as to yourself. . . . T. Grenville is of all men the man I should like best as a colleague ; but if he is to be sent *alone*, and I am to be entirely passed by, I should consider myself as having the strongest grounds for complaint. Is it to be so ? Be assured whatever you write or say shall be sacred.’ And then he goes on to talk of coming soon to town.

“This whole communication is so like what it *would have been* if Lord Malmesbury had written to me to *sound* you, and if I had made a confidence to you of his expectations in order to report to him what you might say, that I feel it necessary again to repeat the solemn assurance that this is *not* the case ; that he neither knows nor has the smallest reason to believe that I have had, or shall have, any communication with you about him.”

WILLIAM WICKHAM to the EARL OF MINTO.

1800, September 5. Crems-Munster.—*Extract.* “I think it right to mention to your Lordship that I have the most unquestionable proof not only that the Count de Lehrbach is the declared enemy of the Count de Dietrichstein, but that he is seeking underhand to do him all the mischief in his power. He has been so pointedly loud in his censures of the armistice during his late journey, that it has been inferred from thence that the Count de Dietrichstein is really out of favour with M. de Thugut ; but, independent of open language, *I know* that he has taken some indirect means to send unfavourable reports to Vienna.

“I shall soon have occasion to write at length on the subject of the Count de Lehrbach, as it is now evident that he is to be employed in the negotiation.

“I have had many and full opportunities of observing him, and *I think* I know his character to the bottom ; and *thinking* so, *I think* him one of the worst men that could be employed for our interests. In a word his merits are great activity and industry, strong attachment to the interests of the House of Austria, an obedience to M. de Thugut, as long, that is, as he shall think his power unshaken. His demerits are, excess in political profligacy, falsehood and low trick in conversation, though by no means so in writing because all that he puts to paper in French passes through the hands of his Secretary Hoppé ; ignorance of the French language ; overbearing insolence, accompanied, as is always the case, with meanness towards those who contrive to gain an ascendancy over him ; and a disposition to listen to flattery that scarcely knows any bounds. I am, besides, not quite without suspicion as to his venality.

“I have ever agreed with him, and have in no one instance to complain of him ; but all this has cost me much pains and not a little flattery.”

## THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, September 1-7.] Coleshill.—“ I send you in your red box all the papers which I have relating to Otto, and all Lord Minto’s correspondence, except the *précis* book of last year, and the first 20 dispatches of *this* year, which are locked up in the drawer of my bureau at Dropmore. In case you should likewise want them, I send you the key of the drawer, but if you send for them you must get Lady Grenville to put them in a box, as they are not sealed up or enclosed. I think your time so uncertain, and mine so much more likely to be wanted in London than to be useful here, that I mean to come to town to-morrow, and you may expect me at dinner with Lord Malmesbury’s Paris correspondence in my hand ; that of Lisle I do not possess.

“ I am sorry for the pressure upon the subject of armistice, yet I know not how you can risk the consequences of refusing it, more especially as Thugut in his letter to Tallyrand of 2nd May, 1800, refuses the armistice to France upon a long reasoned argument, in which he proves the inconsistency, disadvantage, and division of interests which would be found if Austria gave an armistice to France in which Great Britain did not equally join.

“ Surely, however, if you give the armistice to France, you will insist that their troops shall no more levy contributions during the armistice ; and as they acknowledge they demand it as a benefit, you have a good right to arrange the terms of that benefit, so as to extend some protection to Austria through the medium of it.”

## GEORGE CANNING to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1800, September 6. Putney Hill.—“ I certainly will undertake to mention to Lord Malmesbury as much of what you have furnished me with, as I may find necessary for setting his mind at rest. And I shall have an opportunity of doing this to-day, as he has fixed upon to-day for coming here to talk with me upon the subject of his last letter.

“ I am not without hopes that the reasons of a public nature, which your letter enables me to state to him, will go a good way towards calming the inquietude which he now feels ; and which proceeds (I have no doubt) in a great degree from the apprehension of being passed by *without any assigned reason*. As to the choice which you have made, I am perfectly certain that there is no man who can be more warm in his approbation of it than Lord Malmesbury himself, or can more cordially agree in the general sentiment of the public, that it is the most natural and most unexceptionable choice which you could have made.

“ I will let you know how far I think I succeed, and I will endeavour to succeed so far as that you shall have no further trouble in the business. If, however, Lord Malmesbury should still have any wish to see you, which (be it only for the purpose of waiving his pretensions) I think it not improbable, you will perhaps have no objection to affording him this satisfaction.”

## WILLIAM WICKHAM to the EARL OF MINTO.

1800, September 7. Crems-Munster.—*Extract.* “I find that Count Lehrbach is with the Emperor. I had rather myself that it were another, because he is more than unpopular in the army, as well as for other important reasons.

“At all events, I trust your Lordship will, as from yourself, desire M. de Thugut to give him a hint that he ought to use the same fair, open, and manly conduct in his communications with the British minister at the army, that has done so much honour to M. de Thugut himself at Vienna.

“He is full of trick, and low cunning, and foolish affected mystery; of all of which I am prodigiously afraid *in a friend*, as producing unfriendly sensations in my own mind which I have a difficulty to conquer.

“Once again, *recommend* to M. de Thugut to *recommend* that there be nothing of low trick or unnecessary closeness at headquarters.”

## THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, September 10. Charles Street.—“Detained in town to-day, I have been prevented from going to Dropmore, and take for granted by what I read in the foreign papers that the armistice is at an end, and that Bonaparte means to cram the treaty of Campo Formio down the throat of the Austrians something nearer to Vienna than in the house of King Stanislaus at Luneville.

“As I have determined in my own mind that you will hear this to-morrow or next day, and that you will come up to town to do nothing or something in Cabinet, Mr. Fisher and I propose to set forth peaceably to-morrow to Coleshill to let this feverish storm of going and coming pass over Mrs. Cowell’s fir trees, instead of passing backwards and forwards along with it to and from the empty city of London.

“In the mean time I have a request to make to you in favour of an old friend of mine and of the fine arts. Mrs. Damer is going to pass three weeks or a month at Paris, and is very anxious to be allowed to pass over from Dover to Calais in a cartel boat with Edwards and his returning French bookseller. As she is a very good aristocrat and no politician, I have promised her that I will do what I can to obtain this indulgence for her, and I know no other way than that of applying to you upon the subject.

“If she can obtain this permission, she has no doubt of getting through Perrégaux a French passport for the three weeks of October which she means to pass there; she would take only a friend and their two maids to Calais, and from thence take a travelling servant at the recommendation of the banker there. Pray help her in this if you can, and write me a line to say what you can do in it.”

## W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, September 11. Hollwood.—“I return you the Irish papers for further consideration. The more I consider the question of tithes, the more difficulty I see in it.

“ We shall probably have occasion to meet in town within a day or two, and as Dundas will be returned, we may then talk over the military arrangements. I agree very much in your idea, supposing hostilities to be renewed and continued on the Continent, but though I rather expect their renewal, I think their continuance very unlikely, as Austria will, I think, soon be driven to submit to a separate peace. In that case it would be unfortunate to have sent our troops as far as Leghorn.

“ Lord Malmsbury has desired to see me, when I come to town, for the purpose of asking some mark of favour (I suppose a step in the peerage) to show that his not being made our negotiator does not proceed from disapprobation. Pray let me know what ostensible ground you have stated to him for not employing him.”

ARTHUR PAGET to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1800, September 13. Palermo.—“ I do not think it right to delay the departure of my servant any longer, particularly as, if anything new occurs, I shall probably have another opportunity in the course of a day or two of writing to your Lordship. It would appear from the nature of the orders given by Sir R. Abercrombie to General Pigot, that his instructions about Malta differ widely from mine, which I cannot help lamenting that I did not know sooner. In conversing some time ago with General Acton upon this particular subject, he told me confidentially that if his Sicilian Majesty could suppose that it was our intention to hoist English colours exclusively at Malta, he should immediately withdraw his troops from thence.

“ I wish I could give your Lordship any hopes of our going soon to Naples, but I do not see the smallest probability of it, for the reasons I have so often had the ungracious task of detailing.”

The EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, September 14. Berlin.—“ I have this moment received yours of the 2nd. I need not say how much I feel your kindness to John. As to Lord Holland, he is extremely anxious to avoid any misconstruction, and made quite unhappy by the paragraphs which have appeared in the papers. His affairs require, as I know, his presence in England in the beginning of October, and his son is really in such very bad health (as well as his wife) that it is a matter of great consequence to them; and therefore as it is clearly impossible for any answer to be received from you in time, I have ventured to tell him he may go; but I have, at the same time, said that I take it upon myself, and rely on his passing by the shortest route, with the utmost expedition, and having no communication direct or indirect, consequential or not, with any person employed or connected with the Government except what is absolutely necessary to his passage.

“ Since I closed my despatch, I have seen the person mentioned in my separate and secret despatch, but he only told me he should take an opportunity when he could be unobserved by his colleague

here to speak to me. From the colleague however, who has habits of most confidential intercourse with Krudener, I have received full satisfaction as to Haugwitz's interpretation of the Russian measures and representations being wholly wide of the truth; and I am persuaded that, either in the case of hostilities being continued, or a negotiation for general peace, you may derive great support from Russia.

"I have written to Lord Minto in the following terms. I trust if he should give into this idea, and I should not have heard from you, you will not be afraid that I shall do anything that will commit you; but if you wish to renew intercourse with Russia, it will at this critical juncture be a great thing to save a little time. If not, or if you should already have resorted to any other means, there will have been no harm done.

"As we have a letter from Mr. Casamajor mentioning that it is likely he shall set out immediately, I presume you have not abandoned all hope of a successful negotiation. For my part I have none at present."

*Extract :—*

The EARL OF CARYSFORT to the EARL OF MINTO.

1800, September 14.—"I am strongly of opinion that if the war with France continues, as I am persuaded it will, Russia may be brought to co-operate with England and Austria.

"It is very possible that the tone she will assume toward the latter will be harsh and unconciliating, but it will be worth the while of Austria to dissemble a little in order to obtain such powerful assistance.

"The approach of the Russian army will facilitate any attempt of working upon Prussia through Saxony and Hesse. In this situation of affairs it seems of the highest consequence to lay the foundation of a confidential intercourse between our Government and the Emperor of Russia. And I will mention to your lordship an idea which has occurred to me, and which you may perhaps think might be worked upon. Mr. Harris, I understand, is with you at Vienna, and if he was to go as a traveller to Petersburgh, he might by passing through this place be furnished with such communications from me as, without committing the dignity of Great Britain, might be the beginning of an immediate intercourse. M. de Krudener in his present temper would, I think, assist it, and Mr. Harris might bring me such instructions from your lordship as should not only prevent the possibility of any misconception on the part of Austria, but even help to give such a turn as would be most consonant to her wishes.

"As what passed in London with Otto is at length in the Hamburgh papers, and as I presumed it could not interfere with the view of your last despatch, I communicated in great confidence to Krudener the disposition the King had manifested to treat for a general peace; and the curious proposition on the part of the French that Great Britain should, without even an insinuation that any return would be made, give up more than the enemy

could gain by a long course of successful war. He was immediately struck with the date of the answer to Otto, and the notice given in Bavaria, and said he should transmit to his Court this new instance of the perfidy of France. He seemed fully sensible of the extravagance of the proposition of a naval armistice."

COUNT STARHEMBERG TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, September 15.]—"J'étois venu quoique sans *appointement* de vous à tout hasard, *primo*, pour vous féliciter sur la bonne nouvelle de Malte, et, *secundo*, pour vous demander des explications sur la retraite de Thugut. Elle lui fait honneur si c'est lui qui l'a demandée.

"When vice prevails and impious bear sway  
The post of honour is a private station."

"Cependant je crois que ce *Crispin* en politique reparoitra sur la scène. Mes lettres de Vienne ne vont que jusqu'au vingt-deux et ne m'en disent rien. On m'avoit dit ici que vous veniez de bonne heure, ce qui m'a engagé à vous attendre, mais je suis forcé à m'en aller à présent. De grâce voyez-moi demain un instant."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Extract* :—

1800, September 17. Stowe.—"I have thought over Irish tithe repeatedly and most anxiously, because I am sure that so long as it exists, the peasantry will be most discontented for very many reasons. The objections you have started are not the only difficulties that appear to me insuperable; for you have not taken into your consideration the prejudices of three-fourths of your Irish people, who, either as Catholics or Dissenters, easily reconcile or mix their religious opinions with their various reasons for defrauding the parson. And the worthy followers of the religion as by law established have a conscience on tithe cases very different from yours and mine. After the fullest view of all these difficulties, and of that monument of violence and injustice which the Irish House of Commons was pleased again to build last year and to make permanent, I see no possible means of equalizing the tithe where it exists, or of giving compensation (which ultimately is the same thing) where it has been forced from the clergy, as in the case of agistment, potatoe garden, bleach-green, and a variety of other Irish tithe law or practice. Do not startle then, if with my eyes open to the question of English tithe, which stands on ground differing *in toto* from that of Ireland, I propose to you the entire change of that part of the establishment of the Church of Ireland. You will observe that the tithe establishment there is a system differing from the enormous disproportion of the religions; differing, from the quality and situation of the tithe holders, who in Ireland are almost exclusively clergy, and of them a very large proportion Bishops, Deans, and dignified clergy paid by livings (on which they do no duty) annexed to their situations; differing, likewise from the want in Ireland of that principle which is always alive in England to correct the discouragement to agriculture arising from tithe, I mean the principle of commutation in its various shapes,

under the various bills that pass every sessions. I am persuaded under all these impressions, that it will be more easy to provide for the Protestant clergy by a full equivalent of some other description, than to attempt to satisfy your own opinions, and those of so many other descriptions on this subject. Of this provision or commutation there are several modes, but I should earnestly deprecate the principle of attaching this commutation locally on lands, because any such particular provision would still be considered as tithe, and would in the folly or madness of an Irish landholder, or occupant, be considered of a grievance. My idea therefore would be to give to all Bishops, Deans, and Dignitaries, corn-stipends in lieu of tithes, and to all parochial ministers commutation in corn-rents or stipends; to be paid quarterly, and with accommodations easily arranged out of a consolidated fund applicable to this purpose only, with the addition of the Dissenting establishments now paid from Government, and of the new Catholic establishments which must be paid from the same stock; to be levied in the same manner, and in the same proportions as the county presentments are now levied. This would throw the whole ecclesiastical establishment of Ireland on the land and houses of the country; and the stipend would fluctuate with the price of corn; fixing in the first instance by Commissioners the average value of each tithe for the last 7 years, and the number of bushels (or barrels in Ireland) of wheat which that tithe has given or bought at the wheat price of the last seven years.

“You will observe that this is not to interfere with any arrangements for the augmenting small livings, or for the disuniting the profligate unions of livings, or with any other ecclesiastical objects of glebes, houses, *et cetera*; but that it is meant as a general commutation of tithe upon the principles recognised and acted upon in Great Britain in all our enclosure Acts.

“I could state to you many other parts of this project, if you encourage me, but I take it for granted that you will be so much startled at the first blush of this measure, that you will endeavour to patch up the old system; and if so, be assured that you will neither please yourself, nor others.

“For once Tom has been more discreet than you on his views France-ward, for I have not heard one word from him for the last three weeks. My motto is still, *nulla salus pace!* but that does not in the least change my conviction, which I stated to you long since, that you will be obliged to negotiate, and probably to make a very bad and dangerous peace; for John Bull tells you very loudly that *tel est notre bon plaisir*; and he will be equally ready to hang Tom and you for signing it, as soon as the certain consequences of it press upon him.”

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, September 17. Coleshill.—“It was so plain to see in the French proposal of English armistice an intention of their renewing hostilities in order to drive Austria to a separate peace, that we have not much to boast of our sagacity in foreseeing the answer

which I learn from you to be arrived. It is doubtless a very necessary precaution on your part to keep in the terms of the correspondence the best ground which can be taken with the public, but it is impossible not to see that their judgment upon this last communication will more be governed by the ultimate events of the Austrian campaign, than by a more close and logical reasoning upon the matter; if the Austrians can make head against the French in the renewal of hostilities, you will all of you be approved for having refused the naval armistice. If the Austrians are beat into a separate peace, you will then be attacked for not having prevented that event by negotiation; this is not good logic but nevertheless it is John Bull's reasoning. I should myself be much disposed to think that it would be advisable for government to lose no time in making their statement of this last communication public, and to take the highest possible tone in speaking of the proposition for naval armistice, because I think they would in every respect have much advantage by appearing to challenge that discussion, rather than by waiting for it when it shall be blended with other circumstances which may work unreasonably upon the prejudices of the public.

"I know not that I can excuse myself to Lord Carrington for to-morrow unless he sends to put me off, but I can come to you on Friday at all events to Dropmore. I find from Lord Ossory and from Lady Spencer that the best Northamptonshire drainer is an old man of the name of Harte living at Northampton; the Spencers recommended him 2 years ago to Pointz of Cowdrey, who was highly satisfied both with the success of his work and the reasonable charges of it. By a line from you to Lord Spencer you may probably have him whenever you please, if you think him worth trying. Lord Spencer has a constant gang of his own drainers, and therefore does not himself employ Harte."

#### LORD MINTO TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1800, September 18. Vienna.—"Lyell and Wiffen arrived together, and I had a long conference in the afternoon in which I communicated to Baron Thugut all that related to Captain Georges' conferences with M. Otto, and every other point according to your instructions. I hoped to dispatch my messenger this forenoon, but Baron Thugut sent for me again in order to talk over once more several parts of our extensive subject before my dispatches should be closed. I cannot therefore send off the messenger (Ruffe) till to-morrow. In the mean while a packet from India, which I have this moment received, requires that I should dispatch a messenger with it, without a moment's delay; and I avail myself of that opportunity merely to express the lively and grateful sense I have of the kindness and indulgence which run through the dispatches I had the honour to receive yesterday. On every point of business I refrain not only from want of time, but because, in truth, the whole matter is so nice and requires so much certainty of conveying correctly the shades as well as the substance, that I begged Baron Thugut would allow me to see him *after* I had thrown the subject

on paper, and before I should dispatch it to your Lordship ; which he seemed desirous also that I should do. You must allow me however to indulge myself in expressing the real and cordial pleasure I already feel in the prospect of corresponding once more with Mr. Grenville, and the entire and unqualified confidence I derive from his nomination. I understand that there will be a free communication between Mr. Grenville and me by messenger, independent of the Austrian couriers. This will be very necessary, for Mr. Grenville's reports will be rather more to be depended on than Monsieur Lehrbach's. I need not attempt to conceal from your Lordship that very strong anti-Austrian leanings have long been attributed at this Court to Mr. Grenville, and that some indications of apprehension on that account escaped on my first naming him and Garlike. I feel too much zeal however when I speak on this subject not to hope for success ; I mean, not to hope that I shall very soon see those apprehensions converted into confidence and satisfaction. I am sure your Lordship and Mr. Grenville will be inclined to feel sufficient indulgence for these prejudices, and to think it of sufficient importance that they should be removed, to second me on this point by such language as, without sacrificing principles of any sort, may convey an impression of favour and friendship towards Austria, and towards the system of connexion with that power."

#### The EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, September 18th. Berlin.—“My separate and secret despatch will have informed you of the commission with which the Chevalier de Bray was entrusted by M. de Montgélas and Mr. Drake. The Princess of Tour and Taxis has undertaken the part assigned to her with a readiness and zeal which ought to be remembered to her praise. With how little prospect of success the Chevalier de Bray will tell you. It would be superfluous to repeat what you are so well acquainted with already. The King of Prussia is surrounded by persons of the worst description, whom there is no visible mode of counteracting. What passed with the Princess makes it but too certain that he has imbibed all the notions which have been propagated and received with so much avidity upon the Continent, of the ambition and intrigues of England, and the moderation and fair intentions of Bonaparte. The note I have received from Count Haugwitz, which I transmit with my despatch, seems to confirm this, if any farther evidence were necessary.

“The Princess of Tour and Taxis is represented to me as a woman of great prudence and good sense, and she has hopes she may get the Queen to interest herself so far as to resist the impressions which may be made on the King's mind against England ; and it must be considered as an advantage if we can obtain early and good information of the particular points on which he may be prepossessed. This is all that can be expected from this attempt. I do not see that any hazard can be incurred by it, and therefore did not prevent the Chevalier de Bray from acting in it.

“As to my note ; as to what I told you I communicated to Krudener, but not as having any official knowledge of it, and as

to my suggestion to Lord Minto about making use of Mr. Harris to save time at a most urgent and important crisis ; I hope no hazard can arise from any of these steps, but of my appearing foolish or officious. You, I am sure, will not attribute to presumption what really proceeded from zeal. I am not however without real and great apprehensions of having erred in judgement, but you will not scruple to censure me according to the degree of my error.

“The Chevalier de Horta, many years resident at Petersburg as Minister of Portugal, is a good sort of man and an old friend of mine. If you have an opportunity of taking any little notice of him pray let him think I have a share in it. He is just arrived here, and proceeds on his journey to London on Saturday. He may give you some interesting account of the country he has left. He is to tell me what he knows to-morrow.”

VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

[1800.] September 18. Ampton near Bury.—“In compliance with your suggestions, I have endeavoured to trace out the practicability of a proportional commutation between tithe and rent, and have examined a little farther the difficulties of tithe arbitrations ; (it is impossible to answer for the feelings of the Church, but otherwise) think we were at first rather inclined to overrate them. Property in tithes may be as easily surveyed and valued as any other description of property, and it would be as objectionable in practice to settle what proportion short of a full 10th the clergyman should in all places receive, as to attempt to negociate what proportion of the profits of land should go to the landlord, and what to the farmer. The landowner who cannot farm his own land and the rector who cannot collect his own tithe in kind (which in Ireland from the extent of the parishes is physically impossible) must each be contented with reserving as great a proportion of the profits, as by contract he can obtain. The proportion will be regulated so much by the habits of the country, that any attempt to equalize it would be to disturb the relations and in fact the value of property.

“I wish I could prevail on your Lordship to digest something on the two questions of most detail, namely tithes and the arrangement for the dissenting clergy. I am aware of the difficulty at present of any Cabinet decision being taken upon these measures, but it would afford great satisfaction to my mind, before I returned, to see them reduced into *some shape*.

“I shall return to town either on Saturday evening or Sunday morning and shall be happy to receive your Lordship’s further commands.”

COUNT STARHEMBERG TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, September 20.] York House.—“J’ai remis à Mr. Hammond deux lettres que le Colonel Herries m’avoit prié de vous communiquer. L’une est de son frère et l’autre est sa réponse. Vous jugéz bien que la *spéculation de Cocheville* veut dire la négocia-

tion de paix. Au cas que vous soyez content de la réponse du Colonel, il voudrait bien que vous donniez ordre qu'on l'envoie. Il veut être net, et sa conduite lui fait honneur.

“Voilà donc la guerre prête à recommencer. J'en suis bien aise au fond, car mes principes ne varieront jamais ; cependant, tout en admirant la noble détermination de l'Empereur, qui ne peut manquer d'électriser l'armée, je ne vous cacherai pas que je suis fâché que M. de Thugut ne l'accompagne pas. Je craindrais presque, si effectivement ce ministre reste à Vienne, comme on me le mande, que la présence de l'Empereur à son armée ne produira un effet contraire à celui que nous en attendons. Il est possible que ses vieux généraux timides, et d'autres êtres pacifiques, tâchent de lui persuader que *les Français sont invincibles, qu'il faut faire à tout prix la paix avec eux*. On nous dira ensuite que *Sa Majesté s'est convaincu de cette vérité* par elle-même, et si l'Archiduc accompagne son frère, mes craintes redoublent. Ce jeune Prince, rempli de grandes qualités, a le tort de pencher pour la paix. Que tout ceci soit de vous à moi, vous n'ignorez pas le motif qui m'anime. Je connois la faiblesse du chef, et les sentimens de ceux qui l'entourent. Prévenez en Lord Minto et M. Wickham ; le premier, surtout, ne peut pas être comme moi au fait de toutes les embûches et pièges qu'on va tendre. Il ne connoit à Vienne que *Thugut*, c'est le seul auquel il est à faire, et il doit en être content. Il faut tâcher que ce gouverneur n'abandonne pas son élève. Vous savez que je n'adore pas Thugut ; mais il est, avec ses trente-six mille défauts, et cent mille singularités, nécessaire dans la circonstance. Son entêtement bien dirigé lui donne tous les avantages d'un grand caractère. Adieu, cette lettre vous prouve bien ma confiance et mon amitié. J'ai cru devoir ces réflexions confidentielles à la personne d'un ami que je chéris, et au ministre que je révère.”

#### FRANCIS DRAKE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1800, September 20. Amberg.—“I take the liberty of laying before your Lordship an extract of a letter which I wrote some time ago to the Earl of Carysfort, hoping that your Lordship will not disapprove the scheme which is the subject of it. I have long had the honour of being acquainted with the Princess of Taxis, and I am persuaded that, if the project should fail of success, the failure will not be attributable to any want of zeal, dexterity, or address on her part. It were to be wished that her Prussian Majesty's talents were equally well adapted to the management of a scheme of this delicate nature. This latter circumstance, her Majesty's timidity, and the singularity of the King of Prussia's character, are not calculated to inspire any very sanguine hopes of success ; but (as I have already mentioned to Lord Carysfort) the scheme seems worth the trial, and it does not appear that any inconvenience can result from a failure of it. Lord Carysfort will probably inform your Lordship of the progress and issue of this business.

“It was my intention to have paid a visit to the Princess previous

to her departure for Potsdam, but my occupations here would not admit of my absenting myself. I therefore proposed the commission to the Chevalier de Bray whom I knew to be extremely intimate with the Princess; and he readily consented to undertake it, Baron Montg elas having previously given him permission so to do, upon the express condition, however, that the *real* object of his journey to Berlin should never in any case be made known except to your Lordship and to Lord Carysfort."

*Postscript.*—"I have already had the honour of observing, in one of my public letters to your Lordship that, whatever the Chevalier de Bray's former conduct may have been, he has recently given strong proofs that his present opinions are such as we could wish them to be."

*Enclosure :—*

FRANCIS DRAKE to the EARL OF CARYSFORT.

1800, September 4. Amberg.—"This letter will be delivered to your Lordship by the Chevalier de Bray, who sets out from hence to-morrow morning for London, where he is to reside as the Elector Bavaro-Palatin's minister to his Majesty. He goes by the way of Berlin for the express purpose of seeing the Hereditary Princess of Tour and Taxis (with whom he is very intimately acquainted) and of endeavouring through her means, and through the influence of her sister the Queen, to work upon the King's mind, and to impress him with sentiments more congenial to the views and wishes of the allies. The task is a difficult one, but even a partial success would be attended with the most beneficial consequences; and as no possible inconvenience can result from a failure, it appears to me at least worth a trial. I fully intended to have paid the Princess a visit at her country house near Anspach for this same purpose, but my avocations here have not permitted me to absent myself. I therefore suggested to the Bavarian minister my wishes that the Chevalier should take Berlin in his way, and I made choice of him because I know that he possesses a considerable degree of influence with the Princess. Baron Montg elas requests that the *real* object of his mission should be kept a profound secret both at Berlin and in London as it is here, the Elector himself not being acquainted with it.

"The Chevalier will explain himself very fully to your Lordship, and he will follow such advice as your Lordship may think expedient to give him. If his first overtures should be attended with any degree of success, he will leave the further prosecution of the business in your Lordship's hands, to be carried on either by a secret correspondence with the Princess, or by any other means which your Lordship may think proper to advise. I must add that the talents of the Princess, as well as those of the Chevalier de Bray, are peculiarly well adapted to an enterprise of this nature; but my acquaintance with the latter is of a fresh date, and therefore I cannot take upon myself to recommend to your Lordship to give him more of your confidence than just so much as may be barely necessary to give his first overtures a proper direction.

“I need not apprise your Lordship of the expediency of not touching upon this subject (*in claro*) in any letters which your Lordship may hereafter do me the honour to write to me, as every precaution must be taken to prevent this attempt from ever coming to the knowledge of his Prussian Majesty. I doubt much if the attempt will succeed, but, as I have already said, it is certainly worth a trial, and no bad consequences can result from a failure of it. The Chevalier will repeat to your Lordship my conversations with him on the subject. I should have wished to have entered into further details upon it in this letter, but I have various occupations on my hands which require my immediate and incessant attention, in consequence of the arrival of a messenger who is just come in from Mr. Wickham.” *Copy.*

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, September 20. [Crems-Munster.]—“I have been so full about Lehrbach that his brother negotiator at Luneville, if you send one, may know something of his real character, which is flimsily disguised under an appearance of great openness and warmth. I have thought it also right to reserve a subject for *complaint* and *justification* under any circumstances that may happen.

“We are worn off our legs. I have besides horses lame and servants who are leaving me, and am removed three leagues from the scene of action, to which I must gallop hard if Lehrbach does not return in half an hour, and hostilities really begin, which I cannot bring myself to believe.

“If there were more officers and fewer boys in the army I should have great confidence in our exertions, but, as it is, I am not at ease. At the same time if I was the Emperor, I would rather go back fighting to Vienna than give up the fortresses.

“I have always treated Lehrbach like a demi-god at least, so that I believe him without any suspicion as to the opinion I really entertain of him. He must however be either very stupid himself, or have an extraordinary opinion of the extent of my own stupidity if he thinks (as I believe is the case) that I have not seen through any of his tricks of any kind.

“I reserve Flint and all other subjects for another opportunity with your Lordship’s kind permission.

“6 p.m.

“My public dispatch will speak for itself. I have nothing to add to it but the assurance that I will do nothing that shall commit myself or others either way.

“I have not the smallest doubt but that the enemy would have been completely surprised and beaten had we acted only this morning.”

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, September 20. Downing Street.—“You will suppose that the subject of our last Cabinet has occupied most of my attention since we parted. While the subject was fresh in my memory

I put the result of my further reflexion into the shape of a detailed minute. I send it for your perusal.

"I have had a very satisfactory conversation with General Stuart and Sir Home Popham, and Mr. David Scott, this morning on the subject of the Red Sea, and I have now no doubts what it is proper for me to order in that quarter. I have summoned the Cabinet to meet on Tuesday at eleven o'clock. Gibraltar is a very bad situation for the shipping and transports, and we have already lost too much time in sending our orders to Sir Ralph Abercrombie."

#### H. FAGEL TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, September 20. Curzon Street.—"I called to-day in Cleveland Row but was informed of your being in the country. I am returned within these few days from my tour, which has been in every respect extremely pleasant and interesting.

"I shall be happy to see you, whenever it may be convenient; and I flatter myself this may be soon, if you should come to town in the course of next week. Give me leave to send you the enclosed letter from the Hereditary Prince of Orange, which I suppose to be intended for such a communication.

"Permit me also to enquire whether any resolution has been taken during my absence on the subject of the poor Pensionary Van de Spiegel's family. Before I left town in the beginning of July, you gave me hopes that something would be done for them, and as I know their situation to be very far from comfortable, I should be extremely happy to have it in my power to give some satisfactory intelligence to the son, who is anxiously waiting for an answer from me."

#### *Enclosure :—*

#### THE HEREDITARY PRINCE OF ORANGE TO H. FAGEL.

1800, September 17. Newport.—"Votre prochain retour à Londres m'a engagé de remettre de quelques jours à vous répondre à le votre du 2, et à vous renvoyer la lettre de Mr. Garlike qui y étoit incluse. Je le fait maintenant par ces lignes, vous supposant de retour de votre voyage, du quel je me flatte pour vous que la fin aura été aussi agréable que vous paroissiez content du commencement. Permettez que je saisisse cette occasion pour avoir recour à votre complaisance ordinaire, et de laquelle je craindrois d'abuser si je ne connoissois parfaitement son étendue, en vous priant d'entretenir My Lord Grenville à mon égard. Vous vous appellerez que c'est d'après le désir énoncé par ce Ministre, que je me suis empressé de revenir en Angleterre, n'ayant fait le printems dernier qu'une course rapide en Allemagne, et que j'ai passé ici cet été afin d'être à la main dans le cas que l'on jugeroit convenable de faire usage de ma personne. J'ai consacré tout le tems dans ce pais au bien-être du corps de troupes Hollandoises, et travaillant celui-ci jusqu'à présent, j'ai taché de le rendre tout-à-fait capable pour être employé à ce que le service du Roi exigeroit; en quoi je me suis vu aidé du zèle et de l'attention du corps d'officiers, ainsi que de la bonne volonté du soldat, dont l'esprit excellent m'assure de son

utilité s'il est employé convenablement. Mais maintenant le corps de troupes Hollandoises est séparé, un régiment étant déjà pour Guernsey, tandis qu'un autre va être embarqué pour Jersey, de sorte que mon activité auprès de celui-ci est paralysé, et d'ailleurs l'approche de l'automne rendra en peu de tems tout-à-fait impossible de continuer à dresser les troupes dans cette isle. De plus, la saison avancée paroît permettre d'établir l'opinion qu'il n'y aura plus d'emploi actif pour nous cette année, et que, par conséquent, ma présence ultérieure dans ce pais est tout-à-fait superflue. Ma prière est donc que vous vouliez bien vous informer auprès de Mylord Grenville, s'il juge encore nécessaire que je prolonge mon séjour ici, ou bien s'il consent que je parte jusqu'au printems prochain, en donnant l'assurance que je serai toujours prêt à revenir, du moment qu'il sera jugé nécessaire de me faire appeller. J'ose avec d'autant plus de fondement espérer que Lord Grenville ne s'opposera pas à mon départ s'il veut considérer que, pendant cet hiver, je ne suis nullement à même d'être de quelqu'utilité au corps de troupes Hollandoises restant en Angleterre, tandis que, par ma présence en Allemagne, je puis beaucoup en favoriser le recrutement ultérieur, comme mon séjour du printems dernier en fait preuve, ayant obtenu de la Prusse un libre passage pour les Hollandois que voudroient nous joindre. Cet objet devient d'un objet doublement majeur, si la reprise des hostilités en Allemagne faisoit donner quelqu'attention aux offres que j'ai été à même de faire il y a quelques mois, d'augmenter par les relations que nous avons en Allemagne de quelques bataillons le corps de nos troupes, en faisant usage des propositions que divers Princes et Comtes d'Empire m'ont fait à cet égard. Enfin, ma position et mes relations personnelles sont pour moi un motif pressant pour désirer de rejoindre pour quelque tems ma famille. Du moment qu'une occasion s'est présentée de pouvoir être de quelqu'utilité à ma patrie, à mes compatriotes, ou la cause générale, j'ai toujours scu sacrifier tout ce que me concerne personnellement pour ces objets, et je me flatte que vous voudrez me rendre cette justice, mais je me crois aussi obligé, par contre, à me vouer pour quelque tems du moins, pour vaquer aux soins de mes affaires particulières, ainsi que de veiller à l'éducation de mes enfans ; du moins tant que des affaires majeures n'y mettent pas une impossibilité réelle. Ce dernier point est d'une importance d'autant plus majeure pour moi que, lorsqu'il fut question l'année dernière de l'expédition d'Hollande, je fus obligé de quitter très promptement Berlin, et que je dus abandonner mes affaires sans pouvoir y mettre ordre ; que de depuis je n'ai pu passer que six semaines à Berlin, durant les quelles je n'ai pu faire que quelques arrangemens momentannés, ayant de donner mon tems aux affaires concernant le corps de nos troupes ; et que devant me préparer à revenir l'année prochaine en Angleterre, je désirerois avoir le tems tout fixe, de manière à pouvoir sans inconvénient m'absenter quelque tems." *Extract.*

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, September 21. Hollwood.—“ Before I received your box with the papers respecting Portugal, I had a *mémoire* from Dundas

respecting Egypt, and a summons for a Cabinet on Tuesday, which will probably have reached you. Both questions must come under consideration at the same time. I mean therefore to be in town on Tuesday, and have written to Lord Spencer."

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, September 22.]—"Mille grâces de votre communication amicale. J'espère que M. de Thugut restera en place, mais je sais que l'Archiduc travaille à le perdre. J'aime mieux le général civil, puisqu'il est impossible de les avoir tous deux."

LORD GRENVILLE to W. PITT.

1800, September 23. Whitehall.—"I send you Otto's answer to our last note, which is certainly well drawn. I have since seen Las Heras and Front. The former is just come from Paris, and the latter had seen a Danish Consul, who is also just come from there. Both agree in saying that in France the whole cry is for peace with England, that what they feel there the most is the interruption and ruin of their trade, and that they are very indifferent to continental peace in comparison with the other object. This information which accident has thrown in our way at this interesting moment may certainly enable us both to raise our demands as to terms, and to insist strictly on the conditions of our project of armistice.

"Many of the inconveniences of such a measure will be avoided by such a notice as we talked of to-day, but we should be careful so to time it as not to allow the Spanish treasures to come in unless our terms are acceded to. Las Heras told me to-day such particulars on that subject as are really astonishing. He spoke with great freedom, and expressed his persuasion that the French object is to revolutionize Spain. Did it never occur to you that our army in Portugal might in that case be a resource for Spain itself?

"I send you a curious letter from Gregory."

*Postscript.*—"We may so give our notice as to save the fourteen days, and to reckon the re-commencement of hostilities from the very day which we may think it right to limit, and which must, for the reason I have mentioned, be rather less than more than three months." *Copy.*

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, September 23. Wimbledon.—"I return the note without loss of time, thinking you may want it early in the morning. It is certainly dexterously drawn with a view of effect if the negotiation should fail, and may perhaps be intended only for that purpose. Coupled with the rest of your information, it seems to me only to furnish a reason for executing what seemed to be the resolution of this morning firmly in substance, but in the most conciliatory mode the nature of the thing admits of. The more I think of the limitation of the armistice (as you proposed) the better I like it. But I quite agree with you that it ought to be terminated before the time which would admit the Spanish galleons; and that very

circumstance will afford hereafter a convincing reason for the precise limitation which we may fix."

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1800, September 24. Crems-Munster.—"I know not yet what to make of Thugut in all this business, or whether Lehrbach is playing his cards or no. I have grounds for thinking that this is really the case, and pretty strong evidence of the contrary. The leaning of my mind is in T[hugut's] favour. I think however this march upon the Traun a very long one, and it will not escape observation at Berlin that we are in the high road to Bohemia."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, September 24. Coleshill.—"Many thanks for your note; if I judged only from my own speculations, I should still consider Otto's proposal rather as addressed to influence the opinion of the public here, than really to facilitate the means of negotiation and peace; but your opinion being founded upon better documents is I suppose more just; at all events I am glad that Hammond sees him to-day, because that circumstance will give no additional advantage in discussing these overtures if they shall fail of producing any real negotiation; and you will, I presume, have charged Hammond to learn explicitly what the *present* state of things is before you agree to any *future* arrangements. If the French have really prolonged the armistice, as they have nothing to gain by delay, I shall begin to think them in earnest, but I can never believe that Otto would have expressed himself so loosely and obscurely if he had felt himself enabled to say distinctly that Bonaparte had prolonged the continental armistice to favour the discussions with England, and the chance of general peace.

"Both the weather and the business of to-day will keep you in town till to-morrow; be so good as to send me a line, as you will naturally suppose me to be anxious to know what turn this is likely to take. My general intentions were to pass Sunday with you, to meet Pitt and Dundas at Lord Carrington's on Monday and Tuesday, and then go to Coleshill for four days of embodying at Aylesbury, namely till the 7th of October. My brother writes me word that Lord Temple (as I expected and thought most natural) expresses a determination rather to abandon Avington than Wotton, if that alternative should become necessary to his income. Though I should have had great delight in residing there, I cannot but be gratified in a decision which must be so much more agreeable to my dear brother, and which secures so important a protection to the good old place in future."

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF CARYSFORT.

*Private.*

1800, September 26. Cleveland Row.—"I see on looking at our correspondence that I have to answer your private letters

3, 4, 5 and 6. You will not wonder that during the last fortnight my time has been very fully occupied.

“There certainly can result nothing but good from the steps you have taken about Russia, but I doubt whether anything will result from them. If the information I have received this morning from Harward of an embargo laid on our ships at Petersburg be true, the question is already decided. But his intelligence is never entitled to much credit.

“I own however, in my opinion, you overrate the importance of Russia in the present moment. I should rather say that of the Emperor of Russia; for with a steady and consistent conduct, there is nothing that the Court of Petersburg might not have achieved, circumstanced as the Courts of Vienna and Berlin are. But whatever declarations the Emperor Paul might now make, or whatever part he might take for the moment, no power in Europe would place the smallest reliance on it. With respect to his troops, the secret of their indiscipline and insufficiency for any other than a war on Tartar principles is now well known. And if he were disposed to enter into all our measures now as heartily as he did last year, I know not any more embarrassing question to decide than that of the mode in which he could give us any assistance.

“Lord Minto and Wickham can tell you that both Austria and the Empire had ten thousand times rather make almost any peace with France than be again defended by a Russian army. The same thing is true with respect to operations on the coast of France. Wherever the fault may lie, it is plain that British and Russian troops could not act together; and indeed to send Russians into the Royalist provinces would be to alienate them from our cause for ever. They might indeed at first be a little better received in Italy by the smaller powers, who look to them for protection against Austria; but that very circumstance would, by disunion, defeat all hopes of united efforts in that quarter.

“With all this I am entirely of opinion that it is better to have the name of being well with Russia, and that, though the Emperor’s friendship can do us little good, his enmity might decidedly disable our allies from acting.

“I trust however Lord Minto will not have taken your hint about Harris. I could give you many reasons why he is perfectly improper to be employed on any such commission. If there was in my opinion the smallest probability of our soon wanting a *Chargé d’Affaires* there, I should have fixed upon Garlike preferably to any other person, and in the case of his being otherwise employed I have another choice in view. I am however inclined to think with Whitworth that the Emperor has been spoiled by too much courting, and that some appearance of reserve is not less suited to our interests in that quarter than to our own dignity.

“Your official note seems to me very ably drawn, and likely to make as much impression on the King of Prussia’s mind as anything of the sort can do.

“I had already settled with Casamajor to go to Berlin if Garlike leaves you even for a time. He has been in the office here and bears a very high character for talents.

“Lisahevitz is ordered to Denmark and leaves no *Chargé d’Affaires* here, so that all future communications with Petersburg must be through you and Krudener.

“All our communications with Otto are, as you will observe, drawn with a view to their being made public if the thing should break off. There is so much want of peace in France that I sometimes think Bonaparte will be compelled to take any terms on which we and Austria steadily insist. But how to produce that steadiness at Vienna is the great difficulty just now; though, to do Lord Minto justice, more has been done in that respect than I ever hoped to see after the battle of Marengo.

“There is some awkwardness in the state of the business respecting Lord Holland. The Duke of Portland, through whose Office the licence must go, delayed it on account of his having hitherto refused all such applications (or nearly all). By the ‘Traitorous-correspondence Bill’ no permission is valid for this purpose except under the King’s sign manual. You have therefore no power to grant him leave to that effect, nor I to authorize you to do so.

“Our discussions with Otto are, as you will see by my public despatch, brought very near to their point. Most unquestionably we shall not allow them to send troops and arms to Egypt, and if they insist on that, the whole will of course be at an end. But they have conceded so much that I rather look to the chance of their conceding this also. At any rate our negotiation will have given to Austria the interval of a full month which, if she knows how to improve it, is invaluable.” *Copy.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO WILLIAM WICKHAM.

1800, September 26. Cleveland Row.—“There is no one circumstance which ever happened to me that I have looked at with more satisfaction than I do at the fortunate (I may say providential) concurrence of events, which have placed you at this moment at the Austrian head-quarters. To have had no minister at all there, when every step that we are to take from day to day depends on what is passing there, would have been mortifying beyond all endurance, but it would have been no less so to have had at this moment to look out for some person to send there, and to have made at last a choice with which I should have had so much less reason to be satisfied than with the course which the thing has now taken of itself.

“I heartily wish that we could this day have asked you by telegraph whether the Austrians can be trusted to maintain themselves for a month or six weeks longer if hostilities should really recommence in consequence of our refusal to accede to M. Otto’s terms of armistice.

“With respect to any question in which this country alone were to be concerned, there can be no doubt that we have already offered too much. We have done so simply and plainly in the sole view of preventing France from suddenly renewing hostilities in Germany. You will not fail to represent this sacrifice in its true light, and I hope your endeavours will have contributed to make them turn to

good advantage the respite we have procured them. If we can, by these or any other means, arrive at the time when it will be too late to act in Germany, and particularly in the Tyrol, all may yet be well. Austria may assume such a tone of negotiation as becomes her. His Majesty may treat on the grounds which belong to his situation, and we may make France feel that she has more need of peace than the allies.

“But all this depends on our being able to ward off any great reverses for the next six weeks. I reckon that, even if France breaks off on the present ground, it must be the beginning of October before she can recommence hostilities, and the middle of November is, I imagine, late for operations in the countries where they will be to act.

“If we are to treat, we shall be very much embarrassed for the want of some chart to steer by. We are still perfectly ignorant of the views which Austria entertains in this new state of her affairs. I could make fifty projects more or less agreeable to my fancy, but without some foundation in the dispositions of Austria they would be purely castles in the air. You could not do me a greater service than by finding out from Lehrbach what views his Court entertains of terms in the present state of affairs.

“To restore the House of Orange to Holland under any decent and plausible shape of constitution not purely democratical; to give the Netherlands to the Elector Palatine in exchange for Bavaria; and Bavaria to Austria in compensation for the Milanese, or in addition to it, would be my favourite project. But then what to do for France to induce her to give up the Netherlands, and to let Austria have Bavaria? What we have to give back of French Colonies is not much in exchange for such objects, and we have besides Egypt to buy out.

“All these are speculations in the air till Austria speaks out to us as to her own views; and, so far from being jealous of them, all our fear would be lest she should not strengthen herself against France.

“I own that, knowing not much about the matter, I am very much of Weyrother’s opinion as to the projected attack of the 11th. I rejoice in seeing all the old women and intriguers sent to the right about, and heartily wish that some other armies that I know could be *jubileert* and *pensioneert* in the same manner. But it was surely too early to try the effect of such arrangements before they could have time to operate, and the effect of defeat must evidently have been irretrievable.

“How does Thugut dare to trust the Emperor away from him? Is he sure enough of his influence with him, or does he count with confidence on Lehrbach’s co-operating with him in all his views?”  
Copy.

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, September 27. Twickenham.—“Je suis sensible comme je le dois à votre attention amicale. Je ne savais pas encore officiellement le renouvellement de l’armistice, sur lequel je pense bien

comme vous. La poste d'hier m'a apporté des dépêches de M. de Thugut qui m'annonçoient la rupture de l'armistice, les raisons qui l'avoient amenée, et celles qui avoient déterminée Sa Majesté Impériale à prendre le commandement en personne. On m'a mandé en gros le changement arrivé à l'armée, et j'en augure favorablement. *Expurgate vetus fermentum* dit l'Évangile. Avez-vous lu, à propos d'Évangile, les plaisanteries que le *Morning Chronicle* d'hier se permet au sujet d'un acte de religion de l'Empereur, avant son départ pour l'armée. Cela est infâme en vérité. Oserois-je vous demander s'il est vrai que le Comte de Dietrichstein soit mis à la pension ? On ne me la mande point de Vienne, mais je l'ai lu dans les gazettes. J'en serois étonné, et même fâché, car, quoique, de vous à moi, ce soit un pauvre sujet, il est honnête et bien pensant. Je suis lié avec lui, et il est un créature de Thugut. Des avis particuliers de Vienne me disent aussi que ce ministre ira à l'armée. Cela est-il vrai ? Dieu en soit loué *if so*. Vous n'avez pas d'idée de la faiblesse de notre noblesse. Je rougis et je pleurs en vous confiant que mon père me dit dans sa dernière lettre, *hélas ! mon ami, où en serons-nous quand vous recevrez la présente ? Ne croyez pas que son fils lui ressemble. War then, open war, (dit Milton) for who could think submission ?* "

COUNT STARHEMBERG TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, September 29. Twickenham.]—" Mille pardons de vous importuner au milieu des occupations sérieuses et de toutes espèces que vous devez avoir, mais vous connoissez trop bien ma manière de penser pour ne pas juger de l'abattement dans lequel m'a jetté la nouvelle que je viens de lire dans les gazettes Anglaises à l'article de Paris. Est-il possible que nous ayons acheté un armistice au prix honteux de Philipsbourg, Ulm, et Ingolstadt ? Je ne puis le croire, peut on s'abaisser et se trainer ainsi dans la boue ? Ça s'appelle se déshabiller successivement devant le bourreau. De grâce, un mot de *comfort* si vous pouvez me le donner, je suis honteux et désolé, hélas ! hélas ! "

*Postscript.*—" De grâce ne me cachez rien et prononcez hardiment que *nous sommes* ce que *nous sommes*, si *nous le sommes*. Se peut-il qu'un souverain soit si faible, des ministres aussi pervers, un peuple aussi sot, et des généraux aussi lâches ! Je me fais gloire hautement de n'être pour rien dans toutes ces infamies ou lâchetés au moins."

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1800, September 30. Berlin.—" You may think perhaps that I have, in my despatch of the 27th, given an exaggerated picture of the prejudice prevailing on the Continent against Great Britain, but I am convinced I have not. Of the foreign Ministers there is not one, except the Portuguese, by whom it has not been strongly imbibed.

" It passes as current truth from one to another without examination, and no argument by which it is controverted will receive a patient and candid hearing. It is therefore very difficult to counteract it ; nor does it occur to me that it can be done, unless recourse

is again had to what has more than once been employed already with the best effect, some public declaration of the sentiments and principles of the British Government. No pamphlet or paragraph or essay in a newspaper will be read. A state-paper certainly will. The present conjuncture seems particularly favourable for such a measure; as what has been passing between Vienna and France is very imperfectly known, and what share Great Britain may have had in the business is utterly unknown. The opinions of the public begin therefore again to fluctuate a little, and their judgment is suspended. All eyes are turned towards Great Britain, and expectation is universally roused.

“You may think me perhaps prejudiced by my own situation when I say it is of great importance at this moment to make a show of putting some confidence in the King of Prussia, and to impress him with favourable notions as to the moderation as well as firmness of the King’s councils. Much assistance cannot, I think, be derived from him in any case, but to keep up and improve the disposition he undoubtedly has to be upon terms of personal friendship and confidence with the King, and the ideas, not yet eradicated from his mind, of the importance of the maritime power of Great Britain to the general security, may prevent his being made the instrument of mischief. It is certain, besides, (as far as my opinion goes) that he has all along resisted the idea of the Northern League, and deserves some compliment upon that account, as well as to induce him to discourage the resumption of that scheme in future.

“What has passed in Germany will irritate the Emperor of Russia against Austria. The fears of the Elector of Bavaria as to the designs of that power are again excited. The conduct of Austria is considered by him, and so represented to the Court of Petersburg, as perfidious in the extreme. The suggestions and opinions contained in this letter I would not hazard in a despatch, though I could not help communicating them to you.” *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT STARHEMBERG.

1800, September 30. Cleveland Row.—“J’étois engagé hier quand j’ai reçu votre note, de manière à ne pouvoir écrire dans le moment. J’avois déjà chargé Hammond de vous prévenir de la nouvelle étonnante que les papiers François nous avoient apportés.

“Tout bon Anti-Jacobin dans toute l’Europe doit se trouver humilié de voir que l’Empereur d’Allemagne ne prend le commandement de ses armées que pour en fletrir la gloire par les conditions les plus honteuses. Mes dernières lettres ne me donnoient le moindre raison de m’attendre à une pareille démarche.” *Copy.*

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, October 3.]—“On vient de me dire que les papiers de Paris rapportent que les François se sont emparé de Livourne. Si cela est vrai, voilà une bonne raison de recommencer. Il faut se défendre au moins.

“L’auteur du grand homme a l’honneur de vous en envoyer quelques exemplaires. Je serai bien aise que le *grand homme Pitt*

le lut. Vous rémarquerez que j'ai un peu divagué dans le sens p'un émigré pour mieux donner le change.

“ De grâce, ne mandez pas à Lord Minto que je vous ai laissé la dépêche de Cobentzl. Il est si ridicule et si minucieux, et Thugut aussi, qu'ils ne me le pardonneraient jamais, et je veux me ménager la confiance de ces—pour servir la cause, votre cour, et la mienne. Ma conduite et mes principes ne varieront jamais.”

“ Mon courrier est venu avec un passeport du Général Clarke, daté de Luneville du vingt-cinq, et qui sert pour aller et revenir. Cobentzl a envie que le courier le trouve à Paris ; dans tous les cas il y passera, et aura à cet effet son passeport contresigné par le Général Ferrand qui commande à Calais. Je l'expédierai demain au soir si vous êtes prêt.

“ J'écrirai à Thugut par votre courier d'aujourd'hui dans le sens dont nous sommes convenus. Si vous avez quelque ordre à me donner, ou que vous désiriez que j'ajoute quelques mots encore, mandez-le-moi, ou faites-moi venir ; je ne bougerai pas de chez moi.”

#### HENRY DUNDAS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, October 4. Downing Street.—“ After we parted yesterday I prepared in the evening the instructions for Sir James Pultney. Consistently with the opinions I hold, I must of course think that the force proposed to be sent to Portugal is more than sufficient for the purpose of demonstration and effectual defence of that country if Spain is the only enemy they are to contend with ; and that, if they are to be involved in a contest with both France and Spain, it is impossible for us to protect them against such a combination. I trust however that I have been successful in preparing the instructions for Sir James Pultney, agreeable to the opinion of others, without any reference to my own. I am sure it was my intention to do so ; but, that I may be sure I have succeeded, I send the proposed instructions to you in case you should wish to make any alterations upon them. You'll observe that every question of command is kept quite out of sight, and left open for your future consideration.”

#### MARQUIS WELLESLEY TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1800, October 4. Fort William.—“ Although I do not consider the present conveyance to be either very safe, or to promise much expedition, I must hazard a few lines to your address for the purpose of expressing the cordial satisfaction which I have received from your several kind and affectionate letters ; they have sustained my declining spirit throughout a long and tedious season of sickness and of vexation. Much of both have I suffered since the month of April ; and as this climate had been favourable to my health until that period of time, as the first effects of this climate are always the most formidable, and as it is well known that distress of mind in this climate never fails to attack the health, I attribute all my sufferings to the disgust and indignation with which I received the first intelligence of the King's acceptance of my services, and to the agonizing humiliation with which I have since learnt the effect of my Irish honors in every quarter of India. Never was so lofty a

pride so abased ; never was reward so effectually perverted to the purposes of degradation and dishonor. I will venture to assert that there does not exist a man in India who has not formed a more mean opinion of me in consequence of the honors which have been inflicted. If I had been left untouched, my fame would have remained uninjured on its own plain simple basis ; but these false ornaments, composed of vile, despicable materials, have added nothing of splendour and destroyed all simplicity and proportion. I would give half my fortune now that my patent could be annulled. These feelings, operating on an eager temper, have very nearly brought me to my grave. I am however now much better in health ; and notwithstanding the wreck of my spirits and the deep pangs of my heart, I have accomplished many public points of great importance, as you will soon learn ; particularly a great territorial cession from the Nizam in place of his subsidy. This measure will be highly grateful to Dundas. But I have no longer any alacrity in any part of my service. On the other hand I have lost all pleasure in the prospect of returning to Europe, depreciated and disgraced as I feel myself to be, and with the odious marks of my Sovereign's contempt fixed upon my name. It is indifferent to me where my career is now to be terminated, provided it be not terminated by any act of weakness, passion, or dishonor on my part. I shall therefore remain here, and I think, and perhaps hope, end my days here, endeavouring to struggle against the sufferings of my mind and body, and to shame the injustice of my country by additional service. I understand I have been sacrificed to Lord Cornwallis's reputation, or rather to the weak jealousy of his friends. This is atrocious injustice both to him and to me. Thank God the sentiments of my mind on this delicate subject have not been so contracted ; and I have not thought that any tribute to his fame could injure my own ; nor can I conceive how *his* could have been injured by any act of justice, by any fair proportion of reward to service, which the King might have been advised to manifest in my instance. Do not suppose that I mean to direct these complaints against your friendship, or indeed to express a sentiment of animosity against any of my friends in the Cabinet. I can safely declare that my heart beats with as much force and warmth for all of them, as when I left Europe. But their strange mistake has destroyed my personal consideration, and extinguished every spark of happiness connected with public honor in my mind. *O improvidi amici, melius et amantius ille qui gladium obtulisset !*

“I mean to write to you very fully in answer to all your exhilarating letters (which revived the memory of old and better times) by the *Mornington* packet, which I shall dispatch express in the next month, and which may perhaps reach Europe before this ship, as she must touch at the Cape.”

*Enclosure :—*

MARQUIS WELLESLEY to HENRY DUNDAS.

*Most secret.*

1800, October 4. Fort William.—“There is one subject on which I am very anxious that you, and all my friends likely to have any

influence in naming my successor, should be fully and seasonably apprized of my sentiments.

"I understand that Lord Hobart is using every effort to secure the succession to me in this Government, and has declared his determination never to be satisfied until he shall have recovered his station in India and been appointed Governor General.

"I must enter my protest against his appointment to succeed to me, and I ground my objections on reasons both of public expediency and of private justice. Lord Hobart's temper, prejudices, and reputation in Bengal disqualify him for this Government. He will overturn the whole system of this establishment, and he never will be respected here. As far as he is capable of forming any regular plan, he appears to have formed one diametrically contradictory to mine in every respect. He will therefore overthrow all my institutions and frustrate all my plans. He will be the more inclined to this violence from his natural temper, as displayed at Madras, and from his personal resentment against me, and his jealousy of my reputation. All the best men here dread the appointment of Lord Hobart; a few of the worst would rejoice in it. He now corresponds with the famous Mr. Bristow, and with others whom I know to be adverse to me.

"On private grounds, inseparably connected with those of a public nature, I think I may claim from the justice and merited gratitude of my country that my most bitter and implacable enemy, whose hatred is derived from the consciousness of his own base ingratitude and flagrant injustice towards me, should not be my immediate successor. Either I am unfit for my office, or he cannot wreak his revenge on my memory without injury to the public service. If Lord Clive should not succeed me (of whose integrity, honour, and correct principles of Indian Government I entertain the highest opinion) I make it my earnest request to all my friends, as they tender the public interests, and my honour, not to suffer Lord Hobart to be introduced into my place. I sincerely wish him success wherever he can be employed without hazard to the public. Whether my career in India should terminate by my return to Europe, or by my death, I rely on the justice and affection of my friends to keep this request in remembrance."

*Extract.*

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, October 5. Coleshill.—"I did not know of your exercising on Saturday, and therefore made a fruitless ride to Dropmore. The chief object of it was to ask you whether any or what steps are taken to give to Lord Wellesley the option of Burke's at Beaconsfield. My reason for that question is because I think, if it is not sold, that it may be very well worth my immediate attention. My brother is selling Eastbury, and meaning to realise in Bucks; he is kind enough to say that he will purchase land wherever there is a house that I should like; he destines about £15,000 to this arrangement, and with the Florida money, I think one could engage altogether in a purchase of £20,000 which I take to be about the

price of Burke's. I think it very enjoyable, and its near neighbourhood to you will with me stand in lieu of very many recommendations.

"Pray tell me what you know of this and what you think of it, and if you are only thinking of it for Mornington, do not decide anything until we have talked this over. In leaving Dropmore yesterday I rode all about it, and am quite satisfied that I shall like it if it be found practicable.

"I write, because as I hear you go to town on Tuesday, I shall not see you till your return, and I am afraid of any time being lost which may be material.

"I return here on Wednesday to dinner; if you do not want Henry in town pray send him to talk Danish with me on Wednesday.

"I suppose you will escape your naval armistice, but nevertheless if the Emperor treats, and if bread continues dear, you will all of you then be obliged to treat also.

"What a fine thing to be within 3 miles of you in Burke's summer house."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to W. PITT.

1800, October 6. Dropmore.—Proposing an adequate provision, by means of a pension and employments under the Crown, for the widow and family of Van de Spiegel, late Grand Pensionary of Holland, who had been reduced to poverty by the Dutch revolution of 1795.

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, October 6. Wimbledon.—"I received your letter of yesterday, and have made all the alterations you suggest without the least hesitation. Indeed the despatch is improved by them, and I have no indisposition to consider with perfect openness to conviction every thing you wish to state with regard to Portugal, more especially as I suspect you have not formed an accurate conception of the line I think it right at present to pursue with regard to that country. I am afraid I cannot see many things respecting it to the extent of either danger or importance which you do, but I am very far from having made up my mind that an *immediate* invitation to peace is an expedient measure with regard to Portugal. If we had refused her the aid she expected, that would have been a necessary and just measure, but sending fifteen thousand men there makes a material variation on the state of that question.

"When I say I have adopted all your suggestions as to the Portugal despatch I should have excepted one. I mean the giving more immediate hopes of the other two regiments of cavalry than I have done in the words I have used. You are mistaken if you suppose I have any backwardness on that part of the aid we have agreed to give them, but I am sure you are not aware (nor indeed can anybody who is not in the daily detail of such business) of the impossibility of giving hopes as speedily as your alteration as to those two regiments of cavalry would imply. To convey these two regiments will require 20,000 ton of transports, which must all be

fitted up with stalls, and that is not done in a short time, especially at this season, when work is to be done afloat and liable to daily interruption. But this is not the only or the chief difficulty. To take twenty thousand ton of shipping out of the general freight of the country cannot, in the present state of its trade, be done without great difficulty and a most expensive advance of freight. But even this is not the chief difficulty; for cavalry ships you are confined almost exclusively to the coal trade, and to take from that trade so great a proportion of its tonnage at any moment, and particularly at this season of the year, and in the agitated feelings of the country, is an experiment that cannot be tried without the most pressing necessity. I wish you to recollect the effect upon that trade which the measure of taking transports for cavalry to Holland last year produced, and although that happened and every exertion was made, we never had it in our power to transmit even for that passage more than one regiment at a time; I really believe not so much. How much then is the difficulty increased when you are to carry them to Lisbon. If you ask me why I must confine myself to the coal trade, it is because the Baltic, the West India, and all the other great branches of trade are carried on in two decked ships, on board of which it would be impossible to carry horses to Lisbon. Indeed, carry them in the best mode you possibly can, you must lay your account that at this season at least one horse in four will be lost in the passage, and that all the remainder will be a very considerable time before they are fit to take the field. This last consideration leads me to suggest to you the propriety of informing yourself how far it is possible for the Portuguese, by drafting the horses from their own cavalry, or by purchasing for us 1,500 of the best horses the country produces, to mount our men on the spot. It would be worth our while to give any price, when I tell you it will take about 200,000*l.* to carry over these two regiments of cavalry, independent of the delay and other inconveniences I have stated. If they could accommodate us in this respect, we could give them the two regiments of dismounted cavalry as soon as you please, for you deceive yourself if you suppose there is any affected delay on my part. I have no such feeling. On the contrary, I wish every thing that goes to go as quickly and as perfect as possible, and, on that principle, I have much satisfaction by informing you that by the report of the Duke of York, who has been reviewing them, the Dutch troops (in fact most of them are Germans) are in the very highest order. That is the report received this very morning, in addition to that of Colonel Sontag, whose authority I quoted to you formerly, and there can be none better.

“I have only to mention to you one idea more which has occurred to me in the course of last night on the subject of Portugal. With every kind disposition to Sir James Pultney and a high respect for his military talents, I feel what you do, and I know others do the same, as to his getting that command. An idea has occurred that Sir Charles Grey would perhaps be the very best man, *if he could be induced to go*. I have reasons for this doubt which I shall mention to you to-morrow in confidence, but, if any body can induce him, I think it is myself, and I am sure both at home and every where else

it would totally alter the whole complexion of the business if he was to have the chief command of both our and the Portuguese troops."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, October 6. Wimbledon.—“ I thank you for your suggestion with respect to cavalry for Egypt. Sir Ralph has already 150 which he will carry there with him, and I will add considerably to it, 150 more at least. This will answer for orderlies, vedettes, attending the outposts to bring intelligence and prevent surprise. As to all the rest we must trust to the Turkish cavalry if we are to act in squadrons. I have always understood that they are by much the [best] part of their army, and in reality very efficient. By the copy of Sir Ralph Abercrombie's instructions which I have ordered to be sent to you, you will see what I wish you to write to Lord Elgin and General Kœhler. Indeed I wish you to send to Lord Elgin the extract from the instructions which I have desired to be made and sent to you for that purpose. It will further be desirable that you should direct Lord Elgin to provide three or four hundred horses to mount our detachment of cavalry. I imagine he will have no difficulty in getting them for us either from the Turkish cavalry in Suna or elsewhere, or by directing them to be purchased for us at Candia or Cyprus. I have wrote a private letter to Sir Ralph Abercrombie to inform him of this arrangement, and I have made use of the same means to convey to him, that if he has no particular reason against it, he would send Generals Coote and Craddock to Portugal. My reason is that I know them to be favourite officers of Sir Charles Grey, in case he should go there. I am sure Sir Charles would rather have Prince William of Gloucester as [than ?] otherwise, and in every other point of view it is very eligible that he should go as much as possible on service. He certainly did well in Holland.”

W. WINDHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, October 7.—“ I send you the inclosed papers, as there was no opportunity the other day of reading them through.

“ If you concur in general in their contents, I will proceed in the business without delay, sending the plan to Wickham by the officer who will set off to join Ramsay, and be employed in the accounts, on Friday.

“ I am more disturbed by our decision of last week in the part which relates to Portugal than in that which regards Egypt. From the latter good may possibly come. I by no means pretend to say that the attempt may not succeed, and even easily. In fact if it succeeds at all, it is likely to be easily. I only think that the risk is not compensated by the hope, and then the trial might be made in a more advantageous manner.

“ In the case of Portugal it is a question of good faith and of reputation with respect to our allies, in which the evil is certain and never to be repaired. *Laesa pudicitia est, deperit illa semel.* It is one of the fatal circumstances of the time that all who look for effectual protection will learn to fly to the French Republic,

who will at least defend them from all hostility but its own. A facility of giving up allies is not a character calculated to assist us, either in recovering our importance in Europe, or in maintaining ourselves. Even independent of this consideration, I should think it very bad policy to accelerate the period which is to deprive us of Portugal. But this is a subject which it is idle for me to dwell upon. I wish only to mark, in some way, my dissent from this part of the measure as one had an opportunity of doing with respect to the other; to which in fact my objection is less strong and less decisive than it is to the course of policy which is determined upon with respect to Portugal. If no other occasion should occur, I will beg you to take the trouble of keeping this as a memorandum of my opinion."

*Postscript.*—"I congratulate you about Malta, which will be no small help to the present plan respecting Egypt; though I know not whether it does not tell more as an argument for deferring it."

LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

1800, October 7. Dropmore.—"I send you a private letter from Lord Elgin relating to a matter we discussed the other day at the Cabinet. I have too much regard for Sir S. Smith to let this letter go into circulation or get into the Office, nor do I think it fit it should do so without giving both to him and to his brother an opportunity to reply to it. But as it may be material just now that you should have seen it, I send it you in confidence." *Copy.*

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1800, October 9. Crems-Munster.—"I send your Lordship, enclosed, extracts of two letters of mine to Lord Minto on the subject of Lehrbach which will sufficiently shew that I had the same apprehensions as your Lordship on the subject of the Emperor's departure from Vienna, when trusted to such hands. It was the dread of the Queen of Naples, as much as the habit of passing eighteen hours a day in what Suwarow called the *antre infernale*, that induced Thugut to take this fatal step. Lord Minto assures me, what I really believe to be the case, that Thugut knew him thoroughly, and that his only answer on the subject of representations as to L[e]hrbach's known character was that he had no one else to send. Dietrichstein has redeemed many of his sins (besides making a full confession of them) by his conduct on this occasion. He has besides thrown himself entirely into our hands, and he is an instrument of which great use may be made, so that I shall venture to recommend with respect to this gentleman (who after all is but a poor creature) that we should forget all old causes of quarrel, and that he should be received again with favour. I had him here for a week before the renewal of hostilities; fed him well, and coaxed him, so that I really believe he had not a secret of any kind from me. I know, from undoubted proof, that before he left me, he gave his decided opinion to Thugut that nothing but the recall of the Archduke could

save the army. I made him friends also with Fasbinder on the ground of their mutual jealousy and hatred of Count Lehrbach, and I have indeed little doubt but that the driving away of this wretch will lead to the recall of His Royal Highness, the only *real* object at which I have aimed ; for, whether it was Lehrbach or any other diplomatic knave and coward at H[ead] Q[uarters] did not much signify. It may seem a strange thing to say, but from the moment I knew of L[e]hrbach's appointment, I began to entertain hopes that either he would get himself or we should lead him into such a scrape as must somehow or other bring the Archduke back to us ; *quod Divum promittere . . . fecit* Lehrbach.

“ I have only one word to add. Should the Archduke come, never mind forms or prejudices or opinions of his past conduct in certain respects. Let the King write him a *good* line of congratulation on the occasion. I know your Lordship will frame such a one as that it shall be flattering to himself without giving jealousy to the Emperor, and such a measure cannot fail of doing *good* to us, *good* to Austria, and *good* to Europe. May I add that, if any notice is taken of your Lordship's humble servant in the letter, it should be, directly or indirectly, as of a person who has sent flattering and favourable reports of His Royal Highness ; who is an enthusiastic admirer of His Royal Highness ; and whose opinion has ever been most marked and pronounced on the subject of the command of the army being placed in His Royal Highness's hands, whenever it should please God to allow of such an event taking place by restoring His Royal Highness's health. I ask, as in duty bound, a thousand pardons for recurring again to this subject, but it is nearest my heart from the conviction only of its utility.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, October 9. Coleshill.—“ I returned here yesterday from a campaign something shorter but much more successful than that of the Imperial army. By what you tell me of Otto's last communication the Consul appears to have had a very unnecessary apprehension of the possibility of your closing with the terms of the proposed armistice, and therefore he has hurried as fast as he can to the proposition of a separate peace from his confidence that you will reject what you have already rejected, and leave him alone to settle with the Emperor how much or rather how little of his Imperial Crown shall be left to him to wear : for I presume there can be no doubt that these arrangements will now be concluded by a separate treaty for the Court of Vienna. It has long been my opinion that, putting by other considerations upon the mere question of terms of peace, we should treat with great advantage by treating for ourselves alone, and therefore, in this view, I do not see for my part much to regret in the Luneville peace of Austria and France ; but it is impossible at the same time not to see that the apparent dereliction of us by all our allies will have the future mischief of indisposing the country more than ever to foreign connections, and will be an immediate and strong motive with the public for urging our government upon the subject of peace. By what I

can collect, I should not guess that Pitt had expressed much confidence in his materials for another war-budget, as besides the diminution of the income tax, I hear that he is forced to abandon the resource which he had hoped from porter, on account of the very high price of barley; but be this as it may, the scarcity of bread and the consequent distress of the poor, if it continues, will I believe, force you whether you will or no to make your peace with France. God grant that I may be mistaken in my opinion; at least I am sure that opinion does not grow out of my desire and impatience to meddle in that arrangement; to do so may become a duty but cannot be suspected to be an object of ambition or of personal gratification.

“Upon this dreadful evil of the distress of the poor I am really quite sore with all that I hear and see of it, and am strongly inclined to think that there is neither justice, humanity, or policy in not enforcing the power which the magistrates have of proportioning in some degree the price of labour to the actual price of bread, whatever be the cause of that price. In a village which I stopped in the day before yesterday, 3 miles from Aylesbury, I found the established price of labour there in the present moment is *seven shillings per week*, and the farmer who told me so thought I ought to be satisfied with his observing that this low price was made high enough by the increase of the poor’s rates; so that according to that doctrine every industrious and hard-working labourer in the country is told that if he labours all day he cannot escape from becoming a recorded pauper, or live by his spade without receiving the alms and charity of the parish in which he works. These thoughts and reflections do really quite sicken my mind. I had hoped that my brother would have attended the Quarter Sessions, and would have waited there to have urged him to have taken the lead in proposing to the magistrates to exercise their authority upon this point. It would, I think, have become his character and situation to have been the first in the country to propose this measure, however strong may be the prejudices against it; unfortunately, as I think it, he remains at Gosfield till November. You must not be surprised at my wandering from foreign politics into this question, for I am very much persuaded that, in the result, the two questions will be found to be very nearly and closely connected.

“My mention to you of Beaconsfield was in the very first passage of that idea across my mind, but I never was in the house, and I have not any guess whatever as to the value of the estate, the size of it, or the sum which is asked for it. As I suppose from your letter that your friend Bernard has been discussing this point, I think I cannot in any way get so good information as by begging you to write to him directly to send you all the particulars whatever which he knows respecting either the house or the land, the purchase money which is asked, and the supposed value which it really bears. I am sorry to worry you who have business enough upon your hands, but I know that you will not grudge your trouble to help to place us within four miles of one another for the evening of the days that remain to us.”

## LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF CARYSFORT.

*Private.*

1800, October 9. Cleveland Row.—“I have just received your letter, No. 7, from the Chevalier de Bray. I am to see him to-morrow, but it is probable that my despatches to Vienna will too fully occupy my time to allow of my writing to you after I have seen him.

“You will see that I think you inclined to go too far in overtures to Russia; not that the object is less valuable in my eyes than in your’s if I saw the least hope of keeping him steady to our system by attentions and flattery. I believe the contrary to be the case, and that with his character, indifference and even affected neglect, is more likely to work than any system of coaxing.

“His present hostility to us goes much farther than you seem to be aware of. I shall send you by to-morrow’s mail, for your information only, the copy of his representation at Berlin for the purpose of forming a new neutral league against us. To remark upon the extravagance of this paper would be useless; but what is worthy of attention in it is the desire to do mischief.

“Haugwitz’s answer, and the language he may have held to you about it, will afford no bad test of the sincerity of his declarations of wishing us well, of which I believe not one syllable.

“But if he has not spoken to you about it, do not question him upon it. We ought not to betray too much anxiety about a thing that may create some temporary inconvenience, but cannot, in our present situation, do us any serious harm. I do not think any good is to be done at Berlin just now by putting ourselves forward.

“But above all we must be careful not to do anything that can solicit, or even facilitate their intervention in any negotiations of ours with France. They have too great a longing to play the part of mediators, not to watch every opportunity for that purpose. We have nothing to gain by their interference. To our views of maritime strength and power they are, as you yourself say, decidedly hostile. With respect to Austria, such is their blindness that they had rather see France the absolute mistress of Germany than lose the opportunity of lowering Austria.

“I will own to you that I wish you had not gone so far as to give them any insight into our views about Bavaria and the Netherlands. We are bound by treaty with Austria not to mix Prussia in our negotiations respecting Continental peace without the Emperor’s express consent. That subject above all others is one which, if our views could have been acted upon, would have required the utmost dexterity of Austrian management in order to reconcile Prussia and the other states of Germany to the seeing Vienna acquire so great an accession of power. In general I think it much safer for us, in the present state of Prussian politics, to rest upon our oars, and *voir venir*, than to hazard confidences which are only used as so many weapons against ourselves.

“I trust it is unnecessary for me to caution you not to let Krudener draw you into any conversation about Malta, and above all, not to allow him to make you the channel of any thing like official

communications or representations from Petersburg on this delicate subject.

“It is one advantage which we derive (in common with many inconveniences) from the Emperor’s absurd measure of breaking off all official intercourse with us, that he will not know how to communicate with us on this subject without treading back some of his steps.

“I write to you, as you desire, quite freely both as to what is passed, and as to the line which seems to me to be the best for the future. Our situation is no doubt a critical one, and the folly of these Continental powers in directing their jealousies and resentments against their only defenders may create to us much trouble. But long experience has proved to me that this madness is not cured by coaxing and lenitives, and that the only mode to obtain their friendship is to convince them that we do not want it. Their present partiality to France is a species of love which is more than half compounded of fear. By steady councils and the protection of Providence, I have no doubt we shall weather these difficulties, as we have weathered others of a much more fearful aspect than these.

“Before you receive this letter you will probably know with certainty whether Austria decides to treat without us or not. Lord Minto, in his last despatch, seems still to think they will not.

“All our papers about the armistice will immediately be published. It may be very useful for you to try if Gentz can be persuaded to write a commentary upon them, to place in its true light Bonaparte’s perfidy and double dealing, which I have endeavoured strongly to mark in all the notes of this Government.”  
*Copy.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MINTO.

*Private.*

1800, October 10. Cleveland Row.—“I share with you all the grief and indignation which the despicable weakness of the Emperor’s councils has excited in your mind. The step is, I fear, irretrievable, even if from this moment other principles and sentiments could prevail. But what hope is there of this from an Emperor of Germany who has publicly proclaimed his cowardice in the face of Europe, and delivered himself up, bound hand and foot, to his enemies, *qui lora restrictis lacertis sensit iners, timuitque mortem.*

“Yet with all this we have adhered to our system, not in the hope of much further co-operation from such an ally, but because we will not give the example to Europe of abandoning, even under such circumstances, those to whom we are bound by treaty.

“If, *par impossibile*, it were yet a question who should go to Luneville to treat jointly with Mr. Grenville, we should have a right to require that it should not be Lehrbach. But it seems more likely that he will go there and patch up a separate peace, and then we must do the same; for in their present humour, Russia and Prussia would be much more likely to interfere against our objects than for them. Send us therefore the earliest notice you can, that we may take our measures accordingly.” *Copy.*

## HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, October 10. Wimbledon.—“ I yesterday received yours enclosing the private letter from Lord Elgin. I suspect by the date of it, *Dropmore, 7 October*, it should have come to me sooner. I am very sorry for the contents of it. I have some time thought that the French had of late flattered Sir S. Smith into a better opinion of them than he used to have, but I cannot lay aside the partiality I have for his many gallant and honourable traits of conduct. Is there not however a danger in the delay your proposed enquiry will lead to? Either Lord Elgin or the Smiths should come away, for the public service never can go on with any effect or even safety in the hands of such jarring and discordant instruments, and the smallest appearance of it at Constantinople must break down the whole credit of our Government there. I daresay you will do what is best in the business, but you have an embarrassing part to act.”

## HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, October 10. Wimbledon.—“ I have sent for Mr. Nepean to sound Sir Charles Grey before I mention the subject to the Duke of York, as I would not wish to have any battle upon it, and then Sir Charles decline it. When I learn Sir Charles's determination I will then write to the Duke of York in a way to remove any objection to it. The Duke thinks that it would be improper for Prince William of Gloucester to go with only Sir James Pultney there, as, in the event of any thing befalling Sir James, the command would devolve on Prince William. Sir James Pultney and Prince William are the two youngest Lieutenant-Generals on the list. If Sir Charles Grey accepts I think it would remove all objections, as, in that case, with both Sir James Pultney and Sir Charles Grey, I can see no good objection to Prince William, or still less to the Hereditary Prince of Orange on this subject; therefore I will do no more till I hear from Sir Charles Grey.

“ I go to Cheltenham on Monday. As Parliament is to meet so soon, I am really very averse to going, and nothing would make me agree to it except the hope of Mr. Pitt following me, which he has promised to do. Sir Walter thinks if he was once at Cheltenham, he would come there himself and entice him to Bath, which is only forty miles from it. Our plan about Goa may wait till I return. I am afraid the early meeting of Parliament may interfere with the plan of Mr. Pitt going to Bath, but, if there is a prospect on a short trial of its agreeing with him, he might go for a month after our short session.”

CHARLES DE THUISY, Knight of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem,  
to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, October 12. Richmond, Surrey.—“ Fidèle aux sentimens que je vous dois, j'ai eu l'honneur de vous communiquer à différentes époques des notes relatives à Malte. Celle que je crois devoir transmettre aujourd'hui à votre Excellence m'a été fournie par le commandeur de Thuisy, mon frère, qui étoit à Malte lors des

horribles événemens du 10 Juin 1798, qui l'y est conduit d'une manière malheureusement si inutile, et qui n'est arrivé ici que depuis quelques semaines."

*Enclosure :—*

NOTE SUR LE PRODUIT DE MALTE, ET LES DÉPENSES QUE L'ORDRE  
FAISAIT DANS CETTE ILE.

" En 1530, quand Charles Quint donna Malte à l'Ordre de St. Jean de Jerusalem, cette ile n'était qu'un rocher presque inculte, et qui nourrissait à peine 12,000 habitans.

" Aujourd'hui la population des iles de Malte et du Goze est.

" pour la citée la Valette	-	-	de	25,000
" pour la ville qui est à gauche du port	-	-	de	14,000
" pour la citée vielle	-	-	de	4,000
" et pour les campagnes	-	-	de	62,000

Total, 105,000 ames

" Non comprises les troupes de la religion, les membres de l'Ordre, et les Maltais émigrés en Sicile et en Espagne.

" Un bon tiers de l'île n'étant encore que rocher, n'a pas encore été cultivé, mais ces rochers n'auraient su résister à l'inconcevable activité du bon peuple de Malte, le plus laborieux comme le plus heureux qui fût au monde, jusqu'à ce que Ferdinand Hompech l'abandonnat aux Français. Il ne payait presque pas d'impôts. Toutes les dépenses, toutes les richesses de l'Ordre tournaient à son avantage, son commerce était protégé; des écoles gratuites, des hôpitaux commodes et magnifiques lui étaient ouverts.

" Le sol des iles de Malte et du Goze suffirait, peut-être, à une partie de la subsistance de ses habitans, si le désir d'un plus grand bénéfice ne les portait à préférer, à la culture du bled, celle des cotons. Ainsi dans la supposition très positive que les récoltes en grain fournissent pour trois ou quatre mois, la consommation du surplus tiré de la Sicile et du Levant est estimée de 55 à 60,000 salmes (la salme pèse 240 rottes, et la rotte équivaut à 30 onces).

" Pour avoir une idée exacte du commerce des iles de Malte et du Goze, on a calculé par année décimale l'exportation des cotons filés, ainsi que le produit de ceux qui se fabriquent et se consomment dans le pays.

" On a estimé l'exportation des premiers à 10,430 quintaux de rottes qui, évalués à 120 écus Maltais ou scudi le quintal (le scudi vaut 48 sols Tournois) rendraient 1,251,600 scudis.

" On a de même estimé à 600,000 scudi le travail des manufactures et métiers; ce qui porterait l'évaluation du produit

" total des cotons à	-	-	-	1,851,600 scudi
" ou	-	-	-	4,443,840 tournois

" On cultive deux espèces de coton, l'indigène qui est blanc, et celui de Siam qui est jaune.

" Les seuls droits, les seuls impôts qui se perçoissent au nom du Grand Maître étaient

" 1°. Celui sur toute espèce de denrées étrangères, les grains et les comestibles

exceptés. Ce droit pour le Maltais était de  $3\frac{1}{2}$  pour cent. sur toutes marchandises entrant et sortant des ports, et pour les étrangers de  $6\frac{1}{2}$  pour cent. Le simple transit ne payait qu'un pour cent.

Ce droit de douane rendait	-	95,000	scudis
" 2°. Celui d'assise ou droit sur le vin	-	53,000	"
" 3°. Le nouvel impôt créé par le Grand maitre Cotoner en 16—	-	4,000	"
" 4°. Celui sur les meubles vendus, de 3 écus 4 tarins pour cent (le tarin vaut 4 scudi tournois)	-	8,000	"
		<hr/>	
Total,		160,000	"

" Les maisons et fonds de terre ne payaient rien. Point de capitation. Le Grand Maitre avait des domaines dans l'île de Malte et principalement du Goze.

" La dépense que l'Ordre faisait et dont le profit tout entier était pour le peuple de Malte, cette dépense calculée ainsi par année décimale était

" 1° le Grand Hopital	-	-	100,476	scudi
" 2° l'hospital des femmes	-	-	18,676	"
" 3° les enfans trouvés	-	-	6,146	"
" 4° les pensions ( <i>Bene meriti</i> )	-	-	1,070	"
" 5° le Piazza Morte	-	-	2,326	"
" 6° le Monastère de St. Ursule	-	-	520	"
" 7° Les aumones annuelles aux convents et autres, en pain	-	-	17,309	"
" 8° La Castillanie (Tribunal)	-	-	223	"
" 9° Les fontaines publiques	-	-	2,920	"
" 10° Le collège	-	-	1,848	"
" <i>Nota.</i> —Le Grand Maitre doublait cette dernière somme.				
" 11° Les magasins, arséniaux, corderies	-	-	18,264	"
" 12° La Marine	-	-	474,942	"
" 13° Les troupes de terre	-	-	173,038	"
" 14° Les fabriques, môles, rues, &c.	-	-	31,626	"
" 15° Les gardes du Grand Maitre	-	-	20,000	"
" 16° Les aumones du Grand Maitre en grain et argent	-	-	1,006	"
			<hr/>	
" Total	-	-	870,390	scudis

" On pourrait ajouter à ce calcul les revenus du Grand Maitre consommés dans l'île ; enfin l'Ordre consommait à Malte plus de 3 millions d'écus, dont la plus grande partie était au bénéfice de ces malheureux habitants, aux quels les Français sont venus apporter tous les genres de calamité. Les Maltais sont religieux jusqu'à la superstition, ils étaient très attachés à l'Ordre, et ce qu'on doit appeler le peuple était resté très étranger aux infernales machinations qui ont ouvert les ports de Malte à Buonaparté." *Copy.*

## EARL TEMPLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, October 12. Dawlish.—“I some time ago wrote by my father’s desire to Mr. Pitt relative to my old tutor, Mr. Holt, and I have since spoken to him on the subject, but, from the multiplicity of church applications he must receive, and church engagements he must be under, I can hardly flatter myself with any reasonable hope of success. The fact is that poor Holt, to whom I feel every thing I ought to feel for a man for whom I bear a very sincere affection, and who deserves every thing I can do for him, is turned adrift with a small living and a large family, and my father, having church jobs of his own upon his hands quite sufficient, has turned over the providing for Holt to me. I know the difficulty which attends a business of this sort, but, at the same time, I feel so very anxious to serve him, that I am induced to do what in any other case I would not do, and ask your advice in what way I can best set about to arrange my object; and if you could give me any assistance in it I should really feel grateful.”

## WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1800, October 12. Crems-Munster. — Soliciting from the British Government a suitable provision for the widow and family of the Swiss Advoyer de Steiguer, whose recent death had reduced them to poverty. “With the poor Advoyer I look upon Switzerland as irretrievably gone; and I think the manner in which it must be disposed of at the general peace one of the most knotty, delicate, and at the same time important points that you will have to settle. On this subject I fairly own that I cannot see my way at all. And it is one upon which I have heard nothing but rank nonsense from others. I had some talk with Thugut upon the subject when I was at Vienna in June last, but I found him more in the dark than ever, and as unwilling to receive as incapable of comprehending any notions whatever about the necessity of fixing an impenetrable barrier to France on that side, in some shape or other. I need not say that any neutrality but an armed one would be a mere bugbear in the way of armed France; and yet how to arm such a neutrality, or how and with what precautions to trust arms into its hands, or how to obtain anything better than a neutrality, are questions that I find equally difficult to solve. Were it not that such a measure would be at least as dangerous as it would in some respects be advantageous to both parties, I should think that the whole would terminate in a partition; and, in my mind, anything would be better for Austria than an unarmed and inefficient neutrality.”

## WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private and Confidential.*

1800, October 12. Crems-Munster.—“I have said nothing hitherto to your Lordship of my situation with respect to Drake, or of the powers I had found it necessary to give him, because I was sure that your Lordship would immediately guess the whole

truth. The fact is that he fairly drove me away from the left bank, of the Danube, horse, foot and dragoons. I was disposed at first, foolishly enough, to be rather angry, but, upon better consideration, I could not help laughing myself at the adventure, and I thought I should act much more wisely in endeavouring to turn his zeal and talents to the public service, even though I were to make myself, which I saw I must do, his very humble servant. I have since had no reason to repent of what I have done, though it has cost me some alarms and not a few *estafettes* to prevent his going too precipitately to work, both of which I had avoided before by concluding nothing myself, nor letting anybody else conclude anything for want of powers. I think it nothing more than my duty to add that he has done his business, as far as I am a judge, well and ably and with temper; and though I could have dispensed altogether with his interference and assistance, yet now that he is there I shall give him every support, assistance and countenance in my power, direct and *indirect*. I have already marked my entire *confidence* in him in private letters both to Montgelas and to Dietrichstein, who have both dealt with him accordingly. Somehow or other, however, the former gentleman has made him believe that he was above taking a bribe, which I can only attribute to his belief that I should give him a better. My sending Colonel Hope there was a matter of necessity, not of choice, in consequence of the 6th article of the Amberg Convention, which rendered the residence of a British *Umpire* with the corps absolutely necessary; and there was no one else to be found, the Elector having peremptorily refused P—— as such. I thought Hope objectionable in some points; but he has so entirely gained the good opinion of both Austrians and Bavarians, and they have each of them expressed to me such a confidence in his impartiality as well as in his military knowledge, that I am now really anxious that he should remain there permanently. His having the commission of Austrian colonel gives him a weight with the Austrians that no other man could possibly acquire, and he is much attended to in consequence of the personal favour and kindness shewn him by the Emperor. The fact is that the Emperor had given him the commission of colonel gratuitously, and had written through Lehrbach to Thugut to say that he should be happy to have him about his own person as aide-de-camp, when Lehrbach, who had already his project ready cut and dried, interfered, and said positively that he could not have the rank unless he were employed with some of the subsidiary corps, as upon enquiry, it had been found that it was contrary to established rule and etiquette that a foreigner should be placed about the Emperor.

“Before Hope went to the Bav[arian] corps I had a full explanation with him about our respective situations; which, of course, was such in its termination as you might have expected from a man who knew the world, and who was born north of the Tweed.”

The EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, October 16. Berlin.—“As Lord Minto has sent me a box of despatches, with directions to forward them with all possible

expedition, and as there is barely time for the courier to reach Cuxhaven before the packet sails, I have only to say that I have nothing material to add to my last despatch. Lucchesini sets out to-morrow. Our conversation was interrupted almost as soon as it began, but he took me aside to say, in case he should have no opportunity of renewing it, that he was fully informed of, and should pay the greatest attention to all the points of contest between the two countries, *dont les vues et les intérêts ne se croisent en rien, et sont, à bien d'égards, précisément les mêmes, particulièrement pour ce qui regarde la Hollande, et le nord de l'Allemagne.* The Hanoverian Minister, however, seems to be under some alarm as to the intentions of Prussia with regard to the Electorate. His apprehensions originated in something said to him by the Duke of Brunswick at Potsdam, which I mentioned in a despatch. I do not however partake his fears, and think what Count Haugwitz said to me at that time, together with the general tenor of his conversation since, sufficient to show the Prussian Government have, at this moment, no intention hostile to his Majesty's interest there. The Turk assures me he has sent no messenger, but that the report originated from his having applied for a passport for one of his people who is returning home. As it appears however by Lord Elgin's letter that there has been some sort of negotiation carried on through the Turk detained at Paris and the agents of this Court to procure the reception of a Spanish minister at Constantinople, I do not think implicit reliance is to be placed on this account, and am glad I have given notice to Lord Elgin. How deplorable is the state of the Austrian Government, when no person of better character and talents than Cobenzl can be found to be ostensible Minister, and to conduct a negotiation of such importance as that at Luneville, if it ever takes place, must be.

"I have just learned, from an English merchant arrived from Petersburg, the strange story of the sending back of Sharpe, which seems to put an end to all my speculations of good from that quarter."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, October 10-20]. Coleshill.—"Here are authorities enough for *Britanniæ* :

"Scaliger in his notes upon Catullus says : '*solenne Romanorum provincias numero plurali enunciare*' and accordingly we find

"*Hunc Gallice timent, timent Britannicæ* Catullus, Ep. 30

"*Mavult quam Syrias Britanniasque* Catullus, Ep. 46.

"*Die alias iterum naviget Illyrias* Propert, 2 Ep. 16.

but what is decisive authority with me is that Pliny in speaking of the British islands and Ireland says thus, '*ex adverso hujus situs Britannia insula—Albion ipsi nomen fuit, cum Britannicæ vocarentur omnes ; de quibus mox paulo dicemus ;* and then he enumerates Hybernia, the Orcades, Mona. This passage is in *Hist. Nat.* L. 4, cap. 16 ; and afterwards in Lib. 33 of the same work, speaking of the fashion of wearing rings on different fingers he says :

"*Galliæ* (that is the different people of Gaul as he has himself

described them, L. 4, c. 17) *Britanniæque* (i.e., all those islands) *in medio dicuntur usæ (annuls)*. I think these passages ample authority.

“Would not Lucretius furnish a motto for the union, if one were wanted.

“*Vis conjuncta atque uniter apta,*” Lucretius, L. 5, 559.

“I hope to stay here till towards Saturday or Sunday; if before that you hear anything which it imports me to know, pray send me a line.”

#### H. FAGEL to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, October 17. Curzon Street.—“I was particularly desired by the Hereditary Prince of Orange to endeavour to speak to your Lordship to-day, in order to give you an account of the conversation His Serene Highness had yesterday morning with His Royal Highness the Duke of York. In consequence I wrote to you this morning to know whether and when it would be convenient to you to receive me, but hearing that you have left town I am forced to trouble you with these few lines.

“It will not be possible for me now to enter into the detail of the Duke of York’s conversation with the Hereditary Prince, which I should have done if I had had the pleasure of seeing you. I must be contented to inform you at present that the Duke desired the Prince to explain to him in writing what his wishes were, and what had passed on the subject. In consequence the Hereditary Prince desired me to put upon paper what I had mentioned to him in your Lordship’s name and the substance of his answer. From my minute and from the Prince’s alterations and additions has resulted the enclosed note, which His Serene Highness wishes to deliver as soon as possible to the Duke of York, in compliance with His Royal Highness’s request, but which step he would not take before your Lordship had seen the paper. I therefore beg you will return it to me when you have perused it, and acquaint me with any observations you may have made upon its contents.”

#### LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

1800, October 18. Dropmore.—“You have sent me no answer about the command in Portugal. I am sorry to break in upon you, but I am obliged to do it, because I am afraid the Duke of York is already hurt at having heard first from the Hereditary Prince upon the subject, and these two Princes seem to me to be getting into a discussion upon the subject such as is not likely to lead to good. If the thing were over, settled either way, it might easily be put in a proper light as to them both. I am much pressed for a final answer, and should be obliged to you to let me know how it is settled.

“My communication with the Hereditary Prince now rests on this footing, that he is not to be considered as having finally accepted till he knows what officers are to be employed in that army, and what relative rank he is to hold with regard to them.” *Copy.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE to H. FAGEL.

1800, October 18. Dropmore.—“I regret very much that I missed seeing you yesterday. I have some verbal remarks to

make on the paper you sent to me which I cannot so well do by letter.

“I would propose to you to come here if it suited you, but I am myself going away for a day or two, and must therefore defer conversing with you on the subject till Tuesday morning, when I shall be in town.” *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to EARL TEMPLE.

1800, October 19. Droppmore.—“I received a few days ago your letter of the 12th. I heartily wish that it was in my power to be of the least service to you in respect to your wishes for Mr. Holt, but the foreign department offers no means of ecclesiastical patronage. Not even an Ambassador’s chaplain is named here, or provided by the Government, so that it has more than once happened that, in some of the most considerable capitals of Europe, the King’s subjects residing there have not had the possibility of attending the worship of the church to which they belong; a scandal with which, I believe, no other nation in Europe can be reproached.

“You have taken, I believe, the only possible means of putting Mr. Holt *sur les rangs* for a prebend, and all that can be done more is that you should occasionally refresh Mr. Pitt’s memory by fresh applications on the subject.

“But I know by experience that there is no other line of preference in which the things to be given bear so small a proportion to the persons who ask; their being no friend of Government of any consideration in either House who has not a tutor of his own or his son’s, whom he wishes to make a prebendary.” *Copy.*

The EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, October 21. Berlin.—“Nothing but the full persuasion that you will continue without scruple or reserve to give me your opinion of the past, and your advice for the future, can give me any confidence in myself or reconcile me to my situation. But you may rely upon it I have not said a word to court the Emperor of Russia beyond what you have already expressly approved. Still less have I given Haugwitz any insight into your views respecting Bavaria and the Netherlands, nor do I believe that he in the least suspects them. You would not have had this fear if I had not, to save Garlike trouble, omitted almost all the share I had in my last conversation with Haugwitz. As to Bavaria, I really have done no more than to ask Haugwitz if, in case of Austria making an immediate and separate peace, the King of Prussia, notwithstanding his professions of friendship, and the Elector’s earnest entreaties (at that moment the common talk of Berlin) could leave him to the mercy of the French. And as to the Netherlands, I have only set forth the common interest of the two countries to rescue them out of the hands of France, and expressed my private belief that, for such a consideration, Great Britain would perhaps sacrifice a part of those conquests she was certainly fully equal to retain. In any view of the subject it could not but be of use, if possible, to have some ground to conjecture what specific interest

Prussia might take on those subjects. And I have always answered Haugwitz's invitations by reminding him of His Majesty's engagements to Austria. So that though you have been naturally alarmed by the sort of fidget I show when I am writing to you on subjects which interest me so strongly, I trust no harm has been done. Garlike has just read to me a private letter of his to you in October, 1898, respecting a conversation between the Duke of Brunswick and Count Panin, which I think you should read with my despatch of this date. From the two it should seem that Prussia might be bribed to consent to some considerable acquisitions for Austria, and Russia might consent to considerable changes for that purpose in the Empire, and, therefore, that it is not absolutely impossible to bring about some concert of those powers; but I must own I think, though it would be a delicate business, Great Britain must move the matter if it is meant it should succeed.

"Krudener will, I dare say, not return to the charge about Malta. He must have done it of his own head, and I trust I have not steered much wide of the line you wished. Was it my private letter, No. 7, that led you to mistake my meaning as to the disposition of this Court to support our maritime power? Haugwitz has uniformly declared himself and his master convinced that it is the great bulwark of Europe, and desirous of seeing it extended; nor do I believe he has countenanced, or means to countenance, the resumption of the armed neutrality. I alluded in that letter only to the notion prevalent here, that our success in the war makes us indifferent to peace; and that France, since Bonaparte has been sovereign, has really desired it. This delusion is beginning to pass away. But it had seized the King very strongly, and I daresay he will be one of the last undeceived. I have no hopes of the steadiness of Austria. The Emperor's pusillanimity has been too conspicuous, and the language still held by the Court is not at all calculated to rouse the spirit of the army and the people.

"Gentz undertakes the commentary with joy. It will be executed *con amore*; but, to be of use, it must appear speedily, and we want Otto's communication of the 23rd of September, which, from the answer to it, must be curious and likely to make impression on the Continent." *Copy.*

#### THE EARL OF CARYSFORT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Original written in secret ink.*

1800, October 21. Berlin.—"As we do not differ in opinion as to the important use which might be made of Russia, if that country was directed by a wise and steady administration, I trust you will not think it unreasonable if I say that, in spite of the personal character of the sovereign, no means should be omitted to establish a good understanding and some degree of concert with him. The late conduct of the Court of Vienna, the cession of the three fortresses, and above all, if it should be confirmed, the retreat of Thugut, opens a view of affairs almost entirely new, and certainly does not diminish the importance of Russia. I agree in a great measure with Lord Whitworth that Paul's natural perverseness

may be increased by too much flattery. I always thought we did harm by talking so much of his magnanimity; and as to his troops, you may remember I declared, as soon as I knew they were to be employed, pretty nearly the same opinion you now do. But we must look not only to the character of the Russian monarch but the views and conduct of other powers, and first as to those of Prussia, which seem bent upon bringing about a peace between France and all the belligerent powers by separate treaties, if it cannot be done by a general arrangement. For what purpose? That Prussia may form a defensive alliance in which her first object would be a connection with Russia, and the next with Great Britain.

“It is very difficult to form any sure conjecture upon the views of a Court absorbed in such narrow politics and under the guidance of such Ministers; but some grounds for this may be found in my despatches, and Mr. Garlike’s will have informed you that France has long since proposed to ally herself with Russia and the Court of Berlin. If France could find means to induce the Emperor to connect himself with her, Prussia would undoubtedly follow. At this moment then—when Russia, if she cannot do good, may, as you observe, do much mischief, France must not be assisted to work upon the foible of the Emperor and gain him by flattery to her side. Every step he removes from Great Britain is an approach to France, and a moment of irritation against us might be the means of losing an important opportunity.

“But I see strong reason to think some reliance may yet be placed upon the councils of that country. Those who know Count Panin best seem confident that he must, from the superiority of his talents and address, acquire at last a decisive influence; and that, in the mean time, his management will give a bias to the measures of the Government. It is not to be forgot that he has missed no opportunity of telling us that he was doing all he could, and that we must not despair. Let us now see what he has done. If he has not roused this Court to action, he has at least made it pledge itself to some concert with Russia for setting bounds to the ambition of France at a peace, and to make that principle in a great measure the basis of its connection with Russia. He has induced the Emperor actually to prepare for active war. He has taught the Emperor to bend to circumstances, as is manifest from his consenting at all to treat with the present Government of France, and from his having proposed modifications of the terms of general peace to which he might consent, according to the views which might be entertained by the several powers. As far therefore as can be, consistently with the King’s dignity, I think we should court the Emperor to assist the good intentions of his minister; and this may the more easily be done, as the views the Emperor avows are very much analogous to those repeatedly declared by the British Government.

“I am sometimes tempted to think it might be useful to enter with this Court even into such an insignificant stipulation of concert as I have mentioned in my last despatch to have been proposed as the subject of a secret convention to be added to the renewal of the treaty of 1792 with Russia, in order to preoccupy the ground,

and prevent the French from getting any footing here ; for, supposing peace concluded, France having, as seems probable, dictated separate terms to Austria, a defensive alliance with Russia and Prussia might possibly be the best thing we could look to.

“All the intelligence ciphered in my despatch of this date comes, whatever it may be worth, from authority not to be doubted.”  
*Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

1800, October 22.—“I send you a statement delivered by the Hereditary Prince of Orange to the Duke of York respecting his serving in Portugal. As soon as you have fixed anything about that command let me know it. I do not think he can have the command, nor does he wish it. If therefore the officer chosen is a Lieutenant-General, he must be content with that rank. I wish for the reasons we both feel that a fit person could be sent *from hence* for that service.

“We are not fortunate in our Spanish enterprizes.” *Copy.*

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1800, October 22. Phœnix Park.—“As you have more easy and expeditious means than myself of communicating at present with Lord Carysfort, I shall be much obliged to you if you will ask what title he means to take for his British peerage.”

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, October 23. Woodley.—“Your reason for substituting the Lord Steward is conclusive, and the Speaker agrees with me in thinking the letter you propose right. We must, of course, have address, mover, and seconder as usual.

“I have not seen the account of Cobenzel’s nomination, and do not understand your inference from it. If any material despatches are arrived, pray order them to be sent to me as soon as they can be spared. I will return them immediately. I send you a letter which I have just received from your brother, because it refers to something he has heard from you which I think he must have misunderstood. We certainly never had an idea of not bringing forward whatever measures we think can safely be adopted to alleviate the present difficulty, and prevent its recurrence, though the best channel for some of them may be through a committee. Our last plan respecting tythe would, I think, answer every purpose Lord B. proposes, and you remember we talked of other measures of permanent encouragement to tillage. I cannot persuade myself yet that raising wages is the true remedy (at least by itself) for the present temporary distress. I even doubt if fixing them by law or by magistrates can be made practicable. We all agree that some extraordinary provision must be made to enable the labouring class to support their families. Our importations, I am persuaded, will be considerable if a good plan of conditional bounty can be framed to satisfy the importer ; and I do not agree with Lord B. that we shall have any difficulty in paying for whatever we can get. In

addition to this, however, every degree of substitute should be called in, and I will write about his pilchards. If the high price continues, may it not be right (as the crops of barley are abundant and excellent) to prohibit for a time grinding any wheat without mixing a given proportion (suppose  $\frac{1}{4}$ ) of barley? I am certainly better within these few days."

THOMAS MACDONALD TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, October 24. Great George Street.—“The public attention and flattering notice with which your Lordship honoured me on a late occasion induce me to believe that you will take in good part the communication of some few of those many remarks which I might submit respecting the present state of opinion with regard to this country, and the means of increasing our influence in *America*, which may be useful at this moment, and cannot be inconvenient, as I mean to state them very shortly.

“The *leading* fact to be mentioned is that the *true* situation and character of *this* country are less known in *America* than almost anywhere else, and that incredible industry is practised to keep the people in the dark respecting us. Exclusive of foreign exertions for that purpose, supported, either openly or in secret, by every Frenchman of every description in the country, your Lordship may easily conceive the impression which is made on the mass of the people by the discontented and seditious from Great Britain and Ireland; not to mention a set of very complaisant *British* merchants and agents, many of whom are now also American citizens and known coverers of enemies' property, who smile assent to all the calumnies against their native country, and give a currency and credit to every injurious report. Four-fifths of the people there in good earnest believe that we are, *politically* if not morally, a most tyrannical and unprincipled nation; and with respect to *them* restrained only by *fear* from attempting to bring them again under our yoke.

“*Fear*, as with respect to them, they do ascribe to us in a manner which would be amusing, were it not that the error encourages them to act towards us in a way which proves seriously inconvenient. The most extraordinary instances of this belief I have seen in men holding high characters and situations in the country.

“The best of them, of course, imagine that our statesmen are more occupied in watching *them* than in any other national business. Speeches are *on purpose* made in Congress, full of open threats or hostile insinuations, which they think will have the effect to sound an alarm throughout the whole British dominions, such as no Minister would find it possible to resist.

“On this subject they flatter themselves beyond imagination, and therefore never fail to mistake the motive of any *extraordinary* degree of indulgence or suavity of manner. They are a people who must be managed by means of great *reserve* and *grave* civility. In order to be *at all* respected, one must in some degree be feared; for to be what is commonly called *beloved* is, I suspect, to be disregarded. They are not a people to be influenced by personal

affection, but it is not certainly necessary or expedient to be personally disliked.

“Conceive to yourself a set of grown boys, broke loose from school, and playing the various parts of men ; if you add, what is not in general the accompaniment of forward boys, namely, *dishonesty*, or the cheating habits of Jews, you will have, in my opinion, a just impression of the American *community*. I say the community ; for I have known individual exceptions, but those exceptions I have generally found in a certain degree of *retirement* ; and any degree of retirement from business or speculation is a rare situation in America.

“I should add to the above description of grown boys playing men, that most of them may be supposed to have been for some time *sharply* schooled in an attorney’s office.

“The application will, I presume, not only support my idea that they are to be managed by means of a civil and courteous *reserve* ; and that they cannot bear familiarity or indulgence ; but will shew the great expediency of counteracting the industry which is successfully practised on a superficial people, to give false and injurious ideas of *our* situation and conduct as a nation.

“The business of *printing* is much followed in America, and yet half a dozen of books are not certainly published in any one year throughout the whole Union. The printers are employed in the universal business of newspapers, and little pamphlets for the people. An American knows all that a newspaper can teach, and retails it off with considerable address. Indeed his conversation bears a strong resemblance to that cobweb collection of surmises, conjectures, wise discoveries, conceited positions, and sharp superficial sayings which form the columns of most newspapers in every country.

“The consequence is that the opinions of all classes arise entirely from what they read in their newspapers ; so that *by newspapers the country is governed*.

“But ‘*Britain*’ (for they studiously avoid in general saying *Great Britain*) makes a very poor figure in the greater part of the American newspapers ; for which there are two reasons. The papers which abuse or slight us most, sell best. And the American ship-masters always bring over the worst *Opposition* papers from England ; the false colourings and degrading details of which are greedily adopted, even by the Government papers in America. The people really believe that the account given in those papers of our ruined circumstances, our disgraces, our profligate political principles, and our extravagant public folly, is the true state of the matter. But they are not contented with copying only from our worst *Opposition* papers. They mutilate and suppress on many occasions, so as entirely to reverse the fact, if it is favourable to the courage or conduct of England. For example, in stating the convention at the *Helder*, they printed the articles at first insisted on by the French general, leaving out entirely the steady answers and refusal of the Duke of York ; so that the idea of our being subjected to the most complete humiliation on that occasion is *at this moment* very general in America ; for, although the suppression of the truth

was taken notice of in one paper, the poison is not accompanied with the antidote in one instance out of a hundred. The mutiny of our fleet, and the horrible affair of the *Hermione* frigate were subjects of exultation with many persons of all descriptions; and it was said with satisfaction that probably those and similar events were to be ascribed to the *brave* efforts of impressed American seamen, whose *right* to mutiny, and even murder British officers, was *asserted* and maintained in elaborate arguments, even in Congress; a circumstance which leads me to say that the number of our ablest seamen in the American service or employment is incredible. And yet, however difficult the subject, I think it is an evil susceptible of a certain degree of remedy.

“The prevention or correction of those errors which are thus infused throughout America respecting this country, I must therefore beg leave to state, as a more important object of our care; and I think it may, in a great measure, be accomplished by contriving to have true and authentic details of such matters as may give adequate impressions of our *good faith*, our *power*, and our friendly dispositions, but *steady determination* of conduct, published in *plain* and *moderate* language, as *promptly* and diligently as those which are propagated against us. A little expence to support or encourage a central establishment for that purpose, with a correspondence throughout the States, would be wisely bestowed. At any rate the best papers on the side of Government in this country ought, by all possible occasions, to be sent to the different sea ports of America. My wish however is that they know useful *facts*. Declamation or boasting would defeat itself, or be met in the same manner; for America is the land of flimsy and inflated declamation.

“But I have already gone far beyond my intended plan of troubling your Lordship only with a few words; and therefore I will only add, and I think it candid to do so, that I believe my excellent friend Mr. Liston, whose good sense and great worth I shall ever take all opportunities to acknowledge, entertains impressions of the people I have described, in some respects different from mine. But the great favour in which he is *personally* held in that country, and the great attentions he has bestowed, joined with what has happened, confirm the leading point of the opinion I have expressed.

“I hope your Lordship will receive this communication (perhaps a very unimportant one) as a mark of my respect, and not consider it as intrusive; nor apply to me, what I have said of the Americans, that they cannot bear too much encouragement.”

#### HENRY DUNDAS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, October 25. Cheltenham.—“I yesterday received your letter with its enclosure. I have one on the same subject from the Duke of York. Upon looking to the Army List and comparing it with the date of the rank held by the Hereditary Prince of Orange, you will see that, consistent with his ideas, there is no person in our service except the Duke of York under whom he could serve. I dont mean to insinuate by this observation that there is any thing unreasonable in his statement, but, unless he was to have

the supreme command, which you say he does not wish, it seems necessary that he should for the present separate himself from his corps, and follow the other avocations which require his presence abroad. I regret that he should separate himself from them. Huskisson, who is with me, and is returned from visiting his father-in-law at Portsmouth, reports to me that they are almost the finest troops he ever saw, and exceedingly correct and exemplary in their behaviour. The Duke of York, who you mentioned to me not to be too partial to the Prince of Orange, made the same report of them and gave the credit of it solely to the Hereditary Prince. The Duke of York sends me a memorandum, put into his hands by the Prince of Orange, suggesting several additions and alterations to the corps. These suggestions will add a little to the expense, but they will add so much more comparatively to their efficiency and utility, that I have no hesitation in writing this day to the Duke of York to authorise the improvements suggested by the Hereditary Prince. The weather is very fine, and it would be unjust to Cheltenham not to admit that I am very well."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, October 25. Cheltenham.—“I omitted to say in my other letter that I really know not how to make any suggestion for placing the command of the British force in Portugal in any other hands at present than those of Sir James Pultney, unless you should think it essential to push the question of Sir Charles Stuart, a question, I need not tell you, [which] is neither a palatable [one], in England nor in Portugal. The other resource is Lord Moira, and I don't know enough of him or of the *carte de pays* with regard to him as to be certain how such an appointment would be relished by you and others. I know you think me too sanguine, but I cannot lay aside my hopes of Egypt being over so rapidly as to enable Sir Ralph Abercrombie to be in Portugal, if necessary, by the month of April or May next.”

LORD GRENVILLE to RUFUS KING.

1800, October 25. Dropmore.—“I have received from a Mr. Soren, with whose case you are acquainted, a printed statement of his business, which I presume he will also have communicated to you. Having more than once interposed in his favour, in a matter which from the beginning had no relation to the official business of the Foreign Department, and of the final issue of which I was ignorant till I read his pamphlet, I cannot but be hurt at the insinuations which it seems to me to contain, particularly in page twenty-five, of inattention on my part to his sufferings or claims. I have directed a reference to be made to the dates of the correspondence on the subject, by which it appears that Mr. Soren's letter, dated September 19, was by me referred to the King's Advocate by a special letter of reference on the 21st of the same month; and that finding from his opinion that all means of legal redress were shut against Mr Soren, I wrote myself to Mr. Dundas to recommend

the case to his attention, as one which might receive some redress by orders from his Department; though from the Foreign Office it could not. This letter was dated the 27th September, 1798.

“I trouble you with this detail, because it was at your desire that I first interested myself in a business which (if I had not been desirous of contributing my endeavours to procure to Mr. Soren some redress for the injury he has suffered) I might in the first instance have returned to you, as not coming within the line of my official duty.

“The sort of feeling which sometimes urges a complainant to attack those who have most endeavoured to serve him is not uncommon; and I have had too much experience of the circumstances of a public situation to be much surprised at it. Certainly it will not lessen my wishes to be still of some use to a person who seems to me to have been hardly used.” *Copy.*

The EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, October 25. Berlin.—“I have received a letter from the Princess of Tour and Taxis (I cannot conceive why she has chosen to make use of my intervention) desiring me to apply through you to the King in favour of the M. de Bombelles who is now serving as a major-general, I believe, in the corps of Condé. His merits, whatever they may be, are, I presume, fully known to you. His present distress arises from the loss of his wife, by which seven children are left without care or protection in his absence. The additional expense which must be incurred by this event, the Princess says, he cannot supply, and indeed I suppose he has little or no means of subsistence but his pay. To be short, his request made through the Princess is this. I give it in her own words, because I do not understand them. ‘*Son humble prière porte à obtenir la solde entière en les rations qu’on accorde aux généraux.*’ As she adds ‘*D’après le nouvel ordre, cette demande pourroit trouver quelques difficultés,*’ I presume there will be objections to this. I have told her therefore that I am perfectly ignorant of the *ordre* old and new, and can only assure her of the dispositions both of you and myself to obey her commands. That I have communicated them to you, and shall write to her again when I know more, and particularly whether, as it is a military matter, it would not be necessary to apply to the Duke of York; which she would probably choose to do herself. I have only to add that the Princess seems to take a most eager interest in this business, and that I shall be sincerely rejoiced to hear her wish can be obtained, not only because I shall be glad to recommend myself to her, but that she has taught me to share her feelings for this unfortunate family. The Princess has left this country.

“17 129 5 247 1314 277 4329 16 129 222  
 “Hudelist who lives a great deal with . . . die tells me  
 1327 4208 17 25 2997 452 2379 1836 2700  
 that Portugal is about making terms with France. As I do not  
 250 1422 2976 822 2749 452 1427 749 2752  
 believe C . . . die himself knows what his Court is doing I pay

4515 322 1778 17 10 452 3719 27 5  
 regard to the but thought it right to tell it you  
 1452 77 1993 2722 1459 377 17 8 557 3722 27  
 The Count de Rivarso! a friend of Lucchesini  
 4592 322 17 27 1670 1872 1500 222 14  
 tells me he is not gone to Brunswick which is the . . .  
 5 8 7227 579 2785 7259 269 1815 17 227  
 of my believe the account as I first  
 522 3696 253 267 4552  
 gave it for it came to me from very good authority. Gentz is made  
 1789 5 230 16 52 379 16 133 147  
 the happiest man in the world by the opportunity you  
 2297 13 6 1019 143 296 17 9 52 1227 1479  
 have given him of  
 37 147 2317 18 4559.

“Lord Holland and his companions, by my ignorance and his own precipitation, have, I fear, got into an ugly scrape, in which I come in for [a] share. But it cannot now be helped.”

#### H. FAGEL TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private and confidential.*

1800, October 20-25.—“I lose no time in transmitting to your Lordship the Hereditary Prince’s note with those changes which I suggested in consequence of my conversation with you this morning, and which the Prince willingly adopted. I beg you would have the goodness to return me this paper as soon as possible, and to inform me whether you approve of it in its present shape, or whether you have any further remarks upon it. I have endeavoured to render it as conformable as possible to your ideas as you stated them to me this morning, and as little liable as possible to those objections you hinted at. I have every reason to be well pleased with the conversation I had with the Hereditary Prince after I left your Lordship, and to hope that his final determination will be satisfactory, if any thing can be done to meet him half-way. I should be much obliged to you if you could let me have this paper again early to-morrow morning, as I have promised to send it to the Prince in time to enable him to deliver it to the Duke of York, which he can not well defer much longer.”

*Enclosure :—*

#### OFFICIAL NOTE.

“Lord Grenville a fait communiquer au Prince Héritaire d’Orange par Monsieur Fagel que le Gouvernement, voulant employer le corps de troupes Hollandoises qui se trouve à la solde de l’Angleterre, avoit resolu de l’envoyer en Portugal pour servir à la défense de ce royaume, menacé d’une prochaine attaque; qu’avant de faire à S’Altesse Sérénissime cette communication d’une manière officielle, on avoit préalablement voulu l’en informer, et qu’on seroit charmé d’apprendre si s’altesse seroit disposée à accompagner elle-même le corps de troupes; qu’on verroit assurément avec plaisir qu’elle se mette à leur tête, et qu’on étoit persuadé de l’utilité

que sa présence pourroit avoir, et des services qu'elle seroit dans le cas de rendre ; mais, que comme on comprenoit en même tems que le Prince Héritaire d'Orange pourroit être retenu par différentes considerations de nature à l'empêcher de prendre ce parti, on avoit crû qu'il lui seroit plus agréable d'être mis à même, par cette communication préalable, de s'expliquer avec une entière liberté sur cette matière.

“ Le Prince Héritaire charge Monsieur Fagel de repondre à cette ouverture en substance ; que depuis le moment que le corps de troupes Hollandoises avoit passé au service de Sa Majesté Britannique, il avoit fait tout ses efforts pour le dresser complètement, et le rendre aussi utile qu'il avoit été en son pouvoir ; que l'objet qu'il avoit, comme de raison, principalement en vue, et que devoit naturellement lui tenir le plus au cœur étoit de voir un jour ce corps, composé principalement de ses compatriotes, servir à la délivrance de sa malheureuses patrie ; que s'il avoit été question, soit de cette délivrance, soit de la défense de la grande Bretagne, le Prince Héritaire n'auroit pas hésité un instant à se dévouer tout entier à cet objet, et à passer par-dessus toutes considerations qui auroient pû y être étrangères ; mais que dans ce cas-ci l'objet au-quel il paroissoit que le corps alloit être employé étoit pour s'altesse Sérénissime d'un intérêt moins direct, et que plusieurs motifs personels et majeurs relatifs à sa famille et à ses affaires particulières le rappellent d'une manière instante en Allemagne, où il étoit déjà depuis quelque tems attendu ; que cependant, si le gouvernement Britannique attachoit quelque prix à ses services, si l'on croyoit que sa présence en Portugal pût y être véritablement utile, le Prince étoit encore prêt dans ce moment à faire à la cause publique et au service de Sa Majesté Britannique le sacrifice de toute espèce de considerations personnelles ; mais que, dans ce cas, s'altesse devoit représenter, qu'ayant commandé en chef l'armée de la République des Provinces Unies durant les campagnes de 1793 et 1794, pendant lesquelles cette armée s'étoit trouvée ré-unie avec celle de l'Angleterre et de l'Autriche, elle souhaitoit qu'on put prendre, relativement à son rang, des arrangemens qui ne la missent pas dans le cas de servir sous les ordres d'officiers, au mérite desquels elle rendroit pleinement justice, mais qu'elle avoit connu, il y a quelques années, dans des grades de beaucoup inférieurs à celui qu'elle remplissoit alors, et même à ceux que ces mêmes officiers remplissent aujourd'hui ; que si cette difficulté pouvoit être levée en donnant au Prince Héritaire un rang supérieur (tel que celui de général d'infanterie, le quel il a eu depuis 1790 au service de Leurs Hautes Puissances et le quel rang pourroit être local pour le continent d'Europe, au cas qu'il y eut de la difficulté de le donner différemment) son altesse se détermineroit se rendre elle-même en Portugal avec sa brigade ; mais que, jusqu'à ce que ce point fut réglé, le Gouvernement trouveroit sans doute naturel qu'elle suspendit sa réponse finale ; que s'altesse se persuadoit au reste que, dans le cas où elle se verroit mise à même d'accompagner le corps de troupes Hollandoises en Portugal, le Gouvernement sentiroit lui-même l'avantage qu'il y auroit à faire avec elle des arrangemens pour améliorer l'organisation de ce corps, et même

pour l'augmenter ; mais, surtout, que le gouvernement appercevoit la nécessité d'en faire en tout cas pour tenir ce corps au complet, vu que ce dernier objet demanderoit plus de soins et de dépense que par le passé, à cause de la différence qu'il y a entre la destination principale et primitive pour laquelle les individus formant ce corps se sont jusqu'à présent engagés, et celle qu'ils vont avoir maintenant.

“ Monsieur Fagel ayant rendu compte de cette réponse préalable du Prince Héréditaire à Lord Grenville, ce ministre l'autorisa à donner à connaître au Prince que lui-même et les autres Ministres du Roi ses collègues, ne pouvoient qu'approuver au zèle et à la bonne volonté que s'altresse manifestoit en cette occasion ; qu'il recevoit sa réponse comme provisoire, et qu'avant de lui faire une communication officielle ultérieure d'après laquelle le Prince put prendre une détermination finale, on lui communiqueroit la liste des officiers généraux qui seroient employés dans cette expédition, aussitôt que la nomination en seroit faite.” *Copy.*

THOMAS MACDONALD to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, October 29. Great George Street.—“ I see from my notes that it was Mr. Marshal, the present American Secretary of State, a Virginia lawyer of considerable abilities, who in Congress maintained the argument which I mentioned in the letter I lately took the liberty of writing to your Lordship, namely, that *American* seamen had a *right* to do what had been done on board the *Hermione* frigate, to mutiny and murder British officers. He had spoken with effect in vindication of the President's conduct in giving up one of the mutineer's agreeably to the treaty, on the ground that he was in truth an Irishman, and a British subject ; but he took occasion at the same time to proclaim and enlarge upon the very humane and liberal principle I have stated.

“ Being Secretary of State, and a favourite with the President, who appointed him in place of *Pickering*, as being supposed to be less favourable to the politics of England, I have thought that it might not be improper in me to mention this trait of his opinions. He was the framer too of the address of the House of Representatives in answer to the President's speech, in which they justify, in terms calculated clearly to make an impression on his Majesty's Government, the secession of the American Commissioners ; and had all along, as counsel against British creditors, been accustomed to oppose the plain and obvious construction of the 4th article of the treaty of peace.

“ I may further mention what from good information I know of the character of Mr. *Ellsworth*, lately arrived from France. From all I have heard in America I am bound to speak of him very favourably. I take him to be uncommonly honest ; and from a feature which his countrymen ascribe to him, ‘timidity, or shyness of nature,’ (words which some acquaintance with the American language enables me to interpret according to the meaning *there* conveyed by them) I conceive him to be possessed of a certain delicacy of sentiment and conduct which must give him a cast of singularity. I

understand he is ignorant of the world, but not assuming ; another uncommon combination in America.

“ And now I request of you to peruse a very few words respecting myself. Your Lordship’s correct knowledge of the duty I endeavoured to discharge in America, the reception you gave me on my return, the great kindness of that praise with which you honoured me in your conversation with his Majesty at the *levée* (for which I shall never cease to be grateful) and your being happily at the head of the Department under which I have acted, all these circumstances induced me to gratify myself, as with much deference I do, with the flattering belief that I might safely *in silence* rely (as far as became me) on *your Lordship’s* favour. This confidence the Lord Chancellor confirmed by informing me last week that you had expressed to him a wish to be of use to me ; in consequence of which, after some preliminary conversation, he desired I would fully and freely state to him my private situation (which indeed he partly knew) and the precise expectations I entertained, for the purpose of his communicating them to your Lordship. I have done so accordingly, in a letter which may be considered as addressed to your Lordship ; and to which I must entreat your *indulgent* attention ; for whoever writes of himself stands in need of indulgence. My solicitude in this respect is in proportion to the high value I put on the good opinion your Lordship has so kindly expressed of me ; an opinion which it is my favourite hope you will never have occasion to alter.”

CHARLES ARBUTHNOT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1800, October 30. Lisbon.—“ As I happened to learn from very good authority that General Goltze had chosen to say publicly that this Government was extremely averse to the arrival of British troops, I thought myself called upon to make M. Pinto acquainted with this very extraordinary circumstance. I mentioned it therefore in my conference of this evening, and I, at the same time, informed him that this language made a greater impression on me as it had been accompanied by strong declarations that it was very well known to your Lordship that the troops were not wanted here, but that the British Government had its own reasons for wishing that Sir Ralph Abercromby’s army might be allowed to winter in Portugal.

“ M. Pinto was much vexed and hurt at what I said to him. He owned that General Goltze had had the imprudence to express himself in a manner very similar to what I had stated ; but, whatever might be the private opinion of that officer with regard to the measures which this Government ought or wished to take, he had not been authorized by the Prince to talk as he feared he had done, for His Royal Highness still asked for succours with unabated earnestness, and had even very seriously lamented that the whole number of troops which had been applied for were not likely to be granted.

“ Having made this declaration M. Pinto then said that, as a

proof of the good faith with which he was speaking, he would own to me confidentially that he had this very morning written to General Goltze, by the express order of the Prince, to desire he would abstain in future from interfering in politics ; for the language he had held was not only in direct opposition to the views and wishes of this Government, but it might have the serious bad effect of throwing an appearance of inconsistency on that line of conduct which His Royal Highness, after the maturest deliberation, had determined to pursue. For this latter reason he entreated me very earnestly not to acquaint my Government with this part of our conversation. I could not venture to comply entirely with his request, but I have so far agreed to it as to convey only in a private letter that information with which I feel it to be my duty to acquaint your Lordship.

“As connected in some measure with this subject, I must now beg leave to take notice of another circumstance which has been lately made known to me, and for the existence of which I can safely answer.

“M. d’Almeida has written to a friend of his in this town that he finds himself at present in a very unpleasant and awkward situation. He says that every packet brings him assurances from M. Pinto that the country is in the greatest danger, and that succours of all kinds must be applied for. But then, in opposition to this, it is still more positively asserted to him from various other quarters that the state of affairs here is by no means critical, and that an additional number of British troops, instead of being serviceable, would be the cause of much embarrassment. He, of course, obeys the directions which he receives from M. Pinto, but in the private letter from him to which I have alluded, he expresses much uneasiness at the being obliged on all occasions to say more than your Lordship can well credit ; and he even adds that, having found the British Government ever ready to listen to his requests, he wishes he could be spared the ungrateful task of attempting to deceive it.

“Neither the language which has been held by General Goltze, nor what has been written by Monsieur d’Almeida, require my comments, for, on former occasions, I have given so very much in detail my opinion respecting the want of troops, that I am only apprehensive lest in so doing I should have gone beyond the exact line of duty. In this place, therefore, I shall content myself with stating as a matter of fact that, either for the reasons which I have ventured to impute to him, or at least from some more worthy but apparently mistaken motive, M. Pinto is at this moment of time the only person in the country who even affects to represent Portugal as being in such a perilous situation as to render foreign aid necessary. Should the Emperor’s negociation lead to his own separate peace, this Government would then (as it has stipulated to do) have recourse to the mediation of the Spanish Court, and, should its attempts to get out of the war still be ineffectual, the late crisis may again return ; but, as things now are, there is neither the reality nor even the belief of danger.

“As I find it is said that a body of 8,000 Spaniards were entrenched in the neighbourhood of Cadiz when Sir R. Abercromby

proposed to land his troops, I must beg leave to observe that this large force of the enemy was not brought down to the coast till Sir J. Pulteney's expedition, after failing at Ferrol, had gone up to Gibraltar. I wish to mention this, as otherwise it might appear that our generals had been led into error by the inaccuracy of my information.

“By the last packet I had the honour of writing a private letter to your Lordship, in which I enclosed two papers of intelligence from Madrid. Lest they should have miscarried, I take the liberty of now sending duplicates of them, and I regret that an excursion which my friend has made into the country prevents my forwarding, by this conveyance, any further intelligence of a like nature.”

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, October 30. Woodley.—“Many thanks for your abstract of the despatches from Vienna. They certainly do not seem to furnish grounds for any new Cabinet deliberation as yet, and upon the whole they promise rather favourably. But the time is approaching very fast when we must settle the tone to be taken with regard to our Austrian connection, and it is not without its difficulty. If they break the armistice before the end of autumn on the ground of refusing to treat without us, we can (I hope) renew the subsidy. Perhaps we may be able to do so if they even obtain a prolongation of the armistice to the spring, without any new disgrace. But if Cobenzel once goes on to Luneville I have no great expectation that either of these will be the result. We shall then probably see either a separate peace or an armistice bought by concessions sufficient to transfer the prospect of success on the opening of the next campaign from the Austrians to the French.

“With respect to the payment of the second instalment of the subsidy I conclude you will adhere to the determination of declining payment till the armistice shall have been broken, or till we see grounds from unequivocal acts of exertion to justify fixing on any other period.”

#### H. FAGEL to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, October 30.—“I have received the enclosed letter from the Prince of Orange, which I have the honor to send to you, together with the paper which accompanies it.

“The Hereditary Prince is extremely anxious to know whether any determination has been taken on the subject of his journey to Portugal. As the season is advancing so fast, he grows every day more impatient to be relieved from the state of suspense and uncertainty in which he still is. I have no doubt but your Lordship will find this wish natural, and if you could enable me to say something to him on the subject, you would confer an obligation both on the Prince and on myself.”

*Enclosure :—*

#### The PRINCE OF ORANGE to H. FAGEL.

1800, October 30. London.—“J'ai reçu par la poste de Hamburg du 17, de la part du Général Stamford, la copie ci-jointe d'une lettre

de M. le Comte de Goertz au Roi de Prusse en date du 25 September. Il m'a fait prier de la faire passer à Mylord Grenville au plustot. Il ne m'a pas écrit, n'en ayant pas la force, et devant partir de Brunswic le 14. Je vous envoyé en original la copie qu'il m'a envoyée ; il y a des phrases et surtout la dernière que je crois n'avoir pas été bien copiée, car elle ne présente aucun sens. Je n'ai pas voulu y changer la moindre chose ; et quoique je croye que le Gouvernement a des informations directes sur les sentiments de la Cour de Vienne, et de son Ministre, j'ai cru ne devoir pas supprimer la lettre que M. de Stamford m'a envoyée, et que je vous prie de communiquer à Mylord Grenville.

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, October 31. Woodley.—“ I have no doubt that the answer you propose to send to Cobenzell is exactly what it ought to be, and that we can take no other line under these strange circumstances. With respect to the transaction itself, I hardly [know] how to interpret the conduct either of Austria or of France, and have no great faith in the probability of the first adhering to its engagements with us (if pressed to a point) or of the latter agreeing to joint negotiation. The whole is inexplicable, but what you propose will fairly try the experiment. Paris, and still more any other place on this side of France, would certainly be better for us than Luneville, if there should be a joint treaty.”

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MINTO.

1800, October 31. Cleveland Row.—“ You will see by my despatch and its inclosure the first effect of all M. de Cobenzl's promises. I much fear that his real intention is to outwit Thugut by framing and concluding a treaty *quelconque*, and establishing on that basis his ministerial existence ; and that Thugut's weight, even if well-employed, will hardly be sufficient to counteract this plan when peace is presented in one hand, and in the other the renewal of the war.

“ Is it possible that Cobenzl should go to Paris without ever asking the question whether an English minister was to come or not ? Nobody can believe it. And therefore I have no other expectation than that at Paris he will try to patch up the best peace he can ; and failing in this, but not otherwise, will make a great parade of adherence to the treaties with Great Britain.

“ If there was a grain of spirit in the Austrian councils this single event of the capture of Leghorn ought to rouse it to action, and the evacuation of that place ought to be made a *sine qua non* preliminary of all negotiation ; but such measures are, as Mr. Fox calls it, ‘ too strong for the present day.’

“ Surely it cannot be wise that Berlin should, just in this moment, be left without an Austrian minister. The greatest talents that ever fell to the lot of any negotiator would not be too great for the duties which an Austrian minister has in this moment to perform at Berlin. With all their affected indifference, they cannot really be blind to the interest they have in what is passing.

“As for Russia, you see that we are all but at war with that near and natural ally of this country; and that when Thugut has succeeded in making his own peace at Petersburg, he must next make our's, whose only offence was till now the having adhered to Austria when Paul quarrelled with her. Denmark and Malta have now added two other grievances which will not, I imagine, be easily got over; though it is not difficult to prove to any cooler head that in neither instance could we act otherwise than we have.”

*Postscript.*—“In my answer to Cobenzel I shall tell him that, if we are to treat, we had rather treat at Paris than at Luneville. Pray try to make Thugut of the same opinion.” *Copy.*

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, October —.Wimbledon.—“I send you two letters for your perusal which were put into my hands two days ago at the London Tavern, I do not know by whom. Return them to me in case they are asked for. They contain nothing new to you, but I am afraid contain only additional proofs how awkward that business becomes more and more every day. The Americans are egregiously in the wrong, but they are so much in debt to this country that we scarcely dare to quarrel with them; an additional proof how important it is for a great commercial country to have its markets as much distributed as possible.”

*Enclosing* two letters, dated respectively August 6 and September 2, 1799, from W. Parker, Philadelphia, to John Lane, London, complaining of the dishonest practices of the American Commissioners appointed under a recent treaty to consider the claims of British merchants upon the Government of the United States.”

#### The EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, November 1. Berlin.—“What I have said in my despatch of this date stands upon the authority there stated. My private opinion is that nothing can be expected from hence in any conjuncture. A few nonsensical words from France, or the mere mention of the journey of a Louis Bonaparte, who orders post-horses every week but never arrives, is sufficient to keep every thing here in suspense. And notwithstanding what has passed with General Stamford, I know that Haugwitz, so late as the day before yesterday, told a person with whom he is in the habit of conversing freely on all subjects, that he had received a letter in the Emperor's own hand approving in the fullest manner the Prussian neutral system, and that he had shown the letter to the King, who being now assured of the concurrence of Russia, was more than ever confirmed in it. Since my despatch was ciphered, Krudener told me what you see in the postscript. He then talked of Lord St. Helens and others for a mission to Petersburg, and added his conjecture that M. de Kottchoubey had orders to go to London. If that is the case you will have heard it before. Some Englishmen from Petersburg have given me such accounts of the violence of the Emperor during the suspense of the Danish business that I do

well see how you can pass it over. It seems as if all the British merchants were withdrawing from the trade, and indeed I think the declaration delivered to the neutral Ministers of Petersburg amounts almost to a standing declaration of war. As to Malta, I have not seen your convention, but I think it would be a most serious misfortune to all Europe that that place should become a Russian possession, which it will be in effect, if it is given up to the Order of which the Emperor is Grand Master. We are all on tiptoe for news from Vienna. For my part I expect nothing but separate peace. My old acquaintance Cobentzl is not made to be an instrument of good." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF CARYSFORT.

1800, November 1. Cleveland Row.—“The last private letter I have to acknowledge from you is No. 10, but I am too much hurried to-day to enter into its contents. I will send you next mail the papers which were wanting in the suite of Otto’s communications.

“We shall probably now not let them be published till Parliament meets, as that is so near.

“We heard yesterday that Cobentzl is arrived at Paris, where he has renewed his declaration of not treating but conjointly with England. Will he adhere to it? That is the question which a few days will now solve, and which must decide all our measures. By all means cultivate any disposition at Berlin to be better with us. I will write to you more fully on this point if possible by Tuesday’s mail.

“Do not let our papers appear till they are published here, which will probably not be till Parliament meets, if then.” *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT STARHEMBERG.

1800, November 1.—“Je vous envoie la minute des deux questions.

“Tâchez, je vous supplie, de nous mettre à même d’y répondre positivement le plutôt possible.

1. La France a-t-elle consenti à traiter avec les alliés conjointement, et pour une paix générale, et cela sans armistice naval?

“2. Sur son refus, M. de Cobentzl a-t-il rompu sa négociation, ou (ce que je crois impossible) s’est-il déterminé à traiter séparément?

“Vous qui connoissez le pays, sentirez facilement combien il nous est important d’avoir, le plutôt possible, l’oui ou le non direct à ces questions, et de pouvoir y préparer l’esprit public.” *Copy.*

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, November 2. Woodley.—“I confess to you I cannot quite satisfy myself with the manner in which either of the two delicate points, corn and foreign politics, are treated in the draft of the speech which I received last night. With respect to corn I certainly think it highly necessary to discourage the dangerous notions which have been too much propagated of late; but I am

persuaded that it is necessary to sooth rather than to irritate, and that the effect is more likely to be produced by calm discussion and patient investigation than by a dry and peremptory tone for which I am sure men's minds are ill prepared. I am convinced that it is right and essential to shew a disposition to enquire whether there are any undue practices which it may be safe and useful to prevent, and which it may be possible to distinguish from the fair course of ordinary trade, on which I think it as essential as you do not to break in. It also seems to me very desirable to point the public expectation to some relief from importation, which I am persuaded will be realized to a considerable extent, and may effect some abatement of price, still however leaving it high enough to check the consumption and to afford much more than a sufficient profit to the farmer. To withhold all hope of relief will excite a despair which the circumstances do not justify, and is nearly as dangerous as the opposite extreme which asserts that there is no deficiency.

“With respect to foreign politics, I am clearly for communicating the papers to Parliament, and am not at all shaken in this respect by Canning's arguments; but I so far agree with him as to think that it is better not to make this subject too prominent a feature in the Speech, and particularly neither to pledge ourselves, nor to attempt to pledge others too deeply on the subject of our connection with Austria. It seems much safer to maintain only that both good faith and policy required our refusing separate negotiation as we have done; but to leave the question for the future of renewing our engagements, as one in which Government must exercise its discretion according to events. I have made an altered version of the speech with a view to these modifications, which I have directed to be copied and sent to you, and heartily wish you may not see much to disapprove.”

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800], November 6th. Downing Street.—“I send you a fair copy of the speech. In writing out the amendments I have thought it best to put what refers to the encouragement of agriculture in the early part of the speech, and not to blend the foreign with the domestic trade in provisions, as what is said about the latter will not apply to the former. I have made the paragraph about combinations and practices, in the material part, exactly conformable to what we sketched last night. But I own I think the words *injurious to the community* too vague to answer the purpose. And on the other hand the form of the sentence as it now stands seems more directly to countenance the opinion that injurious practices are prevalent, that [than ?] it did in the hypothetical way, in which I had stated it. I have therefore put on a separate paper an amended version of this paragraph, and which, qualified as it is by the reference to unfavourable seasons, I hope you will not think liable to much objection.

“I also send you on another paper an alteration in the part relating to the disposition to peace, which I think would make

that passage more satisfactory, and which consists chiefly in introducing a part of a paragraph in your draft, which I had inadvertently omitted in mine. I would not insert either of these alterations in the copy sent you, because you may like better to show the speech to your mover in its present form as an outline, and these corrections can easily be made afterwards, if on discussion there is no strong reason against them. I would have called on you if the day had been more tolerable."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800], November 7. Downing Street.—“I have desired King to send you copy of a hand-bill which has been circulated to call a meeting to-morrow at Kennington Common, and an account of the steps intended to be taken respecting it, which I imagine you will approve. It is unlucky that, by some unaccountable negligence, the Bill passed in 1795 respecting meetings has been suffered to expire. If any thing different occurs to you as fit to be done you will of course send word, or if you are at leisure to call here you will find me any time in the evening. Indeed there are one or two other topics on which I should be glad to speak to you, though they do not press.”

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF CARYSFORT.

1800, November 7. Cleveland Row.—“I number this letter 8, considering my last of the 1st instant as No. 7. I have four letters of yours to answer; those from the 11th to the 21st October.

“With respect to Russia, Shaïr’s story is conclusive as to any hopes of good from that quarter till the moon changes. The business of Malta will serve to exasperate the Emperor still more, and if he does us no harm, he certainly will not try to do us any good. Your answer to Krudener on that subject was exactly what we wished, but it may be useful that you should know for the sake of conversation with others that the convention to which he alluded was never signed; if it had been signed and ten times ratified, the Emperor’s conduct has released us from it; but signed it never was.

“My alarm about your communications respecting Bavaria arose from my misunderstanding a passage in one of your despatches. What you did say could do no harm; but it is singular that the answer you received of total indifference on the subject should be so different from the language held to the Elector.

“It would be very useful if you could collect some idea of the conditions for general peace which Paul proposed at Berlin, because I have great reason to believe that these are not considered there as wholly laid aside. It is however very difficult to believe that either of those two Courts, governed as they are, will be able to acquire much weight in the negotiations between Austria and France. The latter will, of course, be desirous to bring into play the hostile dispositions of the Northern powers respecting our maritime strength. I wish I may be mistaken in including Prussia in that description, notwithstanding all that Haugwitz may say to the contrary. His

silence to you about the Russia paper is but a bad omen in this respect.

“It is however very well to keep in good terms with them, and I trust my despatch of this day will assist that object.

“I examined the case about Courvoisier, who was not to blame. But I have prohibited the messengers from going through Hamburg, and if you find they have been there, I will beg you to notice it to them and to the Office.

“I will enquire about the case of M. de Bombelles.

“We lay the papers on Tuesday before both Houses, and Gentz may publish as soon as he pleases after you get the printed copies, but not before.” *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF CARYSFORT.

1800, November 7. Cleveland Row.—“I have received by this mail an indistinct account from Hamburg respecting the capture of a Prussian vessel in the Ems, and its being brought into Cuxhaven. I wish you would say to Count Haugwitz that I had already directed an enquiry to be made into a complaint respecting some prior transactions of this nature, and that I wait only to receive the detail in order to direct an amicable communication to be made through you on the subject, which, among others, will also comprise this case. Do not wait till he speaks to you about it, but mention it first.

“What you will have to say will relate both to the captures made by us there and to the captures of our ships there by the (*soi-disant*) French from Delfzyl.” *Copy.*

The EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, November 12. Berlin.—“I take the opportunity of two gentlemen going to England to send you two papers from Gentz, in which you will see the scope of the publication he proposes. The sum of what he asks (though in the state in which you receive the papers it may not clearly appear) is, that if the produce in London should not amount to two thousand dollars, the difference should be made up to him by the public. I think it would be to be regretted if his journal was to drop, as I believe it to be the only publication in support of the good cause which circulates on the Continent; and its reputation is so well established that it commands attention. He has proposed to Herbert Marsh to be his translator, and I have told him I think he should engage him also to manage the details of the publication. *Au reste*, he would employ nobody who had not the confidence of Government, either as editor or printer, and would consign his papers to any one named by you. The two thousand dollars would amount at par to about 300 guineas, and if what I have heard of the subscription for Mallet du Pan’s work be true, I think there can be little doubt but that he would get subscribers enough to make up the sum.

“I rejoice much in what you tell me of Count Cobenzl in Mr. Fisher’s letter, though even the few I talk with here who wish

well to the cause seem to despair of the means of Austria ; but I entertain less apprehension from the personal character of Cobenzl than I did, as it seems clear that Thugut is still the real minister. The Emperor of Russia's madness seems so evident that I trust it will prevent the League which has been forming in the North. I cannot persuade myself that it is yet in any forwardness, though I must own I find many well meaning persons persuaded of the contrary."

*Enclosure 1 :—*

MÉMOIRE, by GENTZ.

" Le principe dominant de la politique de l'Europe, et le principe dominant de tous les raisonneurs et écrivains politiques est dans le moment actuel—*la jalousie de la puissance Britannique.*

" Il ne faut plus se le dissimuler : l'enthousiasme que les principes de la Révolution Francoise avoient inspiré à tous les peuples de l'Europe, s'éteint de plus en plus : la terreur que les forfaits et les armes de cette Révolution avoient imprimée partout s'est dissipée de même. Ceux qui aimoient le système révolutionnaire avec passion, quoiqu' ils ne cesseront jamais de l'aimer, l'aiment avec froideur ; ceux qui le combattoient avec énergie, ne le combattent plus qu'avec indifférence. L'usurpation qui a couronné cette Révolution, est consommée. Chacun cherche aujourd'hui l'attitude qu'il doit prendre, dans le nouvel état de choses que cette usurpation a amené. On verra peut-être avec plaisir tomber l'usurpateur ; mais on le voit régner paisiblement. Le sentiment du juste et de l'injuste, l'horreur du crime, le besoin d'une vengeance légitime, le respect pour ce qui a été longtems sacré parmi les hommes, la loyauté, la pudeur, toutes les nobles émotions du coeur humain sont disparues. Il n'y a pas, jusqu' à l'ardeur révolutionnaire elle-même, qui n'ait été engloutie dans le tombeau de toutes les passions fortes de tous les mouvemens prononcés. L'enthousiasme avoit créé la Révolution ; c'est la lâcheté et l'égoïsme qui l'ont consacré et perpétuée.

" Il ne reste donc plus aux grandes puissances que le soin de s'affermir sur leurs bases, en calculant et capitulant avec ce bouleversement désormais irréparable, et se prémunir de longue main contre les germes de nouveaux déchiremens et de nouveaux malheurs, qui les menacent. L'Angleterre est la dernière ressource de l'Europe ; et c'est précisément contre l'Angleterre que se tourne à présent le torrent dévastateur d'une opinion publique, fruit de l'aveuglement des uns, et de la méchancheté inépuisable des autres.

" La haine contre l'Angleterre découle principalement de deux sources.

1. " Des absurdes préjugés en matière d'économie publique, qui font croire au public *de tous les pays sans exception*, que la grandeur d'un pays doit nécessairement être la foiblesse et la perte des autres, que ce qui constitue la richesse de l'Angleterre constitue la pauvreté du reste de l'Europe, que la prépondérance aussi *juste* qu' *inévitabile* que donnent à une nation son industrie, son caractère, et la sagesse de son gouvernement, est un monopole odieux par lequel elle

opprime toutes les autres nations ; enfin ce qui est le comble du délire, mais en même tems une conséquence naturelle des erreurs fondamentales, que la décadence et même la destruction de l'Angleterre seroit l'événement le plus heureux qui pourroit arriver au reste du monde.

“ Cette haine découle, 2. De la part à jamais honorable que l'Angleterre a prise dans la guerre contre la Révolution, et de la noble et salutaire énergie qu'elle a déployée dans cette crise terrible. C'est un crime irrémissible, que les nombreux partisans de système révolutionnaire ne lui pardonneront jamais.

“ Par ces deux causes réunies nous en sommes enfin parvenus au point, que le gouvernement Anglois—il faut le dire avec vérité et même avec force—n'a presque plus d'amis hors le sein de son p<sup>ä</sup>ys. Ceux qui se sont plus ou moins déclaré pour la Révolution sont les ennemis nés de ce gouvernement ; et ceux même qui n'aiment pas la Révolution voient dans l'Angleterre le fléau de la prospérité publique de l'Europe. Que l'on consulte l'esprit public d'une extrémité du Continent à l'autre : on retrouvera par-tout les mêmes dispositions.

“ Il est vrai qu'un gouvernement fort de sa justice et de sa sagesse peut se mettre longtems au-dessus des vaines clameurs de l'ignorance et des intrigues infatigables de la perfidie. Mais il arrive un moment ou, sous peine de sacrifier les intérêts les plus sacrés, on ne peut, et on ne doit plus rester indifférent a cette réunion de haines sincères et de haines artificielles ; et ce moment paroît être arrivé pour l'Angleterre.

“ Car (1) l'opinion publique, quelque pervertie, quelque détestable que puisse être sa direction, n'est jamais une chose indifférente. Elle pourroit l'être encore pour un gouvernement fondé exclusivement sur la violence et la terreur, auquel tous les moyens paroissent également bons et permis, et dont la maxime suprême seroit, *oderint dum metuant*. Mais un état dont la constitution même exclut l'abus de la force, qui ne veut et qui ne peut se permettre que ce qui est juste et bon en soi, qui régné par la loyauté et non par l'oppression, doit nécessairement compter avec l'opinion publique, la diriger si elle est pervertie, la combattre si elle s'arme contre lui.

2. “ Cette opinion publique devient plus grave lorsqu'elle entraîne dans ses torrents non seulement la multitude aveugle, et les écrivains factieux, mais même les hommes d'état les plus influens par leur position et par leur pouvoir. Or il est indubitable que ce qui a donné si véritable force au système politique du moment, ce qui a entraîné tant de souverains dans les idées d'opposition systématique, de mesures concertées, de ligue générale contré l'Angleterre, ce qui a été la base de tout ce qui se prépare et se trame maintenant contre cette puissance, c'est l'aveuglement de la plupart des hommes d'état, ministres dirigeans, envoyés des Cours, publicistes d'un ordre supérieur, enfin de la plupart de ceux qui dominent l'opinion elle-même ; aveuglement dont les progrès sont plus grands et plus terribles que ne sauroient jamais le croire et le concevoir ceux qui n'ont pas eu l'occasion d'observer de près ce qui se passe sur le Continent.

“ On peut en appeler hardiment à tous les ministres instruits et attentifs de l'Angleterre dans les diverses parties de l'Europe, si l'exagération et la terreur panique ont la moindre part à ce tableau affligeant, si ce n'est pas là l'état réel des choses, s'il n'y a pas de grands pàys et des villes qui passent pour être en possession de toutes les lumières, où il seroit difficile de trouver *dix*, je dis, *dix* véritables et sincères amis du gouvernement Anglois, ou seulement dix personnes qui sentissent quel coup mortel l'affoiblissement de l'Angleterre porteroit à la prospérité et à l'existence même de l'Europe.

“ Je sais tres-bien que les efforts de quelques écrivains n'arrêteront pas tout-à-coup ce torrent dévastateur ; mais il n'en est pas moins vrai qu'au delà de ses propres moyens de conservation (qui sont certainement infiniment respectables, et qui, si la Providence ne nous a pas absolument voués à la destruction générale, nous soutiendront longtems, en dépit de nos propres fureurs) il ne reste plus au Gouvernement Anglois pour ramener peu-à-peu l'opinion à des principes plus sains, que la résolution de mettre à profit tout ce qu'il y a encore en Europe de lumières et de talens, et tout ce que la corruption effrénée du siècle a encore laissé intact de ces lumières et de ces talens, pour l'employer, pour le concentrer dans sa cause. Le public, tout gangrené qu'il soit, n'est pas devenu entièrement sourd à la voix de la vérité lorsqu'elle se présente avec force, avec courage, et avec éclat. *Le Mercure Britannique* de M. Mallet Dupan a été une digue plus salutaire que ne l'imaginent peut-être les ministres éclairés eux-mêmes qui lui avoient accordé leur protection ; et le rédacteur du présent mémoire, éloigné autant qu'on peut l'être de toute présomption ridicule, habitué même à se défier continuellement de ses foibles moyens, ne sauroit cependant se dissimuler que par les morceaux qu'il a publiés de tems en tems, il n'ait influé plus ou moins sur l'opinion du public, sur-tout dans les classes supérieures, pour lesquelles le danger de la séduction est malheureusement aussi grand aujourd'hui qu'il l'étoit naguères pour les classes moyennes de la société. Son ouvrage sur les finances de l'Angleterre, quelque imparfait qu'il soit, en a été une preuve remarquable. On l'a maltraité, insulté de toutes les manières ; mais il n'en est pas moins avéré et incontestable que cet ouvrage a fait en France même une très-forte impression, et qu'il a forcé à respecter l'Angleterre ceux même qui étoient les plus éloignés de l'aimer.

“ Quand on ne peut pas maitriser l'opinion, c'est déjà beaucoup que de l'entraver et de la battre sans relâche. L'abandonner à elle-même seroit la plus grave de toutes les fautes. Dans ce moment-ci ce n'est plus l'absurde fanatisme de la Révolution seul, c'est encore la haine intensée contre le Gouvernement Anglois qu'il faut attaquer de toutes les forces qui nous restent. Heureux ceux qui, en se chargeant de cette tâche noble et nécessaire, pourront se dire qu'ils ont contribué à maintenir ce qu'il y avoit de plus grand et de plus respectable parmi les hommes, et à détourner de l'Europe des calamités qui feroient presque oublier celles dont nous avons été les témoins et les victimes.”

*Enclosuré 2 :—*

MÉMOIRE PARTICULIER, by GENTZ.

“ Vous m’avez permis de vous présenter quelques idées sur la nécessité urgente d’agir sur la direction de l’opinion publique. Vous m’avez permis encore d’y ajouter quelques mots sur la manière dont je pourrais concourir moi-même à ce but salutaire. J’ai fait l’un dans le mémoire joint à cette lettre, mémoire qui ne contient rien que vous ne confirmeriez vous-même d’après tout ce que vous avez vu et entendu autour de vous. Je ferai l’autre par l’exposition sincère que vous allez lire ici.

“ J’ai commencé mon journal sous les auspices du seul homme qui parmi vous avoit parfaitement vû et senti l’esprit malheureux qui dirige les conseils de ce pàys. Vous comprendrez donc sans peine qu’une entreprise de ce genre devoit trouver mille obstacles au lieu d’un seul encouragement. La conjuration de la faire avorter a été générale et terrible. Le Comte Schulemburg m’a seul soutenu. Heureusement qu’alors son crédit étoit encore assez grand pour balancer tout ce qu’on avoit fait pour empêcher le roi de me protéger. Heureusement que les moyens de me protéger efficacement étoient tous entre ses mains.

‘ L’état de notre librairie, et l’indolence et le mauvais esprit du public de l’Allemagne auroit rendu cette entreprise impossible à un homme qui ne s’en seroit jamais chargé sans être sûr de remplir sa tâche avec un certain degré de succès. Les travaux qu’un ouvrage de cette nature exige, les frais très-considérables de livres, brochures, gazettes, qu’il suppose, ne pouvoient absolument être soutenus que par le concours généreux de la part du Gouvernement. Le Comte Schulemburg, aux instances particulières duquel mon journal a du son existence, en a fait les honneurs sous tous les rapports. Il a déterminé le roi, 1 à me dispenser de la plus grande partie des travaux attachés aux fonctions de ma place ; 2, à consacrer une somme annuelle de 2,000 écus à la rédaction de mon journal. La moitié de cette somme m’a été payée comme gratification pour mon travail, l’autre moitié à titre de dédommagement pour les dépenses que ce travail entraînoit ; et je puis vous assurer sur mon honneur que bien plus que cette moitié, que les trois-quarts au moins de toute la somme ont été absorbés par ces dépenses.

“ Ce payement m’a été continué régulièrement, quartier par quartier, pendant les deux années 1799 et 1800. Je savois depuis longtems qu’il cesseroit à la fin de celle-ci. Le Comte Schulemburg avoit déjà fait l’impossible. L’influence et le crédit du parti opposé avoit tellement augmenté, que la discrétion m’engageoit moi-même à prier ce ministre de ne plus se sacrifier pour cette entreprise.

“ Comme je vous dois à présent toute la vérité, j’aurai l’honneur de vous dire qu’elle alloit cesser entièrement, si vous ne m’aviez pas ouvert une nouvelle perspective. La promesse de lui donner une autre forme, et de continuer le journal comme ouvrage périodique paroissant par quartier, n’étoit qu’un prétexte pour masquer au public le changement qui s’étoit fait dans ma position. Le Comte Schulemburg, qui m’avoit du moins procuré pour l’année prochaine la continuation de ma dispensation du travail de département, désiroit lui-même que je ne me retirasse pas brusquement, et que

j'en imposasse, pour ainsi dire, au public, qui n'a jamais été dans le véritable secret de l'entreprise. Je prévoyois et je prévois encore qu'il m'est impossible de la soutenir par mes forces.

“Cependant, comme vous croyez vous-même que la continuation de mes travaux ne seroit pas sans intérêt pour l'Angleterre, comme vous connoissez assez l'état des choses pour savoir que même la publication non-interrompue de mes écrits *en Allemagne* ne seroit pas un objet entièrement indifférent à votre p<sup>ä</sup>ys, et qu'ensuite une traduction régulière dans votre langue pourroit faire quelque bien en Angleterre, je vous présenterai mon plan, en vous laissant le soin d'en disposer de la manière que vous jugerez la plus convenable.

“La seule condition que je fais pour moi doit nécessairement être celle de rester du moins dans l'état où je me suis trouvé jusqu'ici. Je suis persuadé qu'il ne s'agiroit que d'ouvrir une souscription en Angleterre ; et comme les cahiers qui forment une année peuvent très bien, d'après leur volume, être vendus à 2 guinées d'abonnement (ce qui étoit le prix de l'ouvrage de Mallet Dupan) je crois que le Gouvernement couvriroit aisément cette dépense. Mais, comme il me seroit impossible de traiter directement avec un libraire de Londrès, et qu'en général les tracasseries pécuniaires ne s'accordent pas avec le travail soutenu qu'exige un ouvrage de ce genre, je demanderois comme condition préliminaire, ou comme grâce particulière, de n'entrer pour rien dans les détails de cet arrangement, mais d'être simplement assuré de percevoir, quartier par quartier, la somme en question, sans m'inquiéter de toute autre affaire relative à l'argent.

“Si cet objet peut se régler, je vous promets de vous fournir régulièrement ce qu'il faudra pour publier en Anglois les morceaux qui je composerois en Allemand. J'ai pris la liberté de vous désigner un homme à Londrès qui réunit toutes les qualités que cette traduction exige. Si on insiste à ce que l'ouvrage soit publié *par mois*, je m'arrangerai en conséquence. Cependant je vous répète encore ce que je vous ai déjà observé, c'est que, comme je m'abstiendrai presque toujours de traiter les nouvelles du moment, comme tout mon plan est basé sur des morceaux d'une très grande étendue, comme il me seroit infiniment plus favorable de donner à ces morceaux tout le tems et toute la suite que leur perfection demanderoit, et comme, d'ailleurs, la communication avec l'Angleterre est sujette à trop de difficultés pour pouvoir s'engager à y envoyer chaque mois les matériaux d'un cahier, je préférerois infiniment, et pour moi-même, et pour l'avantage du public et de la chose, de ne faire paroître que tous les deux ou trois mois un petit volume. Je vous prie de proposer cette idée aux personnes auxquelles vous ferez part de ma proposition, et je serois bien charmé si elles la regardoient du même point-de-vue.

“Si mon plan est accepté, je n'ai pas besoin de vous dire que je m'attacherai principalement à traiter les objets qui peuvent avoir un intérêt particulier pour l'Angleterre, et pour ses intérêts sur le Continent. Je vous présenterai ici quelques-uns de ces objets qui m'occuperoient sur-tout dans le travail de l'année prochaine.

1. “Développement des principes qui tendroient à convaincre

l'Europe que son intérêt *bien-entendu* ne sauroit jamais être séparé de l'intérêt de la Grande Bretagne, de la conservation de sa précieuse industrie, de son commerce ; et à détruire toutes les fausses idées qu'on s'est faites de ce qu'on appelle si mal-à-propos son monopole.

2. " Analyse de la doctrine de la souveraineté du peuple, dans laquelle je remonterois à l'origine de ce faux principe, dans laquelle je montrerois quel mal il a fait à l'Angleterre depuis le siècle passé ; comment il a été propagé dans toute l'Europe, comment il a engendré la révolution de France (que les badauds regardent comme fondée sur des principes *inconnus* jusqu'à nos jours) ; et comment il a fait que même sous la meilleure des constitutions, il a toujours subsisté un levain révolutionnaire, seule cause de la conduite plus qu'étrange qu'un certain parti a tenu parmi vous, et dont il scandalise encore aujourd'hui la majorité éclairée de votre nation, et le petit nombre d'hommes—*rari nantes in gurgite vasto*—qui sont encore dignes d'entendre la vérité dans les autres pays de l'Europe.

3. " Recherches sur les véritables causes de la guerre actuelle et sur celles de sa durée, dans lesquelles je m'attacherois sur-tout à laver une fois pour toutes votre gouvernement de tous les reproches absurdes dont on l'accable. Je suis pour l'objet de cet article en possession de faits précieux et d'excellens documens, dont je ne pourrois pas faire *chez nous* tout l'usage que je désirerois, vu notre manière de penser, et les principes de ce gouvernement-ci.

" Au reste vous connoissez assez ma manière d'écrire et sur-tout ma façon de penser, pour que j'aie besoin de vous entretenir longtems sur l'esprit dans lequel tous ces morceaux seroient rédigés. Vous savez que je ne suis pas fait pour écrire jamais contre ma conscience, que tout l'or du monde ne m'y engageroit pas, que tout ce que je dis part de la conviction la plus intime, et que par un véritable zèle pour la bonne cause, j'ai consacré ma vie aux objets qui devoient occuper exclusivement dans ce terrible moment les pensées de tous les hommes d'état, et de toutes les bonnes têtes qui n'ont pas oublié que nous sommes encore loin, très-loin, de la fin des malheurs publics.

" Je n'ajoute plus qu'un mot. La fin de cette année approche à grande pas, et vous sentez combien je dois désirer de savoir, le plutôt possible, le résultat de cette démarche. Je vous prie donc instamment de vouloir bien engager ceux avec lesquels vous traiterez cette affaire de me faire parvenir, *sans le moindre délai*, leur intentions et les assurances que je vous ai demandées. Je m'en remets pour tout le reste à votre bonté pour moi, et à votre zèle éclairé."

HENRY DUNDAS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1800, November 13. London.—" I am to see the Duke of York early this morning, which makes me wish for an immediate answer to this question. Have you any objection to our dismounting one or both of the regiments of cavalry at Portugal and sending them to Sir Ralph Abercrombie? He has wrote home excessively anxious upon the subject of some more force of that description ; and, considering the perturbed state of this country, and the great call for cavalry, I don't see it practicable to gratify Sir Ralph to the

full of what I would wish without having recourse to what I have suggested respecting Portugal. I am afraid indeed, from the scarcity of fodder at Portugal, the cavalry may be dismounted in another more fatal way, I mean by the death of the horses."

#### THE EARL OF CARYSFORT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, November 15. Berlin.—“The moon is certainly not near the change in Russia. I hear every day some new instance of extravagance. My friend Krudener has to-day communicated to me Rastopchin's letter to you, by which I find he has complained of me to the Emperor. The power of doing mischief will, from what I hear, be very much reduced by the want of money, and I cannot but hope that other powers will think it dangerous to engage in any measures upon the faith of his support. Major Keir, together with your despatch of November 7th, brought me letters from Messrs. Glennie and Harward acquainting me that the Prussian vessel was restored; and I have another letter from the former to-night, by which I find the Prussian Minister Schultz has expressed his satisfaction, and sent to stop the march of the troops. This will probably be notified to me by Haugwitz to-morrow, and I rejoice to think that the general alarm which has been excited, particularly in Denmark, will have made this Court, and even that of Petersburg, entirely miss their aim; for I am well convinced that the occupation of Cuxhaven was premeditated, and is connected with the plan of the Neutral Maritime League. What I have said in my despatch concerning Sweden is founded upon some advances made by Engeström to Garlike the night before last, in consequence of which I called upon him. We were interrupted, and I am to see him again; but the Swede is, I believe, either alarmed at the encroaching spirit manifested by the present Protectors of the North or desirous from some other cause of drawing nearer to Great Britain. If it were possible, without departing from the principles necessary to the preservation of our maritime power, to give some new security to these people for their fair trade, it would completely, and at once, *dérouter* all the plans of Paul and Haugwitz.

“I wish you had said a word touching General Stamford's communications. Lord Minto's letter will have shown you what is thought of them at Vienna, but, notwithstanding the letter I have had from him, of which he has sent you a copy, neither General Stamford nor I thought it advisable to take any step till we knew something of your sentiments. Haugwitz shows such an eagerness upon the hint which has been given of a disposition in Austria to concert fairly and fully with this Court through the medium of Great Britain, that, if he has any influence at all, it must, I think, give some check to the progress of the schemes against us. This Court is mortified to the greatest degree at the neglect Lucchesini has experienced at Paris. When his last despatches came away he had not had a single interview with the First Consul, nor any mark of confidence or communication from the Government. If the war is resumed he will return immediately. Some people think Lucchesini is at work to supplant Haugwitz; but, I believe, they judge a little

too hastily, though sooner or later he will attempt it. We do not know here how to account for Cobenzl's remaining at Paris after the notice given of the cessation of the armistice. Count Haugwitz, I believe, reckons without his host, when he says he is sure of the concurrence of Russia in the plans he may arrange with Austria for the Empire.

“How mortifying are the accounts we receive from the army under Abercrombie. Surely such a force might, at least, have made some attempt. I do not know where the fault lies, but I am sure it has a very bad effect on our affairs.”

#### H. ELLIOT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, November 14. Dresden.—“I have acquainted your Lordship by another opportunity that a considerable number of the principal families usually residing at Petersburg had assembled at Dresden. Lord Minto, thinking it possible from this circumstance that I may obtain some interesting intelligence with respect to Russia, assures me that I may venture to transmit to your Lordship whatever I can collect upon this subject, as all direct communication between Petersburg and London is now become very precarious.

“The Russians residing at Dresden are divided into different parties who have little connection with each other. Those who have enjoyed employments during this reign, still entertain hopes of being restored to their country and to their former situations in it, by that fickleness of disposition of the Emperor which daily fills the gazettes with lists of the disgrace and subsequent promotion of his civil and military servants. They continue therefore to cultivate by every means in their power an intimate correspondence with those individuals at Petersburg, who are supposed still to retain some degree of influence with the Emperor, and to approach his person. It is therefore principally from them that authentic information is to be derived. For as to several other Russians of distinction here, who were either favourites in the late reign or who participated in the secret transactions of Catherine, they are debarred from much connection with the rest of their countrymen. Although I am persuaded they expect that the day will come when the most *daring* conspirators against the present Emperor will be the most *successful*, yet they are a description of men from whom little knowledge of the existing Government can be acquired, as they are only bent upon its total overthrow, and conceive that their wishes may be accomplished soon, should the Emperor's conduct continue to create such general disgust as it now does.

“In a late letter from Princess Gagarin to an intimate friend, she says: ‘The Emperor has had such repeated fits of rage, accompanied with shrieks and convulsions, that his attendants thought his life in danger, and it was in agitation to endeavour to persuade him to seek for medical advice from some able English physician.

“In another letter from Petersburg, written in the month of October, and from a person who has opportunities of being well informed, the same circumstances are repeated, with the addition, that during the Emperor's indisposition, the only persons who had

been allowed to approach him, excepting his menial servants, were Count Rastopschin, Princess Gagarin, Kutusow, and the Governor of Petersburg.

“There are several Russian gentlemen here with whom Count Rastopschin corresponds. In some of his late letters he laments exceedingly the present state of affairs, and expresses his wish that a good understanding may be soon restored between Russia, Great Britain, and Austria.

“Should your Lordship judge the above circumstances to be worthy of your attention, or direct me in future to collect further information relative to Russia, I am to entreat that no communication whatever may be made to Count Woronzow of what I write to your Lordship. That gentleman has his own correspondents at Dresden, and would certainly put them upon their guard against me, not indeed from any degree of ill-will towards the British Government, to which he is on the contrary well disposed, but from other motives, which it is not necessary to detail by the present opportunity. I am above all solicitous that the name of Princess Gagarin may not be mentioned as having written to any person concerning the Emperor’s health. The publicity of such a circumstance might be fatal to her.

“I have taken the liberty of making this a *private* letter, as I conceive the subject of it to be entirely distinct from the official business of my mission here.

“Monsieur de Kotschubey writes frequently to Count Woronzow, and is one of those who also receives letters from Count Rastopschin. I perceive that he still entertains hopes of being again employed either at home or in some important mission.”

#### COUNT STARHEMBERG TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, November 15.] Twickenham, 11 o’clock p.m.—“Plus j’y pense et plus il me semble que ce que j’ai imaginé est le plus convenable à la circonstance. Il me paroit impossible que vous fassiez une nouvelle démarche directe vis-à-vis les François, mais il est tout simple que l’on sache s’ils veulent recevoir un ministre anglois à Luneville ou non. En le demandant à Otto, il faudra bien que le gouvernement françois ou envoie des passeports, ou prononce un refus qui terminera enfin toutes ces lenteurs. Vous me direz lundi si vous voulez que je parle à Otto. Je vous joins ici un *post scriptum* de la dépêche du Comte de Cobentzl que je vous prierai de me rendre sans en faire mention. La dépêche même est allemande et dit à peu près ce qu’il vous marque dans sa lettre. Il m’y parle encore de son désir de voir arriver M. Grenville à Luneville, et me donne quelques détails sur son séjour à Paris. Adieu, mes sentimens pour la cause, l’union de nos païs, et pour vous-même, vous sont connus.”

#### W. PITT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, November 15. Downing Street.—“I have received this afternoon the correspondence from Copenhagen. The subject is an important and pressing one, but it would be scarce possible

for me to attend the Cabinet on Monday, having fixed that day with our Committee for discussing what is still more pressing, and which I cannot put off without retarding all our proceedings, and producing a good deal of inconvenience. Any time you choose on Tuesday will suit me perfectly.

“If you receive anything from Cobenzel by a reasonable hour, pray order it to be sent to me before the packet is made up for the King.

*Postscript.*—“I have just received the box with Cobenzel’s letter. It is a little suspicious that he should affect not to know that nothing but the refusal of the French to treat jointly or to give passports prevents our Minister being at Luneville. Perhaps the Cabinet to-morrow might dispose of the Danish business also, or at least shorten the future discussion.”

The EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, November 19. Berlin.—“There is on foot not only a plot for renewing the armed neutrality against us, but also a league of the northern powers, Denmark, Sweden, Russia, and Prussia, for a mediation of a general peace. It may be this to which the answer Krudener is promised will relate, or there may be an intention of combining the two. Russia however proposes to invite to the League of Mediation the accession of Saxony and Hesse Cassel, but expressly to exclude Hanover. As I have hopes of full information on this head, I do not make a despatch of it. I am by no means satisfied in my own mind that the occupation of Cuxhaven will not be persisted in, and I conjecture the ultimate decision will be reserved till it is known whether Austria makes her peace. In that case the possession of Cuxhaven will be kept. In case of negotiation, or renewed war, the execution of the plan will be suspended.

“The Danish *Chargé d’Affaires* sees this attempt with the greatest alarm.

“I know from authority which I think good that Sprengporten has been detained here, not waiting for the determination of Great Britain about Malta, but for want of money. He and his suite have been trying their private credit to the utmost. Some of them set forward to-day. Some runners of the Government have said that the order for occupying Cuxhaven will certainly be revoked, but that delays will be contrived so as to let the troops arrive, in which case the charge of their march will be thrown on the town of Hamburgh.” *Copy. Original written with invisible ink.*

P. ABBOTT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, November 20, Piccadilly.—“On the news of the surrender of Malta to his Majesty’s arms it occurred to me that some observations I had had occasion to make at different periods might be of useful information, and I set about to collect from them the annexed notes.

“I have until now hesitated in what manner they could with most propriety be introduced to notice,

“ Being convinced from reflection of the propriety that your Lordship ought to have the first notice of them, and that your Lordship’s candour would, without reference to any other consideration, estimate their utility, and the public motive that alone has induced me to apply myself to the subject, I think it my duty to withhold them no longer.

“ And I esteem this direct mode of communicating them as the highest proof I can offer of my integrity for the common good, and of my veneration for your Lordship’s character.

“ Upon this score I claim your Lordship’s indulgence for the imperfections of the form, style, and diction of these notes.

“ I have also the honour to annex copy of some notes proposing to import corn from Turkey, which my friends encouraged me to offer to Government, and which I presented on the 15th instant to my Lord Hawkesbury ; from the station your Lordship holds, and as Governor of the Turkey Company, it had perhaps been right to have addressed them to your Lordship in the first instance.

“ I much wish that this proposal may meet with consideration, as I have many reasons to flatter myself that the adoption of it would contribute to the speedy relief and future benefit of this country.”

*Enclosure :—*

“ NOTE ON THE IMPORTANCE OF RETAINING MALTA.

“ It would be difficult to point out any event that has happened in the course of the present war that promises more amply to reward the persevering energy of Great Britain than the conquest of Malta.

“ The advantages which strike our first view from the possession of this island are in themselves of great importance.

“ With a moderate naval force, which may be safely and conveniently stationed, supplied, and refitted in her port, England will keep in awe every rival power on the Mediterranean Seas.

“ Sicily and Egypt may thence be more easily protected against the future attempts of the French.

“ And the trade of the Levant will be under the control of Great Britain.

“ Such are the general outlines of the advantages which we discover on the immediate contemplation of this object.

“ And with the certainty that this valuable prize would remain to us at the termination of the war, it would be perhaps unnecessary, at this juncture, to offer any further considerations on the subject ; and we might without uneasiness wait the natural course of events to realize all the minuter advantages, and develope such as are of higher political importance which must arise from our secure possession of this conquest.

“ But as the resolutions of Cabinets are beyond our power of divination, and as they are ever subject to miscalculations, under the anxiety that every Englishman ought to feel on subjects that relate to the welfare of his country, I deem it my duty to endeavour to point out some consequences of great injury to our interest,

which may be apprehended, should we ever relinquish this possession.

“As what I shall offer is the result of observations I have been able to make under particular circumstances, it is likely they may not have fallen under notice of his Majesty’s Ministers ; but if they have, the personal knowledge and experience with which I speak must give additional weight to the necessity of preserving Malta above almost every consideration.

“When Egypt shall be delivered from its present invaders, the next duty of our Government will of course be to adopt measures for placing that country in a proper state of defence. The rivals and enemies of England are aware how vulnerable we are through this Channel ; and we are as fully aware that France will on every favourable occasion endeavour to establish permanent footing in Egypt for the ultimate purpose of attacking our colonies in India. But this fact with all its magnitude, from its notoriety, is less to us than the enormous ambition and insidious policy of another power.

“The Cabinet of St. Petersburg, during a great part of the late Catherine’s reign, pursued, with serious and persevering attention, every means to gain footing in Egypt ; and often exulted in sanguine expectation of severing that province from the Ottoman dominion. During the last war with Turkey, particularly, a project was formed, which, had it been seconded with the means that were solicited, would not have failed of the most complete success.

“As Russia possessed no proper harbour in the Levant seas, and having failed in her attempts to draw Venice into an alliance against the Turks, consequently no longer hoping to procure a station for her squadrons in the port of Corfu, another expedient was resorted to. Every intrigue was employed to persuade the Maltese to join league against the Turks for the purpose of invading Syria, Palestine, and Egypt.

“Relying on the religious constitution of the Maltese government, and confident of the powerful and tempting arguments that he had the means of offering, Prince Potemkin, the great mover of the Russian government, did, not without reason, expect to succeed in these overtures, and it has been declared that persons in authority in Malta were warm in promoting his views.

“The immediate step that was to have followed this coalition, had it taken place, was that a Russian fleet with a considerable body of men should (in spite of every opposition from the Turks, and in defiance of the menaces of this country) sail from the Black Sea through the Bosphorus, and after battering and sacking Constantinople, and destroying the arsenal and shipping at their leisure, with the same winds which are periodically to be depended on, they should proceed through the Dardanells to pour their arms and spoils into Malta ; then, collecting the partisans which were forming in the Morea and other parts of Greece in immense numbers, Egypt and Syria would have fallen an easy prey to them, and with such means, easily maintained against all the efforts of the Turks and their allies to dispossess them.

“But the Maltese Government, as jealous of their political in-

dependence as of their religious professions, were alarmed at these proposals, and not only rejected them *in toto*, but we have observed that the squadrons, and even the cruisers of Malta, ever afterwards avoided joining or acting with the Russian flag against an enemy avowedly common to them both.

“It was easily conceived by the wary brotherhood, nor could those amongst them who had been gained to Catherine’s interest even palliate that such a Russian squadron with troops be admitted into Malta under whatsoever pretext; the very existence of the Order would become dependent on the arbitrary will of Russia; and from the boundless ambition of a power, whose religion is almost as intolerant of the rites of the Romish Church as it is inimical to the faith of Islam, what but a speedy annihilation of their political existence could be expected on such a tempting opportunity being offered.

“Thus the well-founded fears of the Maltese frustrated the accomplishment of a project ever to be deprecated by every power in Europe, but most of all by Great Britain.

“The failure of this object at that time, however, so far from discouraging the Russian Cabinet, seems to have enhanced its value in their estimation; and they have pursued in ardent contemplation the opportunity of acquiring a naval station in Malta.

“And the petulant ardour of the Emperor Paul, no longer allowing him discretion to keep his own counsel, has proclaimed aloud what his predecessor intended to be held secret, by the most extravagant acts and declarations; creating himself and usurping the functions of Grand Master of a religious Order, whose religion not only he cannot profess but would not even dare openly to tolerate, consistent with the oaths by which he holds the sceptre of Russia.

“By the conquest of Egypt the views of Russia were by no means confined to the acquisition of a valuable territory, and the consequent weakness and distress of her natural enemy.

“Long had Catherine and her Ministers eyed with jaundiced hatred the progressive prosperity and greatness of England, and urged by the double motive of jealousy of our greatness and resentment for our thwarting her ambition, she meditated severe vengeance against this nation.

“There were not wanting at her Court men of abilities and enterprise to point out that our vulnerable side lay on our Indian possessions, and that Egypt was the channel through which the blow might the most easily and effectually be struck at the root of our wealth and grandeur; at the same time the advantages that would redound to Russia by turning the channel of the commerce of India with Europe were fully shown.

“Potempkin was surrounded by hosts of adventuring sycophants from every country, who were constantly forming plans and offering proposals calculated to flatter the ambition and vanity of that prince and his Imperial mistress, among which were some of a nature particularly alarming to this country.

“One was presented by a Livonian gentleman of uncommon abilities and experience, who had resided in our settlements in the East Indies. It proposed to establish similar settlements in the

name of the Empress of Russia on the coasts of Malabar, Coromandel and in Bengal. This plan comprised many objects of great political as well as commercial importance, such as enabling Russia to give law to Persia (then beginning to be distracted with inward commotions) to crush at her will the power of the Turks by the destruction of her Arabian provinces, and creating her arbitress of the fate of Great Britain in the East. The whole was planned and digested in India, and the gentleman charged with obtaining the execution of it being able to give ample explanations and illustrations upon it, was received with flattering caresses by Potempkin, who was seriously preparing measures for the enterprise when the late war with Turkey broke out. The agent of this project was, however, honourably retained by the Prince, and still continually promised with the success of his mission; he became very sanguine and urgent, when about the third year of the war, the Prince expressly sent for him from a distant province, and commanded him not to utter another whisper on the subject until he should be called upon by himself, which at the same time he allowed him to hope might be soon. He was then charged with active employments which occupied him until Potempkin's death, soon after which a period was put to that war.

“It did not require all the sagacity that the Livonian possessed to guess that Potempkin's motive for the sudden and mysterious injunctions he gave him on the subject was to avoid further provoking the jealousy of this country, at a time when the Court of Petersburg was endeavouring by every means to avert the hostilities with which Mr. Pitt threatened Russia.

“Since that project was laid aside a native of this country came from India in 1794 with a similar one, and immediately repaired to Petersburg; but this soon failed, partly through the want of temper and address in the negotiation, and partly from the weak influence and energy of the persons through whom the proposals were offered.

“Having, through a peculiarity of circumstances, got knowledge of these transactions, some of them at a very early period of my life, I resolved to trace the sentiments of the Russian Court on these subjects during my visit to Petersburg in part of 1795 and 1796, and being nearly connected by blood and intimacy with a person through whose department every circumstance relative to these projects was transmitted, I was enabled to inform myself of the leading objects, of the views which had been formed on them, and also of many other projects equally important and dangerous to the interests of this country, but not so immediately relevant of the object of these pages. And from other observations I was able to make, I became fully convinced that it has been the uniform and constant policy of the Russian Cabinet to wait the period when they shall conceive this country, and other powers of Europe, sufficiently weakened by the contest that has so long been straining their resources, to adopt enterprises formed on these projects that ought to be watched with all the vigilance, and opposed by all the energy of Great Britain.

“I am satisfied that such was the policy at least of Catherine

and her ministers, and I have no reason to think that the Russian Cabinet ever sincerely adopted a different system, notwithstanding they have seemed to give way to the gust of passion that Paul showed in favour of the coalized powers against the French. But what we have lately experienced from him clearly shows us that the old system of politics has again openly prevailed, having at the same time fairly warned us what degree of dependence we ought to place on the faith and integrity of his council.

“I hope that what has been said above will have sufficiently shown the danger of allowing Malta ever to fall in the power of either France or Russia; and it will, I trust, be unnecessary to point out the great probability that, should we ever relinquish that conquest in favour of its ancient government, every endeavour that we and all the adjacent powers could make to support her in her former independency would prove vain, and that either the intrigues and force of France, but most probably those of Russia, would soon prevail to place Malta under absolute control and in possession of one of these powers to the utter shame and great danger of the interest of Great Britain and her allies.

“It can surely never be expected that a state so completely overthrown and shattered as that of Malta is by the powers and principles of revolution can ever again be held together by its original bonds and interests.

“It would be superfluous to attempt to point out the innumerable advantages that the possession of Malta would ensure to the relative interests of England and Turkey, but I cannot at this moment help urging one object to the consideration of government.

“As a member of the Levant Company I have long been aware of the necessity of giving every facility to enable us to get speedy returns of our freights from the Turkish ports, and I am informed of the acts that lately passed and of the measures that have been adopted to allow foul ships to perform quarantine in this country. But I most seriously dread the possible consequences of suffering ships to approach the coasts of this kingdom with infection.

“The wisest and severest laws that can possibly be enacted will never sufficiently secure us against the secret and subtile infection of the plague, as long as there is a single smuggler on our extensive coasts. This a point of most awful consideration, and calls for the immediate deliberation of the Legislature.

“Malta already possesses one of the best lazaretto's for performing plague quarantine in Europe; and by substituting that for the one established in the hulks in the mouth of our most frequented river, with proper regulations for that dispatch and economy which are so necessary for the benefit of our mercantile intercourse with Turkey, every advantage that can be expected from the late adopted plan might be insured without the danger that the country must be in constant dread of from unlading infected cargoes and crews upon our own shores; and we might ensure greater security by this measure than even from the former quarantine regulations.

“This advantage alone sets Malta at a high estimation to this country.”

## THE EARL OF CARYSFORT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, November 20. Berlin.—“My despatch gives you the result of the steps I have taken on the affair of Cuxhaven. The information received by Redern, which is official, of the countermanding the march of the troops is very curious, for it seems plain from thence that they cannot now be at Cuxhaven, so that the note of the *Ministre d'Etat et de Cabinet* contains a palpable lie. I must incline to think this measure is taken at the instigation of Russia. I heard some time ago a rumour, but not sufficiently authenticated, that the Emperor had solicited this Court to take possession of Hamburg, and Krudener has appeared very eager about this affair.

“The Swede's further conversation with me was only to tell me the reasons he had to know that the King of Sweden's displeasure was personal to Mr. Hailes, and founded upon a persuasion that he had been misrepresented to his Majesty, as unfriendly to Great Britain and favourable to France, by that gentleman. And to this cause he attributes the seizure of the convoy. The account current here is certainly not favourable to Mr. Hailes, and he is considered as having designedly put the Court into a situation in which they could not receive Mr. Talbot without a letter from you. But that is a matter of little consequence. You will judge from better information than I can give whether the existing circumstances make a closer and more constant intercourse with Sweden desirable. I understand from Engestroön that Sweden means to send a mission to England forthwith.”

## WILLIAM WICKHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, November 23. Crems-Munster.—“I can give you no assistance whatever in your speculations on the army of Condé. My public letter says all that I have to say on the subject, which in truth amounts to nothing more nor less than this, that you must send instantly to the depot all that is not strictly military, and make the princes feel that it is as much for their own honour as for their real interest to act the private gentlemen and not the presumptive heirs to the throne.

“But for Windham's letter I would have done it myself at once; and I had placed Plunket there as a steady fellow, but, at the same time, a man of honour and high birth, to have carried the thing through for me. I think it an unfortunate thing for the country as well as for the army itself that I was prevented from realizing my plan in all its parts. I would have reduced the expense to £200,000 a year, and got about 2,500 or 3,000 good soldiers instead of from 1,500 to 1,800. The difference is lost by the immense number of orderly officers, and soldiers who are obliged to wait on, and take care of the horses of, such an extraordinary number of officers.

“I have but one word more on the subject, and that I give to your Lordship in the most strict and unbounded confidence. No earthly consideration should ever induce me to have anything to

do with the details of either the Swiss or Condé corps, as long as they are in their present channel.

“Were they a part of the regular War Office department, I should of course be happy to act under War Office orders; but, in the bureau where it appears that they now are, I know there to be so much prodigality as well as of ignorance of business, that I will take care never to have my name coupled with anything that comes out of or goes into it.

“I am thankful beyond measure for the indulgence your Lordship has given me, of which I have made full use, and am now as well and as ready for business as ever I was in my life. But I had been really overworked, as your Lordship very kindly observed, and some relaxation from business was absolutely necessary to me. I set out to-morrow with a light heart, though very uncertain as to the event, and unable even to form a conjecture from ignorance of the plans as well as of the force of the enemy.

“I am anxious to hear that you have not disapproved what I did at Hohenlinden, and still more to know what measures you have taken to provide against the evil of which such unpleasant accounts are sent us from England. I can form some opinion of the hurry you must all have been thrown into by this untimely meeting of Parliament whilst the carpenters are still employed in making seats for my old Irish friends.

“I hope to establish a correspondence through France, though it will not be without difficulty that I shall succeed unless we advance further.

“I wish I durst have concluded the Bavarian treaty sooner. It would have been better for us all. But when anything is said to me on the subject I always answer *Hohenlinden*.

“In the arrangement of the Swiss corps I hope your Lordship will not forget that the great affair, should we go on, though now of little consequence, will be the patronage, and I hope that you will take measures not to let it go out of its present channel. For the rest, I really think in my conscience that it cannot be better than in Ramsay’s hands, whose faults are more than counter-balanced by his good qualities.

“Hope is the *only* man of business I have seen among our military men, but Ramsay is really becoming one, and I think at last he will succeed.

“This winter campaign will cost us a prodigious deal of money in wear and tear and in horse flesh, even should we be successful. Should we be beat we shall be ruined, as I doubt whether it will be possible to bring away a single Bavarian cannon.”

#### The EARL OF CARYSFORT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, November 23. Berlin.—“I cannot but think the violent measures of the Emperor of Russia will check the scheme of the Armed Neutrality, and I must also hope that what I have been authorized to say of the dispositions of his Majesty to order his Minister to communicate with M. de Lucchesini, joined with Lord Minto’s assurances of the inclination of the Court of Vienna, will

have come in good time to counteract the impressions endeavoured to be given by the French Government to Count Cobenzel and Lucchesini of the reciprocal bad intentions of their respective Courts. The letters I have just received from Lord Minto and Mr. Wickham make me almost regret that I have not proceeded farther in consequence of Lord Minto's letter to me of the 7th. You will believe, I am sure, that it is not from the fear of taking any responsibility upon myself where it might promote the public service, but considering how immediately his Majesty's German dominions are concerned, I thought I could not have with propriety ventured to say anything precise enough to draw any declaration from Haugwitz. In consequence of the eagerness Lord Minto manifests (he probably knows more than I can of the inclinations of our Government) I shall venture to go a step farther and acquaint Haugwitz that Lord Minto knows the Duke of Brunswick's ideas, and that it is with a view to them that he has sounded the Court of Vienna. I have always told Haugwitz I did not enter into the details of the Duke's plan, which I concluded would be varied *ad libitum*, but conceived the substance of it to be that Austria and Prussia should consent [concert?] together, conjointly with Great Britain, a final arrangement for Germany in which the limits of influence of each should be ascertained and acknowledged, taking for a general outline what had been virtually effected by the treaty of Basle.

"The plan proposed by Lord Minto of employing General Stamford would not be relished here, and both the General and I are of opinion that at present his journey to Vienna would draw so much observation as to defeat the object of it.

"The messenger, Mason, I shall, I believe, detain here, and send another person on to London who will not return. Mason says he is wanted by Mr. Wickham, and to send him to Cuxhaven in order to return immediately would be more expense to Government than the mode I mean to adopt. I send a German pamphlet by Haller of Switzerland, which General Stamford thinks it would be useful to have translated into English. I have heard that some body at Hamburgh has undertaken it. I shall be impatient to know whether you think I have done too much or too little in the affair of Cuxhaven. It is a satisfaction to observe that a very great and general anxiety has been excited on that subject. The Dane in particular seems greatly agitated, and not less uneasy at the apparent hostile spirit of the Emperor of Russia. I hope you may be able to make some use of this."

#### FRANCE UNDER THE CONSULATE.

##### BARON DE GILLIERS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, November.—"Chacun voit dans un succès militaire sa fortune et son élévation. Je crains la défaite Autrichienne, s'ils font seuls la guerre. Bonaparte qui craint de rendre ses généraux trop puissans, voudrait la paix ; mais il ne sait comment s'y prendre.

"Vous n'avez sûrement pas oublié que dans ma conversation, je vous ai parlé des obstacles que Bonaparte rencontre dans l'espèce

d'indépendance dont déjà jouissent les généraux. C'est Moreau, dit-on, qui de son autorité privée a ordonné la démolition des trois forteresses. C'est Brune qui, sans pouvoirs, est entré en Toscane. Je crois pouvoir répondre que Bonaparte allait nommer un conseil-de-guerre pour juger les généraux Dupont, et Brune, lorsqu'à la suite de la conférence avec M. de Cobentzel, voyant que la paix ne pouvait pas résulter de cette négociation, il avoua la démarche. Moreau s'était plaint précédemment de la prolongation de l'armistice. Mais je vous le répète, le premier Consul veut la paix ; et si M. Pitt la désire, je pense qu'il serait des moyens secrets de rapprochement, et de traiter confidentiellement pour établir *une paix générale*, même d'après les vues raisonnables de l'Angleterre. Le point le plus important serait de détruire la méfiance. J'ai lieu de croire de plus, qu'avec des précautions, et des mesures discrètes, on pouvait parvenir à recevoir ici un agent secret, chargé de mettre sous les yeux du Ministre, par les moyens d'une personne confidentielle, quelques bases de négociations pour *la paix générale*.

“ J'ai jetté rapidement sur le papier ce que j'ai sçu, et vû. Je vous prierai de suplérer à ce qui manque ici, d'après la conversation que j'ai eu l'honneur d'avoir avec vous.”

#### EARL TEMPLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, November 27. Avington.—“ By the papers I see Sylvester Douglas is promoted. As this will make a move in the India Board I trust I shall not be left out. By you I am sure I shall not be forgotten, and if any proper arrangement can be made, I am sure you will do every thing to forward it. The *obvious move* is that from an *unpaid* situation at the Board to one with salary, the other would I suppose be to the Privy Council. As the first is not so much an object to me, would make no real difference in my official situation, and would vacate the county so short a time previous to the general election, perhaps, if the other step could be obtained, I should prefer it. However, I put myself into your hands, convinced that I shall be in the hands of one who will advise me for the best, and use his best efforts to assist me in any plan he may recommend.”

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, November 28.—“ I am not less sensible than you to all the inconveniences which must arise from the embargo at Riga, more especially because at this time of the season I presume that no new measure can give us the fruits of our Baltic trade before the open weather of the next spring, and I take for granted that the Emperor Paul in laying on this embargo has felt this only security against the danger of our going to Riga to take it off again ; I consider therefore that chapter as closed for the next five months, and I cannot help strongly suspecting that before that time shall have expired we shall, in one way or other, have made either partial or general peace, enough to allow us to look this Northern comet in the face as we ought to do. But neither for this object nor for that

of French peace do I entertain any great expectations on the part of Prussia. They are too much afraid of Russia to help us even by the slightest demonstration on that side, supposing that they were inclined to do so, and the same apprehensions will lead them rather to employ the arms of Russia in a dispute with us than to take any step to divert that storm. With respect to the assistance of Berlin upon the subject of French peace, I have no doubt that they will be very liberal to us in professions of their desire to assist it, and that they would be so far sincere in that desire as they would see their own German views promoted by it ; but while those German views are all views of hostility to Austria and to the interests of the Emperor, we should be daily called upon to the necessity of sacrificing either Vienna to Berlin or Berlin to Vienna ; their fears and jealousies of Austria have thrown them upon France, and I think they now scarcely disown it ; and before they abandon that hold of the negotiation they would require from us to see that we were ready to give up in great degree the interests of Austria as opposed to theirs. If this is in any respect true at Berlin, consider only what effect my going to Berlin now would have at Vienna, and at Luneville with Cobenzel. I do not think it exaggeration to say that I should conceive it must produce almost immediately a separate peace between Austria and France. You will say I am more full of difficulties than suggestions ; I do not deny it ; yet I do not conceal from you that I think a more promising measure, or at least a more effectual measure, would be that we should propose to Austria that Austria and Great Britain should both enter at once into separate treaties with France ; because I think there are many points of view in which this would be advantageous to us, and among others that we could then, as far as we thought proper, avail ourselves of communication and negotiation at the same time with Prussia. I could not help saying these few general words.

“With respect to my going to Berlin, I should not without a good deal of reluctance look at a course of things which could not but be mortifying to Lord Carysfort and lowering to his situation there ; for it is impossible not to see that my arriving at Berlin would annul his business while I staid there, and this consideration I should feel strongly.

“As for my health, you know that I hold it in great contempt, so do not let us think or talk about it. I will come to dine with you if you are quite alone, and will send to put off the Duke of Portland, to whom I was engaged.”

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF CARYSFORT.

*Private.*

1800, November 29. Cleveland Row.—“I have read Gentz’s two papers. I think it much better instead of entering into a paltry bargain that we should allow him 150*l.* or 200*l.* per annum for continuing his journal in Germany. I have great doubts of his success in England, and think Marsh might be better employed than in translating what so few here would read.

“The plan of publishing from three months to three months is

very bad, for the political avidity of the present day wants daily food; and before three months are gone by, half the events that happen are forgotten and leave no traces behind them.

“Say all this to him so as best to manage his *amour propre*, which no authors are without, and journalists least of all; and settle to pay him either 150*l.* or, if you please, 200*l.* per annum sterling money for his services abroad.” *Copy.*

The EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, November 29. Berlin.—“As the papers concerning the armistice appeared in the newspapers, and a copy has been sent here to Mr. Garlike, I presume Gentz may publish forthwith, and I have told him so. The printing is already far advanced. I am happy in hearing that the number of our seamen detained in Russia is very small, the ships having been chiefly manned with neutrals. The conduct of the Emperor is universally and loudly reprobated, and I hope for the best effects from it upon the other Courts. The Dane is frightened out of his wits, and called upon me yesterday to ask whether I knew of anything treating at London or Copenhagen which might save his country from the danger. Glennie writes word that Denmark has made an application to this Court on the occupation of Cuxhaven. The *Chargé d’Affaires* knows nothing of it.

“I told you in a former despatch that General Stamford was to talk with Count Haugwitz on the possibility of some concert with Austria, and I have since seen Haugwitz on the same subject. You may depend upon it nothing has passed either from Stamford or me but in the way of conversation, and the last time I saw him I kept as much reserve as possible. To me however he said he thought the difficulties as to Austria might be removed, but to General Stamford that he apprehended the opposition of the King; for though the King of Prussia would never invade the property or privileges of the Elector of Hanover, the military authority, and the possession of ports which must be allowed to the King of Prussia to make him for any useful purpose head of the North of Germany, must be objects of jealousy and uneasiness. But General Stamford’s principal object, as well as mine, was to discover and influence the intentions and conduct of this Court concerning the Armed Neutrality. And the General was convinced that Haugwitz is alarmed at what has already passed, and will do all he can to prevent its going to any dangerous lengths. I hope I shall not find I have been mistaken in holding the language I have stated in my despatch. I really believe it is the best way to keep on good terms; and so far I may augur well, as it produced an high eulogium upon me to General Stamford, and an invitation to dinner, with many apologies for its having been delayed so long. The Swedish minister too has taken great pains (certainly by Haugwitz’s desire) to convince me that this Court has been doing, and will do, all in their power to prevent and soften any measure which might be offensive to Great Britain. I long to see your answer to Rastopchin. The Russians rely much on a correspondence between their Minister at Palermo

and Mr. Paget on the affair of Malta, the end of last June. Might it not be possible to keep a check over this Court by some insinuation of the possibility of breaking their favourite system for the neutrality of the North of Germany by the Elector of Hanover's thinking himself equal to the defence of his own dominions? Great Britain is now thought to have a large disposable force on foot, and to be desirous of finding employment for it. The bare idea of the probability of Prussia being involved by Russia in a dispute with Great Britain has produced an effect here which I could not have expected, and a change in the language of all those I talk with.

"If you turn to Lord Elgin's correspondence in the year 1797, numbers 70, 80, 91, and 113; and in the year 1798, '*Private*,' January 24th, '*Secret and Confidential*,' February 10th, you will see the proofs of a long continued negotiation between Panin and Caillard at that period; and the probability that the scheme unfolded in the paper transmitted to you by Mr. Wickham was then opened to Count Panin. It is too much in conformity with Russian policy and views not to have made a lasting impression." (*Invisible ink ends.*)

"I have taken steps for ascertaining the question about the sovereignty of the Ems. You will see by the first of my notes on Cuxhaven that I was already aware of the expedience of not admitting any claims founded on arrangements to which his Majesty was not a party." *Copy.*

SPENCER SMITH TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1800, November 30. Constantinople.—"Your letter of seventh March, serving as appendix to the dispatch bearing same date, reached me duly upon the 8th May. While I lost no time in the manifestation of my entire obedience to your directions by my official answers of 10th and 13th May, I was led to delay my farther acknowledgment of what your Lordship condescended to explain to me as a token of friendship, till I should have had opportunity of witnessing some of the fruits of my acquiescence, either with a view to the King's service or to my individual position. Although I am to lament that my expectations have not been realised, either with reference to the distribution of the public business in this mission, or to a more flattering treatment of my services by my immediate official superior, yet I do not mean hereby to return to the charge with the renewal of an application which, having been deemed inexpedient by your Lordship, would be now indiscreet. I take up my pen purely for the sake of a becoming demonstration towards a person I am proud to consider as my patron, and to submit some ideas on what is going on around us that I am forbid to hope could ever reach your Lordship in a genuine satisfactory form through any other channel, when I am even deprived of the use of a cipher to shelter my correspondence in case of need. If my local experience and means of information are depreciated by some, and my opinions concerning a country I have so long inhabited be either disdained or misapplied by those to whom they would always be cordially offered for the service of my country, I see no reason to

put my candle under a bushel, and refuse myself the honest gratification of imparting salutary views to others in the rectitude of whose judgment I can confide; and I therefore offer the following reflections to your Lordship as a mark of my share of the gratitude the Government your Lordship forms a part of is entitled to from every good subject, and that I owe to your office and person in particular.

“The means and extraordinary activity of the French not having operated the extirpation of the Mamlouks, it can hardly be supposed that the dwindling power of the Ottoman Porte will ever attain that object.

“This soldiery has proved itself the most formidable *irregular* army in the world; their education and study are devoted to military exercises; and so expert are they in their peculiar style of warfare, that 2,000 of them resisted and finally defeated 30,000 Turkish troops sent against them in 1785-6. To this the Beys of the Saïd are resolved to supply the advantage of *regular infantry* and *light artillery* which the French have exhibited to them; and this disposition is so well known and appreciated by the enemy, that many adventurous individuals mean to avail themselves of the circumstance to maintain their footing in the country should the French colony be annihilated by superior force. This plan was kept in check by the influence of the British name during the time that Sir Sidney Smith could cultivate a confidential intercourse with *Mourad Bey*, but the face of affairs must have changed since the late mission of his secretary to Cairo, Mr. Keith, to whose good will, uncommon vigilance, and intelligent zeal I am indebted for the soundest notions upon these matters. His observations amongst others have convinced me that Mourad and his party will never bow their necks to the Ottoman yoke. Far less will they allow themselves to be supplanted by the rapacious, merciless ministry of the camp, whose character of bad faith is so established that nothing can eradicate from minds of the Mamlouk leaders that it entered into the plans of the Vizer’s counsellors to send them in bonds to Constantinople, had the evacuation taken place in conformity to the capitulation of *El Arish*.

“Therefore my humble opinion is that we *cannot* succeed in restoring the Turkish dominion in Egypt to its primitive form; but, if I err, and that, contrary to my expectations, we *should*, I then think it is as improbable that they can retain it a twelve month after the departure of our succours. For, independent of their degenerate nullity, the nickname of Yankeedoodle could not be more grating in America than the epithet of *Osmanli* in Egypt; so that, after all, the Sultan will only be the nominal liege lord, and the province will still be exposed to a *coup de main*. Is it not then time for us to take our measures? And does not our national interest seem to require that the government of Egypt should be rendered sufficiently stable and powerful to protect itself? And that we should be sufficiently well with that vassal government in proportion as the tie by which it is held to our ally here may be so slender as to afford bad security to Great Britain for the commercial advantages to which we are entitled by existing treaty.

“ I should be glad to answer the query that I see upon your lips by allusion to a dispatch of Mr. Liston’s, that I recollect to have copied about the winter of 1794 ; but not having the same access to the records under the Embassy Extraordinary, I cannot quote the arguments I feel that work of my old master’s would furnish to the case in point. I therefore content myself with reminding your Lordship of its existence in Downing Street.

“ The soil and climate are comparatively so fine that the ruling Beys are not tempted to push their conquests, nor extend their commerce eastward beyond an old routine traffic with Arabia by the interchange principally of grain, coffee, and Indian manufactures; which latter article might be furnished to a limited extent by the English East India Company, as is the case in the Persian Gulf, not so much for the sake of trade itself as for keeping this branch from profane hands ; to which end I think the Company might avail of the present conjuncture by seeking for leave to establish a permanent factory on the western coast of the Red Sea.

“ When Sir Sidney learnt that Lieutenant-Colonel Murray’s force was unequal to maintain possession of Suez, he suggested to that officer to get hold of *Coffeir*, the place at which Mr. Eyles Irwin landed from Yambo : see his travels. There the French have constructed a redoubt that commands the only well of drinkable water thereabouts ; and it is by means of this post that the French have counteracted all the influence that I could prevail upon the late *Reis Effendi* to advise the Sultan to employ in his quality of *Khalif*, with the *Sherif* of Mecca ; because, as the corn trade of Egypt passes by that *débouché*, he became more or less dependent on them for bread. I understand the French works to be superior to insult ; but if we could once get hold of the place by a proper force, which we alone can employ on that side, we should find from three to five hundred men a sufficient garrison. From thence the communication with the Nile is only forty hours’ march to Kumeh ; and such an establishment, while it would render our intercourse perfect with the Beys, would also give us commanding influence in *Yemen*. Your Lordship will please to observe that I am not here forming a military plan of campaign against Egypt ; my speculation is purely political. I have little doubt but that *Mourad* Bey, notwithstanding his ostensible pacification with *Abdallah-Menou*, would not refuse us the *grant* of a factory at Cosseir, on condition of our furnishing him with the means of preserving his pre-eminence in Upper Egypt, provided the overture is opportunely and dextrously made before his *Anglomania* be extinguished.

“ Having a foot on shore, we might in a few years draw thither the caravans from the interior of Africa ; and an establishment of this kind would not give much umbrage here, where the grossest ignorance prevails relative to every thing beyond the quiet possession of Cairo, Alexandria, Rosetta and Damietta. While a little management and deference for the Mecca pontiff would secure his good graces, and pave the way to quash any scruples of *Islamism*.

“ It is impossible to pass the time I have done at Constantinople and not perceive that the destructive policy of the Turks will deprive them of Europe, perhaps even in our time. Your lordship cannot

be ignorant which of the European powers speculate the deepest upon the gradual corrosion of this territory, and I therefore presume your lordship will agree with me in the expediency of England acquiring a *previous* and decided ascendancy in the quarter whereon we can fix our eyes with the fewest chances of attracting the notice and increasing the jealousy of our neighbours.

“ I have the best information that, about the year 1788, it was proposed to a mercantile house of Ostend to fit out under its firm two ships to sail under Imperial or Danish colours, loaded with warlike stores and hard dollars for the *Red Sea*. One of the two super-cargoes was then in particular connection with the late Admiral *Greig*, and the other was afterwards attached to the *Russian* legation at Copenhagen. The expedition was rejected by the house of Ostend : but there hardly remains a doubt that it was intended to light up a flame on that side, in case the Baltic fleet had entered the Mediterranean ; and that measure, though deferred, thanks to the late King of Sweden, is nevertheless susceptible of renewal in the event of a fresh change of system. That change I look upon as being nearer at hand than is generally supposed by superficial observers ; but from keeping a sharp look out both professionally and from principle on the conduct of certain agents of high and low degree, I have discovered too much underhand work and too many abusive practices not to be uneasy. In alluding to which I think it proper to make use of a memorandum which seems to emit a ray of truth upon a combined system pursued latterly between the agents I have in my eye, to goad these poor people on to certain destruction, and at the same time try to make them fail by starvation. *Garnier*, the deponent named in the annexed paper, is a *Marseillois* of very notorious character here, but reputed able amongst the *pelotes de l'Archipel* ; and as he persisted to remain at Rhodes, notwithstanding my brother's reiterated warnings during good part of a month to proceed to Jaffa, to distribute his cargo to the Vizir's famished followers, it gave rise to sinister suspicions.

“ If I were not really ashamed of the prolixity of this epistle I could have wished to have claimed a few moments more of your indulgent attention for a line or two upon my personal situation and prospects ; but, instead of giving your lordship the trouble of any more reading, I prefer to charge my near relation and confidential friend, General Smith, with the rendering my wishes verbally. I beg leave therefore, once for all, to accredit my uncle with your Lordship as my representative, as well as my brother's and some other of our fellow labourers, and to solicit your kind reception of him upon that footing, as well as your confidence in whatever he shall impart to your lordship on our behalf.”

*Enclosure :—*

Report from Commodore Sir W. Sidney Smith in regard to the suspicious movements of Philippe Garnier, Captain of a Russian vessel which had been chartered by the Turkish Government.  
*French. Copy.*

## LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF CARYSFORT.

1800, December 2. Cleveland Row.—“My last private letter will in great measure have anticipated the contents of my despatches by this messenger. Your *note verbale* seems to me to be perfect, but you must allow me to say to you freely that the second note is taken on too low a tone, particularly where you speak of the satisfaction the King of Prussia has received.

“There was not the least pretence for asking any. The ship was laden with such articles as we have always considered, and always shall consider, as contraband, and it was captured off the Texel. We have a clear right to carry such prizes into a neutral port, and the King of Prussia has no more right to interfere with us there than at Lisbon or Leghorn. It may not always be necessary to put all these principles forward, where (as in the present case) the matter in dispute is otherwise arranged; but there can never be any advantage in doing or saying anything that shall appear to abandon them.

“Depend upon it that when you have known these people as long as, for my sins, I have known them, you will be persuaded with me that they consider all confession not as moderation but as weakness, and that, just in proportion as they crouch to France because she bullies them, they will attempt to bully us if they think us afraid of them.

“Our means are ample; the country is in good heart; the distress for provisions is the only real difficulty with which we have to contend, and that these people can neither add to nor diminish. The value of all Haugwitz’s good words and fine promises about the interest of the King of Prussia takes in our naval pre-eminence is sufficiently apparent from the confidence he has already made you, and still more from what he has not confided. I am every day more and more convinced that nothing will operate on the foolish prejudices of these people but the conviction that they have as much to lose by our shutting them out from the sea as we can lose by their excluding us from the land. If we give way to them we may as well disarm our navy at once, and determine to cede without further contest all that we have taken as a counterbalance to the continental acquisitions of France, for such you may rely upon it will be the tendency of their plan of peace. The conduct of Russia has (in this respect) fortunately enabled us to shut the door to all such discussions, and to tell Prussia that any confederacy with Petersburg now is a confederacy with our enemy, and cannot therefore be the ground of any friendly mediation. From this ground it is important not to let them drive us.

“You will have seen that our Austrian friends have done better than you were disposed to think they would. But I shall still very much fear the impression which any considerable defeat might produce on the feeble character of the Emperor.

“We sent you *Castle Rackrent* last week. Are you not delighted with it? Or do you think the picture overcharged? *Copy.*”

## LORD GRENVILLE to ARTHUR PAGET.

*Private.*

1800, December 2. Cleveland Row.—“I send this letter to Lord

Minto to be forwarded to you by any opportunity that may offer itself. Before you receive it I think it probable that the fate of Italy may again have been put to the hazard of a battle, and though I am not so sanguine as to hope that a victory over the French would regain all that was thrown away at Marengo, yet much may still be done by courage and perseverance and exertion. I was much concerned to learn that your health had suffered by your residence at Palermo. If you find any necessity for a temporary absence on that account I am sure the King would approve of your availing yourself of any interval from the business for that purpose, and you might depend on my representing it in a proper light to His Majesty.

“I am sorry to hear that something like ill-humour has been shewn on the subject of Malta. What has since happened at Petersburg has abundantly proved that we could do no otherwise than we did; and certainly the King has given too many proofs of friendship to the Court where you reside, to leave the smallest ground to doubt of his desire to do everything that may tend to promote their interests.” *Copy.*

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, December 4. Downing Street.—“I send for your *own* perusal, to be immediately returned to me, the accompanying despatches, and among the rest the private one from Maitland to Huskisson. What is past cannot be helped, and talking of it can do no good but much mischief by creating bad blood between the two services. I wish I could bring myself to think that there was no room for inauspicious forebodings as to the future from the same cause.”

#### The EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, December 5. Berlin.—“The unexpected arrival of Mr. Moberly from Petersburg enabled me to write to you with less trouble and a day sooner than I otherwise could. I believe if you could have entertained a moment’s doubt of the falsehood of the Berlin report of my conduct about Malta, Count Rastopchin’s letter, which you must by this time have received, must have convinced you that it was without foundation. I told you at the time all that passed. I make no doubt that Krudener, whose temper is almost as violent as his master’s, has frequently and loudly complained of me as the cause of all the mischief; and from Moberly’s conversation I presume I am so represented at Petersburg. I am doubtful whether you may enter enough into my views of politics here to approve of anything I have done since the affair of Cuxhaven, but I will nevertheless venture to tell you what I think and what I wish. I had no authentic information as to facts wh[en] I first saw Haugwitz, and little more when I delivered my first note. My objects were first to suspend the public opinion as to the hostile intentions of Prussia towards Great Britain; and secondly, if I could not check or prevent the measure, to keep the ground open for you to act in any manner you might think fit. I have always been per-

sueded that the only motives which act upon this Court are a jealous hatred of Austria, a longing for extending its influence in the north of Germany, but principally fear, the object of which has hitherto been either France or Russia. The violent temper of the Emperor, and the continual teasing of his Minister here, led them to countenance farther than they wished his scheme of armed neutrality, and was the immediate cause of the occupation of Cuxhaven. The first they hoped with the help of Sweden and Denmark, but particularly the latter, to make perfectly harmless, and such as should neither give offence nor alarm to Great Britain. At any rate they knew everything must be at rest till the spring, and in the interval they thought some means would present themselves to keep them out of the scrape. Of the Cuxhaven business they thought to make use to gain a little credit with the Emperor, at the same time they should quiet by their assurances our apprehensions. In this affair the assertion of authority in the north of Germany has really, I believe, no small share. Such being the estimate I had formed of the policy of Berlin, when I found that their Cabinet had really entered upon the business of the armed neutrality, but that it was not concluded, and that they were endeavouring to soften it, I determined to oppose intimidation to intimidation; and for this purpose, under the pretext of showing him what direction he should give to the endeavours he always boasts of making towards reconciling us and the northern maritime powers, I talked to Haugwitz in such a strain of the consequences to those powers of renewing the old armed neutrality, or engaging in anything at all like it, that he understood it, and did, I know, speak of it the same evening to persons who are intimate with him, as a plain declaration that we would make war upon Prussia herself if she should go to that length. I have every reason to think that the effect has been what I wished. You have now my state of the matter, and my wish is to be authorised to pursue the same course, that in leaving him a way to retreat by dissembling in some degree my knowledge of what he has already done, to convince him that if Great Britain is pushed beyond the line she has fixed herself, she will not hesitate to strike at Prussia as well as at the other powers. What I said was from myself, and could not commit you.

“As to Lucchesini’s mission, I believe he had no instruction whatever, but generally to watch Cobenzl, and if possible to prevent the separate peace of Austria, in the hope that, some how or other, Prussia might creep into a general negotiation. The universal consternation here when it was known that Cobenzl had the start could not have been exceeded if the whole French army had passed the line of demarcation; and the particular friends of Lucchesini poured a torrent of abuse upon Haugwitz, who could not interrupt his course of pleasure to despatch him in time. The expressions in Lucchesini’s letters of mortification and disappointment are cited over the whole town, and this, among others, *qu’il falloit bien du tems pour relever tant soit peu un Gouvernement si entièrement dé-cré-dité*. You will naturally ask on what foundation all this stands. What is said publicly is universally believed. Gentz is in correspondence with Lucchesini himself, and not a day passes in which

he does not see Madame Lucchesini, who employs and consults him continually. Gentz has also old habits with Lombard, is frequently at his house, and sees continually all the people who frequent him most. His accounts tally very much with the reports I hear from other quarters, particularly those who have most access to the French and Russian Ministers. Nobody here seems to have the least idea that Lucchesini is negotiating for any specific object; and striking off as much as possible from what I hear, because of the chance that the sources from whence it is derived are not to be entirely depended upon, I must be of the same opinion.

“Gentz tells me he has had a letter from Lucchesini to-day, dated on the 27th, and that he (Lucchesini) thinks the war will certainly continue. Gentz and General Stamford are of a different opinion; and the Danish *Chargé d’Affaires* has just communicated to me, in great confidence, intelligence which, he says, comes to him not through the French mission, but directly from Paris, that Bonaparte has offered peace to the Emperor with not only the cession of the Venetian territory, but Ancona and two of the Legations, and *encore une grande incision dans cette partie de l’Italie*; the immediate and complete restoration of the Grand Duke of Tuscany, the restoration of the King of Sardinia, the guarantee of the dominions of the King of Naples, security to Bavaria and Wurtemberg. The Emperor in return to guarantee the German territories on the left of the Rhine and the Netherlands to France. This is stated to be made as much to produce an effect upon the Emperor of Russia as at Vienna; but, it is added that it has been made known at Vienna, and some modifications have been suggested there, which being acceded to, and it was supposed they would, Austria would make a separate peace. If there is anything of truth in this you will probably have heard it from Lord Minto; and indeed the course of events will have declared it before this reaches you. I think it all calculated for an impression on Russia.

“As to Mr. Moberly, I do not know whether you will be able to make much out of his mission. You will of course be solicitous for the fate of our wretched countrymen whom the barbarian has within his gripe. I must own I have hopes of Sweden from the general complexion of his notes on the Barcelona business, and the natural repugnance he must have to Russia, if he can get any good leaning elsewhere. I fear you have but little chance of supplies of corn from the North. This country has no superfluity, and if the disorder among the horned cattle should spread, provisions will be very scarce. The ports of Russia cannot be open till the summer, and then it is very doubtful whether you will be allowed to export. If you direct anything to be said here, I hope you will make me do it in writing, to give the better chance of the King’s being made acquainted with it.

“*Castle Rack Rent* is very comical. I think Elizabeth is pretty stout. The children quite flourishing. I have threatenings of gout, and of course am not comfortable.

“A paragraph copied out of the *Times*, and circulated in the *Spectateur du Nord* and other papers, has been a good deal talked of here. When I went to Haugwitz upon his note about the

Barcelona business, conscious that I had very substantial ground of complaint, he determined to complain too, and was prepared with this paper in his pocket. It is of the date of the 23rd or 25th of July, if you choose to take any notice of it.

“There is certain news here of the advance of the Austrian army and of the corps of General Klenau having passed Ratisbon, which the French had evacuated, and marched upon Ingoldstadt. The Arch-Duke Charles had left Prague, and was advancing with the Bohemian insurrection. I must own the memorial you have received from Wickham about the project of an alliance between the French and Russians strikes me more and more as deserving serious reflection. It is calculated to make a great impression upon Russia.

“I enclose the plan of Gentz’s performance, which I hope will be useful. I have engaged him to publish separately and immediately what relates to the last negotiation. He says it will be out in six or eight days at farthest, and that the rest will immediately follow.”

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF CARYSFORT.

1800, December 9. Cleveland Row.—“I am delighted to see by your last letters how perfectly we agree as to the language which it is necessary to hold at Berlin. The fact which I mention in my despatch is unquestionable, and I much fear that the King of Prussia is already a party to the convention. All this they do in the foolish belief that we shall be intimidated, and yield the points in question. If we did, it is not very easy to see what Prussia would get by them, but it is very important to convince them that they will have a hard struggle before they succeed, and that we shall never yield on this subject but in the very last extremity, such as I trust and am confident we shall never see. Your language cannot be too strong on this head so long as it is, what I know it will be, calm and temperate; but we must show them that we are in earnest. If in answer to these communications they persist in occupying Cuxhaven, the first step we shall take will be to remove our packets to Bremerlee. And I shall endeavour to obtain such orders on that subject to the Hanoverian Regency as may give Prussia uneasiness on that quarter. The idea of Bremerlee may be a good one for us to suffer to get abroad, without your expressly saying it to Count Haugwitz.

“I am more and more confirmed in my opinion of the impropriety of our making ourselves the pandars of their inordinate ambition. The success of such a plan would be highly injurious, as I think, to our interests, and indeed the present transaction affords us a pretty good earnest of what we must expect if the whole north of Germany were in the hands of Prussia.

“What do you think of the Emperor of Russia, who accuses us of breaking a convention which was never signed? The instrument to which he alludes is a project delivered by his order to Whitworth, and drawn by himself, which Whitworth sent over here, but which appeared even then so unreasonable that no answer was returned to it for many weeks, and then only one stating that I should send

further instructions upon it. And this he calls a treaty between the two Courts. Paget has certainly gone further than he needed at Palermo, but that only proves the sincerity of the King's conduct towards Paul, till the latter withdrew from the concert, and made a secret and separate agreement with the enemy on this very point.

"Did I mention to you that at the same time that Bonaparte offered Malta to Paul, he sent us a proposal through Spain that he would evacuate it provided we would join in a guarantee that Paul should never have it? This fact and that about the convention should be known.

"I now send you my answer to Rastopsin. I expect that it will put the Emperor in a towering passion. He has not been used to hear so many truths, but I am confident this is the true way of dealing with him.

"I do not imagine that the whole of the seizure in Russia will exceed a million and a half, and against this we are to set £300,000 which we were to pay him at the peace, in part of subsidy. The loss is a considerable one to the persons concerned, but nothing as a national object. It rather seems to me likely that we shall meet here before long. It is a troublesome business, but a little firmness joined to the feeling that one is doing one's duty will carry one through greater trials than this. If it were not for the difficulty about the price of corn, I should hardly have an uneasy sensation on the subject." *Copy.*

#### H. ELLIOT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Secret.*

1800, December 11. Dresden.—"I cannot detain Coxe one instant to write to your Lordship with any detail concerning Monsieur de Kalitschew's appointment as Vice-Chancellor in the place of Count Panin. He is to see me privately before he leaves Dresden, and I shall not fail to communicate the substance of his conversation by the first proper opportunity. Count Rostopschin's jealousy of Count Panin's superior abilities has been one of the principal causes of that gentleman's former unfavourable conduct towards the Allied Powers, as he was suspicious of an intimate and secret good understanding having subsisted between Count Panin, Count Woronzow, and the British Government, for the purpose of transplanting him and of placing Count Panin at the head of the Russian administration. Lord Whitworth's last adventures at Petersburg must also in some measure be ascribed to this cause, as Count Rostopschin thought his Lordship peculiarly ill inclined towards him.

"Monsieur de Kalitschew is very unfavourable to the Court of Berlin, and I consider Baron Krudener's future influence as likely to be much diminished, if it can be so, by Monsieur de Kalitschew's sincere desire to restore a degree of cordiality between us and his sovereign.

"He looks upon Baron Krudener's entire devotion to the Prussian ministry as having considerably contributed to injure the interests both of Great Britain and of Austria at Petersburg."

*Postscript.*—"Your Lordship will be pleased to observe that it is

very essential Count Woronzow should not be made acquainted with Monsieur de Kalitschew's private communications with me."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, December 11. Downing Street.—“If an assize could be fixed, as the Duke of Montrose suggests, on any *one* sort of the bread to be introduced, his scheme has much to recommend it; but, from what passed last year, we are convinced it will be impossible to agree to any table of assize before the end of the session. It would be too hazardous, during the present high price, to abolish all assize; and therefore we feel it on the whole impossible to prohibit the bread now in use, and think it best to leave it to be sold under the present assize, and only to provide that all coarser or mixed bread may be sold without any assize.

“We regret the less giving up all compulsion as mixtures are certainly in many parts grown into use, and, as in the wheaten bread, it appears that the high price tempts the miller to mix up almost as much of pollard as would be made into bread on the other plan.”

*Postscript.*—“The recommendation to use mixed bread cannot but be right.”

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, December 11. Downing Street.—“Lord Nelson put into my hands some days ago, some letters which have passed between him and the Emperor Paul; and which I think it is material you should see. Our admiral has perhaps gone unnecessarily out of his way, and out of his element, but I do not think he has given any grounds that can be fairly used against us. Pray give me back the letters to-morrow.”

The EARL OF ELGIN to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, December 15. Constantinople.—“On Friday I had the honour of receiving your Lordship's letter to me of the 7 November, mentioning the subject of a conversation which the principal members of the Levant Company had held with your Lordship respecting the present state of the mission at the Porte; as likewise the suggestions which had occurred to you, in the view of obviating in future the continuance of the inconveniencies complained of. Your Lordship further does me the honour of desiring that I would consider of the course to be pursued in this occurrence, and write to you fully and explicitly upon the subject.

“I need hardly assure your Lordship how highly gratifying to me this flattering instance of your confidence must at any time have been. But, when my communications by Courvoisier reach your Lordship you will better judge of the infinite satisfaction I at this particular moment derive from perceiving that you have already recommended to the Levant Company the adoption of the very measure which I had presumed to suggest to your Lordship, in my private letter of the 21 November, as the only mode I could devise

for securing the interests of the state and of the company at the Porte; for correcting the unfavourable impressions which have already been conveyed here to the prejudice of the King's representation; and for superseding the necessity of any discussion whatever on the rights of the Levant Company.

"To those communications by Courvoisier I beg leave to refer your Lordship as containing a full, explicit, and also a confidential statement of my sentiments on the circumstances of this mission, and on the remedy which your Lordship proposes. You will also know from them that your letter of the 7th ultimo has found matters in this mission involved in difficulties far greater, and very different, from what existed at the period of the company's application to your Lordship. As long as I had no means of preventing this mischief except by an act of my own authority I submitted, from deference to a chartered company, to the extreme inconveniencies to which His Majesty's affairs were subjected by the application which their agent had given to an order issued by them. But, as these inconveniencies were increasing upon me daily, and now appear evidently not to have been in the contemplation of the company, it became my duty to lose no time in stopping them, since your Lordship had furnished me with the means of doing it. I have accordingly put your Lordship's intention in execution by a communication to Mr. Smith, of which I enclose a copy; and I have resumed into the service of the embassy the dragomen and others who had been withdrawn from it.

"I have also the honor of enclosing a letter to the Levant Company, which your Lordship will deliver or not as you may think proper.

"As to the period of my continuance at the Porte, your Lordship will recollect that upon this, as upon every circumstance of my mission, I referred myself wholly to your decision. The idea, however, I believe, was that my embassy should last till peace was concluded, not only on account of the general interests to be regulated by that transaction, but particularly in a view to our commercial advantages and our political influence in this country, which will ultimately depend upon the impression that can be conveyed to the Porte of our conduct during her contest with France. I cannot say that any other term has yet occurred to my mind."

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF CARYSFORT.

*Private.*

1800, December 16. Cleveland Row.—"It is a matter of infinite satisfaction to me to see how perfectly we agree in our views of Berlin politics, and how completely your conversations have anticipated our instructions. I think the communication of the line we have taken towards Denmark may be very useful as a lesson at Berlin, but it is important not to let them know it time enough to enable them to give Bernstorff any advice as to the answer he is to make to our categorical demand. I have for this reason directed Drummond positively to send back the messenger with the answer, or with the account that he has received none, on the fourth morning

after his conference with Count Bernstorff, and to apprise the Dane that such are his orders.

“ You will therefore have the goodness to calculate time so as to prevent any previous communication on the subject. Indeed it will, as I compute, do itself.

“ I feel very confident that this line will answer our purpose and maintain peace ; but, if it does not, it is very evident that no better result would follow from taking a lower tone, and we should only disgrace ourselves in the eyes of Europe. I grieve for the English captains and sailors, but as for Mr. Moberley’s mission, it goes no further than to say that if, after the insult we have received, we will do what we refused to do before, we may be allowed to pocket the affront and say no more about it till next time.

“ I really believe if they drive us to extremities, and we are on the point of considering ourselves as so driven with respect to them all, though some temporary inconvenience and alarm will arise as to our commerce, we shall give more animation to the feelings of the country, and go on, upon the whole, quite as easily as we should without it. In the meantime it is for Prussia and the other states in the north of Germany to consider what they will do with the whole foreign commerce blocked up, and the sea at least as effectually shut against them as they can shut the land against us ; with the difference that our sea has other shores, and their land has no sea, so that they must go round to Venice or Trieste for all the articles which they now purchase from us, not certainly in order to encourage our manufacturers, but in order to supply their own consumption.

“ I was very soon satisfied that Haugwitz’s account of your answer to Krudener about Malta had about as much truth as his other assertions usually have. I hope you will approve the answer given to Rastopsin.

“ We do not mean to let the Cuxhaven business fall to the ground. I have a long letter on the subject from the Senate of Hamburg, which, in due time, you will be instructed to communicate at Berlin, with a formal demand for the evacuation of Cuxhaven, and a declaration that, till this takes place, the King can place no reliance on the assurances of friendship he receives from Berlin.

“ It is very difficult to account for Bonaparte’s policy, in his marked coolness to Lucchesini ; possibly it may have been only caprice, to which, like other despotic sovereigns, he seems a little subject.

“ I am confident that the offer of peace on the terms you describe was not made to Cobenzl ; it is evidently nothing more than a fabrication calculated for the atmosphere of Gatchina. My Austrians have really done very fairly this time, and their defeat is no bad proof of it. We have as yet only Moreau’s account of it, from which as usual we make some deductions ; but I fear there will be still enough to stagger the Emperor’s resolutions.

“ I see no appearance in Ehrenswerd’s conversation of a better disposition on the part of Sweden. We have as yet had only one unofficial conversation, but he is presented to-morrow, and in our first ministerial conference I am to make the same categorical

demand as we now make to Denmark for an explanation of their negotiations or engagements on the subject of armed neutrality, and to tell him plainly that till we are satisfied on that head we will discuss nothing else.

“I have not seen the paragraph in the *Times* of which you speak, but you may say, whenever it can be useful, that the *Times* is a paper which, under cover of a pretended support of Government, is in decided hostility to it. I should not be sorry for an opportunity to trounce him if he would give it us, but I think if the paragraph went that length I should have remarked it.

“Gentz’s performance will, I doubt not, be very useful.

“I am very sorry to hear that you are threatened with gout. It comes at a most unlucky moment, but you have only to shake your crutch at them as Lord Chatham used.

“I confess I think you will do well not to appear very credulous as to future assurances of friendship after the business at Cuxhaven, and the Prussian note about the Barcelona business. I should like to ask Haugwitz for the copy of that which he *doubtless must have sent* to Stockholm when the French made a forcible use of Swedish ships in order to invade the dominions of the Porte, *the ally of Prussia!*” *Copy.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE to H. ELLIOT.

1800, December 16. Cleveland Row.—“I was very much obliged to you for your first private letter, and for the intelligence it contained respecting Petersburg. The other I answer by an official letter. You may rely on it that the names you mention shall remain perfectly secret. I am too sensible of the danger to which they would be exposed by any indiscretion to suffer any risk or hazard to be incurred in that respect. I trust therefore you will continue to write freely all you hear.

“Woronzow is retired to Southampton, and I never hear from him, and hardly ever of him. I know nothing therefore of the intelligence he receives.

“I should think the thing must be drawing to its crisis. I cannot conceive how so manifest a madman can be permitted to go on even so long as he has.” *Copy.*

#### COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, December 16. Twickenham.]—“Je ne m’attendais pas quand j’ai eu l’honneur de vous voir hier à la cruelle nouvelle que les papiers françois viennent de nous apprendre. Il y a sûrement de l’exagération, on ne prend pas dix mille hommes ainsi. L’Archiduc n’y étoit pas encore, je crois; on l’auroit nommé sans doute; il faut espérer que l’effet de sa présence opérera sur l’armée, et que l’on réparera sur-le-champ le passé. L’essentiel est de ne pas perdre courage, tout est perdu si l’on fléchit. Je voudrais que M. de Cobentzl n’ait point été à Luneville au moment de cette affaire, car je craindrais qu’il n’y restât après. Adieu, si vous avez des paroles de *comfort* à me donner, de grâce envoyez-les-moi. Je ne me soucie

pas de sortir de ma tanière dans cette cruelle circonstance, à moins que vous n'ayez des ordres à me donner, et dans ce cas je suis à vous—nuit et jour. Vous connoissez mon dévouement à votre païs, et à notre système. Je suis prêt à y tout sacrifier, même pour caver, au plus fort, la répugnance invincible que j'aurois à traiter avec ces scélérats, si je croyois que ma présence puisse vous être utile.”

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, December 16.] Twickenham. 2 o'clock.—“ Je venois de faire partir le billet que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous écrire ce matin quand j'ai reçu le vôtre avec la gazette qui y étoit jointe. Un moment après est arrivé le courier que j'avois envoyé au Comte de Cobentzl. Comme ce qu'il m'apporte est en chiffres, j'en aurai pour toute la journée, et je ne pourrai venir vous faire ma cour que demain. J'ai l'honneur de vous joindre ici la lettre particulière, non chiffrée, ou plutôt les quatre mots qu'il m'a écrit. Vous verrez par son début que ma manière franche et ferme de parler a affligé notre homme, il n'y a pas de mal à cela. Si vous parlez à mon courier qui aura l'honneur de vous remettre la présente, son rapport vous consolera un peu sur cette malheureuse affaire. On la savoit à Luneville quand il est parti ; il a parlé à l'officier qui en étoit le porteur. Les François ne se vantent pas d'avoir été battus les deux jours précédens.”

*Enclosure :—*

COUNT DE COBENTZEL to COUNT STARHEMBERG.

1800, December 6. Luneville.—“ Le courier Moritz arrivé ensemble avec Mayntz, m'a apporté la lettre de Lord Grenville du dix-sept Novembre, et celles que vous avez bien voulu m'adresser le dix-huit. Si j'ai différé plusieurs jours à répondre à votre Excellence, c'étoit dans l'espérance de pouvoir lui mander quelque chose de positif sur les déterminations des François relativement à l'admission du plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté Britannique aux conférences pour la paix. D'après l'autorisation de Lord Grenville j'ai déclaré à Joseph Bonaparte que le collègue, avant l'arrivée duquel je ne pouvois absolument pas traiter, n'attendait que le passeport du gouvernement françois pour venir me rejoindre. J'ai insisté avec d'autant plus de force sur la décision du Gouvernement françois à cet égard en me refusant à toutes les tentatives qui ont été faites pour entamer du moins la négociation. Cette demande, et celle de l'évacuation instantannée de la Toscane, ont été les seuls objets discutés dans les différentes notes échangées entre moi et Joseph Bonaparte. Je ne les envoie pas à votre Excellence parce qu'elles auront sans doute été communiquées à Vienne à Lord Minto. Sans être intimidé des menaces des François, j'ai laissé venir les choses jusqu'à la rupture effective de l'armistice, et à la reprise des hostilités. Il paroît que le premier Consul ne s'attendoit pas à cette fermeté, et qu'il a toujours voulu se flatter que nous céderions au dernier moment ; au moins plusieurs indices

semblent-ils annoncer qu'il ne seroit pas impossible d'en venir encore à un renouvellement pur et simple de l'armistice en réprenant l'ancienne position, bien entendu que nous ne pourrions y consentir sans l'évacuation de la Toscane. Ce n'est que la solution de cette question qui m'arrête encore ici. Il seroit sans doute de quelqu'avantage de pouvoir épargner à l'armée les pertes qui résultent toujours d'une campagne d'hiver. Dans très peu de jours je saurai à quoi m'en tenir, et si le Gouvernement françois ne se résout pas à une négociation commune avec les deux alliés, je quitte sur le champ Luneville, en en informant aussitôt votre excellence. Entretens je n'ai pas voulu la laisser si longtems sans aucune nouvelle de ma part. Je n'écris pas aujourd'hui moi-même à Lord Grenville parceque, dans le circonstance actuelle, je suis obligé de me servir du chiffre ; mais votre excellence voudra bien lui faire part du contenu de cette dépêche. Je crois très apparent que le parti que je serai dans le cas de prendre sera de m'éloigner du lieu des négociations. En tout cas Sa Majesté aura prouvé à ses peuples et à l'Europe entière qu'aucun des moyens combinables avec les engagemens qui l'unissent au Roi d'Angleterre n'a été négligé pour faire cesser le fléau de la guerre, et que c'est l'obstination seule du Gouvernement françois de vouloir à tout prix séparer les deux cours alliés qui est cause de la reprise des hostilités."

*Copy.*

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, December 21. Berlin.—“ Lord Minto's messenger is just arrived here since I finished my despatch. His letter and another from Mr. Elliott contain the same apprehensions as to the hostile disposition of Prussia, evinced by the conduct of its agents, which you have entertained at London, and of which the note delivered at Stockholm is, I think, the strongest and least equivocal mark. At any other Court I should have thought half of what has passed evidence of actual hostile intentions, but I cannot be of that opinion here. I believe the whole to have been only an effect of the temporizing system which has so long prevailed, and hope that we shall soon see a great change in the language and conduct of all the Prussian Ministers. As long as Haugwitz continues to profess friendship I shall continue, unless I have contrary orders from you, to treat him in some degree as if I thought he might be sincere. He is conscious I have good reason to doubt him, but, in speaking of other powers, I can say everything I wish him to feel in the strongest manner. I have done it to-day, with a scarcely indirect application to Prussia, in observations I made on the Swedish answer to his own note. That answer is excellent. Surely the King of Sweden is well inclined. I hope you will be able to draw some important good from that quarter. If the temptation of drawing from Great Britain the subsidy that crown used to have from France would attach him, would it not be worth while, and the best way of defeating the armed neutrality ?

“ Hudelist whispered me to-day that he did not think matters were going on smoothly between Russia and France. He has

watched them as close as he could, and will tell me more another time.

“I have opened this letter again in consequence of what has since passed with Haugwitz. I told him plainly what I had just heard of the opinion universally entertained of the hostile disposition of Prussia towards Great Britain, which was an inference from the measures of the Court of Berlin and from the language of its agents. He seemed very much struck, and asserted the contrary in the most earnest manner and the strongest terms. I now see, said he, that the accidental concurrence in point of time of measures taken by the King with the most innocent intention, with the violent measures of the Emperor of Russia, has led to the belief that they have been concerted, which I solemnly declare they have not, and that they are totally unconnected. You may rely, he added, upon the personal character of the King. Whatever doubt may have been entertained of intentions hostile to England, a very little time will clear up. It could only spring from seeing *le détestable tripot qui l'entoure*. A strong and remarkable expression from a person in Haugwitz's situation, *et qui donne à penser*.”

The EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Secret ink.*

1800, December 21. Berlin.—“I certainly did not intend in either of my notes to admit that the King of Prussia had received, or had a right to any satisfaction from us. But I am the less anxious to defend myself, and the less vexed at not having in this instance held exactly the language you would have wished, because, on a review of all that has passed, I have the satisfaction to find that I have really anticipated in effect all that you have now said to me; and when I have told Count Haugwitz that what he has heard from me respecting the armed neutrality, and the unalterable determination of Great Britain to maintain her maritime code is fully approved by his Majesty, nothing stronger can be conveyed by words. You will see by the reports in the foreign papers of my language and declaration that people have been set a-talking, and have received a proper impression. I did indeed say that I spoke from myself, that you might have disavowed me if you had found it necessary or convenient. But I told Haugwitz it was important he should understand that, though I had not yet orders to make a declaration on this particular occasion, my only doubt was whether the language I had held would be thought sufficiently strong.

“I am entirely of opinion with you, as you will have seen by former letters, that the only way of dealing with these Northern powers is threatening them. The fear of England must be opposed to the fear of France, and I trust will be found the strongest. Sweden, perhaps, wishes to be detached from Prussia. Denmark, it is true, is in a hobble, but as the British fleet can always pass the Baltic many weeks before a Russian force can put to sea, it seems as if even there the balance might be turned in our favour. I am glad you feel so bold, notwithstanding the scarcity. I had great

fears it might have obliged you to take a lower tone. (*Secret ink ends.*)

“I hope you will think the Prussian answer about the corn satisfactory. I am sure Alvensleben, who is a good-natured fellow, meant it should be so. Pray remember you promised to enquire about M. de Bombelles for the Princess of Tour and Taxis.

“It might have been of use to me, in following up the business of the Northern League, to have had accounts now and then of what was passing at Copenhagen, but I do not even know whether we have any body there since Lord Whitworth left it.

“I think *Castle Rack-rent* excellent. I am acquainted only with the polished Irish, but can readily believe that it is no caricature of the rest.” *Copy.*

#### LORD WHITWORTH to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, December 22. Somerset Street.—“I consider Count Panin’s dismissal or resignation, which ever it may be, as a plain indication of the Emperor’s perseverance in his system of aggravation against us and of his understanding with the French. At all events it is a release from daily mortification. His successor, M. de Kalitchew, is a tool of Rastopsin’s, ignorant and conceited, and I think I can venture to say from the knowledge I have of him, that no act of folly or of violence will provoke the smallest representation from *him*. I wish it were in my power to speak more favourably of this new Vice-Chancellor.”

#### The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, December 23. Stowe.—“I had some hopes on the chapter of the Austrians in Bavaria, but they are vanished; for the accounts by Bremen seem as discouraging as Bonaparte could wish for us. Nor do the Austrians appear inclined to act on the *offensive* in Italy. A *defensive* either there or in Germany is certain ruin; and Cobentzel will very soon find himself released from all difficulty of negotiation by the necessity of signing whatever Bonaparte thinks proper to put on his paper. Add to this the armed neutrality, and it really seems as if our cup was full. But be it what it may, we must abide it; and I sincerely hope and trust that Government will not be staggered by the tremendous difficulty of the contest. You have sent 3,000 men to the West Indies, and you have done right, for you must attack the Dane and Swede *there* immediately, and at Tranquebar; but the real struggle must be at Elseneur and a little *petite pièce* at Gottenburgh. As to Russia, I see little chance of *great success* in the Black Sea, and incalculable difficulties both for us and for the Turk, whether friend or foe. The Baltic offers objects, but I fear that the long delay before the ice allows you to attack there, operates in Paul’s favour. I have writ to Pitt to state my opinion of the necessity of again increasing your militia, to enable you to avail yourself of the disposable infantry still in this kingdom: The whole is only 14,000 men, of whom you cannot send more than 10,000. You may get 3,500 in exchange for your Dutchmen from

Ireland, and Sir James Pulteney brings you back 3,000 ; but England will then be left to 36,000 Guards and militia, which is too small a number. I have offered to lend myself to any arrangements he may wish ; but our militia ballots for any augmentation will require at least three months, so that you have no time to lose. My idea would be to allow us to recruit by bounty."

*Postscript.*—"I am made very happy by your *one bread* bill ; it is the only device that is sure to give real relief, and general satisfaction."

The EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, December 24. Berlin.—"Garlike has seen the Dane this morning, and he tells me he finds him talking more confidently in regard to the armed neutrality. I suspect this language may have been put into his mouth by Krudener. He says some proposals will certainly be made, but of a nature which cannot be considered as hostile by England. You must have better information from Copenhagen than I can get here. I have not yet received your answer to Rastopsin, but mean to keep aloof from the Russians. It is to be wished that Sweden and Denmark at least should consider our quarrel with the Emperor not likely to be soon made up."

*Nota Bene.*—"The Dane only speaks of what he thinks is in agitation. He does not believe anything to be yet concluded. If they find you dare to make war upon Russia, I still think it will fall to the ground." *Original written with secret ink. Copy.*

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, December 25. Bromley Hill.—"I enclose a letter which I have received this morning from Lord Auckland, though I hardly think the vague communication from Perrégaux deserves much attention. If you have leisure I wish you would put down your idea of a speech to end the session, and send it me."

*Enclosure :—*

LORD AUCKLAND to W. PITT.

*Private.*

1800, December 24. Palace Yard.—"I have received from M. Perrégaux at Paris a letter, brought by some private hand, purporting to relate to publications, and also to arrears of, *rentes viagères* belonging to Lady Auckland, one-third of which he says is now forthcoming in ready money. In the midst of those businesses there is the following remarkable paragraph introduced '*à propos de rien.*' I transcribe it *verbatim*.

"The world in general and humanity call for peace. We wish it here most earnestly. But on your side the same wishes do not seem to exist. The longer war exists, the more deeply the evils resulting from it must affect the countries which labour under that calamity. It is a pity every one does not give a little way to put an end to it."

“ It is possible that the above may mean nothing ; but I incline to think from various circumstances that it means a great deal. And I have heretofore remarked to you that perhaps the best mode of arriving at a good pacification would be by a mere personal communication, carried on by you or by Lord Grenville with Buonaparte, and not avowed till finally concluded ; and I think that much might be urged in support of that notion.

“ As to the incident now in question, would you wish to have it mentioned to Lord Grenville ? or would you mention it ? or would it be better to disregard it ? ”

LORD GRENVILLE to W. PITT.

1800, December 26. Dropmore.—“ I own I think that it would be best not wholly to reject Perrégaux’s overture, which I rather incline to think was meant as such. The reason I took no step about G. was that just at the same time G. Ellis’s friend wrote to him to propose to come over here for the same purpose. I authorized him to give an encouraging answer, but last week he received, at the interval of a month, a reply that he had been on the point of setting out, but that the publication of the correspondence here had shewn that there was no disposition here to come to any real understanding, and therefore that his journey had been deferred *sine die*. These are not the words, but their meaning.

“ Ellis sent me a draft of an answer which I perfectly approved and which I sent. This expressed that they must know very little of this country if they really so understood a step which was unavoidable ; and that it would be a pity that a misapprehension of this nature should delay a measure which might produce much good. I have the copies of all these, and will shew them to you when we meet in town. While this was going on, I thought we should only embarrass our business by opening another channel.

“ I have written the enclosed to Lord Auckland that he may send it if he pleases, and you think it right, or only extract it. If you agree in its being right, forward it to him. I will endeavour to send you a King’s Speech to-morrow, but I am a little puzzled how much should or should not be in it.”

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1800, December 27. Berlin.—“ You will easily believe with what satisfaction I learn that you so fully approve of what I have been doing.

“ I think the line I have followed will show you that I have not been disposed to place implicit reliance upon Haugwitz’s plausible professions, but you have a very full relation of facts, which I sometimes think best to give without any comment. I really believe we should do, if Haugwitz had prevailing influence ; but it is very doubtful whether any full and true representation ever reaches the King. I think this Cabinet has not, at present, any

hostile intentions towards us, but I really hope they are not so far engaged with Russia as to make a rupture probable at present, but their system has led from the first, and they must every day come nearer to a situation in which France and Russia may compel them to follow whatever impulse they may give. My hopes therefore are never sanguine or extend far, nor can I be perfectly confident even of the answer I am now to receive. I own I think that if you can break this intended league, and it can be plain you act from a generous motive, not from fear, you will do well to think of some favour, if any can be given safely to neutral powers. One grievance, arising perhaps from the extent of the war, and possibly without any remedy, is the long time which elapses before judgment can be obtained. Perhaps in the inferior courts it might be accelerated by multiplying the courts, but there must be one Court of Appeal.

“I enclose the copy of a passage in a letter received by a very respectable friend of mine from his correspondent at Brunswick. It shows the impressions which the Hungarian prayer is likely to make upon the public; and indeed the prayer itself, though it does not contain expressions so very offensive as are stated in this extract, is such as it is impossible not to disapprove.

“The letter to Rastopsin is excellent. Of the effect it may produce I think great doubts may be entertained; for the Emperor may not only have begun to repent of the violence committed, but may be struck with the delicacy with which you have, by pointing out the means of re-establishing good harmony by taking the first steps leading to the reciprocal appointment of ministers of each party resident at a friendly Court, saved him half the mortification of treading back his steps. At the same time the letter breathes the most determined resolution.” *Copy.*

#### SPENCER SMITH TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, December 31. Constantinople.—“The new arrangement of my official situation here, according to a notification I received from the Ambassador on the 12th instant, a copy whereof is annexed, completing the measure of my disappointment of the hopes your Lordship’s dispatch of the 7th of March raised in me of rendering my services still useful at Constantinople, I venture to plead this change of circumstances, besides the recent occurrence in my family of the greatest domestic calamity that could befall me, as the justification of an appearance of importunity in thus renewing my former request for the King’s leave to undertake a journey home upon my private affairs.

“In every event of this application which forms the most earnest object of my wishes, I am under the necessity of recurring to your Lordship’s interference for my relief from certain inconvenient restrictions which a desire I lately expressed to the Ambassador has unexpectedly laid me under. Concerning which I shall say no more than to refer your Lordship, for an explanation, to the perusal of two notes that passed between his Excellency and me upon the occasion.

“ Having now seldom opportunity to offer myself to your recollection, I request permission to remind your Lordship in this place of the unfruitful issue to me as yet of His Majesty’s gracious intentions to extend his bounty to me in alleviation of my loss by fire on 13th March, 1799, as your Lordship had the goodness to make me acquainted with so long ago.

“ And, being once upon subjects of this personal nature, not to trouble your Lordship with another letter on purpose, I take this occasion humbly to solicit your protection of the interest I have in my commission as Secretary of *embassy* bearing the most ancient date consistent with the rules of office ; and that if not as early as that of your first dispatch of notification, my appointment may be at least coeval with that of the ambassador.”

*Enclosure 1 :—*

The EARL OF ELGIN to SPENCER SMITH.

1800, December 12. Constantinople.—“ I have the honour of communicating to you the substance of instructions which I have this morning received, by express, from Lord Grenville, dated the 7th of November.

“ His lordship informs me that a meeting of the Deputy Governor and principal members of the Levant Company had been held by appointment at his<sup>l</sup>house for the purpose of a discussion upon the present state of the mission at the Porte, and that, in consequence of what then passed, I am to accept from the company the character of their ambassador, in the same manner as has been done in former instances, retaining my present situation as the King’s representative. His lordship further confirms his dispatch to me of the 7th of March, an extract of which was at the time officially addressed to you, intimating that the situation of secretary of the embassy, with the rank of minister plenipotentiary, must be considered in the same light at Constantinople as in every other Court ; and that all the transactions of the mission must, without exception, be considered as placed under the direction and control of the King’s ambassador.

“ Being called upon to make this notification to you at a time when concerns of the most important and pressing nature to the interests of Great Britain are entrusted to my management, it is my indispensable duty to direct that you will, without the smallest delay, intimate in an official manner to the officers of the Levant Company at Constantinople that the regulations which, I understand, you delivered to them for their respective occupations, at a meeting you convened on Sunday, the 16th November, are entirely suspended, and that I am henceforward authorised to exercise exclusively the control over these persons.”

*Enclosure 2 :—*

SPENCER SMITH to the EARL OF ELGIN.

1800, December 26. Pera.—“ I beg leave to make your lordship acquainted with a wish I have long entertained to visit the Troad

and other classical spots within an easy distance of Constantinople, and with the desire I have to avail myself of this very first interval of leisure since my employment here to effectuate that purpose.

“It is my intention, with your lordship’s approbation, to set out soon as Mrs. Smith’s health be sufficiently re-established to admit of our separation without uneasiness. To which end I have to request your assistance towards procuring the needful travelling *firman* from the Porte, for my going to and from the Dardanelles either by Rodosto or Brussa, and with sufficient latitude to permit my eventually extending my tour even to Ephesus, with six attendants, all Franks; to which I solicit the additional favour of your lordship’s own passport of a similar tenour.” *Copy.*

*Enclosure 3:—*

THE EARL OF ELGIN TO SPENCER SMITH.

1800, December 26. Constantinople.—“Since the receipt of your note this morning, I have examined Lord Grenville’s letters to me, in the view of ascertaining whether my compliance with your request would be reconcilable with his instructions. But I am sorry to find Lord Grenville has so explicitly stated to me the reasons upon which he denied you leave of absence from hence, that your quitting Constantinople, by any authority except his own, would be equally in contradiction with his orders and his wishes.”

H. ELLIOTT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Secret.*

1800, January 1. Dresden.—“I have received your Lordship’s most secret despatch N 2, 16 December, 1800, together with the enclosures.

“As Monsieur de Kalitschew was already gone to Petersburg, I have sent a private letter to him by Madame de Kalitschew, who followed her husband upon the 30th December. In the enclosed copy of that letter I am to solicit your Lordship’s attention to the paragraph underlined. I trust it will be thought entirely consonant to the instructions you was pleased to convey to me upon the subject of my communications with Monsieur de Kalitschew.

“The rest of my letter is drawn up with the view of giving it the appearance of a letter of private friendship, and unconnected with public business. I shall not, however, regret if my letter should be laid before the Emperor, as from an early knowledge of certain mystical habits to which he was once addicted, I have contrived to insert two expressions, which will attract his notice, as being connected with a system which still prevails among some of the northern princes.

“I can assure your Lordship that such is the weakness of many, with whom I have been acquainted, that their conduct in private and public life continues to be guided by motives too puerile to be credited by those who have not had an opportunity of bearing witness to their absurdity.”

Enclosure :—

H. ELLIOT to M. DE KALITCHEFF.

1800, December 29. Dresden.—“ Lord Minto ayant ignoré le départ de votre excellence de Dresde à la date de sa dernière lettre, m'avait chargé de vous faire sincèrement ses félicitations sur la prouve éclatante de sa confiance et de son approbation dont l'Empéreur Paul vient de vous honorer. Il se réunit à moi pour vous souhaiter tout le bonheur imaginable dans la nouvelle carrière que vous allez entreprendre. Puisse le rétablissement d'une bonne et solide amitié entre la Russie et l'Angleterre en signaler le début.

“ Je viens de recevoir de Milord Grenville la communication *confidentielle* de la copie d'une lettre du Comte Rostopschin à Milord Grenville en date du 23 Octobre 1800, de même que la copie d'une lettre du Lord Grenville au Comte Rostopschin en date du 5 Décembre 1800.

“ *Comme la lettre de Sa Seigneurie explique sans réserve les sentiments de ma Cour sur les événements dont il y est question, je dois me borner à exprimer mes vœux pour le renouvellement de la bonne intelligence entre nos deux augustes souverains.*

“ Je ne vous fais pas les compliments de la saison en vous souhaitant le rétour de beaucoup de *nouveaux siècles*, je crois que vous serez de mon avis, et que vous n'enviez pas le sort du vieux *Methusalem* dans ce méchant monde. Vous souhaitez de la santé et du bonheur pour les années que Dieu vous destine sur ce globe, prouvera assez le vrai intérêt que je ne cesserai de prendre à vous. À Dresde nous continuons à nous ennuyer tout doucement et assez agréablement. Pour ma personne j'y serais parfaitement heureux au sein de ma nombreuse famille si le triomphe indécent des coquins et de Jacobins de tout poël, avoués ou cachés, ne me faisait beaucoup de mauvais sang. Les querelles entre les honnêtes gens sont les plus beaux étrennes que l'on pouvait présenter à leur malveillance pour le commencement du dix-neuvième siècle. *Divide et impera* sera sûrement le mot de guet de *tous les démons* qui dirigeront la marche future des révolutions encore à faire. Nous sommes tous bien maladroits de nous laisser mener de la sorte. Dieu donne que la concorde et l'unanimité renaissent entre les grandes puissances, qui ont un intérêt si commun à agir de concert.” *Copy.*

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private and confidential.*

1801, January 3. Vienna.—“ My public dispatches are so very full on the interesting but calamitous subject of the day that I have little to add to your Lordship in the shape of a private letter. I send Flint back, as well because I have now no *absolute* want of him, as because I think he may be more useful at home, particularly in receiving and communicating to your lordship my Paris correspondence, which may now become very interesting. He will communicate to your Lordship, if you shall think it right to question him, some few Austrian anecdotes which I

have thought it wiser not to commit to paper, and will throw still further light on the present situation of Thugut and Lehrbach.

“ I have been anxious to have it understood that my opinion of the Arch-duke is not founded upon light grounds, because if it could be supposed that I was mistaken, the prospect here would be nothing less than misery and total ruin. I admit and admire the better parts of Thugut’s character, but I know to the full as well all his faults and weaknesses, and have too often felt the mischievous effects of his ungovernable obstinacy not to know that he will go on from one false step to another till we shall all be undone together, unless the military sceptre be taken out of his hands. Fortunately, at this moment, it is an instrument which he finds himself unequal to wield, and I am inclined to think, though he will not say so distinctly, that he is desirous himself of resigning it to another.

“ The truth is that he is thoroughly sick of all his advisers, even of Bellegarde, whose defensive system would have proved the loss of Italy if we had not lost it for him upon the Danube.

“ The Baron has seen Fasbinder twice, and desired to see him daily. He has waited twice on the Arch-duke, and the Arch-duke has been as often in what Suvarow called the infernal cavern. Everything in that respect is taking the very turn that is most to be wished and desired, and at which, though not quite within my sphere, I have been labouring incessantly, though slowly and secretly, for these last nine months. Thugut is coming round slowly and sulkily ; but he is certainly coming round ; and I am confident that the Arch-duke will abide by his promise unless the old man should show himself wayward and foolish to a degree of which, under the present circumstances, I do not believe him capable. I have, besides, prepared the Arch-duke for finding him obstinate and wrong-headed at the dozen first interviews at least. In the meantime his visit to the old man has made a strong sensation, and has been felt as a death-blow to Lehrbach.

“ If the Arch-duke be left to himself, it is my own opinion that he will have an army in one year, though I doubt whether he will go to war in two. But he is susceptible of impulsion, and if you keep the hold upon him which is now acquired by some measure of the sort I lately recommended, *I mean directly* from the King, I shall think nothing impossible or improbable.

“ Circumstances and persons are certainly very different, yet I would wish to recommend here, as far as any similitude can be found between the two cases, a conduct as similar as possible to that which was followed when I left Switzerland ; the consequence of which was the throwing the whole odium of the Swiss invasion on France instead of England, and the whole was gained at the price of a little civility, with a moderate portion of temper and moderation. The same sort of thing will happen here if we play our cards well, and part good friends with the hope of meeting again. And I shall not be at all surprised, in that case, to see an English alliance eagerly sought after by the popular cry before two years are expired.

“ I shall write again by Lord Minto’s first messenger. In the meantime I thank your Lordship for your private letter of the

8th November, and, with best wishes of the season, I most earnestly recommend the holy island of Malta to your special care and protection, and to your most close and safe custody."

The EARL OF CARYSFORT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, January 3. Berlin.—“ I must confess I have been and am a good deal puzzled how to execute your last orders ; for though I am, notwithstanding some unfavourable appearances, very much persuaded that Prussia is not yet in such a situation as to be under any necessity of taking part against Great Britain, and I am sure nothing can be further from her inclination and intentions, yet, without using much stronger language even than what you have employed towards Denmark, I despair of any answer not in some degree evasive. I conceive your object to be twofold ; 1st to convince them that Great Britain is not only very angry, but very fully determined upon vigorous war, if her neighbours do not find the means to remove her suspicions ; and 2nd, to learn their real intentions. Upon the first of these I trust I shall have succeeded completely, not without giving offence, but without offending sufficiently to excite active resentment. And as to the second, I hope also to succeed. This Court is so wedded to the system of doing nothing that they are afraid of being too positive if they say so much. I trust however that, even if the answer they give at last should not appear quite full, I shall be able to lay before you pretty good circumstantial proof of their intentions. I will send you by the next opportunity copies of what I have laid before Count Haugwitz, and a more detailed account of all that has passed with him, that you may judge as much as possible for yourself, and not upon my report.”

LORD MINTO TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1801, January 5. Vienna.—“ The unfortunate course which events have lately taken seems to point out a natural remedy for the difficulties in my personal situation which have been the subject of some of my former private letters. There seems to be no longer any reason to doubt an approaching peace between France and Austria ; and I conceive that this object must be actually accomplished before anything precise or certain can be settled respecting the future system of this government in its relations with England. What I should propose myself, if your Lordship sees no material objection to it, would be to remain here till the peace is made ; and till, after that event, the delicate and important questions which must be treated between Great Britain and Austria are brought to a conclusion. It is difficult to foresee exactly the length to which these matters may run, but at present there is no reason to think that every thing material that is likely to arise out of the new turn of events may not be terminated in the course of the summer ; possibly sooner.

“ A few months, however, would not be of moment either to

Government or me. When things are brought to this state, it appears highly probable that the business of this Court might cease to be sufficiently urgent to render my return to England on a leave of absence in any degree prejudicial to the King's affairs. If this should appear to be the case when the time comes, I flatter myself your Lordship will not refuse me that favour. It will be the most eligible mode in every respect for my return, and is that which I very much prefer myself. It will undoubtedly relieve Government from some expense by furnishing a fund for my indemnification proportioned to the extent of my leave of absence. It would likewise leave the situation open for me, if future events should seem to render my return to Vienna desirable. On the other hand, if at the period I have mentioned the situation of affairs should render it inexpedient to leave this Court even for a short interval without a minister on the spot, the question of my return may then be settled according to the circumstances of the time."

J. H. FRERE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, January 6. [Lisbon].—"I should naturally write to your Lordship in this form if it were merely for the sake of preserving the privilege with which you have indulged me; but there is one point which I am particularly anxious to suggest, at least if there is any intention of preserving Portugal in hostility with France, or indeed of providing for her security in case of a peace with that power. The effect of the Chevalier D'Almeida's continuance in England is to remove one of the only men capable of doing good here, and to withdraw from the English minister a great share of the consideration which ought to attach to his situation. If I had him here, with the perfect good understanding between us, and his favour with the Prince, and the assistance of Don Rodrigo de Sousa, I should think that anything might be effected of which the country in its present state is capable.

"There is at this moment a vacancy in the finance department by the death of the Marquis Ponte de Lima, and I should think that some means might be found out of the present state of things between the countries to send him back with some special communication, and to keep the Marquis Pombeira accredited in his stead. He would then be able to see his way, and might return at any rate if he could not establish himself to his satisfaction here. The views of the Government are, I believe, sincerely to use as much delay as their fears will allow them, and to avoid, if possible, the residence of a French minister. I have not, however, made any enquiries or expressed any curiosity about the terms lest they should be interpreted into approbation. If a French minister is once established here, I should look upon the Court as irretrievably gone. There is nothing like police, and the capital is the common resort of all that is villainous and infamous in the country. It would really require a volume to convey an idea of the total absence of all government, or to repeat one-half of the facts which have been related to me in illustration of it; and when one considers the apathy of the Government, and the literal encouragement which is

given to crimes, it is only astonishing that things are not worse ; and one wonders where it is that the security for life and property still exists, and why it is that people are not murdered and houses broken open in mid-day. I have heard instances of the Duke Dalafoens encouraging assassination, just as Mr. Windham would encourage boxing, as a point of honour among the common people. A street robber fees the guard and makes his escape unmolested. A murderer threatens his judge with assassination, and the judge obtains the continuance of his confinement by going to the minister and declaring that he will murder the prisoner the instant he is discharged. Such is the country which is in expectation of receiving a diplomatic propagandist as soon as the French Government shall think fit to accept the terms which they may have to offer. Mr. Pinto professes himself perfectly aware of the danger ; and if he had behaved more fairly in his communications with me, and were less influenced by his Spanish connections, I should be inclined to give him credit for having fled to this alternative as a refuge from the more formidable evils of war. But, unfortunately, the statement of the discussion between us will not admit so candid an interpretation. I think I have not left any thing undone, unless I had engaged for an army of 10,000 to be here in March ; but having said every thing to provoke some demand of assistance, and having noticed to the minister his silence, it struck me as unbecoming and undignified to obtrude such a proposal, especially as I did not feel entirely confident in the facility of its execution. If, however, there should be any considerable disposable force which it was thought proper to allot to the defence of Portugal, I should hope, and indeed feel confident, that its arrival would put an end to negotiation. With a view to this possibility I shall certainly give M. Pinto to understand that any preliminary excluding British auxiliaries would be considered as an act of hostility. I am afraid that my bad hand, which is made still worse by an accident which has befallen it, will have already fatigued your Lordship's eyes."

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, January 6. Berlin.—“The natural inference, perhaps, from all that has passed would be that the Prussian Cabinet has been led on farther than it meant to go, but not so far as to leave no retreat, and that it means to get out of the scrape and to keep friends with us. But what inference can be drawn with confidence when we know that the Minister never boggles at a lie, that he has no real influence, that the King never sees with his own eyes, that those who approach him deceive him, and keep him in the dark, and are playing a game against us. I still think, however, that they all, king, ministers, and favourites, shrink from the very thought of war. The only questions are whether the moment is arrived when they have no choice left but to obey the mandate of France and Russia ; whether those powers are yet sufficiently connected to act for one end ; and whether both would at this moment think it politic to engage Prussia in open hostilities against us. These are no questions of easy solution, and till it is known

what terms will be imposed by France upon Austria, they must perhaps remain unanswered. I have doubts whether France will give peace upon any terms, and if they do, no part of Italy will probably be allowed to retain more than a nominal independence.

“Haugwitz repeatedly said that a war between Great Britain and Russia must, of course, put an end to all concert between neutral powers and the latter, and the Danes and Swedes certainly are very anxious that our quarrel with the Emperor may be made up. This is probably only dictated by the hope of gaining time to carry their own schemes into effect ; which, I trust, will be effectually defeated by your vigorous measures against Denmark at least, before she can receive any assistance. I have sometimes thought that if the King himself was to remonstrate by letter with the King of Prussia it might produce good effect.

“I am very glad to see by the last papers that the price of corn begins to fall.

“Baron Reden, the Hanoverian, is the good authority I quoted towards the end of my despatch. He lives with all the people who may be called the runners of Government here, and may possibly have been specially desired to tell me this, as he knew of my having been with Count Haugwitz in the morning, and called me out from dinner to make this communication. Lutzow, the Minister from Mecklenburg Swerin, was the reporter of the conversation of the Russians.”

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, January 6. Wilderness.—“I am vexed that I forgot to speak to you last week about the address. I found from my brother that the Duke of Rutland does not mean to be in town till March, and that from that and other circumstances there was no chance of his being induced to move. We therefore agreed it was not worth while to make the trial. I hope you will still have time to place it in proper hands. Our moving it ourselves is, I think, too much out of the common line, and not desirable.”

#### LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF CARYSFORT.

1801, January 13. Cleveland Row.—“I know not that I can add anything to my despatches. I have there explained to you the past, the present, and future. But I fear the result will be that we shall meet much sooner than we foresaw when you left this country. It is in vain to reason with such fools and madmen, but really their want of all common sense does provoke one beyond all patience.

“If you can persuade them that they have not agreed to act against us, and that they can do no better than sit still and enrich themselves by the profits of that neutrality of which Denmark has made so abundant an harvest, you will do a fine thing. But I have no very great hopes that they will have even as much sense as this.”

*Copy.*

## THE EARL OF CARYSFORT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, January 13. Berlin.—“I have not materials to make a despatch, but I would not let the post go without saying a word to you. I still think this Court will get out of the scrape if it can. Haugwitz persists in saying nothing is concluded, and that, if there is war between us and Russia, the neutral league falls to the ground of course. I know not whether the bad news from Austria will oblige you to lower your tone; I rather expect it will have a contrary effect, and I am sure if we temporize now, this armed neutrality will come upon us in the summer with double force. What I principally write for now is to say that you ought to contradict the Emperor's assertion that England entered into a treaty about Malta, as publicly as he made it. It is in vain for me to state the truth wherever I go. Every public paper and every individual says, after the Emperor has declared by a note delivered in his name to all the Ministers at his Court that such a treaty exists, England would deny it openly if she could or if she dared.

“Jacobi's letters would probably be read by the King.

“Every body here, and private accounts from Petersburg confirm it, is of opinion that whoever will give a subsidy will have the Swede. The Dane, I trust, you will make sure of by other means. I am told here, and upon such authority as I can, I think, rely upon, that Baron Jacobi has a very right way of thinking, and would readily be of use if he could. As Prussia can have no real interest in the war, nor we in destroying her little trade, I persuade myself always she may be kept out of it; and his reports might, at this moment, be of more weight than anything I can say.”  
*Copy.*

## THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, January 14. Stowe.—“Even in the midst of the tremendous difficulties of our French contest, I rejoice that the question avowed by the northern coalition comes so distinctly to issue; for I am confident that the spirit of the country bears you out in the resolution to grapple with it *usque ad mortem*. All depends on a vigorous Baltic blow, and I trust that you will not wait for the thaw before you strike where the ice certainly does not impede you. Denmark will pay the piper; but I wish I could see the prospect of shaking the *Bear* by the *beard*. You have not encouraged me to think about *men*; but I have a device for assisting the marine service from the militia; and, at all events, I think you must augment us, for you have no troops in the eastern district, and it is open to insult from Sweden and Denmark.”

## LORD GRENVILLE TO THE EARL OF CARYSFORT.

*Private.*

1801, January 16. Cleveland Row.—“In the event of our obtaining Prussian neutrality we shall have some overtures to make to them respecting the neutrality of the Elbe. By the possession of Altona, Denmark may obstruct our navigation to and from Hamburgh. But by so doing she will interrupt the neutrality of

that river, the whole of which is comprised within the Prussian line of demarcation. And we should thereby acquire, by just reciprocity, the right to station our ships of war just below Altona, and to intercept all trade to and from that town. This we shall be willing, under Prussian neutrality, to compromise, and to admit the line of demarcation as so far in force as to prevent all hostilities on either side in the limits included within that line.

“But we think it best not to make this proposal till we are a little more assured of the conduct which Prussia means to hold. I therefore only state the idea now to you for your information, and would not wish you to bring it forward even as a proposal from yourself till you learn further from us. But if you can lead Haugwitz to make it as a proposal of his, it will be very useful to do so.

“You must, however, always remember that we will not suffer that line of demarcation to be extended, either by land or sea, a single yard beyond what is now marked on the maps officially communicated to us; particularly not to the effect of driving us farther out to sea at the mouth of the Elbe.

“We are very impatient to learn the impression which our measures will have produced at Berlin. The Swede was, I believe, a little prepared for it, but not the Dane. The great haul will not however be in Europe, but in the East Indies, and coming from thence.

“Did not Paul, when he laid on the second embargo, make some declaration or publication in his *gazette* about armed neutrality, as well as about Malta? If you have such a paper pray send it me.”  
*Copy.*

#### THE EARL OF CARYSFORT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, January 17. Berlin.—“As Proby’s part in the Wicklow election must long since have ended, perhaps my best way would be to hold my tongue. Your constant kindness and friendship to me and mine is such as I can never feel or acknowledge too much, and I have only now to regret that I did not talk over this matter with you before I left England; but, indeed, it seemed perfectly unreasonable to trouble you on an affair in which, as it should seem, you could have no personal or public concern, nor a sufficient probability of being useful to me to compensate for the bore. As far as Government were concerned they were apprised of my views for my son, and knew by what had already passed that the question must be between Lord Powerscourt, Lord Fitzwilliam, and me. One of these being in general opposition, and the other having taken as strong a part as he could against the Union, I thought, even independent of Lord Cornwallis’ personal good intentions to me, I was morally certain that I should be allowed to attend to the essential and permanent interest of my family, at least without any meddling against me. But though I certainly know Mr. Cook and Lord Clare better than you do, it is plain I did not know them sufficiently, and they have been the means of inflicting upon me the severest mortification I ever experienced.

“In all county elections many private and particular considerations must enter, and I am certain that not you alone, but

every part of English administration, would have made me the most liberal allowance; but, in this instance, every thing was so plain that misrepresentation, or rather lying only, could have excited a doubt. Nobody can doubt but that Lord Fitzwilliam must carry always one member. Mr. Westby was his man. Mr. Hume, the present member, has neither fortune nor natural interest, and Lord Fitzwilliam] denies that he has any connection with him. I was therefore naturally to point my opposition against Hume and endeavour to come to some understanding with Lord Fitzwilliam, which would have secured us both not only from defeat but from opposition in future. Lord Fitzwilliam's] votes being reduced in number by deaths in the rebellion, Mr. Osborne, rashly I think, thought he might be beat, and declared Proby a candidate; but my letters both to him and Lord Fitzwilliam must have arrived in time to bring him back into the right way, which was to make such demonstrations only as would have led to an arrangement with Lord Fitzwilliam] for the general election; and there being other candidates was the most favourable circumstance that could happen. Their object, you may rely upon it, was the same as mine; and even (which I believe to have been impossible) if any junction could have secured success on the present occasion, it must have ended in a connection with Lord Fitzwilliam] at the end of the Parliament. But, on the supposition that nothing could be done with him, my next object must be to prevent Mr. Wingfield's success, as it would be more difficult to unseat him than Hume. Besides, Lord Powerscourt has behaved very ill to me, and ought upon no account to receive countenance from me.

"As to the strength of the county there is no doubt whatever of mine being next to Lord Fitzwilliam's] much the strongest interest. The Stratford connection, which includes Lord Powerscourt, is certainly powerful; Lord Meath is nothing but a name. I cannot be very widely mistaken about the strength of the county, having in five successive contests taken by the hand the present Lord Powerscourt, Mr. Stratford, and Mr. Howard; and I can safely say that they, each of them, appeared upon each occasion to have no solid support but mine. That part of the county which joins Dublin is, you know, crowded with the villas of attorneys and tradesmen who figure as the gentlemen of the county, but have no weight beyond their own votes. Lord Fitzwilliam's estate and mine cover a vast proportion of the cultivated part, and stretch from the villas to the borders of the county of Wexford; and all the gentlemen who lie between us and the sea are connected with one or other of us; but, independent of all this, Mr. Hume's election must have warranted a different estimate from Mr. Cook's. The same candidates were then declared. Proby, not being of age, could not stand. But Mr. Wingfield and the Stratfords, though they avowed a personal pique against Lord Wicklow for his conduct towards Mr. Stratford, struck their colours the moment my interest was declared for Mr. Howard. The Stratfords nearly divided their votes. Lord Powerscourt and Lord Meath supported Howard, yet Hume was victorious. It is certain however that he did not poll one hundred votes exclusive of Lord Fitzwilliam's tenantry, among whom he resides,

and who, when their landlord left them at liberty, mostly went with their neighbour. So that if it was not notorious that Howard was frightened by the anti-union cry, and fled the pit even before a third of my votes had polled, it would be clear that Lord Fitzwilliam could without any assistance return both members as easily as one. I wish you had not told me Cook was the author of your information, though indeed I should have had no doubt, when I heard the substance of it, that it came from him and Lord Clare; but, though I will certainly never open my lips about it, I am not hypocrite enough to prevent my countenance from betraying, if I should meet him, the resentment which I feel."

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, January 17. Berlin.—“In the answer we gave to Sweden in 1780 there is a stipulation mentioned as contained in the twelfth article of our treaty with that Crown in 1661, concerning the goods of the enemy in neutral bottoms, which does not appear in Chalmer's edition of their treaty, the only one I have had an opportunity to consult; but the article, as it stands in Chalmer's, contains an express stipulation of great importance, which is found also in the Danish treaty, and which I think should have been noticed in the answer to Sweden. It states that, if the certificate and passport in due form is not produced, or there being any other just and urgent cause of suspicion, the ship ought to be searched. I should be much obliged to you if you would let me know how the treaties really stand. Pray tell me also whether we stop naval stores in Swedish bottoms as contraband, and if we do, on what pretence, as it appears against the treaty.

“As the public opinion is always of consequence, and as it is perfectly uninformed upon these subjects, it seems desirable that it should be known how far, upon this business, the letter of the treaties, as well as the general principles of the law of nations, is really in our favour. I have already remarked that advantage is taken of the public assertion of the Emperor concerning the convention of Malta, though even time has been wanting for contradicting it openly. Prussia will get out of the scrape if it can, but her fear of Russia seems very prevalent. As, however, she cannot commit direct hostilities, I presume you will avail yourself, as long as possible, of the benefit of a communication with her. I find by several applications which have been made to me, that if friendship between London and Berlin was well assured, our merchants would immediately establish themselves in Königsberg, Danzig, and Memel. Have you forgot Cuxhaven? You told me I was to have further instructions about it. I am inclined to believe, from several questions which have been put to me, that here at least there is an idea that the powers engaged in the armed neutrality might get out of the scrape by giving to Great Britain everything she contends for, as to search, as to naval stores, as to enemies' goods, and as to convoy where the King's ships only shall be concerned; but proposing to the belligerent powers to abolish, by consent, all privateering. In the present circumstance I conceive this might be of

advantage to Great Britain, and France would refuse her consent. As far as the neutral powers are concerned it seems a distinction without a difference; but one should be glad to turn the tables on the French if possible, and oblige them to refuse a proposition to which their own intrigues have given birth.

“Our situation is not pleasant, for the public opinion is that Prussia is too much involved with Russia to be favourable to us, and therefore we experience great coldness and neglect. The Queen has had an absolute flirtation with Bonaparte, and has drawn upon herself universal and loud animadversion. The Princess of Tour and Taxis has written to me again about the Marquis de Bombello.

“I have advanced one out of the two hundred pounds per annum which you authorized me to give. I am not quite sure I have done right. I have drawn on you for it to-day; he is to write to you to explain what he means to do for it, as well as to thank you.” *Copy.*

*Original written with invisible ink.*

#### E. COOKE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, January 20. Dublin Castle.—“I ordered your Lordship’s subscription to be sent as you desired.

“We had in vain attempted, after Wingfield’s being withdrawn as a candidate for Wicklow, to induce the Stratfords to retire. The principal gentlemen yesterday, before the opening of the poll, made Lord Proby and Benjamin Stratford consent to draw lots. Lord Proby won. Stratford then proposed him. We trust there is now little doubt of Lord Proby’s success.”

#### WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private and confidential.*

1801, January 21. Vienna.—“I could go on for hours if I were to tell you half the little intrigues and tricks that have signalized this new warfare between our two doughty champions. I have selected two or three that will best bear being related in a public dispatch, because it is so much the fashion here to talk of *principles*, and *honour*, and *political views* that, at last, all manner of people, myself among the number, may begin to believe what they are talking about, unless we take from time to time a peep behind the curtain.

“All my own fine speculations disappeared almost as soon as they were formed, and, as both sides have taken me more or less for their confidant, I have no difficulty in saying that Merfeldt and Dietrechstein are the two men who have done the mischief. Not that they had not many and powerful co-operators, but, without they had both done their utmost to irritate the minds of their respective chiefs, I think we might have kept decently together till the peace had been made, which was all that I ever expected.

“I yesterday gave a large military dinner to Prince John of Lichtenstein, the Prince of Schwartzenburg, and a party from head-quarters, Fasbinder included, to which Dietrechstein had the consummate impudence to invite himself, knowing who were my

guests, and that he was perfectly odious to the whole party. As soon as he entered the room, he took Fasbinder aside and kept him screwed up in a corner till dinner was on the table. At dinner he sat by him, whispered in his ear the whole time. After dinner he played the same farce again in the drawing-room, so as to leave the impression on the mind of the *by-standers* that he was sent on purpose to play some state trick, which nobody however could attempt to explain, nor could I take F[asbinder] apart to ask him what had passed between them.

“I dont think that the Arch-Duke can get on without Thugut, but this remains to be seen. If they keep on the reserve with France, which the Arch-Duke thinks they may do openly and with safety six months hence, perhaps Trautsmendorff may shuffle through the regular business afterwards; but who is to combat against French seduction and French menace in the mean time? I have not yet seen the man myself that I think at all equal to it. Thugut kept Fasbinder with him the other day three hours, asked him and obtained from him his opinion of every man of any note in the army, which the other was fool enough to give him in perfect confidence, when the old gentleman made him a low bow, observing, with a sneer, that if he had received such valuable information sooner he might have made great use of it. Observe that he had just got enough to satisfy him that he and the Arch-Duke (who, by the by, is as obstinate as the others) could not by any possibility set up their forces together now or hereafter.

“I have what the French call a *travail* ready for your Lordship on the subject of our several corps. I hope to be able to send it off on Saturday. In the mean while I trust you will not disapprove of my having dismounted the Condé corps, and sold 2,000 horses, the feed of which cost 2,000 florins, or very near 200*l.* a day. It is my own opinion that you should disband and pension the whole. As a military corps it is *quite incapable* of further service; and the difference of *et ceteras* between that state of existence and an equal number of *pensionnés*, even supposing the individual pay to be throughout the same, will be immense.

“I flatter myself, and Hope and Ramsey agree with me, that we can carry off, maintain, and recruit three Swiss battalions, provided their service be limited to Europe and the Mediterranean. I hope your Lordship will turn this well in your mind, and never, never give up Malta. With Malta in your hands, you will still be gods even at Vienna, in spite of Buonaparte. It opens a prospect in the East which, in the present state of things, has really no bounds. But I forget that I am talking to those who know its value, and ask pardon for my rhapsody.”

VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

[1801, January 25. Dublin.]—“Cooke says by this day’s mail that the Wicklow election promises well. Lord Proby the 2nd day 27 ahead. The Stratfords are not playing *quite fair*, but he hopes to manage them. A second poll with such friends would be an awkward event. Lord Proby, 145; Ponsonby, 118.

“ I hope your Lordship’s cold is better, and that your Cabinet went off well. Lord Clare received the communication I made to him with much less warmth than was perceptible in the morning.

“ I have received your Lordship’s note relative to Mr. Foster.”

W. DRUMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1801, January 27. Copenhagen.—“ You will see by my dispatch the unpleasant language which, in the heat of passion, Count Bernstorff applied to me in our conversation this morning. This has certainly affected me, inasmuch as I really had a great regard for him, and believe him to be a man of integrity. I have no doubt, indeed, when he reflects he will be sorry for what he has said. If I had answered him, the consequences might have been disagreeable. I can have no fears of your Lordship giving me your support, as, in delivering the two notes, the first written by you, I exactly followed my instructions. I think, then, I may depend upon its [being] shown to all the world that, when I shall return to England, I shall meet with the approbation of Government. It is to that I alone look up, and with respect to the opinions of others I am, and ever shall be, indifferent.

“ In the meantime your Lordship must be sensible how painful my situation is become, and how anxiously I look forwards to the day of my recall.

“ I am afraid I have stated my conversation with Count Bernstorff indistinctly. Indeed, it is not easy to recollect the language of passion, which is never consistent. Your Lordship may, however, be assured that I did not yield one point to Count Bernstorff, and if I spoke less, I did not speak less firmly. My own opinion is that he will answer my note.

“ I have much to regret that Ross did not arrive sooner. It would have been of the greatest importance to have had their answer before they had heard of the embargo.”

*Postscript.*—“ I find I have omitted to mention in my dispatch that Count Bernstorff took particular notice of that part of your Lordship’s letter to me where you announce His Majesty’s intention to pursue all such other measures *et cetera*. He asked what other measures; I told him I had no farther instructions upon the subject.”

The EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, January 27. Berlin.—“ As there is no mention made in your note to the two Ministers that the engagements of 1780 are repugnant to the treaties of their respective Courts with England, though it is said in one of your despatches, I have some doubt whether I have done right to insist upon it. The stipulation for the free and full use of the Danish ports to Russia, in order to enable her fleets to act beyond the Baltic, is one of the secret and separate articles, and is found in the fourth volume of *Marten’s Collection of Treaties*, a book which seems to be considered here as of high authority. It seems strong for making the avowal of its having

renewed, *sous la forme primitive*, the treaty of 1780, a ground for immediate hostility against the Court of Copenhagen."

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, January 29. Berlin.—“The news of Kalitcheff’s appointment appears to me too interesting and important for me to lose a moment in communicating it. This Court, I am sure, is under great embarrassments; but, as I think the influence of Russia preponderates, unless in the course of a day or two some strong and unequivocal demonstration of its pacific intentions towards us should manifest itself, I shall think it my duty, without waiting for farther instructions from home, to press in the strongest manner for an explicit answer whether Prussia will or will not avail herself of any of the distinctions which have been offered to her to avoid a war with his Majesty; for the now avowed correspondence of France and Russia seems to leave scarcely any chance of keeping in good terms with her but forcing her to an immediate decision, and any appearance of hesitation on our part might counteract a disposition (if such should appear to exist in the Danes or Swedes) to give way. In order not to let the thing cool, I shall seek an immediate conference with Haugwitz on the business of the Ems, in which I shall take occasion to make him understand that he must take his part unequivocally and without delay.

“Pray correct one expression in the copy of my note which you will have received by Johnson. Instead of *a eu l’honneur d’annoncer à son Excellence*, read *a pris occasion de dire à son Excellence*. It is so put in what was delivered to Haugwitz; but in your copy, the connection having been interlined without striking out the words first written, the transcriber made a wrong choice.

“I had some conversation with Haugwitz the evening before last. He laboured to impress me with notions of the facility of bringing about a reconciliation with Russia, and the necessity for our laying aside private considerations to check the progress of the French against the House of Austria. Kalitcheff’s mission shows that his first insinuation has no foundation; and from the general complexion of his discourse, I should be tempted to infer that he meditates a pert but not an hostile answer to us, having no view but to gain a little time. The course of events however outruns his policy, and we must decide though he cannot.

“I shall be very glad to find myself at home again, if I continue to have the good luck of obtaining your approbation to the last.”

LORD GRENVILLE TO SPENCER SMITH.

1801, January 30. Cleveland Row.—“I received by the last mails your letter marked *private* of the 30th November. I had already taken those measures for the new arrangement of the mission at Constantinople which the late occurrences there have rendered unavoidable.

“I have not seen General Smith, and I apprehend he is not in town. If I had seen him I should have had no difficulty in explaining

to him without reserve the impressions of concern with which I cannot but view those transactions. With this letter you will receive the official leave to return home, and with the reception of that you will understand your official character to terminate.

“As I do not know precisely on what footing you stand with the company on the subject of the period at which your allowances from them will determine, that point must be reserved for subsequent discussion with Mr. Bosanquet, whom I may probably see in the course of ten days or a fortnight.” *Copy.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MINTO.

1801, January 30. Cleveland Row.—“I have to acknowledge your private letter of the 5th instant. The great difficulty I feel respecting its contents rests on two points. First, the extreme uncertainty how far, in the present critical state of our affairs in every part of Europe, it can be possible for us to leave the Court of Vienna a few months hence without a resident minister of weight and talents equal to the task he may have to execute. And, secondly, the impossibility of our justifying in the present state of the civil list, and of all other public expenses, the giving any authority to our minister there to exceed the allowances as they stand according to the last augmentation. I have given to this point the fullest consideration with that sincere desire, for which I trust you will give me credit, of doing every thing that could depend on me to remove all difficulties that could be in the way of your continuing in a situation, in which you have rendered such great and important service, and in which I am confident you could most essentially promote the public advantage.

“But with the utmost extent of these feelings, I am compelled to say that I think further augmentation impossible; and with that impression on my mind the only thing I can do is to state it to your Lordship fairly and frankly.” *Copy.*

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, January 30. Downing Street.—“The substance of the abstract which I return you is much too important to be withheld, and ought, in some way or other, to be made public without delay. But I am not sure whether the statement ought not to be softened in that part (I have marked it) which relates to the strongest measures used by Russia towards Sweden and Denmark. The observation made in the abstract shews that these measures were not so much for the purpose of maintaining the rights of powers at war against neutrals, as of forcing neutrals to take part in the war. In this view this argument, and every other referring to the peculiarity of the present war, proves too much. You will see at once whether the statement can be so corrected as to avoid this objection.

“With respect to the mode of making these papers public there is some difficulty. The mode you propose seems to me much better

than to lose the benefit of them. But I doubt whether it would not be better either to lay them and the rest of the collection dryly (and without any preface, only with a proper title) before both Houses, and so print them, or, secondly, to send them with a circular note to foreign Ministers; in which case they might serve as a manifesto on one head of our case with Russia; and the interruption of all intercourse on the part of the Emperor would account sufficiently for our publishing what we have not directly communicated to the Court in question. Without some expedient I own I feel an awkwardness in the publication, though I am not sure that either expedient which I have suggested is right. At all events, I am anxious the publication should be speedy, and as the head and tail piece will any way be very short, the printing need not, I hope, be delayed."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, February 1. [Downing Street.]—"A communication which I received after I saw you from a quarter which I cannot name, and on which I can fully depend, left me no doubt that I was right in my supposition of the extent of the King's opinions, and that he meant I should know them. It was therefore impossible for me to write to him without stating my whole intention; which you will see I have done on the idea I explained to you, and which is the only one I could bring myself to act upon. I shall see you at dinner if I cannot call before. Pray return my paper, as I must shew it to Lord Castlereagh and one or two of our colleagues. I have not yet got the King's answer, but I know what it must be."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, February 1. [Downing Street.]—"You were not come home when I called, and having appointed Lord Castlereagh to meet me here, I could not stay for you. I hope to see you to-morrow morning, when I think our line for the day will be very easily settled. It seems to me that we need say nothing unless questions are put, which however I conclude they will be. When they are, a few words stating the simple fact that we have found it our duty to resign on a ground which may possibly produce more discussion on some future occasion, will be sufficient. The fact and the cause are in truth both sufficiently known; and if the fact had not been sufficiently notorious otherwise, it would be to-morrow; because I have found it necessary, in order to prevent a mischievous impression from indistinct or exaggerated rumours, to state it to-day to the Governor of the Bank in a way which he may report on the Stock Exchange to-morrow. I believe by this step much speculation and some alarm will be prevented."

*Postscript.*—"I rather think we shall find it easy to put off all debates, and choose a new Speaker (as a preparatory step) on Tuesday or Wednesday, though certainly our own resignations cannot well take place till late in the week following."

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, February 3. Stowe.—"You know too well the interest

(I may say pride) that I take in all that attaches on your fame and honour to doubt for a moment the satisfaction I feel in the resolution taken by Mr. Pitt and you. The matter in dispute has always been very sore to the King's feelings; and I knew (as you did) that it would be a very severe struggle; but I really had imagined that he had made up his mind to what was in fact the *avowed* corollary to the Union, as one that was essentially necessary for the attainment of the essential benefits to be derived from it. I was aware a month ago of this difficulty; and I was sure that it was serious and real from the entire silence you observed to me latterly on measures which you had anxiously discussed with me in August last, and on which I agreed with you *in toto*. But it is indeed matter to me of the most serious alarm to find that the King is (to your belief) firm in his decision to change his Ministers on this dispute. At the same time, however, I differ with you as to the result; for I am persuaded that he will ultimately give way; particularly too when it is manifest that he could not out of any materials form a new Ministry on such grounds, which you will observe are exactly those on which almost every public man is pledged so deeply; and on which the difficulties would be multiplied tenfold on any such new Minister by the resignation of the King's servants on a ground on which all Ireland will run riot. Upon the whole then I should be satisfied, if you did not state the converse so peremptorily, that ultimately the King will concede, either from his own sense of the magnitude of the danger of every sort that he runs, or of the little chance of carrying his point by a new Ministry, or of the little chance of finding any Ministry who would be rash enough to undertake it.

"But be all this as it may, you have no alternative; for your opinions and your personal credit are at stake on this question; and I should have thought you, under all the circumstances of the Union question, the weakest or the wickedest Government if you took the contrary line. I have indeed much to say on every branch of this matter when we meet, but I am most happy that we all meet in perfect accord of political and private opinion."

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF CARYSFORT.

*Private.*

1801, February 6. Cleveland Row.—"I owe it to you on every account not to delay apprizing you of an event which will, I know, give you sincere concern, and which, though matters have been for some time approaching to this crisis, has not been finally determined upon till within these two last days. This preface, added to the reports which must have reached you even at Berlin, will already have apprized you of the general result of what I have to communicate to you, which is that the King's present administration is dissolved, and that a few days will probably bring you the official notification of the appointment of my successor.

"The immediate and sole cause of this event is an insurmountable difference of opinion which has arisen between the King and the majority of his present servants on the subject of the measures to be adopted respecting the Catholics in Ireland.

“ I have long thought (although I am not sure that you are not of a different opinion) that to render the Union complete, and to derive from it all the advantages which it ought to offer to this country, it ought immediately to be followed by a removal of all the existing disqualifications. This opinion, confirmed in my own mind by every day’s reflection on the state of that country, and on the general posture of affairs in Europe, has, after much deliberation, been adopted by Mr. Pitt and the majority of our colleagues, including, besides us two, Dundas, Lord Spencer, Lord Camden, and Windham. And upon the basis of this decision an extensive plan was formed and submitted to his Majesty for removing by a general law all religious tests and disqualifications throughout the United Kingdom, and for substituting in their place a strong political test, directed expressly against the Jacobin doctrines, and containing an oath of support to the present Establishment both in Church and State. And this would have been accompanied by other measures for the advantage and security of the Church Establishment, a part of which I once stated to you. As the great advantage to be produced by this plan in Ireland was the affording to the Catholics there, in the first moments of the Union, a pledge of the favourable dispositions of the Government and Parliament towards them, our opinions led necessarily to the immediate adoption of the measure. And finding on the King’s part an invincible repugnance to it, arising from scruples which one must applaud even while one laments them, we could have no option left to us but that of retiring from his service rather than consenting to place ourselves in the situation of being to resist in Parliament a measure which we, in our consciences, think so highly expedient, both in itself, and still more particularly with a view to the circumstances of the present moment, when we seem to be so peculiarly called upon to do everything that properly may be done to attach the body of the people, and all the sub-divisions of it, as much as possible to the Government and constitution which they are called upon to defend.

“ I flatter myself that you will approve the steps which I have taken, even if you should not agree in the question of policy which has led to it. But I am still more anxious to impress upon your mind the indispensable duty, as I think it, of your continuing to give to the King’s service the benefit of your exertions at Berlin, if, as I trust, the discussions there shall have taken such a shape as promises the maintenance of peace with that Court. It is the King’s intention to form without delay a new government from among the supporters of the present system, and to place the present Speaker at the head of it. Our duty and inclination must both equally incline us to give to such a government every degree of assistance and support which it can be in our power to afford them ; and we have given to the King the strongest assurances to this effect. I trust that not many of those who now hold offices (not of the Cabinet) will quit their situations in this country on the present occasion. And, certainly, there is still less reason to justify such a step on the part of one of the King’s ministers abroad, who is in no manner implicated in the difference of opinion which has

arisen, and whose sentiments, if I mistake not, rather accord with those of his Majesty than with ours on the very point which is in question.

“I will not conceal from you that I have a personal interest in making these suggestions to you; considering, as I do, our own honour as very deeply concerned in the avoiding all (even the slightest) appearances of giving, either by ourselves or by those intimately connected with us in alliance and friendship, any trouble, embarrassment, or increased difficulty to those who, at a crisis so very arduous, are to undertake a task from which the strongest nerves might shrink.

“I do not look without some gloomy apprehensions to the result of all this. But I have the satisfaction of thinking that I have seen and still see my own line clearly before me, and that, following that line, it is my duty to submit the event to Providence. To have done otherwise would have been to do evil that good might come of it.” *Copy.*

#### The EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, February 8. Berlin.—“The arrival of Mr. Shairp gives me the opportunity of adding a few words to what I said yesterday. Since I closed and sent off my dispatch, I have some reason to suspect that my conjecture as to the near approach of an open rupture with this country is premature. I received intimation from a very good source that Russia is not inclined to favour the Prussian views of aggrandizement. I also found the Danish *Chargé d’Affaires* much more coaxing and communicative than usual; very desirous of establishing a distinction between the case of Russia, as with respect to us, and that of Sweden and Denmark; and very full of hopes that the latter might be able to give us full satisfaction as to the innocence of the engagements she had taken before we should have proceeded to the last extremities. I understand also that this Court are most anxious to have us fairly embroiled with Russia upon the affair of Malta, and the embargo, so that, in conjunction with the other Powers, it may enter into explanations with us that may prevent the rupture into which Russia would precipitate them all. I learned, at the same time, that it was evidently embarrassed at this moment by something untoward in the state of its own particular politics with Russia. To-day I am assured that Count Keller has warned them that a reconciliation between Russia and Austria is in forwardness, and Mr. *Hudelst’s* conversation with Haugwitz yesterday, of which he gave me an account this morning, confirmed beyond a doubt that something has awakened again a great degree jealousy of the probable renewal of a concert between Austria and Russia. I do not make this the subject of a dispatch at present, because I trust that, in two or three days, I may speak with more certainty, and, I hope, more satisfactorily. I am to see Haugwitz on Tuesday or Wednesday, and I must observe, by the by, that his tone with me is on a sudden totally changed, and become very gracious and inviting.

“I have thought it, on reflection, most prudent not to precipitate

my march, and I hope it will turn to advantage. I do not see that anything can have been lost by it. I shall endeavour to make what I have to say about the Elbe appear the effect of a disposition to favour Prussia, not to court her.

“I am sorry not to have been aware of the article in the convention of the 14th July, 1793, with Prussia, concerning neutral commerce, or of the use to be made of the convention between Denmark and Sweden of 1794. I shall immediately endeavour to supply the deficiency in these respects of the measures I have already taken.

“I cannot conclude without expressing my uneasiness in a situation for which I am conscious I am not at all fit at a crisis of such moment and difficulty. The want of habit in business, which at my time of life it is not easy to acquire, makes me liable to perpetual omissions; and, though I have hitherto received nothing but encouragement from you, I tremble at every step.”

#### LORD WHITWORTH TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, February 9. Queen Street.—“You will, I hope, pardon me if at a moment like this I venture to call your attention to my individual. It is to you and to your friends that I owe every thing, and it is to you and to your friends that I am and ever shall be proud to think that I belong. You would make me as happy as I can be under the present circumstances if it can be so managed that I may be indebted to your Lordship for any arrangement in my favour; and I hope you will not think me unreasonable if I express a hope that as much as has been done for others, and particularly for Lord Henley, who stands in the same predicament with myself, may now be done for me. I feel confident of your Lordship’s support and protection upon this occasion, and I have the presumption to think that such a mark of favour would not be censured by any set of men.”

#### WILLIAM WICKHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private and most Confidential.*

1801, February 9. Vienna.—“I have not only abstained from writing on political subjects any way connected with this Court since my last of the 21st ultimo, but I have studiously avoided seeing any persons, or holding conversation with any body who might be supposed to know what was going on, so that for this time at least I am really in the dark. This sort of situation is however not pleasant to me, and is productive of no good, not even of that which it is intended to produce. But my respect for Lord Minto is such, my wish to do nothing that would give him offence or jealousy so great, whilst our opinions of men and things are wide as the poles asunder; that I am determined to persist in it; the more so as I find that talking to his lordship about M. de Thugut is exactly as hopeless as talking to *another person* used to be about M. de Puisaye. All the answer you can get is, M. de Thugut thinks or says *so and so*. It is in vain to say M. de Thugut thought *so and so*, and said *so and so*, on occasions when his thinking and talking precisely in the same manner brought about some great

calamity. The whole is like reasoning with the waves and the winds. It is not even writing on the sand, for it is not possible to make even a momentary impression. And yet, at this moment, I have no hesitation in saying that the Baron is taking the very steps that tend most directly to ruin himself, to ruin the country, and, above all, to keep up the fatal *prejudice* existing against the English in the public and the army, the only instrument in the hands of the enemy of which I am really afraid, and which, in a given time, one might not safely engage to break.

“There was one broad fair line which he might have taken, with honour and credit to himself, and *advantage to his country*. I am as certain as one ever dares to be of any human thing that the Arch-Duke wished to keep him, but His Royal Highness was not at that moment in a situation to owe him any obligation whatever, much less to sacrifice his principles and his way of seeing things to those of the Minister. It seems therefore to me that the Minister, if he had been guided by a spirit of true patriotism, and had been convinced at the same time that his own services were necessary to the salvation of the country, as well as those of the Arch-Duke, had no other line to pursue but, after protesting against His Royal Highness’s principles, to declare his intention to direct the political counsels of the country according to those principles, to the very best of his ability and with perfect good faith. In the course of only one month’s practice of a conduct of this kind, I am persuaded that the Baron would have been as much the master of the Arch-Duke’s counsels as he ever has been of those of the Emperor. If he found himself unequal to the acting such a part, he should have retired like a man, and left the others to follow their own counsels, until they should think proper to call him back, when he might have returned with honour, credit, and, of course, increased influence. Instead of this he now keeps hanging about the throne, whispering in the ear of the Emperor suggestions which are known to come from him, but which he himself now (as always) lays upon England, suggestions which he knows to be perfectly useless as to preventing the evil he would correct, or bring about the good he aims at, but which clog and embarrass his antagonists on their march (the only good or pleasure he can derive from his present measures) and render the Emperor unhappy and discontented, sometimes with one set, sometimes with the other. I need not say that the consequence of all this, as far as we are concerned, is an increased field for French intrigue to sow and reap in, and a tendency in the opposite party to throw themselves into a French connection from a principle of spite, revenge, and the spirit of party and faction, which always, under similar circumstances, would take a similar direction.

“In my humble opinion the line we have to follow here is a plain and straight one, circumstances seeming to require a conduct as nearly passive as possible. Believe me there exist no means whatever of forcing this country again into war for *some time* to come, with any advantage either to ourselves or to Austria. Why then should we not act in the full spirit of the King’s last admirable letter to the Emperor, and consider this peace *openly* as a measure

dictated by *necessity*, and desirable for ourselves as well as for our ally; though the *necessity* which has so dictated is certainly a great and heavy calamity upon both the one and the other.

“What is it to us whether Austria gains a little more or a little less on the Adige, whether she keeps Tuscany or no *for the moment*. It is admitted that the enemy is master of the conditions of peace; that he has all the ports of Italy in the Adriatic, as well as those on the side of the Mediterranean, at his disposal; that Naples is at his mercy; and, whether the principle be right or wrong, that *all this* must be submitted to. No one feels more strongly than I do that *all this* was worth fighting for; but it has been fought for, and we have been defeated. We have nothing therefore to do but to put up quietly with the loss, and to dream night and day on the means of repairing it. I trust however that we shall not be foolish enough to *talk in our sleep*; for, if we do, there will not be wanting waking ears to hear us. The interval must be employed on close observation of the follies and extravagancies of our enemies, of which, rely upon it, they will be abundantly guilty; in turning all their faults to our own advantage, in gaining friends, purchasing golden opinions, and, above all, in shewing by our conduct, our language, and our counsels that we have a deep and evident interest in the real welfare, prosperity, and aggrandizement of Austria. The rest must be left to time. Grant me only the fact that the enemy is master of the conditions of peace, and I pray for nothing so devoutly as that he may be insolent and rigorous in the extreme, as most fortunately for us he turns out to be. Give the House of Austria Salzburg and Passau on this occasion, and France shall have the three Legations (and ten such if they existed) at her disposal. A concentrated territory, a short interval of repose with the memory of defeat *which, to save the national honour, may be attributed to the injudicious counsels of an unpopular Minister*, and of insult and oppression on the part of the enemy, and of rich and fertile provinces which have been torn away from the hereditary possessions in a moment of weakness, for which the nation and the nobility do not *consider* themselves responsible, however they may really be so; I ask no more, and am happy to obtain so much. If, in the course of a very few years, you do not see Austria spring up again with a degree of elasticity that will astonish the world, never put faith in me more.

“I ask pardon for all this extravagance, as indeed I ought to do; but if my nonsense has sense for its foundation, I think I may trust it to your lordship without a fear of being misunderstood or underrated.

“The army is rising like a phoenix out of its ashes, and this wonder is effected without a soul in the town of Vienna having a suspicion of what is doing. I live in admiration of all that is going forward in the north. I consider our own situation, as I ought, with reverence, but without fear or doubt, and I never had better hopes of the result of the contest since the war began.

“I think we shall embark nearly all our Swiss, providing the Austrians do not raise obstacles. For the *Condéans*, it is over with them. They are all gone mad in a body.”

## COUNT WORONZOW TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, February 10. Southampton.—“Ce n'est que ce matin que j'ai vue par les papiers d'hier, arrivés dans ce moment de Londres, que vous avez résigné votre office. C'est là que j'ai appris aussi la cause honorable de cette résignation, et que Lord Spencer, Monsieur Pitt, et Monsieur Dundas ont fait la même chose. Le motif de la démarche et la compagnie dans laquelle elle s'est faite est digne de vous, aussi je vous en félicite personnellement : mais quoique je suis persuadé que vous retourneriez tout avec la même gloire, avec laquelle vous êtes sorti, j'aime trop ce pays, auquel je serai attaché tant que je vis, pour n'être pas affligé et allarmé des suites funestes qui produira cet *interim*, pendant l'absence de la crème non seulement du ministère, mais de tout le pays. Je crains pour l'Irlande ; je crains pour la Grande Bretagne ; et je crains qu'au découragement que cela produira dans le pays, ne se joigne l'encouragement des ennemis internes et externes qui profiteront de la retraite de ceux qui ont conduit les affaires avec tant de vigueur, vigueur d'autant plus nécessaire que la crise des affaires générales ne fait qu'augmenter, ce qui exige impérieusement une énergie redoublée. La moindre faiblesse, la moindre petit pas fait en arrière du chemin qu'on a suivi jusqu'à présent, exposerait la gloire et les intérêts essentiels de la Grande Bretagne.

“Je vous prie d'exprimer ces sentiments à Monsieur Pitt.”

## THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, February 10. [Pall Mall].—“I should not have chosen the House of Lords for *conversing* on money with you ; my reason therefore for mentioning to you in that House, *with a little reproach*, the inexpressible pleasure which I requested you to allow to me in supplying your wants, arose from the determination of never allowing you to speak to me upon it. And for the same reasons I must insist that you do not converse with Bernard upon it, for I should indeed lose the gratification I so truly feel, if it could be possible for me to hear of such a proposition as that of interest, or of *principal*. Eastbury has given me the means of offering myself to you in such a moment, and I leave you to judge whether any other destination of this money can give me equal pleasure. The only request I mean to build upon this is, that which I earnestly make to you, of not throwing yourself so entirely out of London as I understood from Tom you had thoughts of doing ; and that the whole of this transaction may remain secret.

“And may your head ever lie on your pillow, as proudly and as contentedly as it will this night, with the satisfactory reflection of having sacrificed every thing to your sense of conscientious duty.”

## LORD GRENVILLE TO COUNT WORONZOW.

1801, February 11. Cleveland Row.—“J'allois vous écrire quand j'ai reçu votre lettre. Elle m'est bien précieuse comme un nouveau témoignage de cette amitié à laquelle j'attache avec raison tant de prix.

“ J'étois bien persuadé que vous ne seriez pas indifférent à ce que se passe dans ce moment, et je ne l'étois pas moins que les motifs de notre conduite mériteroient votre approbation. Je ne me dissimule pas l'effet plus ou moins dangereux pour la chose publique qui pourra en résulter, et je ne veux pas me donner la misérable affectation de vous cacher l'inquiétude que j'en éprouve. Si la chose auroit été possible, j'aurois tout fait (excepté de compromettre mes principes et mon honneur) pour ne pas quitter le service du Roi dans un moment de crise et de danger. Mais nous avons tous senti qu'il n'y avoit pas d'autre choix pour des ministres qui voient dans une grande mesure le salut de leur pays, et auxquels il n'est pas permis de proposer cette mesure au Parlement et au public.

“ Le Roi nomme ses ministres parmi les amis et les supporteurs de notre administration. J'espère que les principes resteront toujours ; personne n'est plus convaincu que moi qu'il n'y a que la fermeté qui puisse nous sauver ; et parmi tous les dangers qui nous menacent, je ne crains que le découragement et le désespoir. Dieu nous en préserve ! Car ce sont là les racines du mal partout ailleurs.

“ À Vienne on se conduit comme si l'ennemi étoit déjà maître de la capitale—ou plutôt comme on ne devoit pas se conduire même dans ce cas ; chez vous le mal s'empire, et Kalitcheff, que l'on a fait venir en poste de Dresde pour être Vice-Chancelier, est déjà réparti pour aller jouer le rôle d'ambassadeur à Paris. Louis XVIII. a été chassé au milieu d'hiver, avec des formes que les honnêtes gens n'emploieroient pas vis-à-vis d'un laquais que l'on chasse de sa maison.

“ Tout ceci est bien fait pour ôter à tout homme d'honneur l'envie de se trouver mêlé dans les affaires publiques. Je me trouverai fort heureux d'en être sorti, si ma patrie échappe à la contagion de ces maux ; mais si nous fléchissons, je ne pourrai jamais me croire étranger à la disgrâce et la honte de ce pays.

“ Conservez moi toujours votre estime et votre amitié. Combien je serois heureux si je pouvois me flatter de l'espérance de vous revoir un jour à Dropmore, et de vous en faire les honneurs en *country gentleman*.” *Copy.*

#### COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, February 11.—“ Je suis trop affligé de tout ce que j'apprends pour ne pas parler de mes peines à un ami que j'aime plus que je ne puis l'exprimer, et que je révère, admire, et respecte comme le doivent tous ceux qui ont été comme moi à portée de le suivre, le juger, et l'apprécier. Est-il possible que vous quittiez le ministère. Je regarde en vérité cette nouvelle comme un si grand malheur pour la cause et pour moi, que je ne veux pas y ajouter foi à moins que vous ne me prononciez vous-même ma sentence. Il ne m'appartient pas de scruter les motifs qui vous ont déterminé à une mesure aussi cruelle ; mais je connois assez l'état des choses, et les intérêts de ma patrie adoptive, pour être certain que la retraite des deux grands ministres dont l'administration fera époque dans l'histoire du

monde, est ce qui peut arriver de plus malheureux pour l'Europe dans la circonstance. Vous avez éprouvé trop souvent ma franchise pour ne pas savoir que je ne flagorne, jamais ; ainsi vous me croirez sincère quand j'aurai l'honneur de vous dire que je régarde cet événement comme le coup de grâce donné à la bonne cause. Quelque soit le talent de vos successeurs, et de quelque peu de durée que puisse être votre absence des grandes affaires, le mal est irréparable. Je suis triste et triste et très triste ; vous seul pouvez me consoler par ces deux mots, *je reste*. *Then* (comme dit Macbeth) *I am a man again*. Que de malheurs je prévois ! *I feel now the future in the instant* (Macbeth).

“ Quoiqu'il en soit, daignez souvenir que vous m'avez promis une amitié constante, et Lord Grenville ne pourra pas se débarasser aussi promptement et aisément de cette obligation sacrée que le secrétaire d'état de son portefeuille. Agréez l'assurance des sentimens à toute épreuve que je vous ai voué à jamais, et le renouvellement de mes regrets les plus douloureux.”

#### LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT STARHEMBERG.

1801, February 11. Cleveland Row.—“ Rien ne peut être plus aimable que les assurances que vous me donnez de la continuation de votre amitié, quand nos rapports officiels auront cessé. En cédant au motif d'un devoir indispensable, et en me conformant aux principes constitutionnels du pays que j'ai été appelé à administrer conjointement avec mes collègues, je n'en suis pas moins jaloux de conserver l'estime et l'approbation de ceux dont je connois la droiture et la probité.

“ Vous retrouverez (je l'espère) dans mon successeur les dispositions que j'ai toujours eu pour le maintien de la plus stricte alliance entre nos deux pays : et vous me conserverez, j'ose le croire, dans toutes les circonstances cette amitié que je mérite par la sincérité de mon attachement pour vous.

“ Je serois bien aise de vous voir un de ces matins, et de vous répéter de vive voix que vous n'aurez jamais d'ami plus sincère que le *particulier* qui vous écrit ces lignes.” *Copy*.

#### LORD GRENVILLE to LORD HAWKESBURY.

1801, February 11. Cleveland Row.—“ Hammond delivered to me your very obliging message, for which I beg you to accept my best thanks. There is nobody to whom I should with more pleasure give up the very difficult and arduous situation which I have held than to yourself. You will find it surrounded with embarrassments in the present moment, from that despicable weakness which drives the powers of the Continent, from motives of fear alone, into the arms of France. My unchangeable opinion is that firmness will, and that firmness alone can, extricate the country from the difficulties which the successes of France upon the Continent have brought upon us. Excuse my taking the liberty of troubling you with these few words of opinion on points which your judgment will so soon be called to decide.

“ There are several points of business which I am compelled to

leave undone, because the state in which they are will not admit of their being brought to a point in the course of the few days which remain. On these I should be desirous of furnishing you with all the information in my power ; and, in general, if ten years observation of those wretched things which are called governments on the Continent of Europe can have enabled me to give you any knowledge of them beyond what you already possess, it is most completely at your service ; as well as every other means in my power to enable you to discharge the task you have undertaken, with honour to yourself and advantage to the public.

“ I take it for granted you will not wait for the formality of an actual appointment to call for such parts of the correspondence as you think likely to be interesting or useful to you. That with Prussia I would particularly recommend to your early attention, because *there* is, for the moment, the seat of the principal negotiations we are carrying on.

“ Let me know whenever you wish to see me, and be assured I shall always be at your orders, not on the footing of an ex-minister, but on that of a sincere friend and cordial well-wisher.” *Copy.*

#### RUFUS KING to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1801, February 12. Great Cumberland Place.—“ It not being any longer doubtful that your Lordship, with your principal colleagues, has retired from office, I cannot refrain from expressing my sincere concern that a measure of so much consequence should have been found unavoidable, at a period still so momentous and critical. I am confident your Lordship will give credit to the motives which lead to the expression of my regrets upon this occasion. I have too clearly seen the danger to which the principles, which are the foundation of all social happiness, have been exposed not to have conceived the most favourable sentiments of the persons who have displayed so much firmness and perseverance in their defence. Much has been done, but the labour is unfinished ; and a change in the face of the adversary may prove as mischievous in politics as it sometimes has done in war. The preservation of the confidence and civil discipline of a free people requires an uninterrupted and steady administration ; and the duty of governing is never more arduous than when circumstances, such as at present exist, place the ill-disposed and the ignorant in the power of the unprincipled and the ambitious. These are considerations which must have been carefully weighed before the decision was adopted ; and it is only to be deplored that the occasion, which it is hoped did not relate to the principles of which Great Britain has shewn herself the champion, could not have been deferred to a future and more convenient day.

“ To these causes of public concern I must add what is peculiar to myself, the unexpected disappointment of my hope that I should have been able, had your Lordship remained in office, to effect a satisfactory settlement of those points of disagreement, the continuance of which can promise no possible advantage to either,

and may prove injurious to the more important interests of both of our countries.

“ If, as there is reason to believe, a change has taken place in the Executive of the United States, though the general course of our affairs may suffer no material alterations, the new President will not be likely to go farther upon the subjects we have lately discussed than his predecessor, to whose administration he is supposed to have been in opposition. I mention this observation merely to justify my solicitude upon a subject which I know to be important ; and which I now fear, by remaining unsettled, may become the occasion of still further misunderstandings between our respective countries. But I need your Lordship’s excuse for these reflections, so distinct from the real object of this letter, which is to express to your Lordship my unfeigned sorrow, in reference to the great interests which depend upon the issue of the contest, that your Lordship and colleagues should withdraw from office at a time when the firmness and vigour of experienced statesmen will, with difficulty, be able to save those invaluable rights, for the preservation of which, for others as well as for herself, Great Britain has so nobly contended.”

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO LORD MINTO.

1801, February 13th. Cleveland Row.—“ I was unable, much as I wished it, to write to you by Tuesday’s mail on the subject of the declaration which it became my duty to make that day in the House of Lords, respecting the speedy termination of my public services. Other intelligence will doubtless have apprized you of the grounds on which this determination on the part of Mr. Pitt, Lord Spencer, Lord Camden, Mr. Dundas, Mr. Windham and myself, became in our opinion absolutely indispensable. Report and speculation will perhaps also have conveyed to you other supposed motives for this resolution ; but I do not fear your thinking so meanly of any of us as to suppose us capable of assigning other reasons for our conduct, in so great and trying an occasion, than those by which, and by which alone, it was really actuated.

“ Though public situations can, in the present state of Europe, be matter of envy or desire to no considerate man, yet I should be sorry to be thought to have adopted this step without concern, or to be either insensible or indifferent to the consequences which may, more or less, follow upon it. But there was no alternative except that of taking this step, or of agreeing to the disguise or dereliction of one’s opinion on one of the most important questions in the whole range of our domestic policy.

“ You will have heard of the King’s determination to form on this occasion a new administration from among the friends and supporters of the present system. I most ardently wish that he may succeed, and certainly my best aid and support shall be given to those who undertake to carry on the Government on the same principles for which we have been so long struggling.

“ I should do great injustice to my own feelings if I closed our official correspondence without thanking you in the warmest terms

for the infinite assistance we have derived from your services at Vienna. That they were not more successful can in no respect be attributed to you, but to the fatality which has prevailed in the Austrian councils and arrangements.

“I beg you to be persuaded that in all situations I shall ever retain a lively sense of your conduct, and sincere desire to cultivate your good opinion and friendship.” *Copy.*

The EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, February 13. Berlin.—“My dispatch to-day and Haugwiz’s note leave me nothing to say upon public affairs. Nor can I see that I have anything to do but to wait your orders. If circumstances permit, I should like to take Dresden in my way home, as I shall never have another opportunity of seeing the gallery. I also believe it may be the best way for Elizabeth and the children to go from thence by Brunswick to Hamburg, as affording the best and most frequent bating places. She will be very unwilling to proceed before the weather grows mild, but, if we wait long, I believe we shall be obliged to come round by Constantinople. I must observe that there is a book lately published under the patronage of Government at Paris, called ‘*Etat de la France*,’ where the nature and extent to the scheme which, at the bidding of our inveterate enemy, these northern powers have undertaken for our destruction, are so clearly unfolded, that it could not fail to make a deep impression if published in English, and accompanied with a proper comment. It is a most elaborate and able performance, and the sophisms are so ingeniously woven together that they cannot well be exposed as they ought without answering the whole book. Gentz is now busily engaged about it, and is assisted by General Stamford.

“I think the performance of Haugwiz, which I send you to-night, is, for a display of ignorance, impudent lying, and gross insolence, without a parallel. On reading over Pitt’s speech and yours, I have hopes that you will not have disapproved of the substance of my notes. I rather wish I had made the last communication concerning Russia verbally, but I really thought that you had made a formal declaration of war in London. I think there is still some chance, though very small indeed, of your bringing back Paul, who, after all, is almost as much in his senses and much more honest than the King of Prussia.”

*Postscript.*—“I believe General Stamford will retreat to England, and I suspect Gentz may be obliged to do the same.

“I forgot to mention that I learn from General Stamford that the Hereditary Prince of Orange has been with him to say that all the best affected of the Dutch think that the game is up for his father, but that, if old Stadtholder should retire, they still think something might be done for the son. In the meantime the Hereditary Prince suspects that Prussia is making or has made arrangements with France for taking possession of that country. The Prince is much distressed by the news from Holland, and knows not how to mention it to his father. It must be own[ed] it is very natural that the Dutch should refuse to enlist under such a leader.

“ I am sorry to tell you that M. de la Palue is arrested at Paris.

“ Sir James Craufurd and the merchants at the northern ports are prepared for the worst.”

LORD GRENVILLE to RUFUS KING.

1801, February 13. Cleveland Row.—“ I am extremely sensible to the kindness of your letter, and I beg you to be assured that, in the moment of quitting the public station which I have so long occupied, few things can be more gratifying to me than the hope of preserving the esteem of those for whom I entertain sincere and merited regard and attachment.

“ It would be a foolish affectation in me to disguise the concern I feel in being under the necessity (according to the public principle on which I have ever acted) of quitting the public service in a moment like the present, when the storm appears to augment; and, yet, when I am persuaded that perseverance in our former course will soon bring us into port. But there are duties which an honest man feels too sacred to be trifled with, or compromised; and if I have ever been able to render any service, it has been by openness and plain dealing, qualities utterly inconsistent with the disguise or dereliction of one’s opinions on great public questions.

“ I do not agree with you in the effect which this event is likely to produce as to the great questions which are still afloat in the world. Sudden impressions of alarm are easily received in such a country as this, where they are propagated by newspapers and debates. But they are as easily effaced; and it would be to know very little of the present composition of the two Houses of Parliament to believe with the vulgar in the present moment, that there will be any want of great abilities to be called forth by great occasions.

“ Be assured that in all situations, I shall always be anxious to deserve and to retain your esteem and friendship.” *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to WILLIAM WICKHAM.

1801, February 13. Cleveland Row.—“ You will have learnt from an hundred quarters that the present Government is at an end, and that our future intercourse can be only that of private friendship, such as I shall ever retain for you, and as I trust to find reciprocal on your part. The causes and grounds of this event you will learn from all the papers. The consequences are in the hand of God, *caliginosâ nocte premit Deus*. My best services as a private man are due, and will be given to the King’s government, while it is carried on upon the principles on which we have acted.

“ It would only tire you to repeat the assurances of the sense I entertain of your merits and services. I trust they will not be unrewarded.” *Copy.*

LORD MINTO to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1801, February 15. Vienna.—“ I have had the honour of receiving your Lordship’s private letter of the 30th January, and I beg you

to accept my best thanks both for the explicit decision which it contains and for the friendly sentiments with which it is accompanied. Your Lordship will have seen in my former letters on this subject that I have no choice left, even if I were disposed to deliberate ; and I am therefore to acquaint your Lordship that I am ready to resign my situation as soon as a successor arrives, and I beg leave to express a wish that I may be relieved as early as possible.

“ I felt, with your Lordship, that a doubt might naturally exist concerning the propriety of leaving this Court any time without a minister on the spot, even after the peace. My request was only conditional ; that is to say, on the supposition that it might be found convenient to comply with it ; and I hope you will do me the justice to believe that, when the time came, I should not have proposed to return on a leave of absence in circumstances which would have made such an indulgence disadvantageous to the public service ; but that I should have merely desired to resign. I am sensible, however, that by this means some additional expense might have been incurred even by this short prolongation of my mission, and on that account I fully acquiesce in the propriety of your Lordship’s decision. I must, at the same time, add that, since the date of my letter, all that has happened on the Continent concurs to satisfy me that this Court cannot with propriety be left without a minister from England, even for a short time ; and, as things stand at this moment, I should myself have begged your Lordship to send my successor without further delay. For, since the turn which events have taken, I have never wished for any other option than that of a leave of absence, or a simple resignation. The cause which attracted me to this service no longer exists. The system which I came to support is reversed, and those with whom I have acted have fallen with it, and have made way for other men and for other views entirely opposite to those that went before. In these circumstances I cannot wish for my own comfort to learn this new lesson, and, in truth, any merit I may claim in my past exertions, and the very means I employed for success in the former period, are now converted, perhaps, into disqualifications for the period that is to come. This is undoubtedly the natural termination of my mission ; it is one to which I always looked as such ; and it has become no less proper, perhaps, in a public than in a private light. I leave the judgment that may be formed of my services in this mission with entire confidence to His Majesty’s justice and your Lordship’s candour, not to say friendship. I shall for my own part ever retain the comfort of feeling that I have done my utmost. This is a consolation entirely independent of success ; but if any thing could be deemed a gratification under a total failure of the ultimate object, it would be the reflexion that, in every thing that has depended on me, I have had the fortune to be uniformly successful in all that could lead to an opposite result from that which has happened. I shall detain your Lordship no longer than to express my full confidence that, in one shape or other, my unavoidable loss in this mission will be indemnified to the end ; and I hope your Lordship will allow me to add the assurance of the

comfort with which I have acted under your direction, and in grateful sense I shall ever retain of your indulgence and friendship throughout. I trust you will permit this period of official connexion to become an earnest of a more permanent attachment; and I can safely assure your Lordship that nothing can be more gratifying to me through the remainder of my life than a permission to class myself amongst your friends."

W. WINDHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, February 15. Park St., Westminster.—“I do not know whether I expressed with sufficient clearness, yesterday, the state of my opinion on the two points which made the principal subjects of our discussion.

“I would forego all the advantages that may be hoped from establishing again a good understanding with Russia, sooner than engage in a negotiation so framed as that it must, in the end, necessarily lead to the surrender of Malta, whenever the French shall be expelled from Egypt, and the maritime rights of this country be secured. And, in the case of Denmark, I would acquiesce, if better could not be had, in a positive treaty, formed of course with all the precision and solemnity that words could give it, for securing to our fleet a free egress out of the Baltic, without exacting from the Danes, if they much resisted it, the condition of disarming.”

SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, February 16. Piccadilly.—“I have been this day, according to appointment, with Mr. Hammond at your Lordship's Office, and who showed me a copy of the letter your Lordship sent to the Treasury, and where I only find a nominal pension of £2,000 at my retreat. Your Lordship must remember that, although I had His Majesty's gracious assurance that I should not be removed from my post unless at my own desire, I wrote some years ago that, if your Lordship wished to send anyone to Naples in my room, I should be satisfied with a net income of £2,000, but not with a nominal pension one to that amount. Having been removed from Naples without my consent, or having had the smallest intimation of it from your Lordship until the moment Mr. Paget arrived at Palermo, I took it for granted that your Lordship had secured for me the net income I requested at my retreat after such long services.

“In the paper I left with Mr. Hammond sometime ago, the whole statement of my loss and heavy expenses brought upon me by the revolution of Naples was exactly laid down; and that, during the last eighteen months at Palermo, I had been obliged to draw for no less a sum than £13,222; and that, unless I was assisted by Government with the sum of £8,000 to cover a debt that still remained unfunded after having sold the diamonds I had in presents from His Sicilian Majesty, I should remain in distress to the end of my life.

“Without entering further into my melancholy story, I entreat of your Lordship to let me have the same retreat that was given

to Sir Robert Keith, and which, by the enclosed, your Lordship will see was £2,250 ; and that His Majesty will grant me the £8,000 which lies heavy on me, and was really expended in what I thought indispensable in keeping up the character of His Majesty's minister at Palermo, and where I kept open house for the King's fleet for a year and a half. I really think that, having passed my whole life in the service of my King and country, I do not ask more than what is common justice. I rely upon your Lordship's goodness to recommend the above to the King our kind and royal master, who, I flatter myself, knows enough of my character to be sure that what I venture to represent is exactly true."

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF CARYSFORT.

*Private.*

1801, February 17. Cleveland Row.—“As this is probably the last messenger I shall have occasion to dispatch to you, I am unwilling to let him go without a few lines of private letter, though there is nothing for me to add on the subject of my dispatches.

“The new Government, contrary to the prognostics of many, is formed ; and, though the materials are not in every instance exactly such as might be wished, I have very little doubt that they will establish themselves in Parliament and in the country. My resolution is decidedly taken, upon a sense of what I think an indispensable duty, to give them every support in my power ; not a cold indifferent non-resistance, but active, eager, and zealous support ; for such I think they are entitled to at the hands of all who have a just sense of the interests of this country and of Europe.

“I have not the pleasure of seeing all my friends and connections share this opinion ; but I have no doubt of the soundness of the principle on which I act, and nothing will shake it.

“I very much wish that you may persuade yourself to remain at Berlin as long as there remains a British minister there ; which, if I were to augur from some circumstances that have come to my knowledge, will not be long.

“Upon a sort of overture from the Prince of Hesse, we are sending Mr. Vansittart to Copenhagen on a secret mission to see if they will (as they seem to hold out to us) abandon at once their League and all its principles. But I am convinced our fleet will be our best negociator there, and I trust it will not be long before its arguments are heard.” *Copy.*

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, February 18. Berlin.—“I trust you will not disapprove what I have acquainted you with in my dispatch of to-day. Paul is so vigilant to prevent naval stores getting out to England, that much more caution is necessary for them than in the case of corn.

“You must know everything relating to the trade upon much better information than I can procure here. I should fear, if I was to give credit to what is told me, that the shutting up the Elbe and Weser, which I fear we cannot prevent, will be a severe blow to England. As to the produce of this country and Russia, as much

of it as we have a real occasion for will, I doubt not, find its way to us. The passage of the Sound is here thought to be effectually shut against us, unless we can make ourselves masters of the Island of Zealand.

“What I am told is that, if we can avoid a rupture with this country till the middle of next month, every article which is intended for England will have sailed.

“I am just now told that Krudener is to go to Paris, Kalitcheff’s mission being special and temporary.

“There is a poor man at Stettin called Lentze, who has a nomination of British Consul. I will send you by next post the papers of his case, and you will judge for yourself whether it is fit you should do anything for him. Mr. Garlike tells me he was employed here by Lord Elgin, and this office was meant as a reward and compensation for a post he gave up to attend to the business in which he was engaged by Lord Elgin. It produces, however, nothing, and the poor wretch is, as I find by concurrent accounts, in a state of most deplorable and disgraceful poverty.”

*Postscript.*—“It is very singular that the important favour you granted for the Prussian ship to go to America and bring back 4,000,000 of *piastres forts* should not have been made use of, and that Hoym, whose province was so materially interested in it, should be ignorant of it. Many people here affect to believe that the King has not seen Haugwiz’s answer, and has no mistrust of the style of it, but thinks it such as will be satisfactory to England as well as to the other Powers. I mention this, not as being important, but only to show that this hostile tone is unexpected, and what is the general notion of the inattention of the King of Prussia. His Majesty, by the way, seems at present wholly engaged, and so as to occasion much talk, with the charms of the Grand Duchess Princess of Mecklenburgh Swerin, who prolongs her stay till the 17th of next month.”

WILLIAM WICKHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private and Confidential.*

1801, February 18. Vienna.—“Some indirect hints having reached me that I had been considered as not an unfit person for the important situation of Governor of the Island of Malta, I lose no time in mentioning this circumstance to your lordship, though I am yet very uncertain whether I ought to pay any attention to them or no.

“All that I yet know is that Flint was desired by Huskisson to write and ask me whether such a place would meet my own views and wishes.

“If there be nothing in this but idle talk, your lordship will have the goodness to take no notice of my having mentioned the subject. If there has been anything more serious in it, I still feel naturally anxious that your lordship should know my real opinion, before there be any question of making a nomination.

“If it be the intention of Government to make of this place, what I think it well deserves, a really high situation, such as would

enable the person to whom it was entrusted to do his duty in it in peace or war, in prosperity and adversity, for both are I think to be looked to; in one word, if it be meant that the Governor should really have power and confidence with the appointments necessary to enable him to fill the place with dignity, I know no one situation I should like half so much, nor one in which I think that my humble talents could be exerted with half so much advantage in the public service.

“I am so penetrated with the idea that this is the corner stone of the whole building, the point on which all our success in the East as well as the West must ultimately more or less depend, that my whole attention is turned night and day to the subject; and I feel a sort of confidence in myself that I could gain honour and reputation to my country, with many more solid advantages perhaps not yet estimated at their full price, or considered as impracticable.

“Having said so much I need not add that this is no more than the expression of my wishes and of my opinion to which your Lordship is so fully entitled.

“I am not the less at your lordship’s command; nor would I ever accept anything from any quarter without your lordship’s full and entire consent, and the certainty that your lordship wished the thing as much as those who offered it to me; and this will be the answer that I shall give, should ever the question come to me in a regular shape.

“I say this not knowing to what I am destined here or elsewhere, and anxious only to continue to bear my share in the great and honourable warfare in which we are engaged, in some manner or other that may shew that my past labours have not been neglected, and that I have not failed in my endeavours to deserve the good opinion and confidence of those who have employed me.”

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON.

1801, February 19. Cleveland Row.—“The allowance which I thought it my duty, previous to my quitting my office, to recommend to His Majesty to grant to you considerably exceeds the usual proportion of salary retained by foreign ministers on their retreat. I thought the difference due to the length of your services, but the case of Sir R. Keith can afford no precedent, his salary having been larger than yours. In the letter written to the Treasury on this subject, an express reserve is made for such consideration as His Majesty may be pleased to give to the peculiar circumstances of your leaving Naples, and of your residence at Palermo, and to the extraordinary expenses to which you were thereby subjected.”  
*Copy.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO WILLIAM WICKHAM.

1801, February 19. Cleveland Row.—“You will receive this by the same mail which will bring you the official account of the appointment of my successor. As this letter will go by the ordinary post, I do not enter into any further particulars of what is passing here; but I cannot close my correspondence without once more

thanking you from the bottom of my heart for all the assistance I have derived from your exertions. If I had felt quite sure of the mode of recompense which you would have preferred, I would not have quitted my station without discharging this debt of gratitude in some way more solid than that of words. I have however spoken to my successor in the strongest terms possible ; and have obtained from him such promises as I feel I can rely on to acquit my own conscience towards you." *Copy.*

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, February 21. Berlin.—“ We remain with very little doubt that I shall, with the return of the messenger, receive orders to go from hence. I am sorry that the weather has prevented your receiving the first intimation of the probable contents of the Prussian answer, before the answer itself.

“ I must own I see no way left for Prussia to retreat. The report is circulated to-day of the capture of Heligoland, and, if this Cabinet acts with consistency, I shall, as soon as it is authenticated, be ordered to depart.

“ The conclusion of peace between Austria and France, and the establishment of a basis for the peace of the Empire in which Prussia has not been consulted, is this day confirmed. The account sent to me by Mr. Elliott mentions nothing as to the conditions. I cannot hope that they are otherwise than disadvantageous in the extreme.

“ Against the northern Courts I hope you will act with vigour. I am confident it will rather advance than retard a reconciliation with the Emperor.

“ I mentioned that Krudener had waylaid Kalicheff. The report is that, at the arrival of the former at Leipsic, Kalicheff excused himself from seeing him on account of illness. That, on a second application for an interview, the answer was that fresh advices from Paris made it necessary for Kalicheff to proceed on his journey without loss of time, and that he actually left the place without seeing Krudener.”

*Postscript.*—“ The northern German neutrality will die a natural death at the conclusion of the peace. But, after having received the answer I have sent you, I cannot doubt but that you will approve my saying nothing on that subject to Haugwitz. After the many applications I have made for audience on that subject, and the Ems, his silence and his continuing to avoid me are proof of an hostile disposition, though the conversation with the Prince of Orange may indicate some stings of conscience.”

LORD MINTO TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1801, February 25. Vienna.—“ I received yesterday from Lord Carysfort a copy of M. de Haugwitz's note of the 12th instant, which seems to leave little hope of avoiding a rupture with Prussia. One consequence of such a rupture seems likely to be an interruption of the established communications with England by Cuxhaven and

Bremerlehe. I should feel embarrassed indeed in the present moment to hazard the transmission of confidential despatches by English messengers, and until I am otherwise advised, I shall be inclined to avail myself of messengers dispatched by some friendly court, as I account those of Vienna and Naples to be. If it is found necessary to establish some more secret mode of correspondence, I shall endeavour to form some arrangement for that purpose, expecting, however, your Lordship's instructions on the subject. One of the grand objects proposed by the enemy being to cut us off entirely from the Continent, both in point of trade and correspondence, it is become peculiarly interesting to preserve the neutrality, at least of Austria. I fear that of Naples will be saved with difficulty, and if we should be excluded from their ports, those of the Emperor in the Adriatick will alone remain. This circumstance, no doubt, gives to the Emperor a solid interest in the preservation of his neutrality, and opens to him a prospect of great advantage both in trade and revenue. I do not neglect these topics, and I should have reason to be satisfied with the general tenor of the language held to me by the Emperor's ministers, if much reliance could be placed on general professions, or on the expression of general sentiments, at a time when it is established as a maxim of government that the Emperor can consult his own interest and his own opinion in nothing; and can refuse nothing, of any description or value, to the demand or the slightest nod of the enemy. I confess that, on the best view I can take of the present state of affairs and of the men who direct the measures of Austria, I am not without serious apprehension that the Emperor will fall under a total dependence on France, dignified by the handsome names of alliance and system; and that he will become the instrument of any projects dictated from Paris. The first of these may be expected to be the maritime conspiracy; and the favourite plan of Bonaparte for our total exclusion from the continent of Europe. I am again and again assured that no propositions of that tendency have hitherto been opened in any part of the negotiation with France, or in any form whatever. But while the French armies occupy the Austrian territory and even still hang over the capital, and while the French government retain the consciousness of their power to command at Vienna, there seems nothing to trust to on this question but the improbable or rather impossible chance of Bonaparte's forgetting the Adriatick and not hitting this obvious blot. In this view Count Cobenzl's journey to Paris may be considered as unfortunate, since it affords the opportunity of grafting these new pretensions on the treaty, and forcing the compliance of Austria while she still continues under actual duress. I do not know that these uncomfortable reflexions can lead to any useful conclusion; but they may serve at least to satisfy your Lordship that I have a strong sense of the importance of these objects, and that I shall omit no means of rendering service which the present circumstances admit of.

"One of Lord Elgin's messengers, who was despatched lately from Vienna, returned yesterday from the frontiers of Wallachia without any despatches from Constantinople, the communication with Bucharest having been interrupted for some time by the snow.

“ I would take the liberty of suggesting to your Lordship that, when any intelligence of importance is sent from England to Constantinople, to India, or Egypt, there might be a convenience in its being communicated to me, as I am otherwise liable, on learning it from other quarters some time afterwards, to despatch the same intelligence by a variety of different routes at a great expense to Government.”

LORD HAWKESBURY to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1801, February 26.—“ I send you a note I received on Monday from the Danish minister, and the answer which it is proposed to return to it through Sir Hyde Parker. In case it should be necessary to have recourse to hostilities, it is intended as a kind of manifesto. I should be particularly obliged to you if you would criticise it without mercy, and make any alterations in it you may think proper.”

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, February 27. Downing Street.—“ I am happy to tell you that the accounts to the last moment at which we can have them this evening are very favourable. And there is much more ground of confident hope than any one yet chooses to avow, for fear of aggravating disappointment, if (as yet may be) it should arise. Nicholl gave notice yesterday of some motion on the subject to-day, which led only to Sheridan’s moving (before the motion was made) to adjourn in order to avoid discussion. I came in while Sheridan was speaking, in time to second his motion, and to say what I thought most useful at such a moment. The result was that the motion was waived, and that we are left completely to judge when the subject is to be again named ; and the impression in the House seemed all that could be wished.

“ Happily it becomes of much less consequence to say or think what, under other circumstances, would be done in other quarters ; but as we are used to look at the worst as well as the best, it is not immaterial to say that I have had another interview at Carlton House, and learnt much about it, and I think every thing there looks well.”

SIR JAMES CRAUFORD to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, February 27. Hamburgh.—“ It was with infinite concern that I learned by the last post the secession of a set of gentlemen from His Majesty’s councils to whom the country and all Europe is under the highest obligation. Most particularly has it filled me with regret that your Lordship should have quitted the most important Department over which you presided, at a moment when the foreign relations of the country require more than ever the direction of a great, wise, and enlightened Minister ; an event which I am convinced will be sincerely lamented by every friend to the British interests, and to that system which we have so gloriously upheld in every quarter of the globe. I trust however

that the causes, whatever they may be, which have occasioned this unfortunate event, will not be very durable in their operation, and that no very great period of time will bring back to your stations your Lordship and the worthy characters by whom you are accompanied in your retreat.

“As to what regards myself personally, my regret is unquestionably infinitely heightened by the recollection of what I and my family owe to your Lordship, which nothing certainly can ever efface from our remembrance. I beg leave to assure your Lordship of our most sincere gratitude, of our unalterable attachment, if I may be allowed to use that phrase.”

#### The EARL OF CARYSFORT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, February 28. Berlin.—“How deeply I am afflicted with the calamitous news which, after so long an interval of silence, has reached me from England, I need not say. As to my residence here, I should not perhaps have thought of resigning just in this critical moment unless an Administration had been formed whose principles were decidedly hostile to those which have now for so many years preserved us from ruin; but, as you seem to attach some importance to my stay, I have written to Lord Hawkesbury in such terms as will have answered your purpose of shewing that the support you mean to give is sincere and zealous. When some little time has elapsed, I trust nevertheless that I may be permitted to come back and resume my ancient habits in the bosom of my family.

“I have seen Lutzow in consequence of your last dispatch, and have good hopes that something may yet be done in that business. It will be necessary for me to have full instructions and large and full powers in case the Emperor’s answer is favourable, for this is the moment and the business to which the old proverb of ‘*strike while the iron is hot*’ must, above all others, apply; and your instructions, as well as the very nature of the thing, involve not only Malta and the embargo, but the armed neutrality. Some kind of saving, however unsubstantial, must, I fear, be found for the honour and dignity of these mighty potentates on the last of these points. I thought of some explanatory convention saving, as is done in the convention of 1794 between Sweden and Denmark, all former treaties respectively, and declaring that the force of the Confederates is to be exercised only in conformity to them, and to prevent abuses against those principles of the law of nations which have been universally recognized; and that the other new principles are what they propose as rules for their own conduct, and wish to recommend for universal adoption, but that no idea is entertained of obtaining the consent of other nations to them by force.

“In the appendix to the letters of Sulpicius, and in the letters themselves, and also in the collection of papers relating to the principles of the Armed Neutrality of 1780, there appears to me to be a very material mistake and omission as to the treaty of commerce with Russia. The specification in the 11th article is not, as it is represented in the letters of Sulpicius, a declaration

of what shall alone be considered as contraband, but only a provision against the probable abuse, on the one hand, of confiscation or seizure under pretence that a ship carries arms though no more should be on board than the use of the ship or passengers requires, and on the other, of a cargo really consisting of arms being covered under pretext of their being merely for the use of the ship and passengers. This will clearly appear not only by the ordinary rules of construction, but of comparison with any other treaties where there is no specification of contraband, in which it will always be found that such and such articles only are to be prohibited, and that all other shall be deemed free. The true and only specification of contraband in the Russian treaty is, I think, to be found in the 10th article, where it is said the subjects may freely trade *sous condition qu'ils ne conduiront à l'ennemi aucune munition*; and *les munitions de guerre toujours exceptées, les susdits sujets pourront transporter sans obstacles toutes sortes de marchandises*. And at the time of making this treaty there could be no doubt of the interpretation of the terms *munitions* and *munitions de guerre*, at least by Great Britain, as she had recently fixed the sense she put upon them by the Convention of 1780 with Denmark, explanatory of these very words. I shall rejoice to hear of a British fleet in the Baltic. If the passage of the Sound cannot be defended, so as to make this impossible (which I fear is not the case) Denmark may be less inclined to submit; though I must own I have good hopes from that quarter, because I really think England is a more natural ally for that Crown than Russia. At any rate the explanation with Vansittart cannot take place before you will have received in England the impertinent note of Haugwiz, which, I think, can hardly fail of extending the embargo to Prussian ships, if not producing my immediate recall. Nothing however can be farther from determined, though the longing they have for Hanover gave them a momentary appearance of resolution. Many symptoms of this are discernible, and it has been conveyed to me through many channels in the course of the last week that this Court acts merely from the necessity it feels of courting the emperor, and that it is not too late for England, without making any material sacrifice, to regain his friendship. But the treaty between France and Austria, and Mr. Drake's intelligence of the sacrifices to be required from Bavaria, of the separate arrangement of the remaining indemnifications at Luneville, joined with many concurrent advices from the other quarters, put it beyond a doubt that France has entirely laid aside all consideration for this paltry Court; and this (though I know that not many days ago it was seriously in deliberation whether Hanover should not be invaded without waiting to know in what manner the British Government would treat the note) may have checked their sanguine hopes of immediate aggrandizement.

"I must now say a few words on that disastrous subject which you say has been the only cause of the change of administration. I never have approved either of the restraints on Roman Catholics or of the Test Act, and I must freely own that I have as little approved the manner in which Government has acted hitherto as

to the first of these objects. You gave to the Papists a consequence they were not justly entitled to, and suffered men without character, property, or abilities, distinguished only by their factions and even treasonable practices, to extort, by the most irregular and seditious means, what they ought to have received as a favour. But the measure you have described to me was worthy of great statesmen, and would have produced the effects you intended. To have relieved the Papists and not the Dissenters would have been only raising one faction in the place of another. Your plan would have united the whole people, and the oath you proposed is, in my estimation, an object of the utmost consequence; and, if ever you should establish it by law, I hope it will be contrived to have it administered with real solemnity. Every man taking it once should have a certificate of it, and the production of that certificate should stand in place of the frequent repetitions of the present oath of allegiance, and should be produced upon all important occasions, as of marriage, taking administration, receiving legacies, claiming debts, so as to keep the obligation and the value of it continually present to every man's mind.

“In short, I will support your new administration as long as you desire it, and with as much warmth and zeal as you can desire, both at home and abroad; but God grant the continuance may not be long. It is impossible they should, even with your tuition, conduct the State. You must resume your place.”

#### WILLIAM WICKHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, February 28. Vienna.—“I cannot suffer Colonel Hope to leave me without adding to what I have said in my public dispatch my own private opinion that this officer was so particularly qualified for the situation in which he was placed that it will be an object well worth your Lordship's attention to keep him constantly in your eye for any service of the same kind on any future occasion.

“To much temper, management, and patience, he adds (as I have said in my public dispatch) the most scrupulous attention to his instructions, which he takes care thoroughly to understand; and above all (and what I prize by far the most of all his qualities as the most rare in a British officer) an unceasing care never to commit either himself or his employers without an intention so to do.

“He has made himself so thoroughly master of the whole and every part of the treaties that were concluded by me last year and of the principles on which they were negotiated and concluded, that I could, at any moment, have left the whole business in his hands with thorough confidence, and without a fear or uneasiness of any kind. In one word, I have had nothing but comfort and satisfaction, ever since he has joined me, in every department of the extensive business entrusted to my care in which he has had any concern; and I venture to recommend him very particularly to your Lordship's attention as an officer every way worthy of your confidence.”

## VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH to MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

*Extract of a letter respecting the papers delivered to the Irish Catholics in February, 1801.*

[1801, February-March].—"Mr. Pitt thinks the fair statement to be made in case the papers [are] alluded to in Parliament, is that your Excellency felt it your duty, for the sake of the public tranquility, to impress the Catholics with a strong sense of how much both their duty and interest enjoined a loyal and dutiful demeanour; that the precise terms in which it was done, not having been a matter of previous concert with all the persons to whom the sentiments might be referable, that the papers in question could not be considered as affecting them farther than they adopted them by their language in Parliament: that the sentiments *generally* expressed in those papers met his approbation. In respect to the pledge which might be attributed to the second paper, he should decline upon principle making any other pledge than his past conduct; what his future conduct might be would depend upon what he felt to be due to the question itself as well as to the public interest."

## LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF CARYSFORT.

1801, Marh 2. Cleveland Row.—"You will have been made uneasy by the accounts you will have received of the King's health. Thank God, I can now tell you that our anxiety is almost (if not wholly) at an end. There seems to have been a crisis in his disorder yesterday which suspended for 24 hours the rapid progress he was before making towards complete recovery. This has terminated as favourably as we could wish, and the most confident expectations are now entertained and declared by his physicians.

"You who know that my attachment to him is quite independent of all official situation, past, present, or to come; but is the result of sincere gratitude, and of long opportunity of knowing and observing his character, will readily believe the happiness I have experienced from the favourable change. If I wrote by a messenger, I could tell you more of our domestic politics than I think right to entrust to this conveyance, but I see no reason to alter any part of the opinions I last expressed to you.

## The EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, March 4. Berlin.—"It is exceedingly mortifying for me to have to address my dispatch of to-day to Lord Hawkesbury instead of you. I wish I had time to have it transcribed for you, though it bears the title of most secret. I cannot however suppose that the Office will conceal it from you. Prince Adolphus who, by the by, is by all accounts, as well as in all appearance, a very excellent and amiable young man, brought with [him] an aide de camp, Captain de Decken, with whom the King had been formerly intimate. On the 2nd day after their arrival, Decken came to me and told me he had a private interview with the King, and was ordered to communicate to me the substance of their conversation, and deliver me a message.

The conversation went to show the reluctance with which the King, under the terrors of France and Russia, engaged in measures he abhorred, and his determination not to go a step further than he should be compelled. The message was to say how earnestly he wished that Great Britain would try to satisfy the Emperor about Malta, which, he was convinced, might be done, and at much less expense than perhaps we thought. This once done, we should obtain satisfaction as to every other point, and he should be relieved from all his difficulties. This overture I thought not to be neglected, and determined to tell him under a promise of secrecy what had passed with Lutzow at first, and in consequence of your dispatch of the 17th. I, at the same time, directed Decken to tell the King that I would always obey his commands in conveying any suggestion of his to our Government, and in making to him directly, and not to be communicated to his ministers, any communication that my duty would permit, if he would point out a channel through which it might be done. Decken carried a written account of Lutzow's business, and a letter from me to which, by the King's order, he returned me an answer in writing the same day, of which, as well as my letter, I have sent copies to the Office. The answer contains thanks, expressions of joy and hope at finding a negotiation opened with Russia, a promise to do all in his power to promote its success, and an indication of the channel through which I might correspond with him in future. We met in the evening, but his Majesty's behaviour was not at all calculated to preserve the secret he kept strongly recommending to me; and the language and behaviour of the whole Court has taken quite a new turn upon it. I hope and trust that you will not disapprove what I have done. The having found a way to get at the King is what we have always wished, and is certainly a point gained, though I do not expect much to follow from it.

"The more I think of what has happened at home the more I am vexed. Such a Ministry cannot stand long, and cannot do good; but, I fear, will last long enough to break up completely the strength which supported you, and perhaps some intrigue will prevent your return to office. But I will say no more on this vexatious subject. In a month's time I trust we may have an answer from Petersburg. If that business is arranged satisfactorily, and the Northern war goes off in smoke, as I trust it will, I may surely then without blame ask to go home. My private affairs will furnish very ostensible reason, and I cannot bear my situation long, now that I am no more to correspond with you."

ARTHUR PAGET to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1801, March 3. Palermo.—"It is just possible that, had I been at Naples before the signing of the armistice, it might have been in my power to have prevented it being carried to its full extent. I therefore think it my duty to inform your Lordship that I offered to go with the Prince Royal to Naples (the Russian Minister did the same), and that His Sicilian Majesty rather expressed a wish that the Foreign Ministers should not quit him. But what can be expected

from this Government after what I have related at the end of my Dispatch No. 4? I never thought General Acton otherwise than a very weak man, but it now looks absolutely as if he was doating. With regard to M. Italinsky, of whom so much is now expected, there hardly exists, I believe, a more upright man, but he owes his situation in a great measure to General Acton, to whose opinions I have in general found him inclined to bend. I saw him before his departure in a *maison tierce*. He assured me solemnly that he did not believe it to be the intention of his sovereign to act with regard to Naples as the French had made General Acton believe was the case. He said he could understand nothing of General Acton's conduct on the present occasion. I am only afraid that he will submit to be talked over. At present he considers the armistice as an instance of excessive weakness on the part of the Neapolitan Government.

“Until I receive your Lordship's instructions I have resolved to remain here, for, the ports being shut, I could not go to Naples in a king's ship without perhaps being exposed to what I certainly should not like to put up with; and I do not think that, under the present circumstances, I could with propriety go in any other way. Add to which I feel, after what has passed, that I could be of no service there. That Government is in a sort of fever at present which must take its course. Your Lordship may depend upon His Sicilian Majesty's attachment to England. I have very good reason for supposing that he is not only dissatisfied with what has been done, but with the manner of doing it. I have mentioned such a thing as the right of a sovereign not to ratify a treaty he may be dissatisfied with; but M. Serrati is a man who might have been an excellent Minister during a profound peace half a century ago. When I look around me and reflect upon the persons employed in the different departments of this government, I do not understand how the thing goes on at all. The fact is that General Acton will not employ people who are not blindly devoted to him, and he has certainly brought himself to think that this is a well governed state. I always return to a position I formerly made. There is neither army, navy, commerce, justice, agriculture, religion, or roads in these kingdoms. And as long as General Acton remains at the head of affairs, I despair of seeing any change for the better in them. He will listen to none but those who flatter him. At the same time there is not a man in these kingdoms fit to hold his situation. Your Lordship will naturally expect to see the armistice followed by a peace equally disgraceful and ruinous.

“I think it right to mention that a memorial was sent some time ago to the Emperor of Russia, drawn up by a person formerly French Vice-Consul at Cairo and since Consul at Rhodes. The object of this memorial is to point out to the Emperor of Russia the facility with which, by an alliance with Persia, he might attack His Majesty's East Indian possessions. Dumourier was pointed out as a proper person to entrust with the undertaking. I have not seen the memorial, but I am assured it is such as is likely to have a very strong effect on the mind of such a man as the Emperor of Russia.

"I shall await here with the most anxious impatience your Lordship's further instructions. I sincerely trust that your Lordship will feel that it has not been in my power to stop the mischief which has happened here. Everything that my mind can suggest I have written in the strongest manner to General Acton, and have urged to the Ministers here. Having no other conveyance, and being particularly desirous to hear from your Lordship, I shall send one of my servants at least as far as Vienna with my dispatches.

"Several orders and counter orders have been received for the departure of the three Russian frigates and troops from Naples, but I presume they will esteem it prudent not to risk a passage at this moment.

"Lord Whitworth, who must know General Sevatcheff very well, will certainly be of opinion that he is charged with no other commission than to present the Russian orders to His Sicilian Majesty. I however know that he is charged with nothing else. I have every reason to believe that the Russian General Borosdin, who commands those troops at Naples, always has been, and is, entirely in the French interest."

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO LORD MINTO.

1801, March 6. Dropmore.—"I received by the last mails your letter marked private, of the 15th of February; and I thought it my duty to communicate it to Lord Hawkesbury. You will have been apprized by the letters which you will have received both from me and from your other friends of the changes which have been determined on here, and of the circumstances which have prevented any of those changes being as yet actually carried into effect, except those of the Admiralty and of the Foreign Department. I have, however, the happiness of being able to assure you that the King's recovery is advancing rapidly, and that there is every possible ground of hope that nothing more will be necessary to be done for carrying on the public business than that the persons who happen to find themselves in the different offices of responsible government should continue to discharge the duties of them for a short period longer. If I had been in that predicament I should have felt it my duty to do my best in it, but I am certainly not sorry that accident had completed my release from a situation in which, under such circumstances, one could not hope to do much good.

"I take it for granted that Lord Hawkesbury will have written to you on what relates to your own situation, and it no longer belongs to me to do so. But I trust you are persuaded that I have not omitted to do the justice I owe to your exertions and services at Vienna; a testimony which inclination as well as duty will always make me desirous of bearing both in public and in private.

"I am highly gratified by the kind and friendly sentiments with which your letter concludes, and it will be a real pleasure to me to avail myself of any opportunity to cultivate a friendship which I sincerely esteem and value." *Copy.*

## LORD MINTO to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1801, March 6th. Vienna.—“I received to-day with great and sincere regret your Lordship’s dispatch of the 20th February, acquainting me with your resignation. It is impossible not to consider this event, and those with which it is connected, as a very great public calamity. I can assure you that it is felt as such in this quarter of Europe, and that the dissolution of that administration of which your Lordship was a principal member has created a new consternation here, where, in the midst of their own weakness, they still looked with a sort of involuntary respect to the energy of our Government as the remaining stay and last hope of Europe. The acknowledged and proved talents as well as character of that administration had inspired universal confidence; and one always perceived on the Continent a sort of shabby hope that their own vices and degeneracy would in the end be redeemed by our virtues, resources, and constancy. The late events in England must be reckoned amongst those many and extraordinary interpositions of fortune in favour of our enemy which have so long seemed to make the worse cause appear the better. I am very imperfectly informed of the true grounds of all that has happened, but the general complexion of this change seems sufficiently ascertained to leave me no doubt concerning the part I have to take myself. Your Lordship knows I had already resigned my office on other ground. It would therefore seem affectation to offer this now as a sacrifice either to the principle of the measure that has been taken or to the personal regard, attachment and gratitude I profess towards the men. I must nevertheless so far gratify my own feelings as to declare that, considering the late change as turning on the question of Catholic emancipation in Ireland, I am desirous of adhering to Mr. Pitt and his colleagues, and shall be proud to rank with those who fall on that question. My opinion is clear whether I consider the point of honour, or the point of policy; and I cannot hesitate a moment in pursuing the only course that is compatible with the sentiments I have already professed and still retain on the subject.

“I dare say your Lordship will have already communicated my resignation to Lord Hawkesbury. I have to-day requested his Lordship that my successor may be appointed with as little delay as possible; and I am persuaded that your Lordship will approve of my having refrained, in this official act, from any allusion to other motives than those which I had formerly stated to your Lordship.

“I cannot close my official correspondence with your Lordship without repeating the lively sense I shall ever retain of your indulgence and kindness throughout; nor without expressing a sincere hope that this temporary relation may have laid the foundation of a more permanent connexion, and incline your Lordship to admit me amongst your sincere and personal friends.”

## W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, March 6. Downing Street.—“You will have seen the

bulletin of this morning. The private accounts were still more favourable and the progress since has been most rapid. I have just seen Dr. Willis, and find that the King has seen the Queen for above half an hour, and Willis since for above two hours. He was perfectly rational and collected the whole time, and conversed with perfect clearness on all that related to himself and the state of public affairs. He has since eat his dinner and drank some wine with apparent satisfaction. If things continue in this train, there is little doubt that the public account to-morrow will be that of convalescence. In the mean time we shall not venture to say more than that he is much better even since the morning, and mending rapidly."

WILLIAM WICKHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1801, March 7. Vienna.—“I beg your lordship will accept my very sincere thanks for the very obliging manner in which you are pleased to speak of my humble services, and for the favourable light in which you have so kindly represented them to your Lordship’s successor.

“My mission is of itself drawing fast towards its conclusion; my health has evidently suffered from the fatigues I have undergone during more than six years of the most active and laborious employment, without the intermission of a single day. The situation of my family at home is such as to make my presence there extremely desirable; in one word, every thing concurs to make me earnestly wish that I may have his Majesty’s leave to retire for a time at least from the public service.

“I had already written to your Lordship, before I knew of the change that has taken place in the Foreign Department, to request a leave of absence, and I hope your Lordship will not refuse me the satisfaction of pressing this demand on Lord Hawkesbury, and expressing at the same time my earnest and sincere wish that his Lordship would submit my humble prayer to his Majesty to the extent I have above expressed.

“Your Lordship, I trust, knows me well enough to be persuaded that I would neither abandon my present situation without having placed things in such a state as that the King’s service could not possibly suffer from my absence, nor express a wish to retire from public service unless I had other reasons than the fear of encountering the labour and difficulties by which it is attended, from which your Lordship well knows I have never shown a disposition to shrink.

“If his Majesty should be graciously pleased to grant my request, I must trust to his indulgent goodness to determine whether the situations I have holden, or my past labours in his service, have rendered me worthy of any mark of his royal favour on my retiring from public employment.

“My own wishes on the subject have but one object in view, namely, that my sovereign may appear to have been satisfied with the manner in which my duty has been performed throughout the many important and very confidential missions that have been trusted to me.

“ I wish not to write on this subject to Lord Hawkesbury until I shall have heard whether your Lordship has had the goodness to mention to him my wish for a leave of absence.”

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private and Confidential.*

1801, March 7. Vienna.—“ The intelligence of yesterday, contained in your Lordship’s public and private letters of the 19th ultimo, has quite overcome me. An intimation of something of the kind had reached us through France, but I was not prepared to receive anything so thoroughly disastrous. I consider this event as a great and heavy calamity that has fallen on the country, and I offer up my prayers, hope I have little or none, that it may not be the fore-runner of still greater evils. Those men, whoever they are, who have advised the king to this measure have more to answer for to their country than I would have upon my conscience for all that the country is worth. Mr. Pitt and your Lordship I know will forgive them ; but the tougher materials of which I am unfortunately framed will require time to bend, much too long to have any hope of my acting under them to any good or efficient purpose for a long while to come.

“ Setting however that consideration aside, there are others which make my line as easy to take as it has been readily and cheerfully taken. From its first formation I have been a warm though humble admirer of the Administration of which your Lordship has made a part. In all the trying scenes in which it has been engaged, I have been so sincerely and earnestly interested, and the habit of thinking and acting according to the wishes and opinions of its members is now so *rooted* in me, that my own political existence is, as it were, identified with the existence of that particular Administration to such a point as that I should as soon think of marrying again the day after I had buried my wife as of acting under a new Cabinet until I had had time to mourn and forget the old one, and to form my whole habits anew.

“ I had besides so thorough a confidence in their firmness and their resources in times of danger, in their discretion, their honour and their talents, I considered the fortunes of my sovereign and of my country so safe in their hands, that no public calamity ever affected my courage or shook my resolution ; every check, every disaster seemed to me easy to be repaired ; and I appeal to my correspondence with your Lordship whether even the battles of Zurich or Hohenlinden, which might have terrified the boldest, ever drew from me an expression of despair or discouragement, or were ever presented by me to your Lordship in any other light, as far as ourselves were concerned, than as events which required the application of new measures and new resources, without a doubt but that those measures would be adopted and those resources found.

“ These are comforts and consolations absolutely necessary to every man called upon to act in the situations in which I have been

placed in times like these ; all of which I now abandon, and to the privation of which it is not possible that I should accustom myself at once.

“ When I add to all these reasons a sense of the most unbounded gratitude, as an Englishman, for services rendered to my country, on which no human value can be set, and, as an individual, for unmerited kindness and protection, your Lordship will not be surprised that my language and my conduct should be so firm and decided on this occasion ; nor will you, I am sure, attribute to haste or warmth what is really the result of as much cool and deliberate reflection and discussion as four-and-twenty hours could possibly allow.

“ My connection with the Duke of Portland had, I own, induced me for a moment to hesitate ; but his Grace, to whom however I shall always consider myself under the greatest obligations, has entirely relieved me from all scruples on that head by appointing a successor to my office in the Home Department ; nor do I feel a doubt or a difficulty of any kind but from the possibility, to which some few circumstances seem to point, that a part at least of this new Administration is *really* formed by the old one ; and that it may be the real wish of your Lordship and your friends that those persons out of Parliament who are sincerely attached to you, should continue to serve. Now, upon this point, as I shall be very fair and open with your Lordship, I trust your Lordship will be the same with me. If such be really your Lordship’s desire, which I cannot well believe when I see the names of some of those who retire from office, you may be assured that there is no sacrifice of my own private opinion and wishes, however strong they may be, that I would not readily make on such an occasion, and for such an object. But it would be on your Lordship’s account alone, and not on mine, that I should accept any employment whatever were it offered me ; for, I beg your Lordship distinctly to understand, that both my opinion and my wishes are decidedly the other way, that my mind is entirely made up upon the main question, that I am sincerely ambitious of following your Lordship to your retreat, and that I shall have neither real comfort or satisfaction of mind in any other line of conduct.

“ I hold this language in the entire confidence that your Lordship will give me full credit for the sincerity of what I say, and, in that confidence I venture to send your Lordship the enclosed ostensible letter, and to request that you will make such use of it as you shall think most proper ; only observing, on the one hand, that my circumstances in life are not such as to make any mark of favour that his Majesty may bestow on me in my retreat *as a reward for my past services* an object of indifference ; on the other, that I would not for the world that your Lordship should, on my account, lay yourself under the slightest obligation to any person whatever, or, that anything given to me should be given in the shape of a favour conferred upon your Lordship. I have known what it is to live in confined circumstances ; and am not afraid to meet such a situation again. Too much of the public money has gone through my hands for me ever to dare to wish to be rich, and I had rather

leave a good name and a good example to my son than the first fortune in the united kingdoms.

¶ “With these sentiments your Lordship will see that I cannot be called on to make any great sacrifice on this occasion ; and, if I could forget the state of public affairs, I am persuaded that I should rejoice in having found an opportunity, which I had never ventured to hope for, of convincing your Lordship that my attachment is as disinterested as it is sincere.

“I do not write to Mr. Pitt, because I shall rely on your Lordship’s having the goodness to express to him the substance of what I say and think on this occasion ; and I shall now only add my sincere and earnest prayers for your Lordship’s happiness, and that our country may soon again have the benefit of your Lordship’s services and those of your colleagues, in which case you may be sure that I shall be the first to fly to my post, wherever it may be assigned me.”

*Postscript.*—“I foresee only one embarrassing case. What shall I do if I receive an offer of employment from Lord Hawkesbury before I have your Lordship’s answer ?

“A communication from the Duke of Portland made through Flint (for I have nothing from his Grace) intimates that it was your Lordship’s wish that I should remain here. This among other things makes me presume that an offer to that effect will be made to me from Lord Hawkesbury, that is, if I don’t stand too much in the way of the views of a certain person too well known to us. My present opinion is that I ought to accept, *for the moment only*, in consideration of the state in which this Court would otherwise be left, and of my presence here on other business being still necessary ; but expressing a fear that my health will not permit me to remain, referring to my request of a leave of absence made to your Lordship *before the change*, and expressing my confidence that I may be considered as holding the place *pro tempore* only. This will give me time to receive your Lordship’s answer.”

*Postscript.* March 9, 1901.—“Since the above was written I have received by Captain Cowan your Lordship’s very kind letter of the 13th February. The answer to it will, I trust, be found in the preceding pages. I can only repeat my very earnest and sincere wish that I may be allowed to manifest my friendship and gratitude by sharing the honourable retreat to which your Lordship and your better friends have determined to retire.”

#### SPENCER SMITH TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, March 10. Constantinople.—“Your dispatch of 30 January informing me that the king has been graciously pleased to permit my return to England, on account of my private affairs, was delivered to me on the 2nd instant by Mr. Maltas, the Levant Company’s newly elected chancellor upon this establishment.

“In conformity to which, and the consequential arrangement of the company’s concerns here in obedience to His Majesty’s recommendation, I take the liberty of acquainting your lordship that I shall avail myself of my leave of absence as soon as I shall have

made over the affairs of my department in due form to the Earl of Elgin ; and that I can arrange the means of travelling as the circumstances of the times may render advisable or safe.

“ Upon which occasion your lordship will permit me to express some part of the anxiety I cannot but feel, though perhaps erroneously, at that part of your dispatch announcing the cessation of my appointments upon my arrival in England, and which are moreover therein alluded to as being merely those of secretary of legation, after having been repeatedly given to understand both from your lordship as well as from the ambassador, that His Majesty had been pleased to advance me to the rank of secretary *embassy* since the month of November, 1798. Your lordship will recollect that I have never been in the enjoyment of those of *chargé d'affaires*, and still less of those of minister plenipotentiary ; that my allowances even as secretary of legation have been far from cœval with the date of my service here ; while your lordship may not perhaps know that my pay from the Levant Company of £1,000 a year has ceased since the arrival here of the last advices from the company ; so that, should the king's commands take effect according to the literal tenor of your lordship's letter before me, I should find myself, with an expensive journey before me, reduced to such an irksome situation in point of income as I can hardly suppose to enter into to His Majesty's gracious intentions, any more than your lordship's, towards me ; but which, as standing thus in the text of this last dispatch, I am bound to remark in time, to obviate any future misunderstanding. With my pen then employed upon topics of a personal import, I crave your indulgence to remind your lordship that I am still deprived of any fruits from the King's benevolent declaration relative to my loss by the fire that raged here on 13 March, 1799, as conveyed in two several dispatches from your lordship of the same year ; while every one of my fellow sufferers by that catastrophe has been indemnified by their respective courts. Whereas I have only received a gratuity on the occasion from the Levant Company, amounting to little more than a third of my loss ; at the same time that the inferior officers of the mission have received relief both from the crown and from the company.”

#### The MARCHIONESS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, March 10. Pall Mall.—“ Your kind letter has been a most reviving one to my poor friend Miss Mac, who was dreaming constantly of a jail, and is now delighting herself in the idea of not only being liberated herself from most dreadful anxiety, but also (what she feels more about than anything belonging to self) that she may still do good ; for I have the pleasure of acquainting you that (owing to the necessity of giving proper notice to the mistresses and servants, and also of keeping up an *appearance* of a school to prevent butchers and bakers from being desperate) the establishment is not yet dissolved, and (what added to Miss Mac's regrets) was lately got upon the best of footings with excellent people to manage the children, who were making great progress in every thing that is necessary for girls who must be to depend upon

their talents and industry. She desires me to tell you that nothing could have prevailed upon her to break up an establishment that does so much good but the *want of funds* ; and that if Government will be as generous as you mention in giving 700*l.*, she will undertake to educate, board, lodge, clothe the children *without taking any of the Committee money*, which would be a great help to the parents, and induce them to put their children to the school, instead of keeping them, as many do for the sake of the weekly allowance, in their wretched garrets, naked, starved and without instruction. If I was to say one hundredth part of what I feel, and what Miss Mac desires me to say to you for your great kindness, I know I should make you angry ; and as it is much to our interest to keep you in good humour, I shall only say what you know already, how affectionately I am and ever shall be yours.<sup>24</sup>

#### J. KING TO LORD GRENVILLE.

##### *Most Private and Secret.*

1801, March 14th. Whitehall.—“ We have this moment received the within from our Paris friend. By a separate note you see how he presses for some answer on that point which—whether the parties are in good earnest about it, or consider it merely as a salvo for their consciences, or whether they want to be in possession of such a declaration as they expect—is, at all events, made a *sine quâ non*.

“ The last letter from Flint will, for the present, answer the purpose, and prevent our friend from leaving Paris, where alone he can be of service to *us*. The Duke talked with Mr. Pitt on the subject, who thought £1,000 per month a good deal, but that the intelligence might prove well worthy of it. They both wished me to consult you, for, as I see that unless *we* continue this channel of information it will be lost, I am anxious to do it properly. You will see the answer Wickham gave on the point in October last. One of the drafts of an answer for your consideration Flint has put into my hands, the short one he translated from my English.”

*Postscript.*—“ A day or two ago I thought we might get right again, but alas it is all over.”

#### BRITISH EXPEDITION TO EGYPT.

MAJOR GENERAL JOHN MOORE to his father, DR. JOHN MOORE.

1801, March 16. Camp near Alexandria.—“ From Marmoris Bay to that of Aboukir we met with nothing but bad weather which dispersed the small ships which carried our cavalry ; most of them have not yet cast up. On the 1st of March we appeared off Alexandria, and on the second in the morning we anchored in Aboukir, with an intention instantly to land the troops, but the coast did not admit of the ships anchoring neare than six and seven miles to the shore. Such a distance, with boats loaded with men, required calm weather. Unfortunately the wind blew fresh and the sea ran high. In this manner we were detained until the 8th. Had it been possible to land the first or second day after our arrival we should have had the advantage of surprise, and been

opposed only by the small garrison of Aboukir. We should probably have even been able to push thus far without material opposition; but eight days gave the enemy time to assemble. We daily saw more men and more cannon. The spot upon which it was practicable to land was confined to less than half a mile, and was also in other respects favourable for defence; it was such as to prevent our receiving any advantage from the fire of shipping or gun-boats.

“Notwithstanding every unfavourable circumstance, Sir Ralph was determined to make the attempt. The interest of our country and our honour as military men equally required it of us.

“The time which was given to the enemy to collect was employed by us in making the necessary preparations and arrangements.

“The first landing was to be effected by the reserve, brigade of Guards and part of Major-General Coote’s brigade, arranged from right to left in the order I have named them. These troops got into the flat boats and launches at two in the morning of the 8th, and assembled after daylight in a line, at about two miles from the shore, which small vessels had in the night been sent in to mark. It was 8 o’clock before the boats were all arranged and ready to advance. We saw the French on the heights with their cannon placed in readiness to receive us.

“Our fleet of 160 or 170 sail were at anchor behind us (on the spot where Nelson destroyed the French) filled with soldiers and sailors, our countrymen.

“The sun was bright and the day delightful. Fifteen pieces of cannon opened upon us as soon as we were within reach, first with round shot, and afterwards, as we approached, with grape, and at last with musketry. Our troops answered with huzzas, and the boats continued to advance. The right of the Reserve landed opposite to a high sand hill, which the French occupied, and which it was absolutely necessary for us to possess instantly. I determined to lead this attack with the 23rd and 28th regiments, and four companies of grenadiers and light infantry of the 40th, leaving the direction of the 42nd and 58th regiments to General Oakes upon my left.

“The men, as soon as they got out of the boats, formed and loaded with the greatest composure, though grape shot and musketry was falling on every side of them, and they ascended the hill without ever taking their muskets from their shoulders. We drove the French, took four pieces of cannon, and pursued them for a mile into the plain upon the left. The regiments with General Oakes, the Guards and others, met with considerable opposition, and were charged by the cavalry, which they repulsed. They pursued the enemy to the border of the plain, where we all joined, and they took three pieces of cannon. It was some time before the cannon, which had been landed with the troops, could be got forward. This and the total want of cavalry saved the French from being cut to pieces, and enabled them to retreat.

“The rest of the army landed in the course of the day, and in the afternoon we moved forward, the first line and reserve to a position for the night, two or three miles from the shore.

“Our loss in the landing amounted to 600 killed and wounded.

The next day I was pushed forward with the reserve a couple of miles in front of the army.

“ In this position the army continued waiting for provisions and ammunition to be landed and forwarded until the 12th, when the army advanced in two columns, each composed of a wing, headed by the reserve, as an advanced guard. A corps of cavalry which had been opposite to me, during the two days I occupied the former post, retired skirmishing as we advanced ; but as we approached the ground intended for our encampment, a body of infantry was seen at some distance moving towards us. This obliged the line to be formed, which was done accurately and quickly, and we took instantly advanced. The enemy halted and retired, and we took up our ground. The position of the enemy on our front was strong, we are now upon it. The enemy’s and our sentries and piquets were close to one another during the night, and it was evident that neither army could stir without an action.

“ On the 13th we marched in two columns from the left, each composed of a line of the army, covered on the right by the reserve formed in one column.

“ The design was to attack the right of the French, and if possible to turn it. We got into action instantly. The army formed in two lines ; the reserve continued in column for the protection of the right flank. Our guns, without horses, could not by the sailors be dragged through heavy sand sufficiently quickly to keep up with the troops. That of the enemy was numerous, and, from having even 16 horses to some pieces, was extremely active. The cannonade was tremendous, and may be said to have mowed down our men ; but nothing could overcome their cool intrepidity, discompose their order, or prevent their advancing. The French gave way on every side, and were pursued under the fire of the fortified position they had prepared and now occupy in front of Alexandria. A disposition was instantly made to attack this, but upon examining it, it was found to be so strong and so studded with artillery, besides being exposed to the fire of two forts beyond it, that even had the valour of our men surmounted the two first obstacles, the last would have rendered it impossible for them to hold their ground. Sir Ralph has therefore determined to remain on his present ground until heavy cannon is brought up to cope with that of the enemy and to cover our future movements.

“ The last action cost us 1,300 killed and wounded. We expected no supply from the country—and we have hitherto got water, everything else is landed from the ships. We have been without tents or baggage.

“ I have always had the best opinion of British troops, but their conduct since we landed in Egypt has surpassed every thing I had conceived, and I would not exchange these eight days’ service for all I had before seen. The French have expressed their surprise, not they say at the courage, but at the coolness and regularity of the troops.

“ It is impossible to foresee the event of this expedition. The position of the French is extremely strong, and when they are

driven from it, we have a siege to begin of a place not occupied by a common garrison, but by an army almost as numerous as ourselves.

“The climate has not yet affected us, but the hot weather which begins to set in, together with the labour of a siege, may reduce our numbers more than the sword, by which 2,000 are already *hors de combat*. Of this I am certain, that what men can do will be done. Obstacles may occur to prevent final success, but the honour of the country will not be tarnished, and the character of the army will rise in estimation to whatever it was on the best times. These considerations make me perfectly at my ease. Upon the 13th, when the attack of the enemy’s position was given up, it became necessary to retire out of reach of their guns, to which we were exposed, and were losing men to no purpose. We therefore in the afternoon did so, and took up the ground from which we had driven them.

“Our right is to the sea; on the left the Lake Ma’adi and the Canal of Alexandria. A plain of about a mile and a quarter, broken, on our right, by small sand hills, separates us from the heights upon which the French are encamped. This is a tolerably detailed account of our operations since we left Marmoris.

“I am sitting on the ground and writing on my knee; my friends will I hope excuse me for not writing to them.

“I fag from morning to night and am perfectly well. I have had the good luck to escape unhurt, but many of my friends have suffered. This is the black side to which we must endeavour not to look.” *Copy.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF CARYSFORT.

1801, March 16. Droppmore.—“Four mails arrived yesterday, and brought me your private letters from February 21 to March 4, and as I conclude that the King’s recovery, which, thank God, is now complete, will lead to your having a messenger from the Office in the course of this week, I send this to Hammond to go by that opportunity. All my opinions agree with yours as to the advantage and necessity of acting with vigour against the northern Courts; and, as our fleet sailed on Thursday last with a most favourable wind, I trust the first act of that interlude is already over, and that the whole will be concluded soon enough to leave us at liberty to pursue uninterruptedly our operations against France.

“I am very much obliged to you for the steps you have taken respecting your situation at Berlin. Your quitting in the present moment would really have been extremely injurious to the public service, as well as distressing to myself personally. Without agreeing in the full extent of what the partiality of friends leads them to feel respecting those who have quitted office, I certainly do not disguise from you that I think the public suffers considerably by the change. But it was become unavoidable when measures which we thought not only important but necessary in order to give this country its fair chance of struggling through its difficulties, were impeded by a cause such as that which is now allowed to operate. I am satisfied in my conscience that no motive short

of a religious scruple, grounded on a mistaken opinion of the tendency of his oath, would have induced the King to resist our advice and to change his government ; and, as far as personal kindness could go, nothing could be more satisfactory and even affecting than his conduct to us has been. To such a scruple I should have thought it was our duty to give way, if we could have done so without a sacrifice of the duty we owe even to the King himself, of leaving nothing undone which, in our deliberate opinion, we judge likely to fortify the country against its present dangers. But I thought at the time, and it was then no sudden resolution, and every hour's reflection has convinced me since, that it would have been unpardonable in us, with the opinions we held, to make ourselves the instruments of resisting the measures which are necessary in order to unite the whole people of Ireland, or to stand responsible to the public for the government when so essential a feature of it was conducted in opposition to our advice and our ideas, founded in no rational sense of policy, but in a scruple which, though respectable in its motive, is in itself totally groundless and absurd.

“ Under these circumstances there could be no option for the King but to resort to Opposition for a government, or to endeavour to form one out of the under actors of the same Company. He would perhaps have consulted his temporary ease by the former, but every consideration of honour and principle led to his trying the latter ; and surely, when he does so, nothing but a real difference in principle could justify us (I mean not the late Ministers only but the whole body of Anti-Jacobins) in thwarting his endeavours or in withholding from them any support we can give them. I grieve that this is not more generally felt, but its not being so is only a motive to those who do feel it to use still greater exertions.

“ As to our resuming our situations, I fairly say that I think it impossible. No one can expect that the King, acting from such a principle as he does, can give way ; and surely no one could advise us to do so except in such an extreme case of public danger as I trust will never happen. Should it happen, the difference of the individuals in office at the moment would probably not be of much real consequence.

“ If the Court of Berlin send you away, we shall have the opportunity of talking all this over at our leisure. If not, I certainly should not feel myself at liberty to ask you (when the crisis is over) to remain at Berlin longer than was agreeable to yourself ; because your coming away then would not have the same appearance as if you quitted now. But I am very far from agreeing with you in the estimate you form of your own services in a line for which you are in many respects so peculiarly fitted, and in which you have so much distinguished yourself. The papers tell us that Lady Newhaven is dead. If so, that may perhaps be an additional reason for your wishing to come to England. But surely you had best do so in the first instance on a leave of absence, which will leave you at full liberty to take your decision here.”

“ After all the experience we have both had of this Court of Berlin, I really cannot still help being surprised at the meanness and wretchedness of this last step of endeavouring to keep well

with us after such a note as they have sent us, telling us that they are acting against us only from a fear of France and Russia. I wish they had not said so, because it was my firm intention to have delivered it as my opinion in Parliament in our next debate; and now I feel some scruple in saying so, which I should not have felt so long as they affected to bully. I am very curious to see how they will take Sir H. Parker's proceedings." *Copy.*

LORD HAWKESBURY to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, March 18. Downing Street.—“I return you Wickham's letters, which I have kept entirely to myself. My first idea was to have appointed him to succeed Lord Minto at Vienna, but this is impossible, as Starhemberg was ordered by his court to state to me that, in the event of Lord Minto leaving Vienna, they wished particularly *not* to have Wickham. The two situations which have occurred to me for him are America, or Russia when it is open; the latter is probably what he would prefer. I will take care that your promise to him respecting place is fulfilled.

“It is impossible yet to judge what will be the issue of our contest with the northern powers. France and Vienna are drawing closer together. Prussia is alarmed to the greatest degree; but is so pressed by Russia on one side, and France on the other, that she pretends to have no will of her own. Unless the appearance of our fleet in the Baltic makes a sudden change in the politics of Russia, the Electorate of Hanover will, I am convinced, be sacrificed. We shall probably hear from Sir Hyde Parker the beginning of next week.”

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, March 19. Downing Street.—“The Chancellor had sent me the same accounts in consequence of which I have had a memorandum made of the points which I think will be sufficient for your purpose, and of which you will receive a legible copy early to-morrow. I have also taken measures for your having the account of the general trade and that to the north, by eleven.

“I will call on you, if I get away from my death-bed companions, so as to ride about half-past twelve if that suits you. If you should be gone leave word in what direction.”

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF CARYSFORT.

1801, March 24. Cleveland Row.—“As I neither see nor know anything of foreign politics I can write to you only of our domestic affairs. The new Government are, I trust I may now say, finally established, and I make not the smallest doubt that, unless some great calamity happens, they will be able perfectly to retain their ground. The trial of Parliamentary strength has indeed as yet only been made in the House of Lords, but the result there has been so decisive that it will operate on the other. It affords abundant proof that the ground is, if not equally so, yet at least very sufficiently secure in the House of Commons. My most

earnest wishes are, and must be, with them. I confess I cannot conceive anything equal to the madness of the few among our own friends who are playing Fox's game (while they think they are playing ours) in endeavouring to overthrow what, under the circumstances, and with the unfortunate prepossession in the King's mind, was the only resource left to him against a Jacobin Government. I am very sorry to reckon in that number some of my own nearest connections, whose conduct would certainly make mine be called in question, and suspected of the most dishonourable of all collusions, if I had not reason to hope that twenty years of public life had established my character above such suspicions.

"I have, however, certainly no claim to control their opinions, and can only pursue my own course straightforward, in the very plain line which honour and duty have chalked out for me. As to any interference with the conduct of the business of the Executive Government, I make it a point most studiously to avoid it, but, if in Parliament I can be useful to them, I will to the utmost endeavour to be so.

"I have dwelt too long upon this subject, but just now no man here talks or thinks of anything else. In a fortnight I hope to have let or sold this house, and to have fixed myself at Dropmore, from whence I shall only come to town for the days of debate in the House of Lords. We shall not, as you will readily believe, keep our Easter there without thinking often of you and our dear Elizabeth.

"I imagine that before you receive this the issue of Parker's operations at Copenhagen, whatever it may be, will have been known at Berlin, and will in one manner or another have operated decisively on our situation there. The condition of the Prussian Government seems truly wretched; but, however one may lament it for [our] own sakes, it is impossible to pity them. Precisely what has happened has been repeatedly remarked to them.

"In reading over what I have written, it seems to me to be necessary to assure you and my dear Elizabeth, who might otherwise feel uneasy on the subject, that the difference which seems likely to arise in our political opinions and conduct will be very far indeed from making the smallest diminution of affection or cordial friendship. We have all felt, when we were younger and less wise than we may hope to be now, the folly of suffering such considerations to interfere with the domestic happiness and union of families, and I hope we have all profited as we ought by the lesson.

"If the King of Prussia is frightened into bullying, you will be ordered away on the news of Parker's arrival at Copenhagen. Possibly you may already have applied for leave of absence on account of Lady Newhaven's death, and, in either case, I shall hope that very soon after your arrival in England, you will come to Dropmore, and see how happily we shall live there as a country esquire and his madam." *Copy.*

#### BRITISH EXPEDITION TO EGYPT.

MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN MOORE to his father, DR. JOHN MOORE.

1801, March 25. *The Diadem*, Aboukir Bay.—"My letter of

the 16th March, which went by the vessel which carried the public despatches, contained a tolerably detailed account of our operations from our departure from Marmoris.

“ We were employed from the 16th in strengthening our position. In the meantime provisions, stores, guns were forwarding to enable us to advance, however desperate it might appear, to attack the strong position the French had taken. Sir Ralph was, I believe, determined to do it; but Menou, the French Commander, having collected his force from Cairo and every other quarter, joined the army in front of Alexandria, and attacked us an hour before daylight in the morning of the 21st. His principal attack was made upon our right, where I was posted with the reserve, and upon the guards, who were immediately upon the left of the reserve. The French had contrived to approach very near us in the night without being heard; but our pickets were alert, and our troops had stood, as usual, to their arms an hour before daylight, and were in this situation when the fire from the pickets commenced. The French attacked with shouts, drums beating, but were received by our fellows with that coolness which they have displayed upon every occasion since they landed. Their cavalry charged twice and got in amongst us, but were destroyed. A column of their infantry had actually in the dark slipped past, and got into our rear; the 42nd regiment faced about, charged, put to death or took prisoner every man of them. In short, after repeated attacks during four hours, every one of which was repulsed, they were forced to retreat under cover of a numerous artillery, with which they had pounded us during the whole of the action. Their loss is great; I never saw a field so covered with dead. We have buried 1,200 of them and 4 or 500 horses. Their loss cannot be short of 4,000 killed, wounded, and prisoners. Our loss is above 1,000, of which above 400 belong to the reserve. Having lost so many of my men, it was but decent to get a lick myself. I accordingly was wounded in the leg, early in the action, but was able to continue in it till it was over. Anderson is wounded in the arm, General Oakes in the leg, and Colonel Paget in the neck. The command of the reserve falls to the 4th in rank (Colonel Spencer). Sir Ralph, poor man, is wounded in the thigh, the ball has lodged. I am assured that no material part is hurt. He has however still a degree of fever, and will, I fear, be incapable of taking any further direction this campaign. My wound is in the left leg, on the outside of the cap-bone, which is not touched; the wound is deepish and has about three inches of passage. I shall be at my duty in a fortnight. Oakes, Anderson, and I have come here to be quiet until our wounds are healed. Anderson has lost a brother, a lieutenant in the 42nd; he was killed on the 21st.

“ It is difficult to say as yet what the issue of all this will be. Government have undoubtedly been deceived with respect to the force and situation of the French in Egypt. The Delta is a most plentiful country; their army wants for nothing, and in the last action their numbers exceeded ours; unless therefore reinforcements are sent in time, or the Turks act with energy, what chance have we with inferior numbers to dispossess the French of their strongholds.

“ I have had the satisfaction of seeing the superiority of the British infantry over the French in three successive actions ; we have beat them without cavalry and inferior in artillery. This is the army of Italy ! but the prisoners say that the fighting there was nothing to this. I am convinced that nothing ever surpassed the determined valour of our men, and what I have witnessed here will be a subject of pride and satisfaction to me whilst I live. This goes by Constantinople ; the opportunity was told me privately as a favour, and I have availed myself of it in haste.

“ If you meet Lord Paget you may assure him that his brother’s wound is not serious ; he expects to be with the reserve in a few days, and to command it until Oakes and I can join.”

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1801, March.]—“ Je conçois très bien qu’un homme qui a le façon de penser de Lord Grenville se trouve très heureux d’être actuellement *procul a negotiis* et dans une *private situation*, où il est, peut-être, encore beaucoup plus utile à sa patrie que tous ceux qui se trouvent sur le chandellier et en évidence. Mais vous me permettiez pour ma part de ne pas m’accoutumer à tout régime qui me prive de voir un des amis dans lequel j’ai le plus de confiance, et dont je consulterai toujours les lumières et l’expérience, tant qu’il aura la bonté de m’écouter.

“ Permettez-moi, en conséquence, de vous prier de m’accorder un instant d’entretien, quand un jour vous serez en ville, et que vous n’aurez rien de mieux à faire. Mon projet n’est point de vous ennuyer de politique, quoique, comme dit Boileau, ‘ Chassez le naturel, il revient au galop ’ ; mais j’ai besoin de vous voir, de vous dire combien je vous suis attaché, de vous entretenir de moi-même et des miens. Si ma demande est importune, pardonnez-la à l’amitié que vous m’avez inspirée, et qui est assez exigeante pour s’attendre à de la réciprocité. Daignez vous souvenir que vos bontés m’ont gâté ; pendant votre ministère, vous en êtes puni actuellement. Voilà le seul reproche que le secrétaire d’état que nous regrettons tous, ait à se faire.”



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