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This Report has been prepared and edited, on behalf of the Historical Manuscripts Commissioners, by Mr. WALTER FITZPATRICK. The Index has been compiled by Mr. M. C. B. DAWES, B.A.

## INTRODUCTION.

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The correspondence included in this volume embraces a period of five years : from February, 1801, to February, 1806. This comparative poverty of material, the three preceding volumes covering altogether a period of only three years, is a consequence of the change in Lord Grenville's political situation. From being a leading member of the famous administration which formed, sustained, and in a great measure directed two European coalitions against the French Revolution, and the recognised organ of its foreign policy, he figures as the reluctant chief of a small party, strenuously advocating the same principles in opposition, but divested of official authority, and cut off from those sources of information which had overflowed in his correspondence. Still, however inferior it may be to its immediate predecessors in general importance as a historical record, this volume possesses peculiar interest on account of the light it throws on Lord Grenville's own career, of which these five years of opposition formed the turning point, and on the domestic politics of Great Britain. Readers will find mirrored in its pages the various influences, foreign and domestic—fears and perils caused by the growing ascendancy of a conqueror of extraordinary genius and ambition, new motives of action arising out of the course of political life in England—under the operation of which ties that had bound Pitt and Grenville together for nearly twenty years, dissolved ; and were, in the case of the latter, replaced by a union with statesmen who for the same long period had been political foes of both.

In order to appreciate fairly the circumstances of a separation still resented by many who can see no fault in a historical idol, it is necessary to bear in mind Lord Grenville's situation in Pitt's first ministry and the conditions of Mr. Addington's accession to power. A great deal has been said of Grenville's political obligations to Pitt ; and no one could acknowledge them more fully or in more grateful language than did Grenville himself. But Pitt also owed a great deal to Grenville. It has become a habit in our days to ascribe to Pitt the merit of everything making for national glory or advantage that illustrates his first ministry. Panegyric of this sort is more than usually extravagant when applied to him. Perhaps no great Minister ever more freely appropriated the ideas of others, depended more on the assistance of able colleagues, or was more governed by their advice. The Dropmore correspondence affords abundant evidence that for considerable periods subordinate ministers—Lord Hawkesbury

in matters of trade, Mr. Dundas in war, Lord Grenville in foreign relations—shaped the policy of the country without detracting from Pitt's supremacy. In fact, Pitt carried his disposition to accept advice to a fault. Friends and foes agreed that it too often resulted in instability of purpose, a condition of mind especially fatal to success in war. Where alone Pitt showed himself as a Minister inexorably firm and consistent was in asserting and maintaining his own political supremacy; with which, it is only fair to add, in his own belief and in that of a host of fervent adherents, the greatness of England was closely identified. In his first make-shift Cabinet, all except himself members of the House of Lords, he had not, from various causes, a colleague on whom he could rely for efficient support. It was therefore of great importance to him to find in a near kinsman an able, assiduous, and devoted helper in whom he could absolutely confide. And as the country, recovering from the lassitude and exhaustion which resulted from the American war, began again to turn attention to its Continental interests, and Pitt made his first excursions into the field of foreign politics in which he never found himself quite at home, the need and the value of Grenville's services sensibly increased. And there was another advantage accruing from the association which Pitt probably prized more highly. It brought him the support of a powerful political connexion. Amidst all the selfish aims and freaks of morbid egotism which distorted Lord Buckingham's public conduct, he never wavered in affection for his youngest brother, or in care for his interests. At various times this tie alone kept him steady in his support of Pitt's administration; and it was probably to this family influence with its command of votes in the House of Commons, rather than to his own merits or the Prime Minister's appreciation of them, that Grenville owed his rapid advancement in an official career. Pitt and he, though strongly attached to each other, and having some personal traits in common, differed much in character and sentiment. Grenville was a Whig aristocrat, after the pattern of the statesmen who governed England from the Revolution of 1688 to the death of George II, who regarded France as a natural enemy, and were equally jealous of the Royal prerogative and of everything that savoured of democratic innovation. Although always ready to sacrifice his position in the ministry to Pitt's convenience, no matter how the change might affect his prospects or inclination, on points involving principle or personal conviction he showed himself inflexible even to obstinacy, and incapable of compromise. Pitt's opinions and sympathies were rather those of the great mercantile class whose good opinion he sedulously cultivated. His intellect expanded in peace and found congenial exercise in finance and the development of trade and industry. It seemed to shrivel and become sterilized in the breath of war. By nature and training he was more liberal than Grenville; more pliant in

discussion; but also much more prone to make expediency, which always kept in view his own predominance in the state, the rule of his political conduct. He had talent of a very high order, and transcendent gifts as a Parliamentary leader, without a spark of his father's genius. When the Whig statesmen who had separated from Fox coalesced with Pitt in 1794, they all, with the exception of the Duke of Portland, seem to have found themselves in closer agreement with Lord Grenville than with their chief, or the Tory members of the Cabinet such as Mr. Dundas and Lord Hawkesbury. Lord Spencer and Mr. Windham resigned office with him in 1801 solely on the Catholic question. All of them seem to have accepted indefinite exclusion from office as a consequence of their decision. Lord Grenville sold his town house, and retired to Dropmore, with the declared intention of restricting attendance in Parliament to particular emergencies. Pitt's resignation seems to have been due to various causes, of which the Catholic question was only one. No doubt he would have preferred to make the passing of the Act of Union the occasion of emancipating Irish Catholics. But when after discussion with Lords Clare and Auckland he became persuaded that the measure might more easily be carried through the Irish Parliament on the old lines of Protestant ascendancy, he threw the Catholic cause over. He enlisted Auckland's aid in framing the financial provisions of that Act on this understanding. George III's letter to him approving of his sending Lord Cornwallis to Ireland as Lord Lieutenant to pass that Act, expressly forbade all further concession to Catholics. Pitt knew from what had occurred during Lord FitzWilliam's vice-royalty in 1795 that this aversion was of the strongest kind, deep-rooted in religious scruple. When, however, after an unsuccessful trial, the Irish Government assured him that an Act of Union could not be passed without the help, or at least the neutrality, of the Irish Catholics, the Cabinet under his guidance authorised Lord Castlereagh to assure them that it favoured their claims. Armed with this new means of influence, Cornwallis passed the Act; but Pitt neither informed the King of his change of attitude towards the Catholics, nor the Catholics of the King's continued opposition to their claims. When the time came to redeem the pledge implied in the assurances given by the Irish Government, he hesitated and delayed until the secret was betrayed to the King by the Lord Chancellor, who led a large minority of the Cabinet in unexpected revolt; and the agitation produced by the revelation in the King's mind forced on an explanation. As Pitt afterwards told Canning, this loss of supremacy he had hitherto exercised in his own Cabinet "obliged him to resign."<sup>1</sup> And there appears to have been another which the King and Canning thought the principal motive. General distress

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<sup>1</sup> *Diary and Correspondence of the Earl of Malmesbury*, October 30, 1802.

and discontent caused by a succession of bad harvests, the unpopularity of the war, the isolation of the country consequent on the defeat of its continental allies, and the derangement of national credit, had convinced Pitt of the necessity of peace with France. But in existing circumstances he could not hope to obtain such terms as would satisfy Lord Grenville, and colleagues who shared Grenville's views. As Dundas said, it was desirable in the interests of the party that a new administration should be formed to negotiate peace. It seems clear, also, that Pitt and his more intimate confidants regarded the Addison ministry as a temporary expedient which would facilitate his return to the helm under more favourable circumstances, and, in the mean time, enable him to remain in power though divested of office. Addison, one of his oldest friends and followers, only consented to obey the Royal command at Pitt's earnest solicitation, enforced by an absolute promise of counsel and support. The exact terms of this pledge are not on record; but Pitt informed Canning that it bound him until Addison himself, or the King, or Parliament called on him to form another Government.<sup>1</sup> Before new arrangements were completed in February 1801 the King's reason gave way for some weeks under the strain of excitement. When his Majesty recovered he sent Dr. Willis with a message to Pitt which announced to him this restoration to health and reproached him with causing the illness. Pitt, in Addison's presence, charged Willis with the answer that he would never raise the Catholic question again during his Sovereign's reign. George III expressed satisfaction and relief, and for some days Pitt and those in close touch with him, Dundas, Canning and Rose, expected a Royal command that he should remain in office. But the King said nothing more, and when it was suggested to Addington that he should advise his Majesty to retain Pitt's services as Prime Minister, Addington declined. They could, he replied, offer that counsel themselves and take the responsibility of the effect it might have on the King's health. Pitt then interfered to curb the zeal of impatient adherents and gave up the seals. But he seems to have left Lord Grenville in complete ignorance of the pledge he had given to the King and the expectations he had founded on it.<sup>2</sup> The relations of these two statesmen to the new ministry differed widely from the outset. Pitt was its avowed protector and confidential adviser. Grenville was a candid friend who extended patronage to it on condition of good behaviour. In the minds of personal adherents of both it appears to have excited the same feelings of derision and distrust. Canning would only promise Pitt not to laugh at the new ministers, and seems to have allowed himself some latitude in performance. Lord Grenville's correspondence shows how he failed

<sup>1</sup> *Diary and Correspondence of the Earl of Malmesbury*, October 30, 1802.

<sup>2</sup> *Lord Stanhope's Life of Pitt*.

to reconcile his nearest connexions to his own attitude of toleration. In fact, in point of ability, the new Cabinet presented a very unfavourable contrast to the last. It was composed of the inefficient members of the late Cabinet, Portland, Westmorland, and Chatham, and recruits of more or less promise, but selected mainly on account of conformity to the King's political views. Addison himself, an admirable Speaker of the House of Commons, had made no mark in politics. Lord Hawkesbury, son of the old leader of the "King's friends," now Earl of Liverpool, succeeded Grenville at the Foreign Office. Lord Loughborough, "an engineer hoist with his own petard," found himself, to his great astonishment, not only deprived of the Great Seal which the King gave to Sir John Scott, but altogether excluded from the ministry. Lord Auckland, Loughborough's reputed confederate, "an eternal intriguer," his Majesty said, again missed his aim of Cabinet office; but Lord Hobart, his son-in-law, replaced Dundas as Secretary of State for War. Mr. Pelham, who enjoyed an extraordinary reputation for statesmanship which his political career hardly justified, joined the Cabinet for a short time at the special request of the King; but never seems to have won the confidence of his colleagues, or to have acted cordially with them. But though weak in ability, the new administration possessed in abundance other elements of political strength. Formed on no-Popery and high Tory lines, it enjoyed in complete measure the favour of the Crown. Addington was a minister after the King's own heart. With Pitt's support he commanded large majorities in both Houses of Parliament. The Whig Opposition showed forbearance to a Ministry that was known to desire peace, and, in advocating peace, Fox now represented public opinion. At the same time Addington's courteous and conciliatory manners disarmed personal jealousies and dislikes.

At the outset also Fortune smiled on the new administration. In April intelligence came of two great victories, which lightened the depression caused by a long run of disaster. The first was the sudden breaking up of the "armed neutrality of the North." Lord Spencer had dispatched a powerful fleet under Admirals Parker and Nelson to assail this league at Copenhagen, its most vulnerable point. News of a battle fought by Nelson against the Danes on April 1, was followed in a few days by the receipt of a convention concluded by Parker with the Crown Prince of Denmark, by which the belligerents agreed to suspend hostilities for fourteen weeks, with liberty, if either thought fit, to renew the conflict at the end of that period. Lord Nelson had by this time so accustomed the British public to expect decisive victories at sea, that this apparently lame result of the expedition caused general surprise and dissatisfaction. Lord Grenville wrote to his brother

in high indignation against Admiral Sir Hyde Parker for not having insisted on unconditional submission. Letters, however, soon followed from Captain Fremantle, Nelson's particular friend and second in command during the action, to Lord Buckingham, which threw new light on the transaction and gave it a different complexion.<sup>1</sup> The Danes had defended themselves with the most stubborn valour. At the close of the day Nelson had silenced all their floating batteries; but of his own force seven ships had gone aground, and the others were riddled with shot, and encumbered with killed and wounded. Such also was the direction of the wind, that he could not rejoin Parker without passing under the fire of a formidable land battery which had held its own during the battle. It was Nelson's readiness and resource that not only rescued him from an almost desperate situation, but drew great advantage from it. He sent a message to the Regent that he should have to burn his prizes piled with wounded Danes, unless a truce enabled him to remove them; and he followed it up with his famous letter, "To the brothers of Englishmen, the Danes," which completely captivated the people of Copenhagen. The Regent, yielding to popular pressure, allowed Nelson to bring off his ships and rejoin Parker. But the British fleet could accomplish nothing more by force; and being short of water and other necessaries must, Fremantle wrote, have returned at once to England if the Danish ports remained closed against it. The armistice negotiated by Parker saved it from this necessity, and enabled it to pursue its way into the Baltic. Just then news arrived of the murder of Paul I at St. Petersburg on March 24. This event put an end to the armed neutrality. Count Pahlin, Governor of St. Petersburg, who had organised the conspiracy against Paul, and for a time exercised supreme power in the name of his son Alexander I, removed the embargo from English goods, and sent an intimation to London of the young Czar's willingness to discuss differences in a friendly spirit with a view to an accommodation. Addington, in response to this overture, sent Lord St. Helens to negotiate peace at St. Petersburg as ambassador of George III. And shortly after, Count Simon Woronzow returned to his post as Russian Ambassador at the Court of St. James.

In reference to Paul's assassination, Lord Whitworth wrote to Lord Grenville, with a safe malignity that contrasts painfully with former adulation: "I shall, as long as I live, celebrate as a festival the day on which I learnt the death of that arch-fiend Paul."<sup>2</sup> In the early days of the second coalition the unfortunate monarch seemed to rank in Whitworth's estimation as at least an arch-angel. It would appear from the care taken by the conspirators to conceal the crime, and from hints in Lord St. Helens' despatches, that the feeling it

<sup>1</sup> *Court and Cabinets of George III*, April, 1801.

<sup>2</sup> Page 4.

evoked in Russia, so far from being joy for a national deliverance, was one of mingled indignation and horror. The official announcement to foreign Powers ascribed the death to apoplexy, an ailment which had served the same diplomatic purpose on the occasion of the murder of Paul's father, Peter III. "Really," Talleyrand observed on reading it, "the Russian Government will have to invent another disease." The event, however advantageous to Great Britain, deprived the weaker states of Germany and Italy, whose existence was endangered by rapacity of France or Austria or Prussia, of their only staunch protector. In negotiations then proceeding at Paris, Baron Krudener, the Russian envoy, to Bonaparte's great embarrassment, insisted as conditions of Paul's friendship on the evacuation of Naples and Egypt by the French, and the restoration of Piedmont to the King of Sardinia. The First Consul found Alexander's demands much less exacting. And though by Paul's death he may have lost a precarious alliance, that event removed the strongest curb on his ambition just at the moment when his authority became firmly established in France.<sup>1</sup>

Following fast on the news from the North came intelligence of General Abercromby's brilliant victory of March 21 which demolished French supremacy in Egypt. In this case also military skill and valour had been largely favoured by fortune. Mr. Dundas had originally planned the British expedition with very imperfect knowledge of the difficulties it might have to encounter. A short experience of the hardships and privations involved in the conquest of the country, and, after the battle of the Nile, the interruption of all communication with France, had greatly discouraged Bonaparte's army. After his repulse before Acre, it required all his personal ascendancy over his troops to repress their disgust, and the mutinous spirit of many of his chief officers headed by General Kleber. Yet it was to this officer as the most competent that Bonaparte, on departing for France in the summer of 1799, left the defence of his conquest. Though one of the greatest generals produced by the French Revolution, Kleber was a confirmed grumbler, impatient alike of subordination, and of the labour and responsibility of independent command. Giving free rein to the feelings of anger and depression common to himself and his troops at being condemned to indefinite exile and isolation, he and they in official reports to the Directory, and in private letters, painted the situation of the army in the gloomiest colours; as being reduced one-half in strength, left without money or supplies, and encompassed by enemies. Sir Sidney Smith, commanding the British fleet in Egyptian waters, had correspondents in the French camp. Taking advantage of the ill-humour that reigned there, he brought about an agreement between Kleber and the Grand Vizier commanding the

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<sup>1</sup> Thiers' *Consulate and Empire*.

Turkish forces in Syria, for the evacuation of Egypt by the French army on condition that it was conveyed back to France. In the meantime, however, some of the official despatches and private letters of French officers describing their situation in Egypt as desperate, had been intercepted by British cruisers and sent to England. The British Government, completely deceived, refused to ratify the convention of El Arisch, and ordered Lord Keith, commanding its naval forces in the Mediterranean, to inform Kleber that his army could only be permitted to return to Europe as prisoners of war. As a matter of fact the French general had at his disposal nearly 25,000 veteran troops, well supplied, and in the highest state of efficiency. Indignant at these new conditions which the Vizier seemed determined to impose on him, he destroyed the Turkish army in battle at Heliopolis, re-occupied Cairo, and the whole land, and atoned for past misconduct by establishing a just and firm government which won the respect of the population. An attempt to dislodge the French in these circumstances, of which Dundas had little knowledge, with any force that he could muster for the purpose, afforded little chance of success. It was a far more difficult enterprise than the conquest of Holland which failed in 1799. But in June, 1800, Kleber was assassinated by a Mussulman fanatic, and the supreme government devolved by seniority on perhaps the most incompetent general in the French army, Abdallah Menou. His incapacity being notorious, his chief officers caballed and disputed his orders, and the whole service, civil and military, fell into complete anarchy. The confusion was at its height when Abercromby reached the coast. Contrary winds prevented his landing for a week. But Menou remained with the bulk of his troops at Cairo till the British army had forced a landing, and advanced to a strong position on the road to Alexandria. Then he led a part of his force to attack the British lines, suffered a complete defeat on March 21, and shut himself up in Alexandria. Before despatching the expedition Dundas, better informed in regard to the strength of the French, had limited its object to the capture of the coast towns of Alexandria, Rosetta and Damietta; and on quitting office had advised Addison to attempt nothing more.<sup>1</sup> But Abercromby's victory opened up more splendid results. Two Turkish armies poured into the country to help their British allies. Town after town surrendered to the combined forces, with hardly a show of resistance. General Belliard, commanding a garrison of many thousands of French, gave up Cairo in June at the summons of General Hutchinson, Abercromby's successor, and the Grand Vizier. The terms of capitulation were, in all cases, those which Sir Sidney Smith had been censured and superseded for offering to Kleber and his unbeaten army. The situation, however, seems to have amply

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<sup>1</sup> Pellew's *Life of Lord Sidmouth*.

justified them. The climate and the heat told with terrible effect on General Hutchinson's troops. Of the 12,000 men under Sir David Baird, despatched to their aid from India by Lord Wellesley, less than 4,000 arrived fit for immediate service. And the surrender of Cairo enabled Hutchinson to employ his whole strength in the siege of Alexandria, the last stronghold of French dominion.

In the same month of June, 1801, Lord St. Helens and Count Panin signed a treaty at St. Petersburg which practically ended the quarrel between Great Britain and the Northern Confederacy for the defence of neutral trade. Each party made concessions. Russia gave up two points of the neutral programme: "Free ships make free goods," and the contention that ships of a neutral nation under convoy of a man of war carrying the national flag, should be exempted from search. But on the other hand the right of search was more strictly regulated, and was limited to the navy. Arbitrary seizures were restrained by heavy penalties. Appeals from the awards of Prize Courts were allowed. "Paper blockades" were forbidden; in future the blockading force must be so strong and so stationed as to make an attempt to enter the enemy's port plainly perilous. Naval stores, which formed the staple of northern commerce, and food stuffs were no longer to be classed as "contraband of war." These were the chief articles, and the treaty was generally held to constitute a reasonable settlement. But when communicated by Lord Hawkesbury to Lord Grenville it drew from the latter a long letter of severe criticism and unfavourable comment.

On October 1, after discussions extending over five months, preliminaries of peace between France and England were signed in London by Lord Hawkesbury and M. Otto. One of the chief difficulties of the negotiation had been Bonaparte's refusal to restore Egypt to the Turks. Although the Emperor Paul of Russia had insisted on this point, Alexander did not press it. But all the Consul's efforts to reinforce Menou proved abortive. And news of the capitulation of Alexandria, which reached Paris at the end of September, though unknown in England for some time longer, removed the chief obstacle to the conclusion of peace. Lord Hawkesbury immediately announced the event to Lord Grenville. "We retain possession," he wrote, "of Ceylon and Trinidad; the Cape of Good Hope is to be made a free port; Malta is to be restored to the Order, under the guarantee and protection of a third Power; Egypt is to be restored to the Turks; the integrity of the Turkish Empire and Portugal to be maintained; the kingdom of Naples and the Roman territory to be evacuated by the French armies. I am inclined to hope that, under all the circumstances, you will consider this an honourable peace." On the same day Pitt, in announcing the signature of the treaty to Lord Carrington, described the conditions as "highly honourable and advantageous to the country, although not

perhaps in every point exactly all that was to be wished.”<sup>1</sup> In Lord Grenville they aroused intense indignation. He denounced the surrender of the Cape and Malta as a sacrifice of the honour, interests, and even safety of the monarchy. His brothers were equally unmeasured in condemnation. Before deciding, however, how the treaty should affect his relations with the ministry, he wrote to his principal colleagues in the late Cabinet to gather their opinions. Pitt defended it as highly expedient in existing circumstances. Dundas’s reply, marked *secret and confidential*, was characteristic. He emphatically condemned the concessions to France, but declared his intention to refrain from all censure, private as well as public, so as not to weaken an administration acceptable to the King. Lord Spencer and Mr. Windham having expressed full concurrence in his views, Lord Grenville gave notice to Mr. Addington of his intention to oppose the policy of Government in its dealings with Russia and France. He did so when Parliament met in an elaborate speech, which, after undergoing careful revision, was published by Cobbett, editor of the *Porcupine*, the most virulent assailant of Addington in the ranks of the press. But it produced little immediate effect. Public opinion was almost unanimous for peace. A mere handful of peers followed Lord Grenville in the House of Lords. In the House of Commons Windham did not venture to divide. The most distinguished military and naval commanders who had an opportunity of expressing their views—Lords Cornwallis, Moira, St. Vincent and Nelson—warmly approved the action of the ministry. In regard to the Cape, Pitt and Grenville were both consistent in the lines they pursued. During the conferences at Lille in 1797, Pitt had secretly authorised Lord Malmesbury to restore that colony to the Dutch in spite of Grenville’s official instructions to the contrary. But as to Malta, Grenville himself during the siege of Valetta had repeatedly disclaimed any intention on the part of the British Government to keep possession of the island. And although the disasters of the continental war seem at a later period to have suggested a more selfish policy, there had been no public announcement of a change of purpose. Besides, the British Government could only keep the island by setting aside the sovereign rights of its ally the King of the Two Sicilies, who contributed troops and ships for the capture of the fortress of Valetta on the understanding that, when taken, it should be restored to the Knights of St. John. Henceforth, however, Lord Grenville seems to have assailed the ministry with a personal animosity which it is not easy to account for, considering that the provocation was merely a political difference in which his opponents had the nation on their side. Addington and Hawkesbury had spared no pains to retain his goodwill. They had offered

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<sup>1</sup> Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville, Oct. 4, 1801.

an embassy to his brother, and to his brother-in-law, and given appointments to Mr. Wickham and other friends whose fortunes he had recommended to their care. Even when not agreeing with him, they had invariably shown deference to his counsels. But it would appear from his correspondence that from the moment of their opening negotiations with Russia, and more particularly with France, he watched their proceedings with contemptuous distrust. The fact seems to be that hatred of the French Revolution, and of Bonaparte especially, had mastered his judgment, and distorted his political vision. He could only see in the First Consul "a tiger let loose to devour mankind," and in the Consular Government "a band of robbers and assassins" that neither could or would make peace.<sup>1</sup> It should be recollected that, at this period at least, the Consular Government was probably the best France had seen for many centuries. It found the country at war with all the great powers of Europe except Spain and Prussia, convulsed by internal discord, and in imminent peril of being over-run and partitioned. It used the victories it gained to make peace with foreign nations; while at home it reorganised the State, reformed law, re-established tranquillity, order, and public credit, and restored religion.

Having liberated his mind by a public declaration against the Government, Lord Grenville retired to Dropmore and found solace during several months in literary and rural pursuits.

In November, 1801, Lord Cornwallis, who had thrown up the vice-royalty of Ireland, went to Paris at Mr. Addington's urgent request, as Ambassador Extraordinary, to complete the work of pacification begun in London. After a cordial welcome from all classes of the French population, and a long conference with the First Consul at the Tuileries, he repaired to Amiens to conclude with Joseph Bonaparte a definite treaty between the Republic and George III.

Addington, while leaning mainly on Pitt, lost no opportunity of strengthening his position by conciliating Whig opponents and, if possible, converting them into friends. Although Mr. Grey and Lord Moira declined his offers of seats in the Cabinet, several of the Whig leaders, more conspicuously Mr. Sheridan, and Mr. Tierney, gave him active support in the House of Commons with the avowed purpose of excluding Pitt from office. During debate on the Budget, a fierce attack on Pitt's finance by Tierney, but faintly repelled, as it was thought, by Addington, deeply incensed the late Prime Minister, and brought him up from Walmer in February, 1802, to obtain explanations from his successor, which apparently allayed his resentment. While in town he called on Thomas Grenville and expressed great apprehensions of the danger threatening the country from Bonaparte's hostility and ambition. Mr. Grenville, in reporting this conversation to Dropmore, remonstrated with his brother for relinquishing by a life of seclusion all opportunity of

<sup>1</sup> *Court and Cabinets of George III.*

influencing the political action of his old leader.<sup>1</sup> Shortly afterwards a motion in the House of Commons reflecting on Lord Wellesley's proceedings in India, afforded an occasion for consultation which each of the estranged statesmen willingly seized. But although in conference at Dropmore they thoroughly agreed as to the danger to which the monarchy was exposed by Bonaparte's designs, they disagreed in regard to the policy that should be adopted. Pitt still thought peace highly advantageous if combined with vigilance and preparations for war; Grenville saw in it only inevitable ruin. But the meeting revived old habits of confidential discussion, and the interchange of friendly visits to Walmer and Dropmore.

The circumstances which thus troubled the pacific leanings of Pitt, had, as may be supposed, a disturbing effect on the negotiations at Amiens. One of Bonaparte's chief motives in making peace with England was a desire to restore the foreign trade and maritime power of France, almost annihilated during the revolutionary war; and the colonial dominion by which, according to ideas prevalent at that time, external commerce was best maintained and secured. But in pursuing an object vitally affecting the prosperity of the country he ruled, with his habitual energy and thoroughness, he showed a very impolitic disregard of British interests and susceptibilities. Hardly had the preliminaries of peace been signed when he despatched a large naval armament, carrying 25,000 troops, to bring more completely under his authority the French settlements in the West Indies; and especially the great island of St. Domingo, where Toussaint L'Ouverture, a Black of extraordinary merit, had established a negro republic only nominally subject to France. This display of naval force, ostentatious rather than formidable, as most of the men-of-war were only equipped as transports, aroused apprehension and clamour in England as a menace to British possessions, and provoked remonstrances from Lord Hawkesbury.<sup>2</sup> Explanations were given and finally accepted, but some mutual ill-humour remained. About the same time it became known, and excited jealous comment, that the Consul, by treaty with Spain, had acquired Louisiana in North America, and the island of Elba in the Mediterranean. More serious cause of dissatisfaction was given by the Consul's policy in regard to international trade. Early in the late war, the Committee of Public Safety had excluded English merchantmen from French ports by a decree which punished attempts to evade it by the confiscation of ships and cargoes, and the imprisonment of crews. It was assumed in England that these hostile regulations would be repealed or relaxed at the restoration of peace; and English merchantmen crowded French ports, only to find the prohibitive penalties strictly

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<sup>1</sup> Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville, February 24, 1802.

<sup>2</sup> Thiers' *Consulate and Empire*,

enforced. This harsh treatment naturally excited loud complaints. Cambacères, the 2nd Consul, Bonaparte's wisest adviser, suggested to him to supplement the political by a commercial treaty with England. Addington also, sincerely anxious for the success of his pacific policy, strongly hinted the necessity of such a measure to M. Otto in London. But Bonaparte, listening only to the interested cries of French manufacturers, refused adequate concessions; and the commercial class in England soon began to feel that peace with France had assumed a form of hostility more dangerous to their interests than war, which had given them almost a monopoly of the maritime trade of Europe.

This sense of disappointment and danger, affecting an interest on which the revenue and naval supremacy of the monarchy so largely depended, seems to have powerfully influenced the action of Pitt; and, more than anything else, strengthened the hands of the war party in England.

In the winter of 1801 the First Consul proceeded to Lyons to meet the delegates of the Cisalpine Republic. Amid scenes of extraordinary enthusiasm he was acclaimed as President of the state he had called into existence, and which now assumed the more ambitious title of the Italian Republic. His return to Paris was welcomed with public rejoicings; and all France responded soon after to the applause of the capital, confirming by a popular vote the decree of the Senate which made him First Consul for life. The growing power of one who had so lately been the most terrible enemy of their country, and with whom its present relations were so precarious, could not fail to arouse jealousy and misgiving in leading English politicians.

On the other hand Bonaparte found in the license of French newspapers published in London, the *Ambigu* and the *Courier de Londres*, a grievance to which he was morbidly sensitive, and which operated on his Corsican temperament with a violence that had its natural issue in war. After his rejection of the appeals made to him by the exiled French princes in 1800 to restore the Bourbon monarchy in France, an extreme section of their followers had hatched the plot of the infernal machine from which he narrowly escaped with life. He attributed the attempt to the Chouan chief Georges Cadoudal, acting with the sanction of Count d'Artois, in abuse of the shelter and support accorded to them by the British Government, as allies against the Republic. The *Ambigu*, an organ of the exiles, edited by M. Peltier, continued, after peace had been made, to assail the French ruler and his family with a latitude of vituperation and insult which sometimes outraged decency, and threw him into transports of anger. And when the British ministry, from whatever cause, evaded his demands that they should expel Peltier under the *Alien Act*, and remove Cadoudal and his followers to Canada, he regarded this denial as clear evidence of English ill-will. All

these causes of dissatisfaction had an injurious effect on the negotiations at Amiens. Discussion dragged on during several months. Both Governments made new demands, and insisted more obstinately on others that had remained unsettled. Neither any longer showed itself eager to smooth away difficulties. One article which had been agreed on in London, a Russian garrison at Malta, had to be abandoned. Alexander, having formed a Council of State composed of old Ministers of Catherine II, turned his attention by their advice to the domestic affairs of his empire, and avoided foreign entanglements which did not immediately concern Russian interests. He suggested, however, that the King of Naples, as suzerain of Malta, should be asked to furnish a garrison, until the restored Knights could command a sufficient force for its defence. This solution was adopted. It was also agreed that the island should be declared neutral, and placed under the guardianship of the six principal European powers. It was only, however, through the patient striving and combined personal influence of Lord Cornwallis and Joseph Bonaparte that a definite treaty was signed at Amiens in March, 1802.<sup>1</sup> Their labours were not altogether barren. Peace was prolonged for another year. But it was peace rendered daily more precarious by the increasing jealousy and distrust of one of the parties, and the increasing irritation of the other. Though fiercely denounced by Lord Grenville and Mr. Windham, the treaty, being supported by Pitt and Fox and the great body of public opinion, was approved by immense majorities in both Houses of Parliament. Mr. Dundas, now in confidential relations with Addington, from whom he, to Pitt's astonishment, accepted a peerage, went out of his way with the zeal of a convert, to sneer at the "new Opposition," as the Grenville party was called, as a factious clique; an unprovoked insult which terminated the more or less friendly connexion which had existed for twenty years between Lord Grenville and himself.

Hardly had peace been proclaimed between France and England when Bonaparte's over-vaulting ambition furnished new cause of dissension. By the treaty of Luneville, Switzerland, which the revolutionary spirit, aided by a French army, had transformed into a democratic State, styling itself the Helvetic Republic, recovered its independence. When the French troops withdrew from the country the adherents of the Federal system took arms, defeated the democrats, and summoned a Diet to restore the old constitution. Both parties appealed to Bonaparte, the beaten for aid, and the victors for forbearance. After hesitating for some time, he again sent an army into the country, assumed the office of mediator, and summoned delegates from both factions to Paris to aid him in framing a new constitution which all might accept. The Federalists appealed

<sup>1</sup> Despatches of Lord Cornwallis from Amiens, December, 1802, to March, 1803.

for aid to the Emperor, as immediately concerned in the treaty of Luneville, and to other European sovereigns who had been their allies. Lord Hawkesbury, on behalf of Great Britain, not only instructed Mr. Merry, the English Minister at Paris, to deliver a sharp remonstrance, but sent Mr. Moore, of the Foreign Office, as special envoy to Switzerland to encourage national resistance, without being in a position to render any effectual support. The other Governments appealed to accepted Bonaparte's explanations. Abandoned by the Emperor, their natural protector, the insurgents disbanded their troops; and a new constitution framed at Paris on the old federal lines restored general tranquility. But the Consul's violation of a recent treaty, and his contemptuous treatment of Hawkesbury's remonstrance, hurt national pride in England, and quickened a sense of insecurity; while the diatribes of the English press stung Bonaparte to fury.

In the course of the same year the First Consul incorporated Piedmont with France; took possession of Parma on the death of the Duke, in virtue of the arrangement with Spain which had made the Duke's heir King of Etruria; and, by threat of invasion, reduced Godoy Duke of Alcudia, who governed Spain by the favour of the Queen, to the condition of a French puppet.

But it was in Germany that the extraordinary ascendancy Bonaparte had already acquired in European politics was most strikingly exhibited. The opening years of the 19th century saw the Roman empire of the West, which for a thousand years since its re-establishment by Charlemagne, had claimed, and in some measure maintained a supremacy in the political system of Europe, crumble to pieces under his blows. The French Directory had purchased, the neutrality of Frederick William II, King of Prussia, by a secret agreement that he and other lay princes who ceded territory on the left bank of the Rhine to France, should be supported by the victorious republic in obtaining compensation for their losses by the secularization of ecclesiastical property within the empire. The Emperor had baffled the project for a time by dilatory discussion at the Congress of Rastadt.<sup>1</sup> But Bonaparte embodied this principle of compensations in an article of the treaty of Luneville, which the German Diet was compelled to ratify; extending the benefit of it afterwards to the dispossessed Grand Duke of Tuscany and the Prince of Orange. And by another treaty concluded between France and Russia in October, 1801, Alexander I agreed to co-operate with the Consul in framing a scheme to give that article effect. At the beginning of the 19th century Germany was still governed by a Roman Emperor Elect, and a Diet composed of three colleges, of electors, princes, and free cities. The free cities owed their political existence to the Emperors, who enfranchised them in the Middle Ages to counterbalance the power of their great territorial vassals. In modern times

<sup>1</sup> See Vols. III. and IV. *Dropmore Papers.*

most of them had sunk into complete insignificance. The Electoral College contained three ecclesiastics, the Archbishop of Mayence, Treves, and Cologne, and five lay electors, representing Bohemia, Brandenburg, Saxony, Hanover and Bavaria. The College of Princes was composed of Dukes, Landgraves, Margraves, and a host of Bishops, Abbots, and other richly endowed churchmen, staunch adherents, as were also the ecclesiastical electors, of the House of Austria. By the scheme drawn up at Paris the electorates of Cologne and Treves, having been despoiled of their domains by France were abolished. The Elector of Mayence, *ex-officio* Arch-Chancellor of the Empire, though his see had also been despoiled, was allowed to retain his dignity, and given the bishopric of Ratisbon and other emoluments for its support. The College of Princes and that of free cities were dealt with in the same revolutionary spirit. The rich bishopric of Munster, and a multitude of abbeys and free cities in Westphalia, of far greater value than the territory he had ceded to France, were shorn of their rights and dignities, and handed over to the King of Prussia. Wholesale confiscations of the same kind in Bavaria and Suabia enriched the Elector and the Dukes of Wirtemberg and Baden, and swelled these two duchies into new electorates. But the Emperor's brother, the late Arch-Duke of Tuscany, received in the bishopric of Saltzburg only a very inadequate compensation for his losses in Italy, and that partly at the expense of his own family. This plan, being accepted by the Czar, was presented to the Diet in the names of France and Russia, with an intimation that it should be ratified within three months. In vain the Emperor and the despoiled sovereigns protested against a scheme which subverted the constitution of the Empire, destroyed the balance of power, and was in itself so unequal and unfair. Bonaparte turned a deaf ear to all remonstrance. Alexander showed more sympathy. But Baron Thugut's policy had completely estranged the Russian Court from that of Vienna. And the Czar himself was bound to the King of Prussia and the Electors of Bavaria, Wirtemberg and Baden, by personal or political ties. Finally, Saltzburg having also been made an electorate, and additional territory awarded to the dispossessed rulers of Tuscany and Modena, the new arrangements were accepted by Austria in a treaty concluded with France and Russia in December, 1803. The Elector of Hanover who had lost no territory, was awarded the great bishopric of Osnaburg as a peace-offering. But the British Government found itself excluded from all participation in a European settlement which virtually accomplished what had been the constant aim of French statesmen since the beginning of the 16th century, and to the attainment of which Richelieu especially had bent all the force of his genius, the overthrow of the Imperial sway of the House of Austria. Lord Grenville did not fail to enlarge

on a circumstance so humiliating to national pride in order to discredit the ministry. As a result of retarding influences Lord Whitworth and General Andreossi who had been appointed ambassadors to Paris and London soon after the treaty of Amiens was signed, did not proceed to their respective destinations until more than seven months had elapsed since the conclusion of peace.

During the summer and autumn of 1802 some of Pitt's intimate friends grew daily more urgent with him to resume the direction of public affairs. Pitt fully concurred with them that the time had come for his return to office; but his pledges to Addington bound him hand and foot, as neither the king, nor the public, nor the prime minister himself showed the slightest desire for any change of administration. Lord Malmesbury and Canning therefore set themselves to compel or persuade Addington to relinquish his post.<sup>1</sup> Pitt had been seriously unwell during the summer. It was arranged that he should repair to Bath, as well for the restoration of his strength, as to escape from his compromising position of standing counsel to the ministry, whose reputation for wisdom had not been raised by Lord Hawkesbury's injudicious meddling in Swiss affairs. Before he left Walmer Lord Grenville arrived there, not acting in concert with the others, but not less eager that his old chief should wrest the helm of state from incompetent hands which were letting it drift on political breakers. In the course of discussion Pitt sounded Grenville as to their uniting to form a new ministry, which should include Addington and some of his colleagues, and exclude the Catholic question from its programme. Grenville asked time to consult the leading members of the "new Opposition" before giving a definite answer. On his part he seems to have converted Pitt to his avowed opinion that the safety of the country required the permanent, or at least continued, occupation of Malta, Alexandria, and the Cape of Good Hope by British garrisons, in breach of the treaty of Amiens. At Bath Pitt found himself surrounded by friends intent on paving the way for his return to office. With the view of preparing the king for a change of ministers, Lord Malmesbury opened the subject in confidence to the Duke of York, who expressed warm approbation of the design; but being too cautious to entangle himself in political intrigue, suggested that some man of high political standing, some other Duke for preference, should wait on Addington, and impress on him the expediency of giving place to Pitt. The nearest approach to another Duke available seems to have been the Lord Chancellor; who, on being asked to undertake the mission, required time for consideration. Then Canning, giving effect in a more general form to the Duke of York's suggestion, drew up an address to the Prime Minister, which, having been shown by Malmesbury

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<sup>1</sup> *Lord Malmesbury's Diary and Correspondence.*

to Pitt, Lords Morpeth and Levison Gower carried round to influential members of both Houses of Parliament for their signatures. But the movement had little success; and at Pitt's request, was not persevered in. Meantime Lord Grenville had informed his brothers of the overture made to him at Walmer. Lord Buckingham earnestly deprecated such a coalition as that proposed by Pitt on the ground that it must inflict irreparable damage on Lord Grenville's public character. And this view prevailing at a meeting of the chiefs of the "New Opposition" at Stowe, Lord Grenville wrote to Pitt declaring himself bound by it, but offering to support any administration Pitt might form. Pitt's reply expressed deep regret for the decision come to at Stowe. But, he added, that he had changed his mind in regard to his own line of conduct, since the conference at Walmer. The refusal of the other European powers to interfere in Switzerland showed that war with France could only be undertaken now under most unfavourable circumstances. He thought, therefore, that any measure, such as a refusal to evacuate Alexandria, which would certainly provoke immediate hostilities, should be avoided; and while peace was maintained, he saw no public benefit that could accrue from his resumption of office. It may be noticed here that when, in conversation at Bath, Lord Malmesbury made some disparaging remark about Lord Grenville, Pitt spoke in the highest terms of the qualities of his former colleague, and declared that he could not dispense with his assistance.<sup>1</sup>

In a hostile atmosphere at Bath Pitt seemed for a time determined to break with Addison. He returned, unopened, papers submitted to him by Lord Hawkesbury on the plea of want of access to other sources of information. But the Prime Minister sent his brother Hiley, and Lord Castlereagh who had joined the Cabinet, on missions to his imperious protector, and by these marks of deference deferred a rupture. In fact Pitt had no cause of complaint against Addison that did not arise almost inevitably out of the situation he himself had created. He was impatient of Addington's reluctance to relinquish the position of Prime Minister, fully sharing the conviction expressed by Lord Grenville, Mr. Canning, and other ardent friends, that he alone could save Great Britain from the perils to which it was exposed from Bonaparte's ambition. But it was hardly reasonable to expect that Addison should see the situation in the same light. Addison had resigned the Speakership without compensation, at the earnest request of the King, and Pitt's own urgent entreaties, in order, as he seems to have believed, to rescue his Sovereign from a situation which threatened his reason, if not his life. He was naturally elated by the extraordinary marks of Royal favour showered on him, by his large majorities in Parliament, and by the success of his administration at

<sup>1</sup> *Diary and Correspondence of the Earl of Malmesbury.*

home and abroad. The condition of the country had improved rapidly under his government. He had given no pledges to Pitt, and had done nothing to forfeit the benefit of the pledges given to himself. For the ministry had deferred to Pitt's counsels with a docility, or rather servility, sometimes discreditable to themselves and injurious to the state. When he arrived at Bath fresh from contact with Grenville, Pitt advised them to hold possession of Alexandria and the Cape. Orders to this effect were immediately despatched from London to the officers in command at both places. When the order reached Cape Town, the new Dutch governor and garrison had landed; the British garrison had nearly all embarked; and the latter rushed back from the transports before the eyes of the astonished Dutchmen<sup>1</sup> to resume possession. From Alexandria, Colonel Sebastiani, a French agent, reported to Bonaparte late in November that the British commander had no instructions to quit the place, although the time fixed for evacuation by the treaty of Amiens had long elapsed. Then Pitt, on being informed of the decision come to at Stowe, suddenly changed his mind. The ministry, he wrote again, should limit their measures of precaution to more than ordinary vigilance and preparation. A new arrangement, he added, must be made in regard to Malta. The War Office immediately countermanded its recent orders, and both the Cape and Alexandria were evacuated in February, 1803. The intimation from Bath regarding Malta was followed with the same implicit obedience.

Addington's finance was another sore point with Pitt. Two plentiful harvests had now followed seasons of dearth in England. Discontent calmed down. Trade and revenue flourished, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer's statement, in introducing his Budget, exhibited a picture of national prosperity in some respects over-coloured, and apparently unfair to his predecessor. Pitt also seems to have resented the complacency with which Addington listened to compliments from Opposition leaders, and especially to Sheridan's brilliant speeches, bristling with invective against the late ministry, as want of loyalty to himself. But then, as Addington's friends remarked, it was his own intentional absence from Parliament for the purpose of avoiding close communication with the ministry, which had deprived him of opportunities for rectifying mistakes, and answering personal attacks. At Christmas Pitt left Bath, and after brief visits to Lords Malmesbury and Grenville, went on to Bromley to stay with Mr. Long, a common friend of Addington and himself. He appears to have been still in favour of maintaining peace. A few years more of tranquillity, he told Lord Malmesbury, would so improve the financial condition of England as to enable the country to bear the strain

<sup>1</sup> Colonel Moore, to the Marquis of Buckingham, *Court and Cabinets of George III.*

of war, no matter how prolonged. At Bromley he met Addison, apparently on their old friendly footing, and he spent some days at Richmond Lodge which the King had given to his favourite minister for life, as a country residence. But Addington, though he must have known of the movement for Pitt's return to office, avoided allusion to the subject, except by a hurried word at parting, which signified nothing. Pitt went back to Walmer decidedly out of humour with this unexpected reticence. And, excepting a confidential letter of advice to his brother Lord Chatham, held no communication with any member of the Government during the next two months.

Meanwhile the relations of France and Great Britain grew rapidly worse, in the absence of any attempt on the part of the British Government to improve them, or avoid a rupture. The mortifying rebuff he had suffered in connexion with Switzerland, and a determination in accordance with Pitt's advice not to carry out the articles agreed on at Amiens in respect of Malta, seem to have extinguished Lord Hawkesbury's pacific inclinations. Certain it is that, judging from the instructions given to him on going to Paris in November, 1802, Lord Whitworth was not sent as ambassador from one friendly power to another for the purpose of maintaining peace and concord; but rather as an emissary, amply provided with the means of corruption, to discover, under the guise of amicable intercourse, all that could be learnt of the resources, designs, difficulties, and alliances of a deadly foe. He was also charged to advert in official conference with Talleyrand to the aggrandisement of France since the treaty of Amiens, and report the answer; to avoid all reference to Malta; and to insist on the right of the British Government to make its voice heard in all political changes affecting the Continent.<sup>1</sup>

It is not easy to see why Lord Whitworth was selected for such an important mission. His painstaking docility had commended him to Lord Grenville's favour. But in the whole of the Dropmore correspondence there is not a word of testimony to his professional ability or adroitness. And it would have been difficult to find a diplomatist less capable of forming an impartial opinion of the character, designs, and difficulties of the Consular Government. He went to France, as his despatches show, with an honest conviction that he was about to confront the "Corsican ogre," a fiend incarnate without a redeeming quality. His reception by the French authorities at Calais, by the population along his route, and by M. de Talleyrand, Minister for Foreign Affairs, at Paris, was most cordial. But other official arrangements deferred his audience at the Tuileries for three weeks.

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<sup>1</sup> Hawkesbury to Whitworth, November, 1802; Whitworth to Hawkesbury, November 16.—*F.O. Despatches.*

And during this interval, as might be expected from the tenour of his instructions and his own prepossessions, he found himself inhaling a political atmosphere charged with all the rancours, jealousies, and delusions of beaten parties in a period of revolution. His earlier reports are, in truth, curious examples of prejudice and credulity. Arriving in the French capital about the same time as Colonel Sebastiani's report from Alexandria of the continued occupation of that city by British troops, he announced to Hawkesbury, as an ascertained fact, that the First Consul, with the assent of the Czar and the connivance of the Turks, had decided on another French expedition to Egypt. The British Government, he urged, should send a powerful fleet to watch Toulon and guard the Adriatic. Bonaparte, whom he had not yet seen, he represented as a "duplicate of Paul," a madman swayed by evil passions.<sup>1</sup> A week in Paris, however, seems to have wrought a remarkable change in the Ambassador's view of the situation. He had lost all fear of Bonaparte, he wrote, on December 1, and merely despised him. The Corsican was so distrusted and contemned at home and abroad, his financial difficulties were so desperate, that peace would serve British purposes, and accomplish his destruction, more surely than war. He could not replace the army which had just perished in St. Domingo. But though helpless from exhausted resources, the man's blind ambition would drive him on to ruin. Let the British Government hold Malta and Alexandria and all his hostile designs would be baffled. In a later report, a midnight broil in the streets of Paris is adduced as proof that all France was ripe for revolt. On the day preceding that fixed for his official reception at the Tuileries, the ambassador seems to have been screwing up his courage for a great ordeal. Bonaparte's mortification, he wrote, December 5, on account of the reverse at St. Domingo, his jealousy and hatred of English prosperity and of the love of the British people for George III, would, no doubt, be all discharged on himself. But seeing the base arts by which the Consul's favour was courted by other powers, he would glory as an Englishman in being made an exception. Two days afterwards, however, in describing his public reception, and subsequent dinner *en famille*, at the Tuileries, he could find nothing to object to. In fact, during the whole period of his embassy Bonaparte, all the members of the ruling family, and the French Ministers appear to have treated Lord Whitworth and the Duchess of Dorset with great personal courtesy. But the ambassador's animosity to the First Consul never relaxed. He went so far as to "shut his doors" on Lord Lauderdale, and other distinguished English visitors to Paris, who showed a disposition to promote

<sup>1</sup> Whitworth to Hawkesbury, November 16, 22, and 27, 1802.—*F.O. Despatches.*

cordial relations with the French Government; making an exception only in favour of the Duke of Bedford, whose high rank and estimable character seem to have compelled his respect. His despatches continued to run in the same vein. Bonaparte had fallen into universal contempt and utter impotence; but his furious passions, and especially his hatred of England impel him to persist in projects which lead inevitably to destruction. Occasionally this monotony of depreciation was seasoned with malevolent gossip in regard to the Consul's private life. He is depicted as leading a solitary existence, unloving and unloved; immersed in trivialities; devoting three or four hours every day to the perusal of private letters intercepted in the post-office, in order that he may find matter for the torment of his nearest relatives, as well as of everyone else within the sphere of his baneful influence. Of the able ruler, even of the man with ordinary human attributes, we have not a glimpse. We have a raging monster, rushing headlong into an abyss, "a scourge to himself and to the nation which for its punishment he has subdued to his will."<sup>1</sup> Curiously enough, Lord Hawkesbury seems to have accepted this hideous caricature as a true portrait. He told Lord Malmesbury at a royal levée that Bonaparte was mad. That, Malmesbury replied, was just what another British ambassador reported to his father about Frederick the Great of Prussia.<sup>2</sup> The only measure of the French Government in which Whitworth could see anything to commend was the new Swiss constitution framed at Paris. It was better, he wrote, than might have been expected; but he attributed this result altogether to the circumstance that the universal admiration excited by the dignified attitude of the British Government had held Bonaparte in awe. In a *most secret* despatch dated December 31, 1802, he reported having engaged an *individual* known to Hawkesbury, to supply him with information of Bonaparte's plans, difficulties, and resources, for a monthly payment of 200*l.* The despatches afford no clue by which this anonymous personage can be identified, nor indeed is he referred to again. One of the worst features of the Revolution, and not the least of Bonaparte's difficulties and dangers was the utter corruption of public life in France. He had to dismiss one of his oldest friends, M. de Bourrienne, from the post of private secretary, for betraying his confidence; and his brother Lucien Bonaparte from the post of Minister of the Interior, for peculation. The shameless rapacity of his two ablest ministers, Talleyrand and Fouché, was well known not only to himself but to every Government in Europe. But though sometimes in disgrace, they knew how to recover favour by divining and flattering his schemes of personal ambition, and making their services indispensable. These are

<sup>1</sup> Whitworth to Hawkesbury, January 17, 1803.—*F.O. Despatches.*

<sup>2</sup> *Lord Malmesbury's Diary.*

notorious cases. But there is evidence in Lord Grenville's correspondence that more than one French politician who figures in history as a man of austere Republican virtue, had been at one time or another during the revolutionary war in secret communication with the British Government for the promotion of the Royalist cause. In the same despatch Lord Whitworth announced that he had sent agents in the guise of merchants to visit the chief towns on the French sea-board, especially Brest and the Channel ports, and furnish reports in regard to naval preparations. He had tried, he wrote, to use the American consuls for the purpose, but failed.

Up to this time Lord Whitworth's official intercourse with the French Government appears to have been unruffled by any inconvenient inquiry in regard to British delays in giving effect to the treaty of Amiens. In fact, owing to the negligence of the French Foreign Office, the guarantees for the neutrality of Malta, stipulated in that treaty, had not been obtained. In January, 1803, however, Talleyrand earnestly entreated the British Ambassador, in the interests of peace and goodwill, to have some check placed on the offensive proceedings of French princes in England; and on outrageous attacks on the First Consul not only by French newspapers published in London, but also by reputed organs of Government in the English press. And as the preliminary conditions agreed on with respect to Malta had now been accomplished by the election of a new Grand-Master and the guarantee obtained from the great powers, he asked when the British Government would restore that island to the Knights of St. John.<sup>1</sup> Whitworth referred the question to London. At the end of the month Colonel Sebastiani returned to Paris from his Eastern mission, and, a few days later, his confidential report to the French Government appeared in the *Moniteur*. This official publication of it gave Lord Hawkesbury an opportunity he was not slow to use. On February 9 he wrote to Whitworth that the treaty of Amiens had been negotiated in view of the actual possessions of France and England, and of the treaties by which the parties were bound. The French Government had since by its aggressions altered the balance of power, and therefore the British Government, by the law of nations, had a right to compensation. Nevertheless, the British Government was preparing to withdraw its garrison from Malta when the publication by authority of Colonel Sebastiani's report completely altered the situation. That report was so filled with false insinuations, and disclosed such hostile designs in regard to Egypt, that the British Government could not discuss the subject of Malta till satisfactory explanations had relieved its anxiety with respect to the policy of the First Consul. At the same time there

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<sup>1</sup> Whitworth to Hawkesbury, January 27, 1803.—*F.O. Despatches.*

appeared in the London *Morning Post* a violent article against Bonaparte which Whitworth, when Talleyrand drew his attention to it, pronounced to be "anarchy of the press" not liberty, and worthy of condign punishment.<sup>1</sup> As to Sebastiani's report, apart from any significance attaching to its publication in the *Moniteur*, it is not easy now to discover all the hostile meanings read into it in a moment of intense excitement and suspicion. The writer himself seized the first opportunity of disclaiming to Whitworth any intention of insulting the British army. Talleyrand earnestly assured the ambassador that the Consul had no designs upon Egypt, and that her financial state made peace absolutely necessary to France. He attributed anything in the report that appeared offensive in England to the zeal of a young officer who interpreted the presence of British troops in Alexandria as a declaration of war. And he asked what satisfaction the British Government required. This was a question Whitworth could not answer. A few days afterwards Bonaparte invited him to a personal conference at the Tuileries. The Consul expressed disappointment that the treaty of Amiens had only produced jealousy and distrust. He would never acquiesce in a British occupation of Alexandria or Malta. He would rather see the British Government in possession of the Faubourg St. Antoine. As to the persistent abuse of the London press, he did not, he said, so much complain of English newspapers as of French Royalist publications which openly aimed at rekindling civil war in France. Instead of sending Georges Cadoudal and his Chouans to Canada, as had been frequently promised, the British Government allowed them to remain in England in the enjoyment of pensions, hatching plots for his assassination. Every wind that blew from England brought him nothing but hatred. As to Egypt, he said, the continued occupation of Alexandria had already given him a fair pretext for sending 25,000 troops to aid the Turks in recovering that city. But Egypt was not worth the risk of war, and must on the break-up of the Ottoman empire fall to France. He had nothing to gain by a renewal of war, which he could only wage by a descent on England, in which the chances would be 100 to 1 against him. But he would risk destruction rather than suffer a breach of the treaty of Amiens. If peace were to be maintained, the conditions of that treaty must be observed, the French press in London curbed, and the protection now given to French conspirators in England withdrawn. This vehement address, which, as events proved, truly and frankly expressed the mind of the speaker, seems to have overwhelmed the ambassador. In reporting it to London, while admitting that there had been no lack of personal courtesy, he called it bluster, and therefore a sign of weakness. But his only effective retort to the catalogue of French grievances was a complaint of delay in

<sup>1</sup> Whitworth to Hawkesbury, February 11, 1803.—*F.O. Despatches.*

satisfying claims of English merchants. A few days afterwards Bonaparte allowed himself to insert in his annual statement to the Legislative Assembly a wanton and most unseasonable boast of the superior power of France which could not fail to arouse national spirit in England, and stiffen the attitude of its Government. News of the British evacuation of Alexandria somewhat cleared the air. But on March 3 Whitworth called Hawkesbury's attention to a most scurrilous attack on Bonaparte in the *Courier de Londres*. If war broke out, he wrote, it would be owing to the effect on the Consul's temper of such abominable insults rather than to any political cause. Such power for working evil, he insisted, should not be allowed to an obscure paragraph writer. The emigrants seemed bent on forcing on a rupture for their own ends, and the Alien Act should be used to check their wicked designs.<sup>1</sup> So sensible indeed was the ambassador of the provocation given by the press in London, that he seems to have purposely refrained from remonstrating with Talleyrand against violent articles against the British Government which the First Consul, in retaliation, published in the *Moniteur*. On March 5 he sent a report of another interview with the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, on whom he had called to announce, as instructed, that Bonaparte having avowed hostile designs on Egypt (in his speech to Whitworth at the Tuileries) the British Government would keep Malta until security was given for its Eastern possessions. Talleyrand again disclaimed the intention imputed to the Consul. France, he said, was in no condition to provoke war with England, Russia and Turkey. He again asked what security was required, and offered to discuss any proposal of the British Government, as for instance, a European guarantee of the Ottoman empire, other than the retention of Malta to which France would never consent. Hawkesbury should now, Whitworth wrote, bring forward some definite demand. There was no appearance, he added, of warlike preparation in the French ports. The arsenals were empty. The fleets, dispersed at sea, were ricketty, ill-found, and under-manned. The Consul had no money to equip them properly. On March 7, however, a message from George III to Parliament declared an intention of arming in self-defence, in view of preparations going on in French and Dutch dockyards. Two days later another message announced the calling out of the British militia. When Talleyrand afterwards observed to Whitworth that nothing was doing in French dockyards, and that the Dutch ships were notoriously destined to carry troops to St. Domingo, the latter could only protest that the British precautions were not meant as a threat. But Bonaparte saw them in that light alone, and his anger exploded during the next public reception at the Tuileries. In this celebrated scene he

<sup>1</sup> Whitworth to Hawkesbury, March 3, 1803.—*F. O. Despatches.*

addressed the assembled representatives of foreign powers, and took care to dissociate Lord Whitworth himself from the reproaches so freely hurled at the British Government. Whitworth maintained a discreet silence, and afterwards obtained an assurance from Talleyrand that burning topics should in future be avoided at ceremonial gatherings in the Tuileries. Still the British Government, although pressed for an answer to the question of security, not only in Paris, but by General Andreossi in London, shrank from committing itself by any direct demand.

It would appear as if Addington at this crisis again felt the need of Pitt's counsel and support. Lord Melville had shown himself during the preceding session a zealous adherent of the Minister, from whom he had accepted a peerage, while declining office. On his return from Scotland in March, 1803, he went at Addington's request to Walmer with proposals for a reconstructed administration, in which Pitt and Addington should hold positions of equal rank, under the premiership of some common friend such as Lord Chatham. Pitt rejected this overture with scorn. He would only, he said, resume office when summoned by the King to form a new ministry of which he should be chief. Then Addington sent Mr. Long to Walmer with an offer to make way for Pitt if it should prove on comparing ideas that their general views of the situation coincided; and he asked Pitt to come to Bromley for a conference. Pitt agreed to this. Addington and Long seem to have anticipated little further difficulty in the way of an arrangement which should reinforce, while substantially preserving, the existing Government. But as Long left the castle, Lord Grenville arrived on a visit. We have the latter's own narrative of what passed between him and his host. Pitt acknowledged that Grenville's warlike policy was right, and that he himself had been mistaken in pursuing peace. They both agreed that Malta should not be given up. Asked again by Pitt whether he and his friends would consent to join an administration which should also include some of the present ministers, Grenville declined to commit himself until Pitt had been authorised by the King to form a new government. But he mentioned as probable conditions of such assent, (1) union with Pitt alone as premier; (2) full liberty to hold, and when necessary express, their views on the Catholic question, and on the conduct of Addington's ministry. He thought also that his friends would object to Addington or Hawkesbury being selected for any of the more responsible employments; and he felt certain that none of them would accept office except by the King's desire, freely expressed. Nothing, he declared emphatically, could be more repugnant to the principles and feelings of all of them than to have their services forced on the King. Grenville also urged Pitt to include, if possible, in a new administration men belonging to all the four existing political parties. Fox, it

was understood, did not desire office ; and it might be feasible, Grenville thought, to enlist the aid of Grey, Lord Moira, and Tierney, with great advantage to the State. A few days later Pitt and Addington met for conference at Bromley, when the latter found to his great mortification, that Pitt's dominant idea now was to return to official life with his former colleagues of the "New Opposition." Instead of an arrangement, as Addington seems to have expected, making himself and Hawkesbury Secretaries of State under Pitt, it was proposed to shunt him into a new post of Speaker of the House of Lords, and to move Hawkesbury into the background as Lord Privy Seal. With apparent acquiescence, though unconcealed dissatisfaction, he departed to consult the rest of the Cabinet. Next day a short note from him announcing that his colleagues, while anxious to serve under Pitt, could not enter into alliance with men who daily loaded them with obloquy and insult, put an end to the negotiation. Pitt afterwards drew up a statement of what he conceived to have passed in it, which he requested Addington to lay before the King. Addington's reply has not been preserved. But George III, deeply offended by the whole proceeding, which he regarded as trenching on the Royal prerogative, threw the chief blame on his old Minister, and refused to read his explanation.

While this negotiation was still in a hopeful stage, Lord Hawkesbury, now assured of Pitt's support, and incited by his knowledge of the King's wishes, replied to the repeated question of the French Government as to the security required for British interests in the East. The answer was Malta ; and it was couched in a peremptory form intended to compel acquiescence. Lord Whitworth received instructions, if discussion was unduly prolonged, to give notice of his departure from Paris. The British Government had, no doubt, made up its mind that Bonaparte's ambition must sooner or later bring France and England into renewed conflict. And the Consul's situation, as depicted in Whitworth's despatches, seemed to afford an exceptional opportunity of forcing him to fight under every disadvantage, or submit to a humiliating concession, which would give Great Britain command of the Mediterranean. Lord Hawkesbury, Whitworth had urged, should send as an *ultimatum*, "Malta or war" ; and all English papers coming to France should repeat "Malta or war," so as to give it the force of a national mandate.<sup>1</sup> It was an admitted fact that the French people were sick of war, and especially of maritime war, by which they had everything to lose and nothing to gain. The Bonaparte family also, mindful of St. Regent's infernal machine, and convinced that the first gun fired in renewed hostilities would give the signal for fresh attempts against the Consul's life by French refugees in England, spared no effort to maintain peace. Bonaparte himself, putting a strong

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<sup>1</sup> Whitworth to Hawkesbury, March 21, 1803.—*F. O. Despatches.*

rein on his temper, tried hard to come to an accommodation. He offered to join in a European convention for preserving the integrity of the Turkish empire. He proposed that the Czar should hold Malta in custody for the Knights, to which Alexander consented. But he also insisted on a strict adherence to the treaty of Amiens, as a point which involved the honour of France. Rather than give way on this point he was prepared "to lose fleets and colonies and commerce, and recover them all by an invasion of England." "It is painful," Whitworth wrote in reporting this declaration, "to see to what a state of depravity the leading men of this country are reduced. So far from feeling the least shame or remorse on such an unmanly method of retaliation on us, they not only excuse but applaud it."<sup>1</sup> Bonaparte also declared his intention of sending troops to occupy southern Naples and Hanover if the British Government retained Malta. And when this announcement provoked remonstrances both from Berlin and from St. Petersburg, he offered to submit unreservedly all questions in dispute between France and Great Britain to the Czar's arbitration. But although Lord Whitworth officially professed the most amicable intentions, and awaking to a sense of the gravity of the situation, really laboured hard, in conjunction with Joseph Bonaparte and pacific members of the French Council of State, to find some expedient which should satisfy the demands of Great Britain while saving the honour of France, the British Ministry seem to have deliberately adopted a policy of exasperation. The English ports on the Channel resounded with warlike preparations. The London papers supporting Addison showed daily less restraint in their philippics. Lord Hawkesbury openly sent Captain Wright, an enterprising British seaman, well known in France for his connexion with the Chouan insurgents during the last war, in a diplomatic capacity to Whitworth, in order that he might renew his old intrigues. This wanton provocation aroused the ambassador's anger; any other agent he protested to Hawkesbury would have answered the purpose better. Bartholomew Huber, who co-operated zealously with Lord Whitworth in seeking a peaceful solution of the questions at issue, afterwards declared that the main obstacle to an accommodation was the imperious tone of Lord Hawkesbury's despatches.<sup>2</sup> When sending as an *ultimatum* a demand of the island of Lampedusa for a British naval station, together with possession of Malta for ten years, Hawkesbury directed the ambassador, in case of demur, to bring negotiations to a close without further reference to London. Whitworth, in strange ignorance, apparently, of diplomatic usage, refused to deliver these conditions in writing to Talleyrand, thus giving the French Government just cause of complaint, and exposing himself to sharp reproof from his

<sup>1</sup> Whitworth to Hawkesbury, April 7, 1803.—*F. O. Despatches.*

<sup>2</sup> Huber to Whitworth, May 17, 1803.—*Ibid.*

own official chief. In subsequent modifications of his *ultimatum*, which abolished the rights of the King of Naples and the Knights of St. John to the possession of Malta in favour of the Maltese people, who were declared English partizans, Hawkesbury limited the time allowed for acceptance to seven days, and again to thirty-six hours. And to the French contention that Spain and Holland as parties to the treaty of Amiens, and the six European powers who guaranteed possession of Malta by the Knights, should be consulted as to the changes proposed, he turned a deaf ear. "They treat me," Bonaparte exclaimed, "like a garrison that is summoned to capitulate." Lord Cornwallis had succeeded in concluding peace at Amiens by toning down Lord Hawkesbury's language, and assuming responsibility for concessions not authorised in his instructions, but afterwards approved. Lord Whitworth only ventured to transgress his time-limit, in the vain hope of forcing Bonaparte to yield on the subject of Malta. When he arrived in England on May 17, General Andreossi left London, and war against France was soon afterwards declared. During the debates that followed in both Houses of Parliament, Pitt defended the retention of Malta in one of his finest oratorical efforts. Fox condemned it in a speech which he himself regarded as his greatest, and which high authorities have pronounced to be unequalled for excellence in the debates of the British House of Commons. Ministers, supported for once by Lord Grenville, had large majorities in both Houses. As to the strength of their case, the historical student examining it without national or party bias, would probably regard it as of the weakest, and agree with William Wilberforce that Malta was dearly acquired by a violation of public faith, a nation's most precious possession.

Just before this debate, an offer arrived from the Czar to mediate between the belligerents. Lord Hawkesbury declined it on the ground that it came too late, war having been declared. After the debate, Fox made a motion in the House of Commons that Russian mediation should be accepted. Hawkesbury at first refused, but when Pitt expressed concurrence with Fox, consented with the docility of a devoted pupil. Early in June, votes of censure on the general conduct of the Government were moved from the Opposition benches of both Houses. To carry them Whigs and Grenvillites combined. Pitt, to the amazement of Ministers, took a line of his own, in concert with Lords Melville and Mulgrave in the House of Lords, but for which he failed to secure Lord Grenville's co-operation. While freely blaming the conduct of Government, he refused to join in expelling it from office, and moved, as an amendment, the order of the day. Ministers refused to accept such damaging patronage, and Pitt, to his evident mortification, found few supporters. The votes of censure were also rejected by large majorities. Lord Hawkesbury redeemed the pledge he had given to the House of Commons

in a somewhat peculiar fashion. Taking counsel with the Russian ambassador, Count Simon Woronzow, an implacable foe of the Consular Government, he accepted the Czar's mediation on all points in dispute with France except the restitution of Malta. When Alexander expressed dissatisfaction at an exception which made consent a mere mockery, Hawkesbury, again prompted by Woronzow, protested the surprise and disappointment of the British Government, which in keeping Malta acted solely from solicitude for the general interests of Europe, and in accordance with what it had understood to be Alexander's particular desire. By this time hostilities were in full progress, and Bonaparte being dissatisfied with the general attitude of the Emperor of Russia, withdrew his request for mediation. If we may judge from reports in Thomas Grenville's letters during the month of May of the rapid rise or fall of Government-stock, then below 60, as peaceful or warlike rumours prevailed in London, war with France was not generally popular in England. No doubt, however, Bonaparte's order for the arrest of all Englishmen between the ages of 18 and 60 then in France, as hostages for French unarmed citizens captured at sea before war was declared, exasperated public opinion. It may be stated here that when Lord Hawkesbury protested against this decree as contrary to the usages of civilized nations, Talleyrand replied that all the powers of the Continent respected the liberty of merchants and other individuals travelling unarmed by land, and only made prisoners of armed men. France followed this custom. But the British Government having made prisoners of French merchants and other unarmed persons travelling by sea, France had treated unarmed Englishmen in the same manner. If the British Government would release unarmed prisoners taken from French merchant ships, the First Consul would also release the unarmed persons arrested by his order. Lord Hawkesbury does not appear to have responded to this offer.

Pitt's action in the House of Commons in dealing with the motion of want of confidence in the Ministry was deeply resented by Addington and his friends, much as they exulted in its conspicuous failure. They regarded it as a stab in the back from one pledged to support them. Addison, they complained, though head of an administration which enjoyed the undiminished confidence of the King and the Parliament, had offered to make way for Pitt, yet Pitt had dealt it a treacherous blow because it declined to coalesce with declared foes, whose enmity had been incurred by following his advice. Their resentment found expression in an anonymous pamphlet, which must have stung Pitt to the quick. A paper war followed, from which Lord Grenville conceived hopes of working again in thorough co-operation with his old friend and leader. In conference, their views and feelings seemed to coincide exactly. They agreed that the situation of the country was perilous; and that the peril was greatly enhanced

by an incompetent administration. But when it came to a question of combined action for placing the direction of public affairs in more capable hands, Pitt drew back. He would heap scorn on the ministry, or damn it with faint praise as an independent critic, but do nothing to dislodge it from office. This attitude greatly puzzled and disheartened the "New Opposition." They began to doubt whether, while professing to respond with equal unreserve to the entire frankness with which Lord Grenville laid bare his views and intentions, Pitt, governed by secret ties or motives, was not playing a game of his own. An unlooked for disclosure did much to stimulate this growing distrust. During a visit to Lord Carysford at Eltham in the month of October, the Bishop of Lincoln told his host of the letter given or dictated by Pitt to Dr. Willis for the King, in Addison's presence, undertaking to lend no further countenance to the Catholic claims during his Majesty's reign; and the hopes founded on this communication of Pitt's remaining in office, which the Bishop thought had been blasted by Addington's secret machinations. The knowledge of this incident coming as a surprise to Lord Grenville and his friends, did much, apparently, to shake the confidence of the party in Pitt's sincerity.

As autumn faded into winter the political aspect grew darker without anything like correct appreciation by the British Ministry of the magnitude of the danger to which the kingdom was exposed. In fact, neither Lord Hobart, Secretary of State for War, nor any of his colleagues, was capable of rising to the full height of the emergency, because none of them was able to conceive what was possible for extraordinary genius and energy having absolute command of the strength and resources of such a powerful state as France had now become. Moreover, they seem to have swallowed with avidity Lord Whitworth's encouraging assurances that Bonaparte was universally hated and despised, and utterly without means of engaging in naval warfare. It was the old story of mistaking the whisper of faction for the voice of a nation. No doubt war with England was intensely unpopular in France. But the refusal of the English Government to fulfil the treaty of Amiens enabled Bonaparte to shift on to it the odium of hostilities. It was a challenge which, as he said, could not be declined without loss of honour; and in taking it up he had the support of all the great bodies of the state, and the vast majority of the French people. His financial difficulties were serious, but not insuperable. A rapid revival of national prosperity under his rule, and a more skilful and economical management of public resources, had brought up the annual revenue of France to 24,000,000*l.*, which amply covered ordinary expenditure in time of peace. This equilibrium, however, had been disturbed by a costly and disastrous expedition to St. Domingo. And war with England on the scale which he now designed, required an additional annual

expenditure of about 8,000,000*l.* Though French credit had greatly improved, the 5 per cent. *rente*, which fell below 10 under the Directory, had not yet reached 50, so that he could only borrow on usurious terms which his economical temper rejected. But by selling Louisiana to the United States for 60,000,000 of francs, he disarmed American jealousy which his colonial policy had aroused, and improved his financial position. He commuted the aid in soldiers and vessels of war Spain was bound to furnish to France by the treaty of St. Ildefonso, for a considerable monthly subsidy. And these supplies, augmented by voluntary contributions from France, forced contributions from dependent republics, and an improved system of taxation enabled him to begin preparations for a descent on England with his usual secrecy and vigour.<sup>1</sup>

In the same credulous spirit the Ministry eagerly encouraged schemes of the emigrant princes for the overthrow of the Consular Government, which exposed itself to much obloquy and ridicule, had tragic issues for the House of Bourbon, and opened a way for the great enemy of that House to the summit of his ambition.

The hopes cherished by Lord Hawkesbury that the military occupation of Hanover and Naples by French troops must bring Bonaparte into conflict with the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia were better founded, but proved equally fruitless. By the treaty concluded in 1795 between Frederick William II of Prussia and the French Directory, northern Germany had enjoyed during the succeeding years of war the advantages of peace under a Prussian guarantee. Frederick William III, after the rupture of the peace of Amiens, offered to hold possession of Hanover in the interests of George III, if the British Government would concede to North German trade the protection of maritime law, as interpreted by the powers which had formed the "Armed Neutrality." Lord Hawkesbury refused this proposal. Bonaparte then took possession not only of Hanover but also of Cuxhaven, belonging to Hamburg, in order to exclude British merchantmen from the Elbe; and the British Government, in retaliation, blockaded the mouths of the Elbe and the Weser, the chief avenues of North German commerce. The consequence was that Frederick William found himself in a situation of extreme embarrassment, assailed at once by a storm of clamour from his own subjects, and reproaches of timidity from neighbouring states, which had hitherto enjoyed immunity from the evils of war, under Prussian protection. In regard to Russia, the new Czar, having banished from Court the chief conspirators against his father, formed a Council of State composed of old ministers of Catherine II, who pursued her policy of keeping the empire free from foreign entanglements in which its interests were not directly

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<sup>1</sup> Thiers, *Consulate and Empire*.

concerned. After a little, however, he placed personal friends of his own age in the chief departments of state, in immediate subordination to his recognised Ministers. Prince Czartoriski, a Pole, was thus attached to the Imperial Chancellor, Count Alexander Woronzow, who directed the foreign relations of Russia. Under this new influence Russian foreign policy assumed a more enterprising character, and Alexander had begun to play the part of umpire of Europe. Count Woronzow, however, like his brother Simon, Russian Ambassador in London, cordially detested the French Revolution and all its works. Czartoriski had old and intimate relations with the Court of Sardinia. And Alexander, while condemning the conduct of England in keeping Malta, felt much keener jealousy of the continental aggressions of France. He not only protested at Paris against the violation of North German and Neapolitan neutrality, but offered to join his forces to those of Prussia for the purpose of expelling the French from Hanover. A powerful party at the Court of Berlin, supported by the Queen, urged Frederick William to accept this offer. But Count Haugwitz, whose influence was predominant in Prussian councils, steadily opposed a quarrel with France. Prussia had derived great advantage from friendly relations with Bonaparte, and the cautious statesman feared the lightning blows of such an antagonist, from which the distant succour of Alexander could afford no protection. The King therefore sent Lombard, his confidential secretary, to meet the First Consul at Brussels and discuss the situation with him. Bonaparte proposed an alliance between France and Prussia which should secure the former power against a new continental coalition during its conflict with England, and enable the latter to annex Hanover. Haugwitz and Lombard advised their master to close with this proposal. But it was too bold a course for Frederick William, who feared to offend the Czar; and preferred the half measure of a convention which, without identifying him so closely with French policy, might enable him to occupy Hanover, and at the same time afford some satisfaction to Russian complaints in regard to Italy. Bonaparte however insisted on an alliance, and negotiations on this subject were spun out for many months.

In the meantime the French ruler applied himself with extraordinary energy and concentration of purpose to provide the means of bringing war with England to a decisive issue by transporting 100,000 French troops, encamped in the neighbourhood of Boulogne, across the channel to Kent. When rumours of this design first reached England they seem to have awakened little alarm. Even that most enterprising of British seamen, Sir Sidney Smith, derided it as impracticable under existing conditions. But before six months had elapsed since the renewal of hostilities, gun-boats, gun-brigs, and sloops, armed, manned, and equipped for

battle, had begun to swarm forth from every port, creek, and inlet of the French sea-board, between the mouths of the Loire and the Scheldt. Favoured by storms and by calms, by fogs, dark nights, and ebbing tides, they stole along coasts and crept round head-lands, unseen by British cruisers or evading their attacks, until, in the course of time, more than 2,000 of them, carrying more than 3,000 guns, were collected in four harbours to the west of Cape Grignez, scooped out at Boulogne, Ambleteuse, Vimereux, and Etaples by the labour of the troops, and guarded by forts, and batteries of artillery.<sup>1</sup> When some faint knowledge of this formidable flotilla informed the public mind in England, rash confidence gave place to panic, and to a general conviction of the inadequacy of the ministerial measures of national defence. On December 31 Lord Grenville wrote to Pitt imploring him, in view of the public peril, to take the lead in a movement for ejecting an incompetent administration, and forming another composed of the ablest statesmen of the kingdom without distinction of party. A few days later the two statesmen met in London to discuss the subject. Pitt declared himself to be in general accord with Grenville's views, spoke of Addington and his colleagues with "hatred and contempt," but refused to lend himself to any plan of systematic opposition with the object of removing them from office. The unfavourable impression made by this decision on the minds of leading members of the "New Opposition" may be seen in letters of Thomas Grenville, Lord Buckingham and Lord Carysfort, dated respectively January 13, 14, and 17, 1804. Lord Carysfort's letter enclosed an interesting communication from the Bishop of Lincoln in regard to Pitt's political attitude. Shortly afterwards the Grenvilles and Lord Spencer met in council at Stowe, and resolved, with Windham's concurrence, to make an overture to Fox for a combination of the opposition forces in Parliament to overthrow the Government. Two propositions were formulated as a basis of common action; (1) that the public interests required the removal from office of Ministers manifestly incompetent to deal with the present emergency; and (2) that any new Ministry should be formed on the principle of comprehending the weight, character and talents to be found in public men of all parties without any exception. The negotiation seems to have been carried through by Thomas Grenville and a political adherent of Fox in the course of a morning ride in Hyde Park. Its successful conclusion was announced by Lord Grenville to Pitt in a letter dated January 31, 1804. The new coalition did not, however, include three prominent Whigs, Messrs. Sheridan, Erskine, and Tierney. Tierney had taken office under Addington. Erskine was willing to do so, if an opportunity offered. Sheridan gave the Ministry an independent

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<sup>1</sup> Thiers, *Consulate and Empire*.

support. Pitt replied to Grenville on February 4, expressing regret but not surprise at a step foreshadowed in their recent discussion. The correspondence shows that the separation caused pain on both sides. It also marks the different characters of the men. We see in Grenville's letter the grief and misgiving with which a connexion cemented by long habit and deep personal affection was severed under the influence of an overmastering sense of public duty. In Pitt's the dominant note seems to be apprehension of the difficulties which the new coalition, though founded on principles of which he approved in the abstract, would place in his own way when called upon by the King, in the probable course of events, to form an efficient administration. Hardly however had the confederates opened their campaign against Addington in the House of Commons, when Pitt, as the Bishop of Lincoln shrewdly surmised, rushed into the thick of the fray in open co-operation with them. Before taking this decided part, he, using the Lord Chancellor as a channel of communication without Addington's knowledge, appears to have excused his action to the King by alleging the danger to which the monarchy was exposed by the incapacity of his present Ministers; the very plea which Lord Grenville had urged in vain in personal discussion with himself. His aid, though very effective, proved somewhat embarrassing. It would appear from a letter of Thomas Grenville that his instability of purpose, and his want of consideration for the tactics of his allies while exacting conformity to his own, severely tried even the good temper of Fox.<sup>1</sup> When actually engaged in debate the vigour with which he assailed his old friends and clients left nothing to be desired. Against such a combination of talent giving voice to public opinion, the Ministry could not long stand. Its majority in the House of Commons fell to 34 in the division on a motion by Fox for an enquiry into the state of national defence. Then Addington made an overture to Pitt for an exchange of views on the situation. This being curtly rejected,<sup>2</sup> he resigned office; and the King, through Lord Eldon, called on Pitt to submit proposals for a new Ministry. Pitt recommended a comprehensive administration on Lord Grenville's plan. But the King would not admit Fox to his councils, and only consented after long and pressing solicitations to accept Grenville. Fox at once disclaimed all wish for office, and requested his followers not to allow their minds to be influenced by his exclusion. For a short time Pitt indulged the hope of being at the head of a government composed of eminent men of all parties. But the Whigs, assembled for consultation at Carlton House, refused to separate from their great leader. And the other branch of the Opposition, meeting simultaneously at Camelford House, unanimously agreed that they could not

<sup>1</sup> T. Grenville to Lord Grenville, March 31, 1804.

<sup>2</sup> Dean Pellew's *Life of Lord Sidmouth*.

without a violation of declared principle, join an administration from which Fox had been specially excluded. Then Pitt formed a Cabinet, composed for the greater part of Ministers he had so lately denounced for imbecility, who showed no scruple in forsaking Addington, notwithstanding his fidelity to them.

The Editor confidently appeals to correspondence contained in this volume as completely clearing Lord Grenville from aspersions cast on him by modern worshippers of Pitt, who can see nothing to blame in their hero, and make Grenville the scapegoat for faults and failure which darkened the melancholy close of a great career. "It was from a sense of loyalty to Grenville," it is said, "that Pitt had suffered the negotiation for his return to office in 1803 to fall through, and now when the two statesmen could return together, and when, if ever, a strong government was needed, either a quixotic sense of honour or wounded pride induced Grenville not only to stand aloof from the new administration himself, but to do his utmost to prevent others from giving it their support."<sup>1</sup> It was not from loyalty to Grenville, but because he could not form an efficient administration without the statesmen of the "New Opposition" who had given such strength and character to his first ministry, that Pitt broke off negotiation with Addington in 1803. Neither was it a quixotic sense of honour or wounded pride that induced Grenville to stand aloof from Pitt's last administration. He could not have acted otherwise except in plain violation of principle and good faith. Moreover, he had specially warned Pitt that neither he nor any of his political friends would consent to accept office contrary to the King's inclinations. Grenville's letters to Pitt are frank disclosures of the writer's views and purposes, animated by warm affection for his old leader, and strong disinclination to separate from him which only a deep sense of public duty and urgent remonstrances from the friends who had followed him into opposition were able to overcome. They bear the impress of sincerity, and carry a conviction of it to the mind of the reader; and however prejudiced or intemperate some of the views expressed in them may appear, there is no trace in them of secret motive or personal ambition. Pitt's conduct, as revealed in his letters to Grenville, was that of a man hampered by unavowed pledges, playing a political game of his own, and consequently, sparing of confidence, uncertain and ambiguous in action. On points concerning the security of the monarchy, about which they had disagreed, Pitt in the long run came round to Grenville's views. But even when expressing full concurrence he refused, no doubt from unwillingness to offend the King, to join in any attempt to give practical effect to those views by constitutional action in Parliament, until Grenville took that responsibility on himself by independent movement, which finally carried him into a

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<sup>1</sup> *Political History of England, 1801-1837.*

political connection incompatible with Pitt's personal objects, and therefore made separation inevitable. As for the charge that Grenville did his utmost to prevent the Whigs from joining Pitt, its sole foundation seems to be unworthy, certainly unfriendly, conjecture. No evidence is alleged for it. Lord Stanhope, who frankly avows a strong bias in favour of Pitt, founded on hereditary affection and gratitude, gives it no countenance. There is not a hint of it in the Whig memoirs of the time. All the known circumstances tell against it. Separate meetings of the two branches of the Opposition to consider Pitt's proposals, were held at the same time. The Whigs met at Carlton House, the Grenvillites at Camelford House, and appear to have deliberated and decided with entire independence. Nearly all the leading Whigs agreed with Fox in disliking and distrusting Pitt, and, as plainly appeared a year later, would not consent to serve under him. In Grenville's own party there was no difference of opinion as to the line of conduct imposed on them by the dictates of duty and honour. All Lord Grenville's correspondence, all that is known of his character from trustworthy sources, show him to have been incapable of anything savouring of base and secret intrigue; and that too against one for whom, as this volume amply testifies, his gratitude and affection burned brightly to the last. Lord Brougham's emphatic testimony to the great increase of public reputation accruing to the Whigs from Lord Grenville's connection with them is well known.<sup>1</sup> In the last volume of the *Memoirs of the Whig Party*, edited by Lord Ilchester, Lord Holland refers in the following terms to Grenville's separation from the Whigs in 1819: "It is painful that so honourable a career should end by a separation from many connected with and attached to him. The termination, however, like the course of it, was manly and direct. There was nothing sordid, nothing personal, nothing even inconsistent in it, on either side. I, for one, feel that among the rare gratifications of a public life, the reflection of having known and acted with such a man as Lord Grenville is not the least. . . . Mr. Fox gave me his true character in one word in 1805, when he said, 'I like Lord Grenville. He is a *direct* man.'" The political divergence which has been so unfairly criticized, and which dated from 1801, was the result of a difference of ruling motive. Grenville's dominant idea was the welfare of the monarchy, without alloy of personal aim; Pitt's was the welfare of the monarchy guided or governed by himself. In the circumstances of the State, Pitt's intense egotism and love of power became a public calamity. To stand in the way of his ambition was an offence that seems to have erased from his mind the longest record of friendship and service. For that offence, he treated Grenville as he had treated Addington; not only discarding him as a friend, but even withholding from

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<sup>1</sup> *Statesmen of the Reign of George III.*

him the courtesy due to mere acquaintance. Had he been willing, as Fox was, to take office under a chief acceptable to both, the strong administration desired by all parties, and demanded by the public interests, might have been formed. As was seen after his death, the King must have given way when he had no longer a great minister's personal ambition to fall back upon. These dominating characteristics also became a misfortune for himself. In the early vigour of life, with a good cause, the favour of the Crown, and the support of the people, they had helped him along a path of peaceful reform and development, most favourable to the exercise of his great powers, to a height of fame and authority few English statesmen have reached. In the last stage of his career, when, in broken health, having lost public confidence, deriving little support from King or Cabinet, he found himself pitted in mortal strife against one of those men of all-embracing genius who appear at long intervals to dazzle and subdue the world, they led him, blindfold, from humiliation to humiliation, from disaster to disaster.

The measure, styled the *Additional Forces Bill*, brought in by the new Government to secure the country from invasion, and supply the shortcomings of its predecessors in office, proved a conspicuous failure. Assailed by all the parties in opposition, it exposed Pitt to the same taunts of incapacity he had so freely flung at Addington. Amidst the jeers of Addington's followers his majority in one important division fell below 30; and though he got through the session without actual defeat, he could no longer hope to bear up long against the increasing responsibility of his situation, without some notable acquisition of strength. He had also to contend against disadvantages arising out of the King's recurring malady, now complicated by incipient blindness; and dissensions in the royal family. Interesting details in connexion with the former subject may be found in Lord Buckingham's letters to his brother; the information they contain being derived from General Grenville and Mr. Fremantle, intimate friends of the Marquis, who filled confidential posts at Court. In regard to the latter subject, it may be stated that the King had refused an application from the Prince of Wales for high command in the territorial forces raised to repel invasion. Incensed by what he considered an insult, the Prince absented himself from Court. Shortly after the change of ministry in May, one of the more dangerous crises that periodically marked the course of his father's disorder, and an omission to publish the medical bulletins, led him to imagine that a regency was necessarily impending. In this persuasion he summoned to Carlton House Fox, Grenville, and other leaders of the coalition, constituted them his Privy Council, and by their advice addressed a letter to the Lord Chancellor challenging the conduct of the Ministry in carrying on government during the sovereign's incapacity without

authority from Parliament. The Chancellor replied that Ministers stood on their constitutional responsibility, and enclosed the bulletins, which hardly justified the Prince's indictment. When the King got better Pitt sought to reconcile him with his son, by inducing the latter to accede to his Majesty's desire of bringing up under his own immediate care the Princess Charlotte of Wales, eventual heiress to the Crown, then living at Carlton House. The Prince expressed his willingness to meet his father's wishes, and authorised Lord Moira to explain to Pitt and Lord Eldon, representing the King, the conditions on which his consent would be given. These appear to have been (1) that his wife, now living apart from him, should not be suffered to interfere in any way with their daughter's education, and (2) that he himself should have full liberty to choose his political connections. At this stage of the business, marks of favour publicly bestowed by the King on the Princess of Wales so enraged her husband that he broke an appointment for an interview with his father, and all hope of agreement seemed at an end. Through the continued good offices of Pitt and Moira, the interview took place later in the year at Kew, and was followed by a short visit of the Prince to Windsor Castle. During these meetings the King treated his son with cold civility, refrained from all allusion to his grand-daughter, and after the Prince's departure from Windsor, paid another visit to his daughter-in-law at Greenwich. He then ordered the Lord Chancellor to transmit to his son a memorandum of the arrangements he proposed for the education of Princess Charlotte. This paper contained no notice of the conditions laid down by the Prince, who returned it to the Chancellor, and refused to discuss his father's proposals, except through Lord Moira, then absent in Scotland. When Moira returned to London in December, 1804, his communications with the Lord Chancellor were resumed, and were continued at uncertain intervals during the whole of 1805. In the end the Prince of Wales seems to have had his way. It was arranged that the young Princess should live for half of the year with her grandfather, and for the other half with her father, and that her education should be carried on under their joint control. For the greater convenience of readers all the letters on this subject have been brought together in the Appendix.

In the course of their conferences in the summer of 1804, Pitt suggested to Lord Moira that the Prince of Wales should support his father's government, and offered that nobleman himself the post of Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Moira replied that the Prince had determined to shape his conduct by the advice of the statesmen he had chosen as his councillors. For himself, he refused to separate from Fox. Mr. Tierney, in fact, was the only prominent Whig who leant to the idea of a junction with Pitt; and as regards Tierney, the Prince now put an end to their political connection.

Having failed to recruit his political strength at the expense of the Whig party, Pitt had two courses before him ; to open the way by resignation for the formation of a stronger Government, or to seek assistance from Addington, whom he had treated with such contumely, but who retained in opposition a considerable following in the House of Commons. His wisest friends counselled the former course. The King, however, brought all his influence to bear in promoting the latter ; and Addison, who had also to overcome strong objections on the part of leading adherents, consented to join the administration with Lord Buckinghamshire and Mr. Vansittart, on certain specified terms. This junction so far answered Pitt's purpose as to enable the ministry at the opening of the session of 1805, to command a sufficient majority in the House of Commons. But Pitt's jealousy of power made real union impossible. Addison having submitted, after a long struggle, to quit the chamber from which he derived political consequence, found himself, as Lord Sidmouth and Lord Privy Seal, a mere cipher in the Cabinet and the House of Lords. He had to share responsibility for important measures about which he was not consulted, nor allowed any share in shaping.<sup>1</sup> As he smarted under a sense of his mortifying position, controversy arising out of the charges preferred in the House of Commons against his colleague Lord Melville made it still more irksome. Lord St. Vincent, First Lord of the Admiralty in the Addington administration, had appointed a commission to investigate and report on irregularities in the accounts of the navy during the period when Melville held the office of Treasurer ; and Sidmouth had stipulated on joining Pitt that this commission should have the support of Government, and that himself and his followers should enjoy full liberty of action in connection with its reports. The 10th report of the Commission, issued in February, 1805, incriminated Lord Melville. Sidmouth, who thought the evidence conclusive, proposed that Melville should at once resign. Pitt, on the other hand, thought that the Government should stand or fall in defence of Melville's innocence. Neither opinion seems to have prevailed in the Cabinet ; but when Mr. Whitbread's resolution, carried in the House of Commons by the casting vote of the Speaker, drove Melville from office, Pitt, instead of appointing Lord Buckinghamshire First Lord of the Admiralty as Sidmouth had every reason to expect, gave the vacant post to Sir Charles Middleton, a veteran admiral, who was regarded at the time as a mere stop-gap. Sidmouth, Buckinghamshire, and Vansittart sent in their resignations. But as the session was at its height, the support of the seceders could not be dispensed with. By the personal intervention of the King, and explanations and promises from Pitt, they were induced to resume their posts. Some weeks

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<sup>1</sup> *Life of Lord Sidmouth*, by Dean Pellew.

later Mr. Bond, a leading adherent of Sidmouth in the House of Commons, carried a motion against Pitt's most strenuous opposition, for Melville's prosecution by the Attorney-General. Though they had only acted with the liberty accorded to them on crossing over to the Ministerial benches, Pitt now declared his intention of "marking" the conduct of Bond and others of the Addington party, by withholding from them offices lately promised; and at the close of the session Sidmouth, in spite of the King's renewed solicitations,<sup>1</sup> finally severed a connection which brought neither credit to himself nor advantage to his friends.

Lord Melville's fall was a calamity for Pitt. It deprived him of his ablest and most experienced colleague, whose high Tory principles and pliant temper made him a favourite at Court, and greatly facilitated the transaction of thorny business with the King. Pitt stood manfully by his old friend, and by persuading the House of Commons to rescind its vote for his prosecution by the Attorney General, and substitute one for impeachment, probably saved him from judicial condemnation. But he could not shield him from disgrace, and by vain attempts to do so forfeited public confidence. Melville's political trimming after his resignation of office in 1801 had been a series of blunders, which raised up for him hosts of enemies. An unprovoked attack on Lord Grenville for translating into action opinions in which Melville privately concurred, gave indelible offence to old colleagues composing the "New Opposition." Grenville repaid the injury by abstaining and advising others to abstain from affording any countenance to the proceedings in Parliament against his assailant. But the whole party stood aloof from Melville in tacit condemnation. His short alliance with Addington, from whom he accepted a peerage, surprised and seems to have offended Pitt. His sudden desertion of Addington on a vote of want of confidence made him specially obnoxious to that minister's adherents. In his mode of meeting the grave charges preferred against him by the Naval Commission he showed himself equally injudicious. His defence at the Bar of the House of Commons, according to the impartial testimony of Wilberforce, strengthened the case against him; while the arrogant tone in which it was delivered hardened the hearts of opponents, and alienated the sympathies of many members who bore him no ill-will. The Whigs gave no quarter to a bitter and, as they thought, unscrupulous foe. And public opinion was vehemently expressed in petitions from the City of London and other great centres of trade throughout the kingdom, for his banishment for ever from the King's presence and councils. It may be said, however, that Melville's conduct in the last stage of his political career did not fairly represent his character. It

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<sup>1</sup> Marquis of Buckingham to Lord Grenville, July 12, 1805.

brought into undue prominence the defects of his qualities. Besides, he had always been too conspicuously partial to his own countrymen in the distribution of enormous official patronage, not to have incurred great unpopularity in England.

Pitt's health now began to give way visibly under the increasing burthen of his anxieties. His friends seem to have generally felt that he could no longer carry on the government with credit, and that it had become necessary in the public interests to form a wider administration on the principles advocated by the Opposition. Lord Camden opened the matter informally to Lord Grenville; while Sturges Bourne and minor lights of the Ministerial party in the House of Commons discussed it eagerly with Lord Temple. Grenville, however, cut short Camden's approaches by an announcement that the Opposition chiefs would only express their views on the situation when direct proposals were made to them by Pitt, with the King's authority.<sup>1</sup> Then, it was understood that Pitt intended to bring the subject of a comprehensive Ministry again under his Majesty's consideration during a visit to Weymouth early in the autumn. There were gatherings of the Opposition for consultation, in anticipation of such an event, at Stowe, Dropmore, and St. Anne's Hill, to which the Prince of Wales invited himself with great perseverance; and it appears to have been a recognized condition of a new arrangement on a broader basis that Pitt should not hold in it the position of Prime Minister. At these meetings the Opposition chiefs came to know each other better. Their personal relations became more intimate, but strong differences of opinion were revealed. While Grenville seems to have approved of the foreign policy pursued by the Government, Fox, with wider knowledge and deeper insight into continental conditions, condemned it as premature and reckless. Speculations of coming change were suddenly ended at the close of September by an announcement that Pitt had abandoned all idea of negotiation with the chiefs of the Opposition.<sup>2</sup> He clung to office in the hope, which his sanguine temper informed, but which was, in truth, mere illusion, that the approaching triumph of the European coalition against France his lavish subsidies had forced into unhealthy maturity, would win back public opinion in England to his side, and give him a new lease of power.

When Bonaparte, during the short interval of peace that followed the preliminary treaty signed in London in October, 1804, devoted himself with such untiring energy to the work of developing the industries and the commerce of France, there is little doubt that he regarded his peaceful labours as ancillary to the great design which already dazzled his ambition of ruling all Western Europe as a modern Charlemagne. When the warlike policy of the British Government

<sup>1</sup> Lord Grenville to Thomas Grenville, June 24, 1805; T. Grenville to Lord Grenville, June 25, 26, &c., 1805; Marquis of Buckingham to Lord Grenville, June 27 *et sequiter*.

<sup>2</sup> Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville, October 4, 1805.

effectually thwarted his colonial and maritime schemes, he turned his mind with equal intensity of purpose to the conquest of England, as a more hazardous but a shorter step to the accomplishment of the same supreme object. The subjugation of England would at once place unbounded resources at his command, and paralyse a coalition of Continental powers by depriving it of a paymaster. He did not shut his eyes to the risks of the expedition; the chances against him, as he said to Lord Whitworth, were one hundred to one. But he had already achieved what ordinary men regarded as impossibilities. And he had undoubting faith in his star. At first he seems to have cherished the hope of finding some safe opportunity, afforded by favourable conditions of weather, to transport his army across the Channel in gun-boats without the protection of men-of-war. Admiral Bruix, who was in command of the naval armament at Boulogne, favoured this idea. But more prudent counsels prevailed. And he fell back on the plan of a secret combination of the naval squadrons then in various stages of construction or equipment in the ports under his control from Genoa to the Helder, to hold the Channel during the three days required for the passage of his troops. This plan closely resembled in its main features that which Alexander Farnese, the great Duke of Parma, had drawn up for a similar purpose in the 16th century, at the request of Philip II. of Spain.<sup>1</sup> In the circumstances of that time, and with the precautions insisted on by Parma, success was far from improbable. The Spanish monarchy was the greatest maritime power of the world. Its admirals, especially the Marquis of Santa Cruz, were the most renowned and experienced. Its revenues surpassed the combined revenues of all other European states. How Philip spoiled Parma's plan by blind adherence to antiquated methods and obsolete models; by neglecting its conditions of secrecy, despatch, and a harbour of refuge; and, finally, by placing in command of his "Invincible Armada" a courtier who had never served at sea, with strict orders to adhere in all events to instructions prepared for him beforehand in the seclusion of the Escorial, forms the introduction to one of the tragedies of Spanish history, and to some of the most glorious pages in the annals of England. At the beginning of the 19th century the circumstances were reversed; superiority in ships, in crews, in commanders, in resources, being immeasurably on the side of England. The Revolution had ruined the French navy. An aristocratic service, even more exclusive in all its higher grades than the French army, its officers had been proscribed as Royalists; and their places had been filled by men recommended for high command by furious Jacobinism, who led the fleets entrusted to them from defeat to defeat into

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<sup>1</sup> Strada, *Belgic War*.

that state of general demoralization, which constant defeat produces. A bankrupt Republic fighting for its existence against coalesced Europe, had neither time nor means to repair losses at sea of exceptional severity. And although the victories of British admirals during the wars of the French Revolution were, as a rule, unusually decisive, they, with the exception of Duncan's action against the Dutch at Camperdown, were far less difficult achievements than those won by Hawke or Rodney against the admirals of the *ancien régime* in the days of its rapid decay. Bonaparte had to create the fleets needed to carry out his scheme of invasion, and then to find competent admirals, in whom fear of Lord Nelson had not extinguished every spark of enterprise. And although he could bring to the task unrivalled genius for organization and war, in a dearth of material and of crews it was necessarily a work of time. He, as Lord Whitworth reported truly, had found the French arsenals empty. A close blockade of the whole French seaboard by the fleets of Great Britain shut out fresh supplies of naval stores. Manning the gun-boats had nearly exhausted the available stock of experienced seamen in France. Consequently the descent on England which the Consul hoped to accomplish in the spring of 1804, had to be postponed till the following year. One fact of recent experience encouraged him to persevere. Of the four hasty and ill-equipped expeditions despatched by the Directory to the Irish coast, three, including that conveying the powerful army of Hoche, had completely eluded the vigilance of the British admirals. Only the fourth, carrying Wolfe Tone and his fortunes, had been overtaken and defeated by Admiral Warren. And throwing 15,000 French troops into Ireland was a leading feature of Bonaparte's plans.

This delay severely tried the First Consul's impatience; but, at the beginning of 1804, gave no promise of results prejudicial to his designs. The Continent remained in profound tranquillity. It is true that Admiral Warren, now British Minister at St. Petersburg, was able to inform Lord Hawkesbury that the Russian Government listened with increasing sympathy to his appeals to it to save Europe from French domination.<sup>1</sup> The Czar's persistent protests against the military occupation of Naples and Hanover, and his demands of compensation for the King of Sardinia, had caused intense irritation at Paris, and the withdrawal of the Russian Ambassador, Count Markoff, from that capital in the autumn of 1803. But Alexander could do nothing against France except in alliance with Prussia or Austria. And both of these powers turned a deaf ear to his suggestion of a defensive league against French aggression. The King of Prussia preferred negotiating with Bonaparte for the custody

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<sup>1</sup> F. O. despatches from St. Petersburg.

of Hanover. The Emperor was willing enough to resist the Consul, but utterly unable. The last war had reduced Austria to the lowest stage of exhaustion compatible with independent existence. Defeat had crushed its superb army into an undisciplined and cowardly mob. Its finances had fallen into apparently irretrievable confusion, for no one had been found capable of grappling with the disorder. According to a report drawn up on the subject by Mr. Stuart, English Secretary of Embassy at Vienna, the annual revenue of the monarchy was £9,000,000; the annual deficit about £1,000,000; the public debt, excluding British loans, £10,000,000.<sup>1</sup> Venice detested an Austrian yoke, and desired union with the Italian republic. Disaffection had lately raised its head both in Hungary and Galicia. Count Louis Cobentzl, who had charge of foreign affairs, under the nominal control of the Vice-Chancellor, Count Colloredo, was a fairly capable, though not a strong Minister; but none of his colleagues was fit for the post he held by the Emperor's partiality. And there was no directing mind at the head of the State to bring order or system from the chaos of general mismanagement. In fact the situation at Vienna had only one hopeful feature. Francis II. had endeavoured, in 1801, to repair in some degree the disastrous effects of Baron Thugut's jealousy of Archduke Charles, by placing his brother at the head of the War Department, with absolute control. This able prince abolished the Aulic Council of War, shortened the term of service for the soldier, and began a thorough reform and re-organization of the whole military system. But he warned the Emperor that, with the limited funds placed at his disposal, seven or eight years would be required to restore the army to strength and efficiency; and, in spite of his remonstrances, more pressing needs soon compelled a large reduction of military expenditure. In this helpless condition the Emperor, though daily wounded in his interests and in his dignity by the ambition and imperious language of the First Consul, could not venture on any step which might furnish a pretext for a quarrel. It must be added that the interests of Great Britain had been badly served by the appointment of Sir Arthur Paget as its Minister at Vienna. His despatches are by no means deficient in ability; but an arrogant temper and offensive manners seem to have made him generally obnoxious at every foreign Court to which he was accredited. He was a favourite of Lord Grenville, who had aimed at raising the social character of the English diplomatic service by employing in it men of noble family, and who probably found traits in Paget not altogether uncongenial with his own disposition. In 1799, when British Minister at Munich, a quarrel with the Elector compelled Paget to quit Bavaria. Thomas

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<sup>1</sup> Charles Stuart to Lord Hawkesbury, July 14, 1804. F. O. despatches from Vienna.

Grenville's extraordinary mission to Germany was then drawing to a close. On April 18 Lord Grenville wrote to inform his brother that Paget would be sent to succeed him at Berlin. Replying to this announcement on May 31, Thomas Grenville strongly deprecated the appointment. Not only Count Haugwitz, he wrote, but Count Goltz, Prussian Minister at St. Petersburg, and Count Panin, Russian Minister at Berlin, a main prop of the Anglo-Russian alliance, protested against it. Their grounds of objection to Paget were "his want of knowledge of business, and a want of attention to it, together with a violent and headstrong temper, and an affectation of *brusquerie* in his manners and conduct." They disliked him so much, Grenville said, that there was little hope of friendly intercourse, a most important consideration in the existing relations of England and Russia.<sup>1</sup> In deference to this advice, Paget's destination was altered to the Court of the Two Sicilies. Here, as we learn from his own confidential letters to Lord Grenville,<sup>2</sup> a violent quarrel with Sir William Hamilton, his predecessor, which brought him into bad odour with the King and Queen, and subsequent conflicts with the Prime Minister, General Acton, made his situation neither pleasant to himself nor advantageous to British interests. Lord Hawkesbury, probably at Lord Grenville's recommendation, transferred him to Vienna in 1801. At first he seems to have spoken and acted in this new employment with the respect and forbearance due to the fallen fortunes of an old ally. But on returning from a visit to England during the winter of 1803-4, he suddenly adopted a bullying attitude, with the object apparently of forcing Austria into a league with England and Russia against France. His hectorings, and reproaches, and disrespectful bearing at Court threw the meek Cobentzl into a transport of anger, and deeply offended the Emperor. The consequence was that he found himself completely excluded from the confidence of the Austrian Government. Russian envoys to Vienna soon adopted the same systematic reserve in intercourse with him. And the British Government, while rewarding his zeal by making him a knight of the Bath, found it necessary to acquiesce in treatment of which he bitterly complained as an affront, and carry on its negotiations for a new coalition through other channels.<sup>3</sup> The Foreign Office correspondence of this time preserves an interesting letter dated November, 1804, addressed by John Rea, an English resident at Vienna, apparently of influential position, to Lord Harrowby, which deplores the impediments cast in the way of a good understanding between the British and Austrian Governments by Paget's offensive conduct.

While things were in this state of comparative quiescence, the

<sup>1</sup> Dropmore Papers, vol. V.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. VI.

<sup>3</sup> Despatches from Vienna. F. O. Papers, 1801-1805.

sudden discovery in Paris of a plot hatched in England, in the councils of Count d'Artois, for the overthrow of the Consular government, gave an extraordinary impulse to the current of events. The plot was, in conception at least, a drama in two acts, with different sets of actors : the first being mainly concerned with the removal of Bonaparte from the political stage ; the second with a restoration of the Bourbon monarchy. Georges Cadoudal, the implacable guerilla chief of Morbihan, undertook to assemble a band of his followers in Paris, lie in wait for the First Consul near the road leading to his country house at St. Cloud or Malmaison, overpower his guard, and put an end to, at least, his political existence. To restore the monarchy more powerful agencies were required : a French army commanded by a general able and willing to tread in the footsteps of General Monk. But there were circumstances in the existing situation which seemed to the credulity of the framers of the plot to place those means of success at their disposal. Moreau, the hero of Hohenlinden, had quarrelled with Bonaparte. His house in Paris was a centre of disaffection to the Consular system, much frequented by military officers who, for personal or public reasons, were jealous of the extraordinary fortunes and aspiring aims of one who had so lately been their equal. And it was believed that the soldiers of the old army of the Rhine, now assembled on the heights of Boulogne, were still devoted to the famous captain who had so often led them to victory. Moreau had hitherto meddled little in politics ; but in 1797 the Directory had deprived him of his command on the Rhine for holding back evidence, which had fallen into his hands, that General Pichegru carried on treasonable communications with the Prince of Condé while leading a Republican army. This circumstance seems to have suggested an exercise of imagination, not unusual in emigrant circles, which converted the avowed foe of Bonaparte into a secret adherent of the Bourbons. It happened also that in 1803, Pichegru, whom the Directory had deported to Cayenne in 1797, escaped from that penal settlement to England. Being misled by intelligence from Royalist sources at Paris, he accepted the dangerous mission of returning to that capital in order to persuade his old friend and comrade Moreau to stand forth as champion of the Bourbon cause. When Moreau had been won over, and the time for action arrived, Count d'Artois was to appear in the last scene of the drama, in the character of saviour of France, receiving the homage of a penitent nation as representative of his more sagacious brother Count de Provence, who refused to countenance any of the proceedings. Cadoudal went over to Paris with his band in August, 1803. Pichegru followed later in the year, accompanied by the brothers Polignac and M. de la Rivière, personal friends of Count d'Artois, and charged to prepare the way for his coming. In order to gain admittance into France, they all availed themselves of a secret perpendicular

tunnel in the Biville cliff, between Treport and Dieppe, which, unknown to the local authorities, had long been used by smugglers in carrying on illicit trade. Thence, using by-paths and secret hiding places, they reached the capital in safety, and remained there for months without exciting suspicion. They owed this immunity chiefly to Bonaparte himself. In order to conciliate public opinion he had abolished the Ministry of Police, and placed the department Fouché had made so terrible under the control of the Minister of Justice ; a change attended with great loss of efficiency. Pichegru had several interviews with Moreau, which quite dispelled the illusion which led him to undertake his mission. He found his old comrade a staunch Republican ; willing indeed to hurl Bonaparte from power, but not for the benefit of the Bourbons. Both generals appear to have shrunk with professional disgust from association with Georges, who forced his company on them ; and thus excited the ill-will of the guerilla chief and his companions. Neither Pichegru nor his aristocratic colleagues could discern any sign of a general re-action in favour of the cause they had come to serve ; and they were on the point of returning to England when the arrest and confession of a lieutenant of Georges, Bouvet de Lozier, in February, 1804, enabled the Government to unravel the plot, and arrest the leading conspirators, and Moreau as their accomplice. The Chouan prisoners, when questioned, repudiated with indignation the charge brought against them of intended assassination. They had enlisted, they declared, to fight openly against Bonaparte's guards, under the command of a French prince who was coming from England to lead them. This avowal aroused in Bonaparte a furious craving for revenge—the spirit of a Corsican vendetta. He openly declared that the first French Bourbon prince who fell into his hands should be shot ; and he sent Colonel Savary, one of his aides-de-camp, with a band of soldiers disguised as smugglers to occupy the Biville cliff and intercept the expected leader. Savary kept watch for three weeks in vain. A vessel said to be that of Captain Wright, from which the captured conspirators had landed, was seen to approach the coast several times ; but moved away, it was surmised, on missing some accustomed signal. While smarting under this disappointment, intelligence reached Bonaparte that the Duke d'Enghien had been for some time sojourning at Ettenhiem in the Duchy of Baden, near the confines of France. This unfortunate prince, intent on pleasure not political intrigue, and unsuspecting of danger, was suddenly surrounded by French troops, carried to Vincennes, and shot by sentence of a court-martial as an emigrant who had borne arms against France. Pichegru committed suicide. Moreau, condemned by a special tribunal to two years' imprisonment on some minor charge, went into exile. Georges and many of his band died on the scaffold. La Rivière

and Armand de Polignac owed their lives to the intercession of the Bonaparte family.<sup>1</sup>

While this tragedy ran its course, the strange political melodrama was enacted in which Mehée de la Touche played the principal part. Mehée first acquired notoriety in the early days of the French Revolution by writings of a Jacobin cast; and as secretary of the Paris *commune* in 1792 became implicated in the September massacres. Later on, under the Directory, he held high posts in various branches of the administration. Bonaparte, after the 18th Brumaire, deported him as an extreme Jacobin and Septembriser to the island of Oleron. Escaping thence to England Mehée wormed himself into the confidence of the leading French emigrants, and was recommended by them to the Addington ministry as a valuable agent for raising up troubles against the Consular government. Lord Grenville had been extremely cautious in dealing with overtures of this kind. It was his custom to refer them all to Mr. Wickham, whose wide and intimate knowledge of foreign agents and intrigues made him difficult to deceive. Lord Hawkesbury appears to have so far followed this example as to introduce Mehée to Mr. Drake, the British Minister at Munich. It was an unfortunate choice. Drake, as earlier volumes of Lord Grenville's correspondence amply testify, was a man of unusual ability and energy who had done good service to the British Government in Italy and Germany. He was also incautious and credulous, though not to the verge of fatuity, as Lord Holland depicts him.<sup>2</sup> Zeal clouded his judgment. Thrown off his guard probably by the recommendation of the British Foreign Office, Mehée's wiles completely duped him. The cunning Frenchman having possessed himself of Drake's full confidence, and, actually or in prospect, of considerable sums of English money, went to Paris, betrayed his mission to Talleyrand, sent misleading information to Munich under Bonaparte's dictation, and received indiscreet answers from Drake, which compromised the British Government; but to the Consul's great disappointment, showed no knowledge whatever of the Chouan conspiracy. Spencer Smith, English Minister at Stuttgart, whom Lord Grenville had recalled from Constantinople at the special request of Lord Elgin,<sup>3</sup> was another victim of Mehée less deserving of sympathy.

The execution of Duc d'Enghien sent a thrill of horror throughout Europe. But fear of Bonaparte repressed public expression of feeling in countries adjacent to France. The Czar, protected by distance, put his Court into mourning, and protested against the violation of German territory both at Paris and the Diet of Ratisbon. The King of Sweden, with

<sup>1</sup> *Consulate and Empire*.—Thiers.

<sup>2</sup> *Memoirs*. Lord Holland knew Mr. Drake as British Minister at Turin in 1794.

<sup>3</sup> Vol. VI, Dropmore Papers.

characteristic vehemence, out-ran the example of his powerful neighbour. The King of Prussia allowed his negotiation with France to drop, and secretly concluded a defensive alliance with Russia. Count Haugwitz retired to his estates, and Baron Hardenberg, more influenced by a reviving national spirit, took for a time the lead in Prussian councils. But no German ruler from the Emperor to the Duke of Baden ventured to support the Russian protest at Ratisbon, which the Diet quietly shelved. No word of reproach was uttered, neither grief nor resentment was displayed by reigning members of the victim's family. And Bonaparte repelled Alexander's remonstrance by defiance and insult, with stinging allusions to the murder of the Emperor Paul, and the immunity enjoyed by that monarch's assassins. No doubt the publication by the French Government, with comments of its own, of the Chouan confessions, and Drake's letters to Mehée, somewhat tempered the odium attaching to d'Enghien's execution. The Electors of Bavaria and Wirtemberg, at the demand of the French Government, sent passports to Drake and Spencer Smith. In France itself the abortive conspiracy undoubtedly strengthened Bonaparte's authority, and promoted his designs. Regicides and extreme Jacobins who had hitherto opposed him acquiesced in the supremacy of a ruler who had in a measure identified himself with them by shedding the blood of a Bourbon prince. The crime thoroughly cowed the more zealous Royalists; and while it answered Bonaparte's purpose by putting an end to plots against his life, it only checked for a moment the defection of moderate Royalists from the standard of princes to whom the Revolution had taught nothing. At the same time it gave a fiercer impulse to the Consul's ambition. Responding to his wishes, Senate, army and people acclaimed him as Emperor of the French. Thenceforward laying aside, or casting into the background, the nobler aims and useful labours which, in saner moments, he had recognised as his true titles to greatness, he made every step of his progress a fresh menace to the peace and independence of Europe. In place of the glorious warrior making victory serve the welfare of France; the pacificator, organizer, and legislator; the statesman intent on moulding into a new polity what was really conservative in the old order, and what was really progressive in the Revolution, the world saw lawless violence crowned and consecrated, armed with irresistible force, and impelled on a career of carnage and havoc by an insatiable thirst of military glory and selfish aggrandisement.

To Bonaparte's announcement that he had entered the circle of royalty the Kings of Prussia and Spain returned assurances of cordial welcome. The answer from the Court of Vienna was more reserved, and the assent conditional. Secularizations and other changes forced by France and Russia on the Diet of Ratisbon in 1803 had wrecked the constitution of the Holy Roman Empire, reduced the Imperial supremacy of

the House of Austria to a barren title, and made the retention of that title precarious. Francis II, therefore, wished to secure the Imperial dignity for his family by adding the title of hereditary Emperor of Austria to that of Roman Emperor elect, which he owed to the suffrage of the Diet. Bonaparte agreed to this augmentation, and then overcame the Austrian monarch's reluctance to acknowledge an equal in Western Europe by threatening to withdraw the French ambassador from Vienna. The Consul's answer to his protest against the arrest of Duke D'Enghien so incensed the Czar that he at first resolved to recall M. d'Oubril, his representative at Paris, and without further parley break off relations with France. More cautious counsels prevailed. He addressed a note to the French Government repeating in language of studied moderation the demands he had already made for the evacuation of Naples and Hanover, and intimating that on compliance with these conditions his political attitude should depend. The King of Prussia offered his mediation. But the French answer was delayed for several weeks owing to Bonaparte's absence from Paris.

Meantime Pitt had succeeded Addington, and with Lord Harrowby in the seat of Lord Hawkesbury came a change in the methods of the English Foreign Office. Harrowby reverted to the line adopted by Lord Grenville for the formation of the third coalition against France, of making a Russian alliance the keystone of British foreign policy; and having obtained the Czar's general concurrence in the views of the British Cabinet, of allowing him to take the lead in negotiations for giving them effect. This was in fact the only road to success. Continental states which received with suspicion overtures from a great naval power, guarded by its belt of seas, and levying tribute from the industry and commerce of all other nations, to join it in war against France, would listen to them without repugnance from a great military power which stood forth in the common interests of Europe, without special advantage to itself, to protect the weak, and defend established order against revolutionary aggression. Pursuing it, Harrowby took occasion in despatches to Sir Arthur Paget to condemn the use of language or other conduct offensive to the Austrian Government; and instructed him to offer no advice to Count Cobentzl, except at the invitation of the Russian Ambassador to the Court of Vienna. He also informed the Czar, through Count Simon Woronzow, that the British Government was prepared to grant 5,000,000*l.* for the purpose of subsidising a fourth European league against France. While awaiting an answer from Paris, Alexander again sounded the dispositions of the Austrian and Prussian rulers, using Pitt's offer as an additional argument for active measures against Bonaparte. But the King of Prussia would not go beyond his defensive treaty with Russia. Archduke Charles and Count Cobentzl, on military and financial grounds, insisted that peace was

still necessary for Austria unless Prussia could be brought to join in war. The whole 5,000,000*l.* offered by Pitt would not suffice, Count Stadion declared at St. Petersburg, to place the Austrian army on a war footing for more than one campaign. A scheme suggested by Sir A. Paget, and approved by the British and Russian Cabinets, for turning out Count Cobentzl and replacing him at the Austrian Foreign Office by a more warlike Minister, had to be abandoned, because no other competent Minister could be found at Vienna. These checks were not encouraging. But a curt refusal from Napoleon to withdraw his troops from Hanover or Naples till peace had been concluded, gave a more decided impulse to the Czar's hostility. He refused to acknowledge the French Emperor; broke off diplomatic relations with him; and sent M. Novosiltzow, who enjoyed his full confidence, on a mission to London to arrange with the British Ministers the basis of a new coalition. Early in November the Emperor Francis II, alarmed by rumours of impending changes in Italy, followed the King of Prussia's example, by entering secretly into a defensive alliance with Russia against French aggression.

On the other hand an act of premeditated violence on the part of the British Government provoked a renewal of hostilities between England and Spain. King Charles IV. had bound himself by the treaty of St. Ildefonso to aid Bonaparte by sea and land in the event of France being at war with a third power. After the rupture of the peace of Amiens he tried to evade this engagement, but consented, under threat of invasion, to pay a monthly subsidy to France for permission to remain in other respects neutral. Addington's ministry, knowing the extenuating circumstances, and at the intercession of the Czar, tolerated this one-sided arrangement. But Pitt proved more exacting; and Mr. Freer, British Minister at Madrid, after angry altercations with the Prince of Peace, quitted the Spanish capital, leaving his brother to continue negotiations. These were prolonged till the time came for the arrival of the treasure ships carrying home the annual tribute to the Spanish Government from South American mines. The British Admiralty, without any positive rupture of diplomatic relations, issued secret orders for the capture of those ships; and of four Spanish frigates carrying 12,000,000 of dollars, three were taken by force, and the fourth went down in fight. This breach of the law of nations set all Spain in a blaze; and drew an immediate declaration of war from the Spanish Government, which placed its empty arsenals and decayed navy at Napoleon's disposal. In all respects this act of violence was a blunder; an outcome probably of the short-sighted rapacity which had so often, during Pitt's first administration, characterised Lord Melville's policy as Minister for War. It gave a severe shock to European opinion; and provoked an angry remonstrance from the Russian Emperor, whose resentment had been

already aroused by recent depredations of British cruisers on Russian and Danish commerce, in spite of the treaty concluded in 1801 by Lord St. Helens at St. Petersburg. In fact it would in all probability have retarded if not prevented the formation of a new coalition, had not Bonaparte's assumption of the title of King of Italy produced a still more decisive effect on the political situation. For how could Alexander, with any regard for the position he coveted of arbiter of Europe, urge Continental powers to join in resisting the rapacious violence of Napoleon, at the instigation and with the aid of an ally which, on the element where its strength prevailed, laid itself so plainly open to the same reproach.<sup>1</sup>

The announcement of Napoleon's design to assume the crown of Italy created an extraordinary sensation at the Court of Vienna, and thoroughly exasperated the Emperor. Francis II's pride and his interests were equally aggrieved by it. As Roman Emperor he was King in Italy as well as King in Germany; and this usurpation foreshadowed the loss of Venice, which bore with impatience an Austrian yoke. He protested against it warmly as infringing the treaty of Luneville, and refused to acknowledge the new title. Unfortunately, also, evil counsellors took advantage of his extreme irritation to arouse his latent jealousy of Archduke Charles, and make him dissatisfied with the slow progress of that able prince in the work of re-organizing the Austrian army. By accident or design General Mack suddenly returned to Vienna in January, 1805, after a long period of enforced retirement. This celebrated soldier had figured prominently in Lord Grenville's correspondence during the latter part of the year 1793. As a result of reports from Lord Elgin and other British agents in Belgium of his extraordinary merit as Quarter-Master General of the Prince of Cobourg's army during the campaign of that year, he had been invited to England by the British Government to discuss with them a plan of operations for 1794. He appears to have been a theorist of uncommon plausibility, and quite abnormal self-confidence until confronted by the perils and difficulties of actual warfare. In peril and difficulty he lost his head. During the course of a few conferences with Pitt, Dundas, and Grenville, he was able to impress them all, and especially Pitt, with a profound conviction of his consummate ability as a strategist which remained proof against the effect of subsequent defeat both in Flanders and in Italy. No doubt this favourable opinion resulted in some measure from Mack's compliance in shaping his plans in order to secure the chief continental aim of British policy, the permanent exclusion of the French from the Netherlands. He seem also

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<sup>1</sup> Lord G. L. Gower's despatches from St. Petersburg; Sir Arthur Paget's despatches from Vienna.—F. O. Papers. Thier's: *Consulate and Empire*.

to have been a proficient in the useful art of shifting the blame of failure to the shoulders of others associated with him. At all events, it was still, apparently, at the beginning of 1805, an article of belief among English politicians that he was a master of the art of war. More competent judges had arrived at a different conclusion. Bonaparte, when only an officer of subordinate rank, had told Bourrienne that this famous strategist was a mere pretender, whose incompetence would be exposed whenever he had to contend with a general of superior ability.<sup>1</sup> Nelson, from a short observation of Mack's proceedings as Commander in Chief at Naples in 1799, formed an equally low estimate of his merits.<sup>2</sup> Archduke Charles disliked and despised him as a charlatan. And although the Archduke's enmity was generally a recommendation to Baron Thugut, Mack had found no favour in the eyes of that all-powerful Minister. His return to Vienna was eagerly welcomed by Sir Arthur Paget. And Archduke Charles attributed to Russian, and more particularly English interference, now exercised indirectly and exclusively through Russian channels, the changes that followed in the Austrian capital.<sup>3</sup> The Emperor, still violently excited, after a few conferences with Mack, whom he had hitherto disliked, fell completely under that general's spell. He removed his brother from the control of the War Department, re-established the Council of War, and assumed to himself the chief direction of military affairs, with Mack, installed in the post of Quarter-Master General, as his adviser and guide. The business of recruiting and equipping the army was now pressed forward with feverish haste. And as French troops began to assemble in Lombardy in order to grace with military pomp the inauguration of a new kingdom, Austrian troops were moved into the Tyrol and Venice, as if to guard them against attack.

By another coincidence, just as Mack emerged from retirement, the Czar despatched General Wintzingerode on a special mission to Berlin and Vienna, to insist in more peremptory language on the necessity of combined action against France, and to discuss some common plan of military operations.

Early in the spring M. Novosiltzoff returned to St. Petersburg with the scheme for a new coalition, as modified in London by the British Cabinet, after consultation with the Russian Ambassador, Count Simon Woronzow. Alexander's project had been armed mediation, undertaken by himself, and offering France terms of peace based on the treaties of Luneville and Amiens. Refusal was to be followed by war; acceptance by a general congress to guarantee the new settlement, and decide other questions affecting the future tranquillity of Europe. It came back to him little altered in form, but altogether different in scope and intention.

<sup>1</sup> Bourrienne's *Memoirs*.

<sup>2</sup> Southey's *Life of Lord Nelson*.

<sup>3</sup> Sir Arthur Paget's despatches from Vienna.—F. O. Papers.

Without regard for past treaties, or present balance of power, the modified plan embodied the conditions which Pitt and Grenville had hoped to impose in 1799 on beaten, exhausted, and divided France before Bonaparte's return from Egypt. The country, empire monarchy or republic as events might determine, was to be reduced to its old monarchical limits; and all the territory it had acquired since the Revolution was to be distributed in such a manner as to form insuperable barriers against future attempts at expansion. In order to accomplish these objects, the coalition, if Prussia joined it, was to place at least 500,000 soldiers in the field; without Prussia, at least 400,000; Great Britain undertaking to pay at the rate of 12*l.* 10*s.* a year for every man actually serving, and to advance four months' pay to each confederate as preparation money. No effort was to be spared to obtain Prussian co-operation. The King of Prussia was to be offered the Rhine provinces, and all of Belgium not required to form a barrier for the Dutch extending from Antwerp to Maestricht, and including both cities. If he refused this bribe, the Czar was to compel him by force, if not to join, at least to allow a free passage through Prussian territory to Hanover, for an army of Swedes, Russians, and English or Hanoverians, to be assembled at Stralsund under command of the King of Sweden. In one respect there was a departure from British policy in 1799. Napoleon, after assuming the Imperial crown, had written again to George III. proposing peace. The British Ministry, mindful no doubt of the bad effect produced by Lord Grenville's haughty rejection of the French ruler's former overture on becoming First Consul, now agreed that Alexander, as a public manifestation of moderation and disinterestedness, should send an envoy to Paris with proposals which, while insisting on an abandonment of Italy and Belgium, left France in possession of her territory on the left bank of the Rhine. No one could have believed that such conditions would be accepted.

The British Cabinet, deceived by the facility M. Novosiltzow had shown in conforming to the views of Count Woronzow, seems to have expected that the altered scheme would have been adopted with equal readiness at St. Petersburg. But it encountered an opposition which Lord Granville Levison Gower, who supported the British proposals with tact, temper, and ability, found himself unable to overcome. The British conditions, Prince Czartoriski declared, took no account of existing circumstances. They were such as might be offered to an enemy who had lost one or more decisive campaigns, but not to a victorious power which had already vanquished three European coalitions. During the last ten or twelve years the Continent had been over-run and desolated by French armies. Sovereigns could only induce their subjects to face the calamities and privations of another conflict by convincing them that every effort had been made to avert it.

For this purpose the terms to be offered to France must take account of the treaties of Luneville and Amiens. The British Government, in keeping Malta, had repeatedly declared that it only did so in the interests of Europe, and because no other means could be found of preserving that island from the grasp of France. The Czar had offered, and was still willing, to solve the difficulty by sending to Malta a garrison of Russian troops. If Europe complained of French tyranny on land, it also felt aggrieved by British tyranny on the seas. Alexander, therefore, insisted that the British Government, as public proof of moderation and disinterested views, should consent to restore Malta to the Knights of St. John; and to submit disputed questions of maritime law for the decision of a European congress. Levison Gower, in order to save the treaty, made large concessions in regard to the terms to be offered to France, and consented to refer the question of the restoration of Malta to the British Government. He refused, however, to hold out any hope of departure from British maritime practice. But Alexander, when signing the treaty, as now revised, on April 11, 1805, made its ratification depend on the cession of Malta; and announced his purpose of persevering in his efforts to have the principles of naval warfare defined, and its practice regulated, by a congress of European powers. The Austrian Government, though still hesitating to pledge its co-operation, expressed entire concurrence in the Russian policy of observing recent treaties with France. The Emperor, it declared, required nothing in Italy but the fortress of Mantua or Peschiera as a bulwark to Venice and the Tyrol. So far as Austria was concerned Napoleon might, if he pleased, make his brother Joseph King of Lombardy; and keep possession of Piedmont, provided compensation were found for the King of Sardinia. Alexander, having despatched the amended treaty to London, requested the King of Prussia to apply to the French Government for a passport for M. Novosiltzow, whom he was about to send on a special mission to Napoleon.<sup>1</sup>

The absorbing interest of events at Paris during the year 1804 seems to have hardly distracted Napoleon's attention from his expedition to England. The difficulties he had to encounter in manning, equipping, and collecting a fleet sufficiently powerful to protect the passage of his army across the Channel, and in finding admirals fit to lead it in a hazardous enterprise, have already been noticed. And in regard to the last-named impediment, time, instead of aiding, fought against him. Admiral Latour-Treville, on whom his chief hopes rested, died at Toulon in the course of the year. Admiral Bruix, who had charge of the gun-boats and all the preparations for a passage, did not long survive Treville. Admiral

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<sup>1</sup> Lord Granville Leveson Gower's despatches from St. Petersburg.—F. O. Papers.

Villeneuve, sent by the Minister of Marine, with little opportunity of choice, to fill the vacancy at Toulon, was a skilful but irresolute officer, oppressed by a haunting sense of the deficiencies of his own fleet, and by almost superstitious fear of his great antagonist, Lord Nelson. In order to combat this timidity, and supply what was wanting in enterprise and audacity, Napoleon attached to Villeneuve Colonel Lauriston, one of his own aides-de-camp. The quarrel between England and Spain had caused a greater dispersal of the naval forces of the former power, and added something to those of France. At the beginning of 1805 Napoleon saw the menace of another European coalition looming faintly on the political horizon, and determined to finish, if possible, his conflict with England before this new war-cloud had time to gather and burst. There were in the principal French and Spanish ports between Toulon and Brest more than 60 ships of the line, besides frigates, in various stages of preparation. British squadrons kept them all under close watch. But equinoctial and other gales sometimes dispersed blockading fleets, and dense fogs baffled the most vigilant scrutiny. It was in accordance with these conditions that Napoleon shaped his final plan of capturing the British Channel. Secret orders were sent from the Ministry of Marine to the Admirals commanding in the various ports under its control, to sally out as opportunity might offer, and, using every subterfuge to mislead the enemy, shape their course for Martinique in the West Indies as a common rendezvous. It was expected that these expeditions would not only train and season the raw crews, but draw away English fleets from Europe for the defence of trade and territories scattered over the world, and left almost without protection. When the allied forces, united at Martinique under one command, had cruised for a sufficient time in American waters to effect the purposes of the voyage, then, by Napoleon's plan, they were to return with all speed in overwhelming strength to sweep the English Channel clear for the passage of the "Army of England," encamped along the heights of Boulogne. In January Admiral Missiessy, finding the coast clear, left Rochefort, and sailed with his small squadron to the West Indies. Shortly after, Villeneuve attempted to follow this example, but was caught in a storm, and his scattered and frequently dimasted ships with difficulty made their way back to Toulon. This rough experience did not raise the Admiral's courage. It was not till March, when the mistral had blown away Lord Nelson from the coast, that he ventured forth again, formed a junction at Cadiz with the gallant Spanish Admiral Gravina, and reached Martinique in May with 20 ships of the line and 7 frigates. But Cornwallis, commanding the Channel fleet, held Admiral Ganteaume and 21 ships of the line pent up at Brest. And 11 French and Spanish ships of the line at Ferrol were equally unable to elude the vigilance of a blockading force under Sir Robert Calder. Bonaparte, finding spring and

its storms passing away without the results on which he had reckoned, sent an express to Villeneuve to return to Europe with all the force he could muster after a cruise of forty days, raise in succession the blockade of Ferrol and of Brest, and with the fleets thus released added to his own, force his way at all costs into the Channel as early as possible in August.<sup>1</sup>

Having made these arrangements for his great enterprise, Napoleon went to Milan to assume the Iron Crown. The pomp and splendour of the ceremony, the enthusiasm evoked by his presence, the homage paid to him by all classes during a triumphal progress through the historic cities of his new realm, exalted his pride. His ambition grasped the whole peninsula; and he spoke and acted as if he were already its master. The Queen of the Two Sicilies having ventured to object to the claim of supremacy implied in his title, he publicly threatened to expel her and her husband from Naples. He called the Emperor to account for reinforcing the Austrian garrison of Venice. He endowed one of his sisters, and then another, with Italian duchies and principalities. And at the request of the Doge and Senate he incorporated the ancient Republic of Genoa with the French empire. In answer to the application of the King of Prussia, which followed him to Italy, he ordered passports to be sent to M. Novosiltzow to meet him at Paris in July; intimating at the same time that Russian mediation would only be tolerated if it proved to be impartial, and not merely in the interests of England. But his annexation of Genoa had consequences he seems to have been far from expecting. It was as the last drop which made the Emperor's cup of mortification overflow, bringing more clearly before him the approaching fate of Venice. In vain Archduke Charles urged the weakness of the Austrian army, and Count Cobentzl the penury of the Austrian treasury. General Wintzingerode having failed in his mission at Berlin, whither the King had recalled Count Haugwitz to combat the war party, came on to Vienna to place at the Emperor Francis's disposal 120,000 Russian troops. At the same time the British Government consented to relieve his financial needs by an immediate advance of 1,000,000*l*; engaging not to claim repayment of this sum, even if Napoleon should accept the terms of peace about to be proposed to him. The projected French descent on England seemed also to promise an Austrian opportunity. In these circumstances Francis II signed the treaty of April 11, which had been transmitted to him from St. Petersburg. And before returning to the Russian capital General Wintzingerode, in concert with the Austrian Council of War and General Mack, framed a plan of campaign by which the allied powers undertook to place in the following October at least 400,000 men in the field against France.

In the meantime, however, an important change in the

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<sup>1</sup> Thiers: *Consulate and Empire*.

political situation had occurred elsewhere. The British Government, while accepting with great reluctance other modifications favourable to France made at St. Petersburg in the treaty signed on April 11, refused to relinquish Malta, or to consent to any discussion on the subject of English maritime practice. This refusal put an end to the Czar's project of mediation. And intelligence which arrived about the same time at St. Petersburg of the annexation of Genoa, gave him a public pretext for ordering M. Novosiltzow, still at Berlin, to send back his passports to Prince Talleyrand, and return to Russia. But Austria absolutely required three months more to complete her preparations. These had already roused the anger of Napoleon. They must be discontinued, or the negotiations abandoned by Alexander must be resumed in order to gain time. It was proposed, therefore, that Russia and Austria should have full liberty, without forfeiting the subsidies stipulated in the treaty of April 11, to disclaim any alliance with Great Britain, until war had actually begun; and that the Emperor Francis should in his own name and that of Alexander, issue a Declaration offering Napoleon terms of accommodation based on the treaty of Luneville. The British Government accepted this arrangement. And Alexander secretly sent General Lascey, a Russian officer of merit and experience, to Naples, to study the country and its resources, concert measures with the Government, and take command of the Russian and English troops who were to be dispatched to its aid from Corfu and Malta.

Napoleon returned to France in July; repaired at the beginning of August to his camp at Boulogne; and passed in review all the forces assembled along the coast for the conquest of England. The Dutch and Belgian divisions of gun-boats under command of Admiral Verhuel, at Ostend and Dunkirk, now fought their way around Cape Gris-nez, and joined the rest of the flotilla at Boulogne and the adjacent harbours. Guns and material of war were put on board; and all arrangements were made for an immediate embarkation of the troops, on the appearance of the great French fleet now impatiently expected. Meanwhile Napoleon had kept close watch on the movements of Austria. Warnings from the Elector of Bavaria quickened his suspicions; and the answers to his repeated inquiries at Vienna proving evasive, he called on the Emperor to disarm. Francis II in reply issued the Declaration concerted with the Emperor Alexander. This manifesto completely opened Napoleon's eyes. He refused the proposals made to him; and ordered his Minister at the Diet of Ratisbon to announce that he would treat any act of hostility to Bavaria on the part of Austria as a declaration of war against France. Still Austrian movements were proverbially slow, and the most effective counter-stroke would be a successful expedition to England. A decisive victory, such as that of Senlac, followed by the capture of London, which, according to his

calculation, might be accomplished in a few weeks, would reduce the British Government to ask for peace, and by stopping the supplies of his continental foes place them practically at his mercy. But though he had faith in his star, the ordering of events was not in his power.

Lord Nelson, after some delay caused by false intelligence and contrary winds, had followed Admiral Villeneuve to the West Indies with only nine ships of the line. When the French admiral, who had 20 ships of the line under his command, and had captured an immense fleet of British merchantmen, heard of the arrival at Barbadoes of the great antagonist fear of whom dogged his movements like a Nemesis, he departed for Europe with a precipitation which not only disregarded Napoleon's orders, but flung away every advantage, moral or material, acquired in the outward voyage. Approaching Ferrol on July 22, he encountered Admiral Sir Robert Calder and fifteen English ships of the line. After a confused battle in a fog the hostile fleets separated. Calder fell back to join Admiral Cornwallis before Brest, carrying with him two Spanish men-of-war he had taken in the fight. Villeneuve, after some delay, reached Ferrol. He found there a reinforcement of eleven French and Spanish ships of the line in good condition, and peremptory orders from the Minister of Marine to proceed at once to Brest, and at all hazards raise the blockade. But the late action had so discouraged him that several weeks elapsed before he could muster resolution, under the vigorous spur of Lauriston's chiding, to quit his shelter. At the moment of departure Lauriston sent an express to advise Napoleon that Villeneuve was on the way to Brest. At sea, however, all the Admiral's misgivings returned; and being overcome by apprehensions that Nelson as well as Calder might by this time have joined Cornwallis, he suddenly turned his back to the unseen foe, and steered south for Cadiz. As it happened, Nelson had gone back to Cadiz in pursuit of his enemy. Hearing no news of him in that quarter, he had turned northwards to join Cornwallis, and then, worn out by fatigue, went on to England for a short rest. Cornwallis, after waiting a short time in expectation of Villeneuve's appearance, sent back Calder with eighteen ships of the line to resume the blockade of Ferrol. And, according to French official accounts,<sup>1</sup> Villeneuve might have brought thirty-five ships of the line to encounter only eighteen retained by Cornwallis; and been aided by twenty-one more which Admiral Gauteaume, forewarned from Paris, brought out from port, and ranged in order of battle in Brest roads. The British Admiralty, however, had by this time penetrated Napoleon's design. And Cornwallis, who had already won great renown for dogged valour and skilful manœuvring in the face of a more powerful foe, could have fallen back, fighting,

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<sup>1</sup> Thiers: *Consulate and Empire*.

on the more powerful armament collected in the Channel, with which Nelson, two months later, won the battle of Trafalgar. Had Villeneuve executed Napoleon's orders with even moderate skill and vigour, it is well within the range of possibilities that, considering the magnitude of the opposing fleets, and the thousands of gunboats prepared to join in the fray, the English Channel in August, 1805, might have been the scene of the greatest naval battle recorded in history.

Towards the close of August, Napoleon, after several days of restless expectation, learned that Villeneuve had failed him. Ungoverned fury, it is said, seized him for several hours. Then calming himself by a strong effort of the will, he dictated to M. Daru at a single sitting the plan of campaign against the fourth coalition which military writers of all nations have concurred in extolling as a masterpiece of the art of war.<sup>1</sup> The coalition in truth rescued him from a most humiliating position. For nearly three years he had kept a great army encamped on the coast of Picardy; he had proclaimed to the world his purpose of leading it in a descent on England; he had devoted all the thought, energy, and resources at his command to preparations for this enterprise, with the ridiculous result of finding himself unable even to attempt it, except on conditions little removed from certain destruction. If he chose the safer course of abandoning it, he became the laughing-stock of Europe. From this embarrassing situation the precipitate policy and lavish subsidies of the British Government opened to him not only a means of escape, but a most advantageous issue. At the beginning of September the "Army of England," raised by constant labour and exercise to the highest point of military efficiency, was in full march to the Rhine.

According to the plan of operations adopted by the allied powers, against the advice of Archduke Charles, the principal Austrian army of 120,000 men, under the command of that famous general, was to take the offensive in Italy, by laying siege to Mantua and Peschiera. Archduke John, with 25,000 men in the Tyrol, was to support his brother. Another Austrian army of 80,000 men, under the command of the Emperor, with Archduke Ferdinand as his lieutenant, and General Mack chief of the staff, reinforced by 60,000 Russians under General Kutusow, was to cross the Inn into Bavaria. The Czar at the head of 80,000 Russians, stationed on the Polish frontier, was to persuade or compel the King of Prussia to join the coalition; or, at least, to allow a free passage to Hanover for 40,000 Swedes, Russians, and English or Hanoverians, assembled at Stralsund under the King of Sweden. 20,000 Russians from Corfu, and 5,000 English from Malta, were to land in Italy. And the British Government undertook to distract the forces of the enemy by expeditions to the coasts of

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<sup>1</sup> Daru's *Memoirs*.

France and Holland. In pursuance of these plans, Kutusow crossed the Russian frontier into Galicia towards the end of August. A few days later the Emperor Francis sent Prince Scharwtzenberg to Munich with a summons to the Elector of Bavaria to join forces with the Imperial army on pain of being treated as an enemy. The Elector feigned compliance, and thus gained time to save himself and his troops by a rapid retreat to Wurtzburgh. Archduke Ferdinand and Mack pursued him, over-ran the electorate, which they dealt with as a conquered country, and finally took up a position on the river Iller, extending 25 miles from Memmingen to Ulm. It was a defensive position of great strength, if held by a sufficient force; being guarded on one flank by the defiles of the Black Forest, and on the other by the Prussian territory of Anspach. Napoleon's plan was a rapid concentration of all his forces to deal crushing blows at the armies of Austria, before confederates could come to their aid. He sent his Grand Marshal, Duroc, on another mission to Berlin, to offer Hanover to the King of Prussia as the price of an alliance. Having concluded a treaty of neutrality with the King of the Two Sicilies, he ordered General St. Cyr to evacuate Naples and reinforce Marshal Massena who commanded in northern Italy against Archduke Charles. Marshal Bernadotte at the head of the French troops in Hanover, and General Marmont with the army of Holland, crossed the frontiers into Germany and formed a junction with the Bavarians at Wurtzburg before the end of September, just as the advanced guard of Napoleon's army, under Prince Murat, flashed into the Black Forest. These movements left Hanover and Holland open to English invasion, but the British Government was not ready to take advantage of the opportunity. The Emperor Francis was still at Vienna. Archduke Ferdinand scared by the unexpected apparition of Murat's horsemen in the defiles of the Black Forest, hastily called a council of war, which decided to retire at once to the Inn, where Kutusow had now arrived. General Mack, however, dissented from this opinion, and produced a written order of the Emperor giving him absolute control of the military operations. Bewildered by Napoleon's tactics, and confiding in Prussian neutrality, he clung obstinately to the Iller; having recalled to his aid 30,000 troops from the army of Italy, and sent an urgent summons to Kutusow to join him by forced marches. But Bernadotte, disregarding Prussian neutrality, forced his way across Anspach; and the French sweeping round both flanks to the rear of the Austrians, cut them off from the Inn. In little more than a fortnight, Mack found himself shut up in Ulm with the wrecks of an army which, surrounded, beaten, and driven in from all quarters, had no resource left but to lay down its arms. Archduke Ferdinand escaped into Bohemia with about 1,500 cavalry. Of the 80,000 troops under Mack's command, 60,000 were killed or taken, together with 400 guns

and immense supplies of all kinds. The remaining 20,000 evaded or broke loose from the French net, and joined Kutusow on the Inn. Then Napoleon conducted the Elector of Bavaria back in triumph to Munich. Pressing onward he entered Vienna. Prince Murat, still leading the French vanguard, having captured by a ruse the fortified bridge over the Danube, near Vienna, the main body of the French army crossed that river, pursued the allied forces under Kutusow into Moravia, and took possession of Brunn, with the chief Austrian magazines. From Brunn Napoleon advanced to Olmutz to meet a second Russian army which the Emperor Alexander led in person to the aid of his unfortunate ally.

In Italy Archduke Charles, weakened by the recall of 30,000 of his troops to help Mack, so far from being able to assume the offensive, had to yield ground slowly to the vigorous attacks of Massena. Intelligence of the capitulation of Ulm hastened his retreat in the direction of Vienna, for the purpose of covering the Austrian capital. On the other hand, news of the landing of an Anglo-Russian expedition in Italy, checked Massena's advance. He sent back General St. Cyr to oppose these unexpected enemies, and discontinued his own pursuit of the Archduke.

Several weeks seem to have elapsed before the march of the "Army of England" to Germany came to the knowledge of the British Cabinet. So late as October 7, Thomas Grenville reported to his brother an opinion expressed by Lord Harrowby, who, though no longer a member of the Government enjoyed its entire confidence, that the Austrians had caught the French napping. Particulars of the catastrophe of Ulm, published in the *Moniteur*, not unnaturally excited incredulity in England; and when the event was certainly known in all its magnitude, the disappointment it caused appears to have been lost in exultation for the victory of Trafalgar. A few days later on, news arrived from Berlin which revived all Pitt's confidence in the success of the coalition. At the opening of the campaign, the Czar, according to previous agreement, had assembled an army on the Prussian frontier. Finding all the inducements suggested by the British Government in the shape of English subsidies and French territory fail to lure Frederick William III from his attitude of neutrality, he plainly indicated to the King that the allies could no longer allow him to remain an inactive spectator of their contest with France. Frederick William, roused to anger by this threat, declared his intention to repel force by force; called out a part of his army; and seemed on the point of accepting the alliance offered to him by Napoleon, when news of Bernadotte's march through Anspach aroused a storm of national indignation which swept all other considerations from his mind. Alexander at once changed his tone, paid a friendly visit to the Prussian Court at Potsdam, and was welcomed with enthusiasm. A free passage through Prussian

territory was opened to the allies. The two sovereigns swore eternal friendship on the tomb of Frederick the Great, and signed a convention known as the treaty of Potsdam. By this instrument Frederick William assumed in his turn the office of armed mediator. If Napoleon, after a fortnight allowed for consideration, refused terms of peace based generally on the treaty of Luneville, but ceding Piedmont to France, he engaged further to join the coalition with all his forces on the same footing as the Russian and Austrian sovereigns, and another special condition which Alexander bound himself if possible to obtain. This was the cession of Hanover to Prussia, already offered by Napoleon. If George III refused this concession, Prussia, while still requiring the British subsidies stipulated in the treaty of April 11, would co-operate with the allied Powers so long and so far only as might be required for the accomplishing of objects affecting her own particular interests, such as the expulsion of French troops from Hanover and Holland. These aims being satisfied, Frederick William was to have full liberty to withdraw from the coalition, on giving six months' notice of that intention. Alexander despatched M. D'Ouvril to London to communicate the treaty of Potsdam to the British Government, and persuade it, if possible, to sacrifice Hanover to the general interests of Europe. He then proceeded to join the Austrian Emperor at Olmutz; and Frederick William sent Count Haugwitz to Napoleon's head-quarters, as the bearer of the Prussian terms of peace.

When it was known in London that the war party had got the upper hand at the Court of Berlin, Pitt dispatched Lord Harrowby, clothed with extraordinary powers, and accompanied by Mr. Hammond of the Foreign Office, to conclude an alliance with the King of Prussia on the lines already laid down in the negotiations leading to the treaty concluded on April 11. A few weeks later a body of British troops embarked for Hanover, under Lord Cathcart as Commander-in-Chief. The War Office also sent Lord Harrington to Austria, to encourage the Emperor with assurances of the immense efforts it had in view for the campaign of 1806; and also as military adviser, to supply, apparently, the loss of General Mack. Harrowby and D'Ouvril met at Hamburgh, one on his way to Berlin, the other on his way to London. And as the instructions of the former envoy did not apply to the new situation created by the Russian mission, his first conferences with Baron Hardenberg, Prussian Minister for Foreign Affairs, were of merely a tentative character.

During the first part of the campaign of 1805, little was heard of the famous Austrian staff, governed by its three great chiefs, Schmidt, Weyrotha and Chatelar, which figured so prominently in Mr. Wickham's correspondence with Lord Grenville before the campaign of 1800, as an oracle of military science and a nursery of great captains. Chatelar had not

apparently recovered from the discredit attaching to him from Marshal Kray's defeat by General Moreau ; but his more renowned colleagues, so closely associated with the victories of Archduke Charles and Marshal Suvarow, seem to have been lost in the blaze of Mack's sudden ascendancy. It was only after the capitulation of Ulm and the appearance of Russian armies on the scene of warfare, that they emerged into prominence. Although Alexander at the beginning of his reign devoted much attention to the reorganisation of his forces, he had been unable to supply the wants that had detracted so much from their military efficiency in the time of Suvarow. They came again into the field unprovided with trained staff, or commissariat. The soldiers, mindful of many great victories and not inglorious defeats, considered themselves invincible ; and both hated and undervalued their Austrian allies. The generals of Russian birth, such as Kutusow, knew little of military science and probably despised it. But Alexander, appreciating as Suvarow had done, the conditions of civilized warfare, eagerly welcomed the advantage of Austrian staff officers and magazines. General Schmidt succeeded Mack at Quarter-Master-General, and was attached to Kutusow's army in its retreat to Moravia. Under his skilful direction the Russian general fell suddenly, and in much superior force, on the French corps of Marshal Mortier, marching carelessly without sufficient support along the left bank of the Danube, and nearly annihilated it. This success, the only notable one gained by the allies during the war, greatly elated the Russians ; but was dearly purchased by the loss of Schmidt, who fell in the battle. Weyrotha who, earlier in the year, declined an invitation from the Duke of York to fill the post of Director of the Military College in England, vacated by the death of General De Jarry, had succeeded Schmidt as chief of the Austrian staff, when, at the end of November, 1805, the French and allied armies commanded by their Emperors in person, confronted each other in the neighbourhood of Olmutz. The allied forces were the stronger, opposing 65,000 Russians and 25,000 Austrians to 75,000 French. Every other circumstance of their situation counselled delay. Strong Russian reinforcements were close at hand. Archduke Charles, leading 50,000 Austrian troops from Italy, had reached Gratz in Styria. Count Haugwitz had arrived at the French camp with the Prussian ultimatum. But Alexander was surrounded by a band of young officers, without military experience, full of presumption, and panting for battle. And Napoleon left no artifice untried which might hasten a decisive conflict. He sent Colonel Savary to Alexander with a request for a personal interview. Then, as if in panic, he broke up his camp in the night, and retreated some leagues to another position near Austerlitz, carefully chosen beforehand, and screened from hostile observation. The Russians followed eagerly. And when Prince Dolgorouki visited the

new French camp as the bearer of a civil refusal from Alexander of the interview proposed, and to make observations, Napoleon so ordered appearances, and spoke in such a humble tone, as to confirm the Prince in a false idea of the weakness of his army and his anxiety to avoid a battle. It so happened that, at the same time, in consequence either of the capture or depletion of Austrian magazines, or, as the Austrians averred, the improvidence of Russian soldiers accustomed to live at free quarters, dearth of food made itself felt in the camp of the allies. During the night of December 1, the Czar, without consulting the Emperor Francis, called on General Weyrotha to draw up a plan of battle for the following day. It was immediately prepared and transmitted to the generals charged with the execution of it. Its leading idea was to turn the right of the French army, in order to cut off the enemy's communications with Vienna and the Rhine. But, however able in conception, it had the practical defect of being executed without exact knowledge of the French position. On the morning of December 2, the allied army marched in a long column of five divisions along the heights of Praslin, facing the French camp, to execute Weyrotha's grand manœuvre. The leading division, on sweeping down from the high ground to envelope the French flank, encountered an unlooked for resistance, which brought the whole line to a halt; and while thus stationary, Napoleon sent forward two strong French divisions, supported by an immense park of artillery, which cut it through at the centre, where Alexander had taken his post. The French guns, following through the gap, wrought fearful havoc in the disordered ranks of the allies, spreading terror and confusion on all sides, and playing with terrible effect on the frozen surfaces of some adjacent lakes, across which crowds of fugitives sought to escape. Whole battalions of the Russians were crushed by the fire or engulfed in the waters. Other French divisions pressed forward to pursue the advantage; and the charges of Prince Murat's splendid cavalry completed the rout. The allies lost all their artillery and baggage. On the following day the Emperor Francis, with the Czar's consent, went to Napoleon's head-quarters to ask for an armistice, for the purpose of treating for peace. It was granted on condition that Alexander and his troops should at once withdraw from Austrian territory. At that moment apparently the French Emperor had not yet learned the full extent of his success. The Russian army was a disorganized mob, nearly surrounded by the French, and without supplies of any kind. Alexander gladly accepted a proposal which opened for it a safe retreat. He went at once to St. Petersburg, but sent his brother Constantine and Prince Dolgorouki to Berlin to place his remaining forces at the service of the King of Prussia. Then Napoleon, committing the negotiation with Austria to Prince Talleyrand, returned to Vienna to confer with Count Haugwitz. The

Prussian statesman had reached the French headquarters in Bohemia on November 28, in order to discharge his mission. Napoleon in a brief interview observed that he was about to give battle to the allies, and that the King of Prussia's communication had better be deferred. Haugwitz took the hint, and retired to await events at Vienna. At his second interview with the conqueror, instead of presenting the Prussian ultimatum, he offered his congratulations; denied all hostile intentions on the part of his sovereign; and finally concluded a treaty of alliance between France and Prussia, by which the latter power, in return for Hanover, ceded Anspach and other territory to Bavaria, and the Duchies of Cleves and Luxemburg to France. Having thus rid himself of Prussia and Russia, Napoleon imposed his will on Austria, which now lay at his mercy. By the treaty of Presburg, signed on December 27th, the Emperor acknowledged the kingdom of Italy, and ceded to it Venice and the Venetian provinces along the Adriatic; ceded the Tyrol to Bavaria, and all Imperial rights and domains in Suabia to the Elector of Wirtemberg and the Grand Duke of Baden; and agreed to pay to France an additional war contribution of 100,000,000 of francs. At the personal solicitation of Archduke Charles, whom he held in high esteem, Napoleon reduced this imposition to 30,000,000 of francs, the whole land being sorely distressed by famine. Francis II also consented to recognise his chief remaining vassals, the Electors of Bavaria and Wirtemberg, as independent kings, on the same footing as the King of Prussia. And thus the Roman empire of the West, restored in the year 800 A.D. by a warrior sprung from the barbarians who had overturned it, crumbled to dust under the sword of a soldier of the French Revolution, who again, after the lapse of 1,000 years, aspired to bring all Western Europe under his sway.

While the war was at its height in Germany, an Anglo-Russian army landed in Naples, and the King, notwithstanding his treaty of neutrality with France, joined forces with the invaders at the solicitation of the Czar. When this intelligence reached Napoleon he proclaimed that Ferdinand IV had "ceased to reign." Massena's troops, accompanied by Joseph Bonaparte, advanced into the kingdom. The Russians and English retired to their ships without striking a blow; the Neapolitan troops disbanded; the Bourbons fled to Sicily, and Napoleon became master of the whole Italian peninsula, with the exception of the strip of territory still left to the Pope.

In the meantime M. D'Oubril had arrived in London with the treaty of Potsdam. The British Government rejected the demand of Hanover as "inadmissible"; but accepted the alternative of an alliance with limitations as proposed by the King of Prussia. Lord Harrowby therefore offered Baron Hardenberg to subsidize 180,000 Prussian troops, to be

employed during the year 1806 in expelling the French from North Germany and Holland. Before any agreement was concluded, news reached Berlin of the battle of Austerlitz. Hardenberg at once assumed a reserved attitude; and when pressed by the Austrian and Russian ambassadors to carry out the treaty of Potsdam, took refuge, with evident embarrassment, in absolute silence.<sup>1</sup> Count Haugwitz returned to Berlin after Christmas, but threw no light on the situation; and when Grand Duke Constantine complained to the King of the mysterious conduct of his ministers, Frederic William declared his intention of making a personal communication to the Czar. Meantime Lord Harrowby fell ill, and got leave to return to England. It was only on the eve of his departure, early in January, 1806, that Baron Hardenberg informed him, with unconcealed shame and grief, that the King of Prussia had entered into an agreement with Napoleon to occupy Hanover till peace should be signed between France and England; but guaranteed the safe embarkation of Lord Cathcart's troops on condition that they abstained from all further hostilities against the French garrison of Hamelin.

Lord Harrington, whose mission to Austria had been cut short by the armistice which followed the battle of Austerlitz, remained at Berlin to fill the place of Lord Harrowby, till all the British troops in North Germany re-embarked for England in February, 1806.

William Pitt was the most illustrious victim of Austerlitz. He had gone to Bath early in December, suffering from gout, but in high spirits and full of confidence in the political outlook. The cure worked well, and promised to renew his strength for the conflicts of the approaching session of Parliament, when the shock caused by the sudden crash of all his hopes drove back the disease, with fatal effect, into his system; and he returned to Putney Heath in January, only to die. In the meantime the leaders of parties in Opposition had been at variance among themselves. During a gathering at Dropmore early in December, the views expressed by Whigs and Grenvillites on the question of the war differed so widely as apparently to forbid hope of any common plan of action against the Ministry. Lord Grenville, agreeing with Pitt rather than with Fox, had allowed his sympathies to take form in a neutral line of conduct, which exposed him to remonstrances from Thomas Grenville as being incompatible with his duty as chief of a party, and with the principles on which that party was founded. The battle of Austerlitz cleared the way for a better understanding, by merging personal partialities in a common sense of public danger. But it was not till the very eve of the meeting of Parliament in January that the various sections of the Opposition found a basis of union. In the course of a con-

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<sup>1</sup> Harrowby to Mulgrave. *F.O. Despatches*, 1805.

ference with Thomas Grenville at St. Anne's Hill on January 12 Fox stated that, however much he condemned the origin and conduct of the war, he considered that the interests and honour of England now required that it should be pursued with the utmost vigour, and that all engagements with foreign allies should be strictly observed.<sup>1</sup> This announcement satisfied Lord Grenville, and left ground of attack open on which the Opposition could combine; Whigs, Grenvillites and followers of Lord Sidmouth being equally disposed to censure the measures of Government, offensive and defensive, against Napoleon as ill-judged and inadequate. Parliament had actually met, and a hostile motion against the Ministry had been framed, before the critical state of Pitt's health became generally known. His medical advisers, almost to the last, held the hopeful view that the only alarming symptom of his condition was extreme debility, which chiefly needed complete rest and freedom from worry. It was from Lord Wellesley, who had just returned from India, and paid a short visit to Putney Heath, that Lord Grenville learned the desperate case of the Prime Minister. Thenceforward the Bishop of Lincoln and Sir Walter Farquhar sent him daily accounts of the illustrious patient's rapid decline. Pitt died on January 23, 1806. Prostrated by grief Lord Grenville retired to Dropmore in order to escape from discussions to which he found himself unequal. None of his published letters, perhaps, place his character, whether as a statesman or as a man, in such an admirable light as those written by him during this brief period of seclusion. His advice to the Opposition, conveyed in a letter to his brother Thomas, was equally wise and high-minded. The deep affection and earnest solicitude for the honour of a lost friend and leader displayed in others drew a warm and grateful acknowledgement from Lord Chatham.

The King, after many fruitless efforts to avert the inevitable, authorised Lord Grenville to construct a new administration on Opposition principles. And the correspondence on the last pages of this volume is chiefly concerned with the formation of the Ministry of "All the Talents."

WALTER FITZPATRICK.

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<sup>1</sup> T. Grenville to Marquis of Buckingham: *Court and Cabinets of George III.*



THE MANUSCRIPTS OF  
J. B. FORTESCUE, ESQUIRE.  
PRESERVED AT DROPMORE.

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VOL. VII.

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THE EARL OF CARYSFORT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, April 1, Berlin.—“ I have asked for leave of absence on account of Lady Newhaven’s death, and with a promise not to use it if any particular crisis should make it probable my stay would be useful, I therefore trust I shall have fully answered the object you had in view in desiring that I should keep my station. There is some juggle about the business which has been managed through Lutzow that I am not able to understand; but it should seem either that the communication to the Emperor has been suspended, or that they wait to declare his sentiments till the result of the operations of Sir Hyde Parker’s fleet is known. It is needless to trouble you with all the little circumstances on which I found this conjecture. It is sufficient that it evidently appears that it is yet possible the affair may be brought to a conclusion. Till then I should not wish to leave Berlin, and there is unluckily a present obstacle which we cannot surmount. The children have been attacked, as we fear, by the scarlet fever, and Dr. Brown says if it turns out to be so, they will be confined a full month. The conduct of this court continues what it has been, full of outward violence and private professions of good will. The truth is, at the present moment it is absolutely dependent on Russia or France, and I hardly know which is the most prevalent terror.

“ I have just received your last letter, March 24. I have not time to answer it at large. It gives me great concern in every point of view. As far as I am concerned, I shall undoubtedly continue to act under and with the present Administration long enough to show that I at least consider you as perfectly sincere in the support you give them, and that I am influenced by that opinion. I must own, at the same time, that I am not sufficiently convinced of the abilities

of any of them, or of the principles of many, to have much confidence in them. The business of Parliament will be over for this session probably before I can return, and I cannot for a long time be called upon to give any public opinion about them, nor will I fix myself to any till I have seen you. I believe I need not say that we look forward with the utmost delight to the probability of soon making a visit to farmer William and his good dame.

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, April 12. Southampton.—“ Cruellement persécuté dans mon pays où on ne cesse de fraper sur moi et mes biens, parce que je suis resté dans celui-ci, quoique j'étois resté d'après une permission qu'on m'avoit donné, et qu'il n'y avoit ni guerre déclarée entre les deux cours, ni proclamation public chez nous pour ordoner à tous les Russes de quitter l'Angleterre, j'avois déjà écrit au mois de février que je quitterois cette isle au mois de mai, mais avant l'arrivée de cette lettre, on m'a déjà traité en criminel. J'attens d'un jour à l'autre le passeport du gouvernement français pour pouvoir débarquer à Calais, et de là aller tout droit à Pymont où je vais me rendre.

“ Je dois éviter Londres et la rencontre de tout ce qui est du présent et ancien ministère, car on m'en feroit un nouveau crime, et on persécuteroit ma famille. Au regret d'être obligé de quitter cette isle, j'ai encor celui de ne pas vous voir, et d'être privé de la consolation de vous exprimer de bouche ma reconnaissance pour toute les marques d'amitié et de confiance que je n'ai cessé de recevoir de vous, depuis que j'ai eu le bonheur de vous connaître. Croyez, je vous supplie, que je sens tout le prix de cette amitié et confiance qui m'honore.

“ Je vous réitère ma prière d'avoir votre portrait que vous m'avez promis. Je vous prie de l'envoyer dans la maison de Mr. Thomson Bonar No. 32 Old Bethlem street dans la cité. C'est encor un ami bien rare à qui je dois infiniment, et qui est chargé de toutes mes affaires. Partout où je serai mes vœux seront toujours pour la prospérité du pays que je quitte, pour cet excellent gouvernement, le seul au monde où l'homme est dans toute sa dignité, et pour la prospérité d'une nation où j'ai le bonheur d'avoir tant d'amis si estimables ; parmi les quels vous êtes celui au quel je dois, et pour le quel je sens, un attachement qui ne finira qu'avec ma vie.”

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, April 12. Berlin.—“ I have a letter from Tom, of the 28th, who excuses the barrenness of his epistle by saying that you are writing to me ; but I have not received a single

line from you either of that date or of the 3rd, down to which time I have despatches. He says you have learned and will tell me a new and more distant situation which is intended for me. This can only be Vienna, since, on the 28th, there was no expectation of sending a Minister to Petersburg. To that Court I certainly would not go, unless the reconciliation of the two countries appeared absolutely to depend upon the expedition with which a Minister should be sent, and nobody else could be ready at that moment. But nothing would persuade me to stay there. Indeed all I wish for at present is to return home, where my private affairs require my presence, and where we shall all be comfortably assembled, and have leisure to enjoy ourselves for some time at least, though I cannot but pray for your return into office; and, to say the truth, I cannot sleep of nights for the terror I am in lest the inexperience of our new leaders should not steer us steadily and skilfully through the most intricate and hazardous navigation in which we are at this moment engaged. What will come of this attempt to negotiate with France? And what could lead to it when all the advantage seemed on her side? I trust that God will give us good success in the Baltic and in Egypt. Then indeed we may hold up our heads, and it is already a great point gained to be able to keep Malta without losing on that account the friendship of Russia. I have strongly solicited leave of absence to come home; following in that your advice and Tom's, but not having the least intention of ever returning. I think the division on Grey's motion is decisive, but, somehow or other, I have no comfort in looking to the stability of the present ministry. Lord Hawkesbury writes that the king is going on well, and I trust it is so, but other rumours are abroad."

#### LORD HAWKESBURY to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, April 13. Sackville Street.—“I send you a letter from Lord Carysfort which will, I conclude, inform you of the important intelligence of the death of the Emperor Paul, on the 24th of March. I have just received from Monsieur Simolin a letter from Count Pahlen announcing this event, and the peaceable accession of the Grand Duke Alexander. It is written in the most conciliating terms, and marks the strongest disposition on the part of the new Russian government to renew their connection with this country. We have every reason to believe that our friend Woronzow is re-instated.

“Accounts have been received from Hamburgh, dated the sixth instant, which state an action to have taken place at Copenhagen on the first. The loss is represented to have been very severe on both sides, and the result is not mentioned;

so that there can be little doubt that it has been favourable to us. We shall have, I have no doubt, further particulars in the course of to-morrow."

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD HAWKESBURY.

1801, April 14. Dropmore.—"I received a letter from Lisbon, with a message from M. de Pinto desiring my support of a request which, as I collect, the Prince Regent has made to this Government respecting the present situation of Portugal. I am not sufficiently acquainted with the particulars to be able to do more than to bear that testimony which I really think is due from me, to the upright principles and conduct of the Prince, as far as I have ever had occasion to observe them. Some instances of weakness we have unquestionably seen in the course of this great contest; but these may very well be accounted for, I had almost said justified, on the part of so weak a power as Portugal, when you consider what the conduct of the greatest monarchies in Europe has been. And although I know a contrary opinion is held by many, and that it is a sort of fashion to affect to discover instances of deep-laid schemes of perfidy in every step taken by the continental powers, yet I must declare my unaltered conviction to be that Portugal has, during the whole contest, adhered to its system of connection and alliance with Great Britain, with as much steadiness as can ever be expected from a power so circumstanced; and that it is very desirable to avoid on our part any step that may hereafter afford to a French or Spanish party at Lisbon the pretext of saying that Portugal was, under the circumstances which now exist, abandoned by Great Britain.

"I state this without reference to any particular subject as to which Pinto's message relates; but what I have said is no more than I owe in justice to them. I am very sure the importance of that connection is not more strongly felt by myself than it is by you." *Copy.*

LORD WHITWORTH to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, April 16. Knole.—"Your congratulations and the terms in which they are conveyed call for my earliest and warmest thanks. Your lordship well knows the value I have ever placed on your esteem, and I have only to say that the most anxious desire to deserve it will follow me in every circumstance of my life.

"I shall, as long as I live, celebrate as a festival the day on which I learnt the death of that arch-fiend Paul. His successor will, I am persuaded, be anxious to remedy the evils which that madman was drawing upon his country, as well

as upon his natural friends. As such Alexander considers us, and he has a character to support his principles.”

COUNT WORONZOW TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, April 17. Southampton.—“ Mille grâces pour vos deux billets que j’ai reçu hier. J’allois vous écrire pour vous annoncer le changement survenu chez nous ; mais comme ce n’est plus une nouvelle pour vous, il me reste à vous comuniquer ce qui suit. On m’autorise à dire ici que dès qu’on nomera un ministre de votre coté pour la Russie, celle-ci en nomera aussi un autre pour l’Angleterre, et on me dit que l’Empereur me désigne à cette place. Je vous avoue que je suis si dégouté de tout service, que l’idée seule de rentrer de nouveau dans cette maudite gallère me fait frémire ; et, si je l’accepte, c’est pour très peu de tems, et uniquement pour coopérer au rapprochement des deux cours.

“ J’ai trop bonne opinion de Lord Hawksbury pour n’être persuadé qu’il vous consultera sur tout. Il est tout neuf dans les affaires étrençères, et il ne peut pas avoir de meilleur guide que vous. Or il est important que le ministre qu’on enverat chez nous soit un homme non seulement de beaucoup de sagesse, mais qui connoisse particulièrement le nouveau souverain, qu’il connoise aussi ses allentours, el le pays en général.

“ Or il n’y a perssone de plus propre à ça que Lord Whitworth que l’empereur actuel aime. Je sais qu’on lui destine la mission de Paris. Elle peut lui être plus agréable, mais elle ne sera pas aussi utile à ce pays, car votre bonne ou mauvaise paix dépendra de votre bonne ou mauvaise intelligence avec la Russie. C’est elle qui fera hausser ou baisser le ton de Bonaparte, Le mariage de Lord Whitworth ne peut pas être un obstacle, car il peut n’y aller que pour huit ou dix mois, mais pour le premier moment il y sera plus util que tout autre. Dans le cas qu’il s’y refuse absolument, c’est Lord St. Helens qu’il faut perssuader d’y aller. Il ne sera pas aussi util que le premier, mais il sera plus util qu’un autre, parce qu’il connoit le pays, et qu’il est connu et estimé. Il y a un troisième qui, quoiqu’il n’a jamais été en Russie, seroit pourtant très util à cause de ses talents et de ses liaisons d’amitié avec le Comte Panin, qui a la plus grande estime et confiance en lui, c’est votre frère. On a envoyé chercher le Comte Panin, et il sera très influent chez nous dans les affaires politiques. C’est donc à vous perssuader votre frère de faire ce sacrifice pour le bien de sa patrie ; qu’il accepte ce poste pour huit ou dix mois, ce sera toujours un grand bien. Au défaut de ces trois c’est Mr. Fawlkner qu’il faudroit choisir et perssuader. Il y a encor un quatrième, et quoiqu’il est probable qu’il ne l’acceptera pas, je ne vois pas pourquoi on ne fera pas la tentative de le lui proposer, c’est Lord Makartney ; la peine

n'est pas grande de tenter la chose. Mais si perssone de ceux-ci ne veulent aller chez nous, et que Liston est en état de santé à l'accepter, c'est encor un sujet tres propre. En tout cas je vous conjure de consseiller qu'on n'envoy perssone de vif, de jeune, et d'inexperimenté ; que ce soit un homme sage, posé, et qui a été habitué à traiter dans les cours étrangères ; car il aura à combatre Steding et d'autres ministres étrengers tres habils, qui connaissent le terein, et qui sont contraires aux intérêts de ce pays. Habitué à vous parler avec cette franchise insséparable de la vraie amitié, je vous avoue entre nous que je crains les liaisons de parentes, et leurs influences dans les affaires. Je crains que Lord Hawksbury ne noma à cette place son beau-frere Lord Hervey, que je connois beaucoup, ayant été ami intime de sa défuncte mère, que j'ai beaucoup connu en Italie il y a vingt-quatre ans, et je suis resté constamment en liaison d'amitié avec elle. J'ai vue croître ce fils, je le connois intimement ; il a la vanité, l'esprit, la légéreté et le déficit de jugement caracteristique de la famille. Il est Hervey, Hervey, et Archi-Hervey, de manière que je tremble que ce ne soit lui qu'on nome ; et si on le fait, je m'attens à mille follies de sa parts ainssi qu'à mille regrets de la vôtre. Pour l'amour de Dieu empechez une nomination aussi malheureuse. On peut le faire sans choquer les parents, en diseut que dans les circonstances scabreuse, il ne faut envoyer qu'un homme rompu dans les affaires, et que l'empereur même ne trouveroit pas bien qu'on lui envoi un homme qui n'a jamais été employé, et qu'on le traite comme une petite cour d'Allemagne, où on envoi les comencents.

“ Vous vous souvenez que quand Lord Whiteworth alloit partire de chez nous, et avant que Casamajor en fu chassé, le Comte Panin m'a écrit, et vous a aussi écris à ce qu'il me semble, pour prier qu'on envoi Garlic [Garlike] comme chargé d'affaire à Petersbourg ; il le connoit, l'aime, et l'estime. J'ai proposé à Lord Hawksbury de l'envoyer tout de suite comme chargé des affaires chez nous, en attendant l'arivée du nouveau ministre. Je ne sais s'il le fera, mais je vous prie de consseiller à votre successeur de le faire sans tarder.

“ L'union de la Russie avec l'Angleterre a été votre ouvrage ; coopérez, je vous supplie, à leurs rapprochement. Vous le devez à vous meme, à votre patrie ; et je suis sûre que vos consseils seront suivi par votre successeur qui a du jugement, de la docilité, et qui a pour vous cette considération que vous inspirez à ceux qui ont l'avantage de vous connoître.”

#### THE EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1801, April 17. Berlin.]—I send you by Sir Francis D'Ivernois's desire, a copy of the work he is about to publish. A letter was to have accompanied it, but, being enclosed to Garlike, it is gone to Petersburgh. I have just had a letter

from Lord Nelson informing me that he has sailed from Kioge Bay for the Gulf of Finland. He has sent a letter to the Swedish admiral at Carlscrona to tell him that, though at the Emperor of Russia's desire he suffers merchant ships to pass unmolested, he shall certainly attack the Swedish fleet if he meets it at sea, and therefore he advises him in a friendly way to remain in port. And the appearance of the fleet at Revel the new emperor is to consider as *a very great compliment*. If there are no actual hostilities before the arrival of Garlike or Lord St. Helens, I think the presence of the fleet may do good, but I have no doubt on my mind that the northern powers mean to make it up with us. Prussia is civil to excess, and promises speedy satisfaction about Hanover ; and they have to-night, at my desire, sent special orders to the Baltic ports for the supply of the fleet. Haugwiz has quite changed his language about Bonaparte, whom he has now found out to have no essential difference in character and principle from his Jacobin predecessors, and who, he is persuaded, thinks only of war. He seems very jealous of an intimacy between France and Austria, and to point at a defensive confederacy of the remaining powers in the north, for there no longer exists any in the south. The decisions of Prussia however still wait upon the nod of St. Petersburg. I have not time to write what I originally intended, therefore you must excuse this abrupt conclusion, and wait for the departure of another messenger.

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF CARYSFORT.

1801, April 21. Camelford House.—“ One reason of my writing to you less frequently of late has been the great uncertainty which I felt there was whether my letters would reach you at all, except by being sent back after you to England. I now take it for granted that, either at Berlin or Vienna, you are still likely to remain some time longer on the Continent. I presume they begin at Berlin to be very sorry for the folly and wickedness of their conduct ; and if they could suffer for it without its affecting our interests, I should greatly rejoice.

“ We received yesterday the news of the armistice for four months concluded at Copenhagen. I know nothing of the light in which it may be considered by the Government, not having seen anybody from whom I was likely to learn it. The critics out of office think Parker has exceeded any powers that he could have ; and has very much frittered away the good effects of his (or rather Lord Nelson's) victory. I have, myself, not the smallest doubt that Denmark would have acceded to any ultimatum he had thought proper to require. I cannot therefore think that he has done well in frustrating our principal view in sending him, which was the separating Denmark by force and definitively from the

armed neutrality. But much less can I conceive how any English officer could think himself justified in granting an armistice to Copenhagen, while Hamburg remains occupied against us by the Danes. If he avails himself of the interval to strike a blow at Carlsrona, for Revel is of course out of the question now, or if he lays Dantzic, Memel, and other ports under contribution, this may excuse but (I think) not justify his conduct.

“I know nothing of the language Prussia may have held to you since the great change which the two events of Petersburg and Copenhagen have produced in the face of affairs in Europe, but I think they must feel much embarrassed indeed how to get out of the scrape. If Egypt turns up well, which the first accounts seem to promise, France will probably be too happy to conclude such a peace with us as, I fear, the present Government will think themselves very happy to conclude with her.

“With respect to domestic politics, I was confident of the event, and it has fully justified the speculations I stated to you. Unless any great calamity happens there is not a doubt of the present ministers finding full support in Parliament and in the country. And there are even many who support them more willingly than they would have supported us, from a belief that our opinions and wishes are less pacific than those of our successors. You will probably have seen in the papers that I have omitted no opportunity to take my part, such as I have thought incumbent upon me as an honest man, and on the principles on which I had before mentioned to you my intention of acting.

“I have been fortunate enough to sell my house in town very advantageously, a circumstance not indifferent to me, as I certainly have not made my fortune in office; and I now look to the expectation of remaining chiefly at Dropmore, with the exception only of an occasional attendance in Parliament on great days. I must not say that I am impatient to see you there, for I conjecture that you may still be very useful indeed in the present circumstances either at Berlin or at Vienna. But when you do return to England the farmer and his dame will be most happy to see you there.

“Woronzow tells me that he is to give assurances of resuming his character here as soon as a minister is appointed by us; and I understand that, in the interim, Garlike is to go as *chargé d'affaires*, which I am very glad of.” *Copy.*

## BRITISH EXPEDITION TO EGYPT.

COLONEL ROBERT ANSTRUTHER to COLONEL BROWNRIGG.

1801, April 20. Camp near Alexandria.—“From the papers which were enclosed in my last, you would see what plans of operation were proposed for us here. That against

Rosetta has been adopted and carried into effect without loss or difficulty. Spencer marched from hence with about 500 British and 4,000 Turks on the 2nd. Owing to tempestuous weather which delayed his progress, he did not reach Rosetta till the 9th. The enemy had reinforced their corps there considerably; but when they found themselves attacked by such superiority of numbers they retreated, without making any stand, across the river, leaving a garrison in the small fort at the mouth of the Nile. Spencer's corps has been gradually augmented in proportion to the detachments which there was reason to suppose the enemy made from Alexandria; there are now on the Rosetta branch ten battalions of British under Cradock, and a body of Turks whose numbers it is not easy to ascertain, but they amount certainly to above 5,000 men.

"The fort at the mouth of the river having surrendered, and the navigation consequently open, General Hutchinson will proceed to-morrow to take the command of that part of the army and will operate towards Rhamanie [Rahnanieh]. At that place there is every reason to suppose the enemy to be in considerable force, the garrisons of Damietta, Randsdiera and Cairo have been assembled there, as well as large detachments from Alexandria, and there probably Menou will make his last stand before he suffers himself to be blocked up in Alexandria.

"The Vizier has advanced with more rapidity than we hoped from him. It is true he has met with no resistance, the object of the enemy being evidently to risk no action but with his force assembled, and intending probably to throw the whole into Alexandria, there to await reinforcements from France. We know that the Vizier was at Belbeis eight days ago, that a detachment had taken possession of Damietta, and we are now assured that he has entered Cairo. You will understand that the fort at Damietta, and the citadel at Cairo he has no means of reducing.

"In the meantime we have cut the canal of Alexandria by which the low plain to the south and south-west of the town is overflowed, and the communication between the town and the country will be rendered very difficult. The impossibility of investing the place has determined to this step, of which however the advantages are somewhat problematical; as we know not the extent of the country which will be laid under water, it is impossible for us to calculate all the consequences. Upon the whole therefore the situation of things in this country may be considered as follows:

"The Turks are in possession of the whole country to the eastward of the Nile, excepting the forts of Damietta and Cairo, which we shall enable them to take.

"We have a firm hold of the Rosetta branch, and a great part of the Delta, and have a fair prospect of forcing the enemy from Rhamanie [Rahnanieh], either by a direct attack in conjunction with the Captain Pacha's corps, or by a movement combined with the Vizier from the side of Cairo.

“The French have the communication open from Cairo to Rhamanie along the river, which is covered by their gunboats ; and from Rhamanie to Alexandria by means of a large body of cavalry to which we have little to oppose. They hold, as yet, the upper part of the Delta from which they draw their supplies. They have put Alexandria into a respectable state of defence, and will be enabled, with six or seven thousand men, to make a long resistance ; but we possess the canal, so that if the unanimous assertions of all travellers are founded, as well as the information collected from the people of the country, they cannot have a supply of water beyond the months of October and November. At [the] same time I have many doubts on the subject. We have found water in abundance where it never was expected ; and it is not impossible that, by digging to a considerable depth, the enemy may find it either in the old town, or along that part of the canal which they possess.

“In consequence of this persuasion, I am still strongly inclined to return to the attack of Alexandria the moment the rest of the country shall be in our possession ; until that place falls we are never secure against the exertions which France will make to retain this most important possession, the value of which even in its present state is immense, but which presents *capabilities* beyond calculation. One must feel some regret that there is a probability of its returning to the horrible government of the Turks, still more that there is a chance of its remaining with the French. If we had not more foreign possessions than we can manage or defend, and if it would not raise the whole world against us at a moment when we must try to keep at least some friends, I venture to say that a small addition to the present army would leave me neither of the causes of regret mentioned above.

“Supposing it not impossible that at the present moment the situation of affairs here may be of importance to be accurately known, I have written you this long detail, from which it may be fairly said that our allies and we have full as much of this country as the French. In order to render my account more intelligible, I send a plan of the triangle between Rhamanie, Alexandria, and the Rosetta, more accurate than anything published, although not entirely correct.

“The army remains perfectly healthy, the climate is delicious, our supplies of all kinds are abundant, in almost every respect our situation is the reverse of what we had been taught to expect.

“The fleet which escaped from Brest has given us most serious alarm ; we know not now where they are gone. They were seen near Cape Bonna [Bon] in Africa three weeks ago, steering to northward ; that looks like an attack on Sicily or a return to Toulon. All calculations here are, of course, made *barring reinforcements to the enemy.*” *Copy.*

## ARTHUR PAGET TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, April 23. Palermo.—“ I take the earliest opportunity to acknowledge your Lordship’s letter of the 20th February, the contents of which have given me as much real concern and uneasiness as any event which ever came to my knowledge. How we are to go on without your Lordship, Mr. Pitt, and Lord Spencer is what my mind is upon the rack about, and is likely to continue so, for I am confident that three such men are not to be found in Europe ; and I own that the motive of their resignation, as I understand it, enhances their character in my opinion as much as any one of their public acts.

“ I may now own to your Lordship that I am most completely disgusted with my present situation. My only wish is to be removed from it, and my wish is founded both on public and private reasons. Your Lordship is pretty well acquainted with the former, and General Acton’s late unaccountable conduct has considerably added to them. With regard to the latter, the appointments are really inadequate to the situation, the consequence is that I have always been and continue to be a burthen to my family, which is a most cruel reflection.

“ Your Lordship will, of course, have heard every account from Egypt down to the 2nd April, which is the latest I know of ; but I cannot help extracting a passage from a letter from my brother Edward who commands the 28th. He says, ‘ with all the system and regularity of a Berlin review, the British never acted more like Britons than on these occasions.’ It seems that almost everything has been done with the bayonet.

“ There is one subject which dwells sorely on my mind, it is Malta. You may rely upon it that if Captain Ball is not sent there, some mischief will happen.

“ I sincerely hope for a continuation of your Lordship’s friendship.”

## THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, April 30.—“ I have just now met Addington in the Park, who stopped to tell me the agreeable news of Mr. Lock the consul having arrived this morning through Paris, where Lucchesini told him on Friday last that the Consul had received accounts of a decisive action having taken place in Egypt in favour of the English who had taken Menou prisoner. Major Kerr, who came with Lock, heard this report likewise at Paris, accompanied with the circumstance of the French army having obtained a capitulation by which they evacuate the country. Lucchesini spoke with certainty of this news to Lock, and as he added that the French Government were

endeavouring to suppress the knowledge of it, that would account for the French papers of the 26th, which arrived yesterday, being silent on the subject.

“I should guess by this communication between Lucchesini and Lock that there is no cordiality between the Consul and the Prussian minister, and there will probably be less than ever now that Prussia has consented to open the German ports, though I do not find the evacuation of Hanover will follow upon that of Hamburgh.

“Since my last conversation with you I have learnt from a channel upon which I can depend that the Prince strongly professes his determination to take no step of any sort, and that Lord Thurlow is of opinion that nothing should be said or done by the Prince or by any of his friends; this accords with what both you and I guessed would be the case, and you may depend upon this being the case as late as the day before yesterday. I was prevented from going to Stowe with my brother, who returns directly to town on Monday, and tells me he means to make you a special and separate visit to Dropmore.”

#### LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT WORONZOW.

1801, May 2. Dropmore.—“Mille graces pour votre lettre de dimanche. Vous savez tout l'intérêt que je prends à ce qui vous régarde personnellement, et je suis d'ailleurs trop attaché au système d'union entre nos deux Cours pour ne pas réjouir de ce que vous continuez d'occuper un poste où vous avez tant de moyens d'y contribuer.

“Vous etes trop bon Anglois pour ne pas vous réjouir avec moi du succès brillant et décisif d'Abercrombie. Ce qui me plaît encore plus que la conquête de l'Égypte, c'est d'avoir montré à ces messieurs, qu'à nombre égal, le soldat Anglois vaut bien le François, et que nous sommes les memes Anglois par terre, qu'ils nous ont si souvent connu par mer.” *Copy.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE to LORD HAWKESBURY.

1801, May 2. Dropmore.—“I feel it impossible for me to decline transmitting to you the enclosed letter from my relation Mr. Wyndham, with my best recommendation of the request it contains. You will find in the correspondence very strong acknowledgments from the British merchants of the uncommon zeal and activity he has repeatedly exerted in their behalf.” *Copy.*

#### THE EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, May 4. Berlin.—“I must own I have no inclination to remain abroad in any situation under our present ministers,

whose incapacity I cannot disguise to myself ; and what you say on the subject of peace completes the measure of my alarm for the public interest.

“ We stand now in a very high situation, and the present crisis will establish our superiority, or deprive us of all the fruits of the struggle we have maintained.

“ I never doubted what would be your opinion of the convention of armistice. Captain Doyle, whom the admiral sent here, told me that our commanders considered Revel as the great object of their expedition, and that they had done everything in securing time for doing their business there. It is however pretty clear that the business is essentially done in the north, though we must not attempt to carry it with too high a hand ; because, if they do not speedily agree with us, we have, in fact, gained nothing by the battle of Copenhagen but honour, and the fleet must be supported by a considerable body of land forces to do anything decisive upon a second attack.

“ I have no idea of Bonaparte making peace but upon such terms as would be ruin to us, and indeed, the general opinion here in this respect accords with mine, and points to a new Continental war. The language of Prussia has been quite friendly ever since the battle. The plan of shutting the rivers was immediately declared to be abandoned, and I transmit by this messenger full assurances that the King of Prussia will not retain possession of the electorate. Affairs in that quarter are very critical. I have no doubt but that the order for the evacuation by the Prussians will be the signal for the entry of the French, who will march the instant they see a certainty of Russia and Prussia being reconciled to us, without waiting till any concert can be formed to prevent them.

“ There is some reason to think Haugwiz is tottering. Schulenburgh will, in that case, be the man to come forward. Haugwiz has lately received and introduced an agent, who has resided here some time by connivance, as *chargé d'affaires* of the Batavian Republic. This has been commented with much disapprobation. The Hereditary Prince of Orange means to speak strongly to the King ; and, stating all his reasons for distrusting Haugwiz, to desire that some other minister may be named to treat the business of his indemnifications. It is openly talked of that the King is much displeased with the conduct of his affairs, and even Lombard is thought to be tottering.

“ Haugwiz tells me he has undoubted information that, by a secret convention between France and Spain, the latter is to pay for the Duke of Parma's establishment in Italy by large sacrifices in America and the West Indies.

“ Hamburgh will be evacuated by the Danes forthwith, and all impediments to trade and navigation in that city

and in the Elbe are removed. If my private affairs would permit me, I think Elizabeth might not dislike, and might not suffer in her health, but the contrary, by going to Vienna ; but I should really fear for her if she was to pass another winter here. However, for the reason I have already stated, I wish to return home ; and, as Lord Hawkesbury tells me Mr. Casamajor is coming to me, that circumstance is decisive. I will not remain with a man whom universal report describes in such colours."

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, May 6. Charles Street.—“ Instead of Lord Buckingham's return to town yesterday there arrived from him a letter of summons to his wife and children to go down to join him at Stowe where he proposes to remain the whole of this month ; with him therefore I have no opportunity of talking about the geography of Homer. I perfectly agree with you in wishing that we could have added with Reynell's assistance a new Homeric map to adorn the Adelphi edition, and I will make another effort upon that subject through Lord Spencer, although with no great hopes of success. But short of furnishing a new and valuable map, I should be sorry to see any addition ; anything of an inferior description or of a patched and garbled shape would rather clog and load our book than give to it either advantage or beauty. The Bryant controversy will make a very ample volume by itself, and if Carlyle keeps his word, I understand we are to expect from him what will much assist the formation of a new Homeric chart. Having however told you my own fancy on this subject, I can only desire you for the determination to please yourself, and in so doing you will be sure to please me. I do not now say anything of the account which you sent me ; because my bill *per contra* of maps and other things exceeds your demand upon me in some pounds, and it will be less trouble to settle all when all is paid. When it shall please God to send us a little rain I hope to come down to you for a day or two, and Fisher, as I find, has the same project.

“ I hear no news either from Kew or from Egypt, but Lord St. Helens is still in town, and I am to meet Woronzow to-day at dinner at Lord Camden's.

“ Pelham's marriage with Lady Osborn is announced, and Meadows is to carry his best brains to Dublin immediately. Does not Meadows' journey to Ireland put you in mind of the reason for sending Hamlet to England ; ‘ he shall recover his wits there, or if he do not, it is no great matter, for there the men be all as mad as he.’ ”

## THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, May 7. [Charles Street.]—"I found in Count Woronzow at Lord Camden's more inclination to talk to me of the affairs of his court than I knew how to disappoint, although I told him fairly that I had not accepted of his offer to send a letter from me to Count Panin, because I did not like even the semblance of mixing in business which I was ignorant of, and unconnected with. His wish however was, as I found by his conversation, that I should say to you what he imagined you might make useful to government from your acknowledged desire to serve them. The main point of this was that his hopes of things going on well at Petersburg were much improved by his finding that Krudener had already been charged to tell Lord Carysfort that the first communication made respecting the Russian adherence to the principles of the northern neutrality, was not to be taken *à la lettre*; and he seems confident that as soon as Kotchebey shall have arrived at Petersburg, the language there will be more direct and more favourable. Another good symptom likewise he thinks is to be found in a *circulaire*, which has arrived here as well as at the other courts, directing all correspondence to be addressed to Count Panin; and this he thinks favourable, not because he holds Panin in as high an estimation as he holds Kotchebey, but because it proves a diminished influence on the part of General Pahlen, whom he considers as more Swedish and Prussian than either English or Russian. He told me that he had sent a memoir to Count Panin, the object of which was to prove to him that the advantage of the new system of neutrality would be entirely Swedish instead of Russian; and he took occasion to express some anxiety that, though he had sent you a copy of this paper six days ago by the post to Dropmore, he had not yet heard from you, although he had desired you to send him the paper back. With this general conversation was mixed a good deal of question on his part as to the prudence of our government in so eagerly soliciting a negotiation for peace; and he expressed, quite as strongly as I myself feel it, great distrust of any real intention on the part of Bonaparte to make peace with us. He rests much upon the importance of our not entirely abandoning the coast of Egypt, if we succeed in driving the French from it; and he suggests, what in that case seems to me very desirable, if it shall be found practicable, namely that we should hold Alexandria and Rosetta and Damietta by Sepoy troops with British officers from India. How far the arrangements of the India army would admit of this may be a question, but there seems no doubt that troops of that description would have less to fear from climate malady and excess of every sort than European regiments who, under British discipline, would drop off in Egypt as rapidly as in the West Indies.

For himself he said he had fairly told Panin that he could be of no use for any other system than that of intimate alliance between Russia and Great Britain; that if that system was adopted at Petersburg he would again serve for ten or twelve months before he totally retired; but all that you have probably heard from himself."

*Secret.* LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY ADDINGTON.

1801, May 8. Dropmore.—“I think I cannot do better than send you the enclosed just as I received it. What Woronzow says of the dispositions of his court is very material; the rest may be more or less worth attention according to circumstances. I would certainly wish to urge in the strongest manner upon your consideration the suggestion respecting Alexandria. So long as the war lasts, if we do not hold Egypt we shall not and cannot have an hour's security that the French will not by intrigue or by force wrest the possession of it from the Turks, if we leave it solely in the keeping of the Ottoman Government. I am very confident that it would not be difficult, with a little management, to convince the Turks themselves of this.

“I cannot help taking this opportunity to express to you, with a freedom which I am sure you will not misinterpret, my strong doubts whether it be wise to go so far as I think Lord Hawkesbury said you were inclined to go, in consenting to the restitution of the Danish vessels taken by the effect of the embargo; and since I really believe that this disposition will give you no new facilities at Petersburg, where they will not care one farthing for the clamours of the Danish merchants; and I think the permanent interests of this country are very much concerned in leaving at Copenhagen a strong impression of the certain loss which Denmark incurs when she embarks in any such confederacy as the present. Beside this consideration, I think the probable discontent which such a restitution must create in our navy a very serious consideration. It seems to me that nothing can be clearer than the line of considering Parker's declaration as a declaration of war, which in effect it was; and proceeding thereupon to the condemnation of the Danish prizes. But if you once suffer the question respecting them to be mixed in your negotiations at Petersburg, you create a point of honour there, which it will be very difficult to get over.” *Copy.*

GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, May 8. Downing Street.—“I have had the honour to receive your kind letter this morning which, under the calamity that I have suffered, has afforded me great conso-

lation; as I cannot but consider it as a clear proof of my continuing to preserve that place in your friendship, which I have ever considered as the most honourable and flattering circumstance of my life."

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, May 9.—“The *Louisa* is arrived and brings a naval lieutenant with dispatches from Lord Keith up to the 19th, on which day the *Louisa* left Alexandria. This evening's gazette will be a better history of the killed and wounded than I can give to you who have heard no names, but I write this line to tell you that Lord Spencer has conversed with the lieutenant whom he describes to be a very intelligent man, and is highly satisfied with the accounts he brings of our general situation in the country, and the warm confidence which he expresses of the certain success of our expedition. He describes the troops to be very healthy, and very much satisfied with the skill of their general; he says that communication has been had with the interior of the country who appear to be well disposed to us; that there is the most perfect good understanding between Keith and Abercrombie, and that the gallantry of our troops at their first landing exceeded all that had been seen by any of those who had been in former actions. Our whole loss of killed and wounded up to his departure is very heavy, not less than 1,600; that of the French is described by him however to exceed 3,000. It is a mortifying circumstance that the frigate which got into Alexandria was seen by the *Flora*, but the Frenchman, having got our private signal, was regarded as an English frigate till it was too late to recover her from under the guns of Alexandria.

“The Paris accounts still insist that they have 18,000 men in Egypt, but if their army had been anything really considerable they would have been enabled to collect a much larger force to dispute our landing, as the contrary winds kept us six successive days before we were able to land. I tremble for our Dutch negotiator at Petersburg, for I hear his language before he went was in the lowest possible key, and that he held forth by the hour upon the folly of maintaining what he called *abstract questions of right*, and upon the *impossibility of England maintaining any system against the inclination of the united powers of the north of Europe!!!*

“Lord Egremont tells me he is sorry to find that Law and Erskine tell him it is of the greatest importance to his brother's cause that you should be subpoenaed to prove that he could not follow his wife to England without having first obtained the king's leave of absence from Italy. I thought however I might safely say it was not a trouble that you would object to, if it really was deemed necessary to the success of the case.”

## HENRY ADDINGTON to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, May 12, Downing Street.—“I really cannot sufficiently express to your Lordship my sense of obligation for the unreserved manner in which you communicate to me opinions to which I attach the greatest value and importance. In the suggestion respecting Alexandria I entirely concur. With regard to the vessels, now in our ports in consequence of the embargo, I own to you I have some doubts of which, I cannot help thinking, you would partake if I had an opportunity, which a letter does not well afford, of stating to you all the circumstances of our situation with reference to the northern powers, particularly Denmark. I am however satisfied of the propriety of proceeding to condemn captures made at sea, since the declaration of Sir Hyde Parker.

“The Lord Chancellor saw the King this morning, and his report is satisfactory to the greatest degree.”

## LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY ADDINGTON.

1801, May 15. Dropmore.—“I have many thanks to return you for your Egyptian news, which, but for the loss of poor Abercrombie, I should consider as very favourable. It seems evident that we had rated Menou’s force too high, but that in military preparation is a fault on the right side.

“I can perfectly understand that a correct judgment cannot be formed on the question which I mentioned to you without the knowledge of many circumstances with which I am necessarily unacquainted. But I owed it in friendship and good wishes to you to express to you my general impressions on the subject, when they happen to be as strong as they are on that point, and I was confident you would see it, as you have done, in its true light.” *Copy.*

*Enclosure.**Egyptian news, communicated by Mr. Addington.*

“The despatches from General Hutchinson and Lord Keith go down to the 7th of April and give an account of the battle of the 21st. The French made the attack with nearly their whole force, having collected at Alexandria twelve demi-brigades of infantry, of the fourteen they have in Egypt, and all their cavalry except one regiment. The conflict was most severe, the enemy behaving with great spirit; but they were everywhere repulsed by the superior steadiness and bravery of the army, and retired to Alexandria with the loss of 3,000 men. The British lost in killed and wounded about 1,300. Sir Ralph Abercromby received a mortal wound early in the action, but continued to direct it till the

close, when he was carried off, having fainted through loss of blood. This great officer died on board the *Foudroyant*, on the 28th.

“General Hutchinson appears to have conducted the affairs of the army with great judgment since the 21st. The troops continue very healthy and are abundantly supplied with provisions and water.

“The Capitan Pasha was arrived with six sail of the line, and about five thousand land forces, said to be tolerably good.

“An expedition against Rosetta was on the point of proceeding under Colonel Spencer. General Moore’s wound is slight.

“The French army that made the attack on the 21st is stated at between eleven and twelve thousand men. Generals Lanusse, Baudet, and Riouse were killed ; Regnier and three other generals wounded.”

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, May 17. Stowe.—“I have not altered my plan of passing some days with you at Dropmore, though I varied my arrangements after I got here ; for having found the seed wholly in the ground, and my yeomen impatient for their fourteen days, I determined to get rid of that duty now, that I might not be called for it from Essex in the course of the summer. We therefore embody to-morrow.

“I should think from Hutchinson’s letter that the question of Alexandria must be now quite clearly decided in our favour ; and what is equally material is, that we appear to have broken that magical invincibility *sur terre* of the great nation ; and not by one accidental advantage, but by a systematic operation, and in three distinct and heavy actions. Every thing seems to point out the battle of the 21st as the last serious struggle in that country ; though I do not expect that Alexandria will capitulate till Menou knows as clearly as we do, that Gantheaume is *hors du combat*. And what is to be the result of all this ? excepting always the wreath of laurel which it is to give to those so well entitled to it, I mean the *new* ministry. Will it shake Bonaparte, and give us the prolongation of the war on the same grounds as Brissot originally made the war ; or will the great man make the peace and keep it ? My own speculations rather lead me to think that for him *omnis salus bello est* ; for the Jacobins will be too strong for him if he weakens his army, which he must do after a peace ; and, at all events, I think that our present most unwise, ministers run much too violently into a language and conduct the most unlikely to lower the tone of French insolence. All I hear of Ireland inclines me to think that he will strike at it if he can at any risk get his fleet to sea, and get 10,000 men on shore ; in which case I hope that the Lord Primate, as the

least mad of the three, will command the army, and leave Lord Hardwicke and General Meadows at Dublin to take care of the Church.

“But from all these details of ministers and generals, it is most delightful to turn to our prospects of harvest, and hitherto there never was a more lovely prospect. And the last general week of south-west rain has given a new face to the country; and, thank God, a new face, and that a very long one, to all the mealmen and bakers.”

*Postscript.* “My son is gone to Avington to cool his indignation by trout-fishing. I do think that Addington deserved most richly the dressing that Dick gave him. Will they venture to *prorogue* the Parliament? Surely that question deserves much serious consideration.”

#### COUNT WORONZOW TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, May 18. Southampton.—“Je suis tout aussi peu satisfait de la *politique temporisente et cédente*, que vous l’êtes vous-même à ce que vous. Vous vous souvenez que je vous ai dit à ce sujet la dernière fois que j’ai eu le plaisir de vous voir; j’ai dit la même chose à Monsieur Pitt, à Monsieur Addington, et à Lord Hawkesbury. J’ai fait mon devoir en bon Russe; c’est à ceux qui gouvernent à faire le leurs en bon Anglois; car je vois que, chez nous et ici, on ne s’aperçoit pas qu’on jouent le jeu qui convient aux intérêts de la Suède, de la Prusse, et de la France.”

#### LORD HOBART TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, May 19. Berkeley Square.—“You will probably have heard from Lord Carrington that the second reading of the Enclosure Bill is fixed for Friday, and as we shall certainly have a great difficulty in carrying it through our House, and therefore be very much in want of your assistance, I should hope you would be able to attend.

“I have had some, though not much communication with Lord Eldon upon the subject; and although I cannot say he is very confident in his expectation of the success of the measure, he is, I believe, disposed to try it as an experiment; and upon that ground, I have no doubt, will give it his support.

“From all I can learn respecting our situation in Egypt, I conceive that if the French are not considerably reinforced, and our troops do not become very unhealthy, we must succeed.

“The position of both armies when the last accounts came away was such as to render an attack on either side too hazardous to be attempted; but it is confidently said that, as we command the canal of Alexandria, the French must

make some great effort before or during the month of August in order to obtain a supply of water.

“The hot season was certainly coming on, but our people were encamped near the sea, had finished their entrenchments, and would probably have no duties of fatigue to perform; and above all, the tempestuous period being over, we were likely to make the blockade of the port effectual.

“You will, I am persuaded, have received better accounts from others, but I could not suffer so interesting a subject to pass wholly unnoticed.”

LORD HOBART to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, May 22. Berkeley Square.—“The Bill is ordered for committal, though not without some very inauspicious appearances.

“We were forced to fix on Wednesday as the only open day next week; but if you cannot attend, we must postpone it to the Monday following. Be so good as to let me know whether you are likely to be able to come to the House on that day, as I should endeavour to prevail on as many persons as I can to be present, and should not wish to make the exertion for Wednesday if we are likely to put off the debate.

“The Chancellor, I fear, will work himself into determined hostility to the measure, though he unquestionably conveyed a very different intention in his conversation with me.”

*Most private.* J. K[ING] to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, May 28.—“I hope we shall be able to return with, or soon to follow you to Dropmore. I was so thoroughly convinced before I received your note of the truth of your suggestion, that I had, last night, a serious conversation with the Duke on his return from Bulstrode. He has this morning seen Addington, and if Pelham feels as he ought and I trust will do on the subject, an arrangement may be made by translating Lord Liverpool to the Presidency and Pelham to the Duchy, which would keep the Duke here for the present. I found, not on the part of Pelham but in another quarter, an eagerness to accomplish the change which satisfied me that no time was to be lost in representing to his grace the bad effects of the change, which he was in no respect called upon to make, and by which the real interests of Government would suffer. I believe Addington is convinced as well as the public of the value and disinterestedness of the Duke. More when we meet.”

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1801, May—June.] “Je ne me pardonnerai pas à moi-même si je ne m’empresse point d’informer mon ami

d'un événement auquel mon cœur me dit que le sien voudra bien prendre part. Un courier de Vienne en m'apportant les assurances et les preuves les plus flatteuses de la satisfaction de mon maître, scellées d'une générosité sans exemple dans mon pays, m'annonce la volonté de sa majesté que je reste en Angleterre, où elle juge que mes services peuvent lui être essentiels. La noblesse de mon souverain envers moi a fermé la bouche à l'économie de celui qui vouloit que je quittasse ce poste, et l'Empereur a bien voulu me permettre de le servir ici au lieu de m'employer autre part. Mon attachement à votre patrie me fait jouir doublement des bontés de ma cour. Ce sentiment y a bien plus de part que l'amour propre. Nous causerons sur cet objet la première fois que j'aurai l'honneur de vous voir. Me voici dévoué à jamais à celui qui me traite aussi bien. Je suis convaincu que vous partagez tout ce que j'éprouve, et j'aime à me flatter que vous ne doutez point que la Cour de Londres ne peut pas avoir un ministre impérial plus imbû des bons principes et plus anglais que ne l'est celui que vous honorez de votre amitié."

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, June 1. Wimbledon.—“I have your letter respecting the sketch of the movements of the army in Egypt. Upon looking at it you will see it is entirely confined to that. What I send you is a copy of what I caused to be made from the one communicated to me by General Dundas. I have no other, and, therefore, when you have done with it return it to me. I have no objection, of course, to your ordering a copy to be taken for yourself.

“It is still our intention to see you before going north, and I thought of doing it the end of this week, and to have gone straight from Dropmore to Scotland. But I am afraid I shall be detained here some days longer than I intended. The Accomptant of the India Board is to be here this morning with the accounts which are arrived from India, and which, agreeable to the Act of Parliament, have been laid before the House of Commons. If they are complete or in sufficient order to be reduced into the shape of a Budget, I am afraid I cannot be so shabby as to turn my back upon it, even out of office; and, if I undertake it, I suspect it will lead me into a somewhat more detailed explanation than if I had been to remain in office, or had the prospect of doing it after the return of peace; when the whole system, with all its consequences retrospective and prospective, will fall in propriety to be stated to the House.”

#### GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, June 3, Downing Street.—“I have the honour to send your Lordship the inclosed letters which I have this morning

received, and also the extract of a letter from Mr. Thornton containing some observations on the use of Indian corn. I expect another letter by the next packet on this subject, which I will lose no time in transmitting to your Lordship."

*Enclosure I.*

— THORNTON TO GEORGE HAMMOND.

1801, March 9, Washington.—“I write immediately to Baltimore to Mr. Wood, His Majesty’s Vice-Consul, to procure the 20 barrels of Indian corn which Lord Grenville desires ; and I will give him, as well as other merchants, notice that they may ship corn for this object of feeding horses. I would refer you to Mr. Strickland for the most accurate information upon this point, for he paid great attention to it here, and spoke highly in its praise ; and you will give me leave to add the little I have learnt on the subject. In general, for horses employed in the common work of the farm or the draught, it is an excellent food, but there is danger in long journies of horses foundering upon it, unless the corn is very old and dry. New corn will swell in the stomach, and is very dangerous. I shall make it a point in a day or two to get certain and accurate information on the whole of this business, and I desire Mr. Wood to procure the oldest corn he can find. People here mix their Indian corn with bran, moistened with water, with chopped straw and chopped corn stalks, particularly when green ; whether this corrects the injurious effect of corn I know not. It is certain that, in the Southern States, oats are rarely used.” *Extract.*

*Enclosure II.*

VICE-CONSUL WOOD TO GEORGE HAMMOND.

1801, April 10, Baltimore.—“I beg leave to trouble you with the enclosed letter for the Right Honourable Lord Grenville ; it is on the subject of 20 barrels of Indian corn which Mr. Thornton says you have directed to be shipped on account of his Lordship.

“Of this grain, and the meal that is ground from it, there are immense quantities shipping for the ports of Great Britain and Ireland, which cannot fail to be a reasonable supply of nutritious food, and will no doubt greatly relieve the poorer classes of His Majesty’s subjects.”

*Private.* WILLIAM WICKHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, June 4. Vienna.—“In my letter of the 18th February I desired your Lordship would have the goodness to

inform me whether I should continue to draw on the Secretary of State for my current and extraordinary expenses, or leave the whole as a charge on the commissariat, from whom I had been supplied with all that I wanted since the arrival of Mr. Wood on the Continent. Not having received any answer to that letter, I have drawn as usual on the Secretary of State according to my original instructions, and I send your Lordship enclosed a copy of the letter of advice I have written on the occasion to Lord Hawkesbury, from the contents of which I trust that your Lordship will be satisfied that, in what regards my personal expenses, I have neither exceeded your Lordship's expectations, nor what I was justly and fairly called upon to expend. Indeed, to say the honest truth, I am myself surprised to find that I have expended so little.

"I have had no answer on the subject of the service of plate concerning which I wrote to your Lordship in the same letter. At present I am the value of the service out of pocket, not daring to carry that article to account without an express authority to that effect, notwithstanding your Lordship's private letter, of which, of course, I shall never make any use but with your Lordship.

"I hope to leave this place on the tenth, and arrive in England about the 12th."

*Enclosing* : a copy of an official letter to Lord Hawkesbury, with an account of personal expenses for one year, amounting to 4,685*l*.

#### COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, June 4. Crillon's Hotel, Brook Street.—"Je suis ici depuis hier-au-soir, ayant reçu des lettres de créance dans mon ancien caractère, parce qu'au moment de leurs expédition, on ignoroit chez nous la nomination de Lord St. Helens comme ambassadeur en Russie. J'aurois aujourd'hui à trois heures l'honneur de présenter mes créditives à sa Majesté le Roi dans la maison de la Reine. J'ai cru de mon devoir de vous informer de ça, comme un ami qui s'intéresse à tout ce qui me regarde."

#### *Private.* WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, June 11. Vienna.—"I send your Lordship, with real satisfaction and pleasure, the enclosed account of the moneys actually expended for the subsidiary corps, every possible article of expense included except loss on exchange and commission. From each of the three sovereigns who furnished their troops I have obtained receipts in full of all

demands, as well as from the contractors, and acknowledgements that all claims whatever have been satisfied by the British Government.

“The whole expense is very much within the estimate, a circumstance that may, in some measure, be attributed to your lordship’s influence; for no other consideration but my personal attachment to your lordship, and the repeated and unbounded marks of friendship, consideration, and confidence I received from you, could ever have made me go through with the labour I had undertaken, or bear up against the numberless difficulties and vexations of every kind which I had to encounter.

“Your lordship may now perhaps have the leisure to compare the sums expended on this occasion with those incurred by former subsidiary treaties. It will be only when this shall be done, fully and fairly, that I shall have any hope of having my labour on this occasion estimated by others than your lordship, at what in my conscience I believe them to be worth.”

*Enclosure:* An account of money disbursed for the pay and subsistence of foreign troops in the service of Great Britain, amounting to 1,281,260*l.*

GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, June 12. Downing Street.—“I have the pleasure to return to your lordship Count Wedel’s letter, and the copies of your answer to it, and of your letter to Lord Hawkesbury. His lordship has desired me to express his sense of your kindness in communicating to him Count Wedel’s letter; but he is of opinion that, as Count Bernstorff may be hourly expected, Mr. S——’s being *advised* to quit the kingdom at the very moment of the arrival of the former, might have a suspicious appearance; and therefore that it is most expedient to wait until Count Bernstorff’s arrival, and for Lord Hawkesbury to state to him in their first interview that Mr. S——’s conduct in this country was such as to render his presence here no longer expedient, and that the order for his departure had been suspended only by the expectation of shortly seeing Count Bernstorff, and of explaining to him the motives of this measure.

“The inclosed letter to your lordship was received by the mail which arrived this morning. There is an account of Lord Carysfort being greatly recovered from his accident, of which I presume that your lordship has had an account. If you should not, I think it right to mention that, in consequence of a fall down stairs, Lord Carysfort had dislocated his shoulder; but he states in his letter by this mail that he was then so well as to be able to venture out in his carriage.”

## THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, June 13. London.—“I have just heard from the Bishop of Bangor that the thirty copies of l[arge] p[age] and small will be sent by the waggon of next week to Charles Street. They have determined not to make their sheet of *variantes* a part of their edition, and they give us for our private property six copies of l[arge] p[age] and six of small. I think they judge right upon the whole, and our own six copies will be the more valuable for this exception in our favour. The Bishop desires that you will be so good as to pay in at Child’s immediately one hundred guineas, for the use of the Clarendon Press, to the account of Dr. Marlow, Vice-Chancellor. He apologises for asking guineas instead of pounds by stating the increased expense of Porson’s collation; and I have, in consequence, ventured to assure him that if he can suggest to us any decorous mode of our contributing to lessen that expense to the University Press, we shall readily and willingly adopt it.

“My dealers in house and land are so good as to give me a great deal of trouble about my little cottage, without advancing in the business. I shall therefore abandon the thing to the newspaper and to Froggatt, and hope in two or three days to come down to you at Coleshill.

“The last wonder that I hear of is Sir C. Grey’s intended peerage; as he and his son have not quarrelled, how is it possible that the son should acquiesce in so gross a sacrifice of his views of power and ambition. I understand nothing done by Opposition, and scarce anything done by Government, who seem to me all at sixes and sevens.”

## HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, June 17. Wimbledon.—“Doing my last duties to India has kept me here at least three weeks more than I intended. I will however perform my promise of not going from this without seeing you and Lady Grenville at Dropmore. We cannot pay you a long visit at present, but we will be with you before dinner on Saturday, and stay till Monday.

“Thinking of seeing you at the time I received the enclosed, I did not send it to you, but, as nothing further has arrived since, you may probably like to read the enclosed private letter from Colonel Anstruther to Colonel Brownrigg.”

## The EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, June 22. Charlottenburg.—“I am very sorry to see by one of your letters that you think it probable the present

ministry may listen to terms of peace with France not corresponding either with the advantages we have gained or a due regard to our future security. If, in the present state of the French armies, peace would not expose the dominion of Bonaparte to hazard, it is obviously good policy for France to purchase, even by large concessions, the means of restoring their marine, in order to begin a new war with us upon more equal terms. I think however I can distinguish in all the measures and publications of the French Government such a spirit that, it may fairly be presumed, they will bring forward demands to which even the present ministry will have too much sense and courage to subscribe. The two points on which I find it most difficult to make up my mind are Hanover and Portugal. The sincerity of this Court with respect to the former is much to be suspected; and I fear we have no means of protecting either. The occupation of Hanover by the French must be a circumstance of alarm to Denmark, and perhaps it might not be impossible to engage that Court, and Sweden also, to lend their troops for its defence. The Hanoverian army is, for its numbers I believe, very good, and would easily be augmented. These forces, with the addition of 10,000 British, might make a stand sufficient to encourage Prussia, or at least to keep her in check. Haugwitz professes to be waiting upon the court of St. Petersburg, and it is certain that Lucchesini is in such disgrace at Paris that Bonaparte has caused it to be notified here that he will not treat with him; but, nevertheless, and in spite of many hints about concert against France, I cannot help suspecting that the two Governments understand each other, and in particular are very likely to agree about Hanover. While the business with the northern powers remains unsettled, and the conduct of Prussia is equivocal respecting Hanover, I think I cannot well avail myself of my leave of absence.

*Postscript.* "Having expressed so much disgust at the appointment of Mr. Casa Major, I think it but justice to say that I find him much less formidable than I expected. He is very sensible, and has pleasing and gentlemanlike manners, and his behaviour to me is as attentive and obliging as possible. But he is captious with others to a degree that must make him miserable, and, unless he can be broke of it, will certainly bring him into scrapes."

#### OFFICIAL BULLETIN.

1801, June 29. Downing Street.—"Intelligence has been this day received from Lord Elgin (dated May 23rd) that General Hutchinson with 4,000 British troops and an equal number of Turks, had, on the 9th ultimo, defeated the French near Rahnanieh and obliged them to retire towards Cairo,

after leaving a small garrison in the intrenchments of Rahmanieh.

“On the 10th the fort surrendered, and the combined force then proceeded towards Cairo, having concerted their movements with the Grand Vizir, who was then at El Hanka, a position about four leagues from Cairo. Our loss at Rahmanieh is stated not to exceed 30 men.

“A reinforcement of 3,000 British troops had arrived at Aboukir about the 6th of May.”

#### COUNT WORONZOW TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, July 11. London.—“Un courier de Lord St. Helens, arivé par mer aujourd’hui de Petersbourg, a aporté la convention signée par lui, le dix-sept juin, avec le Comte Panin, et ce dernier me l’a comuniqué aussi. Elle est bien faite, et termine tous les différens sur les principes des neutres d’une manière satisfaisente pour ce pays et pour le mien. La Suède et le Denemarc n’ont rien su de cette convention, et on vat la leurs comuniquer en leurs ofrent d’y accéder si elle veullent. Je la fairai copier, et je vous l’enverai lundi ou mardi.”

#### *Enclosure.* COUNT PANIN TO COUNT WORONZOW.

1801, June 18. St. Petersburg.—“Le traité qui rétablit la paix entre l’empire de Russie et la Grande Brétagne a été signé hier, dix-sept du courant; je m’empresse d’en transmettre l’agréable nouvelle à votre excellence, et je profite du courier de Lord St. Helens pour vous faire tenir la copie de notre convention, avec ses articles séparés et secrets.

“Cet acte va être communiqué confidentiellement aux Cours de Stockholm et de Copenhague par une déclaration qui les invitera à y accéder, et il semble que l’une et l’autre ne peuvent recevoir qu’avec réconnoissance les stipulations que notre auguste maître a arrêtées eu leur faveur. Sa Majesté Impériale vous défère le caractère d’ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire à la Cour de Londrès. Le rescrit par lequel l’Empereur vous invite à accepter ce titre honorable est déjà signé, de même que la lettre de créance; et un courier, dont je hâte l’expédition autant que possible, vous les apportera peut-être en même tems que la présente. Il sera chargé également de toutes les pièces relatives à la négociation qui vient de se terminer si heureusement.

“Sa Majesté Impériale désire que vous mettiez tous vos soins à faire accélérer l’expédition des ratifications du Roi, et nous avons tout lieu de croire que cette tâche vous sera facile à remplir.” *Copy.*

*Private.* GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, July 11. Downing Street.—“ I am desired by Lord Hawkesbury to inform you that a cutter arrived this morning from Petersburg with a convention signed on the 17th of last month by Lord St. Helens and Count Panin. By this convention the right of visiting by royal ships of war, but not by privateers, neutral vessels sailing under convoy is distinctly recognized ; and no other restriction is attached to the mode of exercising this right than such as Lord St. Helens by his instructions was authorized to admit. In this and in all other respects (all our principles of maritime law being solemnly recognized) the convention is as satisfactory as could be desired. Sweden and Denmark are invited to accede to it, but Lord St. Helens would not consent to Prussia's being invited, and insisted that the adjustment of the differences with that power, in consequence of the predicament in which it had placed itself, should become the subject of a separate arrangement. The Emperor of Russia also agrees by the convention to grant an equitable compensation for the losses sustained by British shipping in consequence of the embargo in Russia.”

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, July 13. London.—“ J'ai passé ce matin chez Monsieur Pitt pour lui lire la convention signé à Petersbourg, en cas qu'il ne l'a pas eu des ministres actuels, après quoi je voulois vous l'envoyer à Dropmore. Je n'ai pas trouvé Monsieur Pitt à sa maison, où on m'a dit qu'il est à la campagne, et ne reviendra que demain. En même tems j'ai appris par hazard que vous deviez venir ce soir en ville.

“ Je vous envoi donc ces pièces, en vous prient de les comuniquer à Monsieur Pitt après que vous les aurez lue, et de le prier de me les renvoyer à Welbec Street, No. 55.

“ Demain matin sera achevée la copie de ces mêmes papiers que je vous enverrai, et que vous pourez garder si vous le voulez.

“ Je suis bien aise d'apprendre que vous venez ici, car vous ne seriez jamais guéri de votre fluxion à la campagne, ne pouvent vous empêcher d'aller à cheval, et de rester à l'air malgré les vents et la pluie.”

GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, July 14. Downing Street.—“ I have the honour to transmit to your lordship, by Lord Hawkesbury's desire, the dispatches received on Saturday last from Lord St. Helens, inclosing the convention.

“ It was my intention to have waited upon your lordship this morning, but I have been prevented by business ; I however hope to have that pleasure to-morrow.”

## LORD GRENVILLE to LORD HAWKESBURY.

1801, July 15. Camelford House.—“ I received last night from Mr. Hammond the despatch, with the treaty enclosed, from Lord St. Helens, which he sent me by your directions. While I congratulate you sincerely on the restoration of friendship between this country and Russia, I owe it to you in friendship not to conceal from you the great uneasiness which I have felt on reading some parts of the treaty, the objections to which I am persuaded escaped Lord St. Helens’s attention, when he consented to them on the part of this country.

“ It has always been my system when a thing is done to endeavour to make the best of it ; but as I understand that you have it in contemplation to propose an additional article to remedy the omission by which the commerce between France and her colonies is opened to neutrals—contrary to the now undisputed law and uniform practice of this country—I cannot let any false delicacy prevent my submitting to your consideration whether other amendments should not be attempted upon points not less essential than that is. You will easily judge that I can have no other motive for doing so than friendship and good wishes towards yourself and the Government of which you form a part, and an anxiety for the public interests. At the same time it is very possible I may be mistaken in some of my apprehensions, and the rather as I write this without any book of treaties to refer to.

“ In paragraph 1, of article 3, in the copy sent me, the words are *pouvront naviguer librement aux ports sur les côtes des nations en guerre*. But I presume the word *et* is omitted by mistake of the copyist between *ports et sur*. And if this be the case, I apprehend that it is at least very doubtful whether, in fair construction, a right to trade freely not only to the ports, but also *sur les côtes*, along the coasts, may not be understood to include the right of trading from port to port, which it was the very object of Lord St. Helens to exclude, and which we never can yield without great detriment to our interests. The inconvenience resulting from paragraph 2 in its present form I understand you are aware of. But the great difficulty I feel is on paragraph 3. I conceive we have always maintained that, by reason of the thing itself, and by the general principle of the law of contraband of war, naval stores serving for the equipment of ships of war are necessarily included under that description ; and consequently that every case of treaty in which we have agreed to a more limited enumeration was an exception to this general principle ; but that, where no treaty exists, the principle equally applies to naval as to military stores. This doctrine it seems to me particularly important for us to maintain at this moment, when we have no commercial treaty with Holland, and probably shall have none if we were to-morrow at peace with her ; and when our commercial treaties both with

America and Russia itself are of limited and short duration. Now the words of this paragraph plainly declare not that the king agrees to let such and such articles pass freely on board Russian ships, although they are contraband of war, but that both the king and the emperor agree as to what *ought to be called* contraband of war, and declare that they *acknowledge as such* no other articles except the military stores enumerated in the treaty; adding—which is still more extraordinary—that all other articles not only are not contraband, but *are not naval stores, ne seront pas réputés munitions de guerre et navales.*

“When Russia hitherto has hesitated to renew her commercial treaties we have always had to say to her that with them had also fallen to the ground the special privilege granted by them to Russia as to the transport of naval stores, and that no treaty existing, the general law of nations on the subject revived and would, in case of war, be exercised by us. But now we have not only given this special privilege to Russia by a permanent treaty independent of all commercial treaties—a measure at best of very doubtful policy—but we have declared the exception itself to be the general rule, and have recognized the special privilege as matter of universal right. I speak from much experience of negotiation with America when I venture to assure you that, if my apprehension of the fair construction of this stipulation be just, and the matter is as I have stated it, you will find the effects of this alteration of your ground most sensibly when you come to treat with the United States for the renewal of our treaty with them.

“I have not the former Russian treaties by me to refer to, and will not delay this letter for the purpose of looking into them, because, if any alteration can be made, time is precious. But I cannot help thinking from recollection that the old treaties as renewed—I think—in 1797, were not liable to this objection; and even if they were so, the present occasion was one where it was highly important to rectify an error leading to such extensive and dangerous consequences.

“In paragraph 4, the distinction between *et* and *ou* seems rather too nice for supporting so material a claim as that we assert of blocking our enemies’ ports by cruising squadrons, especially because the neutral argument against such blockade has always been that our ships so cruising were not *at all times suffisamment proches*, to constitute an evident danger of entering.

“Paragraph 5 is, I fear, in the first sentence in direct contradiction with what we must maintain and what the 4th article seems to intend to maintain; I mean the right of detaining *on suspicion* as stated in all the former treaties. It is here expressly said that ships shall not be detained except for *de justes causes et faits évidens*; so that to justify detention there must be manifest and certain facts in violation of neutrality, and damages must now be given by our courts whenever

ships are detained without such manifest facts. Whereas the present practice is to restore without costs in those cases where the captor has had reasonable grounds of suspicion, though he cannot bring such proof as will justify condemnation.

“Now I am afraid you will think me very critical when I come to speak of the 4th paragraph of the 4th article, but I do not in my conscience think that any sworn arbitrator of competent understanding and knowledge of the law and practice of treaties would construe the first sentence of this paragraph in the sense which Lord St. Helens wishes to give to it, and without which it gives up the whole point for which we armed and fought at Copenhagen. The practice contended for by Denmark was that their fleets sailing under convoy should be exempted from all other search except that our ships of war might send an officer on board the neutral ship of war and there receive communication of the papers and certificates belonging to the different merchant ships of the convoy ; adding that if these papers were found *en regle* no other search could take place. How does this paragraph vary from that claim ? No otherwise than by adding the words and *s’il n’existe aucun motif valable de suspicion*. But let me ask you how it is possible that a *motif valable de suspicion* can exist previous to the actual search of the ship. It can never be, except in the single and very rare case where the Government has received previous intelligence of some contraband or fraudulent trade with the enemy, and sends its cruisers out to intercept the particular ship to which such information relates.

“In the present practice the search precedes the suspicion. We examine the papers on board the ship to which they relate. We compare them with the appearance of the ship and its crew and cargo. We question the crew, we judge on the spot of an infinite variety of small circumstances which often constitute just ground of suspicion ; and the officer then acts at the peril of paying the costs and charges of the vessel which he unjustly detains. But when he, being on board a Danish frigate, is shown through a spy glass a certain number of ships (suppose they were actually French ships with crews entirely French, loaded with gunpowder, and destined to a blockaded port), and is then desired to look at a set of papers *en regle* which the Danish captain keeps in his cabin for twenty years together, to be applied to all possible ships he may have under his convoy, what can the British officer do, or what *motif valable de suspicion* can there arise from the distant view of the ship to which he is told these papers apply, and which he is not permitted to search unless such a motive already exists, and is declared by him to the neutral captain of the convoy. And all this too, not under the former penalty of paying the costs of undue detention, but under that of *further punishment* ; a term which I doubt whether you will find in the whole code of our maritime treaties ; but which was certainly never before used to secure neutral vessels against search and detention.

“To all these objections you must allow me to add one more against the 8th article, where again Lord St. Helens seems to have been betrayed into the admission of the very thing which he professes himself to have wished to combat; and I fear has been so betrayed by the same original error which has led to so much other mischief in framing this treaty, the consenting to take as the basis of it the inadmissible conventions of armed neutrality concluded in 1780 and 1801 between the northern powers. You will, I am sure, not have overlooked the circumstance that in this 8th article we bind ourselves, not only that these stipulations shall be permanent *as between* the contracting parties, but, in the very words of the neutral conventions, that they shall serve as a constant rule to the contracting parties in all matters of commerce and navigation; which necessarily implies that they are to be a rule to us in our transactions with other powers as well as with Russia; or, in other words, that they are, as Lord St. Helens expresses it, ‘to convert the present special engagement into a general rule of maritime law.’ If the words have not this sense they are useless, for every treaty binds the contracting parties in their transactions with each other.

“I need make no excuse to you for the length of this letter, for, if my apprehensions are just, you never can be called upon to consider more important questions than this instrument involves; and I should have been deficient indeed in that openness and sincerity which I trust you will always find in all my conduct, if I did not take the very first moment to express to you without reserve the sentiments which the first perusal of this treaty has impressed me with. I shall be sincerely glad either to be convinced that I am wrong, or to learn that means have still been found to prevent the mischiefs which, if I am unhappily right, must follow from the ratification of this treaty.” *Copy.*

#### HENRY ADDINGTON to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, July 15. Wimbledon.—“I need not say that a recommendation from your lordship would always have great weight with me; but, in the present instance, I have not the merit of acting upon it, as my best services in favour of Sir Christopher Pegge were promised this morning to the Duke of Portland, who is unquestionably a perfectly proper person to succeed Dr. Vivian in his professorship.

“If twelve o’clock to-morrow should perfectly suit you, I shall be happy to see you at that hour.”

#### *Private.* GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, July 15. Downing Street.—“I am very sorry that I have been prevented from fulfilling my intention of waiting

upon you this morning, first by the rain, and afterwards by the mail and a Cabinet which is now sitting.

“As I understand from Talbot that your lordship returns to Dropmore to-morrow, and as I expect to have more leisure next week than I shall probably have for some time to come, I propose to myself the pleasure of paying my respects to your lordship and Lady Grenville at Dropmore on Sunday next, if that time should be perfectly convenient to your lordship. If it should not, I will defer my visit to another period.

“In order that no time might be lost I gave your lordship’s letter to Lord Hawkesbury this morning, but he has promised to return it to me in order that a copy of it may be taken by either Mr. Wynne or myself.

“I inclose a bulletin of the intelligence received from Lord Elgin relative to Egypt.”

*Enclosure.*

“General Baird is arrived at Suez with the reinforcements from India. Colonels Murray and Wellesley are with him.

“The Grand Vizir has defeated the French near Cairo.

“There are no details of this action.

“General Sir John Hutchinson has taken prisoners 700 French who had attempted to embark on the Lake Burlos, in order to escape to France. He has also taken 500 camels and 100 dromedaries, who were conveying provisions to Alexandria, together with 800 French troops (of which 200 were cavalry) who composed the escort.”

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, July 18. London.—“Je vous envoie la copie d’une lettre que j’ai reçue hier par courrier. Elle vous fera plaisir par l’amitié que vous avez pour moi. J’ai indiqué à Lord Hawkesbury, Lord Carysford, et il m’a promis de lui en faire la proposition.”

*Enclosure.*

ALEXANDER I., EMPEROR OF RUSSIA to COUNT  
WORONZOW.

1801, June 10. St. Petersburg.—“En ordonnant à mon ministère de vous faire connoître dans tous ses détails la négociation qu’il vient de terminer heureusement avec le Lord St. Helens, je me suis réservé la satisfaction de vous témoigner tous les sentimens qu’a excités dans mon ame la lecture de votre intéressante dépêche du dix-huit mai dernier. Non, assurément, elle n’est point trop longue; et bien loin de

régretter le tems que j'ai employé à en prendre connoissance, je dois vous remercier de m'avoir jugé digne d'entendre les vérités, dont l'accès devoit toujours être facile ; et qui, pour le malheur des souverains, ne parviennent presque jamais au trône. J'attende de votre fidélité et de votre patriotisme que vous continuerez à me parler avec la même franchise, et, en retour, je ne négligerai rien pour vous convaincre du prix que j'attache à cette qualité, et combien je désire qu'aucuns de mes sujets ne craignent de me déplaire en m'exposant sans réserve ce qu'ils croient utile au bien public. Il me sera surtout très agréable de vous inspirer cette confiance. Vous reconnoîtrez celle que je vous porte dans les résultats de la négociation avec la cour de Londres. Des motifs que vous saurez apprécier m'imposoient la loi d'y comprendre les intérêts de mes alliés, en tant qu'ils étoient compatibles avec ceux de la Russie ; mais je n'ai pas voulu attendre l'assentiment des cours du nord pour conclure l'acte de la pacification ; et l'ancienne convention maritime a subie plusieurs changemens, déterminés en partie par vos sages observations." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE TO LORD WORONZOW.

1801, July 19. Dropmore.—“ C'est avec un vrai plaisir que j'ai lu la copie que vous avez eu la bonté de m'envoyer de la lettre de l'Empereur ; et cela non seulement par une suite de l'amitié que je vous ai voué, et qui me fait voir avec une satisfaction infinie que l'on sçait enfin vous rendre la justice que vous méritez ; mais encore parceque c'est un vrai bonheur pour l'Europe de voir un empereur de Russie qui désire de connoître la vérité, qui encourage ceux qui la lui disent, et qui demande les conseils d'un homme éclairé et vertueux.

“ Puissiez vous jouir longtems de cette confiance honorable, et du sentiment délicieux de n'avoir jamais sacrifié à des intérêts personnels votre âme, et les principes d'honneur qui vous dirigent, et conservez-moi toujours votre amitié qui m'est si précieuse.”

*Postscript illegible. Copy. Secret ink.*

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, July 27. Charles Street.—“ My intended journey to Wales has been first delayed then disturbed. It was delayed by a letter from Lord Hawkesbury on Friday night, desiring to see me on this morning. Having heard of Lord St. Helens' determination to return to England, now that he has got his peirage in his pocket, I suspected this to be the subject of the proposed conference, and therefore very reluctantly

consented to put off my journey, which stood for Saturday. I went to Downing Street to-day, and there Lord Hawkesbury with a good deal of embarrassed preface of the importance of Petersburg, of the necessity of sending an established ambassador there, of its becoming the first situation in the foreign line, proposed it to me. My answer was as short and civil as I could make it, acknowledging his motive for the proposal to be the wish that it might be agreeable to me, but assuring him that I had at no time of my life entertained a thought of embarking in foreign mission, and that the only occasions where I had made exceptions to that rule were such as belonged to claims of confidence, and to pressing temporary business, such as I could not refuse myself to. We parted very civilly and I go to-morrow to Althorp. I take for granted that Lord Hawksbury did not seriously imagine that I should go to Petersburg when all is done that could be interesting; but I imagine that he had been pressed to this by Woronzow and Panin, and that he likes to have to say to them that he has pursued their wishes as far as belonged to him.

“It turns out that there is no chance of Watkin’s obtaining leave of absence now, and perhaps therefore there is no hope of my finding myself at Wynnstay; how far this may derange my projects I have not as yet decided, but at all events I go to Althorp to-morrow.

“The good fortune of our navy has abandoned us with our old Admiralty board. To the loss of the *Hannibal* we must add that of the *Swiftsure*, with no other consolation than that Ganthaume, who has brought her to Frejus, has not succeeded in landing a single man to join Menou.

“Nelson and Trowbridge have undertaken the coast defence from Orford to the Nore inclusive, and Lord Cornwallis is to-day at Colchester in command of the Eastern District. I still think it is more demonstration than serious attack which is hanging over us, but it is right to be prepared. When you write, direct to Charles Street, as my steps are uncertain.”

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, July 30. Althorp.—“As soon as I had read your letter here, which brought me the news of Lord Dartmouth’s death, I turned in my mind as well as I could the means of suggesting to the Duke of Portland your being named by him to the office of High Steward. If that appointment were one which were fit on your account to be asked, there could be no shade of difficulty in my writing to the Duke upon it; but, to say the truth, I feel for you, and I think you seem to feel for yourself, that this appointment could have no other grace or value to you, excepting as it seemed likely to be agreeable to the leading persons, and to the general body of

the University, and to be adopted by the Duke in that view ; but as a personal obligation, I cannot think it worth your acceptance, nor should I, in your situation, annex any sort of value to it as such. This being frankly my opinion, I have suspended the step of my corresponding with the Duke upon it until I should more decidedly hear from you that you wished me to do so, in which case I will not lose a moment after his return from Weymouth : but in order to put this forward in the only shape in which I think it desirable and decorous for you, I have written to the Bishop of Bangor to tell him how acceptable I knew this appointment would be to you, if it arose from any notion that your holding that situation would be agreeable to the University, and I submitted to his discretion whether, in this view, he might not with propriety and advantage mention this matter to the Dean of Christ Church to be suggested by him to the Duke of Portland ; and I have done this in the first place because it will so take the creditable shape that I wish, and secondly, because I know that Jackson is the person with whom the Duke will concert this appointment, and by whom he will be much regulated in the disposition that he will make of it. The two candidates whom I should guess to be in any question are the Duke of Beaufort, and Addington ; and with the tendency which Oxford always professes to government, if the old connexions of the first do not prevail, I should think it not unlikely that much stress may be put upon the advantage to the University by placing the First Minister upon the staff of it ; though, on the other hand, his conduct when candidate for the seat in Parliament has made him unpopular with his own college. Pray tell me how far you agree or differ with me upon this subject, that, having told you what I think, I may do in it whatever you most wish.

“Your account of Woronzow’s and of Hammond’s conversation confirms me in my guess that the proposal made to me had been pressed upon the Foreign Secretary, and that he could not seriously imagine it was an idea which could for a moment be entertained by me. I think I had some little merit in keeping my countenance when he told me that Lord St. Helens had gone to remain there, but that the *severity* of the climate made it impossible for him to do so. You recollect that he went in the middle of May, and will return in August. Colonel Sir Watkin will not have leave to receive us at Wynnstay, and Colonel Lord Spencer hesitates about leaving his yeomen to the menaces of the French, so that Major Grenville, though much inclined to doubt of any actual invasion taking place, does not find temptation enough to pursue his journey to Wales.

“It is possible that I may still keep my northern promise, and go in about ten days to the north ; if I do not I will then endeavour to join you at Cirencester about the time you mention ; but I rather incline to look at the new

improvements at Castle Howard, which is an engagement that I have successively made and broken for these last 5 years.

“ I delight in your complete success as to road and common, and do not wonder that you hang at home to overlook it, but I still wish that you would, if possible, rout the two remaining inhabitants of Handkerchief Piece ; both your augmentation of the flower-garden and your walk across the lawn must, as I should guess, wait for the downfall of the pale and of the hedge before the *unity* of the ground, as the picturesquers would call it, can be well ascertained.”

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, July 30. Berlin.—“ The expectation of peace with France seems, I think, by the accounts which have lately reached us from London, to be much weakened, and the danger to which we have been exposed from the dispositions manifested by our new ministers will have been probably dispelled by the restless violence and ambition of the enemy. I am by no means satisfied with the situation of things in the north. If Russia had manifested an intention to act in concert with us, as far as the exhausted state of her resources would admit, everything would be tending to a point from which we must derive advantage ; but I fear that France is acquiring influence at Petersburg, and that I must therefore entertain strong doubts whether the business of Hanover will have so favourable an issue as I expected some days since. When this is brought to some conclusion, I mean still to avail myself of my leave of absence, and to return about the beginning of October, that is, when the heats are past, the roads in good order, and we have a better chance of a steady wind for the passage. It would, on some accounts, be desirable to defer our removal till the spring. But I have some business too urgent to be neglected, and am very uneasy at Proby’s situation, who may, I fear, be still some time without a ship, and is too inexperienced not to get into scrapes if he remains without control on shore.”

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, July 31. Colchester.—“ You have no idea of the constant employment in which I have been engaged ever since we moved hither. All our generals agree in keeping us to the strictest alert, though none of them seem to give any credit to the invasion from the Dutch or Flemish coasts. It is indeed most certain that France did not intend it, or was not prepared for it. It was not possible for her ever to find our eastern coast so defenceless, either on the water or ashore, than it has been within these few days ; and ever since the 12th of this

month the wind has blown steadily from the south-east, which is exactly the point in the compass the most favourable for their sailing and their debarkation, and the spring tides only began to fall on the 27th. I cannot therefore help thinking that Bonaparte and Addington, from very different considerations, agree in exciting this alarm which has certainly caught John Bull very universally. Most truly I agree with you in the real alarm I feel from all these projects of driving the country, the mischief of which is in every point of view incalculable; and I am very glad to find that General Balfour (who commanded here till Lord Cornwallis took the command yesterday) understood by driving the country nothing but driving or destroying horses and draught cattle, and as many of the slaughter cattle as the commissary might wish to collect for the troops; beyond this I am sure will not be practicable, and, if practicable, would still be a very hazardous and probably mischievous operation. We are all ready to move at a moment's warning."

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, July 31. Althorp.—“In consequence of your letter of the 29th which I have just now received, I have again written to the Bishop of Bangor to tell him that there is nothing to be done upon the subject of the High-Steward. Generally speaking, I should have said that you had nothing to regret in its present disposition, but I confess that I should have much liked it for you at this particular moment in the particular shape which I had mentioned, because, originating with the University themselves, it would have been the best public testimony which they could have given you of their being satisfied that your political measures were not considered by them as hostile to the interests of the church. If this, however, was not to be, and if they chose to put by their ordinary course of connecting themselves in this shape with one of the great families of the country, the present appointment is otherwise creditable enough, and furnishes to the black coats of Oxford a fair access to the ecclesiastical patronage of the Chancellor, and a more ample fund of solicitation than he will well know how to satisfy.

“Lord Cornwallis's command, as I understand it, is limited to the Eastern District, but I presume that the same motives of acknowledged superiority in his profession which place him in the expected point of attack, will carry him also wherever that attack shall take place. By what I hear from good authority, I understand that he is not satisfied with his disposable force, and I am not surprised at that when Lord Buckingham tells me that their whole force amounts only to 4,500 men between Yarmouth and the river Thames. There is, however, to be a meeting of the Cabinet with the Duke of York at

Mr. Addington's to-morrow, to concert new measures of defence, and I am a little surprised, though very well satisfied for the benefit of the consultation, that Pitt is to take part in this military conference. There had been a report that the neighbouring yeomanry of all the counties round London were to do duty there in case of an invasion, and now again I understand that is contradicted; if you know or suspect anything of our destination in such a case, pray write me a line, because in that case I would not go a pleasuring quite so far as Yorkshire and Westmoreland, but would content myself with a little inland circle perhaps of Warwick Castle, Kenilworth, Hagley, and Cirencester."

*Private.* GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, August 6. Downing Street.—“I have had the pleasure to receive your letter of Tuesday last. I have lost no time in obtaining the information which you desired to receive; and I can now assure your lordship with perfect confidence that it has never been the intention of Government to call out the yeomanry, or to employ them in London or in the environs. The East India Company Volunteers (2,400 strong) have offered their services for any part of the kingdom; but I understand that it is proposed to employ them only in the place of the guards, if it should be thought expedient to send the latter to the coast.

“The apprehensions of an invasion, in consequence of the good spirit of the country, and the measures of defence which have been taken, are, I think, almost wholly at an end.

“Lord Nelson returned yesterday from Boulogne, after having destroyed two floating batteries, one gun-brig, and five gun-boats. These were stationed *without* the batteries; the enemy's loss *within* them has not been ascertained.”

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, August 7. Clarges Street.—“If I have not written to your lordship sooner it has been because I had nothing to say on the only subject upon which your lordship desired me to write to you; and, if I write now, it is only that you may not suppose that I am inattentive to your wishes; for not one syllable has yet passed between Lord Hawkesbury and myself either on the subject of my present or future situation. I have however seen him three times, and dined with him twice, and have no reason whatever to be dissatisfied with the manner in which he has received me, or the confidence which he has shewn me. Whether it is that he feels a little uneasy on the subject of Vienna, or that the arrangements about Berlin and Petersburg are not yet finally made I cannot pretend

to say, but there certainly is a something which prevents his speaking out; and he is gone down to Weymouth, and I have leave to go into the country without our having come to any explanation whatever.

“ I understand, however, as well from the Duke of Portland, as from the Office, that it is generally understood that I am to have Berlin; and that there is a disposition on the part of Mr. Addington to make any provision for me that my friends may think desirable, either as to pecuniary arrangements in the way of a contingent pension, or to any personal mark of honour that I may wish to receive hereafter for the better supporting my dignity abroad, particularly pointing at a red riband.

“ I tell your Lordship just what I have heard myself, and shall wait the accomplishment of what is promised with due patience.

“ I am going down to Weymouth on Friday next, in consequence of a wish expressed by the Queen to know something of the Duchess of Wirtemberg; and of a question asked directly by the King to the Duke of Portland whether I did not mean to go there. I shall go from Weymouth across the country to Yorkshire, and return from thence about the end of September, when I hope your Lordship will allow me to pass another day at Dropmore.”

#### THE EARL OF CARYSFORT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, August 8. Berlin.—“ I quite forgot to tell you that I think the best way of sending Count Stadion's wine to Berlin would be to consign it to some mercantile house in Hamburgh, directing them to forward it by the safest and best conveyance. I do not name one to you, as I have not been satisfied with the care and attention of that which I have myself employed.

“ The King of Prussia has declared by his ministers, and by word of mouth to M. de Krudener as well as to me, that he will hold the electorate only at the king's pleasure, and for the purpose of keeping out the French. In short I must own I think we ought to be satisfied with what has passed, and that advantage may be derived for the future from appearing to give the king the confidence he claims.

“ I fear matters are not going on quite well in Russia. The emperor has testified a strong interest about Hanover, and Krudener has exerted himself to the utmost; but there is certainly a convention with France on foot. I hope it will be something very inoffensive, but Lord St. Helens seems apprehensive that it embraces the most important objects.

“ Prussia confines its demand of indemnity to the bishopric of Munster, and Haugwiz has formally desired M. de Reden to dispose the Hanoverian government to instruct its minister at Ratisbon to second the views of his court in this respect.

“ I hope now shortly to avail myself of my leave of absence.

I have some doubts whether I shall be approved for what I have done about Hanover, but I believe, in my conscience, that more could not have been done."

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, August 10th. Althorp.—"The expectation which you held out to me of our passing the greatest part of the month together in hunting the steeples would certainly have decoyed me away from all other projects if I had not already taken my engagements, in despair of its being possible for you to leave the new arrangements of the new road. To-morrow we go from hence for 4 or 5 days to see Warwick Castle, Kenilworth, Birmingham, Hagley, and the Leesowes; and next week I set forth to Castle Howard, from whence I shall make a little northern circle of smaller or larger diameter as time, curiosity, or invasion and yeomanry may determine; but, at all events, I think the middle of next month at farthest will bring me again into cockney neighbourhood.

"I yesterday received a short letter from Lord Carysfort dated 30 July; I find by it that he talks of availing himself of his leave of absence this autumn, partly from an anxiety which he feels about Lord Proby, who, not finding a ship, has found himself in love and in danger of matrimony; and partly because in the ardour of Lord Proby's matrimonial pursuits, he seems to have done less of his father's business than of his own. This is an unlucky event; and though, by Lord Carysfort's manner of speaking of it, I take for granted there is nothing decidedly objectionable about the intended lady, yet I agree with him in most heartily wishing that Lord St. Vincent may terminate this embarrassment by giving him a tight frigate, instead of leaving him to provide himself with a pretty wife. Lord Carysfort says nothing by which I can judge decidedly of his intentions, but as far as I can guess, I understand him to mean for himself a short temporary absence in the autumn. Of course you will not mention the circumstance which he describes to be the cause of this intention.

"I am surprised to observe that, notwithstanding the slender means of preparation which Lord Nelson found at Bologne, and which he left still lesser than he found them, our government still feels so much alarm as to direct the embodying of the supplementary militia in the very eager and first burst of the corn-harvest. I am always a friend to active preparation, but for a measure of so much inconvenience and unpopularity, there should be (as perhaps there is) the plea of strong and urgent necessity. For my yeomen, I have communicated to them the paper which I have received, and have recommended detached meetings of 10 or 12 for an hour now and then as suits the shopkeepers, until we can meet after the harvest."

## GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, August 14. Downing Street.—“The enclosed extract of a letter from Mr. Tooke, and a private letter from Lord Minto to Lord Hawkesbury contain all the intelligence which has been received here relative to Egypt. What Lord Elgin can be doing we cannot conjecture, for surely between the 17th and 19th of July he might have found time to have digested and transmitted any information which he might have received on this interesting subject.

“Lord Nelson sailed again yesterday morning as it is supposed for Flushing.”

*Extract not found.*

## GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, August 21. Downing Street.—“A dispatch has been received from General Hutchinson, dated 29 June from the camp before Gizeh, by which it appears that the combined armies invested Cairo on the 21st of that month. On the 22nd the enemy made proposals for capitulation, and after a negotiation for several days, they agreed to surrender the town and ports on condition of being allowed to march to Rosetta with their arms, artillery, and baggage, from thence to embark for the ports of France. The British forces took possession of the gate of Gizeh on the morning of the 28th. The enemy's forces of all kinds in the town amounted to about 6,000 men.”

## EDWARD FISHER to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, August 21. Pall Mall.—“By Mr. Addington's appointment I have just had the honour of seeing him. The object of this visit was to propose to me the exchange of the office which I possess by your Lordship's kindness, for one of increased value, and requiring less confinement to London, namely, the agency for Upper Canada, which, he stated, as worth from 300*l.* to 400*l.* *per annum.* This arrangement, as you will easily believe, did not meet with any difficulty on my part, and it will in consequence take place immediately.

“In this conference Mr. Addington took occasion to state to me the situation I held on his list of preferment to the English Boards of Revenue, and on my observing it differed widely from that I was led to believe from your lordship's interpretation of Mr. Addington's words, he said he would not decide on the matter till he should have the honour of seeing you.

“Being desirous of paying my respects to you and to Lady Grenville, I shall endeavour to leave London for a day for

that purpose. I will take that opportunity of stating to your lordship what further passed between Mr. Addington and myself."

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, August 27. Berlin.—“Lord Hawkesbury had mentioned to me the embassy of Petersburg before I received your letter. I was not aware that there was any doubt about the allowance, but I certainly agree with you that it would be madness to take it unless upon the same appointments as the three ambassadors received at Paris, Madrid, and the Hague, before the peace. The residence is much more desirable now than it was some time since; and the difference of the retreat, as it would enable me to make my son's situation more comfortable, is not to be overlooked; but I hope to be allowed to come home before I am called upon to decide. The climate is not properly unhealthy, though there are some constitutions which do not well support its rigour. But even in the depth of winter, a fortnight is sufficient to reach, with women, a milder climate. As to this Court, I own I am sick of it. If it can be influenced, it must be by that of St. Petersburg; so that I might flatter myself that I might be more useful there, and there is some gratification in getting a step. But I have told Lord Hawkesbury that I cannot think of it without the extended allowance.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, September 10. Brocket Hall.—“Just arrived here in my way from Castle Howard, and finding by your letter that you are returned to Dropmore, I shall defer my visit to Petworth and Gosfield, and come and pass a few days with you, and with Charlotte before she goes to the west and I to the wars, which latter event takes place on the 28th. I see that we have read, as we were sure to do, the Russian treaty with the same eyes. As I hope to be with you almost as soon as this letter, I do not write a word about it, except to desire that you will give me credit for a discreet control of my impatient temper when I tell you that I did not express a word of dissatisfaction upon this subject, when I was hard pressed upon it in the house which I have just left.”

J. HILY ADDINGTON TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, September 20. Great George Street.—“By Mr. Pitt's advice, to whom I had been referred by my brother on the accompanying memorial of Sir Ralph Woodford, I

take the liberty of writing to you, and should esteem it a favour if you would have the goodness to inform me whether you recollect any promise having been made to carry into effect the arrangement which he submits ; or, if not, to what you conceive, from your recollection of the case, he is fairly entitled.

“ I cannot help taking this opportunity of assuring your lordship that it has not been from a want of repeated and pressing solicitations from me, that no report has yet been made by Mr. Wyatt on Mr. Mason’s petition respecting some iron gates, about which you wrote to me in the spring.”

*Endorsed.* “ Answered 22nd. That I have no recollection of it.”

#### LORD HAWKESBURY TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, October 1. Downing Street.—“ I send this letter by a messenger to inform you that preliminaries of peace between Great Britain and France have been signed this evening. I will send you a copy of the treaty in a day or two, in the meantime I will inform you in confidence what is the substance of it.

“ We retain possession of Ceylon and Trinidad, the Cape of Good Hope to be made a free port, Malta to be restored to the Order under the guaranty and protection of a third power, Egypt to be restored to the Turks, the integrity of the Turkish empire and of Portugal to be maintained. The kingdom of Naples and the Roman territory to be evacuated by the French armies.

“ I am inclined to hope that, under all the circumstances, you will consider this as an honourable peace. I feel as strongly as any man that new difficulties may open upon us in consequence of this event, to what extent and of what nature it is impossible to speculate ; but I am confident that nothing could have been reasonably expected from a continuance of the war which would have justified us, under present circumstances, in rejecting these terms.”

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, October 2. Aylesbury.—“ A letter from Pitt to Lord Carrington has just brought him the news, which you will probably have heard still earlier, of the preliminaries of peace being signed yesterday. The terms in which Pitt speaks of them shew that he is well satisfied with them. I am more anxious to learn what our naval establishment is to be than to know what are to be the articles of mutual concession, if indeed they are to be of that description. My next anxiety is to know whether Government has made any

arrangement respecting our yeomanry and volunteer corps ; many of them become *ipso facto* dissolved by the peace. For my own part I think I am entitled to construe the peace into definitive treaty, and therefore I shall go on with my exercise till Thursday, when long and tedious quarter sessions have put an end to my campaign. Not knowing, however, whether you will mean to pursue your quartering on the 5th, although I entirely think it desirable to do so, I wish to hear from you a line by return of post hither, unless you will send over to Wycomb, where I mean to pass Saturday night and Sunday, and to return to exercise early on Monday morning.

“ My chief reason for making this enquiry of you is in order to know how your project stands for our meeting at Stowe, as I have not a word from my brother upon that subject.”

#### H. W. WILLIAMS WYNN to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, October 4. Wynnstay.—“ This morning’s post brought us the agreeable intelligence of the signature of the preliminaries for peace. I am at present in a state of great suspense, as we have not yet heard if the negotiation is to be carried on in England or by a British minister in France. My first impulse upon hearing the news was to set off immediately for London for fear of losing my chance of accompanying Lord Whitworth, should he be the person fixed upon to go to Paris ; but my brothers thought it would be better for me to write to him and wait four days for his answer, as it would be a pity to abridge my holidays by a fortnight, and run a chance of finding when I got to town that a French negotiator was to come over here. I do not think I lose anything by this arrangement, as I must have heard if Lord Whitworth was going quite immediately, and I can easily be in town in twenty-four hours after the receipt of his letter. I wrote to him by to-day’s post, to tell him where I was to be found, and to ask if he thought it expedient for me to go up directly in order to be upon the spot, and to give him any assistance preparatory to his setting off. I hope you will be so kind, in this instance as well as in every other, to give me a little of that advice of which I have so often felt the value, and of which you have been so liberal to me, I reckon that I shall be able to get your answer at the same time as Lord Whitworth’s.

“ I was very sorry that, owing to your being from home, I had not an opportunity of seeing you before I set out for Devonshire, as I wished particularly to consult you respecting the duration of my holidays. I hope you do not think that six weeks is too long an absence from town, as that is what all the clerks are allowed.”

## THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, October 4. Wycombe.—“ The post of yesterday morning brought to me at Aylesbury your letter of the 2nd, and at the same time brought also a few words from my brother from Gosfield, dated October 1st, in which he tells me that, despairing of accomplishing our triple Stowe project on account of the increased alert upon the coast, he had determined to come down for one day only, and would be with me at Aylesbury on the evening of the 7th, on which day my exercise ends on account of the sessions. I wrote a few lines to him in answer, to say that I concluded this new event would give him new liberty, and allow him to pass some days at Stowe where you had told me you hoped to meet us both. I have no doubt but that he will contrive his arrangements so as to bring this to bear, because he had already, before this event, expressed great anxiety to converse with you and with me together upon the state of public business; and certainly that anxiety will not be diminished by the contents of the extraordinary *gazette*. I cannot understand how you imagine me to have any knowledge of the conditions of the preliminaries; neither Lord Carrington nor myself having heard one word beyond the vague guesses and suggestions of the *Evening Courier*, which are of a description so intolerable that I had hoped there could not be the smallest affinity between those terms and the terms which Pitt’s letter had described to Lord Carrington under the general expressions of being highly honourable, and advantageous to the country, although perhaps not in every point exactly all that was to be wished. The manner however in which you who know them have spoken of them almost staggers my former incredulity, and makes me fear that too great a part of the statement of the *Courier* may be a true statement. If it be, there never was conceived so disgraceful and desperate a surrender of the honour, the interests, and the future security of this country as that to which Mr. Otto has persuaded Lord Hawkesbury to affix the consent of the King and his ministers. With this apprehension, however, which arises out of your letter of to-day, in addition to my own uneasiness, I feel very sensibly for yours, for as I saw Pitt’s letter to Lord Carrington, which was written on the 1st October the moment after the preliminaries were signed, I can have no doubt that, whatever they be, they are highly approved of by Pitt, and appear to have been known to him before they were agreed upon, and therefore, as I imagine, must have received his previous concurrence. In this deplorable state you will naturally judge how much, for your sake as well as for mine, I wish to converse with you. It seems probable to me that, with Lord Buckingham’s earnest and active mind, he will almost do anything to meet us as soon as he possibly can. I therefore rather suspect that he will still come down on the 7th or 8th, and I know not whether I should not almost recommend to you to name only three

or four days to your yeomanry; that exercise will be enough to shew them that you do not consider the preliminaries as disbanding them, and you will then be free on Thursday or Friday; on one of which days, if Lord Buckingham comes to Stowe, I hope you will come likewise, or, if Lord Buckingham does not, I will then come to you at Dropmore.

LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

1801, October 4. Dropmore.—“Long before this letter can reach you, you will have learnt the news of the signature of the preliminaries with France, by which we give up everything everywhere, except Ceylon and Trinidad; even Malta—and what is, if possible, more than that—even the Cape of Good Hope.

“What my impressions and feelings are on this occasion it is difficult for me to describe to you, but you will judge of them by what I know you will yourself feel on the subject after what you said to me here.

“I know not whether it was your intention to come to town at the meeting of Parliament which, the papers tell me, is fixed for the end of this month. If it was not, I do not think that you are likely to feel the situation in which we shall stand so tempting as to induce you to accelerate your journey. But if you do come, it would be a satisfaction to me, beyond what I can describe, to have the opportunity of conversing with you on this subject before I take a part which, whatever it be, must be full of embarrassment and difficulty.

“You can witness for me that at no period of the greatest difficulty did I ever entertain an idea of agreeing to concessions that can be named with these, which are now (after all real difficulty has been by the effect of your councils and exertions surmounted and done away) lavished as the price of a peace which neither these nor any concessions can render permanent.

“You can also witness for me how little my mind is disposed to make to the King’s kindness to me so ungrateful a return as that of harassing his government, or stirring up or encouraging any factious opposition to his measures.

“But, is it not too much to expect that I should say, or acquiesce in its being said, contrary to my own conviction of the truth, that the measures in which I bore a share have reduced the country to the desperate necessity of purchasing a short interval of repose by the sacrifice of those points on which our security in a new contest may principally depend?

“If you do not come, have the friendship to write to me with your accustomed frankness on this most interesting subject, and tell me how you feel upon it for what regards yourself, and what part you think most consistent with integrity and honour in so difficult a situation.

“I direct this to Melville, because I think it more sure of catching you in case of your being on any excursion.” *Copy.*

## W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, October 5. Hollwood.—“ I have been so long accustomed to find my opinion on most important questions concur with yours that I cannot entertain one different from you without very much distrusting my own judgment. But on the present occasion, the sentiments which I entertain are certainly very wide of what appear to be yours. I agree with you indeed in thinking that the permanence of peace under the present circumstances (though there are many chances for it) ought to be considered as very precarious ; and that we ought therefore to be constantly prepared for the possible renewal of the contest. But I cannot, and I think you would not, push this consideration so far as to make it a reason against any treaty with the present French government ; and, if once the question of peace or war is looked at only as a question of terms, I am far from thinking that those now agreed to can, upon the whole, be denied to be honourable and reasonably advantageous. I certainly regret very much that the Cape is not retained, and that the arrangement with respect to Malta is not more precise and definite. But to the first of those points I know that great Indian and naval authorities attach much less value than I have been used to do ; and, with respect to the second, I do not think we could make our possession of it the *sine quâ non* of peace, and, if not, I know no more satisfactory arrangement that could have been made in the present moment. At all events, as far as security at home is concerned (to which you seem principally to refer) neither of these points, if conceded to us, would have materially affected it. The great object in my mind was that the general complexion of the peace should be such as not to appear in any degree dictated, and that we should reserve what is most essential for the security of our East and West Indian possessions. For the latter purpose I think we have accomplished much in retaining the great naval stations of Ceylon and Trinidad, which, in various views, I consider as the two most valuable acquisitions we could select ; and I think the credit of the transaction completely established by having not only preserved all our ancient possessions, and obtained these islands in addition, but by having been enabled to stipulate in favour of the allies who adhered to us. I know that a stipulation of this sort, dependent on the good faith of those with whom we have been treating, is not to be too much relied upon ; but it is at least honourable on the face of the treaty ; and it gives to the powers in question a chance of preservation, of which they would have had little or none in the event of the continuance of the war. On the whole, looking at the terms in themselves, and combining them with all the difficulties attending the continuation of war, and the little prospect of being able to make any material impression on the

enemy, I cannot but think the conclusion of the treaty fortunate for the country, and see no ground which would justify me in my own mind from withholding the fullest support and general approbation. I shall however be most anxious to talk the subject over with you at large before Parliament meets, and shall be happy to come to you at Dropmore as soon as I return from Walmer, where I must go in the course of the week. If you can conveniently write to me in the meantime, I should like much to know what are the particular grounds on which your objections to the transaction chiefly rest."

LORD GRENVILLE to W. PITT.

1801, October 6. Dropmore.—“You will easily believe that few things could have given me more concern than the fundamental difference which appears between our opinions, and which must, I fear, manifest itself in our conduct, on this most important question.

“To state to you by letter all the grounds of my objections to this treaty (as far as it has yet been explained to me) would be a task of time and labour. They rest unfortunately on all the same points on which you ground your more favourable opinion of it.

“I do not object to the having signed a treaty with France—I thought the evident insecurity of such a treaty was not (under all the circumstances of public affairs) a sufficient reason against concluding it; but I did always think that this consideration ought materially to influence the terms.

“I consider the present treaty therefore merely with reference to the question of terms, as it affects our security at home and abroad; the balance of strength, particularly of naval and colonial strength, between us and France; and, above all, the general credit and dignity of our national character.

“In all these points it appears to me most miserably defective; but (if I am not mistaken in my interpretation of the short and ambiguous expressions from which alone I derive all my knowledge of the facts) it is most of all so in the last point; which I agree with you in thinking by far the most important.

“To discuss, one by one, the comparative importance of the only two of our acquisitions which the present Government has retained, and of all those it has ceded, would not perhaps be a fair proceeding towards the negotiators of this treaty. The just way, unquestionably, of trying such a transaction is to view the whole together. This I have done, and on this my opinion rests. If instead of this, we were to go into the detail of the cessions, the grounds of opposition to the treaty are almost without number. To have ceded to France, Martinique, Malta, Minorca, the Cape, the Dutch

Settlements both in the East and West Indies *and even Cochin*, and to have obtained nothing in return but the name of peace, is such an act of weakness and humiliation as nothing in my opinion can justify.

“ If better terms could not be had, and if, as you say, we could make no impression upon France and her allies by continuing the war after we had conquered all their colonies, and annihilated their commerce, a position in which I am not very well prepared to agree, yet I may at least ask whether in this state they could make much (or any) impression on us. And if they could, let me then ask what security we have against their doing so now, and whether their means for that purpose are lessened, or increased, by this desperate act of our Government which disbands our force while that of the enemy remains entire, which relaxes at once the spring by which their predecessors had wound up the spirit of this country to resistance, and which gives up into the hands of France the command of the Mediterranean sea, the command of the West Indian seas, the command of all navigation to and from the East Indies, and the means of collecting at any moment, in the very heart of our East Indian territories, an European force to any extent which the immense military establishments of France may place at her disposal.

“ I am going to Stowe at the end of this week, having contrived so as to get rid of my yeomanry on Friday. It would, for obvious reasons, have been more satisfactory to me if I could have seen and conversed with you first, as I shall not feel satisfied with any decision I may take as to the extent to which my conduct ought to be governed by my view of this subject till I have discussed the matter fully and thoroughly with you. All confidence in the present Government is completely and irretrievably destroyed by their conduct in this negotiation, and in that with Russia. What in that state I ought to do, and what I ought to wish, is a question of more difficult solution. You do not name any particular day for coming here. I should naturally stay at Stowe till about Saturday se’night, but a day or two either way would make no difference, and I could easily accommodate myself to your convenience if you could let me know by to-morrow’s post what day it would suit you to be here.” *Copy.*

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE

1801, October 6. Aylesbury.—“ I have just now heard from Lord Buckingham, who tells me that he will be certainly here to-morrow evening, that he hopes to get home from the quarter sessions on Friday to Stowe, where I shall wait for him, and where he tells me that he has written to press you to come and pass with us the four or five days of his stay there.

I trust therefore that you will join us by Saturday at latest, though you will be sure to find me there any time after Thursday morning.

“I find my brother officers here disposed to agree with me in their general conversation upon what is known of the terms of the peace, though my captain dwells a good deal upon the necessity of some peace. Fisher writes me word that he hears Lord St. Helens talked of to conclude the definitive treaty at Amiens: I do not think they could have found a better man for that purpose.”

#### WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, October 6. Hertford Street.—“Ever since I received your lordship’s very kind letter of the 7th ultimo, I have been wandering all over the country and only took up my habitation here on Thursday last. Your lordship will probably have discovered before this that it was against a greater person than myself that the Philippic in the *Moniteur* was directed. I cannot however be sorry for the mistake, as it has given me so pleasant and unequivocal a proof that the interest your lordship is pleased to take in my welfare is not confined to the time that I am acting under your orders, and that I shall have as much of your confidence and esteem as an individual, as I enjoyed when a minister.

“I cannot however flatter myself that I shall long escape similar attacks from the same quarter; nor, in the present state and temper of things and persons, should I be at all surprised if I were to become, as far as a man of an independent spirit can do, the victim of that spirit of persecution to which every one who has taken the line I have done will now be necessarily exposed.

“I will fairly own to your lordship however that it is not so much on account of anything that can come from France, as from what passed on my leaving Vienna, that I should think it an object not to go to another foreign Court without some ostensible mark of my sovereign’s favour. I cannot flatter myself that any circumstance attending the transaction can be long concealed; nor, on the other hand, can I help feeling that it will ever carry with it something like a stigma, and that, whilst so honourable an appointment at that particular period of my life could have been considered as a direct and distinguished mark of my sovereign’s approbation, the tardy nomination to Berlin (if it take place at all) unless accompanied by some mark of honour, will have the appearance either of being brought about by suing and solicitation, or, at best, as a provision for an individual who was hanging as a dead weight on the arms of Government; for, as to my past services, I can never hope that they will be taken into the account.

They are neither valued, nor understood, by anybody but your lordship.

“In this state of things it is very important for me to fix my situation in life as soon as possible, and to provide against the consequences of my being sent home again at the solicitation, demand, or suggestion of the French Government. Beggars must not be chusers, but what I look to, what I should most like in every point of view, and what I certainly mean to ask, with your lordship’s approbation, is the Privy Council instead of the red riband. With *that*, and something like confidence from the department under which I acted, I still think I might obtain consideration abroad, and render my country some service under the present administration; and, at least, have something more of consideration at home without the necessity of soliciting *de novo* on my return. I own, however, that I feel so deeply depressed by what has just happened, and see such a gloomy prospect before me, as not to be very anxious about anything.

“God grant that your lordship may have the fortitude on this occasion to suppress what I know must be your own feelings and forebodings; and that we may not see the friends of the king and of good government, *openly* divided among themselves, at a time when, in my mind, there is greater need of union and of mutual support than ever.

“If the meeting of Parliament should make no alteration in your lordship’s plans, I will come down to Dropmore before November, otherwise not before the first recess.”

#### LORD GRENVILLE to EARL SPENCER.

1801, October 6. Dropmore.—“You will have seen, long before this, the detail of the conditions on which peace has been concluded with France. What judgment you will have formed of them I know not, but I confess they appear to me so inadequate to any reasonable expectation, and of a nature to leave the country, especially if they are followed by any considerable reduction of our force, in a state of such extreme insecurity, that I do not see how I can easily avoid stating some part of these opinions in public.

“By a letter I have this day received from Mr. Pitt it appears that he thinks more favourably of them. You will readily believe that, if anything could shake my opinion, it would be the knowledge of a contrary sentiment on his part. I am, I confess, extremely anxious to know what you think on the subject, and what part you think it honourable and fitting for those who quitted the King’s service in February to take on this occasion.

“I see by the papers that there is an idea of Parliament meeting about the end of this month, or the beginning of November. If it could be possible for you to give me a day

here any time before that, and after next week during which I shall be at Stowe, it would really give me very great satisfaction. But if you cannot contrive this, I would manage so as to come to town for that purpose, whenever it suited you best.”  
*Copy.*

[GEORGE CANNING] to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, October 7. South Hill.—“I have been intending ever since June to pay the visit to Dropmore which some mistake about Dundas’s and Lady Jane’s proceedings prevented us from paying at that time till now, when the summer is nearly past, and therewith the season of family visiting gone by. But I am not the less desirous of coming to you, if you will receive me alone, some time before the meeting of Parliament. On the contrary I look to you for comfort—if any is to be had—under the events which have just taken place, and which really have—at first hearing at least—quite astounded and dismayed me.

“If you are likely to be at home and disengaged, and if it would be convenient to you and lady Grenville to receive me on either Saturday or Sunday next, I should be very glad to visit Dropmore on either of those days.”

E. FISHER to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, October 9. Pall Mall.—“I have lost no time in calling on Cobbett, and delivering to him a copy of your inclosure. I told him that in putting into his hands, for insertion in the *Porcupine*, a contradiction of a paragraph that appeared in that paper, I trusted that no comment whatever would be made upon it; and that he would be cautious not to give admittance in his paper to any observations upon what might be supposed to be the opinions of Lord Grenville on any public measure, till after his lordship had himself delivered them, where only they ought to be delivered, in his place in Parliament. I added that it was but common justice, as well to Lord Grenville in this particular, as on every other occasion, and not only to him, but to every other public parliamentary character, to suspend criticism on their supposed sentiments till they had made a public expression of them in Parliament. He told me he felt the justice of my observations, and that he would not fail to comply with my wishes as far as related to any remarks on the opinions of Lord Grenville; but not so with regard to the opinions of Mr. Pitt, and the part he had had in these preliminaries. His information was such as not to leave the shadow of a doubt that Mr. Pitt had been consulted in the whole negotiation, and that he was committed to the support of the treaty in Parliament; a treaty, he said, to his mind filled with present ignominy

and future miseries to his country ; and he therefore considered it his duty not to omit any opportunity of rousing the indignation of the public, as well against the treaty as the authors of it. With respect to the contradiction of the paragraph in Thursday's *Porcupine*, he was too much rejoiced to find there was no truth in the report which he had heard of Lord Grenville's speech to his yeomanry, not to seize the earliest opportunity of giving insertion to the contents of the paper I had delivered to him. In order to avoid committing your Lordship in any way in this conversation, I took care that he should understand everything I said as coming from myself alone.

“ Of this unfortunate peace with France my own opinion, and it coincides with that of the public as far as I have yet heard any opinion expressed on the subject, is that not only this country but all Europe is placed by it at the feet of the Republic of France. I cannot tell you with what emotion I read that part of your letter where you so kindly mention your apprehension that the part you are likely to take in Parliament may affect the fulfilment of the minister's promises in my favour which had been obtained at your instance. Indeed you only do me justice in believing that I cannot entertain the most distant wish that my interests should in any way interfere with your conduct in or out of Parliament. On the contrary, as it is from your kindness I hold my present income, so would the relinquishment of it be to me a sensible gratification if, in doing so, any fresh proof would be found of my zeal for your service, or attachment to your person.”

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, October 9. Park Place.—“ I found your letter on my return to town yesterday, but too late to answer it by that post. I had made my arrangements for setting out to-day to Walmer, and as you are on the point of going to Stowe, I think it best not to defer my journey, and to return long enough before the meeting to give us full time to talk over the new and painful situation in which our different view of this great question places us. I am afraid our opinions in the main are too much on each side fixed to make it very probable that by any discussion they can be brought nearer to each other on the immediate merits of the treaty ; but, with respect to the practical line which we may be obliged to take in consequence, I shall be most anxious to talk it over very fully, as the decision upon it must be most material not only personally to our own credit and satisfaction, but to every public consideration that can most nearly interest us. I confess fairly I cannot at present see how any line can be adopted tending materially to endanger or embarrass the present Government, without leading to consequences which you of

all men living would be most anxious to avoid. At the same time, under the conviction you entertain, I am fully aware of the delicacy and difficulty of your situation. All detail on such a subject must be reserved till we meet. My present idea is to stay at Walmer about ten days or perhaps a fortnight, and I shall be happy to come to you the first day you are at leisure after my return."

EARL SPENCER to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, October 9. Clermont Lodge.—"I will certainly so arrange my motions as to have it in my power to wait upon you at Dropmore before the meeting of Parliament, which I see is now fixed for the 29th. If it should suit you, I believe Monday the 25th will be the day on which I think I could most conveniently be with you, and, if I hear nothing further to prevent it, I shall consider it as so fixed.

"As to the conditions on which peace has been concluded I confess that, although I had formed no very sanguine expectation of our being able to make it on such terms as I should have thought favourable, even under that impression I could not avoid being disappointed at the terms on which it has been made. I will not enter more on this now than to mention that Mr. Pitt having been so kind as to write to me an account of the terms as soon as the preliminaries were signed, and to ask my opinion of them, I shortly stated to him some of the reasons why I could not think so well of them as he seemed to do.

"The other part of your inquiry, what it will be proper for those to do on this occasion who quitted the King's service in February, is rather more difficult to answer, because I am much afraid that they will differ in opinion upon this point, however much in general they have agreed on others. I shall, however, have great satisfaction in talking over the whole of this matter with you, and greater still to find that our opinions and determinations coincide."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private and confidential.*

1801, October 10. Duneira Lodge.—"I last night received your letter of the 4th, and I am truly unfit to give you any advice on the subject. Immediately on the receipt of Mr. Pitt's letter informing me of the outlines of the peace which had been signed, I wrote him by the return of the post to say that, although from the manner in which the negotiation had commenced my hopes were not sanguine for a creditable issue, I still had flattered myself that the negotiation would end

leaving us in the possession of Ceylon, the Cape, Malta, and Trinidad ; but that I had never allowed myself even to suspect the abandonment of the Cape and Malta. It is long since I had given up any idea of indemnity, but I hoped we would obtain security for what we had got. By giving up the Cape we have given up one of the essential points of security to India ; and we have done even worse by giving up Malta, for we have abandoned Egypt to a future danger from France, and we have abandoned the proud pre-eminence we had obtained in the Mediterranean. If we had stationed ten thousand of our troops in Malta, and preserved it as an exclusive naval station, such a force joined to our naval superiority would have given a *real* guarantee to the states in the Mediterranean and Levant, in place of that childish interposition in favour of the Neapolitans and Turks which, I understand, makes a part of our treaty. I don't perceive why either Malta or Egypt made any part of the treaty. They were in no sense possessions of France ; we had possessed ourselves of them by the valour and success of our arms. The fate of Malta was very proper subject of arrangement between the Order, Russia and us ; and, in like manner, Egypt was most proper to be settled on some secure and permanent footing by the joint interposition of the Russians, British, and Turks ; but there was not a pretence for admitting either of these points to be the subject of negotiation between France and us ; and I was really hopeful that these were the necessary consequences of the complete success of our arms at Malta and Egypt.

“ Writing to you who have been accustomed to think on these subjects with all their relative bearings, it would be absurd in me to trouble you with extensive details on the various gloomy prospects which this transaction presents to my view. I have told Mr. Pitt that my best consolation was the chance that my time of life was such as might afford me the prospect of escaping from being a witness of the calamitous consequences which, in my judgment, must result from such an end of the contest.

“ Such are my feelings, and they, joined to other considerations, obviously point out to me the line of conduct I ought to pursue. I cannot, on the one hand, sanction such a peace by any vote of approbation from me ; neither, on the other, can I by expressing my sentiments in public on the occasion mix myself in those debates and altercations which must tend immediately to weaken the king's government, and ultimately end in a factious opposition to it. Such a line of conduct is incompatible with my principles and declared course of conduct. If his majesty's ministers had been compelled to come to Parliament and announce the necessity they had been reduced to of carrying on the war, I should have felt it my duty to have appeared in my place, and to give them my decided and eager support. Circumstanced as matters

now are, I have not the smallest thoughts of coming to town at the meeting of Parliament; indeed it is not impossible that I may carry into earlier execution the resolution I had formed of retiring totally from Parliament at the close of the session. I find myself so comfortable with my farm and my plantations, it requires very little additional inducement to persuade me to make my retirement from all public concerns and avocations perfectly complete. You'll observe that I have marked this letter as *private and confidential*. I mean to impose upon myself silence and reserve; for if I do not find myself at liberty to give my sentiments of disapprobation openly and in their proper place, I should feel it unpardonable to spread my sentiments in private, and thereby, so far as my influence goes, do in an unfair and unmanly way that very mischief which my feelings of duty prescribe to me to avoid in public."

H. W. WILLIAMS WYNN to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, October 11. Wynnstay.—“Many thanks for your very kind letter which I received yesterday. Owing to my being at Llangedwin I did not receive it in time to enable me to answer it, which otherwise I certainly should have felt it both my duty and inclination to do.

“When I called the signature of the preliminaries *agreeable intelligence* we had not heard a word of the terms, which we agree with you in thinking most disgraceful.

“I this morning received a very kind answer from Lord Whitworth, saying that Lord Cornwallis was to go to Amiens, but that the mission to Paris had been offered to him, which he thought he should accept, and desired me to turn in my mind whether I should like to accompany him. In my answer to him I said that ‘I hoped he would allow me to defer any positive answer till I had consulted you and my other friends; that I feared that as the situation would be considered as permanent, I should not be allowed to hold the *précis* writership at the same time, and that of course I must be a good deal governed by the opinion of far more competent judges than myself whether they think it advisable for me to throw that up, and embark at so early a period of my life in the diplomatic career.’

“I hope when I get to town you will allow me to have some conversation with you on the subject. I do not think from what I have heard you say that you would wish me to give up Smedley and my other masters for such a situation.”

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MULGRAVE.

1801, October 13. Stowe.—“Long before this letter reaches you, the preliminaries of peace, such as they are now published to the world, will have engaged your attention, and your

judgment will probably be in great degree formed upon them. What that judgment may be I know not, but I think I owe it to our friendship not to delay expressing to you those impressions which they have produced on my mind, and the resolution to which those impressions will probably lead.

“Although the present Government had, as I originally understood, accepted their situations with the intention of pursuing the same system of measures which they had supported individually in the hands of their predecessors, yet from some symptoms I had observed, particularly in the conduct and issue of the negotiation with the northern powers, I was prepared to expect a greater disposition to concession in treating with France than I had ever been able to consider as advantageous or safe for the public interests.

“But I confess that the extent of what is now ceded to France goes so much beyond those expectations, and the consequent insecurity of the situation in which we shall be left appears to me to be productive of such extreme hazard to the country, that I cannot think I should be justified in concealing these opinions; especially as it is only by impressing Parliament and the public with a just sense of the danger, that there is any hope of leading them to think at all of those measures of precaution and preparation which such a situation indispensably requires.

“Nothing can be farther from my wishes (even if I had in other respects the least pretence to attempt it) than the influencing on this subject the opinions of any other persons. I have the misfortune on this point to differ completely from Mr. Pitt, with whom I have so long agreed on all questions relating to it. I may also possibly, and even probably, differ from others whose opinions I value highly; but with so strong an impression on my own mind upon a matter which so nearly concerns the merit or demerit of all my past conduct, and in which the future safety of the country is so much interested, I cannot but act on the best judgment of my own mind.

“What your opinions are I know not, and have no grounds to conjecture; but in this difference of opinions between two persons whom you have jointly supported in public, and to both of whom you are attached by private friendship, I thought I owed to you an early and explicit statement of the fact.

“I expect to see Pitt next week at Dropmore, but I have no hope that discussion can bring us nearer in opinion on this subject, though nothing, I trust, will ever alter our intimate friendship. When you come to town or its neighbourhood, I shall be most anxious to converse with you on the whole business.” *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY ADDINGTON.

1801, October 14. Stowe.—“In writing to you on the subject of my other letter (respecting M. de Nagell, sent the same

day), I cannot avoid adding a few words on a point with which my mind is in the present moment much more occupied.

“When Lord Hawkesbury had the goodness to apprise me of the conditions on which peace had been concluded with France, I did not conceal from him the impressions which the first knowledge of those conditions produced on my mind. The treaty itself has since been published, and after the most deliberate consideration both of that and of the convention of St. Petersburg, the merits of which I consider as in a great degree connected with it, I feel that public duty will compel me to express in Parliament my deep regret at the manner in which both these negotiations have been terminated; and my conviction of the absolute necessity of providing by all possible means of precaution and preparation against the new and imminent dangers to which I fear the country is exposed.

“I shall not be in town till a day or two before the meeting. When I come, I will, if you will allow me, state to you more particularly in conversation the grounds of these opinions. But I was unwilling to delay so long apprising you of the determination which, however reluctantly, I have felt myself obliged to adopt. I owe it also to Lord Hobart and Lord Hawkesbury to make to them the same communication, but I have not thought it necessary to trouble them with separate letters, and I trust you will have the goodness to state the circumstance to them.

“I can with perfect truth assure you that nothing but a sense of indispensable duty could have led me to this separation from those for whom I entertain sentiments of friendship and regard, and whose measures I was most sincerely desirous of supporting.” *Draft.*

#### HENRY ADDINGTON to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, October 15. Wimbledon.—“I have just received two letters from your lordship, and beg to assure you that I shall not fail to bear in mind your testimony in favour of Baron Nagel, which entirely accords with all that I have ever heard respecting him.

“Though it was impossible for me to learn without regret your lordship’s sentiments concerning the preliminaries of peace with France, and the convention at Petersburg, my best thanks are due to you for the openness and candour with which the communication has been made, and for the expressions of kindness and friendship with which it was accompanied.”

#### GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, October 16. Downing Street.—“I have deferred writing to your lordship for some time past under the

expectation of being able to inform you of the fall of Alexandria; but although there is little doubt that that event took place early in September, there is as yet no official account of it.

“Some time ago I received a letter from Lord Elgin in which he requested me to apply to your lordship for a copy of a private letter which he wrote to you on the 4th November, 1798. I shall be much obliged to your lordship, if it can be found without giving your lordship too much trouble, if you will have the goodness to send it to me, in order that a copy of it may be taken and forwarded to Lord Elgin by a messenger, who will be dispatched to Constantinople in the course of a few days.

“By a letter which I received by the last mail from Lord Carysfort, I learn that he proposed leaving Berlin on Sunday; and, in compliance with his desire, I applied to the Admiralty for a frigate to be sent to Cuxhaven to bring his lordship and family to England. The *Shannon* frigate has been ordered for this service.

“I have the honour to inclose to your lordship a copy of your letter to Lord Hawkesbury on the subject of the Russian Convention, and also a copy of the letter from Colonel Malcolm to Lord Elgin which I mentioned to you at Dromore.”

#### LORD MULGRAVE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, October 18. Mulgrave Castle.—“I shall be happy to converse fully and confidentially with you on my arrival in London, upon the subject of the letter I have just received. I confess myself under considerable difficulties respecting the line of conduct to be pursued in Parliament on the discussion of the preliminaries of peace. The terms cannot, I should think, be fully approved by any but those who admitted and ratified them; that they are not such as Pitt would have stipulated I must firmly believe, till I hear the contrary from himself. His support of them I therefore attribute to his magnanimity, and to the controlling influence of a dilemma which I strongly feel in the present situation of Parliament and of parties. It is obvious that the present administration could not maintain themselves either in Parliament or in the country without the support of Mr. Pitt and his friends, and without the general opinion which prevails that he watches over, guides, and assists the conduct of the ministers of the Crown. This general opinion might perhaps seem to render it still more necessary for the leading members of the late administration to assert on this occasion the importance of that character of vigorous policy which distinguished their conduct in government, both with respect to our enemies, and as relating to the great objects of our power, security,

and glory. But, at the same time, the more immediate inconvenience and the more pressing danger which would arise from displacing, or even totally discrediting the present Government, without having any set of efficient men to place in their situations, may render it expedient rather to gloss over the defects of the treaty of peace (which at all events cannot be set aside) than, by the exertion of strong talents and popular character, to weaken the influence of Government in the country. There certainly is reason to apprehend that the foreign and domestic enemies of the country and constitution will continue an active and vigilant pursuit of their objects. Mr. Fox's speech at his anniversary dinner, is a specimen of what may be expected from Jacobin factions in the country. If Mr. Pitt and his friends should (as they can) overturn the present Administration, what would be the situation of the country. The King will not replace his late servants on the terms which they think absolutely necessary to enable them to serve him ; there would therefore remain no set of politicians to form a ministry but that party whose professed principles, and uniformly rash conduct in and out of government, would only tend to accelerate the approach of dangers which you see as a distant consequence of the terms of peace. It must, I conceive, be considerations of this nature alone which could lead the great mind of Pitt to sanction, or warp it to approve terms in any degree inadequate to the full extent of those claims of security, which the glorious superiority of this country in the contest with its powerful enemy might entitle it to demand, and would enable it to enforce. Pitt's support in the House of Commons will be all-powerful ; but can the Government make a respectable appearance in the House of Lords, with no auxiliary reinforcement to the talents of Lord Hobart and Lord Pelham ? I think not ; and in my present view of the question, I apprehend more danger from enfeebling the Government at this moment, than from omitting to enlarge upon the formidable preponderance of strength which has been allowed to the *enemy*, for such, I am convinced, they still *remain*.

“ I most earnestly wish that your mutual friends (I do not presume to hope that I could effect it) might be able to bring you and Pitt to something near a similarity of sentiment, which, without sacrificing your former public declarations, might keep you both short of political hostility, and avert any marked censure of the existing Government. This has the appearance of recommending what is called an half measure ; but half measures sometimes become necessary in delicate circumstances, such as those under which the public safety now labours. It is impossible to express one's sentiments fully in a letter. I shall wish to have much explanatory conversation both with you and Pitt. The dangers of the treaty, whatever they may be, are unavoidable. I only dread the creating others more imminent in addition

to them ; and therefore am rather inclined 'to take up this mangled matter at the best. Men do their broken weapons rather use, than their bare hands.' ”

#### THE EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, October 18. Berlin.—“As I have finally determined to begin my journey next Friday, I shall not write a long letter. You will readily believe that I shall be a very short time indeed in England without seeing you. We shall then have a great deal to talk over, and I a great deal to learn. In the meantime Hanover is yet not evacuated, and though the two great German Powers make very fine professions to each other, they are yet not agreed upon any point, and thwart each other in everything they can. We shall be at least five days going to Hamburg. I hope we may find a frigate at Cuxhaven.”

#### MARQUIS WELLESLEY to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.* 1801, October 21. Patna.—“I did not receive your kind letter of the 20th February until the middle of last month, the dispatch having been delayed at Bassorah for want of a safe conveyance. Your letter was peculiarly acceptable to me, as it is the only communication (save a brief and most cold epistle from Dundas) which I have received either from the old or new Ministers since the change. The change itself is a most miraculous event ; the causes of it utterly incredible (if not attested by such authority as yours), and the consequences most formidable. I should have concurred most decisively in your opinion respecting the complete union of the Catholics, as a necessary part of the general materials destined to form the cement of the new fabric. This, as you may remember, was my opinion long ago, when I pressed the necessity of the union at Holwood and elsewhere in various debates and discussions. The obstacle of the coronation oath may be *respectable*, but it is a gross error. I agree with you in the propriety of contributing every aid to the new Administration ; but it is ludicrous to be so Be-jenkyed, and so Be-blockheaded, and so Be-quizzed, and so Be-black-guarded ; however I rely on Addington ; and we must make the best of the other parts of the bargain. I am very glad that I was absent from the scene ; it would have been a most painful sight. With regard to myself, I am desirous of returning home ; but I feel it to be a duty not to suffer this charge to devolve into any hands which have not been specially appointed by the Government at home to receive it. When my provisional successor shall have been named, I shall exercise my discretion with regard to the propriety of returning

immediately ; always adverting to the condition of the public interests here, and to the calls for exertions which perhaps might not be within the power of another man unpossessed of equal advantages of established influence and authority. With all these sentiments I think I may hope to be in England in the summer of 1803. I am now making a royal progress through the provinces ; and have been highly pleased with the expedition. I mean to be absent from Fort William for some months, having now a council there (for which I have long contended) on which I can rely for the dispatch of business in the ordinary course.

“ I am in very good health and spirits ; although the Directors have been very vexatious in disturbing many of the details of the government. Addington will tell you that they have not moved my temper ; which I am resolved to preserve unruffled to the close of my administration.”

#### GEORGE HAMMOND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, Oct. 21. Downing Street.—“ I have at length the satisfaction to inform your Lordship that a dispatch has been received this morning from Sir John Hutchinson, containing an account of the surrender of the French army at Alexandria on the 2nd of September. The garrison consisted of eight thousand soldiers and twelve or thirteen hundred seamen. They are not to be treated as prisoners of war, but are to be embarked for France as expeditiously as vessels can be procured for them.

“ The French ships of war and merchant vessels are given up to the combined English and Turkish commanders. The different actions which preceded the surrender reflect the highest honour on the British troops. Sir John Hutchinson mentions not only their heroism but their discipline also in the most enthusiastic terms.”

*Postscript.*—General Baird with four thousand of the troops from India arrived Cairo on the 10th of August. The remainder were daily expected.

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, October 22. London.—“ I have seen so few people in London since I came here that I scarcely know more than I did last week of the opinions which prevail respecting the peace. The only persons whom I have heard endeavour to justify it take no other ground than that of necessity, and admit to the fullest extent all that can be said of the inadequacy and insecurity of the conditions on which it stands. I am told that though the word peace be popular amongst the lowest classes, yet amongst persons of all descriptions who affect

to reason upon the articles, they are considered as a confession of our defeat. Of the magnates I heard very few opinions quoted, but I know from good authority that Lord Fitz-William is determined to oppose the peace even if he should be single; and I am assured that he has been equally loud in his disapprobation of the language which was held at the Whig club. This latter sentiment will not be a little strengthened by what Fawkener has just told me of accounts being come that they have planted the "Tree of Liberty" at Nottingham. Lord Gower is not expected in town; Lord Hertford is here, probably not knowing that Lord Whitworth is to go to Paris; Lord Essex has said one word to me in passing which sounded to me like approbation of the peace. Meantime the language of the officers and supporters of Government is not very confident; they talk of people hanging back in the House of Commons; and I have heard it said that there are 50 in that House expected to be in opposition, and as many as 30 in the House of Lords; but all this must be very vague as yet, for town is still empty. I have reason to believe that the Ministers have made up their minds to retain 90 regiments, but I have not heard upon what establishment. Lord Cornwallis is expected to go on the 31st. The accounts which I hear of Ireland are as unpromising now as the last were of which I spoke to you; and I am the more struck with this as my historian is a very sanguine politician, and a supporter of Government.

"The *Gazette* of to-day would have made me feel proud a month ago, but I now feel more of mortification at our civil misconduct, than of exultation in our military success. Look at the Turkish treaty where, on the 9th October, Bonaparte gravely promises the Turk to evacuate Egypt, and both consents to and requires the acknowledgment of the 'seven islands.'"

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, October 23. Gosfield.—"I have just heard from a channel which you will easily guess, that *he* has been told in secrecy both by Lord Hawkesbury and by Mr. Otto, that Tobago is to be ceded by France to Great Britain for an *equivalent*, which *he* collects from both, is to be the sum due on the account of the prisoners. This is I think not unlikely, though it is possible that Lord Hawkesbury may be the dupe of such a proposition which, as far as *he* collected, is not a secret article; and in any view of the question, the proposition of a *purchase* precludes all idea of a benefit obtained or retained by the negotiation. I have likewise this morning heard from another person (a quarter from whence occasionally I pick up odd communications and whom you will guess) that *he* was told on Wednesday 'Lord Grenville has notified

his intention to oppose the peace and the Russian treaty.' The two observations that were added were 'I am not surprised at it,' and 'this has once more united the family again.' To all which not one word was said. I do not know why I trouble you with this nonsense; but I collect from it that the pill of the peace has not been very easily swallowed. How do you like the treaty signed by Talleyrand with the Turk on the 9th October, stipulating that they shall have in Egypt every advantage that shall be given to any other power; and in every other part of the Turkish dominions, they shall be on the footing of the most favoured nation, in their relation of peace and intercourse; in exchange for which they promise to evacuate Egypt, in which they had not a soldier or a seaman after the 2nd of September."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, October 25. Gosfield.—"I had very little doubt when we discussed the matter together at Stowe but that Government would dissolve as soon as possible; but I very much doubt whether that can be quite so soon as you have been informed, as I cannot persuade myself that they will venture to leave the country for 50 days without the securities of different sorts that expire with the war; and which, if they are only to be renewed in part, will require more time than can be employed between the 1st November and the 25th of December; however we have learnt to our cost *nil admirari!* The threat of dissolution has been employed in the way you point out. Sir R. Williams is one convert to the opinion of Carnarvonshire, who have declared that the high price of corn was owing solely to the war, for that it fell as soon as the peace was known! Bulkeley is, I fear, bit by the same Welsh logic; and I know of two others who argue in the same manner. At the same time I have reason to think that Government find their peace less popular than they expected. I think the Turkish treaty is the consummation of the impudence of France and of our imbecility."

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, [October 23-31.]—"I return to you the letter of Lord Glastonbury, which is written with a more vigorous pen than I expected from Butleigh, but I presume he will satisfy himself with this written protestation to you, and will not quit his after-dinner nap in Somersetshire for the noisy wranglings of the House of Lords.

"I have seen Windham and find him as ardent as I expected, but very accessible to all suggestions as to the imprudence of mixing in the debates on peace the feverish topic of the

restoration of monarchy ; he seems much impressed with the advantage of confining himself to the two points, of vindicating his own character from all approbation of the peace, and of rousing the country to a proper sense of the dangers which are incurred by it.

“ I still hear that the Government are now looking to a large peace establishment, though I am told that, a little while ago, they had certainly determined differently.”

#### W. PITT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, October 26. Park Place.—“ I passed my time so pleasantly in hunting and shooting ; and found myself so much the better for sea air that I have been tempted to stay as long as I could at Walmer, and am only just arrived in town. I could not now well leave it again, and my coming to you would answer little purpose, as you are probably moving this way, and Hammond seems to think you may be expected tomorrow. I only write therefore to say that I am here, and shall be happy to know as soon as you arrive.”

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, November 6. Charles Street.—“ It is reluctantly that I send instead of bringing to you what I possess of the debates respecting the northern convention, but the cold air of yesterday, in a cold walk with Lord Buckingham, broke through the thin case of my head, and it would be good for nothing but sneezing if I were to put it into a chaise to-day to carry it down to Dropmore. If, nevertheless, you still wish to talk this point out with me, perhaps you would come to town after church on Sunday, and there would be in that way ample time for discussion before Tuesday ; yet I am so little versed in the subject, and you are so much so, that I do not easily see what help I could give you.

“ To say the truth, as far as I can form an opinion, it would lead me to doubt much of the expediency of your presenting to the House any regular series of propositions upon this subject. In the first place such a proceeding would appear to me to have more the appearance of a regular course of hostility to the Government than you think it desirable to adopt ; in the next place it would be represented as a measure calculated to invite renewal of hostilities, which no man will now venture to look at ; and may give to the general turn of your supposed political opinions the character of too great an inclination to engage the country in war. Nor would it in any view be desirable that you should place so strong a record of your opinions on this subject as would lead people to imagine that your future return into a situation of government

must be immediately followed by discussions with the northern powers of a nature likely to produce war with them. If instead of a string of propositions you take only the natural course of commenting in a speech upon the treaty which has been concluded, it seems to me that you will be equally able to deliver your opinions, and that those opinions, offered in the shape of advice to ministers how to pursue those objects which are deficient in the present arrangement, will be the most decorous and becoming shape in which you can be seen by the public upon this occasion.

“Perhaps my ideas may carry me farther than you may approve of when I tell you that, in your situation, I am inclined to believe that I should state in a speech all the ideas which I entertained upon the matter; that I should endeavour forcibly to recommend those ideas to the notice of Government; and that I should conclude by saying that I would still hope those ideas would be acted upon in negotiation, and that with this hope I should forbear giving a vote against the measure, although I could not in conscience express my approbation of it. This is all that has passed in my mind since I last saw you, and all that I could have said if I had been enough without cold to come down to you; but your own judgment will certainly better direct you upon this as upon all other subjects of this description.”

#### LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY ADDINGTON.

1801, November 26. Dropmore.—“Mr. Fisher having mentioned to me what you had the goodness to say to him the other night at the play, I cannot omit expressing to you the sense I entertain of this instance of a liberality of sentiment on your part, for which I certainly had already given you credit; but the assurance of which is not on that account the less entitled to my acknowledgments.” *Copy.*

#### HENRY ADDINGTON to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, November 27. Downing Street.—“I am much gratified by your letter, as I truly value your good opinion, and as it is not possible for political differences to divest my mind of those sentiments of regard and esteem with which I shall ever remain; (and it is very painful to me to address you in a style of such formality).”

#### H. W. WILLIAMS WYNN to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, December 3. Downing Street.—“I send you an extract from a letter which I received from Cockburn about

the wine which he promised to get you last year. If you do not want it, I am sure Watkin will be too happy to take it off your hands. I cannot conceive what accident can have happened to the books, but I will enquire.

“I have found in this office a quantity of private papers which belong to you. I have sealed them up in green bags, and intend to send them to Camelford House, for Killick to take them down to Dropmore.”

*Enclosure.*

ALEXANDER COCKBURN to H. W. WILLIAMS WYNN.

“I hope ere this you have received the books which I sent for Lord Grenville by the British merchant ship *Jane*, Captain Reynolds. Your silence, however, on the subject makes me fear that some accident has prevented their safe arrival. You may remember that I promised last year to send Lord Grenville some champagne, an unlucky accident made it impossible for me to fulfil my promise. I have now, however, purchased seven chests of the finest Burgundy (I believe in the world) and if Lord Grenville likes to have it I will send it to him with Lord Carysfort’s effects whenever the Berlin mission is finished. Each chest contains 54 bottles at 2 15 marks per bottle; according to the present exchange 4s. sterling. You will therefore observe that if they are sent as I propose they will cost very little more than his port wine. I am sure that in England he could not get such for a guinea a bottle.

“I wish, when you see Lord Grenville, you would mention to him how happy I should be if at any time I could render him any services, or make myself useful to him here; that nothing can efface from my mind the recollection of his kindness to me; and that, during my life, I shall ever be ready to prove myself worthy of it.”

LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY ADDINGTON.

1801, December 6. Dropmore.—“In the course of the last summer I wrote to Lord Hardwicke to mention to him that, if Government was not under any engagement which prevented it, I should be highly gratified by his allowing it to be understood that his good wishes respecting the approaching election for Waterford went with Sir John Newport, who has already declared himself a candidate. In addition to the claims which a most respectable situation at Waterford afford him, Sir John Newport adds the merit of an early and decided support of the union; and my intimate knowledge of him, commencing almost with our childhood, enabled me to do

that which I would do for very few men living, to pledge my own honour and character for his loyalty, his attachment to the principles of good government and British connection in Ireland, and his general uprightness and integrity. Lord Hardwicke's answer was such as I expected from our long friendship; expressing a desire, which I am sure was perfectly sincere, to do what might be agreeable to me, stating that his government was not under any other engagement respecting the election at Waterford, and intimating a strong disposition on his part to comply with my request; but adding—as I thought with great propriety—that he could not come under any final engagement on the subject of an election for the Parliament at Westminster without previous communication here. The matter rested here, and by a letter lately received by Sir John Newport from Mr. Abbot, I imagine it still remains in the same situation, as far as the Irish Government is concerned; but as it is necessary for Sir John Newport's interest that he should, as soon as it can be done, be apprized of any final resolution that may be taken on the subject, his brother Mr. William Newport, who is now in London, has requested from me a letter of introduction to you, paying me the compliment of saying that he wishes rather to come to you with that introduction, even under the present circumstances, than to avail himself of the friendship of any of his other connections. I am perfectly sensible that having felt myself obliged to express a public dissent from the measures which Government has been pursuing, and being unwilling to give any other assurance or pledge of my future Parliamentary conduct than may result from my public character and principles, it neither becomes me to ask, nor is it to be expected, that the King's servants should give their support to any person in the approaching elections, on the ground of any wish expressed by me. But I thought I should neither do justice to you, nor to Mr. Newport, if I declined the step which he has now requested; and the effect of which will only be to give him the opportunity of stating to you in person his brother's pretensions to the support of Government on this occasion, and to afford you the advantage of seeing a person on whose declarations (whatever they may be) you may, I am certain, rely." *Copy.*

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, Dec. 15. Stowe.—“I have just got rid of my French princes, and while they were depending I had too much mercy upon you to dream of exposing you to what I well know you would have disliked. But I cannot agree to let you off and your good wife from your promise to us for Christmas, and therefore give you the earliest notice that our fires are excellent, the new room entirely warmed and more truly comfortable

than anything I ever hoped for. *Arrangez vous* therefore, for no excuse will be permitted.

*Postscript.*—"Lord Moira has certainly been in negotiation, and probably in concert with Mr. Grey; but I cannot conceive Mr. A[ddington] weak enough to take the former (who is most ready to accept) without the latter."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, December 20. Stowe.—"A bird has whispered me that your plantations have interfered with your speeches, and that the Russian speech is not finished, nor that on the preliminary treaty even begun. I know how to estimate your comforts, but indeed I shall be heartily disappointed if you suffer anything to put you by from such a *mémoire justificative*, which I think on many grounds so essentially necessary to *us all*, but to you more than to *all of us*. I believe you will not be sorry to hear that I have thought it became me to offer Windham a retreat at St. Mawes, in case of disappointment with his weavers; and he has accepted the offer in a manner that shews me that he estimates it very high. For every reason it is agreed to keep it a secret. Has Mr. Pitt stopped the negotiation with Mr. Grey? You cannot tell me, nor can I tell you that the fact is so; but I have reason to know that it is so said by a person who looked to such a negotiation; and certainly there are symptoms that lead me to imagine that Mr. Addington will go through this session as he has begun it, and will save himself from opposition by coquetting with them.

"The army is to be what you see thrown out in the papers; namely, 101 battalions making 70,000 men, exclusive of six (or eight) black corps to be paid by the islands, and 34 regiments of cavalry making 20,000: added to which are the horse guards 800; and the 7 battalions of foot-guards, 4,200, makes above 100,000 men, exclusive of artillery and marines. The militia establishment is likewise to be raised to 70,000 English, and 10,000 Scotch. This is, I think, sufficient to satisfy *us*; and Mr. Pitt told a person who repeated it to me, that Mr. Addington was sufficiently provided with the necessary taxes; at the same time I know that the latter doubts his means."

#### WILLIAM WICKHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, December 23. Hertford Street.—"I am ashamed to think that I should have been near a week without communicating to you a piece of intelligence which, though of no consequence in itself, concerns me and my interests very nearly.

“After the last drawing room, Mr. Addington sent for me to say that, in a conversation which he had just had with the king on my subject, his majesty had been pleased to say that he thought very right and proper that I should have a seat in the Privy Council as the reward of my services during my last mission; and that it should be given immediately so as that it might not be supposed by any body to be other than what it really was, and, above all, that it might not be considered as an appendage to the Berlin mission.

“I understand from the Duke of Portland that it was the intention to have conferred this honour on me much sooner, but for some circumstances (not personal to me) which I will explain to your lordship when I see you at Dropmore.

“I received a very flattering letter from the Treasury the other day, founded on the report of the Army Comptroller, to say that the treaties I had made not only appeared to be much more advantageous than any former ones of the kind, but that, through my exertions, they had been carried into execution on principles of economy deserving the highest commendation. I take it that it was this report which induced Mr. Addington to mention me to the King.”

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, December 28. Charles Street.—“I told you in my last that I could not believe the prevailing report of the Brest fleet having been suffered to sail by our government upon no better assurances than those given by the Great Consul respecting its destination. I was however yesterday evening assured from undoubted authority that sixteen sail of the line have actually sailed with above 10,000 troops, and I have great reason to think that our government have ineffectually endeavoured to prevent this measure by their negotiations with the French Republic.

“The consequences of this expedition appear to me full of danger of every sort; some danger certainly of St. Domingo being merely a pretext for covering intentions of an immediately hostile description to us in the West Indies; and although I do not incline to think that Bonaparte will throw away the advantages of this treaty by beginning hostilities before he has received the benefits of it, still I think this speculation is not a sufficient security against the danger of our losing Jamaica in case that speculation should appear to be unfounded. But the real and immediate mischief which I see in this expedition is that, by suffering Bonaparte quietly to place this powerful armament in the middle of our West India islands, before the definitive treaty be signed, we are absolutely placed in the most undisguised state of dependance upon France as to any requisition which she may make in constructing the definitive treaty; for how can we affect

to hesitate to comply with her demands, when we see that a renewal of hostilities would begin by putting our enemy in possession of some of our most valuable islands in the West Indies? And if it be true that our government has in vain endeavoured to resist this, our future danger is still more increased by our present submission. In this view I may perhaps feel it necessary to say a few words in the House, to endeavour to call the attention of the country to this very interesting subject; at all events I mean to go down to see what they do with their adjournment, and whether there shall appear to be fit opportunity of my saying a few words. I am sorry for this disappointment. If I am kept by the same business from Dropmore, I then hope to meet you at Stowe on Wednesday."

#### COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1801, December 28.] Twickenham.—“ Quoiqu'il y ait bien longtems que je n'ai eu l'honneur de vous voir, et que peut-être vous n'avez entendu parler de moi, je compte trop sur la stabilité de vos sentimens pour ne pas douter que vous ne conserviez souvenir et amitié à un des hommes qui vous est le plus attaché. J'ai essayé deux fois d'aller vous chercher à Dropmore, et j'ai toujours joué de malheur, et appris à *Salthill* que vous n'y étiez pas. Comme c'étoit pour rencontrer mon ami et non pas pour me faire écrire que j'allois chez vous, *I never left my name*. Je n'ai pas été plus heureux *when I called at Lady Camelford's*. Permettez-moi donc de vous demander quand je pourrai vous trouver chez vous. Daignez me mander quel jour vous serez en ville, et à quelle heure vous voulez recevoir votre ancien ami. J'ai réellement besoin de vous révoir, et de vous parler de mes sentimens pour vous qui ne varieront jamais.

“ L'événement n'a que trop vérifié ce que j'ai marqué à ma cour dès le lendemain du jour où nous avons eu le malheur de vous perdre. Quelques conversations que j'ai eu avec Mr. Addington, et votre successeur, m'ont confirmé dans mon opinion; et je n'ai cessé d'écrire à Vienne que la paix de l'Angleterre seroit faite quand *le monstre Corse* le voudroit. La manière dont je me suis expliqué sur nos traités me donne au moins le droit de m'affliger de ce qui s'est fait chez vous. La dernière digue qui s'opposait à l'anarchie vient de céder, et nous allons, au lieu d'une invasion, avoir une inondation de régicides. Je crois le mal sans remède, à moins d'un miracle de la Providence, et je suis trop franc pour ne pas avouer à mon ami que le mode de cette paix me fait même craindre une quantité de maux incalculables, avant la culbute générale que je considère comme inévitable. Peu de gens ont comme vous et moi la satisfaction de pouvoir se dire à eux-mêmes qu'ils n'ont eu aucune communication directe *quelconque*

avec les scélérats qui triomphent. Tout ce qui vient de se passer en simplifiant beaucoup la politique, dont il me paroît que le principe est à présent *partout* de céder *sur tout*, diminue nécessairement les occupations de ceux auxquels le désir et l'espoir d'opérer le bien ne permettoient jusqu'à présent un instant de repos. J'y renonce pour le moment, et je me réserve pour l'occasion si jamais elle se présente. *Meanwhile* je me trouve heureux d'avoir réussi à échapper aux effets de l'extrême bonté de mon maître, dont la confiance flatteuse m'a destiné à plusieurs reprises à l'ambassade de Paris. L'ami de Lord Grenville *will never creep at the proud feet of the Corsican usurper.*

“La circonstance actuelle a bien été le creuset de la fermeté des caractères, et ce país-ci peut se glorifier d'offrir *dix sages* dans la chambre des Pairs. La Grèce n'en comptait que sept, et les autres nations de l'Europe n'en ont peut-être pas autant ensemble.

*O tempora! O mores!*

“Je ne puis m'empêcher, avant de finir, de vous parler de l'effet qu'a produit sur moi le superbe discours que vous avez tenu l'autre jour. Je vous assure que je n'en ai jamais lu ni entendu qui fut plus fort de raisons, de principes, de logique et d'éloquence que cet incomparable *speech*. Je vous y ai retrouvé tout entier, c'est vous dire que j'étois digne de l'entendre. Adieu, agréez hommages et tendresses de la part de *L'anglo-austrian*, et pardessus tout, *Antigallican*, habitant de Twickenham.”

#### VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1801.] Cleveland Square.—“I should be very thankful to your Lordship to let me have some papers relative to the Irish Dissenters and Catholics, which I left with you last winter. The former are drawn up by a Mr. Black, the latter by Sir J. Hippesley. Mr. Abbot informs me that the arrangement for the Dissenters is to be proceeded with, and wishes for the information contained in those papers. The arrangement for the Catholic clergy seems for the present likely to stick.”

#### VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1801.] Cleveland Square.—“I return your Lordship many thanks for your kind attention to my request; you have returned all the papers which I left with you, and I have only to lament that the purposes to which your Lordship meant to apply them have for the present been frustrated. The comprehensive system which you had in view will sooner or later accomplish itself, but it never can be effected with the same grace which would have attended it had it immediately followed the Union.”

## COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, January 20. Harley Street.—“ J’ai reçu hier du peintre Romney votre portrait ; vous avez exaussez mes vœux en m’accordent la faveure que je désiroit tant d’avoir. J’ai à présent la satisfaction de posséder l’image du ministre le plus éclairé, le plus ferme, et la plus honnêt que j’ai jamais connu, avec le quel j’eu le bonheur de traiter, et qui m’a constamment honoré de son amitié, de sa confiance, et des lumières du quel j’ai beaucoup profité : aussi lui ai-je voué un attachement qui ne s’éteindra qu’avec ma vie.

“ J’ai remarqué avec une satisfaction extrême que vous tenez à la min [main] le traité que nous avons signé ensemble, et qui posa le premier fondement à cette union entre les deux pays qui n’a été interrompu sept ans après pour le malheur de l’Europe que par des circonstances si peu naturelle et extravagantes qu’aucune prudence humaine ne pouvoit prévoir ni empêcher. Cette malheureuse mésintelligence a cessé, voilà tout : mais pour rétablire l’ancienne intimité, la renforcer, et la rendre permanente, il faut que le même ministre qui était au timon des affaires politique de la grande Brétagne, et qui forma cette alliance, retourne à son poste pour faire cet ouvrage util aux deux pays, et salutaire à l’Europe entière ; car je vois avec douleur que, malgré la tendance naturelle et réciproque des deux pays à cette union si désirée, ceux qui se sont emparés ici de la manœuvre du vaisseaux de l’état qu’ils conduisent avec tant d’inabilité, sont tout-à-fait au-dessou d’un si grand ouvrage.”

## THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, January 25. Charles Street.—“ Whenever your printer furnishes to me the slips of your speech I will forward them to you with as many censures as I can devise to keep them company.

“ I think with you that our weekly journal is very dull in its outset, and if it does not shew a little more vivacity, I should think with less confidence of its extensive circulation than does its editor. If, however, it be read, and if it continue to shew to the public of the country how little even their base fears ought to find of future security in their dishonourable submission, and how much their danger increases by the multiplied concessions of their government, if these things are read, they are so true that they will sink into the mind by their own natural weight, without wanting any assistance of genius or vivacity to give them effect. To-day everybody is asking one another whether the French have demanded and obtained the island of Elba. I understand they have, but when I am asked I say, and that with some truth, that I

am not altogether without anxiety lest it should be demanded of us to hang up Grant and his little garrison for their audacity in defending Porto Ferraio against the French arms.

“What can they mean by respiting Wall a second time? There were two other charges against him which were not tried, because though a man can several times commit murder, he can be hanged but once. The expectation of the lower class is so alive to this case of public justice that a pardon would be intolerable, and repeated respite without pardon is wicked torture.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, January 26.—“Cobbett sent me two sheets last night, and I forward them to you by this post, with pencil marks in reference to the *valuable* annotations of my critical pen. If they are not clear enough to be legible to you, you may comfort yourself with my sincere assurance that they are not worth the trouble of decyphering. I heard yesterday that the language of our minister at Amiens, in a letter to a confidential friend, is full of complaints at the unmeasurable prolongation of his exile; and if I do not refine too much, I think I see traces in his friend’s conversation, of some uncertainty as to the result being such as was expected.

“I hear nothing of new arrangements, but I think Sheridan’s Whig speech, in which he questions himself, and obtains from himself such satisfactory answers, indicates a desire on his part of shaming his friends out of an arrangement which he may suspect they incline to.

“Tierney, at a large dinner at Addington’s the other day, congratulated him upon the *appearance of an opposition, good for constitutional purposes, and not dangerous to his power*. I believe Addington would be better pleased with a plain course of undisturbed power, and that he does not much look out for these decorations to which Tierney is something more habituated than he is.

“I rejoice that the sun is shining upon your gravel-carts.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, January 30.—“As far as I can form an opinion upon the subject, I am rather disinclined to the idea of annexing Sulpicius to the publication of your speech. In the first place I see in this shape no particular advantage, because to all who are likely to pursue this subject, both the letters of Sulpicius and the name of the author are sufficiently known; and the direct reference made to them in the speech of Lord Hawkesbury must have made them still more notorious; if therefore on the last blank page of your speech, Mr. Cobbett

announced that the letters of Sulpicius were to be had at his shop, all those who wish to put together what is written by you on the matter will easily thus be reminded how to do it; but my chief apprehension of its being made a part of your speech is that the volume of it will be thus very much increased, and upon a subject so little inviting as the northern neutrality, I would not discourage the reader by shewing him too many pages to wade through. This is my chief objection. Another is that your adding those letters to the speech, makes you more prominent and more active in publication, than I think is desirable. A speech steals out, and nobody knows how, but an addition to the speech would give it too much the air of a political pamphlet. *Dixi.*

“Lord Glastonbury assures me that he knows that the negotiations with Grey and Lord Moira are brought to an unsuccessful conclusion, as they stipulate for the repeal of the treason and sedition bills, which is refused. I know not how any of this is. I have just heard that Sir William Pulteney is dead.

“Your neighbour Dupré has bought Lord Howe’s in Grafton Street for 8,000*l.* Hester is fat and flourishing, and is panting for the possession of Sir R. Lyttelton’s house in Piccadilly.”

*Private.* WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, February 9. Hertford Street.—“Your Lordship’s letter of this evening has very much surprised me. On Sunday, at 5 p.m., Mr. Addington made me the offer of Ireland which I accepted under certain conditions; but the strictest secrecy was required and promised till Lord Hardwicke’s approbation should be *formally* obtained. You may naturally suppose that I did not wish to be exposed to a refusal, and therefore that I made my first stand there; but I was answered that both Abbot and Charles Yorke had *formally* engaged for Lord Hardwicke’s full and unequivocal wishes being for my appointment, in preference to that of any other person. It was however thought more decent that nothing should be said to *anybody* till an answer had come from Ireland to the first letter which notified the intention to offer the situation to me. This was even carried so far as that I was forbidden to call on the new Chancellor, though I knew that he had been earnest for my appointment, and had said everything that could be said to fix Mr. Addington in his resolution.

“I shut myself up to-day that I might see nobody. I have really seen nobody, and till I received your Lordship’s letter I thought the thing a profound secret.

“I this instant receive a letter of congratulation from Colonel Hope, saying that Mr. Addington has mentioned it to a friend of his.

“ I will tell your Lordship much more on the subject if you will give me leave to call on you on Thursday morning after breakfast. I will not give your Lordship the trouble of calling here.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, February 16. London.—“ The papers will have shewn you the new degradation of the House in the suppression of Lord Folkestone’s motion against the printers of the *True Briton* ; upon Sheridan’s speech in their defence, Addington, Lord Hawkesbury, and other ministers nodded assent to all his speech, and the order of the day was passed upon Lord Folkestone’s motion, because, as William Dundas told him, Government, being abused in opposition papers, were determined to defend their printers in the same practice. I was told that Lord Folkestone would only give notice yesterday, and therefore I was not in the House.

“ The paragraph in the *Moniteur* seems to announce the *Department of Piedmont* as subject to France ; and I am told to-day that it is universally believed that we are to have Martinique for Trinidad, and for our claim on account of prisoners ; an exchange which at first sight I am not disposed to complain of, because I apprehend Martinique to be a much more secure possession to us, and Trinidad to be less valuable to France than to us, because it will demand a greater capital than France can yet furnish for the cultivation of it.

“ These successive acts of conquest on the part of France do begin to make considerable sensation, but whomever they may alarm, they do not alarm the Government, for Charles tells me that Vansittart speaks of the disbanding all the yeomanry as the only measure which he hears of respecting them.

“ Fox, as I hear, will oppose the referring of the arrears of the civil list to a committee to-morrow, but he will probably defend the Prince’s claim to his Cornish arrears, and so far save hostility with respect to him.

“ This matter at present occupies the conversation of London, and it is generally stated that the arrears will be above 600,000*l.*, and the Prince’s claim near 400,000*l.* ; but the accounts will be presented to-day. I am told in the city that there are many faces which grow very long upon finding that in addition to the positive prohibition of English goods in France, and in the Batavian Republic, the new duties in Spain do likewise amount to a virtual prohibition.

“ Can it be true, as it is confidently reported to me, that to secure the independence of Malta, we take upon ourselves the payment of the Neopolitan garrison there. Where will all this childish folly end ?

“ Ross speaks with little hope of seeing his friend from

Amiens, and thinks there is a hitch about Turkey. Prussia has endeavoured, being backed by France, to obtain Mechlenburg; but this has been stopped at Petersburg with great anger at the attempt."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1802, February 18. London.]—"I cannot avoid writing one line to you, in answer to your letter of to-day, to urge you on no account to delay to come up to London, if there is any new sensation whatever from your hand more than belongs to the spot which was hurt.

"Lord Spencer some years ago was himself a good deal affected by a thorn which wounded his foot, and though care prevented real mischief, it was by early and unremitting attention that he did so. Do not imagine that your feeling this pain in your elbow *immediately* after hurting your hand is any real security as distinguished from my case; the singularity of my case was the late appearance of the consequences of the wound; but in all this uncertainty I own I should feel better pleased if you would come up but for the single object of asking Farquhar or Home whether any and what precautions are necessary. I know that fatigue and much exercise must be avoided, while you have any suspicion on this subject, therefore as you cannot work in the country, you had better come and be idle for a few days in London.

"You see by what passed yesterday that Addington means that the Prince's claims should be established; and yet I remember that Pitt formerly contended that, even allowing his claim, the set off on the other side would still leave him debtor.

"Lawrence tells me that you have fallen into a small mistake by mentioning the order for the advantage of America as the *only* relaxation of our principle; he says there was a second order in 1798 of stronger effect which you should have noticed, and which you will find at the end of Robinson's reports."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1802, February 20. London.]—"I will get from White's the 1st part of the 2nd volume of Robinson, which contains the order of 1798, and Sir W. Scott's remarks upon it; I cannot depend upon getting Hammond's frank for it, but, as I presume, if you remain at Dropmore your Auditor's messenger will go down to you on Monday, I will send it to Oxford Street.

"I should at all events recommend to you to publish a supplementary postscript, because I think what Lawrence describes of the order does very much affect the whole of that part of your argument which applied to the *single exception* made

by us in favour of America. In order to prevent your being attacked upon this point too soon, I should even advise you to make Cobbett immediately advertise that in a few days will be published a postscript to the appendix to your speech.

“ I am glad that you talked to Fulwasser, and yet I think him hardly equal to any conversation on lacerated tendons ; surely you had better come up for two days to write your postscript, and to satisfy yourself and me by seeing Home.

“ Pitt has just been sitting here for an hour with me, and has already made me almost too late for the past.

“ We differ much, but I see we entirely agree as to the magnitude of these last events, and, upon the whole, his conversation is more in his own style than I expected it.”

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1802, February 23. London.]—“ I rejoice very much in your determination to come up to-morrow, and the more so because Falwasser’s practice can hardly be such as to make him a competent judge of the case in question : I think it very probable that you may not be told to take anything but precaution against over-fatigue and irritation, but still I wish that you may be told so by somebody who is better qualified to judge than your country councillors can be.

“ You say nothing about desiring Cobbett to announce a postscript, but the more I think of it the more necessary it seems to be ; for in truth the whole of your argument on that particular point is affected by the *generality* of the order of 1798. I depend upon seeing you to talk over with you the conversation which I mentioned to you. Let me know as soon as you come.”

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, February 24. Charles Street.—“ I sit down to supply what the hurry of yesterday’s post did not allow me to write, and what I had trusted that I should have had an opportunity of saying to you, although it is scarcely worth troubling you with any written detail in order to describe the conversation which I had mentioned to you. What struck me a little was that Lord Spencer had remarked an unusual promptitude in his neighbour to return his visit, and to declaim against the insolence and ambition of Bonaparte ; and it did not seem quite by hazard that to me, who had called at his door, he likewise came the very next morning and stayed a considerable time with me. He talked very soon without any apparent constraint, and we had a very familiar, easy, and friendly discussion of all the late events which have happened. I told him that I would not say a word to him about the preliminary articles, on which subject I know that we had different

opinions, but that I was sure if I spoke to him as a friend to the preliminary articles, he would not deny how much even his expectations of any of the advantages of those articles must have been discouraged by all the subsequent instances of the increasing rapacity and undisguised ambition of Bonaparte, as they were seen in the possession of the Cisalpine, of Piedmont, of Louisiana, and not least neither, in the circumstances of the general and active display of all the naval force of France for the nominal object of St. Domingo. To all these points he was so impatient to express his assent that he would hardly wait till I had stated them before he spoke even more strongly upon them than I had done, and among other things he expressly said that he would grant to me that, in any other times, any one of these events would of necessity have produced from hence a war with France; but he took great pains to prove that, bad as this situation was, it would not be mended by renewing the war at a time like the present when we could not hope for support from either Germany or Russia; though he agreed that if they would act with us, and shew real disposition and means to do so, that would alter the question. I told him that I took for granted that the French occupation of Italy, with a large army at the Imperial Venetian frontier, must probably have produced great alarm at Vienna, and strong reclamations here, which, I supposed, might be improved into confederacy; but I asked what hope we could ever have of exciting a proper spirit of resistance upon the Continent, if we ourselves were the first to shew a readiness to bend to the yoke of France; and I told him plainly that, with the low and desponding tone which government had given and were giving to the country here, I did fear that all the proper feelings of English resistance to the power of France would be irrevocably lost, even when we might have no choice but that of submission or defence. This he stoutly denied, and said he should have no fear of finding the mind of the public right if he had made up his own; and I agreed with him that *he* could do so, but that this government could not. The best part of his conversation was his declared sense of these new dangers; the worst was that when I asked him how far he could carry his own ideas of the necessity of temporising, and whether he was prepared to see France take possession of Spain and Holland and so on in succession, and I must say that, even to this, he doubted whether in the present moment we ought to shew resistance by war.

“ Upon this I put the case to him of France herself renewing the war with us, and I think he scarcely affected to resist in argument this state of the question; but said that he should be for an establishment so large as almost to amount to defensive war; and to this I answered that, if so, we should make no material difference in things by this peace, except that we should give our enemy the cessions of the peace, and undisturbed means of arranging his future attack, while we, with the

expenses of war, had none of the advantages either of war or peace.

“He ended by saying that he thought it a very doubtful and difficult question whether we should gain as much as our enemy would by this interval. I told him I should again pursue him on these subjects, to which he very cordially assented. I wish you were more in the habit of communication with him ; I think he courts it, and that he is more accessible to our view of the matter than he has yet been.”

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, February 27. Charles Street.—“It was because I imagined that Pitt was accessible to the influence of conversation, that I so much regretted your being so entirely out of the reach of all communication with him ; however inclined as I really am to seek for such opportunities myself, they are not easily found ; and as they belong not to my ordinary habits, they awaken in some degree a jealousy with respect to their object that is not favourable to give such impressions as arise out of the renewed habits of old and familiar intercourse. With regard to yourself none of these objections apply ; and there is moreover the additional inducement in him to listen to you from the political weight which your opinions are likely to have. The more I think of this particular topic the more do I persuade myself that considerable advantage would be likely to arise from it. In the first place the subject, as arising from these recent events, is entirely new, and offers to those friends of the preliminary articles who choose to look for it a consistent mode of declaring their sense of these new dangers without the unpleasant task of recanting their former opinions ; and whatever difference of opinion there was between you and Pitt upon the preliminary articles of peace, as there is no great difference between you as to the dangers of these subsequent events, why may not one hope that communication upon these agreed points may lead Pitt to acquiesce in the conclusion which ought to arise from the consideration of these dangers ? Why, at least, should he not be induced to think that those who reluctantly differed with him are rather seeking for all means of doing away those differences, than dwelling singly or solely upon them ? Why, if the question of his own decision upon the steps which ought to be taken to resist the overbearing ambition of France be left in any degree doubtful, as in my conscience I incline to think it is, why should not the chance be taken of bringing that decision to a right bias, by his seeing that such a decision may lead to renew those connections which I am sure he cannot but regret, and which the increasing difficulties of every hour must hourly lead him more and more to value and to desire.

“I know with all this that there is a sort of solitary

consolation which you find in keeping entirely clear of discussion, as well as of business, when everything takes so disgraceful and unpromising an aspect ; and I think I see strong symptoms in your letter of your inclination to indulge yourself in this sort of negative gratification of not hearing or talking of anything so bad as the present state of politics consists of. If this feeling be so prevalent with you as that it is painful to you to resist it, I do not know why I should press upon you a task which may be both ungracious and unprofitable ; but if you are a free agent in this respect, and if you allow yourself to be influenced by a desire rather to do all that may turn to good than to do only what is gratifying, and what may appear to be the bare line of duty, then and in that case I think you will be disposed, in reflecting upon this subject, to think that you should not let the present moment go by unemployed.

“ Perhaps my own inclination would, in your situation, be to write to Pitt, and to ask him plainly how far he did or did not agree with you in your sense of these new dangers subsequent to the preliminary articles ; telling him fairly of the duty which seems to be imposed upon him of not letting the courage and spirit of the country be irrevocably lost at a moment when every reasonable man must agree that it may soon be called again into question for its independence and existence. If his answer seems to invite a discussion, you might then come to town ; if it does not, you will at least have done something more for the gratification of your own mind.”

#### LORD GRENVILLE to WILLIAM WICKHAM.

1802, March 3. Dropmore.—“ I learnt yesterday, by an extract which I read in a newspaper, that Count Dietrichstein had, in a pamphlet published here, renewed some of those unfounded assertions respecting the causes of the failure of the campaign of 1799, and particularly of the separation of the armies on the Swiss frontier, which he at that time circulated, and which, I remember, you were then instructed to contradict.

“ There are many reasons which induce me to wish to do away by some authentic statement, supported by proper documents, the unfavourable and injurious impressions which those assertions, coming from a person employed in high stations, must create on the Continent respecting the conduct of this country. And the materials furnished by the papers which I possess, would be sufficient for the purpose, even without the assistance of your correspondence, of which I have not got here any copies or abstracts.

“ Dietrichstein’s pamphlet I have not yet seen, but I have sent for it ; and, if you had leisure to look out the two or three dispatches which relate to that point, and your note

to the Arch-duke Charles upon it, that would be all that would be wanted for the purpose of stating the truth in a manner to carry irresistible conviction. Perhaps when I read the whole pamphlet it may appear to me less entitled to attention than it now does ; but, if the contrary should be the case, I should then most earnestly wish to intrude even on your present occupations, by requesting you, at your leisure, to put down a short statement of what occurs to you upon it.

“I am perfectly aware that after I have drawn any such answer to M. Dietrichstein as I have in view, I cannot publish it without the King’s permission. Nor indeed should I wish to do so. I should therefore, in that case, send it to Lord Hawkesbury, and request him to signify to me the King’s pleasure respecting its publication or suppression. If the Government had any views of co-operation or concert with Austria against France, I can readily imagine that such a publication might be injurious to the success of such projects, and, God knows, I should be the last man in England to desire to incur any such risk. But, as it seems too evident that nothing of this sort is either decided by them or in itself practicable, I do not imagine I could run counter to their wishes in doing justice to myself personally, and to the conduct and character of the country.” *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to W. PITT.

1802, March 3. Dropmore.—“I see by the papers this morning that Sheridan has announced a discussion in the House of Commons respecting the late arrangements in the Carnatic ; upon which subject there has also been some conversation in the House of Lords. I feel myself in a very awkward situation in what relates to this point. By some accident which I cannot explain, it is now more than a year since I have had from Wellesley any other letters, except one or two which were merely introductory of East Indians returning home. I am therefore totally unacquainted with every part of this subject, and neither know what has in fact been done, nor what share he has had in doing it. At the same time, I do not think I am quite fulfilling what he has a right to demand from me in suffering his character to be implicated, as I am told it is, in conversation on this subject, without shewing myself ready to discharge towards him the duties of that friendship which I have so often experienced at his hands. Especially as I know from what has passed on another subject, that it is no longer to the East India House or to Whitehall that he can look for protection and support.

“I am so little in the way here of hearing what passes in political discussion, other than such as the newspapers contain, that I am probably ignorant of many particulars on this point which are the common conversation of St. James’s Street.

You will not suspect me of wishing you to tell me anything the disclosure of which would be a breach of confidence on your part towards persons with whom I neither am, nor mean to be, in habits of confidence ; but, subject to that reserve, whatever you can tell me of Wellesley's conduct and situation, and of the means by which I can make myself useful to his credit and reputation and honour, would really relieve my mind from much uneasiness which I now feel from a total ignorance on the one hand of what I ought to do, and from a great reluctance on the other to sit still and do nothing when his character is at stake.

"I do not write any thing to you about the late events, but I cannot think that we differ much upon them. I see nothing likely to bring me to town before the discussion of the definite treaty, unless the payment of the civil list arrears should be opposed in the House of Lords, which I do not think likely. Whenever I do come I confess it would give me great pleasure to talk with you *prospectively* of the present situation of public affairs, and of the scenes which are now passing on the continent, and of those which, as I think, are preparing for us.

"As you probably have more than enough of such discussions in town I do not invite you here for the purpose of passing two or three days in the same amusement ; but whenever you can spare me that time to look at my new road, and to see Dropmore in its present shape, I shall be heartily glad to see you." *Copy.*

*Private.* WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, March 4. Hertford Street.—"I shall not lose a moment in complying with your Lordship's wishes expressed in your letter of yesterday. I send Dietrichstein's pamphlet enclosed, and, in the course of a day or two, you shall have copies and extracts of all my dispatches relating to the subject, with such notes upon them as may be likely to refresh your Lordship's memory. My note to the Arch-duke Charles, your Lordship may remember, was never delivered. The instructions to frame and deliver it only reached me the night before the battle of Zurich, when the Arch-duke had already marched to Manheim, so that I had no chance of seeing him for some time to come. In the mean time Lord Mulgrave and Lord Minto, the former verbally, the latter in writing, had given *the lie direct* in so very unequivocal a manner that I thought *more unnecessary*, and so explained myself to your Lordship at the time. I will endeavour to find Lord Minto's note.

"Dietrichstein's pamphlet is below mediocrity, but it certainly contains the mischievous assertions of which your Lordship complains, in very unqualified terms, and they appear

to a certain degree founded, from the art with which he has contrived to confound all manner of times and dates.

“Lord Hardwicke behaved very handsomely on the subject of my appointment, so that I trust I shall find my situation, in that respect at least, pleasant.

“There is still however much unsettled matter of dispute between the Lord Lieutenant and Lord Pelham, in which I shall do my best to avoid taking a share, if Lord Pelham will have the prudence to permit me to follow that line.”

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, March 4, Park Place.—“Having heard by report that the arrangements in the Carnatic were likely to become matter of discussion, I some time since desired to see the papers which have been received from India on the subject. As however they are very voluminous, and the business did not seem then to press to a day, you will not wonder that I have hitherto found more entertaining reading, and have therefore not made progress enough in them to be able to give you any particular information on the subject. I have seen enough however to shew that the act is principally Wellesley’s own, and I shall therefore now look into the correspondence as carefully as I can, and shall be very glad to talk it over with you before it is agitated in either House. Considering your connection with Wellesley, I think there can be no impropriety, though you stand in the situation you describe with respect to Government, in my asking for his sake, the liberty to show you the papers if you have no objection to seeing them. Whether Government has formed any or what opinion on the subject I do not know, but I may probably have an opportunity of hearing soon. It will be a great satisfaction to me to talk with you prospectively as you propose, on the present strange and uncertain situation of things. With respect to their actual complexion we cannot much differ, nor much I should think, on comparing our opinions, as to any practical inference; but whether we differ or agree, I shall like very much to discuss the whole.

“If you are likely to be at liberty the beginning of the week, I think I could easily come to you at Dropmore Monday, or at latest Tuesday; and I shall be very glad, in the interval of our speculations, to mix the much pleasanter occupation of looking at your *arrondissement* and acquisitions at Dropmore.”

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1802], March 5. Stowe.—“My accounts from London all agree that Ministers have worked themselves up to a momentary tone of firmness in which I have no confidence, for I am

persuaded that they are ready to sign to articles specifically worse (independent of the Italian question) than those which we conceived utterly incompatible with our immediate honour or security, and still more incompatible with our future prospects.

"Tom wrote me word of the opening which [Pitt's] conversation with him had given on this subject, and of the pains which he had taken to urge you to fortify in [Pitt's] mind the alarm that he had taken so strongly; but he tells me since that you had declined it.

"I cannot but think it highly advisable that the alarm should be sounded as widely as possible, and with that view I heartily approve the conversation of Elliot and Windham, and I wish that you could have reconciled it to yourself to have contributed to this work by attack in the House of Lords, and by communication where it is reasonable to think you could have made impression. I am satisfied that the fabric is shaken to its centre."

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, March 5. Charles Street.—"I am very well enabled to give you an account of Count Dietrichstien's pamphlet, since he sent me a copy of it a fortnight ago, with an accompanying letter of flattery in his usual style. When I read the pamphlet I found it was written to contradict a paragraph in the *Times* of 1799, which charged him with ordering M. de Chateler to retard the siege of Turin till the Russians should have left Italy. To acquit himself of this charge he proves that Chateler did not command the siege, and that he had neither communication nor authority for communication with him; he does moreover add what his opinion was of the *defective* plan proposed to Austria by England, and of my having stopped him on that subject at Berlin by telling him that the English plan had already been arranged and announced at Vienna. He was right if he thought fit to deny the treachery imputed to him by the *Times*; he was wrong in publishing his opinion or his official communications about the plan of the campaign. I answered his letter therefore by telling him that nobody had ever talked of the paragraph in question, that I had never heard of it, and certainly would never have advised him to have written any answer to it, but should have thought he would have done better to have taken no notice of an anonymous newspaper two years old; but I said nothing of the plan of campaign, being unwilling to further any discussion with so *indiscreet* a Minister. He replied to me in a letter of still greater flattery to me, and to my *digne frère*, whose speech he applauds up to the skies; and to all this palaver I have made no rejoinder, being very desirous to close a correspondence which I should not willingly have invited.

“I will shew you the letters and pamphlet when I see you, but there is nothing in the letter which could warrant any animadversion on your part, unless Lord Holland should adopt his censure, and then you will be able to answer for yourself with propriety in the House of Lords.

“I am very glad that you have written to Pitt, and I hope that if he cannot go down to Dropmore, you will come up for a day or two to London, where, besides politics, you are much wanted by Randolph, who is invested with full powers to treat with you respecting Demosthenes.

“What I have heard of the debate in the House of Commons, and particularly Baker’s speech, in addition to the general appearance of the House, bespoke a very considerable change in the public mind since those topics had last been discussed. Pitt, though in town, was not present; and Lord Castlereagh’s speech, though very feeble and much below par, gave an impression of more difficulty as to the treaty than had hitherto struck the public mind; in addition to this the sudden sailing of seven sail for Torbay has so much encreased the public apprehensions that stocks have fallen to-day, as Coutts tells me,  $1\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. I suspect by the embarrassed and dejected Treasury Bench which I saw, that they feel themselves forced to add so largely to our means of defence that they tremble at the possible effects of the faintest shade of vigour and exertion; and yet, for my own part, I am persuaded that this will rather accelerate the peace, and that the treaty will come as soon as ever Bonaparte thinks our Ministers will really give no more.”

*Private.* WILLIAM WICKHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, March 6. Hertford Street.—“I think you will find in the enclosed papers all that I have in my power to furnish your Lordship with on the subject of Count Dietrichstein. I have no copy of Lord Mulgrave’s dispatch to your Lordship, after his interview with the Arch-duke near Schaffhausen, but he there gave so plain and full a disavowal, in the King’s name, of the supposed wish of this Government that the Arch-duke should retire from Switzerland, as in my opinion (particularly after I had seen Lord Minto’s note to Thugut) fully answered every object that your Lordship could have in view. I therefore (and also because I did not see the Arch-duke till the end of October) thought it might do harm, and could do no good *at that late moment*, if I were to carry my instructions into execution.

“Dietrichstein has frequently denied to me that he ever discouraged the attempt to pass the Aar. Tolstoi on the contrary, the Russian envoy at the army, declared *that he heard him* remonstrate strongly with General Schmidt, and declare that the Courts of Petersburg and London would be offended with the measure.

“ Your Lordship will observe that, at that moment, neither Tolstoi nor myself had any knowledge of the real wishes of our respective Courts on the subject.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, March 10. Charles Street.—“ I have only time by this post to send you Cobbett’s answer to my enquiries, and you will be satisfied with it.

“ I am told by undeniable authority, but as a *profound secret*, that France has even refused to acquiesce in Malta being garrisoned by a Neapolitan garrison. How that discussion will end I know not, nor do I conceive why France should object to this Neapolitan proposal, although I see a thousand reasons why we should ; perhaps the Great Consul expects from the weakness of our Government that he has only to go on objecting about Malta, untill we agree to put it into his hands. I rejoice to hear that Pitt is with you, and so do many others ; the public grow sensible of our danger, and are impatient to see some better defence than is now found in Downing Street.”

*Enclosure* :—A letter from William Cobbett to Thomas Grenville in regard to the publication and rapid sale of Lord Grenville’s speech on the preliminary treaty with France.

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, March 13.—“ As I hear nothing from you respecting your Dropmore conference, I presume that you have nothing interesting to tell me of it, and yet I am curious to know the general tenor of it, and the more so because it seems impossible that his prospective view can differ much with yours. The latter events have made a convert for us of Lord Glastonbury who, in his conviction of the hostile intention of France, is now the loudest in deprecating the conclusion of the treaty. I hear it whispered about that we claim to retain Malta to ourselves, and I imagine this arises from its being now known that Russia will not have it, that France will not let Naples have it, and therefore it is presumed that we shall keep it, but I know not how to believe that we have vigour enough to make such a requisition, or that France would have the folly to refuse Malta to Naples in order to cede it by preference to Great Britain. Your friend Woronzow is impatient for your arrival in town, and is sick of the weakness and incapacity which he daily sees in the foreign department ; you may guess of the indignation with which he told me that a few days ago Lord Hervey desired Lima to give him a dinner, then desired him to ask Otto, then desired that Lord Hawkesbury might likewise come there, and the evening concluded by Otto’s going with them to the opera, where he sat all

night in their box between Lady Hawkesbury and Lady Hervey. In short Woronzow's patience is quite exhausted, and he talks of Lord Hawkesbury only now by the name *ce jeune Nigaud*.

"I presume that your old friend King has recovered his temper and understanding, for although I scarce know him, he accosted me to-day in the streets with very tender enquiries about you, and great expressions of impatience at your continued absence from London."

#### LORD ELDON to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, March 12. London.—"I return you my sincere thanks for your obliging letter. I am not likely to alter the opinion to which your Lordship alludes, and I know too well the value of the fewest words your Lordship might be disposed to state on any subject in the House of Lords, not to be covetous of your Lordship's attendance, if there should be occasion for it. But I believe that the present bill for further suspending the Residence Act has no object but to extend the suspension for such further part of this session, as may give time to pass, if the Houses shall think proper to adopt it, a bill which Sir William Scott means soon to propose to Parliament; and the substance of which must be communicated to your Lordship as soon as he has quite determined what he will abide by, and I hope that determination will be found in a few days. I am reasonably sure that the proposed Suspension Bill has no other object, but, if it should have, your Lordship may rely upon my taking care that you shall have such notice of the day proposed for a second reading of the bill, as to secure to you the opportunity of conveniently attending it."

#### POLICY OF GENERAL BONAPARTE.

INFORMATIONS SECRÈTES MAIS CERTAINES. *Translated from German to French by Count Starhemberg.*

[1802], March 15.—"1. Il est certain que Bonaparte veut non seulement envahir toute l'Italie, mais aussi l'île de Sardaigne qu'il a de projet de révolutionner et de réunir à la France. Les personnes qui doivent entâmer et achever ce nouvel œuvre d'iniquité sont déjà nommées, et parties depuis plusieurs mois. Salicetti est un de ceux qui en est chargé, et il s'arrête pour le moment à Lucques. Selon toute apparence l'escadre de Gantheaume et la flotte de Brest qui a passé dernièrement le détroit de Gibraltar, ont la même destination. Il paraît important au gouvernement français de réaliser ce projet.

1. "Pour se rendre sérieusement maître de la Corse qui tire des grands secours de la Sardaigne.

2. " Pour se dédommager de la perte de Malte, par un beau et bon port dans la Méditerranée.

3. " Pour avoir plus de facilités à faire des incursions dans le midi du continent de l'Italie, ou, du moins, pouvoir le tenir constamment en respect. Ses vues expliquent la raison du délai que la France a mis jusqu' à présent à conclure sa paix avec le Roi de Sardaigne.

2. " Le Comité révolutionnaire de Naples existe encore à Paris et continue à entretenir une correspondance et des liaisons très étroites avec la nouvelle république Italienne. Un certain Baribelli né dans la Valtalène, mais qui a été au service de Naples en est un des premiers agents. Il est surtout lié avec et a été appelé à toutes les délibérations sur les affaires d'Italie. Un de ses frères est employé actuellement dans le gouvernement.

3. " La France pourrait bien être incessamment en froid avec la Prusse. Bonaparte et Luchessini ne s'aiment pas réciproquement, et le Consul n'a pas voulu jusqu' à présent recevoir les nouvelles lettres de créance du ministre de Prusse. L'origine de cette haine de Bonaparte pour Luchessini vient 1. de ce que quand ce dernier était en Italie en 1796 avec une commission secrète de son Roi, et ayant l'air de vanter en toutes occasions les hauts faits de Bonaparte, il doit lui avoir conseillé une opération militaire qui n'a point réussi, et qui a couté sept mille hommes à la France ; ce qu'on ne lui a pas pardonné encore.

2. De ce qu'en dernier lieu à Paris Luchessini lui a adressé la parole en italien devant des étrangers, ce que Bonaparte n'aime point, craignant que cela ne lui fasse tort vis-à-vis des français.

4. " On ne voit pas d'autres livres dans le cabinet de Bonaparte que les *Commentaires de César* et les *Capitulaires de Charlemagne*. Il les étudie constamment, et s'explique ainsi comment il est continuellement occupé de plans d'une domination insatiable, et de conquêtes qui paraissent chimérique, mais auxquels il est d'ailleurs déjà porté par son caractère. Il est aisé en comparant ceci avec les événements du jour, de juger de tout ce que cet homme, qui se croit tout possible, médite encore si on le laisse faire. Aucun traité, aucune promesse ne sont sacrés pour lui. L'amitié dans son sens n'est que la soumission de son ennemi, et la paix une trêve, ou plutôt la destruction ou ruine totale de celui avec qui il l'a fait."

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, March 15.—" I am much obliged to you for the very interesting account which you have given me of your Dropmore conversation, and do most entirely agree with you in the advantage which is to be expected from a renewed and improved intercourse under the critical circumstances in which

the country, and everybody in it appears to be placed. My friend in St. James's Place concurs so much in this view of the subject, that he writes to you by this post to desire you to come to town a day sooner than you had proposed, in order that you three may have an unembarrassed and uninterrupted opportunity of talking together after dinner in St. James's Place, and I heartily hope that you will not disappoint this expectation. My own conviction still is that the treaty will come, and that some roundabout contrivance will be adopted respecting Malta which will satisfy everybody in France and nobody in England except our ministers. In truth, the mass of those whom I meet in the streets will not easily be satisfied, and you may guess how general this change of opinion is when I tell you that the faithful Hatsell, though he holds us bound by the preliminary articles, laments openly that they were ever signed; and that you now scarcely find anybody who considers the peace other than as a mode of our stripping ourselves to become an easier conquest to France; and I am assured that this language is nowhere more universally prevalent than in the city.

"I am happy that I shall soon have the means of talking over these matters with you. Pray do not disappoint Lord S[pencer] on Thursday."

#### EARL SPENCER TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, March 15. London.—"I was very happy to hear that we were likely at length to have the pleasure of seeing you again in town; and my purpose for writing to you now is to endeavour, if possible, to accelerate that satisfaction by proposing to you to come and take a dinner here with us on Thursday next. My reason for naming that day is that Pitt has promised to dine with us on it; and I really do think that it may be of some service for us to have a little confidential conversation with him, if possible, before he shall have again involved himself in new pledges to the measures of the present Administration, which, if the current report of the day says truly, he will very shortly indeed be called upon to do by the arrival of the definitive treaty, which, as far as I can collect from tolerably good authority, is now on the eve of coming. Under the hope that you may agree with me in thinking such a communication useful, and that you may, in consequence, be induced to come on Thursday, I shall not ask any other man for that day till I have your answer. If Lady Grenville comes up with you, Lady Spencer will be extremely happy to see her too."

#### COUNT WORONZOW TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, March 30. Harley Street.—"J'ai vue hier le fameux traité. Il a surpassé mon attente. C'est la pièce la plus

absurde en son genre, et vraiment honteuse pour ce pays, qui depuis le règne de Charles second n'a fait aucun traité dont il auroit pu rougir. Il part aujourd'hui un courier pour la Russie, ce qui m'occupera assez pour détailler à ma cour toutes les bévues et la pusilanimité de ce misérable ministère. Si vous pouvez me recevoir après demain, mercredi, à l'heure qui vous conviendra, je vous ferai un détail de la honteuse transaction que j'ai vue,"

#### COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, April 11. Harley Street.—“ En quittant l'Angleterre pour six mois, je pars dans l'espérance que Dieu aura pitié de ce pays ; qu'il le délivrera d'un ministère inepte, dont la concentration est réduite à trois individus, dont l'un est réduite à trois individus, dont l'un est un bon homme, excellent pour la chaire de la Chambre des Comunes, mais incapable pour celle de premier ministre ; dont le second est précisément (comme disoit Linguet d'un autre ministre) plus étrenger dans les affaires que ministre des affaires étrangères ; et le troisième, n'ayant aucun autre talent que celui de l'intrigue, est encor gouverné par son beau père, le plus intrigant des hommes, au point qu'en dernière analyse, c'est ce beau père qui, sous mains, fait jouer tous les ressorts de ce trio singulier. Toutes les mesures de ce Cabinet concentré sont incohérentes ; car les trois associés ne se concertent que sur les mesures propres à se conserver en places, sans se soucier d'un accord parfait pour la conduite des affaires, faisant chacun tout ce qui lui plaît dans son département. Celui des affaires étrangères est mené par le beau frère du principal, et ce beau frère est un poux à lier, qui gouverne son chef, et est en même tems gouverné par Otto, qui s'est tout-à-fait emparé de lui.

“ Ce misérable ministère entré, Dieu sait pourquoi et comment, en place, n'est occupé qu'à s'y maintenir à force de souplesse, en cédant à tout le monde, amis ou ennemis, sans considérer le bien de l'état. Cette bande inepte et lâche a cédé sur tous les points à Bonaparte par la crainte de la guerre que ces gens sont incapables de conduire ; elle a eu tant d'effet sur eux qu'ils n'ont pas vue ou se sont dissimulés à eux-mêmes que la France avoit plus besoin de la paix que l'Angleterre ; vérité incontestable prouvé par les conditions du dernier emprunt qu'on vient de faire ici. Ils cèdent aussi en tout au propagateurs de l'anarchie, eu laissent expirer, au lieu de renouveler, les actes les plus salutaires que vous et vos amis avez fait passer pour maintenir et renforcer votre bienheureux constitution, qui fait la gloire et la sûreté de votre patrie. Ils irons de cession en cession, et de bassesse en bassesse, tant au dehors qu'au dedent [dedans] du pays, en l'avillissent de plus en plus à la face de tout l'univers.

“ En comparant cette misérable conduite avec la saine

politique, la dignité, et la vigueur que déployoit le précédent ministère, le cœur me seigne de voir cette différence.

“Je suis sûr que ni moi in perssone autre n’a pas besoin de vous exhorter a perssévérer dans votre énergie acoutumée, et que vous ne cesserez de faire tous vos efforts pour remédier au mal, qui pour peu qu’il dure, perdra ce pays sans retour. Si je ne suis pas déçu dans mon espérance, vous et vos amis reprendrez vos places avant mon retour, et dans ce cas je vous supplie d’avoir de la bonté pour le secrétaire d’ambassade le Baron de Nicolay que je laisse ici en qualité de Chargé des Affaires. C’est un jeune homme de beaucoup de mérite, d’excellent principes, que je connois depuis sa naissance, étent intimement lié d’amitié avec son père depuis quarante ans. Son caractère, sa sagesse, et son jugement inspirent avec raison la confiance pour lui à tous ceux qui le connaissent.

“Conservez-moi votre amitié qui m’est chère, qui m’honore, et que je me flate de mériter par l’attachement que je vous ai voué pour la vie.”

#### GEORGE HAMMOND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, April 28. Downing Street.—“Having communicated your note of this morning to Lord Hawkesbury, he has desired me to inform your lordship that the treaty will certainly not be laid before the two Houses this day. It is not yet determined whether the treaty will be laid on to-morrow or Thursday, but as soon as I am certain of the day, I will not fail to apprise you of it.”

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, May 2.—“I have just received your letter which is not very different from what I expected it to be; and, in truth, the inclination of your mind is so strongly marked in it, that whatever may be the natural eagerness of my temper or the earnestness of my opinions, I do not see motive either of duty or of advantage sufficient to press against so decided a bias as I see in your sentiments upon this matter, and therefore I am perfectly ready to acquiesce with you in the nullity of the present moment.

“Windham and Elliot intend to be in the House to-morrow, and to open their minds upon the occasion of the two months’ additional estimate which was to be moved, but which, I hear to-day, will be a whole year’s estimate; if Pitt could have been induced by you to take the same opportunity of adverting to the facts which I mentioned in my last, perhaps some considerable influence might so have been had upon the public mind; but without Pitt no effect will be had in the House by the remarks of the alarmists in the present moment.

“Kinkel, who is just arrived, tells me that the Hereditary Prince of Orange is actually gone to throw himself at the feet of Bonaparte at Paris in order to entreat him not to take the Nassau estate from his father, by giving it to Nassau Usingen in compensation for what he loses on the left bank of the Rhine, a menace which Bonaparte daily threatens to carry into execution. To this humiliating embassy the king of Prussia makes himself a party by sending a minister of his own to accompany his brother-in-law to Paris. It seems possible that a farther arrangement respecting Holland may be in question, and that the Hereditary Prince may become the Melzi of the north when he has sworn fealty to Bonaparte ; and yet I think the Great Consul will not trust him so far. Will not our ministers rejoice in this event, and boast of what they would have done if the House of Orange had trusted to their interference at Amiens ?

“Cobbett presses for his money immediately. Pray send me a draft payable to Windham or bearer ; I write to my brother for his also. I have had so many busy nothings to do, that I have not latterly had a single moment to myself so that you must not wonder that I am silent about Homer in the present moment.”

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, May 19.—“I find by what I hear that Government mean to make a point of writing out the impression of the arguments against the peace, and that Lord Hawkesbury is giving all his time to arranging the materials of his speech, which will be printed within the next week or ten days ; under these circumstances it seems to me more than ever desirable that your speech should likewise appear in as short a time as possible ; and though it sounds somewhat ungracious to say so to you, I confess that I would willingly sacrifice something of the polish and perfection which time would give to it, in order to have the advantage of its reaching the public eye now that the public attention dwells so much upon the subject. Your fame and reputation is enough established not to require, on that account, a laborious highly-wrought performance, and your speech will be good enough to do you ample honour if you publish it according to your best recollection, and agreeably to such notes and memoranda as you may have at hand. You know that I am seldom found on the side of persuading my friends to save their labour ; neither would I do so in this instance if I were not strongly impressed with the belief, that a less correct and less perfect sketch of your speech, if it appears promptly, will have twice the effect that would be had from the most exquisite shape of it, if that should retard its appearance now that all the world are eager for it, and loaded with all that the government presses can give to them

in defence of the peace. I have taught myself to think these suggestions important enough to pursue you with them by the post to Dropmore ; when I have said my say, it is for you to do as you like. Fisher would come to you whenever you please. Randolph leaves town for Oxford on Thursday se'nnight, and is very anxious to settle with you about Demosthenes before he goes. I have told him that I would say so to you, though I was not sanguine as to your coming on Wednesday morning as he wishes."

*Private.* MARQUIS WELLESLEY TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, June 8. Fort William.—“ I have received your kind letters relative to the change of administration, and your letter in the character of an idle, poor, itinerant country squire. Both were pleasant and melancholy to my soul.

“ I could not but smile at some of the appointments, while I trembled for the result ; and I admired your magnanimity, and laughed at your occupations ; but I wept over the loss of your services in such a crisis ; and my indignation mounted at the idea of your being obliged to deprive yourself of any article of your former enjoyments. You know my great value for Addington ; from him I should expect much good service in any station ; but is he quite equal to that of Commander in Chief ? Pitt, according to the usual course of his indolence, left me without a line from him on the subject of the change ; and Dundas wrote me a dry letter containing nothing more than the newspapers had announced. In this situation I was obliged to shape my own course without a guide, and I have determined to remain here until the expiration of my intended period of pilgrimage, unless Pitt should recall me, or I should be otherwise relieved. In the interval however an episode of the grand action of the poem has arisen between me and the Court of Directors, which I think may terminate in my return to Europe in 1803. I refer you to Lord Dartmouth and to Addington for the particulars of the quarrel. I am very indifferent to the issue, which is of little importance to my fame, fortune, or convenience. It is of some to the public service, which I certainly possess more ample means of conducting through the arrangements of the peace than any new Governor General could bring with him.

“ I hope, however, that nothing can detain me in India beyond 1804. I suppose you will see Colonel Harcourt, who carried home my last dispatches ; he is a great favourite of mine. I wish to God you had been with me on my voyage and march to Lucknow ; it is impossible to conceive so grand a scene. I was highly amused for eight months, and I think I have done some good. Henry has proved a most useful assistant to me. I am in very good health and spirits, and as my anxieties and labours relax, I return to my Greek

and Latin. Adieu my dear friend and remember me to Lady Grenville.

“I do not agree with you in your opinion of the extent of the danger to be apprehended in India from the peace; but although I do not think the danger so great as you consider it to be, I am far from thinking India so secure as Stinkingson states it to be. *Mon Dieu quel charivari!* I really can form no conjecture what atom of this chaos is to be uppermost, or what system is to be regenerated into its primeval chaos! I think myself happy in my exile. I believe I should have expired of grief, shame, and indignation, if I had been on the spot.”

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, June 11.—“Sir William Scott took fright and has withdrawn his bill till next year; and Dickenson brings on another protecting bill which will pass without difficulty, though I wish to except the cases of prosecution at the suit of anyone actually resident in the parish during the months for which the penalties are sued. However my zeal will not keep me beyond Monday, on which day (if you will insure me from your diplomatic friend) my wife and I with George and Mary will come to you, and we will beg your hospitality till Friday morning.

“The dissolution will according to general belief not be protracted beyond the 22nd. A day was, however, lost yesterday by the manœuvre of Mr. Robson, and I think it possible that more checks of the same sort may occur. Every one here is satisfied that Dundas (Lord Melville) takes office. He went to Walmer on Monday with the intention according to the *Morning Chronicle* of engaging Pitt to take office, but according to me with a very different plan, namely of procuring from Pitt a due discharge and character from his last place. I have reason to know that his acceptance of office has been stated as the surest barrier against Mr. Pitt and against us.”

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, June 12.—Windham is gone to Norwich to meet a formidable opposition carried on by King-Killer Smith. I have a vague recollection of his having been implicated in the rebellious projects of Stone, and I think he absented himself some time from Parliament for fear of being expelled. If you have any accurate remembrance of any of these facts which can be talked of, it might be useful to Windham if you will enable me to give him any such information.

“The Fortescues and Buckinghamhs both seem to have an immediate project of Dropmore, mine is something more

distant as I have hitherto fixed no time. The expectation of dissolution, however, increases every day, and there seems no doubt of it's taking place between the 21st and 26th.

“The dull task I had imposed upon myself is fortunately put by; Lord H[awkesbury] does not print his speech, and our friends agree that the work which we had talked of is not only unnecessary, but would be improper without it.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, June 19.—“The passing and repassing of so many copies to and fro has a good deal disordered the accuracy of my recollection with respect to the exact detail of the L. P. Homers. I have, however, found your original copy with the India prints and *variantes*, as you described it, and I have this day given it to Mr. Herring to bind for you. With respect to the stained leaves in your copy, you had better send me an account of them, and I will add them to the list which I am making out of others in order to send to Oxford, and to have them replaced as far as the waste remaining there will supply. At all events we will make out your own copy perfect.

“I thank you for your *memoranda* respecting Smith, although I yesterday heard such favourable accounts from Windham, that I am in hopes he will scarcely want the benefit of his opponent's character.

“Watkin has a serious embarrassment before him in Montgomeryshire. Mr. Cockburne has canvassed him for this interest in Montgomery where, under Lord Hereford's protection, he is going to oppose Lord Clive. Lord Hereford is the old head and leader of Watkin's friends in the county, and to offend him may be a real difficulty; on the other hand, to assist him would be an open act of hostility to the Powis interest. I am therefore disposed to recommend to Watkin to endeavour to pacify Lord Hereford by the assurance of his taking no part against him, and to satisfy Lady Clive by assuring her that he had directed his agent to take no part in the borough election. This is not good, but I see nothing better to be done. I am, however, much afraid that the Welsh fever of Watkin's friends will hardly make even this course acceptable to his old connections with Lord Hereford.

“I still hear the 28th or 29th named for dissolution; I shall scarcely leave London much before that time; but whenever I do my first step will be to Dropmore.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1802, July 1. Althorp.]—“I cannot help thinking that it would be desirable for you to see Windham, and to converse with him in such manner as you may deem most prudent.

Knowing as he does of your residence upon the sea coast, and expressing as he did to me some impatience and curiosity to hear the result, any longer delay of communication might appear to him to be more than accidental. It is likewise probable that Canning may, when he returns to his neighbourhood, say something to him which he would rather have expected to have heard from you ; and, farther, some suggestions of the present possibilities may lead W[indham] to give, if he can, a better direction to his friend Cobbett's Saturdays.

“ You would find Windham by a line to Binfield, or by a letter to Pall Mall, but I am pretty sure he is at Binfield.”

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, July 8. Stowe.—“ My election took place at Buckingham yesterday, and on the same day the melancholy Barnard was defeated at Aylesbury, an election in which I believe nobody else could have failed with the same means of success ; but to be a good electioneerer is not the fate of all men, and to fail in that talent is not to incur any very severe censure. I am glad to find that my brother has taken no declared or personal part in it beyond the expression of his good wishes, and such assistance as he could naturally furnish, so that to him there is at least no personal disappointment. You will have heard of the Jacobin triumph at Norwich. Windham speaks vaguely to my brother of the possible chance of the county for him, but I consider that suggestion as having no solid ground, and therefore am glad that he has found refuge in the peaceable port of St. Mawes where his constituents though less numerous will, however, be less troublesome. The election there most probably took place yesterday.

“ Lord Temple's election takes place on Tuesday next ; I therefore shall pass Sunday and Monday at Wotton, and shall fly from thence to Dropmore on Tuesday morning in order to escape that celebrity, and the quarter sessions which take place on Thursday and Friday ; but Lord Buckingham returns on Friday night to Wotton where I have promised to return to him, and have encouraged him to believe that you will ride back with me on Friday evening or Saturday morning, that we may pass a few days comfortably together in the old nest. Pray do not disappoint this project. I shall see you on Tuesday at Dropmore, but I write now to give you previous notice and to prevent your engaging yourself for Saturday.”

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, July 8. Park Place.—“ I returned to town yesterday, and shall remain in its neighbourhood for a week or ten days, before I go back to Walmer. As I shall probably not move

from thence till late in the year, I wish much to pass a couple of days with you before I go thither, and shall be happy to come to you at Dropmore either on Wednesday or any later day next week, if you have no engagement to make it inconvenient to you."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, July 12. Stowe.—“The letter which I enclose to you from Coutts will explain itself; be so good as to return it to me. I have written to assure him, with Lord Buckingham’s concurrence, that neither of us are likely to attribute bad principles to him because he got 10 or 12 votes for his daughter’s husband; I have told him that though I should not have voted for Sir F. Burdett, I thought it very natural that he should, particularly with the motives which he describes for his wishing to see Sir Francis in Parliament. Lord Buckingham will write him a word, and it would be kind to him if you would do so too. I think it is childish in Lord Hawkesbury to have taken this step; Coutts is no Jacobin, but if the government announce him as such, they do all that in them is to make him so; he is not young, and he is sick, and he is very susceptible upon these subjects, so that a kind word from you will do him good.

“Here we are still with ‘hey ho! the wind and the rain.’ My brother is got quite well, and we wait only for the sun that never shines and for the new moon that is to make him shine, to begin out course to Warwick castle; but as we insist upon a solid promise of fair weather before we stir, we cannot at soonest quit Stowe before Thursday or Friday next, and I have written to Charlotte to desire her to come here, as the only possible security for her knowing any thing positively of our uncertain steps.”

GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, July 14. Downing Street.—“A very short time after I had last the honour to speak to your Lordship on the subject of the secret service account I accidentally met Mr. Deare, who informed me that, on examining the warrants for money issued on account of secret service, he entertained no doubt that the Commissioners for auditing the public accounts had no authority to take cognizance of your Lordship’s secret service account, and he therefore presumed that you would have no further trouble upon the business. To my great surprise however on Friday I received the letter from Mr. Deare which I now inclose. On Monday I called upon that gentleman, and had a long conversation with him. He informed that his opinion, in which Mr. Cobbe (the other

Inspector General) coincided, remained as I have before mentioned, but it had been overruled by the Commissioners. We then entered into a discussion of the articles described in his letter as objects of surcharge or 'as requiring farther attention.' With respect to query No. 25, Mr. Deare suggested that the only expeditious and feasible mode of settling the difficulties respecting the fees would be for your Lordship to present a memorial to the Lords of the Treasury reciting—that the Commissioners for auditing the public accounts had transmitted to you a statement of your secret service accounts in which they had charged you with the *gross* sum issued from the Exchequer, but that you could not give an account of any other than the *nett* sum which you actually received; and that the difference between the *gross* and the *nett* sums arose from fees, chargeable at the Exchequer and Treasury, of which fees, for the reasons assigned in your former answer to the 25 query (I enclose a duplicate of the answer) it was impossible for you to furnish any account; and therefore praying that the Lords of the Treasury would direct and instruct the Commissioners for auditing the public accounts to pass your account for secret service money, and to insert in their return to the Treasury a disallowance of 22,049*l.* 17*s.* 5½*d.* the difference between the *gross* sum issued at the Exchequer and the *nett* sum received by you. A return to this effect would be a complete discharge to your Lordship, and Mr. Deare informs me that, in case of difficulties, it is a very common procedure for the Treasury to authorize such disallowances. Query No. 32 relates to the sum of 100*l.* stolen out of the desk of the messenger at the Exchequer. In my former answer to this query, I enclosed the oath of the messenger that this sum was actually so stolen, but as this has not appeared to be satisfactory, the request of a farther disallowance for this sum might be inserted in the memorial to the Lords of the Treasury. I also beg leave to suggest to your Lordship whether it might not be proper for you to desire the Lords of the Treasury to disallow out of the balance in my hand the sum of 500*l.* expended by you, or Sir James Burgess, in the year 1793, for which no receipt has hitherto been found. Your Lordship's draft for this sum still remains in my hands.

“With respect to Queries 33 and 34, I presume that there will be no difficulty.

“On the subject of the 3rd and 6th articles, I have proposed to Mr. Deare (who assures me that this mode will be perfectly satisfactory) that Sir James Burgess and Mr. Frere should not take any new oath, but should each give your Lordship a new receipt stating respectively that during the period (designating that period precisely) in which they acted as Under Secretaries to your Lordship, they had received the sums with which they are charged.

“If your Lordship should approve of this suggestion of

presenting a memorial to the Lords of the Treasury to the effect above mentioned, I should be much obliged to your Lordship if you would have the goodness to send it to me before the 31st of this month, as, upon that day, I intend going with my family to Eastbourne for five or six weeks."

LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE HAMMOND.

1802, July 16. Dropmore.—"I have received your letter with the inclosures, and I lose no time in transmitting to you a letter to the Treasury on the subject to which it relates.

"With respect to the competence of the Commissioners to examine and pass these accounts, you must, I am sure, remember that, instead of wishing to dispute it, my desire has always been to take every step on my part that could tend to remove difficulties, and to bring the account under their audit. I have therefore no remark to make as to the difference of opinion between them and their inspectors on this point, or as to the grounds of their decision upon it.

"The extreme rudeness of their stile and manner could not but strike me on the first perusal of the paper which you have received from Mr. Deare; but I suppose they imagine this to be a way of paying court to their superiors, and I therefore do not think it worth my while to bestow a second thought upon it.

"My only solicitude has been in drawing the letter which I inclose to you, to mark in the clearest manner that I am making a claim of justice and not an application for favour; and I most earnestly intreat you to keep this constantly in your view in any further explanation which you may be called upon to give on this subject. There is nothing to which I would not submit rather than to put myself in the situation of soliciting from the Treasury relief or assistance in passing an account of public money.

"When you return from the sea you will make us very happy by passing a day or two here if you can.

"I will request you to have the copies made for the Treasury of the papers to accompany my letter; the originals you will of course carefully preserve, and I will thank you, at your leisure, to have a full copy made of the whole for my use.

"You will have the goodness to write to Sir J. Burges and Frere, transmitting to them the observations of the Commissioners as to No. 3 and 6, and the form of oath or receipt required by them. It is best to do it in the mode the Commissioners point out, as their mode of transacting business appears not to be at all conformable to Mr. Deare's opinions.

"It will, I think, be necessary to extract for the Treasury only those parts of your correspondence with the Commissioners which relate to the points mentioned in my letter. The business will thus appear in a clearer shape than if you added any other matter." *Copy.*

## GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, July 22. Downing Street.—“I had the honour to receive your letter of the 16th by Mr. Fisher on Saturday afternoon, and on Monday morning I sent to the Treasury your Lordship’s letter to Mr. Vansittart, with the papers to which it refers. I have not yet received any intimation upon the subject of it from Mr. Vansittart or from any other quarter ; but your Lordship may be assured that, in any future explanations which I may be called upon to give, I shall most carefully attend to the clear distinction which your Lordship has desired me to keep in view. Indeed I can say with truth that I have never for a moment lost sight of it, as after every conversation which I have had upon this subject with Mr. Deare or the Commissioners, my impression has uniformly been that I had manifested more warmth and indignation than the occasion would perhaps justify.

“I have received a letter from Sir James Burges (in answer to one that I sent to him at Tunbridge) in which he informs me that he shall be in town in the course of a few days and will make a new affidavit in the form which (if they still consider it necessary) the Commissioners may prescribe.

“As Frere is abroad, and as his affidavit must be sworn to before a Baron of the Exchequer, I see no other mode of removing the difficulty with respect to him than that of his signing a receipt to the effect which I mentioned in my last letter.

“I think I shall be able to settle Sir William Hamilton’s business without any further expence to your Lordship. The bills which have remained unpaid are the usual quarterly bills of extraordinaries allowed to all foreign Ministers, which Sir William’s agent omitted for several quarters to lay before you for signature.”

## GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, August 1. Eastbourn.—“I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship a letter with its inclosure which I have this morning received from Mr. Deare.

“The money was paid by Sir James Bland Burges to Mr. Gregory, and the receipt which he represents to have given to me was in lieu of one given by his brother to Sir J. B. Burges. I am entirely ignorant of the service performed by Mr. Gregory, but I can easily infer, even from his own representation, that it was of a secret nature. If, however, your Lordship be of a different opinion, the receipt can be withdrawn, and the secret service fund reimbursed by an application to the Treasury for 700*l.* expended by Mr. Gregory.

“At all events this spirit of impertinent investigation on the part of the Commissioners for auditing the public

accounts must, I hope, be soon checked by a very high hand, or there is no calculating the mischief which it may produce.

“It was my intention to have answered this letter myself, but being anxious to have your Lordship’s sanction in every step which I may be compelled to take in this business, I have thought it right previously to learn your Lordship’s sentiments as to the mode and spirit in which Mr. Deare’s letter should be answered. My own impression was to have stated to Mr. Deare my astonishment at the conduct of the Commissioners in assuming the right of deciding on what is secret service and what is not; and that before I can so far violate the trust reposed in me by my situation, as to enter into any explanation which may betray official secrets, I have a right to enquire on what authority they claim the privilege of making the requisition contained in Mr. Deare’s letter. If however it be proper in the Commissioners to make this requisition, I would have observed to them that, in the event of Mr. Gregory’s having been employed on a secret mission, his travelling expenses would necessarily have been defrayed out of the secret service fund; and that if the Commissioners had read Mr. Gregory’s letter with attention they would have perceived that, although the receipt was given to me, the money did not pass through my hands; as it was paid to Mr. Gregory’s brother in the year 1791, at which time I was not Under Secretary of State. If however your Lordship will have the goodness to return Mr. Deare’s letter to me, and inform me, by letter addressed to me at this place (where I arrived last night and hope to remain four or five weeks) in what manner I should reply to Mr. Deare, I will most scrupulously obey your direction.

“Mr. Gregory’s conduct in answering Mr. Deare’s letter without previous communication with Sir J. Burges or myself appears to me extremely culpable.”

#### GEORGE HAMMOND TO WILLIAM GREGORY.

1802, August 5. Eastbourne.—“In consequence of a letter received from you by the Commissioners of Public Accounts, a copy of which has been transmitted by them to me, I am to request that you will furnish to me for Lord Grenville’s information a statement of the application of the sum of 700*l.* there mentioned, in order that his Lordship may be enabled to judge with greater certainty whether the said sum ought to be included in his account of secret service money; or whether the same ought to be accounted for by you under any other head; or, lastly, whether application should be made to the Treasury to allow the same as money expended by you on His Majesty’s service.” *Draft by Lord Grenville.*

## GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, August 8. Eastbourne.—“ I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship a letter which I have received this morning from Mr. Gregory. It does not appear to throw much new light upon the business, but I am now convinced that the money must have been paid to him on account of secret services.

“ The Commissioners for auditing the public accounts have required the Duke of Portland and Lord Hawkesbury to give in a statement of their secret service account ; but as the former conceives they have no right to make this requisition, and has desired the opinion of the Crown lawyers to be taken upon the subject, Lord Hawkesbury intends to delay giving any answer to the Commissioners until that opinion shall be received.”

*Enclosure.*

## WILLIAM GREGORY to GEORGE HAMMOND.

1802, August 7. London.—“ In reply to the request you make to me in your letter of the 5th instant, I have the honour to state to you that the 700*l.* received for my account by my agent in 1791 at the Treasury, were paid to me, partly in reimbursement of the expenses attending the execution of a commission in Portugal and Spain in the year 1790, and partly in remuneration for my time and trouble in the execution of that commission. I was charged with the commission directly by Mr. Pitt ; and the correspondence relative to it was conducted, while I remained abroad, through my relation Mark Gregory, who was then in personal communication with Mr. Pitt, but who is since dead ; and on my return to London in April 1791, I was referred to Mr. Long of the Treasury who, I presume, settled the account (the amount of which was received after I had again left England) under the directions that he received from the proper authority.

“ The difficulty which has arisen respecting this article of disbursement in my Lord Grenville’s account, must, I conceive, have resulted from the circumstances of the transaction having occurred under the administration of his Grace the Duke of Leeds as Secretary of State in the Foreign Department, and the money having been directed to be paid soon after my Lord Grenville succeeded his Grace in that department, by which means his Lordship had little or no cognisance of the transaction itself, and consequently no circumstantial traces of it have remained in his Lordship’s recollection. If any other elucidation within my power be required to settle this business with the necessary regularity, I shall readily give it.”

## GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, August 15. Eastbourne.—“I have the honour to inclose to your Lordship the copy of your letter to Mr. Gregory, and also the copy of the letter which, by your Lordship’s desire I sent to him on the 5th instant.\*

“The original of the former I send to him by this post under cover to Mr. Broughton who is acquainted with his address. I desired King before I left town, to furnish me with a copy of the report of the crown-lawyers on the Duke of Portland’s representation, and as soon as I shall receive it I will transmit it to your Lordship.

“This place is far the pleasantest sea-bathing place at which I have ever been. The houses are few in number, and as they are now generally occupied, there would be no probability of engaging a suitable house for your Lordship at present; but I should imagine that in the course of two or three weeks the probability would be greater.

“If I can be of any use to your Lordship in this respect, I beg leave to offer my services. As your Lordship may never have been on this part of the coast, I think it right to inform you that this place is divided into Eastbourn, at the distance of a mile and a half from the sea; Southbourn, three quarters of a mile from the sea, and the Sea-houses which are upon the beach.

“I am ignorant of the rent of houses at the former place; but at Southbourn they let for about five guineas by the week, and the Sea-houses are let from six to eight guineas by the week. I have one of the latter, for which I pay seven guineas, and which, as I understand, is one of the most comfortable houses here. It consists of a parlour, drawing-room and three good bed rooms, one of which could be converted into a second parlour. The accommodations for servants are very good. My family will remain in it till about the first week in October. If that season should not be too late for your Lordship I could secure it for you from the time of my family quitting it. Linen, glasses, and other necessaries are provided by the owners of the houses.

“I think that your Lordship would be pleased with this place, as the bathing is remarkably good, and the rides and walks are delightful.”

*Enclosure.*

## LORD GRENVILLE to WILLIAM GREGORY.

1802, August 12. Dropmore.—“I have received from Mr. Hammond your letter to him of the 7th instant.

“Before I can take upon me to swear that the sum in question was paid to you for the performance of a secret service, it is

absolutely necessary that I should be satisfied what was the particular nature and object of the commission for the reimbursement and remuneration of which it was to be applied.

“The money appears to have been paid to you in 1791 by my directions out of the secret service fund. I have therefore no doubt that it was then understood by me that it was to be applied for purposes of that description, and (if I mistake not) I have a pretty clear recollection of what those purposes were. I should certainly consider that a due compensation of your expence, and a reasonable reward for your diligence and labour in the discharge of any commission of a *secret nature* would fall correctly and strictly under the description of Secret Service. If therefore by *fully* explaining to me what was the nature and object of the commission in which you was so employed and remunerated you should satisfy me that the same was (as I think that I recollect that it was) of a secret nature, I shall have no difficulty in swearing positively, as I could now swear to the best of my recollection, that the money in question was paid to you for a secret service. And if you, on your part, know that such was the destination and application of this payment, I can see no difficulty in your taking an oath to that effect.

“But if you neither feel yourself justified in taking that oath, nor explain to me the particulars of the transaction in such a manner as, by bringing it fully to my recollection, can alone enable me to charge myself with it, I must in that case content myself with referring the Commissioners of Accounts to your receipt, as being under the express terms of the Act of Parliament a full and ample discharge for myself, and I must leave you to account to Government for the application of the sum, in such manner as the Lords of the Treasury may direct, or as you may be required by law to do.” *Copy.*

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, August 21. Wynnstay.—“You, who know from the recollection of your last year’s excursion how difficult it is to find under such circumstances one writing hour in the whole twenty-four, will not wonder that so many days should have elapsed between my receiving your letter, and my answering it. My brother and I arrived prosperously at Birmingham, and my first care was to visit Mr. Eggington who showed to us the drawing which you had sent of the Wotton window. The shape of it appears to me to be very light and rich, the arms well disposed, and (with one or two exceptions of the different neighbouring compartments being of one and the same yellow) the colours appear to harmonise extremely well. As far therefore as the beauty of the design is to be considered, I should be very well disposed, with one or two very slight alterations, to think that the effect of it would be extremely

good wherever there was space enough for the fair execution of it. Unluckily you have not taken with you *memoranda* enough of the very limited scope which can be allowed in the Wotton chancel window to your heraldic exhibitions; and upon applying your design to the proportions such as they really exist, it is obvious that all the art of Egginton cannot find room enough for the seven isles of the Durham drawing; and he himself is clearly of opinion with us that, though the design of the drawing is extremely pretty, it cannot be made applicable to so confined a space, the partitions of the seven isles alone taking up a very considerable portion of what must be given to the light of the window. In addition to this, my brother remarks that the walls of the chancel must be rebuilt to admit such a window, and that, besides the expense attending such an operation, the execution of the stone work (for Egginton says the frame must be of stone) is far beyond the skill of any country mason, and would therefore demand the additional cost of London workmen being sent down for the building. These objections appear to me to be insurmountable as to the execution of the plan which you sent, and Egginton has undertaken to describe these objections more at large to you, and to send to you a sketch of a more simple project which seemed to all three of us to be much more applicable to the spot than the rich and extensive design which you had drawn. The object of this proposition is to make the chancel window accord with the old chapel window, and to insert in those divisions the arms of my father and mother and the seven children in best taste in which Mr. Egginton can place them. A slight sketch which he drew seemed to be very unobjectionable, and he promised to employ himself for some days in the arrangement of it, and, when he had satisfied himself about it, to send on to you a drawing of it coloured according to his own ideas. Thus, therefore, I have been content to leave the matter for the present, and the rather because, in the first place, I see my brother is very desirous of some such idea being adopted, and there is ample time for discussion, as nothing can be done till the possession of the chancel is actually secured to the owner of Wotton. For my own part I shall be well content with almost any plan that can be proposed, being much more solicitous to see the thing done, than to criticise or object to the different shapes in which it may be done. In the meantime you will be glad to hear that my brother is so pleased with our Birmingham artist that he has given him large orders for the windows, and he is to go to Wotton to see the church in order to insure the better execution of the designs, so that you will have the advantage of Egginton's advice after that he shall have examined both chancel and chapel with his own eyes.

“Our tour hitherto has been very prosperous, my brother continuing in good health and spirits, and the weather uninterruptedly fine, although in this moment it begins to look

a little threatening. We go to Bangor on Friday next, and after a week's stay there and perhaps at Beaumaris, if the season continues favourable we shall return by Hafod, Dinevor, Swansea, Tintern Abbey, Hampton Court, and find ourselves at Stowe about the 16th September for my brother's yeomen ; if it rains and blows upon us we shall come home sooner. I could almost have wished for Elizabeth and for you that you had taken for your autumnal bathing a southern coast instead of one as much to the north-east as Ramsgate ; yet Charlotte tells me that Elizabeth will probably move to Bognor after Margate. Some how or other I hope to meet you at my return, though if Parliament does not meet till after Christmas, I may perhaps go to Yorkshire in October, if I can take courage enough for such a northern expedition in the end of the year ; but all this is *adhuc in nubibus*.

“ I had a letter two days ago from Lord Carlisle pressing earnestly that we shall have some explicit communication, and urging the absolute necessity of distinct and decisive determinations before the business of the session begins. If I go there, I can talk with him upon the matter ; for the present I have written to say that I agree with him in thinking such an explicit course very desirable and even very necessary, but that I had some doubts whether it would be very easy to obtain that information which we must all equally wish to be possessed of. I told him that our difficulties seemed to be very much increased by the extraordinary situation of the public mind, which seemed to distrust the capacity of the present ministers without any anxiety to change them, and to be governed by their fears of the power of France without showing any disposition to resist the daily and hourly increase of it ; but I added that we live in times so fertile of events that, without being very sanguine, it was probable enough that between this time and the end of January we might better see what could be done than I knew how to hope for under all the actual difficulties of the present moment. In truth I do entertain great doubts as to any good being done in the present state of the public mind, though at the same time I feel entirely persuaded that this state cannot continue. If I was to believe my Welsh intelligence it cannot be long before there will be a very material change ; for Mr. Cholmondeley of Vale Royal told me that he had just received a letter from his dear friend Lord Belgrave who assured him that he knew that it would be difficult if not impossible to *persuade* Mr. Addington to *retain* his situation. What this new affectation of our new minister is I do not pretend to understand ; but nonsensical as it sounds, it is rather curious when one recollects the intimate footing upon which Lord Belgrave always stands with Addington ; yet I apprehend that it amounts only to an indirect puff of the minister to attribute to him this *nolo episcopari*, of which I have not heard till I found it upon these Welsh mountains. I am told that Sir W. Scott has spoken

pretty loudly of the mismanagement of administration in the general election ; he will probably go on to carp at them and at those who oppose them."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, September 6. Wynnstay.—“ Just returned from the Carnarvonshire mountains I find here your letter of 30 August. We are now advancing fast on our road to Stowe, where we expect to arrive on Tuesday the 10th, in order that my brother may meet his yeomen on Monday the 16th. My original intention was to have gone to Dropmore on that day, but as I guess from your letter that it is possible that you also may be wheeling to the right and left, I should in that case probably go to Wimbledon if the Spencers are there, and come back to you after your visit to Walmer. I do not much like Margate or Ramsgate, but if I find that the Carysforts are on the Sussex coast, I should in that case perhaps go and pass a few days with them ; but at all events I should be glad to find a letter at Stowe on Friday to tell me decidedly as to your yeomanry ; meantime I enclose to you a buck warrant which will be good till the 26th September when the season ends. I hope to see you so soon that I will not prolong this letter by any political remarks ; certainly in the present posture of affairs I do not see any credit or advantage to be got by active opposition. At the same time, I do think that while the government writers are daily endeavouring to lower our credit by imputing to us projects of eternal war, if those imputations are not repelled successfully by us, they will at last, by alienating the public mind from us, prevent us from being able to do what little good we otherwise might. It therefore seems to me to be highly desirable that there should be an attendance in parliament to do justice to ourselves by our own language, and to do justice to the country by animadverting upon the total incapacity of our ministers to conduct the government even upon the disgraceful system which they themselves have adopted. This course seems to me highly desirable, but as I know how difficult it is to obtain from anybody parliamentary attendance without immediate and great political objects, I confess that what I recommend is rather what I wish than what I expect ; and although it is both easy and necessary for us to prevent our names being used as synonymous terms for war, and although it is equally easy without referring to war or peace to point out the daily domestic blunders of our incapable ministers, I own I think it probable that we shall all incline to the idle and popular system of *laissez faire*, till some pressing call shall arise out of the strange state in which things now stand.’

## THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, September 19. Althorp.—“Having some business which will soon call me to town, I think that I shall manage more conveniently to go directly there from hence, rather than from Dropmore; this will of course delay my seeing you for some days, although, as I hope, not for many; I will write to you from Charles Street as soon as I can finally decide about it.

“Lord Spencer’s letters of to-day from Wimbledon mention that Farqhar had told Lady S[pencher] that Pitt was again quite well, and she adds that his going from London was only by mistake of Pitt’s servant, who had been ordered to ride over to Margate where Pitt had fancied Sir Walter was, and the servant’s zeal was such as to pursue the doctor to London much against his master’s intention. I hear no other news.

“My brother will take care of your justices as soon as he can, and has no apprehension that you can have anything to fear from the wanderings of the Grand Junction Canal.”

## The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, September 26.—“I have reason to know that the king has been seriously uneasy on the score of Mr. Pitt’s state of health, foreseeing that his death must displace Mr. Addington, and I know that he expressed at the same time his full conviction that *Mr. Pitt never would resume his office*. He told the same person that the Catholic question was not the real ground of Mr. Pitt’s resignation, but ‘that he could not carry on the war, and could not bring his mind to make the peace;’ I find that Hildesheim and the German *et ceteras* have severely indisposed him to his ministers, and that, by name, he blames Lord St. Helens ‘who gave no information whatever of the Russian understanding with France, and Mr. Addington who has so incautiously committed himself against all continental connexions.’ These are little indexes to the thermometer of his feelings, but in truth they lead to nothing.

“I find the popular cry against the *English Privy Council* of the Consul extremely strong; and the conduct of Mr. Fox really is inexplicable, as I cannot yet persuade myself that he means all that Mr. Cobbett imputes to him; and yet it seems impossible to account for all this flirtation on any other principle. At all events this new standard of opposition puts us, if possible, at a greater distance from them.”

## W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, October 3. Walmer Castle.—“I have heard nothing of the excursion to the sea coast, which you talked of before we parted. The season is now so far advanced that if you

still intend it you have not much time to spare, but at present it has everything to recommend it, and I should be extremely happy to find that you had fixed on any part of the coast which might give me a chance of seeing you here. I shall remain here to the end of this month, when, out of precaution, I shall go for a few weeks to Bath, which I believe is more likely than any thing else to establish the health I have now regained. If any change of your plan should prevent our meeting here in the interval, I shall endeavour to call at Dropmore in my way to Bath. I say nothing on all the events which are passing on the Continent. They lead to considerations much too large for a letter, but which I should wish much to be able to talk over with you."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, October 14, Charles Street.—“The distant period to which our meeting at Brighton had been deferred by your present arrangement, had already made it necessary for me to put by the notion of keeping lodgings there for so long and useless an interval; and I had therefore already written to surrender up my Brighton mansion when a letter which Lady Camelford was so good as to send to me, relieved me from all difficulty on that score by telling me that the place is still so crowded as to make it impossible to find even the two rooms which I asked for. Under these circumstances therefore, not forgetting the absence of Lord Egremont which I hear is to last three weeks, I think I have not heart enough left to look at any coast or coasting excursion, and that the extent of my absence from London will not exceed a visit to Audley End, till you come back to Dropmore. Lord Carysfort has agreed to meet me at Lord Braybroke's to-morrow se'night, and if the weather is fine, we shall pass five or six days there together. I do not hear more of news in London than I did near Beaconsfield; but I am told that the non-evacuation of Malta continues to affect the stocks; and all that I hear of our ministers is lamentation for their incapacity both for peace and war.”

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, October 22. Stowe.—“Your letter had been opened at the Post Office, though in such a way as not to enable me to prove that it had been opened and resealed. I mention this that I may not be supposed to have quoted any of the opinions contained in it. And as it is possible that this may undergo for the same reasons the same examination, I will only say that I am utterly incredulous as to any idea of a war, for I am persuaded that whatever may have been the causes (and there may be many) that have led to angry discussions with

Bonaparte, there is no humiliation and no expedient for the moment, however weak or unsafe, to which the ministers will not submit, rather than risk the war ; and in truth I feel this country and its means so much put down by the peace, that I am half inclined to believe that the *manus tendamus inermes* is the only alternative left to us, if France will be contented to manage the little remains of English spirit left amongst us, by bringing us to the bridle by more gentle degrees.

“To us indeed, all that has arisen and all that may arise is not unexpected ; and it is as little matter of surprise, that others are coming fast round to our ideas ; but this triumph is matter of no consolation to me, nor do I envy those, whoever they may be, who are to undertake to repair the mischief already done. As to the continuance in office of these wretched shadows, it seems (whether peace or war) impossible that they should continue ; and in either contingency, my first object, most certainly, that Mr. Pitt should resume his office. *But I verily think that even in his hands the game is lost.*

“I have just heard from George Nugent, dated September 6. The accounts from St. Domingo are full of disasters. The troops from various causes nearly dead or dying ; only 4,800 men fit for duty. The black troops very mutinous and disorderly ; and the white inhabitants dying by hundreds in the towns, to which they are confined by the savage desolation spread through the country not only by the black insurgents, but by Christophe’s blacks, who rob, burn, and murder just as much as the others. Add to all this that their navy, from first to last, are impeding Leclerc in all his objects, with most avowed hostility to Bonaparte. His letter is too long to transcribe ; but the result of it is, that he considers St. Domingo lost, unless 12,000 men at least are sent out to secure it.

“As to your idea of meeting at Dropmore a few days before the 22nd, I shall have great pleasure in such a plan ; but I think for very many reasons we had better transfer our meeting to Pall Mall, where I will come *en garçon*, and will give you bed (including Lady Grenville if she accompanies you) as it probably will be expedient that we should see *others* before we finally decide upon our language. I can foresee much advantage that may arise from *communications*, which I will not state for the amusement of Lord Auckland.”

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, October 22, Charles Street.—“I was much gratified in receiving from you so full and so interesting a communication at a moment when so many circumstances had occurred to make me very anxious to hear from you. If I was a little disappointed in your medical bulletin, which falls a little short of what we had been taught to expect, I was on the other hand very agreeably surprised to find that the change which

had taken place in the language and opinions of your invalid had so much outstripped the improvement of his bodily health ; that change, as far as I can collect, appears to me to be of a very important and promising description. If the present step has been indeed taken without any previous communication with Pitt, if he is unshackled by any obligation or disposition either to defend the improvident and unconnected baseness of this measure, or to vindicate the new disgrace which it's failure is likely to bring upon us, if his own opinions are decidedly in favour of our retaining at all events the two great points in question, and if he is fairly determined to announce those to be his sentiments and to support them as such with the fair weight of his talents and influence, I do really incline to think that almost every thing which could be desired in his instance appears to be already gained. I say almost every thing, because I fancy that I see in your letter a stronger sense of the only thing wanting than I can believe will be found wanting in fact and in practice, however it may seem to be so in previous discussion. I can perfectly understand and approve with you in theory the delicacy of not appearing to be contending for power, and admit, if you please (though that is going a great way), that a demand on the part of the public seems almost necessary to furnish the means of making that new power useful ; but yet, giving to this consideration all it's due force, I do not think any such consideration can practically stand in the way of the natural course of proceeding in this business. If the general course of your friend's sentiments is as strongly marked as you describe them to be, if he really does think upon the two essential points which you mention, that in all cases and at all events those two points must be directly and openly insisted upon, and that not to do so would be to destroy the safety and the interests of the country, if such and so strong in his sense of the importance of these measures, he will and must feel it his duty to pursue them, and he will not suffer himself to be diverted or deterred from doing a duty of such high import, because he will read in some newspaper paragraphs that by maintaining those opinions he is only paving the way for his return to power. You see that I am all this while begging the question in supposing that these are measures which cannot be supported by the present ministers, and I own that, though I have no information upon that subject, I think what we have seen of their administration fully justifies me in begging that question. But even supposing that this speculation is unfounded, and that the equinoctial winds have blown into them a new character of vigour, activity and combination, yet still as I am convinced those winds have not wafted hither any new confidence to the country at large in their present ministers ; as, on the contrary, every mouth is full of despair and despondency at their utter incapacity, their new courage, if they have any, will turn to no warlike account ; for to see

them carry on the war, if war we are to have, is what, I do verily believe, the country will not bear to see. Upon the whole then, as, on the one hand, I cannot believe that the sentiments which you describe are such as your friend can, out of delicacy to himself, allow himself not to assert and to urge, because they are of too large a consequence to bear any such personal managements, on the other hand I do not think that the sort of points to which such personal management or such delicacy should apply, are likely to be of real weight, in the very critical position in which the country seems now to be placed. His line being once announced upon the great topics which you mention, if he stirs not one step beyond his bare duty in supporting that line, I still incline to think he will have done enough. What does not depend upon *him* is indeed a very different consideration. Of that and of the other interesting parts of your letter I am no less anxious than you can be that we should converse, and wait only to hear of your arrival at Dropmore to go there."

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, October 28. Charles Street.—"I am this moment returned to town. I will endeavour to be with you tomorrow, if I can get a little business that I have here to be finished early enough for me to set forth. If I should be detained to-morrow morning I will, at all events, be with you on Saturday to dinner.

"As I am to see you so soon I will not advert to your last letter more than by observing that the error which you correct in my version of your first, makes a very important difference in the state of things, and may lead to a result very different from that which seemed to belong to your first narrative as I interpreted it.

"Lord S[pencer] intended to pass from Norfolk directly across to Althorp about this time, so that I fear all immediate communication with him of any near access will be difficult; yet it is perhaps neither prudent nor possible to discuss these points with him by letters. I will however write to him to see what facilities he offers as to our meeting. A letter which I received from my brother the day before yesterday leads me to expect and hope that we shall have him at Dropmore. I write a line to him to-night to tell him that I shall be with you either to-morrow or the next day at furthest."

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, November 1. Stowe.—"When I came here yesterday I was a good deal disturbed to find my brother in some degree of confinement on account of his leg; a very slight pressure

of rubbing one leg against the other had broken the skin of the old wound, and he is obliged to have recourse to a plaster and to a horizontal posture to prevent the inflammation which would arise if he dropped his foot to the ground. I do not understand that there is any actual unpleasant appearance, and my brother speaks very slightly of it himself, but there is something quite dispiriting to me in the frequency of these returns, which show a state of body so prompt to create the alarm and apprehension of mischief.

“Upon the subject which has occupied our time entirely since I have been here, I have persuaded him to write to you himself, and therefore I do not enter into much detail about the present disposition of his mind which you will best see from his own pen, and hear, as I trust, from his own mouth; for, in truth, with all the disposition in the world to save you the inconvenience of moving, I cannot but think it indispensibly necessary that we should talk this interesting subject over together; and, as my brother is utterly unable to move, I should hope that you will agree to his wish of seeing you here on Saturday and Sunday next. I shall by that time, or rather by Friday, have returned from Althorp, and shall be able to tell you what is the course of Lord Spencer’s opinions. Indeed I am not without hopes that I shall prevail upon him to ride over hither to meet you, which is another motive for me to wish at all events that you would give Saturday and Sunday to Stowe. Of course I should wish to know your determination and therefore will desire my brother to forward to me to Althorp your answer.

“The general turn of my brother’s thoughts and reflections upon the communication which I made to him is certainly very unfavourable to the sort of arrangement which I repeated to him as having been discussed between Pitt and you. He dwells much, and perhaps not without reason, upon the danger of your suffering in public opinion by your consenting to sit in Cabinet with Addington and Lord Hawkesbury and Dundas; the two first of whom have been so often reproached by you with incapacity and error upon the same topics of war and peace which must continue to occupy the new Cabinet; and Dundas, whose abuse of your motives and conduct, make it impossible for the public to believe in any real cordiality between you and him, or indeed in any such agreement as is necessary to the good harmony of an administration. He thinks likewise that, in this situation, you would be put forward to stand the brunt of the unpopularity of renewed war, and that you would be seen fighting this battle in concert with all those who, having some of them made, and some approved, a ruinous peace, must either be considered as acting upon different principles from you, or as having obtained from you the sacrifice of those opinions which have been proved to be just and well founded. These dangers he considers as very much increased by the additional circumstance of the

compromise which seems likely to be required upon the Irish question, a compromise which he personally feels great difficulty if not the impossibility of giving himself to, his opinions being already so strongly committed to that object. With respect to Windham he agrees with us both in the absolute necessity of not suffering any indignity to be put upon him by the invidious preference of which we had talked. These being his general objections upon the first mention of the subject, he seems strongly of opinion that the most prudent and becoming and safe course for you would be to withhold yourself from an arrangement such as that which was discussed ; and I confess that my mind is not free from the impressions which act so forcibly upon his. The magnitude, however, and importance of the considerations which this question involves make me wish to avoid giving my hasty opinion, and the expectation which I have of seeing you here in the end of the week will give me the opportunity of more deliberate reflection than I have hitherto had upon the matter.

“I am going this moment to Althorp, and shall return on Friday. My intention is to make the same narrative precisely to Lord S[pencer] as I did to my brother, and to avoid, as I did with him, making any comment, or offering any judgment till I see what is the natural impression which the bare narrative makes upon his mind. I apprehend that he is likely to feel strongly the Irish question, and the disgrace of according with Addington and Hawkesbury.”

#### The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, November 1. Stowe.—“You will easily believe that my mind and every moment of my time has been most fully occupied by the very interesting communications which Tom has made to me from you, and upon which I am only prepared to offer to you the very crude and undigested reflections that have occurred to me, in the discussion with him of what I understood now to be the proposition floating in your mind, namely of assisting Mr. Pitt to form a Cabinet composed of Mr. Addington and Lord Hawkesbury, Mr. Dundas, Lord Spencer, Mr. Windham and yourself, with the addition of the Lord Chancellor, and of the Duke of Portland or some other person of that description from amongst the present ministers, or with some other not very material change. It seems difficult to ascertain correctly from the long details of your conversation with Mr. Pitt, how far you stand *engaged* to him, supposing Lord Spencer and Mr. Windham willing to accede to such an arrangement ; and under that uncertainty I feel some little awkwardness in giving you the first blush of my opinions ; and should have paused upon it if Tom had not urged me to state them to you immediately. You must therefore take them undigested and unarranged, but they will

at least occupy your thoughts so far as to enable you to satisfy my mind upon them when we meet, which, for the reasons given in Tom's letter which he has read to me, and which I enclose to you, I trust will be. I clearly understand the proposition to be, not that of forming an administration in the usual way, that is with *carte blanche* from the king, and with materials or rather persons acting in unison of opinions together ; but to be an arrangement of infinite difficulty, having for its object the placing Mr. Pitt at the head of government, notwithstanding his public and private *embarrassments* of every sort, and consequently with an imperious call for great sacrifice of whatever stands in the way of that object. The first sacrifice is that which I know you make, but for which no one will give you a moment's belief, namely, your own personal wishes for personal ease out of office. The next sacrifice is that of your own feelings when called upon to sit in a Cabinet with Mr. Addington and Lord Hawkesbury, to whose ignorance, imbecility, and deception on the public, as well as their criminal annihilation of the internal and external political strength of the country, you have imputed and must still more strongly continue to impute the present tremendous crisis. For this sacrifice the public will, I am persuaded, give you no credit ; but on the contrary that it will expose every member of such a government, but more particularly you, inasmuch as your language and sentiments have been more prominent on these points, to well grounded reproach of such a nature as to shake all public confidence in you most of all, but in every member of such a Cabinet. And when you add to the consideration of those political opinions that induced them to make such a peace, the particular opinions avowed by Mr. Addington in Parliament, and ostentatiously held out as the shibboleth of that party, of disclaiming all foreign alliances and interference with continental objects, let me ask you, what confidence can you expect *in your particular department* from those to whom you must immediately look for personal confidence in you for a different system. The next sacrifice as arising out of this plan is that of the indulgence to the Catholics *in Ireland*. You will remember how strongly you stated that measure as one from which you could not depart, in your valedictory speech in the House of Lords ; and you will remember the sort of manifesto printed by Lord Cornwallis and given to the heads of that party in the shape of a letter through him to them from Mr. Pitt. I do not now mean to go into all the history of that paper, or of your speech, and that of Mr. Pitt, of Lord Spencer, and Mr. Windham ; but I mean to recal your mind to the impression and belief of the public as to the *pledge* then given, and for which *pledge* that body felt themselves invited to forego any public measure that should distress the government, and to ask you, what you can expect save the bitterest reproach and the increased animosity of a body stung by disappointment, and very ill-disposed to

admit any explanation of expediency for postponing the performance of that to which they and I verily believe every one else conceives you personally pledged. And in truth, if I were inclined to admit the distinction which Tom tells me had passed across your mind, of considering this question coupled with the Union, and therefore one that might be put by without inconvenience to Ireland *now*, the union having rolled over our heads for two years ; let me ask you upon what grounds of expediency could you put it by in the moment of a new war, believing this measure, as you do, the most likely step for conciliating attachment and confidence to government in the most vulnerable point in our dominions.

“These are serious considerations to you. The profligate abandonment of political opinions which formerly used to bind public men, has for the last 20 years nearly annihilated all public confidence ; but, I thank God, the imputation has not reached you, and even with your opponents (as well new as old) those who differed with you on the peace gave you full credit for the consistency with which you maintained former opinions and lines of conduct. Consider how this is to apply to such a coalition with men thus publicly pledged to opinions so different from your own, and to a compromise or rather an abandonment (for so I have argued it) of your opinion upon a point of such importance as to have justified you (in your explanation in the House of Lords) in quitting the king’s service under all the circumstances of that moment for that very point. You will observe that I have said nothing yet on the question of your sitting in Cabinet with Mr. Dundas, for that proposition stands on different grounds from the question of Lord Hawkesbury and Mr. Addington. In the first place there is and must be a wide difference in comparative unfitness of sitting in Cabinet with the *makers* and with the *approvers* of the peace ; and certainly whatever guilt belongs to the measures that have during the summer weakened and disarmed the country, attaches upon the two former, and not upon Mr. Dundas. But I am free to own that personally I should in your situation feel perhaps more repugnance in the intercourse with him, than with the former ; and yet when I consider the influence and assistance which he brings to government, particularly in the Indian department, I should be satisfied that I gained my *quid* for the *quo* ; and therefore, though personally I dislike the man, and really think that much of the failure of the war in his department is fairly imputable to him, yet I should advise you in that instance to waive considerations that are merely personal, and not to think of making him the exception to the proposition of *re-establishing the old government*. That proposition would re-admit Mr. Dundas, but it would not apply to Mr. Addington or Lord Hawkesbury. I say nothing of the specified arrangement for Lord Hawkesbury, because I take for granted with you, that no preference of the sort to which my brother adverts in his letter, can be intended as against

Mr. Windham, if it is really meant to conciliate the co-operation of the former administration ; but it cannot escape your observation that the introduction of two persons into the Cabinet so distinctly in hostility with you as these two delinquents, supported in their jealousies and dislike of you by Mr. Dundas, Lord Chatham, and perhaps the Chancellor (from House of Lords jealousy) must inevitably sooner or later operate on the mind of Mr. Pitt ; more particularly when much of the same jealousies and dislikes, of the same persons, will apply to Mr. Windham, whose eagerness and want of management will probably give them grounds for working upon, which your prudence and your influence over Mr. Pitt's mind will enable you to parry in your own instance, though you may be equally committed by the same attack upon Mr. Windham.

“ You are likewise well to consider the *certainty* that this difference of opinion must break up the government whenever you are officially called upon to treat for peace, unless Mr. Pitt can make up his mind to remove Lord Hawkesbury and Mr. Addington at such a moment, which certainly is at least as doubtful as the king's consent to such a removal would be at that period. And, above all, you are to consider that your resumption of office claims for yourself and for Mr. Windham the entire responsibility of the war from all descriptions of people, for a period and for objects not defined, and consequently, according to common reasoning, for eternal war, unless you should be prepared to sacrifice your present opinions by signing a peace short of that which you shall deem secure or honourable. You will observe in this argument I do not dissuade you from incurring an honourable responsibility or risk ; but I urge you not to charge yourself and Mr. Windham (the two supposed advocates for war) with this impression for objects which, constituted as this Cabinet is proposed to be, must ultimately be disclaimed, certainly by those who have made, and probably by those who have approved the peace.

“ I must likewise observe to you that, believing the war inevitable, the concoction of such a Cabinet, even if it were not exceptionable in the points to which I have adverted, not only does not add to the strength of the old government, for it leaves no opening either for the talents or the influence of any one that might be a useful accession, such as of Mr. Grey, or of the non-efficient description of the Duke of Portland ; but it weakens the old government by the introduction of those seeds of discord that must inevitably tear the fabric in pieces. In a word, suppose yourself for a moment perfectly uninterested by feelings of any sort on the question of confidence to such a Ministry, whether from the public at home or from foreign powers, and I am sure that you would not entertain it for a moment.

“ After stating this, I must add that it is far from being clear to me that these sacrifices on your part, or that of our

friends, are at all necessary for placing Mr. Pitt at the head of government ; for though I do not mean to impute to him in the slightest degree any unfairness towards you, it is impossible not to observe that he stakes nothing upon his game compared with that which this arrangement requires from you. His *embarrassments* in removing Lord St. Vincent, Lord Pelham and Lord Hobart (none of them personally connected with him) will cost him nothing ; and although I am satisfied that he is much in earnest in wishing your support, and that of our friends in their respective offices, yet it is probable that he is prepared to go to the head of the Cabinet constituted as it now is, in all contingencies of the failure of this negociation ; being secure, as he now is by your explanation, that he will be supported in his war by us ; and I must remark that Mr. Canning's letter on which he is now employed, may, if Mr. Pitt should be obliged to disclaim and disavow it, ultimately make it impossible for him to refuse to take that step, even though your or Lord Spencer's opinion, which Mr. Canning cannot yet know, should completely put an end to the ideas of a cabinet such as were opened at Walmer.

“ Nor is it quite clear to me that a government thus formed by those who made the peace and supported it, would be in reality weakened by the non-accession to it of you, Lord Spencer, and Windham. I know how much they would lose of talents ; but I know and estimate very highly the value of union, and it is obvious that less clamour would arise against them than against you for sacrifice of opinion, or for that *war mania* which many sober persons, and all the disaffected persons, would fear or affect to fear from your counsels.

“ If however I am right in my persuasion that you will be deemed to have sacrificed much of your personal fame and credit, of your former opinions, of your predictions now justified by the events, of the measures to which you are pledged, by a compromise both with respect to measures and to the men with whom you are to act, and all for the love of office, to which all that you now do will be imputed, it is impossible for me not to pause upon your proposition.

“ I have intimated to you strongly my opinion that you should not shrink from an honourable risk and responsibility. I certainly felt that risk when I encouraged your opposition to the peace ; and I should now urge you to resume office with Mr. Pitt provided that the Cabinet was changed (I except the Chancellor) leaving, of course, to Mr. Pitt to settle his *embarrassments* by means of subordinate offices. The old government might then be resumed. The Home Department, vacated by the Duke of Portland's move to the Presidency of the Council, would be given to Windham, and the Secretary at War with the Cabinet might be offered to Mr. Grey, unless we could induce my brother Tom to take it. This you will observe even goes the length of preserving to Lord Westmoreland the Privy Seal, but my advice would be that Mr. Pitt should

dispose of it to some efficient purpose. In stating all this I do not urge it as anything that you can do, but rather offer it as a picture of what I would wish were done, though it cannot be done by you. I give you great credit for the management of different sorts that have led Mr. Pitt to all the avowals, and all the strong steps of communication that he has authorized. I expect much good from the whole of it, but I cannot think that the shape which you jointly have given to this proposition is likely to serve the public, or to contribute to the character or satisfaction of any party concerned in it. He must be judge of his *embarrassments*. That chapter is not new to me, for I foresaw it when you resigned ; and if no solution for them can occur but that which you have stated to my brother, I am inclined to think it better in every sense that they should be avoided altogether by leaving you and our friends out of his arrangements. Our course is then clear, distinct, and liable to no mistake or imputation.

“ I cannot help observing how much is assumed in all these transactions of the probable sentiments of the king, which at the same time cannot be reasonably judged of, without much more *certain grounds* than those which have been put forward. I do not dispute Canning’s information ; but I have strong reason for thinking that no disposition existed at a very late period for placing Mr. Pitt at the head of government ; still less do I imagine that any wish of this sort exists for replacing any of the old ministers ; and least of all do I imagine that he has any idea of removing Mr. Addington. And if no such *sure grounds* exist, though I think your communications with Mr. Pitt and your management of him invaluable to the purpose which ultimately must arise out of them, yet it is possible that they will not lead immediately to a change of ministry. In a word the whole is in Mr. Pitt’s hands ; he may go to the head of government tomorrow if he chooses it, or he may let things take their usual course, and may wait his moment to overthrow the old, and to form a new Ministry. *My opinion is that he will prefer the former.*”

“ But I am most anxious to talk over with you all that is best for your fair fame and honour. Tom has told you why I cannot move, and I think it highly useful that Lord Spencer and you should meet ; I therefore press you earnestly to send me back my groom with a very short note of one line in answer to this tedious letter, made more long and tedious by my anxiety for you. That line will, I trust, tell me that you will be here on Friday or Saturday for one day ; for as Tom returns from Althorp on Thursday evening or Friday, I wish you should know Lord Spencer’s opinion as soon as possible.

*Postscript.*—“ Surely, surely, if Mr. Pitt wishes union with you as heartily as I trust he does, some arrangement might be made for Tom in the Cabinet. I cannot say how mortified I should be at his exclusion.”

## PAPER GIVEN TO MR. CANNING.

1802, November 8.—“Supposing a new Government were in other respects to be arranged in such a shape as that we could hope to be of use by taking a share in it, we should feel as to the Catholic question a sincere desire to find, if possible, such a solution as might be satisfactory to his Majesty, and at the same time not inconsistent with the maintenance of our public characters.” *In Mr. Pitt's handwriting.*

## LORD GRENVILLE to W. PITT.

1802, November 8. Dropmore.—“In the hope of seeing you here on the 17th or 18th, I reserve till then the principal part of what I have to say to you on the present state of public affairs, as it results from the extraordinary events which have taken place, even since we parted. But in such a moment as the present I think myself bound not to keep you one day unnecessarily in ignorance of one circumstance which may materially influence your decisions and measures.

“Unless our present difficulties can be removed by some miracle, for nothing less could do it, I am confident that the public will not any longer bear with the imbecillity of the present Government. You know it has all along been my fixed opinion that, whenever this happens, a call will be made upon you such as you cannot decline; and that your own interest and honour as well as the public welfare are very deeply concerned that this call should be made before the mischiefs of the present management shall have become irretrievable.

“When we conversed on this subject at Walmer, I thought it possible that, with this view, such arrangements might be made before the opening of the session, as would enable those with whom I have been acting for the last twelve months to take their share with you (if you wished it) in carrying on a Government formed to meet the present exigency; and that we might content ourselves with looking to you alone for the maintenance of those principles in the discussion of which I had found that you and I completely agreed; and might therefore feel a considerable degree of indifference as to the other individuals (whoever they might be) whom you might wish to bring back into the Cabinet, or to retain there. But we were both of us aware how much the actual renewal of hostilities in Parliament, and that too under such circumstances as the present, must necessarily alter my situation, and that of my friends in this respect.

“This event seems now inevitable, considering that I am now writing to you on the 8th of November and that Parliament meets on the 16th. It is therefore perhaps not very material

to add, what however I feel I cannot conceal from you, that, even in discussing with others the opinion above stated, I have found many more difficulties than had occurred to me upon it ; and that, on the whole, we really do feel that all our means of being of any use would be totally destroyed, and our own public characters rendered justly questionable with the country, by any such compromise as that on which you and I conversed at Walmer.

“The grounds of this decision I shall, I trust, have the opportunity of explaining to you in a very few days, and I am sure I shall succeed in convincing you that, in fully acceding to it, I have not in the smallest degree been influenced by any diminution either of personal affection towards you, or of that firm conviction which I entertain as a public man, and which I shall always be most ready to express, that from the dangers which are gathering so thick around us, it is you and you only that can, under the mercy of God, protect and deliver us.” *Copy.*

#### W. WINDHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, November 8. Pall Mall.—“I have wished much for the conversation which you propose, and with a view at once to convenience and satisfaction, to have made the occasion of it a visit to you at Dropmore. But I am set fast unfortunately by the necessity of an operation of no importance or danger, which, not being capable well of being deferred till Parliament shall break up, must take place now lest I should be still confined when Parliament meets. I must trust therefore for communication upon those most anxious subjects to the medium of your brother, unless you should chance to be in town for a day, or I should find the necessity of my confining myself ends sooner than is supposed.

“I have as yet no idea of the course to be pursued (nor is it easy in so varying a state of things) other than to give a lecture to the *country* upon the nature of its situation, the errors of its former opinions and conduct, and the necessity of its preparing itself, not physically but in spirit, in a frame and temper of mind, for a more dreadful struggle than any that it has ever yet experienced. As to the Ministers it really seems, besides that it is bad taste always to indulge in triumph, that they are not mark sufficient ; the shot must fly over their heads. Indeed I am much of Cobbett’s opinion that, unless a spirit gets up in the country, preceding a change of Ministry, and independent therefore of that which a mere change of Ministry might give, it is of no great consequence who the Ministers are. They may retard our fate, but they will never finally prevent it. Elliot is come from Scotland, and is, like myself, very anxious for concert and communication.”

## GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, November 8th. Downing Street.—“I have the honour to inclose to your Lordship a letter which I have received from Mr. Deare on the subject of Mr. Gregory’s receipt, together with an extract of the Attorney General’s report upon the Duke of Portland’s representation respecting secret service.

“I hope very shortly to have the pleasure to see your lordship in town, and to have some further conversation with you in order (if it be possible) to bring the business with the Commissioners of public accounts to an immediate termination.”

*Enclosure 1.*

## PHILIP DEARE to GEORGE HAMMOND.

1802, November 5th. Somerset Place.—“The Commissioners for auditing the Public Accounts having had under consideration your letter of the 20th of last August, and having come to the undermentioned resolutions thereon, they have directed me to communicate the same to you for the information of Lord Grenville.

“With respect to the sum of Seven Hundred Pounds received by Mr. Gregory from Lord Grenville; Resolved, that Lord Grenville’s affidavit is sufficient; and,—Ordered

“That Mr. Gregory be not again called upon to account for the same, the money having been paid to him for performing a secret service, and not for the purpose of being paid over to any other person by him as consul.”

*Enclosure 2.**Extract:—Opinion of the Law Officers of the Crown.*

“As the account of the money issued for secret service is contained in the imprest rolls transmitted half-yearly by the Auditors of his Majesty’s Exchequer to the Commissioners for auditing the publick accounts of the kingdom, it is their duty under the provision of the 25 George 3d, C. 52. to call upon the Secretary of State for his account of the expenditure of the money so issued to his Grace; that is to say, for such discharge *only* as is required by the Act of the 22 Geo. 3d. Ch. 82, namely, his own or his Under Secretary’s affidavit with respect to the money expended at home for secret service, in detecting, preventing, or defeating treasonable or other dangerous conspiracies against the State; and for money remitted abroad for secret service, the receipt of the person to whom the same was remitted, with the proof of his handwriting.

“This we conceive to be the true construction of the two Acts of Parliament above mentioned, and avoids all the

inconvenience and mischief which the Duke of Portland very justly apprehends would arise from a disclosure of the particulars of such an account."

SP. PERCIVAL.

THOS. MANNERS SUTTON.

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, November 15. Bath.—“I am very much obliged to you for both your letters. The first of them I should have answered more immediately, but I was prevented by going from hence for a day or two to Burton. Though your decision gives me on many accounts great pain, I am not the less sensible of your continued kindness in putting me as early as you could in possession of it. It would still be a great relief and satisfaction to my mind to be able to talk over with you again the whole of our situation before your part is taken; but this I am afraid is now impracticable, as under all the present circumstances, I have determined to avail myself of the plea of health for remaining here a fortnight or three weeks longer, and to avoid being present at the opening of the Session. I should, notwithstanding, be very much tempted to come to you at Dropmore for a day, and return hither; but in the short interval now left, I do not see how I could do so, without creating too much observation.

“With respect to the general state of things, I scarcely know anything of what has been passing since I came here, except from the newspapers, and have no means of forming a final judgment of what may be the issue of the present crisis, or what I should myself think the exact line to be pursued. Two things, however, I am afraid are but too clear, that all chance of resistance in Switzerland is at an end, and that there is no present hope of any aid either from Austria or Russia. If this be the case, though we have abundant provocation to justify us in any steps of precaution or hostility against France, I much doubt on reflection the policy of determining, in consequence of what has passed, to insist on retaining our conquests at the hazard or rather with the certainty of immediate war. I believe it would be wiser to avow openly that we should have been ready to embark to the utmost extent in any concert with the powers of the Continent which could have been effectual for its purpose; that we consider all that has passed as necessarily creating a state of the utmost jealousy and suspicion; that we must, as things now stand, trust for our own safety only to such a state of extensive and constant preparation as may enable us to meet an attack at any moment; and that we shall be always ready, whenever the policy of other powers admits of it, to join with them for the general defence of all that is left to defend in Europe. You know that, on the first view, I concurred with you in a

different opinion ; but, after looking at the question in all its views, I think that the line I now state would be the best for our own security, and afford the best chance too in the end of retrieving the affairs of Europe. As to myself, I am persuaded that any idea of my returning to Government being either useful or practicable is out of the question, unless in the event of war having taken place, or at least being evidently inevitable. If, contrary to my expectation, that should happen, the call may be made upon me in a way that I should still think myself not at liberty to decline, though your decision would add the greatest possible discouragement to the attempt. Short of such an extremity, I see nothing to be gained by the public, and much to be lost to my own credit and character by listening to the idea ; and most of all while the issue of the discussion now pending remains to be decided. This is the general outline of the best opinion I have been able to form. I should have liked much better to be able to discuss at large with you all the grounds of it, and to compare it with yours ; but I have been anxious at least to state it to you as distinctly as I can within the limits of a letter. I must however add that circumstances may have arisen of which I at present know nothing which might lead me to a different conclusion.

*Postscript.*—"I, of course, suppose some fresh arrangement to be made about Malta, which however I feel to be a point of the greatest difficulty."

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, November 15. Charles Street.—"I sit down to write a few lines to you, although the only subject on which I am earnest to converse with you is one of so confidential a nature that I do not quite like committing it to the hazard of the post ; and yet, as time presses, I believe my prudence must upon this occasion give way to my zeal. Lord C[arlisle] came up yesterday from the north, and I find him in his conversation precisely such as I had expected upon the points that we have discussed ; he has however conceived a notion which he has entrusted to me as being now floating in his mind without any positive decision as yet taken upon it. It is the notion of his taking the necessary steps for speaking his mind upon the present state of things, and upon the absolute necessity of supplying to the Government more vigour and abilities than it now possesses. This opinion would likewise be described by him as what he has collected to be the general sense of the country, and he is inclined to think that he should name Pitt by name upon that occasion. His chief inducement seems to be that of thinking it particularly becoming to him to take this step, both because he was the first to express his distrust of the present Government, and chiefly because professing, as he means to profess, not to take office, he thinks

on that account a representation from him, so justified, will be less objectionable, and more likely to be useful.

“The *tête-à-tête* in question is one which would not be agreeable to him, but he is disposed to think it a duty imposed upon him by his sense of public danger, and his only present hesitation is the fear of doing harm where he means only to do good. For my own part I scarcely know how to wish to assist his decision, because the expediency of the measure depends upon an estimate of temper, character, and circumstances of which I am too little informed to make a sufficient judgment in the case. The inclination of my mind as at present is to think that it would be not unbecoming, and that though it might produce no other good, it is a testimony for himself and his neighbourhood of the sense entertained both of the weakness of the present government and of the obvious mode of giving strength and confidence to it; and I do not see any real mischief to apprehend that ought to stand in the way of this possible chance of doing good. Pray let me have a line from you, by some coach to-morrow, on this subject, because naturally there may be question of this for Wednesday or Thursday next.

“What do you think of my being informed from undoubted authority that two Swiss gentlemen of the highest respectability and character, having come over hither to communicate with government ten weeks ago about the state of Switzerland and the possible wishes or inclination of the British Government as to the future and ultimate position of that country, what do you think of those gentlemen returning to Switzerland a fortnight or three weeks ago, to say to those who had sent them, that in ten weeks in London, with every powerful recommendation and intercession made by their English friends, they were not able to arrive at any sort of communication with any part of the English administration ? ! !

“Windham is not quite well, but hopes to be so; town is filling, and the *Morning Chronicle* is making me Speaker. I had some thoughts of writing to Abbot to assure him that he may spare himself the trouble of a canvass upon a subject where he is certain not to have me for an opponent; but perhaps it will do as well if I disclaim in conversation with everybody as I do, all idea and notion of any such arrangement, as far as I am concerned in it.”

LORD GRENVILLE to W. PITT.

1802, November 16. Dropmore.—“Although your resolution of staying a fortnight or three weeks longer at Bath deprives me of the great satisfaction I should have felt in conversing with you again before I take my part in Parliament, yet I really heard of it with the greatest possible

pleasure. I am convinced that it will be materially useful to your health, but I rejoice at it even more because I am quite sure that it is, as matters now stand, by much the most advantageous line you can pursue for the maintenance of your own character and situation in the country.

“ I feel with you all the difficulties both of the public line to be pursued in the present crisis, and also of your own particular conduct if you were now called upon to extricate us from this situation while the issue of peace and war may still be considered as doubtful. And, as I am still persuaded that this work can be done by you alone, I think it infinitely important that whenever you do come to it, no fresh embarrassment shall have been thrown in your way by any language you may in the interval have held in Parliament, at a time when the full means of decision cannot be within your reach.

“ One great ground of my anxiety for your re-assuming the government before the meeting of Parliament was that I still flattered myself that, by the effect which such a change would have produced in France, war might have been avoided; and that by being known to possess the courage, the talents, and the public confidence that such an extremity would require, you would have been able to close these discussions without having recourse to it, and in a way which, by raising our character abroad and our public spirit at home, would materially have added to our future security. I assure you that I look with as much uneasiness as you can to a new war to be undertaken without allies, and to be carried on without any visible object of animating attack; and I feel this impression the more strongly since I have learnt, by enquiring into the details, that our means even of home defence have been reduced very far indeed below what we had imagined when we discussed that point at Walmer. But, on the other hand, I fear that if a great country like this, after an ostentatious display of impotent resentment on such points as have now been in question, shall then shrink from the contest for the want of that assistance which there was from the beginning no reason to expect, we must be so lowered in our own eyes as well as in those of other powers, that we shall have little chance thenceforth of finding any means, either at home or abroad, of resisting farther encroachments even on our most immediate interests. It could not be hoped that Bonaparte would use this advantage with moderation. We should practically have submitted to his claim of excluding us from all concern in the affairs of the continent; and, penned up as we should be in this fold, we could hope for no aid from others when it is our turn to be driven to the slaughter house.

“ It is not reasonable that you should be called upon to decide between this alternative of difficulties; for you have had no share in the desperate folly that has brought it upon

us in this pressing and urgent shape, precisely when we were least prepared to meet it. A paragraph which I will enclose to you under this cover from a letter I received this morning from my brother Mr Grenville will shew you the extent of that folly. He does not name his authority, but I am sure he has not taken up such a story lightly, and you will remember that what I told you at Walmer, from my own knowledge, as having passed last spring, precisely resembles it.

“Still this decision, difficult as it is, must be made by this country in one shape or other: and if they call upon you, as I think in all reason and prudence they ought, to make it for them in the only way that you can make it, that is with a full knowledge of the grounds on which it is to rest, and with full means to give to your plans the fair advantage of being executed according to your own ideas, I do not see how you are at liberty to decline the call. But, in the present moment, you are not bound to take any step; you have the best of all reasons for taking none; and you could take none that might not infinitely increase the difficulties of that situation in which you will unquestionably, a little sooner or a little later, be called upon to act. In the meantime you can do nothing better for the interests of us all than to preserve your character untainted by a mixture (either real or supposed) with such counsels as now govern us, and to keep a station *despicere unde queas alios, passimque videre errare, atque viam palantes quærere.*”

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, November 17. Charles Street.—“I received your letter yesterday evening, and my object was perfectly answered by it. Upon a matter which appeared to me so doubtful, I was anxious to know whether any decided objection occurred to you, because, in that case, I felt I had probably still the means of stopping it; but now that I see your mind with mine is rather inclining to the measure as a harmless one, than dreading any extreme inconvenience from the pursuit of it, I shall leave it to the chance of its own natural course without much either of expectation or apprehension. The news of your yesterday’s letter has just been told me in the streets by a person to whom Addington had mentioned it. ‘Pitt’s health’—said he—‘though better, is so far from being re-established, and Hiley, who has just left him, sees him to be so little strong, that, much as we want his advice and assistance in Parliament, we have been obliged to have a prior regard to his recovery, and therefore we have prevailed upon him to take another fortnight or three weeks of the Bath water, instead of coming up as he had thought of doing to the first meeting of Parliament.’ Certainly some such ingenious suggestion was absolutely

necessary to ministers, in order that, by making Pitt's absence their act, they might prevent any suspicions or lukewarmness in his friends, when they have to comment upon his absence at so critical a moment.

“The sun, after whose complexion you make such tender enquiries, has latterly approached very much in colour to the moon, and appears to have contracted all the changeableness likewise which is imputed to that delicate luminary. What I expect to be the result of this short fever of courage in our government, is, that Andreossi will tell them that they are not to attach any real consequence to the newspaper paragraphs of the *Moniteur*; and that, as for the *Argus*, they will prosecute their printer, if Addington will prosecute Cobbett, and therefore complete satisfaction will be stated to have been obtained upon that subject. Further we shall have to hear that there have arisen some difficulties in executing the provisions of the treaty of Malta so as to provide for the independence of the Order; but that with the amicable disposition and language of the French minister, it was to be hoped that some satisfactory solution will be found to those important difficulties; and then, in a certain time, we shall have a new bundle of new tongues that will marvellously concur in preventing the possibility of the island being under the influence of France; and for this new instance of the wisdom of our ministers we shall have to express a due sense of what has been acquired by the happy union of temper and of firmness in the councils of the present Cabinet. If you persist in not coming till Friday I will forgive you, though I know not whether Lord B[uckingham] and Lord S[pencer] who expect to meet you to-morrow here, will be so indulgent. At all events I will have a dinner for you likewise on Friday, but you had better come to-morrow. Windham is well enough to dine here, and I have asked Elliot, but nobody else.”

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, December 3. Bath.—“I have delayed thanking you for your letters, as well as for your Greek extract, from having nearly determined to come to town in the course of this week to attend on the Army Estimates, in order to have at least the satisfaction of making my protest against the absurdity and mischief of all the doctrines which Fox has been attempting to establish. On comparing however the different accounts which I had from town, I hardly thought that the impression he was likely to make rendered it worth while to come merely for that purpose; and, in every other view, I am much better satisfied with remaining here at present. I now mean to prolong my stay till near Christmas, and then to return to Walmer, and continue there at least till Parliament meets. If you are likely to be at Dropmore,

as I conclude you will towards the end of this month, I shall be particularly glad to call there in my way. There is scarcely anything which can afford me a greater relief and satisfaction than to have an opportunity of talking over with you all the multiplied difficulties of the time, which are not a little increased by the events which have passed since we parted.’’

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, December 16. Bath.—“Your last intelligence respecting Malta was in all its parts perfectly new to me, and is indeed most extraordinary. It seems impossible to doubt the authenticity of any of the particulars which came within Ruspoli’s personal knowledge, and were stated by him to your informer. But he may perhaps have had less accurate means of information with respect to the supposed acquiescence of our Government in the Pope’s nomination; and, without absolute proof of it, I cannot bring myself to think that all our preparations are to end only in the absolute surrender of Malta, for all practical purposes, into the hands of France; and yet such would unquestionably be the effect of the measure said to be agreed to. I shall be much obliged to you if you will let me know if you consider your intelligence with respect to this particular point of the part taken by our Government, to be as certain as the rest of the history. I am also anxious to learn whether you have heard anything more with respect to the transfer of Cochin to France, and whether you conceive the fact can be sufficiently established to make it an ostensible ground to reason and act upon.

“The question which you refer to in one of your letters, on the tonnage duty, is, I see, not to be discussed till after Christmas, and we shall therefore have an opportunity in the meantime to talk it over. My present impression upon it is that although, *prima facie*, anything which seems to give a possible preference to foreign shipping over our own is wrong in its principle, yet that the present tax is so slight as not practically to produce any effect. I mean to stay here till to-morrow se’nnight, and hope to reach Dropmore Monday or Tuesday following, and to pass two or three days with you, if it does not break in on any of your engagements for the holidays.’’

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, December 21. Charles Street.—“I rejoice to have to tell you that my brother is well enough to return to Stowe to-morrow, and to give good promise of entirely re-establishing himself by a future course to Bath, preceded—as I hope—by Cheltenham. In the meantime the *Annual Register*

arrangement is considered as completed, and is to be sanctioned by the general meeting of this evening, so as to allow our friend to go to-morrow morning by appointment and to settle his terms with the outlandish politician. The other arrangement is likewise advancing, but it looks only at present to a morning share. Evening would I think better answer the purpose in question; but upon the detail of this subject I feel myself so unable to make a competent judgment, that I cannot go beyond giving all general encouragement to any of these schemes that shall appear to the undertakers to be practicable.

“Our House, as I am told, adjourns to-day, first to Friday and afterwards to Monday, because the Chancellor has declared he will not pass the bill before Monday. In the current circle of London news is Dundas’s peerage, and some speculation of his replacing Pelham. This does not sound very improbable to me, though I have no good ground for believing it; if however I care about it, it is because such an event may in some degree weigh with your expected visitor, and lessen the chance of his looking eagerly to other changes.

“I am told in Pall Mall from pretty good authority that Steel, embarrassed by the present state of men and measures, would be desirous of quitting his present office, if he could secure anything for his son; this is of no other importance than inasmuch as it furnishes new facilities, and Sheridan’s language both public and private is so avowed and vehement a defence of administration, that I cannot help believing he has a view more or less distant of joining them in office.”

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, December 25.—“A new trace of dissension in the Cabinet has appeared within the last two days, which I will not let pass without mentioning it to you. It seems that the informers and attornies have lately left the clergy to fasten upon the clothiers; they have rummaged out obsolete but existing laws in which they found large penalties for manufacturing cloth except with certain threads and of certain breadths; penalties for employing any persons not having served a regular apprenticeship; forfeiture of all unshorn cloth exported from this country, such as our Bath great coats and such like; in short a formidable list of breaches of laws, some as old as Edward VI., and so entirely disregarded that the execution of them would attach upon all the dealers in fine cloth, and some of those who deal in coarse also. Regular notice, however, having been given by the attornies of their pursuing these penalties and confiscations in regular course, the clothiers at the meeting of Parliament stated their case to Addington who promised them immediately an Act of Suspension of the above laws until a new detailed law should

pass upon good consideration of the subject. It was not till to-day that I heard to my utter surprise that such a Bill of Suspension being silently brought in by Vansittart, had actually passed our House without the smallest notice of the nature of this bill ; a bill which after all, whether actually justifiable or not, could only be justified by a satisfactory statement of the necessity of the case, and such evidence upon it as ought to warrant so strong and extraordinary a measure. This bill however, such as it was, went up to the Lords with the Navy Bill, and was read, committed, and reported without notice ; but the report being now upon the table of the Lords, the Chancellor and Pelham have both in private expressed their entire dissent from such a mode of proceeding, and consequently Lord Walsingham did not move yesterday for the third reading, and the matter so stands at sixes and sevens ; the clothiers, alarmed at this check after the dependence which they had placed upon this promise of Addington's, and Addington not knowing how to prevail over the difficulties which are made by the Chancellor and Pelham, both as to a suspending bill being an unconstitutional measure, and as to the indecency of any such important measure being taken without evidence. The best that the clothiers can hope is that the Lords will recommit the bill in order to receive evidence, and then the Commons will be put in the disgraceful state of having done with their eyes shut what the Lords can hardly be brought to do upon evidence and enquiry. But exclusive of these considerations, I am assured that this perversity of the Lords, following upon the Navy Bill, which they have amended into it's being ineffectual, has created a serious ferment among the Ministers of the first and second order."

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, December 27.—“I am just come from the House of Lords ; the Chancellor has shown no other hostility to the bill than by deferring the committee till after the holidays, for it seems the question now was only a second reading. Pelham was more direct and manly in his objections to the measure being pursued without sufficient evidence, and he likewise expressed his dislike of the principle of suspension ; but to my utter astonishment, the Chancellor, who is the natural guardian of the law, and whose opinions were pledged against the principle of suspension, did not say one syllable upon that part of the subject ; and he was very washy and very unmeaning in that which he did say.

“It turns out upon enquiry that Vansittart proposed to Abbot to have evidence in our House, but Abbot put it by as unnecessary, and said the petition to our House was sufficient ground of notoriety.

“Canning was to have gone to-morrow to meet Pitt at Park Place, and to have gone on to Dropmore, but Mrs. Canning is not so well and he now doubts.

“I know nothing of the arrangements which you allude to, because though they were in a good train, yet I have only communicated with Lord B[uckingham] upon them, and since his departure for Stowe, I am quite in the dark.

“Canning says he feels sure that there is no chance of Dundas taking office with them, but I think he is too sanguine.”

#### COUNT WORONZOW TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, January 1. Harley Street.—“Arivé ici il y a dix jours, après un voyage continuel de onze semaines, dans une saison horrible, et par des chemins plus horribles que le saison même, je me trouve dans l'état d'un homme qui sent toute sa faiblesse après une fièvre, longtems continué, qui vient de le quitter. Je ne suis pas en état de sortire de chez moi ; je l'ai fais pour une demi-heure, il y a quatre jours, pour affaire pressente, et ça m'a beaucoup fatigué, de sorte que je suis encor à me réposer des fatigues passées. Je n'ai pas eu encor mes audiences de Leurs Majestés, ni ne sais quand je pourai les avoir.

“Il n'y a que ces circonstances qui ont pu m'empêcher jusqu'à présent d'aller à Dropmore, pour jouire de la satisfaction de vous voir, et de causer avec le plus respectable et le meilleur ami que j'ai.

“Si vous ne venez pas en ville pour le dix-huit, je viendrez à Dropmore après ce jour.”

#### The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, January 16. Stowe. “I will only say on the subject of your last letter that I agree with you in all the inferences you have drawn ; but from many of the circumstances that occur in the composition of this drama, I think that the final *anagnorisis* (to use Aristotle's phrase) will be brought forward more rapidly than the principal actors of all descriptions would mean that it should. Many circumstances convince me that Bonaparte is looking to immediate war, and that Ministers are *convinced* he does so.

“I know of two facts, one in the military and the other in the naval department, that have occurred since Wednesday last, that are decisive proofs of this *conviction*. We shall hear about the end of this month what the orders from hence (and the winds) shall have done respecting the Cape, and I shall not wonder if that is made the point on which much of the question is to turn. The Dutch governor-general, with his admiral, and staff, and troops, sailed in the *Bato* of

74, from Plymouth, on the 30th September, and from the Madeiras on the 24th October; they would reach the Cape by the 30th November, and either they or we shall have a frigate home in two months from that date; which probably (if the West Indian accounts are correct) will bring us news from Campeachy and the other points in the Bay of Honduras, from which, I believe, that we are now actually driven away. God knows what means will have been left to us of fighting that battle, which sooner or later must be fought for our existence.

“My hopes are low, for I verily think that every day’s delay adds rapidly to the mass of weakness that will on the day of trial prove too heavy for us. These facts or opinions Mr. Freeling is most heartily welcome to. But I do not mean that he should understand me when I tell you that chapter the first is completely settled as you and I wish; and that chapter the second is, I trust, in such train as will within a few days answer our objects; but it will be necessary to forego the advantage that was proposed for my friend who in this, as in other objects, might wish for the benefits but is bound to look to the black side of the picture. I shall know more *very shortly*, and will write to you.

“I have been very ill since my return to Stowe; and am by no means satisfied with myself. The faculty want to send me to Bath, but so long as I have the faculty of deciding I shall object to Bath in winter. I look to it, however, in March, and my present intention is to be in town about the 4th or 5th of February.”

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, January 19. Charles Street.—“I had been as much struck as you was with the strange unbecoming tone in which our Minister had addressed those who came to him to support them in making claims which are founded upon specific treaty now existing between nation and nation; and it had not escaped me that the Foreign Secretary is now the advocate for the exploded arguments of Chauvelin, which I had imagined none could have adopted but those few who represented us as aggressors in the last war; but nevertheless as the claims of these Anglo-Gallic creditors are with everybody unpopular, and in the opinion of many untenable, I do not expect to see any sensation produced by this quotation from Lord H[awkesbury]; and I am very much mistaken if the answer to your letter will in any degree correspond with your expectations. All that I have lately heard makes me look with much less confidence to the quarter which naturally excites the greatest curiosity; a much greater intercourse has already prevailed than, from all I had heard, could reasonably have been expected, and the result of that intercourse is, I think, already strongly marked.

“I dined yesterday in Conduit Street, *en troisième*, and found there much stronger expressions of fear than of hope, and little room to believe that any useful effect can be produced. I stayed, however, till eleven to urge everything that I could think of, and find my host disposed to make one vigorous effort, by showing to his friend how much the real strength of the country must depend upon the language used by him on the first day, and by appealing to him whether any consideration should justify him in not speaking out enough to ensure the keeping the strength of the inland sea. His own language is more eager and decided than I have known it yet, but I see plainly that he is recently impressed with the belief of things having turned much against his wishes and expectations in these few days. He thinks that his friend will loiter about in town, and with the great men till the meeting. The only chance I can hope for, if this continues, is that he will be really induced to take part with, and actually to join, what is too weak for present service, but what the circumstances of the day and character of those who should decide otherwise, still will keep up and maintain.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1803, January 20.] Charles Street.—“The Homer *erratum* is palpable enough; I will send the set of plates as you desire to Bernard.

“I forwarded your letter to Stowe by Thursday’s coach, but have heard nothing of it’s arrival, although I wrote by the post of Wednesday to announce it. I learn by our friend in Conduit Street that, in the conversation which took place between in and out, not a syllable was said or the most distant allusion made to that matter which we thought might perhaps be faintly hinted, in order to obtain credit for an offer having been made which, at the same time, it was not meant should be found possible to be accepted; not one word of the most distant reference to the subject.

“I was yesterday assured that Nepean is out. Having been roughly treated by Markham, he complained to his old friend Lord St. Vincent, who told him his best way would be then to go out; and he has accordingly named his own prize-agent Tucker, or Trotter, or some such name, to succeed Nepean. Lord Melville is not expected before the beginning of March.

“Government disclaim having any official notice of the Honduras business, but even the peaceable St. Helen’s assured Lord Glastonbury that, if it be true, we must go to war. Where we shall go I know not, but I fancy the whole country feels that we are going fast to the bottom.

“Pitt is said to have had a slight return of complaint in his stomach; but he comes up to the birthday, at which I own I think it would be better that you should be seen too.”

## THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, January 23. Charles Street.—“ I have not seen my host, because, as it seems, we were yesterday at each other's doors about the same moment. I had, however, tried the same course through the medium of St. James's Place, and the report which I have just received of that conversation appears to show so much of fluctuation, uncertainty, and modification both as to the time and to the terms in which any thing is to be said, that I count very little upon the steady opinion which is still delivered as to, what I call, the substantial and important article of strength which is in question. What signifies it how far any opinion is felt, and acknowledged in private, if nothing but the publication of that opinion can make it useful ; and if the publication is withheld, or is pared down into insignificance, from motives of personal delicacy and embarrassment. If that which is necessary to be had, can be had only in one way, how can any correct mind permit itself to think that personal embarrassment should be allowed to stand against public safety ; or how is it possible, with embarrassments in every course, not to prefer that course which at least produces the first step to public security ? To these questions I can frame no answers that are satisfactory to my mind. The general result which you describe as the impression which you receive, appears to me likely to be that which we shall all agree in as being the most fitting and decorous to the persons concerned. I must also add that I am sometimes inclined to think that even public advantage may be better obtained by such a course being adopted on our side as the end of your note points to.

“ When do you mean to come ? Lord S[pencer] goes to-morrow to Norfolk till Saturday next. Pitt meant to go to Walmer yesterday. Nepean is not out, but it is thought that he stays in only till they find some arrangement for him. I hear unpleasant whispers about the progress of the new navy commission. Have you ever heard of any supposed enquiry into a direction to issue navy bills, not for naval purposes, but merely as a financial manœuvre unconnected with the navy ? Did any such thing happen two or three years ago ? ”

## THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, January 25, Charles Street.—“ Sunday being the seventh and not the first day of the week, I naturally interpreted the phrase of next week written on last Sunday, to mean the week that is now current ; but as there can be no possible motive why you should come a day sooner than you like, so neither can there be any embarrassment except the disappointment of those who expect to meet you here. In truth, you must see that the disposition of my mind is

not such as to look for any real good to be now done by pressing forward on our part, and I have taught myself to believe that we shall do what is most useful as well as most agreeable in keeping "our presence like a robe pontifical." Nevertheless, as we are immediately pledged to two or three questions, we must neither abandon our opinions, nor those of our friends who have promised to maintain them, and therefore, to avoid any such appearance, I hope you will find it convenient to be here by the 3rd, as your being out of London at the meeting will perhaps disturb those who have undertaken points which they will wish to talk over with you. If it was not for this consideration, I know no other that would tempt me to press you in the least upon Parliamentary attendance in the present moment."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, January 27.—"G. Berkeley has desired to talk over with me a letter from a private seaman of the *Jamaica* frigate in the Downs, to his brother in London, who is a servant of the Margravine's, and who had tried to obtain his discharge. In this letter, dated four days ago, the seaman desires his brother to take no more pains, as the ship had been suddenly ordered to sea, and they imagined they were going to the West Indies. The man tells his brother that upon orders coming down for the ship's sailing, the crew went aft to state to the captain that they had 19 *months' pay* due to them, which they hoped to receive, and which, as you know, they are entitled to receive by a special Act of Parliament before they sail; the man says, however, that they obtained no hopes of relief, and he adds that the Admiralty do what they will with the seamen now, but that *it will not long be so*. I mention this fact to you to show the strange misconduct which prevails now at that Board; we shall soon hear of mutiny on this subject abroad, where our ships are not relieved as they ought in order to be paid; but this fact of the *Jamaica* is so strong, so directly against law, and so likely to be of serious mischief, that I have prevailed upon Berkeley to write a line to Lord St. Vincent to tell him the facts as he hears them; adding only that he thought it his duty as a naval officer to state these facts to Lord St. Vincent, in order that he might be sure that his Lordship was apprized of them. Did you ever hear of such unprovoked and wanton disdain of all the common attentions to the laws and practice of the service."

LORD GRENVILLE to W. PITT.

1803, January 30. Dromore.—"Although everything that is daily passing takes away more and more the little hopes which I had entertained of such a change of system on the part of

this country as can alone in my view of things save either Europe or ourselves, yet the news which I yesterday heard is of such a nature that I could not satisfy my own mind if I forbore to take the first moment of communicating it to you.

“Fagel has been here for a day on his return from Holland, and tells me that, since he left that country, he has learnt from thence that Bonaparte has demanded of the Dutch Government the gratuitous cession of *their whole frontier*. This, he says, is the expression used in his letter. He knows no particulars; but supposes that these words must mean Bergen-op-Zoom, Breda, Bois-le-duc and Grave. And with this demand, he says, the Dutch, feeling their own inability to resist, have determined to comply, and the rather because all these places are at this hour in fact garrisoned by French troops. The circumstance, he says, has been communicated to Liston, and is of course known to this Government. And it is under these circumstances that we shall be to hear, in a few weeks, of the actual surrender of the Cape.

“There is but one person in this country that could have prevented this; there is but one that could now apply the only remedy which can save us, if any can. That person has waited for two years to see the malady increase to a point at which it may perhaps even now be far beyond his skill or means. And he is still waiting, and deliberating upon personal delicacies, which a *very strict* conscience would perhaps not allow to influence even a vote upon a turnpike bill, but which no man of correct practical virtue could (I should have thought) admit at all into his deliberations, when the question is whether, by giving free scope to the dictates of his own heart and judgment, he shall do what can alone save his country, and what he alone can do; or whether, by upholding a system which he cannot approve, though he is loth to condemn it, he shall add daily to his own embarrassments, and ultimately disable himself from acting even in the moment when he himself at last will wish to act?

“My anxiety on all these accounts is increased by my long and sincere affection for the person of whom I speak. Whatever may be the lies of faction, *he* does not think me interested in my advice, or conduct, for he *knows* the contrary. And if he feels any pain from the freedom with which I draw this picture, he is certain that my uneasiness proceeds in great part from what I think I see of his situation.

“I was sorry to hear that you did not talk of being in town till about the 15th. I shall go from here on Thursday, and I do not think my stay will be prolonged much beyond the 15th. I can do no good, and shall by that time or near it have done all that duty can require of me.”

## THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, February 1. Charles Street.—“The Dutch intelligence to which you very naturally attach so much importance appears to me, as it does to you, to offer the most solid and most striking ground which can be taken for our making one last solemn appeal to the sense and feeling of the country, and the motion which you have projected appears to me on every account the most desirable which can be framed. As far as I can trust my own judgment, I attach so much consequence to this measure for its standing *alone*, that, if I were the only person concerned, I should not hesitate to say that I would confine myself to this measure, and put off the two other discussions till a later period. The question of *Switzerland* would, as I think, very naturally wait for the completion of its present plan of government, before the whole matter would appear to be enough concluded to furnish a full scope for examining into the conduct of Government respecting that country; and I should not imagine we should find any sort of difficulty in inducing Lord M[almesbury] to take this course respecting his question, if this course be indeed the best. Of the Dr., I am more diffident as to any chance of prevailing upon him, because I think he is more easily persuaded to undertake speeches than to postpone or abandon them, and if he makes any difficulty he has so strong a claim upon us that we cannot perhaps resist. I confess, however, that I think the instant revival of these questions had better be avoided, if it can, because the impression of our active hostility will be renewed by them, and being renewed will not be explained away by anything we can say afterwards; but of this we will talk when we meet.

“My poor brother, as I find from Lord Temple’s letter, has been again attacked as he was in London, but is now recovered, and Lord Temple writes to beg me to urge his going to Bath immediately.”

## W. PITT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, February 3. Walmer Castle.—“I am much obliged to you for the interesting and important news contained in your last letter. Some fresh encroachment of this nature is what we have for some time been expecting, and, if it takes place, it will certainly advance the crisis to which we have been looking, and for which, therefore, it is impossible for one’s mind to be unprepared. I see the approach of such a crisis with great grief from a consideration of all the circumstances of the country, and the whole state of things and of parties. With respect to myself, I cannot help believing that, as things stand, you greatly over-rate any use that I can be of. As far as I can be of any, it is not a false sense of personal

delicacies that will restrain me ; and I really have no wish so strong as to fulfil, if I can, what is really due to my own character, and still more to the country. But on these grounds I see no line that I can properly take, at present, but that of finding the best opportunities for declaring in public my general sentiments on the line which we ought to pursue in our foreign politics, and in our establishments and finance. I have already stated them explicitly to Government. What will be their conduct remains to be seen, and (from what you tell me) it will perhaps speedily be put to the test. My subsequent conduct must be regulated by the opinions I hold on these great points ; but in maintaining them as I must do, I earnestly wish, if possible, to avert the necessity of any change, because I really do not see, at the present moment, the prospect of any being affected in a way to promise real benefit to the country. I ought also to add that I am perhaps a little influenced (not, I hope, by any personal laziness, but) by a real doubt whether (though certainly much improved in my health) I am, at least as yet, in any degree equal to the exertions which a new style of things would require from me. I have endeavoured, as far as I can, to shew you the real state of my mind, and I hope it will not be long before we have the opportunity of talking over these points more at large. I shall not fix the precise day for my coming to town till I see what is likely to be the course of business, but, at all events, I shall not be later than towards the end of next week, which will, I hope, leave an interval of some days before you return to Dropmore.

“ I looked at the report you referred to in a former letter of Lord Hawkesbury’s conversation with the British creditors. It is in many respects a strange one, but it does not seem to make him a party to the objection founded on the Alien Bill ; and I own I do not think that argument likely to make any impression that deserves much notice.”

*Private.* MARQUIS WELLESLEY TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, February 16. Barrackpore.—“ The departure of this packet is so pressing, and I have been so harrassed by business and vexation for sometime past, that I cannot at present attempt to express the full extent of my sentiments upon the contents of all your kind and affectionate letters. Indeed, until recently, I entertained strong hopes of being able to return to England in the present season, and I trusted that I should have seen you before any letter could have reached you.

“ You will find that I wrote to you, although not by the *Georgina*, by the overland packet which departed a few days subsequent to the dispatch of that vessel ; I have also written

to you since my resignation of this government; and I directed Colonel Harcourt in the most particular manner to call upon you in town or in the country, and to explain to you fully the nature of my situation. Colonel Harcourt unfortunately did not remain long enough in England to enable him to see you; and I now find, that you could not have been on terms with Ministers to admit of your having access to my dispatches by the *Mornington* and by Colonel Harcourt. Until your latest letters I entertained no idea of the nature of the division between you and the Ministers; nor could I form a correct judgment until very lately of the painful alternative, to which I am likely to be reduced upon my return to England. You are already apprized by my last letters of my sense of the exigencies (both with reference to my own honour and to the public interests) of this laborious station; and you know my judgment with regard to the necessity of my holding it, until I shall have completed my political and financial arrangements in India. This judgment was subject to alteration, according to the nature and extent of the support which I might receive from home. For it was obvious that any defect in the support of my measures at home would absolve me from every obligation of duty towards this station; since any such defect must frustrate the objects which require my continuance. Whatever may have been the conduct of Addington and his Cabinet in other respects, they have certainly afforded me a very decided and honorable support, since I brought the state of India distinctly under their view, and declared my intention to return home, unless enabled by proper aid to complete my public plans. Addington has acted on this occasion with considerable kindness and affection, as well as with great public zeal. That the alternative to which I was reduced, of resigning or of making conditions for my continuance, was produced by the weakness and instability of the counsels of the present Cabinet is a lamentable truth. But I have every reason to believe that I shall now receive from them the necessary support for bringing my administration to a prosperous, and, I trust, a splendid termination in January, 1804; when I propose to embark for England. In all my most important dispatches of a confidential nature to Addington, I have referred directly to you and to Pitt; in the full confidence that you were both upon terms with the Ministry to communicate freely, at least on every question which related to my discharge of this great trust. To Pitt I distinctly referred for his instructions with regard to my conduct, and more particularly with regard to my continuance in India. But I never have received a line from him.

“Your sentiments have been fully stated to me in favor of my return; but they rested on the supposition that I should not be supported in bringing my administration to an honorable close; and in this respect I have no reason to

complain. Under these circumstances, every motive of public duty and of regard for public character appears to me to demand my continuance here until I shall have completed my own plans, which I entertain little doubt of accomplishing before the month of January, 1804.

“With regard to the more general question to which most of your able, and, I must add, most eloquent and affecting letters are directed, I cannot by this dispatch convey any adequate idea of my sentiments. I have expressed some notion of my feelings on this most painful subject in a letter to Addington, of which I enclose an extract. In many points my opinions coincide entirely with yours. The peace is in the utmost degree perilous and humiliating. It is not so dangerous, however (if a manly policy be maintained) in India, as you seem to apprehend, nor is our general humiliation at all felt *here*. Although most of the names in the Administration astonish me, they are nearly all men of honor and common sense; and your early letters upon the new Cabinet express a strong hope of their success. That they possess no great degree of energy as a Cabinet is too evident; and I believe I need not express my sorrow for the change. The question, however, will still remain, whether it is our duty to aid their weakness, or to drive them from their offices? This question must depend on so many circumstances of detail, which can only be decided on the spot, that I declare myself to be unable to determine at this distance any part of it, beyond the immediate extent of my particular duty, in my station, and in the actual crisis of affairs. Addington has certainly manifested great firmness and friendship in his support of my administration; at my departure from England, I respected and esteemed him highly, although I never imagined that he could have been selected for his present office. Of the mysteries of his appointment, I am ignorant, nor can I now imagine why Pitt and yourself are not in your proper places. But I am not therefore prepared to say that the grand enemy is best to be resisted by weakening the hands of the present Ministers.

“At all events I am determined on one point, that no human power ever shall interrupt for an instant the cordiality of my affectionate and established friendship for you; the assistance which I hold myself bound to afford to the public service, must be limited to points exclusively of Indian government, and Indian interests. If we should unhappily differ on other points, we must either contrive to compromise our differences, or I must withdraw to my farm and my books.

“No power of expression can convey a just representation of my ardent sense of your conduct towards me since my departure from England, and especially since the villainous faction of the Nabob’s creditors and of the Directors has levelled the late scandalous attacks against me. In your public and animated support nothing is left for the most nice sense of honor or the most passionate desire of fame to lament

or to require. You may rest assured that every word of your speeches, and every point of your conduct, of which I receive innumerable testimonies from various quarters, is recorded in my breast, and will never perish but with my existence. If no other tie of friendship existed between us, this alone would be sufficient to unite us to the end of our lives ; and I declare solemnly, that I know not the sacrifice which I would not make to preserve our cordial intercourse upon my return to England.

“Thus much I thought myself bound to write, although in great haste, and without order or connection. I trust that my brother Henry, who returns to England in a few days with the documents respecting Oude, will be able to give you full information on every point respecting my sentiments and situation. By him I will regularly answer all your letters.

“Pray remember me kindly to Lady Grenville, and to Lord Buckingham ; to him I will write by Henry.

“Your kindness to Richard is a most grateful proof of your regard for me ; I receive most admirable letters from him, and I really hope that he will be found an useful instrument in the preservation of our country, *si Pergama dextrâ defendi possunt.*”

*Enclosure.*

MARQUIS WELLESLEY to HENRY ADDINGTON.

*Extract.* 1803, February 12. Barrackpore.—“You may be assured that I continue to repose the most cordial confidence in your public and private honour, nor have my sentiments of friendship, kindness, and personal respect, ever suffered the slightest abatement. The information which I have received from various quarters of the zeal, assiduity, and firmness which have distinguished your support of my character and public services in the present crisis, has not been lost upon my mind, but it has not in any degree excited an emotion of surprise. Whatever may be the vicissitudes of public affairs, I think I can rely on the immutable firmness of our friendship. I have suffered the most severe pain from witnessing, even at this distance, the differences which prevail between some of those persons who must ever be the primary objects of my esteem and regard, as well as of my most respectful attachment. I trust in God that I shall never be called upon to decide upon a choice of political alternatives, which must involve my friendship with one or other of such parties. My greatest ambition, upon my return to Europe, would be to become the bond of union between them, and to be the instrument of reconciling those who ought never to have been divided. Having no personal objects to pursue, having been removed from the scene of contention and possessing, I trust, the

confidence of all my former friends, my endeavours will be uniformly directed to produce such a co-operation among them, as shall present the most formidable obstacle to the attempts of that faction, which never can gain an atom of strength, or of character, otherwise than at the expense of the public safety, and of the established constitution. With these sentiments, I desire neither power, emolument, nor honours upon my return to England; my wish is to preserve the regard of my friends for myself, and to preserve or rather to restore their union for the preservation of the country. In such a course office or honours will not engage my attention; but I never will withhold my assistance from the public service, while the cause which has so long united us shall demand my exertions." *Copy.*

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1803, February 20.]—"I send you the enclosed letter which I have just now received from Lord Temple, and which contains a good account of my brother, except that I think there is great danger of his prescribing for himself more Bath water than is fit for him in his present state. What Lady Buckingham can mean by urging us not to trouble him with politics at a moment when we are preaching nothing to him but the inutility of his thinking about them, I do not pretend to understand.

"Everything is settled—two hundred by monthly payments has been offered and accepted. I hear no news except that the two reports which I told you of my hearing appear to tally with what my Conduit street friend has just heard of the absentee, who is said to give as a new reason for absence his conviction that the event is very fast approaching which he thinks ought to take place without being promoted by him. Lord Pepper said two days ago that the Government would not give up Malta."

*Enclosure.*

THE MARCHIONESS OF BUCKINGHAM TO EARL TEMPLE.

"We go on better and better. To-day being fine, after the glass of water we went in the post-chaise to the top of Landsdown, where your father got out and walked round Sir Bevil Grenville's monument, and looked very curiously at it, and seemed thoroughly to enjoy his airing. He always says the water feels like a cordial, and warms him throughout the moment he swallows it; he has hitherto taken but one glass, and that at noon, he will soon begin drinking before breakfast. If, please God, we have no drawback, I have great hopes; but I am sure *every* thing depends on persevering with great

*quiet*, for I attribute great part of his amendment to his having nothing to do but to read an amusing book, and am convinced he would not have got well as long as we had continued at Stowe, even with the only occupation of militia and county business. What would it have been if politics had once laid hold on him? Preach this up with all your oratory to our brotherhood. Indeed they would soon be convinced of this were they to see Lord Buckingham for one day; he can not even write a letter without the most evident marks of fatigue. He has rubbed in no mercury since he has been here, nor I think shall we get him to do it unless he feels any return of pain; which, thank God, he has not; and I hope will not."

*Private.* MARQUIS WELLESLEY TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, February 27. Fort William.—“The advanced period of the season has compelled me to dispatch Henry in such haste that I have been unable to accomplish my intention of replying regularly to all your letters; which, however, I hope to be able to effect before the departure of the last ships.

“In the meanwhile I refer you to Henry, who is fully apprized of my sentiments on every public and private topic, and in whose discretion and honour you may place the utmost degree of reliance.”

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, March 14. Bath.—“Very many thanks to you for your clue to the inextricable labyrinth of conjecture, on what had been done or left undone by our Ministers to bring us to the difficulties of the present moment; yet the wildest conjecture would have been completely at fault before it could have hit off such a chase as that which you have described. If I were bound to give an opinion, it would be that Bonaparte's violence and presumption have hurried him much too fast; and that he will admit a negociation upon Malta in order to regain the advantage of preparation, which I take for granted, by no means keeps pace with his vindictive detestation of this country; and Mr. Addington is so completely tied by various circumstances to the chapter of negociation, that he will not be able to bring the matter to that shorter decision, which *possibly* might be more politic for us. I say *possibly*, because I really am too much uninformed of the state of numbers both of our army and navy to be able to judge whether we shall grow comparatively stronger by delay. Of our regular army I know nothing, except that none of the troops announced for the West Indies, or for India, in the vote of November last have yet sailed. I should, therefore, state our cavalry, guards, and infantry in Great Britain,

Ireland, and our Channel Islands, at about 52,000 effective men; our militia is a mere name, for *no* county has as yet completed its ballot, and some *have not even begun*.

“Bad as this is, I fear our naval report is more unfavourable. The stock of naval stores and of naval victualling is most calamitously defective; and of the general state of our ships, you will be able to judge decisively when *I assure you* that even if we do not send one ship to foreign duty, we shall have for home service only the seven ships commissioned before this alarm, and not stored and manned; to which are to be added thirteen ‘*serviceable*,’ and perhaps six, or at most seven, that may be collected from those now in dock, and from those which may be fit for service, though not having been examined since the peace they are not reported ‘*serviceable*,’ and this is our only navy for home defence. Still, however, I fear that, wholly unprepared as we are, notwithstanding all our warnings of every sort, we shall be comparatively worse this day three months; and therefore I agree with you that Bonaparte will negotiate. As to Mr. Pitt’s assistance, I am not yet quite sure that Mr. Addington (and still less am I sure respecting the King) will think of him, but as a ‘second in this war, not as a leader.’ If so, he will hear of no invitation of that nature, nor do I think he will have any option put to him save when, in all human probability, it will be too late. The temper of the country must be very different from what it now is, before any personal friend of Mr. Pitt would wish him to be called to conduct a negotiation, which we know beforehand must end in a war, made necessary not only by the ‘folly,’ but by the treacherous determination of the two last Ministers to see nothing that they did not like, and to take no measure whatsoever on the only point remaining in discussion, on which not only all England but all Europe was hourly reminding them. It is indeed a personal gratification to us to recollect that no part of the tremendous mischief hanging over us is imputable to our councils; but that gratification will go but little way to comfort in the hour of ruin. However, we must persevere in one straight line; and I should now dread nothing so much as an invitation to you to assist in negotiation such as I have described it. Mr. Addington has made the peace, he must announce it gone, before you can embark in the public service. Any arrangement short of this will throw the war upon your shoulders. Will Mr. Pitt see this in the same point of view? I should think not, and yet it applies to him almost (not quite) as strongly as to you.”

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, March 16. Walmer Castle.—“I am very much obliged to you for your letter. It is scarce possible to suppose that your informant could be inaccurate in his report of the

conversation he had had, and yet I know not how to believe that Lord St. H[elens] could mean to make the assertion imputed to him. The simple fact is that I have not written a single line to Addington, either on the subject of Malta or any other, during the two months that I have been here, nor have I written one word to any one of his colleagues, except my brother. To him I certainly stated very fully (in answer to a letter I received from him) my opinion of the danger and disgrace which would arise from giving up the place without fresh and substantial security, especially after Sebastiani's report, and the Consul's communication to the French Legislature; but this statement was made in strict private confidence, that he might give it whatever weight he chose in forming his own individual judgment; but on the express condition that he should not say one word of my opinion to any of the Cabinet. I am perfectly sure that he will have complied most scrupulously with this condition, and besides my reliance on his exactness in this respect, I have another security for this letter never being brought as a proof of my advising Government, as it expressly stated my determination to remain here in order to avoid being importuned to express an opinion. So much with respect to any letter of a recent date. I am equally confident, on memory, that I have never in writing to Addington at any previous time mentioned this subject, except *once*. The period I allude to was just before the opening of the session in November, when after expressing my doubts of the prudence of pushing the question of Switzerland to a rupture, I added, in a single line at the end of my letter, that I took for granted a separate arrangement must be made respecting Malta. With respect to my general sentiments of the importance of the place, Addington is certainly fully apprized of them from former communications. I have repeatedly stated those sentiments in conversation to various persons during the last twelve months; and I particularly explained them to Lord Castlereagh when I saw him at Bath in the end of December, and afterwards to Addington himself, as well as to Lord Hawkesbury and the Chancellor, when I passed through London in January. I have troubled you with a very long history, but I feel anxious that you should know the real state of the case; and I hope you will have the goodness to take an opportunity of undeceiving your friend, as well as to contradict the report if you hear it from any other quarter. The details of this account, and particularly what relates to my letter to my brother, are of course meant *only for yourself*. I do not enter on the wide field of our present situation. It is impossible to view it without infinite anxiety, and I feel this impression the more deeply because I see no part that I can take, at least in the present moment, which could contribute to diminish its difficulties and dangers."

*Postscript.*—"I should add that the only other person connected with Government to whom I have written has been Steele, and to him only on points of finance. To Lord Alvanley, indeed, I lately stated very shortly my general line of thinking on our present situation, but it was quite in a private letter, and one which (even if he were in more habits of political intercourse) he was very little likely to have communicated."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, March 23. Walmer Castle.—"I have certainly no thoughts of going to town while the present state of suspense continues; and am therefore particularly happy in the prospect of seeing you here. Besides every other account on which I shall rejoice in it, I wish much to mention to you a communication made to me within these two days, which, though in its present shape leading to nothing, will probably in one event be followed by some proposal that I may not be at liberty to decline. Any day next week that suits you best will be perfectly convenient to me, but as the Bishop of Lincoln is coming to me for a day or two in the beginning of it, perhaps you will like as well to defer your visit till Wednesday, that we may be more at leisure."

GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, March 23. Downing Street.—"I have the honour to send to your Lordship four parcels of books which I have received from Mr. Talbot, and which I imagine are intended for your Lordship. By a mistake of the messenger who brought the two first parcels, they were taken from him at Dover, and sent to the Custom House in London; in consequence of which an expense of 3*l.* 6*s.* 4*d.* has been incurred, according to the messenger's memorandum which I have the honour to enclose. I have endeavoured, but without effect, to obtain from the Treasury the repayment of the duties. The messenger who was charged with the two last parcels brought them to town without any interruption at Dover.

*Postscript.*—"If your Lordship wishes to have any more books from Paris, I will desire Talbot to have the parcels made of a smaller size, which circumstance will probably prevent their being detained at Dover."

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1803], March 24.—"Many thanks to you for your very interesting communications. Bonaparte's answer probably will not have taken quite so much time to compose as Lord

Hawkesbury's seven good reasons for not giving up Malta ; still, however, I think that the French preparations are not as forward as I had at first imagined. But if he knows as well as you do (and probably he knows it much better) that we are comparatively weaker every day, he may still put off his definitive answer for three weeks.

"In consequence of your doubts, I have satisfied myself that the effective force of cavalry, infantry, and guards in Great Britain, Ireland, Guernsey, and Jersey, is not less than 52,000 men ; perhaps you do not include the seven garrison battalions. Still, however, this is cruelly short of what it ought to be for foreign duties and for home defence. The militia, with everything to discourage it, wants nearly one-half its numbers.

"I wish you to know that I have reason to *be sure* that the language of the King has from the first moments of this alarm been *extremely eager* for the war ; and that he has occasionally spoken of *your opinions* as having been more congenial to his own than any that he had heard on the views of France ever since the peace : and he is represented to me as having *urged the Ministers to the war which he says is inevitable*.

"Nothing in all this is interesting save his opinion on the necessity of the war, but, with the certain loss of Hanover, I cannot explain his eagerness. You will guess my information.

"I have very little doubt of Lord Melville's acceptance if he sees either of two games open to him ; the prospect of inducing Pitt to join with him (so soon as war is declared) in supporting Addington ; or the prospect of turning the Ministry out with greater advantage so soon as he thinks the moment is ripe for doing it with Pitt's assistance. My speculation, however, is that he will *bona fide* join them, and try to urge Pitt to support them out of office."

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, March. Charles Street.—"Having been lucky enough to conclude my Midhurst committee and report it to-day, I have scarce five minutes left me for the post to answer the letter which I find from you. I should judge by your account that, little as the chance of recovery is, the present state may perhaps be prolonged for some time. I am sorry for the distress and fatigue of the poor little woman, and do not wonder that you should be anxious to relieve it as much as you can. Your presence no doubt is peculiarly desirable just now, but that must be governed by your own feelings only. The inclination for the revival of the question which had slept is now revived, and I am persuaded it will be brought to action ; I still continue to think that it has the same advantage and disadvantage which we have so often talked over, and I think the

expediency of the measure more doubtful from there appearing to me some doubt whether it is wished to be pressed by those whom it chiefly regards. If the production of it be made matter of common council I should dissuade; if it is pursued only in the shape mentioned in Grosvenor Square, the same course must be pursued by us. My brother and Lord S[pencer] come to-morrow. I am in hopes Wrottesly will speak after Berkely to-morrow. Yorke's Volunteers still stand for Wednesday, and still nobody knows what he is to do; a pretty mode of preparing this particular description of 370,000 men, who are to be disposed of without communication previously had with any of them or of their officers. All those whom I have consulted are anxious to refer only to the general principles of your plan, to leave them the full and compleat discussion of their own, and not to hamper ourselves by originating bills which depend upon details and execution that we cannot control. I have shewed the copy of your letter where you wished, and to one or two more to whom I thought it useful. I need not tell you how much these important topicks press for communication with you."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, March 27. Bath.—“When I assure you that your last letter has gratified me to the fullest extent of my wishes, I mean to avoid the trouble of composing, and to you the trouble of reading verbiage upon the matter of it. My Lady-day rents seldom make their appearance at Coutts' till about the 10th of April; and on that day Bernard is to repay to me 1,000*l.* which he borrowed from me for my land-tax trust. This money will, therefore, be more readily convertible to your purposes, if it is perfectly convenient to you to wait these 14 days; but if not, you will let me know it, and the 1,000*l.* shall be placed to your account by return of post. You may likewise depend upon the remaining 500*l.* in the course of the next twelve months at furthest; and if, upon winding up this bottom, you find that you had calculated (as it often happens) short of the truth, you must let me know what is to be added to these 1,500*l.*, which is all that you state in your letter.

“I have heard from the Cape, dated January 14th; my correspondent states our land force to be 1,600 effective rank and file, and states that the Dutch fleet are going to Batavia in the course of a few days. Claris said publicly that he had been taken twice and would take care not to be caught a third time. I see that Lord Melville's return from Walmer has been followed by a long discussion at the Queen's house, and I have no doubt but that he is now the real and efficient Minister. Lord Moira has been spoken to, but, as I am *assured*, he has refused to come in *except in force*.”

## COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, March 28. Harley Street.—“ Je vous envoie les deux lettres que j'ai écrites, et j'ai joints aussi celle de mon frère pour le Comte Markof, afin que vous puissiez les lire au maître de la maison où vous allez demain. Je vous prie de me rapporter ces papiers. Je fais des vœux ardents pour que la personne que vous allez voir, prene pitié de son pays qui continue à se dégrader. Le vaisseau de l'état est battu par une tempête horrible, il est tems que le pilote habil reprenne le soin du gouvernail, et de la manœuvre de ce vaisseau en danger.”

## THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, April 1.—“ Since you left London, what I have heard strongly leads me to believe that I was right in my conjectures as to the object of the letter which was sent from London to the north, and I am assured that the writer of that letter has distinctly expressed his wishes to be such as I have talked over with you (himself out of the question); and farther, that the writer of the letter has declared that he thinks it would become the owner of the great house in Pall Mall to propose and assist that arrangement with all the influence of all his friends.

“ The person to whom the letter was written has, I believe, been more reserved in his conversation, but I know that the day before yesterday, upon somebody quoting to him the danger of eternal war if Lord Grenville returned to office now, he said ‘ quite the reverse; I think the apprehension of that reproach would be ample security against Lord Grenville’s acting so as to deserve it.’ ”

## THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, April 2.—“ I have received yours of yesterday and will meet you on Tuesday at dinner. I think there is much to regret in finding that practice pares down so closely the wide and magnificent views of extensive theories, because whatever had been the practical difficulties, the great advantage of the general result and the proofs it would have afforded of real sacrifices proportioned to the difficulties and exigencies of the times, would perhaps have greatly over-balanced the inconveniences which first stood in the way of all great theories. The different character proposed to be adopted must evidently be more of an apologetic kind, and will entail the necessity of explanation upon points, which one could wish should not appear to want any. Of this, however, hereafter. I hear nothing new; but in general the expectation of domestic changes occupies the public attention even more than the arrivals of couriers.”

## COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, April 6. Harley Street.—“ Je serai demain chez moi, et à vos ordres, depuis onze heures jusqu'à une heure après midi.

“ On vient de m'apporter la belle édition d'Homère que vous destinez à l'Empereur, et que je lui enverrai par un vaisseau qui doit partir dans vingt jours d'ici pour Petersbourg.”

## THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, April 8.—“ Lord S[pencer] and I intend to come to you at Dropmore on Sunday; we depend upon your not dining till six, because we shall not be able to arrive before that time.

“ I am told from good authority that Mr. A[ddington] has been with the Duke of Devonshire at Devonshire House; this agrees with what you had already heard, and perhaps explains the undefined project hinted at by the seaside of something that would not long last.

“ My reflection is the same that it was, namely, that all this makes what we talked of more pressing than ever in point of time; for it may come so late as to lose its value, if care be not speedily taken.

“ The King complains so much of rheumatism, that he says it disables him from putting on his own stockings, and prevents him from sleeping.”

## GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, April 8. Downing Street.—“ I had the honour to receive your letter last night, and I have this morning seen Mr. Brook, who has promised to send me any farther information which he may receive respecting Lord Camelford, and which I will forward to your Lordship without delay either by messenger or express. I have also written a private letter by this day's messenger to Lord Whitworth, and have desired him to communicate to me any particulars which he may be able to learn relative to Lord Camelford's actual situation. I may expect to receive Lord Whitworth's answer either on Thursday next, or on the Sunday following.

“ In conformity to the note which I received from your Lordship on the day on which you set off for Walmer, I wrote to Heriot and desired him to abstain from inserting in the *Sun* and *True Briton* any paragraphs respecting Lord Camelford. In his answer he promised that he would do so, but I will see him to-morrow and repeat this injunction.

“ I therefore trust that every measure has been taken, not only to prevent Lady Camelford's receiving any sudden shock, but also to procure for your Lordship some positive information with regard to Lord Camelford.”

## GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, April 14. Downing Street.—“I have the honour to enclose to your Lordship a letter which I have received this morning from Lord Whitworth. I did not think it right to send it to Lady Grenville, lest by any accident it might have fallen into Lady Camelford’s hands ; but I have written to Lady Grenville to inform her that Lord Camelford has not been ill-treated by the French Government, and that he is now on his way to England.

“Mr. Wynne has desired me to acquaint your Lordship that the German letter which you forwarded to me to be translated by him was merely a begging letter. As I have some notion of having formerly seen the handwriting of the French letter—which I also enclose—I have sent to the Post Office to withdraw the two letters mentioned in it, which I will forward to your Lordship as soon as I shall receive them.”

## The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1803, April 14.] Bath.—“I have received your long letter, and I answer it for obvious reasons most shortly.

“I subscribe to every opinion stated by you ; and very particularly to that which urged the addition of the materials number 4. I deprecate the necessity of including no. 3, unless no. 4 is likewise added, and I think for ourselves, that our Stowe opinions of October last are very much strengthened, and apply more strongly to the present moment than even to that of October. Beyond this I will not say one word, for I think I see clearly that there is no real intention or wish on the part of government to see Lord Spencer, Windham, or you in office ; and all that has passed gives abundant means to them of not offering that which you most certainly do not ask from any one.

“As to the means that might be employed by a firm and able government, I really begin to doubt whether it is possible to recover enough of the ground which in every way has been lost by these two fatal years to give us a reasonable hope of escaping the punishment due to the extreme misconduct of the people who have borne out our imbecile government on the question of the peace. The storm is thickening every moment, and I am satisfied that we shall have war, because I think Bonaparte will find it his interest as well as his wish to use the means which he has so well collected for our humiliation.

“I leave this place on the 18th, and pass two days at Avington on my road to Stowe, where I wish to pass 14 days ; but we must meet, and perhaps it would be easy for me to pass either Friday or Saturday next at Dropmore if you are there, for it will not be above ten miles out of my way. Let

me know therefore by return of post whether you will be returned to London, or whether you can give me (if you should be there) a *tête à tête* mutton chop at Dropmore."

The EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, April 15. Cumberland Place.—“I am going to Elton upon a little business, and though I mean to return on Tuesday before dinner, yet as it may happen that the country may tempt me to stay a little longer, if you should want me in the House of Lords you will be so good as to write to me.

“I wish to put you in mind that Lord Moira and Lord King, both of them expressing themselves towards you in terms of the greatest civility and respect, put off what they had meant to say on Lord Auckland’s financial statements because they supposed you might wish to take a part in that discussion. I do not exactly know the time they named after the recess, but I believe it was Wednesday, and I think you would not wish, whenever it comes, that they should neither see you in your place, nor have heard a word from you.

“I regret very much to see you remaining at Dropmore when Pitt is not only in the neighbourhood, but, I am well convinced, actively employed in making arrangements for a new administration. I will not allow myself to believe that you are not in correspondence with him on this occasion, or that he will take any decisive steps without you. But if I should be mistaken, I hope you will not suffer it to be impressed upon the public mind that you are laid aside because nothing short of actual war will satisfy you. Though war may be inevitable, and the nation may undertake it vigorously, it will not be popular, and Lord Spencer and you seemed to me to take the best possible ground when, upon the King’s message, you rejoiced in vigorous measures as the only means, if any means could now be effectual, of preserving peace. It is in consequence of what I have heard that I have been induced to say this. I have no information but report. You know my motive, and my ambition is to see you in office again.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1803, April.] Monday.—“Upon the order of the day, which was the Consolidation Bill, Addington said that he found opinions would differ upon that discussion, as to the different propriety of that measure in the different cases of hostilities or of accommodation arising out of the present discussions with France; and as (much as he regretted the present state of suspense) he had the greatest expectation of being able to make a communication to the House on that subject before

Monday next, he moved to put off the Consolidation Bill till next Monday. Upon this Shaw Le Fevre urged this as a reason for Patten likewise deferring his motion, and Fox, Ryder and Canning joining in this request, he agreed to make his motion immediately subsequent to the communication taking place; which is perhaps as good a state as the business can stand in. In the House of Lords, the Chancellor being confined by illness, nothing was said. Lord Carlisle hears that Addington thinks it will be war, and is in a great fright; that the negotiation is got again into the hands of Talleyrand, who kicks at all notion of our keeping Malta for any time; and therefore, I suppose, there will still be a short term of two or three years which we shall accept.

“Lord Hawkesbury has told Grey that they shall resist the committee on the state of the nation.”

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, April 17. Bromley Hill.—“I should have written to you sooner, but I could not have told you with any confidence till after what passed yesterday, the probable result of the communications which have taken place since I came here. All prospect of the proposition coming in a proper shape seems now at an end. From the tenor of the conversations which I held with Addington in the course of Sunday evening and Monday morning, I should rather have guessed that he would have brought himself (though reluctantly) to do all which depended upon him to meet the ideas I stated to him, and to put the business into that train which might possibly have led to a satisfactory arrangement. His letter, however, of the 12th (which I received only late the next day and which I enclose with everything else that has passed in writing) led to a very different expectation. You will see in the next paper the copy of my answer, which was followed yesterday by his letter No. 2. To the latter I at first returned an answer barely acknowledging the receipt of it; but as it seemed to put a most inaccurate construction on the whole transaction, I thought it right on reflection to send him this morning my letter of which the copy is marked No. 2. This I trust will completely obviate the danger of misrepresentation on any material point, and particularly on that in which you and those who stand in the same situation with yourself, are most immediately concerned. I meant that it should at the same time avoid the possibility of appearing by explanation to afford the slightest invitation to any fresh overture. I have recapitulated in it, with all the accuracy I could, the substance of the most important parts of our conversation, and I cannot therefore put you in possession of the state of the case more fully by writing than by referring you to this paper. I should be very desirous that you should

communicate the whole of this information, *in strict confidence*, to Lord Spencer and your brother; but I am most anxious that it should go no farther, and that no particulars should at present transpire. I must beg you to return the papers if possible in the course of to-morrow, lest I should receive any answer from Addington which may require my referring to them. In the present state of things it is not my intention to stay long near town, and I believe, on Tuesday, I shall go for a day to Lord Carrington's at Wycombe, and afterwards to Wilderness in my way to Walmer. Sunday, I dine at Wimbledon. Pray let me know what your plans are. I will certainly make my arrangement so as to meet you either in town or at Dropmore, if you are likely to be there."

*Enclosure.*

CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. PITT and MR. ADDINGTON.

HENRY ADDINGTON to W. PITT.

1803, April 12. Downing Street.—“There is to be a meeting of Cabinet to-morrow at Lord Chatham's, when I propose mentioning the subject of our conversations at Bromley Hill. I think it, however, incumbent upon me to acknowledge that, after the best consideration which I have been able to give to the proposed arrangement, my opinion respecting it remains unaltered; but if I could justify the recommendation of it upon public grounds, the only honourable course I could pursue would be to concur in the sacrifices it would require, and to put myself entirely out of the question, and this I would do with the utmost readiness, and the most perfect satisfaction. I will only add that the objections to what has been suggested respecting the Speakership of the House of Lords appear to me to be insurmountable under any circumstances; and I am convinced that they would appear so to you upon farther consideration. I have here expressed only my own sentiments, and I am very sorry that it was not in my power to write to you earlier in the day. With those of my colleagues you shall be acquainted either to-morrow afternoon, or on Thursday morning; indeed, if I hear nothing to the contrary from you, I will endeavour to be at Bromley Hill by one o'clock on Thursday, but I must return to dinner. In the meantime I shall entertain a hope that you may not feel it necessary to adhere, in it's full extent, to the proposition which you have made.” *Copy.*

W. PITT to HENRY ADDINGTON.

1803, April 13. Bromley Hill.—“I shall certainly be at your orders at the time you mention to-morrow, if you continue anxious to see me, but I can have nothing to add

to the explicit statement I have already made to you of my general ideas ; and as you already know the *only grounds* on which I can entertain any farther discussion on the subject on which we conversed, I trust you will not think it necessary to give yourself any farther trouble upon it, unless, after consulting your colleagues, you feel it advisable *on those grounds* to recommend that step being taken from the highest quarter which I have felt it my duty to represent as an indispensable preliminary to my entering on the formation of any plan of arrangement. As my opinion on this point cannot admit of alteration, it would be fruitless to resume our discussion if you entertain, on your part, any idea of its proceeding on any other basis." *Copy.*

#### HENRY ADDINGTON to W. PITT.

1803, April 14. Downing Street.—“It is necessary, notwithstanding the intimation contained in your last letter, that I should acquaint you with the sentiments of his Majesty’s confidential servants on the subject of our conversations at Bromley Hill. I stated to them the motives which could alone induce you to think of returning to office, and the outline of the only plan upon which, as it appeared to you, an arrangement could be advantageously made. They all expressed in the strongest terms the satisfaction which they should derive from the union of those who had concurred in opinion respecting the leading measures of Government ; but they feel that what appears to them to be due to the interests of the public, as they might be affected by the declared opinions of some of those who were proposed to be comprehended in such an arrangement, would not allow them to give their advice that steps should be taken towards carrying it into effect.” *Copy.*

#### W. PITT to HENRY ADDINGTON.

1803, April 15th. Bromley Hill.—“On receiving your letter I abstained from doing more than acknowledging it, because I felt unwilling to make any observations on a subject which I considered (as I still do) as brought to a decided issue. But, on reflecting on some passages in that letter, I am not sure whether they do not give reason to think that you have, in some respects, understood what has passed between us in a different light from that in which I viewed it, and in which I hoped it had been placed by the whole tenor of our conversations. I refer to those expressions which seem to imply that you considered yourself as authorised to state to your colleagues a specific and positive proposition as made by me, and as containing the outline of a plan of arrangement, which it was for them to consider

whether they ought to recommend to his Majesty to carry into effect. I certainly do not consider myself as having made to you *any* proposition on the subject. Our interview originated as I conceive, in a strong wish expressed by yourself that I might be induced to return to my former situation in the King's service. On this point I stated that the only ground on which I could think myself called upon to give any positive answer to such a proposition, or to say any thing which could be in any degree binding with respect to the details of any arrangement connected with it, was that of receiving some direct previous intimation of his Majesty's wish to that effect, together with full authority to form, *for his Majesty's consideration*, a plan of arrangement, *in any manner* I thought best for his service, *as well out of those who were in the former as those who are in the present Government*. I added that the *whole and every part* of such plan, when submitted to his Majesty, must of course depend on his approbation or rejection; that nothing could in any instance be so adverse to my sense of duty and propriety, as to press for a moment any part that might not be consistent with his Majesty's opinion and inclination; but that, in case of any such objection, it must be open to me to judge, whether it did not in my opinion render it impossible for me to engage in his Majesty's service.

“With respect to my colleagues in the former Government, I also stated, that until I was enabled, in consequence of such previous authority from his Majesty, to make them a distinct proposal, I could neither be authorised to state, nor could in fact expect to know what would be their determination upon it. In all our subsequent conversation that had any reference to detail, I wished you to understand that I could only state to you the outline of my present ideas of such arrangement as the circumstances appeared to me to require, in order to enable you to judge how far, in your present situation, you felt it to be your duty to recommend to his Majesty to honour me with the intimation of his pleasure, on which any proceeding must be founded; and finally, in proceeding to explain these ideas, I certainly apprized you in the strongest manner of my intention to include, in any plan of arrangements which I might submit to his Majesty, former colleagues of mine (in case they consented) to whose opinions on the measures of Government your letter immediately refers. You will perceive therefore from this explanation that it does not in the smallest degree tend to vary the grounds on which the objections of yourself and your colleagues to the ideas I entertain, appear from your letter to be formed. Indeed no consideration would have induced me to trouble you with it, if I thought it calculated to produce such an effect, much less if it could lead to the possibility of reviving between us a discussion with respect to the object which was in view, which I consider as now finally and absolutely closed. My only motive has been the desire of endeavouring to prevent

any possible misunderstanding with respect to what has passed, in case it should ever become necessary hereafter to refer to any part of the transaction." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to W. PITT.

1803, April 16. Dropmore.—“Your servant arrived here late last night with your letter, and the papers enclosed in it, which I now return agreeably to your desire. In every respect but one the perusal of those papers has afforded me the highest satisfaction. Nothing could be more gratifying to my feelings than to observe the honourable, wise, and dignified line on which your own conduct has been rested, and the fresh proof which you have given of unabated friendship and good opinion towards myself. The only cause of regret which this transaction can afford is to be found in the consideration of any circumstances, be they what they may, which continue to deprive the public service of your character and talents, at a time when both are so necessary to the preservation of the country.

“Agreeing with you, as you know I entirely do, in the absolute necessity that before you could proceed to form the plan of any new arrangement you should be authorized to that effect by the only person from whom you could properly receive that authority, and being no less persuaded in common with yourself that, in the progress or conclusion of such an arrangement, it would be equally inconsistent with prudence, as with duty, for any individuals to consent to take a share in it, unless called upon to do so by the wishes and commands of that person, it is unnecessary for me, especially in the turn the business has now taken, to repeat to you what I have uniformly said on that subject, both in my own name, and in that of those with whom I have agreed in opinion on the late measures.

“But if we could, even now, believe that any consideration personal to ourselves did form the real obstacle to an arrangement calculated to give to the country the fair benefit of your services, there is no entreaty we should not make to induce you to forego any such consideration. It is too apparent that this is not the case, and that the real desire has been that of strengthening by the accession of your name a system of government which is too weak either to carry on the public service with any prospect of advantage, or even to maintain itself, and not that of enabling you to exert your own abilities and to apply your just weight in the country to the formation and conduct of a Government suited to the exigency of such a crisis.

“I am going this morning to Wimbledon to make to Lord Spencer the communication of these events as you desire. I shall stay there to-morrow, and will drive down with you either here or to Wycombe on Monday or Tuesday, as may suit you best.”

## W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, April 16. Bromley Hill.—“ I shall be in town early on Monday morning and will call on you before twelve at Camelford House; we may then settle about Dropmore. I cannot well avoid going straight to Wycombe on Tuesday, and could not come to you before Thursday. In town I am afraid Monday and Tuesday morning will not allow of much leisure, but Thursday I am quite at liberty, and if you do not want to be in town, shall be very glad to pass it at Dropmore. At any rate, I would come to town that day if we cannot conveniently arrange it otherwise, as I have fixed nothing more than to be here on Friday, and go to Wilderness on Saturday.

*Postscript.*—“ I would have proposed to call at Lord Spencer's on Monday morning, to have taken my chance of finding both him and you there, but I think crossing the common in that direction just now would add a little to the number of wise speculations which are as well avoided.”

## THE COUNTESS OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1803, April 16.]—“ The Bishop of Lincoln has just been here to ask me whether I had any tidings about your coming to town. He was at Bromley yesterday morning when a *letter arrived* which puts a complete close to all the pending negotiations, and Pitt looks upon it as so entirely concluded, that he is at present thinking of returning to Walmer early next week. The Bishop is very anxious for you to see Pitt, and to learn from him the detail of all that has passed, which, as far as it relates to Pitt, will be satisfactory to you. He suspects that some favourable intelligence has been received within the two last days from the Continent, which makes the Doctor still think of running alone a little longer. Pitt will probably pass Monday next at the Deanery, but, of course, wishes his being in London not to be published. If you will write me an answer to this, I will transmit it to the Bishop.”

## THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1803], April 17. Bath.—“ One word only to say that though as no one is more sensible to the blessings which the steerage of the old *Palinurus* would give to us at the moment of such a storm, I am most delighted that he has felt all that we could have wished him to feel, as due to the King, to the country, to his own honour, and lastly (though not least) what is due to us in this matter. Whatever is to be the result, I shall ever be most happy that this most insidious proposition (for the general report states it so) has been put by. As to what is

ultimately to happen, it is much beyond the speculation of Bonaparte, even though his commercial commissioners may have reported most accurately upon the value of your rhododendrons, of my oaks, and Mr. Pitt's Walmer farm.

"Adieu! I hope to be with you on Thursday, and direct to you in London without any fear that Mr. Freeling should make use of this letter in any way he likes best."

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, May 1. Walmer Castle.—"I arrived here on Friday evening too late for the post, and therefore could not answer your letter till to-day. Your explanation of the difference of 141,000*l.* in the statement of supply is clearly right, and perfectly satisfactory. Your reasons are equally so for not striking off the sum of 133,000*l.* for increased balance in hand, for which credit is taken in Vansittart's abstract. The question respecting the allowance of 126,000*l.* for deficiency of malt can only be ascertained by knowing whether a provision for that deficiency is actually included among the miscellaneous services for the year. If you will take the trouble to send to Rose, he can at once clear it up by a reference to the Vote of Supply. If it is not included, I suspect the sum of 624,000*l.* is itself too large instead of too small, as the average deficiency is (if I recollect right) more than 126,000*l.* I have not seen the appropriation paper to which you refer, but the sum of 497,000*l.* is stated as interest and charges of the Austrian loan, in the last printed account of the Consolidated Fund, and I am pretty sure is correct. Perhaps the difference of 37,000*l.* may arise from the Sinking Fund of 1*l.* per cent. being omitted in the other account. On the whole I think your statement will be as clear as possible not only to those who understand the subject, but to any persons who are capable of forming any idea on a question of figures. Perhaps its effect may be made more striking and the result more likely to be remembered, by dividing the comparison formally under three heads in the manner I have marked in the paper. You will also find one or two slight alterations suggested in the second page, which strike me as making the sense more correct. The only material suggestion is in the last page. I doubt whether it is wise, in framing the result stated in the conclusion of the statement, to take it so much for granted that *no material* reduction can be expected in our establishments. I certainly despair of their being brought (within any moderate time) to Addington's estimate, but I am not quite clear that they may not safely be reduced in another year by 1,000,000*l.* or 1,200,000*l.* below their present amount. At all events I should think it safer to state this point more cautiously, and I have put down some words for that purpose. I do not know whether you have had occasion

yet to refer to the accounts of the 5th April last. They certainly cannot be brought to contradict the accuracy of your statement as drawn from the papers before you ; but they are material with respect to the practical question of our future prospects ; and they are the more likely to be introduced into the debate because, on the face of them, they shew a large increase of revenue in the last quarter. I send you the only account I have received on the subject, and there are some articles on which I cannot judge without further explanation. You will observe that in the permanent revenue (exclusive of new taxes, and of land tax, which last can only be estimated on the average of a year) there is an increase of about 600,000*l.* But only 44,000*l.* of this is in the general revenue, and the remainder is under the head of sugar, malt and tobacco, and may probably therefore be only casual in this particular year, as there is reason to believe that the sugar duty is from temporary causes more productive than usual, and the malt still more so. This point, however, cannot be fully ascertained without an accurate comparison with the produce of those duties on an average, and particularly in the quarter ending 5th April, 1802. This information also Rose could, I dare say, furnish you with. I have troubled you as you desire with all the observations which occur to me. Your debate I suppose will now come on at all events, though I have little faith that the ultimatum will have been received even by that time, unless it announces war."

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, May 1. Harley Street.—“ Comme le Prince Casteleicala vous a communiqué ce qu'il a reçu de Gallo, et que je l'ai prié de vous raconter ce que m'a écrit le Comte Markof sur le même sujet, j'ai cru qu'il valoit mieux vous donner la copie de cette information. Elle est incroyable, et couvrira ce ministère Lampédousien d'un ridicule inéfassable dès qu'il produira cette belle transaction aux deux chambres du Parlement. En attendant, ça restera entre nous."

*Enclosure.*

COUNT MARKOFF to COUNT WORONZOW.

1803, April 25. Paris.—“ Whithworth sort de chez moi ; il m'a dit qu'il a épuisé ses instructions et ses modifications : parmi ces dernières il a proposé la conservation de Malthe pendant un certain nombre d'années, jusqu'à ce que l'acquisition que l'Angleterre fairoit dans la mer d'Afrique de l'isle de *Lampedouse*, appartenente au roi de Naples et actuellement *déserte*, fut mise en état de recevoir les escadres anglaises, et de former un établissement dans la Méditerranée. On a refusé

net la proposition de garder Malthe plus longtems, de quelque manière que ce soit.

“Quant à l’isle de Lampedouse on a offert de concourir à cette acquisition de tous les moyens possibles, parcequ’on ne demande pas mieux que d’embarquer l’Angleterre dans une entreprise qui lui coutera des sommes immenses, et qu’on sera le maître d’anéantire à l’instent où on la vera devenir de quelqu’utilité pour l’Angleterre.

“L’ambassadeur d’Angleterre s’attend à recevoir sou peu de jours son *ultimatum*, et, en même tems, l’ordre de partire, si cet *ultimatum* n’est pas admis dans un certain terme fixé. Le ministère d’ici attend la rentrée des réponces de notre cour, et Talleyrand me dit également qu’on n’admettra aucune composition sur l’article de Malthe.” *Extract.*

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1803, May 1-10.]—“Lord Pelham tells Lord Darnley that he means to announce that, *contrary* to expectation, Lord Whitworth had stayed at Paris, and therefore the communication must be deferred till the English messenger returns, which he will in three or four days. I know from my *old authority* that the new proposition made to us was that we should evacuate Malta, and that it should be garrisoned by Russians, Austrians or Prussians; this was after they had refused us Malta for ten years. We are angry at Lord Whitworth for staying only to send us such a proposition, and we have nevertheless sent to Paris to say that we will hold Malta till Lampedusa be made a safe port, and we accompany this with a secret article, to say it shall not be deemed a safe port before ten years are past. Lord Whitworth is ordered to come away in thirtx-six hours if this is refused. I presume it will.

“I hear France wants time, having a Newfoundland fleet out, St. Domingo fleet out, and Spanish treasure coming home. Nothing will be objected in House of Lords or House of Commons to-day.”

#### COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, May 10. Harley Street.—“Vous pouvez bien croire combien je prens part à l’affliction où vous êtes, ainssi que Lady Grenville, par le malheur qu’elle a eu de perdre une mère si justement chérie.

“J’ai respecté votre douleure, et je n’ai pas cru devoir vous importuner par mes lettres; mais je crois qu’à présent il est du devoir d’un vrai ami de vous avertire qu’il est très important à un homme de votre grand caractère de venir au secours de votre patrie dans les circonstances actuelles, qui deviennent de moment à moment plus difficiles et plus allarmentes. Vendrédi

prochain sera un jour trop important dans le deux chambres pour que vous puissiez vous absenter. Excusez la liberté que je me permets de vous donner ce *hint*."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, May 11. Walmer Castle.—“As I understand the message can hardly be expected before next Monday, and the consideration of it will probably not be sooner than the Monday following, I do not mean at present to be in town sooner than Saturday. Sunday, or any day afterwards I shall be quite at your commands, and if it will suit you better than coming to town, will come down to you at Dropmore for a few hours any morning you like. I do not propose a longer stay, because I am afraid it would be breaking in upon Lady Grenville; though I hope she is beginning to recover from the shock she has had to sustain, as well as from the effects of so much continued anxiety and fatigue. Have the goodness to let me find a note in York Place on Saturday (unless you write so that your letter may reach me here on Friday) saying what you wish. I am not a little impatient to learn your expedient about Malta, which I certainly cannot divine. In the meantime I will be very cautious on the subject, though it is rather late as I have never hitherto had much reserve in stating my opinion upon it.”

The EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1803, May 11. London.]—“The newspapers and Lord Spencer’s letter to Tom will have put you *au fait* of every thing that passed here yesterday. Lord Fitzwilliam rose to speak at the same time as Lord Carlisle, but Lord Carlisle getting the start of him, he contented himself with dividing. The minority were Darnley, Spencer, Fitzwilliam, Albermarle, Yarborough, Cawdor, Carlisle, and myself. Lord Spencer spoke very well. Moira went upon the steps of the throne, saying that as he could not attend himself to-day, it would not be proper for him to vote the short adjournment. The Duke of Clarence did not vote, Cumberland voted with the majority, and the Bishop of Chester, as I was told, after the question put, went away without voting. The division in the Commons was, I think, very strong, and I dare say you are not displeased that it was called for when Tom was absent. I reckon that we cannot take into consideration the papers that will be communicated on Monday till towards the end of the week, and I hope no material debate will come on till you are present, as there is nobody who can at all supply your place.

“I am one of those who are still in doubt whether the communication on Monday will be as decisive as it is

expected. Lord Whitworth not having left Paris on the day fixed, something has probably been thrown out to amuse ; and I dare say the orders were not sent to Andriossi to ask for his passport till the French Government had good reason to think that Lord Whitworth would not stick to his point."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1803, May 12. London.] Monday.—“I write this line to tell you that Pelham gave his notice, and Lord Spencer as had been agreed, said a few words to justify the vote of Friday, and to take credit in acquiescing in the delay which Ministers asked for.

“In our House Addington said that when he spoke on Friday he believed Lord Whitworth to have left Paris, that unforeseen circumstances had prevented his leaving Paris, that the House would not now ask him to describe those circumstances, but he would say that those circumstances must be decided upon *to-morrow* or *Wednesday morning* at latest, so that he had the strongest possible conviction of being able in a very short time indeed to make a communication to the House ; not a word was said.

“Thelusson and the French houses in the city say it will be peace, but the language of government runners is war.

“The King’s having come to town on Saturday for six hours gives some suspicion of some arrangement being contriving.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1803, May 13. Charles Street.] Tuesday. Charles Street.—“My kitchen is still an hospital ; Lord Carysfort has therefore undertaken to receive you on Thursday, and Lord Spencer, Windham, Elliot, and Canning, will meet you on that day in Cumberland Place. I will send my carriage to Pall Mall at six to fetch you, that we may go together, and I will bring you back. I can likewise take you to the House on Friday, so that you will have no occasion for your own horses in London. I hear nothing new to-day, even in report. I do not find that there is any reason to expect Pitt before the final conclusion of this business, but I take for granted that you will, by this time, or by to-morrow, hear from him.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, May 14. Charles Street.—“You was scarcely gone from town before Pitt arrived in Pall Mall, and Pitt was hardly come before the messenger from Paris, who at one o’clock brought the news that Lord Whitworth on Thursday night was to sleep at Chantilly, on his road to England. Bragge has just told me that Addington sends a message to the

Lord Mayor with this account ; he added that Bonaparte had referred the question to his Council of State, and that, in consequence of their decision, Lord Whitworth left Paris. Rose tells me that Pitt, whom he has just left in Baker Street, had determined to go down to you to Dropmore to-morrow, and means to set out about twelve, so that you will hear from him the latest and fullest accounts of all that is known here. I have met almost all the Ministers riding about *comme si de rien n'étoit*, although, by Lord Bathurst's account, the stocks have fallen to 57.

"The King has countermanded his horses and stays in town. With all this there is still a latent hope of peace, even though Lord Whitworth should arrive ; and it is said that the discontent in Paris at the departure of Lord Whitworth is very universal. Will Addington stick to his text of yesterday, and really make no communication to the House on Monday, if the wind should be contrary enough to prevent Lord Whitworth from arriving ? If there was any other government this question of doubt would seem childish to propose, but now it is a fair matter to speculate upon. Our friends are all very impatient at your absence ; surely you had better come with Pitt to the message, and return again afterwards to Dropmore."

#### W. PITT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, May 19. York Place.—"I return the four papers you left with me. The letter from Woronzow to his brother here refers to a copy of the instructions to Count Marcoff as being sent to him for his guidance. Marcoff's letter also refers to a copy of the Emperor's rescript (which probably is the same paper) as sent by him ; but no such paper accompanies either of the letters given you ; and it's contents would probably be very material towards understanding more distinctly what sort of arrangement Russia points to. On the face of these papers the overture rather strikes me at present as less promising than it seemed to you ; though not, I believe, to such a degree as to make any material difference in the proper mode of treating it."

#### COUNT STARHEMBERG TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1803, May.]—"J'ai été vous chercher inutilement ce matin, je voulais parler un instant des affaires du tems à mon ami. Ce sont les seuls momens de consolation politique que j'éprouve. Les régnaux, qui ne savent pas régner, ne m'entendent pas, quoiqu', en général, ils soient personnellement bien pour moi. *Frendonreich* m'a prié de vous redémander ses papiers ; je crois qu'enfin Lord Hawkesbury le verra, il me l'a promis ce matin, ce sera de la moutarde après-dîner. Vous savez sans doute que *le Valois* est déjà formellement

incorporé à la France. Nous avons parfaitement reçu M. Diesbach, espèce de ministre Suisse et très bien pensant. M. de Cobentzl l'avoit prié de demander des lettres de créance, et il paroissoit un favori ; mais un billet de Champagny, qui a exigé son renvoi comme un homme dont les principes étoient hostiles à la France, lui a valu de notre part l'ordre de quitter Vienne. *O tempora ! O mores !* Je ne crois pas que les grandes puissances fassent fortune à la longue comme *Pertinax Sycophant* dans le *Man of the world*, (all by bowing).

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, May 26. York Place.—“I was very sorry to miss seeing you before you left town, though even then I fear it was too late to entertain any hope of changing the course which you mean to pursue. I do not like to break in upon you to-day, when it would only interrupt you, but I cannot help writing to tell you that, though I certainly have no idea of disguising my real opinion respecting much of the past conduct of Government, I shall feel it necessary to state how far I am from approving an attempt to remove them by Parliamentary censure. And the same sentiment which I must state in the House of Commons will probably be expressed to-day in the House of Lords.”

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1803, May 28], Saturday.—“The failure of yesterday's ballot, which was put off till this day, makes my journey impracticable for to-day, and Canning having desired to see me on Monday morning, and Lord Carlisle to-morrow, I fear I must abandon all hopes of seeing you at Dropmore. Lord F[itizWilliam] with whom I passed three hours this morning, is well satisfied with all the resolutions, but wishes to take the three first on the first day, to which I presume there can be no objection. I have, however, engaged that you shall call upon him on Wednesday at three to settle finally, and I have desired Lord Carysfort to give you and me a dinner on Wednesday also.

“Canning tells me in his note of to-day that the P[eeers] wish to stick to their original three resolutions ; we must, therefore, look to a second day, as well as you.

“Stocks have risen 3 per cent., as they were sure to do from the discussion of yesterday ; and although there is little substantial ground in what passed yesterday, one sees in the eagerness with which people interpret what was said, how eager they are for the event which they have now new hopes of seeing arrive.

“I do not absolutely find whether [Pitt] gave notice or not for Friday ; if he has not I know not whether Tuesday (the day after Addington's Budget) would not be our most propitious day ; but this must depend on the wishes of our friends.

At all events Lord F[itizWilliam] says his motion shall stand for Thursday."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1803, May 30.]—"Canning has settled with me to make a new arrangement of the Res[olutions] (leaving out the 4th) and writing the 5th and 6th in one, to have them all moved on Friday together, this course is thought the most advisable, and we find the Budget is put off till Friday se'nnight or perhaps even later.

"How far Lord F[itizWilliam] adopts or disapproves of this in the Lords I do not yet know, for he is out of town and does not return till to-morrow. I will expect you on Wednesday between two and three; our friends meet us at Lord Carysfort's at dinner on that day.

"Pitt returns here from Bromley on Thursday."

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1803], June 5. Stowe.—"I write to you to express my satisfaction at all that I have seen or heard of your labours; and perfectly agree with you that Thursday would have been decisive against the Doctor, even if the House of Lords debate had been less decisive as to Mr. Pitt's total separation from him. Lord Hawkesbury's attack upon Pitt was exactly every thing that I could wish; and the utter despondency of his speech, as well as of that of Lord Castlereagh, shews plainly how little they trust to the Doctor's new recruits. I have no idea that Lord Moira can be sufficiently insane to engage in such a bark; but I perfectly agree with you that Addington has made up his mind to try any experiment that can enable him to live over to-morrow; though it will as certainly annihilate him next day. All this can ultimately end only one way; and whether that necessity will occur a little sooner or later is of little importance except in the most important point of view, namely, that of the national distress.

"As to yourself, I shall be so glad to see you, and so unwilling to put by any opportunity of intercourse that may be broken in upon by so many public and private chances, that I am very anxious that you should begin your tour with Stowe, which may put you on your road to Wales and back through the northern counties; a tour that I should recommend very much in preference to Devon, which will put your good women too near Cornwall."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, June 16.—"Pitt, as I understood from the first, had not meant to oppose the Budget, at least in it's opening, but I just hear that although he goes to-day to Walmer, he returns

to town in three days, and therefore probably for some of the details of the business.

“The points that seem most questionable are first, as to the land tax, that although it is divided into the shares of 1s. for the proprietor, and 9d. for the tenant upon all *existing bargains*, yet wherever there is no lease, and wherever any estate now on old rents is to be raised, the whole of the two taxes, amounting together to 8 $\frac{3}{4}$  per cent., will fall upon the landlord. I yesterday met with a man of large landed estate who told me that he had just now settled for a rise of his estate, the new leases of which were not yet executed, and that he is already told that his tenants will not agree unless their 9d. tax shall be allowed for in their new bargains. Surely, in this view there is no just proportion kept between the tax on land and the tax on money. The other question the most mooted is as to the propriety of the exemption of foreigners, not only because it will create fictitious holdings in our funds, but because where the holding is real it gives the foreigner too great an advantage. The price and value of the funds will be lowered by this tax, and so the foreigner will have the advantage of the tax in buying at a lower price, while he incurs none of the disadvantage by the payment of the tax, and is therefore able with the same sum to buy a larger profit than an English dealer can. Rose says it is folly in the extreme to think that the consumption of tea and wine will not be affected by such enormous taxes.”

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1803, June 18.] Charles Street.—“I can give you no positive intelligence as to the Report of the Clergy Bill, other than they expect to finish the details to-night, and if they do, it will be reported Monday or Tuesday. The chief object of the two Houses sitting to-day is, as I am told, to receive a message from the Crown about arming, which message will be taken into consideration, as I hear, on Monday; but they appear to be so little prepared with their plan and message that I cannot undertake to say more than that Addington yesterday told Lord Ossory that his arming message would come down to-day, and would be considered on Monday. The only general description which I hear of it is something of a ballot of all men between 16 and 45 to serve in the regular army, but not out of Great Britain and Ireland. My own notion would rather be a ballot for immediately completing your regular army according to the ordinary rules of service, but I must repeat that I hear daily of such changes in the plans of Ministers on this subject as announce no well-considered or mature arrangement on their part.

“The language of Government runners and of Court runners in the last days has been to deny the existence of any supposed objection to P[itt] at Bromley Hill, and much is whispered

of the advantage of union. I hear, too, that our Scotch *Confederate's* language about the present Ministers is less hostile to them than it was, and many little circumstances concur to make me rather believe that the idea is entertained of obtaining effective support to Government by their reconciliation with P[itt].

“ In the meantime I have secret but certain reason to know that strong demonstration is made at Paris of all sorts of professions to a third Power as to disposition to furnish every possible facility for accommodation ; some things that I hear of this nature, though too secret to put upon paper, are to the greatest degree curious and interesting although difficult to decipher.

“ If you ride up Monday morning, I think it probable that day, or that and the next, would give you *clergy, arming message*, and a better knowledge of the interesting news which I hint at.”

LORD GRENVILLE au MARQUIS DE WELLESLEY.

1803, Juillet 12. [London.]—“ Il y a deux jours que j'ai reçu votre lettre du 16 février, et j'y réponds en ce moment quoique j'ignore entièrement quand j'aurai occasion de vous faire parvenir ma réponse. À l'égard de votre séjour dans l'Inde, il y a long-tems que cette question a été décidée, et telle est la distance qui nous sépare, qu'avant que celle-ci ne vous parvienne, le tems fixé pour votre départ sera déjà arrivé. J'ignore entièrement si l'événement de la guerre que nos sages ministres ont enfin déclarée les aura engagés à vous prier de continuer encore quelque tems votre séjour dans l'Inde. Il n'y avait personne capable de mieux apprécier qu'eux la certitude de cet événement, en sorte qu'on doit supposer qu'ils ont pris toutes les mesures que le moment exigeait ; mais cependant tout nous fait voir qu'ils ont été pris au dépourvu comme si cet événement avait été le moins attendu. Il n'est pas en conséquence improbable que lorsqu'ils ont vu que la guerre était inévitable, c'est-à-dire, le jour qu'ils l'ont déclarée, ils peuvent vous avoir expédié l'ordre de rester dans l'Inde. Mais c'est ce que j'ignore entièrement ; je ne puis en conséquence en raisonner. Si cela n'arrive point, j'espère que rien ne m'empêchera d'avoir le plaisir de vous revoir l'année prochaine, en supposant qu'à cette époque vous ayez encore *une patrie à revoir*.

“ Quand je me sers de cette dernière expression, ne croyez pas que mon mécontentement de la conduite du gouvernement ait en rien changé mon opinion sur les moyens et les ressources de ce pays. Je n'ai jamais été du nombre des *aboyeurs* sur ce sujet. Il est moins question ici d'opinion (si je ne m'abuse pas moi-même), que d'une parfaite connaissance qui équivaut à une certitude, lorsque je dis que le

pays possède non-seulement d'abondans et amples moyens de défense, mais même encore de faire repentir sérieusement notre ennemi de sa conduite hostile, et de le forcer à nous craindre et conséquemment à nous respecter. Mais jusqu'à présent, il y a eu tant d'indécision, de timidité, et de lenteur dans toutes les mesures prises pour obtenir des ressources, et tout notre courage porte en ce moment à tel point l'empreinte de la crainte, que je ne puis avoir la satisfaction d'être fondé à rendre justice, sous ce rapport, aux talens qui sont mis en œuvre et aux dispositions prises.

“ Mon plan de conduite politique a, comme vous l'aurez vu, dévié de plus en plus de celui du Gouvernement. Quant à l'opinion que j'avais énoncée sur la paix, j'ai en ce moment la satisfaction de voir qu'on me rend parfaite justice dans tout le pays. Non-seulement les événements subséquens ont prouvé que le petit corps avec lequel j'ai agi de concert en cette occasion était composé des seules personnes qui sussent alors apprécier cette mesure et ses conséquences ; mais on a eu l'aveu général que nous avions bien vu les choses. Toutes les infâmes calomnies du gouvernement sur ce sujet, sont retombées avec une double force sur leurs têtes. Dans tout ce que j'ai fait depuis, et dans tout ce dont je me suis abstenu, vous recounaîtrez, j'espère, ces sentimens et ces principes, desquels aucune opinion, quelque défavorable qu'elle soit à la conduite personnelle de tout individu, ne me fera jamais dévier.

“ Si j'avais été sûr d'une occasion, je vous aurais écrit le détail de ce qui s'est passé en avril dernier, au sujet d'un changement projeté dans le gouvernement, et je vous aurais expliqué (selon ce que j'en ai pu comprendre), les bases de la conduite que *Pitt* a tenue depuis. J'éprouve un grand plaisir à voir que tandis que ma brouille avec Addington devient de jour en jour plus sérieuse, tous les motifs qui nous faisaient différer d'opinion et de conduite, *Pitt* et moi, diminuent journellement : nous n'avons pas encore pu assimiler complètement nos plans de conduite politique. Notre situation en vérité est, sous un point de vue essentiel, tout-à-fait différente. Quoiqu'il n'ait point recommandé Addington pour son emploi actuel (et en effet, qui le connaissant pourrait le faire ?) cependant il lui a accordé une portion d'influence plus active que mon opinion ne m'aurait permis de lui accorder dans la formation de la nouvelle administration. Il a conseillé ses mesures long-tems après que j'ai eu cessé de communiquer avec eux, et il les a approuvées dans les différens points qui me paraissaient les plus criminels, et qui l'étaient en effet comme l'événement l'a prouvé. Il est en conséquence plus restreint dans sa conduite que je ne le suis, et il ne jouit pas en ce moment de l'instimable avantage que j'ai, de n'avoir jamais caché, ni compromis mon opinion sur des matières d'une telle importance politique ; mais je crois que ses idées sur leur conduite publique ne sont pas très différentes des miennes ; si toutes fois elles diffèrent en rien ; et à tout cela,

il faut ajouter un ressentiment justement mérité, en raison de la conduite personnelle d'Addington envers lui ; il ne cherche plus à cacher ses sentimens. S'il vous a écrit (ce que sûrement il aurait fait, s'il ne s'était pas mis dans la mauvaise habitude de n'écrire à personne) si dis-je, il vous a écrit, il vous aura exprimé, j'en suis persuadé, tous ses sentimens sans réserve, et c'est dans cette persuasion que je vous parle autant de ses opinions. En vérité la mesure qu'il a adoptée dernièrement, (je veux parler de sa motion d'ajournement, ou de son vote de censure mal-jugée en elle-même, comme je pense qu'elle l'a été, et malheureuse dans ses résultats, puisqu'elle a diminué son influence publique), a au moins le mérite d'exprimer d'une manière non équivoque sa désapprobation de la conduite du gouvernement.

“ Je ne me hazarde pas à deviner quels nouveaux événemens auront lieu avant votre arrivée ; et le seul avis que je desire vous donner, ce que je vous ai déjà suggeré plus d'une fois, est de ne vous engager à rien avant votre arrivée ; mais de vous conserver la liberté d'agir d'après tels motifs que vous jugerez devoir diriger votre conduite, lorsque vous serez sur les lieux, et après que différens rapports avec les personnes qui sont à la tête des affaires dans les diverses subdivisions des partis, vous auront mis à même de juger ce qui vous convient le mieux. A l'égard de l'idée énoncée dans l'extrait que vous m'avez envoyé de votre lettre à Addington, vous devez, je crois, ne l'envisager que comme un des événemens possibles les plus réculés. Quant à des inimitiés éternelles, j'en déteste l'idée ; et si j'ai une inimitié éternelle, ce n'est que contre les partisans d'un principe aussi détestable. Mais on doit beaucoup à l'opinion publique, ainsi qu'à la situation personnelle et au caractère des individus, qu'il faut respecter, long-tems après qu'ils ont cessé d'avoir du ressentiment, ou de se plaire à en donner des preuves. Et rien ne parait moins probable que de nous voir à aucune époque rapprochée, (je crois que je pourrais dire à aucune époque de notre vie) *Pitt* et moi disposés à établir avec Addington des rapports de confiance et d'amitié.

“ Les papiers, si vous les avez, vous informeront que toutes nos conversations roulent à présent sur l'invasion ; et qu'enfin nous commençons à prendre des mesures pour nous mettre en état de faire face à nos ennemis, s'ils venaient à bout d'effectuer un débarquement, qui, quoique très improbable, n'est certainement en aucune façon impossible. Parler de conquérir ou subjuguier dix ou douze millions d'hommes, s'ils sont préparés pour le combat et dirigés par un gouvernement désireux et capable d'animer leurs efforts, serait complètement ridicule. Mais l'expérience nous a fait voir que le nombre seul d'habitans, et de plus, des avantages de position locale, ne sont rien, si la direction de la défense reste entre les mains d'hommes qui ne sont distingués que par leur imbécillité et leur faiblesse. Même en Hollande, et plus encore en Allemagne, en Italie, en Suisse, ce ne sont point les habitans, mais les

gouvernemens qui par leur faiblesse ont livré leur pays ; et de la même manière, si dans cette île, ou en Irlande, nous éprouvons quelque échec considerable, nous en serons redevables, non pas à la timidité et à l'ignorance de la nation, mais bien à celles du gouvernement. Vous aurez déjà été à même de juger jusqu'à quel point ces qualités existent dans le Gouvernement actuel, si (comme je le suppose,) vous avez, avant d'avoir reçu cette lettre, lu la correspondance de Lord Hawkesbury avec Otto et Lord Whitworth, et comparé les dates des différens contre-ordres au sujet du Cap, pendant le cours de nos communications avec la France.

“ Il serait superflus d'ajouter à la longueur de cette lettre, en m'étendant sur le plaisir que j'ai éprouvé en trouvant dans la votre ces expressions d'amitié, qui retracent notre ancienne et continuelle liaison. Je n'ai jamais fait pour vous plus que vous n'eussiez fait pour moi en pareille occasion ; et si l'intrigue projetée contre vous est totalement sans effet, et vos mesures justifiées avant d'avoir été condamnées, je ne puis me flatter d'avoir contribué à ce résultat par mes efforts ; quoiqu'il en soit néanmoins, vous pouvez, je crois, regarder l'affaire comme terminée. Il ne paraît pas qu'il en ait été soufflé un mot au parlement jusqu'à Noël ; et je crois réellement que nous n'avez rien à craindre. La seule chose à appréhender à ce sujet ne pourrait être que la peine et le désagrément d'une contestation particulière de cette nature.”

Lord Grenville's letter to Lord Wellesley dated July 12, 1803, and that of Henry Wellesley to his eldest brother dated July 28, 1803, having been captured on their way to India by a French man of war, were translated and published at Paris by order of the Consular Government. It was in their French dress, as we have them here, that they reached the Governor General.

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, July 23. York Place.—“ The House of Commons and Cinque Ports and Trinity House arrangements have left me so little time for several days that I have not been able to write to you. I have now only time to say that I flatter myself you will have seen that the plan at last extorted from Government is at least free from any of the revolutionary organisation you seemed to apprehend, and has been rendered in its progress a measure that may be essentially useful both now and hereafter. I have been unable to avoid engagements for to-day and to-morrow, or I would have endeavoured to pass them at Dropmore. Afterwards I shall only wait for the last stage of the Income Bill on Tuesday, and go then to join my volunteers at Walmer. I shall probably, however, return in the course of next month, and if you remain at Dropmore, I shall hope to be able to come to you. Perhaps you will be tempted to come and look at the French cliffs in the course of the summer.”

## W. WINDHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, [July 27–28]. House of Commons.—“The plot thickens, or rather the piece opens with an incident as dreadful and alarming as can well be conceived. A messenger has arrived, a few hours since, from Dublin, bringing an account of an insurrection having broken out, the extent of which is not distinctly known, and which Ministers do not seem disposed to state even to the extent to which they do know it; but of which the first effects have been the murder of the Chief Justice (Lord Kilwarden) who is said to have been pulled out of his carriage and torn to pieces by the mob; and of the foreman of the grand jury, a Mr. Clark, who is reported to have been killed as he was carrying up an address to the Castle. From some circumstances too, mentioned to me by Corry, it would seem that this was only part of a rising which was to take place at once in various parts of the kingdom. It is not at all clear that when the messenger came away the insurrection, even in Dublin, was got under. In fact I should rather conclude, from what I first heard from persons not connected with Government, and afterwards from the language of some who were, that, at the time of the letters being sent off, the issue of the contest remained still in suspense. A more frightful picture of the state of things in that part of [the] empire cannot well be conceived, because even if the present insurrection should be suppressed, what must be the condition of a country in which such an insurrection could ever have broke out? The papers, of course, of this evening will be full of the news, but I thought I would send you the present hasty account, formed from the best intelligence which I have hitherto been able to collect.

“I wish I could balance this in any degree by accounts of the activity of our preparations here; but, on the contrary, everything that I hear shows that the conduct of the Ministers in the execution of their measures is quite of a piece with the feebleness and dilatoriness which they have shown in bringing them forward. If I may rely upon Thelusson, who is now come to town, a camp of 1,300 men in his neighbourhood had for their whole ammunition 600 ball cartridges; and about the same number with others. I am afraid, too, that the whole of this general training will take the shape which you observed with you, of a separation of the town and village aristocracies from the lower orders of the people. The only cure that I can see is what we were talking about, of forming more efficient corps out of the remainder.”

## HENRY WELLESLEY au MARQUIS DE WELLESLEY.

1803, Juillet 28. Londres.—“Je viens d’apprendre par Lady Wellesley qu’une dépêche par terre doit partir le 28, et j’espère que cette lettre vous parviendra assez à tems pour

vous mettre en état de faire vos préparatifs pour quitter l'Inde en Janvier prochain. Je vais vous faire part, aussi bien que possible, de tout ce qui s'est passé relativement à l'Inde depuis mon arrivée ; et alors vous serez en état de juger quel degré de support vous devez attendre des ministres actuels, et si le Conseil du Contrôle n'a pas été réellement transféré du Conseil à la Cour des Directeurs. Je suis arrivé à Londres en juin, et je me suis de suite présenté chez le Lord Castelragh, qui m'a reçu avec la plus grande honnêteté ; il m'a parlé de vous dans les termes les plus favorables ; il a approuvé toutes vos mesures, mais, en même tems, il est parfaitement évident qu'il ne peut pas obtenir ce que la Cour des Directeurs a pris la résolution de ne pas accorder. Il m'a beaucoup parlé du collège, et m'a paru bien convaincu de l'importance, ainsi que de la nécessité de l'institution. Il croyait, m'a-t-il dit, qu'il viendrait à bout de faire consentir les Directeurs à sa continuation suivant votre plan, avec quelques modifications que vous ne jugeriez pas conséquentes. Il m'a dit que les Directeurs lui avaient écrit, sur ce sujet et sur d'autres, plusieurs lettres fort sèches, et que rien ne pouvait lui être plus désagréable que la situation dans laquelle il était placé.

“ J'ai dit au Lord Castelragh que, dans cette occasion, la Cour des Directeurs vous avait décidément manqué de parole, car une des conditions principales aux quelles vous deviez rester encore un an dans l'Inde, était qu'ils ne se mêleraient rien de vos nominations ; qu'ils avaient déplacé un homme qui avait passé par tous les grades inférieurs au service de la Compagnie.

“ Je lui ai dit ensuite que votre santé était très bonne, et qu'il n'y avait point de sacrifice que vous ne fussiez prêt à faire pour le service public ; mais que je croyais qu'il était impossible que vous restassiez dans l'Inde, au-delà du mois de Janvier prochain, à moins que vous ne fussiez vivement sollicité à ce sujet par les ministres de Sa Majesté et par la Cour des Directeurs ; que quant aux ministres de Sa Majesté je croyais qu'ils étaient d'opinion que votre séjour dans l'Inde était une chose très désirable sous beaucoup de rapports ; que pour la Cour des Directeurs, il devait savoir si elle le désirait ou non. Il ne m'a pas répondu sur le premier point ; quant au second, il a été assez clair ; car il m'a dit que la Cour des Directeurs avait été si courroucée au sujet des opinions que vous aviez manifestées dans quelques-unes de vos dépêches, (ce qui prouve qu'ils n'ont pas la moindre idée des vrais intérêts de l'Inde, et que sous ce rapport ils ne sont guères que des *entêtés imbéciles*), qu'il était persuadé qu'ils désiraient plutôt vous voir résigné, quoiqu'il leur fût impossible de ne pas reconnaître que la continuation de votre séjour dans l'Inde ne pouvait être que très utile aux intérêts publics.

“ Dans une autre conversation que j'eus avec le Lord Castelragh, il me parla beaucoup des négociations Marattes, et je réussis à le convaincre de la justesse de vos mesures à

*Ponah*, et des grands avantages qui devaient en résulter, si nous venions à établir notre influence dans cette cour. Il me demanda de nouveau si vous aviez pris une détermination fixe sur l'époque de votre retour en Angleterre : je lui répétai ce que je lui avais dit dans une autre occasion, à quoi il ne répondit point. Il me parla de la nomination de Barlow, et me demanda si je croyais que vous l'approuveriez ; je lui dis que vous aviez la meilleure opinion de Barlow, mais que vous pensiez qu'aucun employé de la compagnie ne devait succéder au gouvernement général ; je lui dis aussi que la nouvelle nomination était inutile, puisque Barlow avait été antérieurement désigné pour vous succéder provisoirement, et qu'il était préférable d'attendre votre retour avant de présenter personne pour cette nouvelle nomination. Je crois qu'il y a une certaine intrigue secrète concernant la nomination de Barlow, et voici ce que c'est : lorsque les ministres proposèrent Lord W. *Bentick*, pour Madras, la Cour des Directeurs fit les objections les plus formelles à cette nomination, mais elle fût enfin obligée de céder, en se consolant par l'idée qu'un de ses propres employés serait nommé au gouvernement général.

“ J'ai vu Addington à dîner chez le Lord Castelragh : il me parla de vous dans les termes les plus pompeux et les plus affectueux. Il me parla aussi de la nomination de Barlow comme d'une mesure qui devait vous être très-agréable. Le résultat de mes conversations avec Lord Castelragh m'a convaincu que les ministres sentent toute l'importance de la continuation de votre séjour dans l'Inde, et qu'ils désirent beaucoup que vous y restiez, mais qu'ils ne sont pas assez forts pour contester ce point avec la Cour des Directeurs, qui est également déterminée à vous forcer de revenir. Je crois qu'on pourrait se livrer et avec succès à de nouvelles tentatives, pour engager la Cour des Directeurs à solliciter la prolongation de votre séjour. Mais après les avoir vus tout récemment violer l'engagement qu'ils avaient pris de ne se mêler d'aucune de vos nominations, il ne serait ni sage, ni de la dignité, de faire aucune démarche qui donnât à soupçonner que vous désirez rester dans l'Inde, ou que tout motif autre qu'une intime persuasion que ce n'est que pour le bien public, pourrait vous engager à rester une heure de plus que l'époque que vous aviez fixée pour votre retour.

“ Je reçus du président une réception civile mais très froide : il me parla des améliorations dans le commerce, mais ne dit pat un mot de mes services personnels : il me parut disposé à trouver quelque chose à blâmer dans tout ce que nous avons fait à *Ponah*, et nous nous séparâmes après une conversation de dix minutes : lui me disant qu'il avait tant d'affaires qu'il n'avait pas eu le tems de lire les dépêches (quoiqu'elles fussent à l'hôtel de l'Inde depuis cinq jours), mais qu'il espérait avoir de fréquentes occasions de causer avec moi sur les affaires de l'Inde. Je ne l'ai pas vu depuis (quoique je sois resté quinze jours à Londres, pour en avoir l'occasion), et la cour n'a pas

même eu la civilité de m'engager à un des diners qui se donnent tous les mercredis. J'ai depuis été forcé de revenir à *Chester-House*, en raison de ma santé, qui est toujours très mauvaise.

“ Une autre motif qui me fait désirer votre retour est la position des différens partis en Angleterre. Je suppose que vous avez reçu une lettre du Lord *Grenville* à ce sujet ; mais je vous dirai tout ce que j'en sais, et que je tiens en partie d'un intime ami de *Pitt*. Il parait qu'Addington a proposé, il y a quelques semaines, a *Pitt* de rentrer ministère à certaines conditions. *Pitt*, sur cette ouverture d'Addington, commença une négociation avec lui, expliqua les conditions aux quelles il désirait faire partie du ministère ; déclara qu'il n'insisterait pas pour y faire entrer personne contre qui le roi pourrait avoir quelqu'objection, mais qu'il insisterait sur ce que toute l'affaire demeurât secrète jusqu'à ce qu'elle fût totalement arrangée, et, qu'en même tems, il se réserverait la faculté de se retirer de la négociation, s'il était d'opinion que ses services ne pourraient pas être utiles au bien public. A ces conditions il donna le tracé de son plan à Addington ; désigna plusieurs personnes qu'il voulait proposer, et dans le nombre se trouvait Lord *Grenville* ; continuant cependant toujours à déclarer qu'il ne voulait introduire personne malgré le roi, mais qu'il se réserverait la faculté de se retirer. Addington proposa ce plan à ses collègues qui le rejetèrent, et la négociation fût rompue. A présent tous les amis d'Addington déclarent que *Pitt* a refusé d'entrer au ministère, parcequ'il voulait qu'on lui accordât d'y faire entrer *Grenville*, et ses amis. *Pitt* comme vous l'aurez vu, a depuis été opposé à Addington, dans la Chambre ; et ils ne se parlent plus à présent. Lord *Grenville* (qui est l'organe de *Canning*,) m'a dit que *Pitt* avait un tel mépris pour Addington, qu'il ne voudrait pas à présent agir avec lui à telle condition que ce fût. En même tems *Pitt* conteste tous les jours dans la chambre contre l'acte de défense, comme un avocat pourrait le faire ; et par les vrais moyens qu'il a employés, il l'a rendu propre à remplir l'objet proposé, ce qui n'aurait jamais eu lieu autrement. Dans une occasion, il divisa la chambre ; et à l'étonnement d'un chacun, la division était de 50 membres. Néanmoins, je pense avec beaucoup d'autres qu'il est impossible que les choses aillent long-tems sur le pied actuel, et je crois que *Pitt* rentrera dans le cours d'une année. Ceci me fait désirer que vous soyez sur les lieux, pour faire partie du nouveau ministère, qui alors serait excellent, si *Pitt* était à la tête. Qu'en pensez-vous, je vous prie ? Vous seriez en état d'obtenir tout ce que vous voudriez relativement a l'Inde, et si vous le jugiez convenable, d'y retourner comme gouverneur-général.

5 Août.

“ J'ai commencé cette lettre à Londres, mais ayant rencontré le Lord *Castelragh*, il m'a dit que les dépêches ne partiraient pas avant dix jours.

“Pole, a été chez Addington, pour lui parler de moi ; et il m’a promis de consulter le lord Castelaragh sur les moyens de forcer les Directeurs à me recompenser pour mes services dans l’Inde. Je n’attends néanmoins rien d’eux.”\*

#### W. WINDHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, July 29. Pall Mall.—“Though I have seen several letters from Dublin I learn nothing further than what the papers contain, unless it be that it was a complete surprise, and that there are great complaints, both there and here, of the supineness and inattention of the Government. Whether the story be true of the arms in the Town House having been seized I don’t know upon any certain authority. If it is, the expression will not be far wrong, which they complained of so much last night, that the city was upon the point of being lost.

“By a refusal to let Robert Crauford go on, on a point to which, to say a few words, and which could not, to be sure, have been pursued to any length, they have driven him, happily, to the making a separate motion which is fixed for Monday next, and which will relate to the new measures for the defence of London. He wishes for some assistance in the framing his motion. His own ideas are, of course, confined pretty much to the immediate object. But it may be a question whether, if he will consent, the resolutions should not extend a little further, though not so far, I think, as to encroach upon what we were talking of lately, and which I hope you have not lost sight of. In letters from Norfolk I hear sad reports of supineness and apathy, and, in some degree, of disaffection of that sort which I have always apprehended, which shows itself not in open treason or sedition, but in a great relaxation of zeal and loyalty. Ten years of such language as Messrs. Sheridan and Tierney, the new allies of Ministry have talked will have produced more mischief in that way than their support of their present friends, not in their vigour but in their want of vigour, is likely to do good.

“The post is going. If I hear anything particular in the course of to-morrow I will let you know. But perhaps the best way, now the dust is laid, is to come yourself.”

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, July 29. Stowe.—“Finding that the zeal of the Buckingham yeomen was ready for a campaign in Stowe Park on the 1st of August, I have descended from the beautiful mountains which form the vale of Llangedwin to the flat scenery of this country, and shall begin my military labours in it on Monday next. How long they will last it is not for me to determine.

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\* See note at foot of page 175.

“The sudden explosion at Dublin announces very fully that the co-operation of Irish rebellion is one of the active means of Bonaparte, and I do not doubt but that the movement at Brest which was reported by Cornwallis, was intended to be a movement of promise to the friends of France in Ireland. My brother sees much ground to rejoice that the Irish insurrection has been as usual premature, and I rejoice with him in that sense of his joy ; but at the same time I cannot help saying that the proof which this event affords of the total surprise upon our Government in Ireland, totally destroys whatever confidence one might have had in that quarter from their repeated assertions of the entire security which prevailed as against all chance of Irish insurrection. My brother’s accounts state to him that some information had been given to Government in Ireland some days previous, but that they thought no new measure necessary, and therefore that nothing was done till the armed mob of Dublin had possessed themselves of the Mansion House, and plundered it of 600 stands of arms which were deposited there. The best hope is that, as the country mails had arrived at Dublin, it does not seem as yet that there was any general co-operation in the distant counties. That we should have such Ministers in such a moment is of so desperate a danger that one hardly knows how to think that the country can have a fair chance of escape.

“I rejoice to hear that your numbers encrease, and that there is no recruiting officer so active and so successful as you are. The enclosed letter which Lord Buckingham desires me to send to you from Cathcart, announces to you an excellent adjutant. Lord Buckingham has written to accept him for you, and to desire him to be sent immediately. You are probably aware that cavalry corporal in Life Guards is cavalry sergeant.”

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, July 31. Stowe.—“It is not till this morning that Lord Hobart has sent here any such communication as applies to the questions of your letters of the 28th and the 29th, which letters I undertake to answer as well as I can, Lord Buckingham being entirely engaged by a variety of official letters for this morning’s post, and having desired me to become his secretary to you. Lord Hobart’s is, however, nothing more than a printed circular letter, all the material points of which I have copied for you and enclose herewith. You will observe that he has given no answer as yet to the conditions on which Lord Buckingham made the offer of volunteers from this county, and until he does it is impossible to know how far it is fit to proceed in obtaining volunteer offers upon those special conditions which Lord Buckingham stated ; namely, of their being attached to their own county militia, or forming a separate corps, as in clause 54, in case

of invasion. Lord Buckingham, however, is employed to-day in making a new offer to Lord Hobart, which, is as I think, a very handsome offer, and may very probably be received. It is that if Government will provide arms for the three-fourths of the first-class, Lord Buckingham will undertake at his own expense to clothe them in a regular uniform. He imagines that these three-fourths will turn out to be about 3,000 men, the clothing of which would cost him at least 4,000*l.* or 5,000*l.*; but, if this is accepted by Government, I think the offer very creditable to my brother, and very likely to become a powerful inducement to raise a sufficient number of volunteers in the county to suspend the compulsory effects of the Training Bill. At all events, however, the schedules must be completed in the first place, whether this offer be or be not accepted by Government.

“I now proceed to answer such separate questions as I find in your letters, and as I know how to give any answer to. Lord Buckingham promises to you the formal letter of notification of Lieutenant-Colonel in the first moment that he can spare to write it.

“I enclose to you one of the forms of returns according to your desire; it must, when completed, be returned to Lord Buckingham. My brother has carbines for his men, but no pistols, although they have goat-skin coverings and holsters. Aylesbury, as I understand, has pistols and holsters, but no carbines, except in the proportion of 12 for each troop. My brother's new recruits are so anxious to have their clothing that he cannot send a pattern jacket as yet, but he will do so in two or three days. Lord Temple comes here on Tuesday, and I shall learn from him whether there is any variance in any of the Aylesbury outsidies from those of Buckingham. With respect to your idea of opening books for volunteer infantry *according to the terms of the Act*, there can be no objection to the pursuing that course, as the exemption which Lord Buckingham asks for respecting their being only attached to their own county militia, or formed in distinct corps, will be an additional boon that will be very grateful to them, no doubt, if it can be obtained. I told you in my last that your adjutant was provided and upon his road to you. The limits of the military district for volunteers *who clothe and arm themselves*, is Bucks., Bedfordshire, Oxfordshire and Northamptonshire, but yeomanry and Training Bill levies are, as you see, to go to any part of England in case of invasion. Gwynne has offered to come whenever he is wanted, but Lord Buckingham thinks there is no use to be made of him until the returns are made to the schedules of the Army Bill. With respect to Grenfell's information, you will see that he was well informed, as Lord Hobart's circular, of which I enclose extracts, evidently cancels the former propositions for volunteer infantry; and it is undeniably true, as you state it, that, according to their present system,

there would be no difference between volunteers and trained bands. The merit of Lord Buckingham's offer of to-day is that it provides the distinction of their being clothed, and therefore ready for service, instead of being the *rudis indigestaque moles* which trained bands must be.

"Mason has written a growling letter, to which Lord Buckingham means to answer by suggesting to him that he must try to make the Amersham troop a squadron, of which he is to be Major, and young Drake and Sir G. Russell the two Captains.

"I take for granted by seeing Lord Kirkwall in the papers as Captain of the Denbigh Foresters, that he does not mean to join your corps, but I suppose e'er now you have written to him and heard from him.

"Lord Buckingham has written to Lloyd, who will accept the inspectorship, but thinks it would be necessary that you should likewise write, and that you should find a colleague for him.

"Lord Buckingham has issued new brown cloaks with red collars, made by contract by Dickie, army clothier, London; the old cloak cases were leather rollers with pocket in lining for a couple of shirts; they were made at Buckingham.

"Thus ends my list of answers such as I am enabled to give them. It is some thing to find by the papers that there is no new Irish war out of Dublin, but the surprise of Government under all the circumstances is such as utterly destroys all possibility of confidence in what they think or say upon the subject."

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, August 2. Stowe.—"Just returned home from our yeomanry exercise, I find your letter of the 31st ultimo, and do not fail to acknowledge it, though I have but very little time to answer it before dinner and post.

"Lord Buckingham had a confidential line to-day from Lord Hobart promising him an official answer to-morrow or next day, and telling him the general grounds of that answer which appear to my brother to be very satisfactory.

"Lord Hobart says that the yeomanry and county volunteers will be counted as part of the three-fourths of the first class; and that, moreover, twenty shillings will be allowed per man to clothe them, and a shilling a day for their exercise on every day, except Sundays, on which they exercise. Moreover, he says that although arms cannot universally be allowed, that the county of Bucks is one which will be provided. He seems also to think that by the immense number of volunteer offers already made, the compulsory part of the bill will in no instance probably be resorted to. This is the substance of what I collected from Lord Buckingham, that he is officially to hear to-morrow or next day. Nothing is

intimated about the offer made by Lord Buckingham, and he himself has not yet determined whether, under these new circumstances of allowances for clothing, exercise *et cetera*, he shall or shall not adhere to his first offer.

"I am glad that you like Lord Cathcart's adjutant, and hope you will succeed in making Colonel Shairp a yeoman lieutenant, as a second adjutant will certainly not be allowed. Your numbers seem as prosperous as one could wish. We had only seven absent this morning out of 137, and I understand Lord Temple furnishes as large a list or somewhat larger from Aylesbury.

"I am probably not more partial than Lord M[almesbury] W[indham] and E[lliott] to the measures of Government, but I am myself most clearly of opinion that we do better in the present moment by zealously executing the measures of ministers than by arraigning them or protesting against them in Parliament. It is very well for those few who have made a point of attending and resisting the defensive plans of our Ministers, to continue to do so if they think it useful, but I have great doubts whether that conduct has been advantageous to those who have adopted it, and I have no doubt at all that for us, who have taken the course of executing their measures instead of debating against them, the best and most consistent and most useful course will be to continue to try to make sense of their nonsense by doing whatever seems practicable; and that, in so doing, we do what, for a hundred reasons, is better than the most eloquent protest which can be put upon the journals of Parliament.

"Such, at least, is the general course of my own opinions, subject always to the consideration of better judgments.

"I hope by the continued silence of the papers as to Irish rebellion, that it has not spread as widely in the country as such extensive preparations in Dublin had seemed to announce; but it is a miserable thing to see that, even on this pressing and important point of danger, it is impossible to place the least confidence in the Government, or in their assurances."

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, August 7. Stowe.—"I rescued the papers in question from the state of disgrace to which you had exposed them, and with the exception of some few who were already mutilated, the whole muster-roll of them is packed up and given to Fremantle, who passes this morning either through Beaconsfield or Maidenhead, and who undertakes from one of those two places to forward them to you without loss of time. My brother has heard nothing from Lord Hobart to-day.

"I have a letter from Yorkshire to-day complaining of the total want of arms, and ridiculing the notion of calling people to train in a churchyard without putting into their hands

one weapon of offence or defence. The magazine of Hull contains only 1,800 arms, and that is to supply the supplementary militia and the army reserve!!! Do you remember a fortnight ago that Addington, being asked in the House as to the supply of arms for the Training Bill, assured the House that Government had for a long time past adverted to that subject, and that there was an ample supply of arms to carry the Training Bill into effect. I go to-morrow to look at my old Aylesbury friends, at such of them at least as are not up to their ears in wheat and barley."

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, August 9. Stowe.—“The post of this morning has brought hither Lord Hobart’s answer respecting the numbers of our yeomanry, and the allowances for exercising the volunteer infantry. Lord Buckingham is perfectly satisfied that the first paragraph is a complete warrant to him to include all the troops which he had described to Lord Hobart as being within the arrangement which he proposed, and has desired me to tell you that you may go on with the eight troops, and that he will draw for them all. With respect to the allowance to be paid by each parish of 2s. 6d. for every day’s drill, the plan which he means to follow, and which he recommends to your hundred, is that the magistrates and gentlemen should make a fund consisting of the twenty half crowns to be paid by each parish for twenty days’ drill; and should, out of that fund, provide payments for an adjutant, sergeant-major and sergeants of companies. He recommends the selecting for adjutant some half-pay lieutenant upon the allowance of 50*l.* or 60*l.* *per annum*, or less if less will do, out of this fund; and for the sergeants of companies, any old militiamen who will certainly give their assistance for even less than half a crown a day, sergeant’s pay being only 1s. 6d. per day.

“The expression of ‘the serious inconvenience to Government’ is too comical to escape your notice.

“The last paragraph of Lord Hobart’s letter is the grateful acceptance and acknowledgment of my brother’s offer; but as my brother has not absolutely decided whether he shall not require some additional exercise for the proposed county, he has desired me not to copy this paragraph, in order that nothing may be finally announced about it until he has finally determined upon the conditions of his offer. As soon as he shall have fixed it, he will communicate it to you.

“My second enclosure is an opinion on the militia laws which, as it is completely new in practice, is formed, as I suppose, upon a melancholy view of the difficulty or impossibility of filling up the militia with no other assistance than that of the fines.

“I exercised with 119 yesterday at Aylesbury, officers included, and about 50 have promised to work with the adjutant from four to six every Monday evening. The return of volunteers in these hundreds will amply supply the demand of the Training Bill; and I trust that in your neighbourhood the plan will be equally successful. Mrs. Stapleton is gone to Elton. I shall probably go on Friday to Althorp, unless my brother should want me for any help; and I may perhaps ride over to Elton from thence, but you shall know and hear from me.

*Postscript.*—“Lord Temple’s Aylesbury are deficient of one lieutenant and one cornet; if you have any candidates that you cannot provide for, they would probably be gratefully received. The sage Bernard is one captain, but did not produce himself; if you have a captain to sell, perhaps Bernard might be tempted to fight on foot.”

#### THE EARL OF CARYSFORT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, August 10. Elton.—“I received yesterday with a parcel from town, a pamphlet written by Genz [Gentz] upon the French *compte rendu*, with a letter from Count de Montjoye Fröberg, who has been employed to have it printed. Count Montjoye Fröberg tells me that a few copies only have been printed, and that the communication is to be considered as confidential, Genz’s situation at Vienna rendering that precaution necessary. He adds that it is his intention to send a copy to you, but, as he is not acquainted with you, he desires me to inform you of it, and apologize for his taking the liberty. This man was introduced to my acquaintance by a letter from Genz. I have heard him very well spoken of, and his conversation appears that of a man of sense and information. He lived in Jermyn Street when I was last in town, but as I have forgot the number, I send my letter to Coutts, who knows where he will be found.

“I had a letter about ten days ago from Genz at Vienna, who tells me he is preparing to attempt the apology of this country and distinguish its cause and its merits from those of its Ministers. He has desired me to send him *les pièces que Lord Auckland a fait imprimer avec un de ses derniers discours*. As I never send for Lord Auckland’s speeches, I do not know what he means; perhaps you can tell me. He seems (from some newspaper report of your speech upon Lord King’s motion) to have taken up some notions about our finance much more desponding than you would wish to circulate. Your object upon that occasion was not to represent a distressed situation of the public resources which no prudence could remedy, but to detect a false statement of the Minister’s (which he had sent abroad to get a little temporary popularity) and to expose his absolute want of any rational system of finance.

But as the notions which circulate upon the Continent at the present conjuncture may materially affect this country, both now and at future periods, I could wish to have a hint from you what points I should particularly recommend to Genz, and what turn I should endeavour to give to his work before I write to him."

COUNT WORONZOW TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, September 3. Harley Street.—“ Sa Majesté l'Empereur ayant reçu l'édition des Œuvres d'Homère que vous avez eu l'attention de lui envoyer, m'a chargé de vous témoigner toute la reconnoissance que lui inspire cette marque de votre égard envers sa personne. Infiniment satisfait d'avoir une aussi belle édition des œuvres du plus grand poète, il l'a mise dans sa bibliothèque, très flatté de les avoir d'une famille, dont les talens, les vertus, et le profond savoir sont connus à toute l'Europe; et qui, particulièrement, par vos principes politiques, par votre zèle pour la bonne cause, par votre amitié et attachment pour la Russie, a mérité l'estime générale de mes compatriotes, et, particulièrement, celle de sa Majesté Impériale.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, September 16. Gosfield.—“ From Althorp and from Elton, by way of Audley End, I arrived here the day before yesterday with Windham, whom I had picked up at Lord Braybroke's. He is now gone on to pass a day or two with Sir James Craig and Sir Sydney Smith before he looks after his Cromer volunteers, which make the ultimate object of his excursion to Norfolk. His stay there cannot but be limited, because I see that he considers the meeting of Parliament as being inevitably fixed for November, and all that one hears or observes seems to show that the state of the public purse alone will make that meeting necessary, particularly if it be really true that after all the cookeries of the Property Tax Bill, it is still found too unintelligible and impracticable to be carried into effect. The military associate of your financial criticisms in the House of Lords is, as I hear, louder than ever in his attack upon this article of the public administration, and announces his determination of stating in the first moments of the session, the delusion that has been practised upon the public on this subject. I differ with him only as to the choice of this word, because I do think that the gross negligence and ignorance which has marked their money statements has been too gross to delude anybody but themselves. My friend who has just left us here seems to be of opinion that Ministers will begin their session by provoking an early discussion of the Catholic question, in order that Addington may take his ground

of opposition to it. There seems to be some ground for this conjecture, and my friend himself is confident that he is well founded in entertaining it; but upon this, as upon other matters, I hope soon to be able to converse with you, and the chief object of these lines is to learn from you what is the present state of your military labours, and whether in a few days I shall find you at Dropmore, or shall only hear of you with your flying squadrons among the woods and defiles of the Chiltern Hills. I have written to Major Lord Temple to know when he has directed his squadron of Aylesbury to embody for exercise, in order that I may see my old friends there; and I take it that the Buckingham and Winslow in addition will give me ample occupation for the next three weeks; but, at all events, I shall find time to come to you, so let me know about you as soon as you can."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1803,] September 17. Stowe [Gosfield?].—"Tom is with me and talks of going soon to Dropmore; he brought Windham with him, who is gone to Norfolk to raise a corps which I prophesy will not be very soon found to his liking. His accounts of Ireland are as gloomy as mine: I have very particular reasons for believing that Lord Cathcart's instructions are such as General Fox resisted, and that Government have taken the resolution to force forward a most explicit avowal of the re-establishment of what they call the old system of English government in that kingdom. My information states that Lord Hardwicke has been induced to agree to it by Lord Redesdale, *against Mr. Wickham*. But whatever these great or little men may think upon it, I have no doubt but that the system of force to its full extent is entertained and will be pursued; and I have as little doubt that it will succeed in creating a new and general rebellion.

"*Postscript*.—Since I wrote this my fears respecting Ireland and my information respecting Lord Redesdale are confirmed. He has been writing *ostensibly* to Lord Fingall in the style of a fanatic of 1640, and these documents have run like wild-fire through all Ireland! He is certainly the real governor, *et Dii boni*, what a governor!"

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, October 7. Althorp.—"I write one line to tell you that I have come over hither for to-day and to-morrow and return to Stowe on Sunday. I saw Mansell at Aylesbury, who, on finding that I had fixed on the 24th for our inspection, intends to propose to you as early a day afterwards as may be for the inspection of the northern regiment. Our Aylesbury squadron

have very handsomely offered me to come over to Stowe for regimental exercise on Thursday and Friday, the 20th and 21st, and on Monday the 24th for inspection; so that all our difficulties about place are at an end, if Lord Buckingham sends me word that he approves, as he probably will, of this proposal.

“The Northamptonshire inspection is over. The general thanked them, but with some reserves of ‘considering the short time they had been levied,’ which did not sound very gracious. He criticised some of the horses, which he would not have done if he had seen mine at Aylesbury first; and he observed to Lord Spencer that there was no use for our service in any of Dundas’s movements, but that we should act as skirmishers, as he saw the provincial troops act in America. I presume one may defend oneself by pleading ignorance upon a point upon which neither our civil nor our military governors have condescended to offer us any instructions. He, however, ended by announcing that he would come two or three days and ride about with Lord Spencer and his yeomen, though he observed it would be very troublesome to him to do so. All this I tell you to prepare you for the 13th. I imagine that it is through the Lord Lieutenant that the days of inspection should be settled with the inspecting-general, and therefore I presume that I am right in requesting you to name to him the 24th for our inspection, if that day be agreeable to him. Stowe must not be named till I have my brother’s answer.

“Elliot writes word that the alert and the hurry of preparations continues in London to announce the expectation of attack, but says that only ten days ago, a post-captain commanding a corps of sea fencibles on the coast of Sussex, had still in vain applied for arms, and was still left ten days ago without any.

“Lady Buckingham has written to me from Gosfield, in great anxiety about my brother’s having pocketed his resignation and carried his poor legs to Harwich. I cannot tell you how much I am vexed at this inconsiderate delay of his resignation, which still must arise out of illness, and that illness must come but too soon by his carrying so disordered a frame to fatigues and exertions that he is so little capable of supporting. Lady Buckingham says her only hope is in you and me to persuade him, but alas my rhetoric was in vain employed upon this subject every day that I was with him.”

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1803,] October 9. Gosfield.—“I returned the day before yesterday from Harwich, having made a last and fruitless effort, in consequence of the alarm of immediate invasion, to resume my command, but a very slight exertion of one day so completely crippled me that, after trying twice the effect

of the hot sea-bath, I determined to make the sacrifice that has cost me very dear, and I have requested the King's leave to resign my regiment. I have been very ill both in body and mind and beat down for want of sleep, my pains having increased so much by the warmth of my bed. However, I am told that I am to be better. For the present I continue here, unless the landing should drive me hence, and in that case I must go to Buckinghamshre, though God knows very useless in every sense of the word. I enclose to you a letter from Gwynne aide-de-camp, and have sent a copy to Tom requesting him to send it to Mansell for the north yeomanry and infantry, and to Paulett for the middle infantry, and directing them to forward these returns to you. You will of course look to the returns of your own division and send the abstract of the whole to Gwynne."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, October 9. Stowe.—"I write one line to acknowledge your letters of the 6th and 7th, the latter of which seems to clear away the difficulty of the refusal of our adjutant's pay. Where it will be paid is another question, and perhaps you had better direct the same mode of application in your case and mine as in that of Mansell; but I do not know what the mode is by which Mansell is paid.

"I rejoice to find by-my brother's letter of the 7th, that my brother being made ill by one day's exertion, has returned to Gosfield, and *has resigned*. I wish now he would come to Stowe. His indisposition will allow of his continuing you his vice, and will be his excuse for having nothing to say to Gwynne, whom I can undertake, and save him all trouble. Do not forget to let me know if Gwynne approves of the 24th. My brother gladly accepts the Aylesbury offer to come to Stowe, and, when you name the 24th, you will, of course, tell Gwynne that, though my brother is absent, I can give him a bed at Stowe.

"I am now here till the 24th, or possibly after that—Fremantle desires me to put off exercise till the 17th. I have told him it is impossible, but I suppose he will not come till then.

"I can get no answer from Lowndes, who does not seem very accessible, but I will do all I can to get you a return; there is no trace here of your letter to me. Lord B[uckingham] has certainly had it and burned it."

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1803,] October 14. Gosfield.—"I have this moment received your letter, and am very grateful for all that you say and all that you do to relieve my mind from all that presses upon it.

I am very unwell in health, but my spirits are still more depressed, beyond what they would be by illness, from the sense that I can lend no exertion to assist in any way at such a crisis. As to returning to Buckinghamshire, I cannot look to it at present, but about the beginning of November I shall go to Stowe, if I am not driven from hence before that time. I cannot understand the delay of your infantry arms, for all Essex is fully provided, and I have heard of other counties; nor can I conceive why they should choose to put into your hands such a document of criminal neglect.

"I have just heard from Tom, who desires me to recommend to you the name of *Lord George Grenville* to be cornet in the middle regiment of yeomanry cavalry. I find that he has recommended Robert Lowndes to be cornet, *vice* Tookey, resigned, and therefore George will be the youngest cornet.

"I will write to Yorke to urge training of [dues ?] for I find that in the Cottesloe hundred there are two refractory parishes that will not pay till they see what they will be compelled.

"Some particular circumstances have satisfied me that the Texel armament, which in number of troops and of water craft is much the largest, is destined for Lynn. This has set me to examine that plan, and it is obviously so much the easiest from turning all our lines of defence and of operation, and from having the certainty of forty-eight hours uninterrupted in their debarkation, that I am satisfied they will gain greater facilities for their move of 94 miles to London, than by attempting Harwich or Dover at the distance of 72. We can spare no troops from this coast to check such an attempt, so long as the other armaments threaten the coast of Essex; and one forced march of the enemy of less than 30 miles from Lynn, and of 25 from Wisbeach, gives them all the French prisoners now at Norman Cross, guarded only by one militia battalion. Pray look to the extreme facility of this project, which, I again repeat, I have very strong reason to *know* to have been in the contemplation of Andreossi, but it was joined to a feint upon Hull from the Elbe which is probably now at an end."

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, October 20. Walmer Castle.—"I am ashamed of having appeared so tardy both in answering a gentleman's letter and returning an author's works. Do not imagine, however, from it that I have been indifferent to either. The fact is that I received your packet just as I was going to my brother's quarters at Chatham, and as he wished much to read the manuscript I left it with him. I have since been expecting to hear from him on the subject, but I have now written to him begging him to return the papers to you, under Hammond's cover. I flatter myself he cannot see any reason to object to the publication, and as far as my opinion goes, I wish it most

eagerly, as I think it may prove essentially useful. It might, however, be rendered useful in a much greater degree if, after stating (as you have done in the preface) that the instructions given are to be considered only as relating to broken and detached parts of education, and not as forming a system, you would take the trouble to supply (as you very easily could) this deficiency. Formidable as the enumeration may seem, it would, I am sure, cost you very little labour to lay down a complete course of study, with a list of authors in the several branches of classics (especially Greek), mathematics, and philosophy, ethics, public law and treaties, history and memoirs, and what (for want of any other terms) I am afraid I must be contented to call *statistics*. By the latter I mean of course Adam Smith, and a very little besides. You will, I am sure, not think that any one of these branches is superfluous, with a view to making a man such a scholar as may best qualify him for public life; and I know, too, that my father would not have omitted any one of them, if he had been to give at one view a general outline of a plan of education. Pray consider whether you could not compress the detail of what I propose in a narrow compass, and whether you can render a greater public service than by teaching young men of hope and promise how they may really employ their time to the best advantage from the period of coming to the University till five-and-twenty, and as long after as they please.

“These ideas may seem a little romantic when we look at the present breed of statesmen, but perhaps they may not be quite thrown away in some future generation, if it should ever again be thought that there is room for something more than *moderate talents* and *moderate acquirements* in managing the concerns of a great empire.”

#### The EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, October 30. Elton.—“Elizabeth will write to you with more detail what passed during the bishop of Lincoln’s visit to us the end of last week. When the bishop first entered upon a political conversation with me, he introduced it by speaking of the certainty of Pitt’s appearing at the opening of the session; of his resentment of the conduct of Mr. Addington; that I was for some time persuaded that he would act a vigorous and decided part; and that the principal or rather the only difficulty which still weighed upon his mind was the danger of throwing the Fox party into a close alliance with the ministry. This was said in such a manner, the bishop at the same time affirming that Mr. Fox would be content to remain out himself provided his friends were admitted into a new arrangement, that I though the was endeavouring to learn what might be my sentiment upon some negotiation which he knew to be on foot. I did not hesitate to say that I thought

such an accession of real strength and reputation was not to be neglected, especially if all difficulty about Mr. Fox himself was, as he seemed to be certain, entirely removed. But I afterwards found that in the bishop's opinion the easiness and good nature of Mr. Pitt's temper is such that it is even now no improbable conjecture that he may forgive Mr. Addington. It is, however, in the bishop's opinion, certain that he will attend at the opening of the session, and speak his sentiments whatever they then may be. The bishop himself makes no scruple to say that, if his pupil does not now stand forward, openly censure the conduct of ministers, and press for their removal from office, the great talents which he possesses may again, after a course of time, bring him into power; but he will completely have destroyed his own consequence for the present, and the situation he has hitherto held in the public estimation. With these feelings he is very anxious that those who think as he does, whose abilities Mr. Pitt respects, and whose friendship he confides in, should at this moment see and talk with him, and counteract the impressions which other persons who have access to him may make upon the easiness of his temper and his good nature. To suppose that Mr. Pitt can be influenced by the most contemptible agents against his own conviction, against his interest, and against his principles, notwithstanding his sense of the public danger, is to impute to him a degree of weakness which is not credible, and which would make his alliance of no value to any part[y]. His sincerity appears more fairly questionable. It is a fact which is very striking, if you are hitherto unacquainted with it, that Mr. Pitt wrote a letter in the presence of Addington, which was read and approved by him, to be communicated by one of the Willises to the King, by which he was to pledge himself not to bring forward the Catholic question; and it seems evident to me from the tenor of the conversations I have heard, that, in the interval of suspense occasioned by the King's illness, other steps were taken besides what I have just stated, not unknown to Mr. Pitt, and frustrated or eluded, in the bishop's opinion, by the art and pertinacity of Mr. Addington only. If you had communication of all this at the time, it is all well; but, if not, the sincerity of the Great Man's conduct cannot be defended. As things stand at present, the bishop will have represented to Mr. Pitt not his own opinion only, but that of others of his friends, that even those who gave such an extraordinary proof of attachment to him as to vote for his question of adjournment, will leave him, if he does not take some firm and decided part at the meeting of Parliament. The bishop seems to think it important that you should see Pitt at this juncture, and to be upon the whole persuaded that his resentment against Addington, particularly excited by the pamphlet, burns very high; and that, if there is still any hesitation, it proceeds not from want of inclination to oppose

with vigour, but doubt as to the means and mode of doing it with effect. In the meantime the presumption of ministers is rising every day, and Lord Westmorland told the bishop here, 'you see that all they told us of Pitt's power and influence in Parliament is come to nothing. He was to have swallowed us up at once, but he made the trial, and Mr. Addington appeared a greater man than he.' The bishop seemed to wish that something like the call that was made last year for Pitt by Cartwright, Sir H. Mildmay, and others, might again take place, and to think that it would decide him. I told him I thought it not probable that men of that description, having been once disappointed by him, should commit themselves again; but that, upon the first indication of Mr. Pitt having determined to act against ministers, I did not doubt but that he would have their support. In truth, unless you were sure of him, it is folly any longer to embarrass your own measure with any consideration for him."

The COUNTESS OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1803, October 30.] Elton.—“It is a very long while since I have heard from you or even of you, but as I know you always save your poor eyes as much as possible, I should not even now write to you were I not desirous of communicating to you some conversations which I have had within the two last days with the b[ishop] of L[incoln]. He seems even more desirous than ever that his friend should come forward at the meeting of Parliament, and though he has not seen Mr. P[itt] lately, he hears that his language has been that of great resentment at the general conduct of the Government towards him, particularly at the publication of the pamphlet. Three weeks ago he said that he was determined to attend on the first day of the session and avow his sentiments, but still the b[ishop] seems to apprehend a change in those sentiments from the extreme lenity and facility of his temper, in the event of any conciliatory steps towards him being taken by Government. If, however, the general tone of the party may be learned from Lord Westmorland (who dined here two days ago) they mean to set Pitt at defiance; saying that his House of Commons division plainly showed his inferiority in point of strength to Addington; indeed Lord Westmorland's language on this point was coarse and almost indecent with respect to his former friend. The b[ishop], however, so far agrees with Lord Westmorland as to think that Mr. P[itt]'s political importance will really be lost if he plays the same game that he did last year, and he is very anxious to prevent, if possible, the accession of Fox's party to Government, which would perhaps be hindered if *you* and *they* could understand each other; as he says he thinks he has reason to believe that Fox has no *personal* political views whatever, and

therefore some arrangement with him might possibly be managed. Under these impressions the b[ishop] wishes very much that P[itt] should not be left entirely at this moment in the hands of the Philistines, and unequivocally offers himself to do anything that you may think expedient in any possible shape. I hear Lord Chatham complains loudly of his brother's conduct, and says that Pitt's ambition could never be more fully gratified than by coalescing with the present Government, whom he would find willing to accede to all his views. P[itt] speaks much of the fear of disturbing the K[ing]'s mind, and indeed he seems to have more apprehension on that subject than the present state of the K[ing]'s health seems to call for. Did you know that in the interval between P[itt]'s resignation, and his actually going out of office, he made Doctor Thomas Willis the channel of a promise which he made to the King never to bring forward the Roman Catholic question. The message was given to Willis in the presence of Addington, and the b[ishop] saw the letter which Willis actually wrote to the K[ing] on the subject. Notwithstanding this, I am tempted to believe that the promise *did never actually* reach the K[ing], as I was told last winter of the King's *then* mentioning the Roman Catholic question as an insurmountable barrier between him and his old ministry. It is more than probable that you may be perfectly acquainted with every circumstance to which I have alluded, but, on points of so much importance, it is better not to leave anything to probability. We are in all the horrors of a review to-morrow, and moreover the perspective of a review in hard rain, which will be particularly unfortunate to my poor husband's gouty habit and swelled legs, which, alas! but little accord with his present avocations."

The EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, November 7. Elton.—“I certainly agree with you that, after all we have already said in Parliament, we are not called upon at the present moment for more than to mark our opinion that every part of the subsequent conduct of Administration has only served to confirm the judgment we formerly passed upon them. At the same time, as they must bring forward new measures, and must attempt to botch the old ones at the very beginning of the session, our attendance cannot long be withheld; nor will there want opportunities for Pitt to mark his concurrence with us if, at length, he can be roused to act a vigorous and manly part.

“With respect to the Catholic question, the difference you state as probable I consider as certain, after what I have heard and communicated to you. And on this as well as on other occasions, I shall feel great pleasure in the comparison that must be made of your firm, manly, and consistent

conduct, with the shifting, undecided, and fluctuating behaviour in another quarter. On the question itself, if ever it comes forward, you and I shall probably differ. Of the policy of a general comprehension I have no doubt. The mode of effecting it is very disputable. That admitting the Roman Catholics of Ireland to sit in Parliament and hold offices like the members of the Established Church is called for by the peculiar circumstances of Ireland, I cannot admit; I think the very reverse. Instead of tending to pacify Ireland, it seems to me likely to produce an immediate civil war that would shake the kingdom to its base; and even if it should fall short of such a calamity, it would continue to inflame beyond all former example the animosities between the two religious parties."

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, November 13. Elton.—"I would have copied the enclosed, as I doubt whether you will be able to read it, but I have not time. It is from Judge Osborne, who has just been on a special commission to try the persons detained for treason in the north of Ireland. I think his account not uninteresting at this juncture."

*Enclosure.*

*Extract.*—"It is now clear beyond a possibility of doubt from the investigations at Downpatrick and Carrickfergus that the rebellious spirit has not gained any ground, but, on the contrary, is completely down. I do not go so far as to say that all engaged in the former rebellion are converts in principle, but they are in general (I mean the Dissenters of the north), steady now; though I think they wish to place their loyalty on rather an unsatisfactory basis, namely that the country is in danger from the Catholics. It is a lamentable thing that the country should be so considered in that state with respect to foreign invasion, that it should be thought prudent to give countenance to such an opinion in order to fix that party. I know not how far the Government avow it, but this I know, that in the north-west with the exception of Donegal, and as far as I have seen in the north-east, the yeomanry corps are all raised on the Orange principle; and the line of demarcation between Catholic and Protestant is at this moment more visibly drawn, and more odiously, than it ever was within our memory. This may be a good principle for a recruiting serjeant, but it is none for a statesman."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, November 29. Charles Street.—"The navy estimates come on to-morrow; the army is fixed, as I understand, for Monday; if on this latter question you think any previous

conversation useful, or wish to have the subject pressed, you had better come for that purpose on Saturday. But do as you will, for it is so difficult to say enough upon that topick without saying too much, that, great as the temptation is, the embarrassment of the matter is likewise very great. Sussex is reinforced, and has now about 10,000 regulars and militia. The whole of regulars and militia in Kent and Sussex, including cavalry regiments and artillery, is near 33,000; on this return I know I can depend. These are:—

16 regiments of Regular Infantry .....	12,800
Militia .....	14,300
Regular Cavalry.....	4,000
Horse Artillery.....	400
Artillery .....	600
	<hr/>
	32,100

This is thin enough, but it is better than it was.

“My brother comes Sunday or Monday for certain.

“We have taken Surinam, and are firing and bell-ringing as if we had drowned the French, as well as plundered the Dutch.”

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, November 30. Charles Street.—“I think *the* answer a most heartless and washy performance; the general tone of it apologetic to such a degree as to create in the reader no belief that the writer himself is confident in his own cause, and from the beginning to the end the prominent feature of it is rather the fear of giving offence than the desire of doing justice and of asserting truth. I should likewise be not a little struck by the feeble and unequal vindication of Lords Grenville and Spencer and Mr. Windham if I could have expected that, where the principal hero is shewn to so little advantage, the secondary personages had any chance of being placed in fair and favourable lights. But my greatest objection to it is that, as universally as it is read, it gives the impression of that neutral and negative course being now as much as ever the course adopted and pursued by the person of whom it chiefly treats, and I already find that more is lost in this impression than is gained by the few contradictory facts which are so delicately touched upon in it.

“There is some little expectation of debate on our army estimates, which, I hope, will be put off till you are come to town. Fox most certainly attends, and by what I hear will certainly attack. I believe that even beyond his own opinions, which are insuperably contemptuous of the Doctor, he is determined to show that his sentiments are not to be looked for in Sheridan’s contrivances.

“Perhaps C[anning?] will think this an occasion which

would admit of his appearing and taking part; at least I am not aware of any inconsistency or inconvenience that his appearance would produce to him."

The COUNTESS OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1803, November. Elton Hall.]—"I send you, by Lord Carysfort's desire, an extract of a letter which he wrote yesterday to the bishop, in answer to that which you will already have received from Lord Carysfort.

"We are to be in town, I believe, before the meeting of Parliament, and indeed the state of politics and of his Lordship's leg equally incline him to leave Elton."

*Enclosure.*

*Extract.*—"Lord Grenville and Mr. Pitt being agreed upon so material a point as the necessity of removing Mr. A[ddington] from his present situation, it must be a matter not only of regret but of surprise that they should not be able to reconcile any difference of opinion between them as to the sort of opposition to be carried on against him in Parliament; and I cannot help thinking that Mr. Pitt's avowal that he intends opposition would in itself be sufficient to incline (not merely Lord Grenville and his friends who have made it a principal object to be united with Mr. Pitt, and place him again at the head of affairs, but) all the parties who mean to oppose, to leave the mode pretty much at his option.

"I lament extremely that I was so unfortunate as to have left town before you called in Cumberland Place, and more that your Lordship did not see Lord G[renville], for your letter leads me to think that Mr. Pitt and he may not have understood each other. Lord G[renville]'s attachment to Mr. Pitt has been so conspicuous, and I am persuaded that his communications have been so frank and explicit, that I cannot account for Mr. Pitt's using any reserve with him; and I must be of opinion that greater openness, where there is such solid ground for confidence, would lead to more satisfactory results."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, December 2. Walmer Castle.—"The subject of the letter which I received from you yesterday is a very large and a very difficult one; and I shall be most anxious to converse with you fully upon it as soon as possible. I hope to be at liberty to leave this place on Monday se'nnight, and to reach town that day, or at latest Tuesday morning, and shall be extremely glad if it suits you to come to town about that time. My ideas, as far as I have hitherto had an

opportunity of considering the question (which I have done at different times) correspond very much with those you suggest. The second of the two measures you have in view might, I am inclined to think, be rendered more complete and effectual by adding to the mutual guarantee of individual merchants and bankers, an engagement on the part of the public to receive the paper so guaranteed (under proper regulations and for a limited time) in payment of taxes, and an association among landed proprietors to receive them in like manner in payment of rent. But to render this measure safe, and to prevent giving a false credit in many cases, it may perhaps be necessary to have (if the time will admit of it) some previous secret Commission to examine the solidity of the Houses to whom this measure should apply, and to ascertain and limit the amount of their circulation. These, however, and many other details of great delicacy and difficulty, must be reserved till we meet. Another point nearly connected with this, and which also strikes me as of great importance, is how to prevent the danger of large classes of manufacturers being suddenly deprived of their subsistence, if any alarm should lead in any part of the kingdom to a general stagnation of business. I write this, as you will perceive, in great haste, having just at present hardly any leisure from my new duties."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, December 3. Charles Street.—"Tuesday is now become as good as Wednesday, because Leigh has this moment told me that the army estimates do not come on till Friday: I still feel persuaded that something must be said by the new as well as the old on that occasion. I find Elliott so indignant about the Martial Law Bill being renewed without any new information to Parliament that he is almost determined to speak upon the second reading on Monday: the subject is a delicate one, inasmuch as the language one holds will be represented as opposing the prosecution of vigorous measures in Ireland, and, if any thing is said by any of us, great care must be taken to avoid coming within that imputation; my notion of what is desirable would be to plead the absolute necessity of Parliament giving sober and mature consideration to the present state of Ireland, and to complain that Government without giving any real grounds of judgement to the United Parliament, expect that Parliament to act only upon the changeable and changing and inconsistent language of ministers respecting that country; a language which in the last session began with calling the insurrection a formidable rebellion, and then treated it as no other than a partial and temporary tumult; and that in this session begins by expressing the King's hopes of permanent tranquillity there,

and six days afterwards goes on to renew the *precise bill of last year*, the preamble of which recites a *rebellion now raging in Ireland*; such remarks as these might be directed not against the measure so much as against the neglect of ministers in not laying proper ground for the measure, and against the inconsistency of ministers in their language and conduct respecting Ireland; and might be the best first vehicle of our opinion that the affairs and state of Ireland require sober and mature deliberation, grounded upon authentic documents and Parliamentary grounds. To do this well would perhaps be more than one is sure of, and to do it ill would be a great mischief. The old Secretary at War and Russian ambassador, as Lord Temple tells me, sat by him, Lord Temple, in yesterday's short discussion.

"I am glad you think as I do of the shabby performance which I mentioned: if it were possible to write half a dozen letters they might appear separately, and would be capable of being reprinted together, and so would have a double effect.

"My Wiltshire cousin has called to tell me how desirous he is to take his share in any attack on ministers, and begs to know of anything that may include his assistance; he is for the present gone back to the country, supposing nothing serious to be done till after Christmas."

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, December 20. Charles Street.—I have a negotiation upon my hands, the success of which, like many others, I have satisfied myself will be better assisted by my speaking out plainly, than by my keeping a mysterious secret. My brother, whose kindness, as you know, always runs before every possible circumstance that can contribute to the comfort of any of us, had commissioned me to look about and to hire for him an unfurnished house at the rent of 250 or 300 pounds *per annum*, which house, when become his, he intends to insist upon your occupying and keeping warm and comfortable for him: in this commission I am irrecoverably engaged, and therefore I do not write to consult you about my accepting or not a commission which I have accepted, and which I owe to my brother the faithful execution of; but it has occurred to me to-day that, seeing as I did your predilection for Lord Harrowby's house, which was to cost you about 500 pounds, my brother's commission would be best satisfied by his giving the sum which he has named for the annual rent of that house, by which means you will have at the cost only of 200 pounds to yourself a house which you and Lady Grenville seemed to have no other objection to than that it cost 500 pounds. I am myself so struck with the advantage of this arrangement that I could not avoid discussing it with

my brother, who approves highly of it, altho', in case of your declining this, I must execute his original commission as I had promised to do. Write therefore to acquiesce in our dearest brother's kindness, and write likewise to Lord Harrowby to fix him. If you saw anything when you visited Lord Harrowby's house that created an objection, give me at least a hint where I can best execute my remaining commission the most to your mind."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, December 21. Charles Street.—"I enclose to you Lord Harrowby's answer to my protest of yesterday against his parting with his house, till he should have heard from you.

"I had a letter to-day from the person whom we met on the east side of Grosvenor Square, to say that '*in deference to the judgement of others*' he had declined for the present the matter that he had mooted to me; that if he altered his mind he would give me the earliest notice, and that he need not add that the matter, if brought forward by others, would have his warmest support.

"My answer was to thank him for the frankness of his communications; to observe that the inconvenience of bringing on the question was that its effect would have tended to strengthen those whose power I thought a great evil; and that the advantage of the question would have been to have shewn, however ineffectually, a disposition towards conciliation that could not but have been of publick benefit; that I hoped his decision was for the best, and easily could see how necessary it might be in such a matter to defer to the inclinations and opinions of others. I added that ministers were, as I heard, more intent upon preventing enquiry into the last insurrection, than on taking measures to prevent a renewal of the same scenes; but that York's assertions had been too strong to be patched up *with the publick*, and that I could not be sorry for any topick the discussion of which must draw the attention of the country to what had passed, and might probably again pass in Ireland. Elliot and Windham will be at Beaconsfield on Monday or Tuesday, and I have half invited them to Dropmore on Wednesday by half promising to meet them there on my way to Stowe."

The SAME to the SAME.

1803, December 24. Charles Street.—"The town has been full of the Brest fleet, but Nepean denies it, and says the whole story is a fiction caused by the arrival of an Admiralty express which came, but came from a very different quarter, and brought no Brest news whatever. I see no objection to

your writing to Kent *generally* to say that the idea which had been entertained was not to be pursued at the present, and was not likely to be resumed in that quarter without some new change of circumstances of which previous notice would be given.

“I hope certainly to be with you on Wednesday, and Elliot tells me that he and Windham will be there on that day and sleep there.”

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, December 25. Walmer Castle.—“Allow me to remind you of your promise to send me your code for the volunteers. I hope there will be no treason in sending it under Hammond’s cover. In spite of winter gales, we are again taught both by accounts from the opposite coast, and by intimations from headquarters, to expect some early attempt from the enemy. Just at present the weather puts it wholly out of the question, but the suspense from day to day will probably keep me here till the meeting of Parliament, and prevent my seeing you, as I had hoped to do, in my way to Bath.

“I conclude nothing interesting will be likely to arise for a few days after Parliament meets again. Before anything does, I shall wish very much to talk further with you on the strange state of things.”

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1803], December 25. Stowe.—“Indeed you waste your time and paper very idly in employing them on so very trifling a matter as the very small token (which Tom undertook to arrange) of my wishes that you should not feel yourself checked in any of your views of amusement of Lady Grenville of yourself or of *the Doctor*, by the not having the lodging for which you were looking: be so good therefore as to arrange your matters and you will find that Mr. Coutts will have the 300*l.* ready for you.

“I cannot understand the meaning of all this alarm on the Eastern coast, but the troops are all very alert there (amounting *entre nous* by last week’s return to 27,600 rank and file) and all neutrals are ordered out of the ports between Hull and the Thames. Surely our Government cannot expect an invasion on Essex and Suffolk in January! The same authority whom I quoted to you for Russian news tells me that things look worse for us in that quarter; and an authority equally good of Addington’s confidence tells me that the Doctor is confident that France must give way in this struggle in the course of the next six months, from absolute want of money and means. How can this be?”

“ I have just got a note from Lord Carysfort and Elizabeth to tell me that they will be here on the 7th, when we shall have Lady Williams and Tom, and I shall be extremely tempted to find out that he and I can do nothing in the way of yeomanry without you.”

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1803], December 30. Stowe.—“ I have received your letter and its enclosure and have delivered it as you wished, it being in every particular everything I wished. Tom will be here to-morrow and will, I am sure, be pleased with it.

“ I find that Government are very seriously alarmed, and are endeavouring to spread that alarm of invasion which I cannot prevail on myself to credit. Perhaps they may find it essential to cry out, but the old story of the wolf is, I think, very applicable to the present moment, for I am much mistaken if the people at large join in that cry. I hope that you have seen the sermon to us all on the subject of coalition in the *Morning Chronicle* of Wednesday last, and the supplement to it, evidently written by Mr. Sheridan, in the same paper of yesterday.

“ I trust and hope that the Doctor has seen them, for they must be highly gratifying to him.

“ I hear that he is fully satisfied that Pitt and Fox can never agree ; and I hear this from a quarter I credit.”

LORD GRENVILLE to W. PITT.

1803, December 31. Dropmore.—“ By this post or the next you will receive, under Hammond’s cover, our cavalry and infantry regulations. I shall be very happy if they are of any use to you.

“ Should Bonaparte have derived no other advantage from the present panic of Government than the keeping you at Walmer till Parliament actually meets again, I think this may stand him in the stead of many victories. If he can keep the Government, the Parliament and the country in the present state of inaction and suspense, he accomplishes that object which he ought most reasonably to pursue. There is no other means of speedily and effectually putting an end to this evil, but by an understanding between the considerable persons in the country, forgetting past differences, and uniting to rescue us from a danger which is not the less fearful because it may not be quite so immediate as those which we had the good fortune to escape this year. The success of such an experiment depends entirely on the advantages which the present moment affords for it. If we all remain looking at each other, and forbearing to act separately lest we should render future co-operation

more difficult, or should contribute to the success of something that we may think not the best, the consequence must be that new circumstances will arise to make all co-operation impossible, and that, in the end, no men or description of men will find themselves strong enough to do the country any real service in or out of office. I conceive, therefore, that we all owe it to ourselves, to one another, and to the country, to make up our minds upon this great question during the present recess, and so far to act upon the decision as to have ascertained whether what we think best can be effected, and, if not, what other course remains for us to pursue. But for this purpose communication and intercourse during the course of the next month is indispensably necessary, and I am so much impressed with this that, although as you well know not naturally of a very locomotive disposition, yet I should not for a moment hesitate in meeting you, if that cannot be in London which would be on many accounts the best, then at any other place (Walmer included) that you may prefer. You will see in this anxiety to communicate with you the same sentiments public and private towards you which I have uniformly felt for more than twenty years, and which have not varied even when our opinions upon particular questions have not been in unison. It is, and I am sure it always will be, the first wish of my heart that our lines may entirely agree; and, next to this, that if they cannot entirely agree, they may as little differ as possible. But indeed this is not a moment in which I can think it right or honourable for either of us to forbear to speak and act decidedly, and to take, while it is yet time, all honest and just steps for giving weight and efficacy, and for procuring support and authority to those opinions on which (if they be right) the safety of the country depends.

“You are already in possession of all facts that I am myself in possession of up to this time. Much more you must have heard than I can even guess as to the opinions of those whose opinions may have weight with you; and when you consider the circumstances in which I am placed, you will, I am sure, not be surprised if you should think you see some personal impatience of the present suspense mixed with a very sincere opinion that, on public grounds, that suspense is more to be deprecated than *any* one, I speak absolutely without exception, of the three or four different ways in which it may be terminated.

“I go to town for Wednesday and Thursday to settle about taking Lord Harrowby’s house. A letter from you, directed to me at Lord Fortescue’s in Grosvenor Square, would find me there either of those days.” *Copy.*

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, January 4. Walmer Castle.—“I feel very truly obliged to you for all the personal kindness and friendship

expressed in your letter, and enter very fully into your feelings as to the necessity of our settling with as little loss of time as possible whatever may be the course for each of us to pursue. If I should find that I am likely to be confined much longer to the coast, it will be the greatest possible satisfaction to me that you should execute your kind intention of coming here ; but I wish much, if possible, to save you the trouble of so distant an excursion, and I begin to think that I may be released sooner than I expected. A few days must probably now decide whether the enemy entertains any serious intention of making an attempt at this season ; as the wind is now perfectly fair, and the weather much more favourable for their purpose than could be expected during the winter. If, therefore, they do not make use of this opportunity, I shall hardly think it necessary to wait their motions much longer. There is certainly an appearance of activity on their coast, and another large reinforcement of gun boats, I believe, found its way to Boulogne yesterday, without the possibility of being molested ; but, notwithstanding these preparations, and the intelligence which Government appears to have received, I do not much believe they will try the experiment, on the faith of so uncertain a promise as that of a calm day in January."

W. WINDHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, January 7. Felbrigg.—“I shall never be able to get to town by Saturday. I had written to Elliot wishing even for a longer respite, though I suppose I must now give up any such hope. I *suppose* this, however, altogether upon the footing of *confidence* : for I do not myself see what there is which we shall have to do or to decide immediately ; and still less what there is which I shall not feel very glad to find already decided. If I were not pleading to those, who being once in London, were *Nescii humanis precibus mansuescere*, I should say that, if there was nothing immediately to be done, I might, in respect to counsel and deliberation, wait till Tuesday or after. I shall not however venture upon this unless further advised and authorized. Should it happen that, after pushing to reach town by Sunday, I should find that you were gone to Dropmore, and nothing was to be done in the House on Tuesday, it would be charity to let me know, even though I should at this time have left Felbrigg. Were there time, I should do some good by going through Colchester, and talking about what we have been projecting here, with Sir James Craig ; unless indeed the account is true that Lord Cornwallis is about to be appointed to the eastern district, a change which, at this period, I hardly know whether to be glad or sorry for. I am at present, as you see, wholly engrossed with the military campaign. I shall, however, from this moment transfer myself with all diligence to the Parliamentary one.”

## W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, January 8. York Place.—“I have thought it best to make use without delay of the interval which the present state of the weather affords, and am here for three or four days. I would propose coming to you at Dropmore, but there are a few persons whom I shall wish to have the opportunity of seeing in town, and I should also not like to add so many miles more to my distance from Walmer, in case any real or imaginary alarm should suddenly call me back. I therefore hope it will not be inconvenient to you to come up to town. The sooner you can, the better.”

## THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, January 12. Althorp.—“I write a line from this place, where I arrived yesterday, to tell you that the new Irish Secretary is Sir Evan Nepean. The offer of succeeding to Nepean at the Admiralty was made to Mr. Marsden, who declined accepting it, and intimated at the same time his determination to quit the office of Under-Secretary to the Admiralty which he has long been weary of. It seems doubtful whether Lord St. Vincent will at once make Tucker Secretary to the Admiralty, or whether he will begin by placing Tucker at first in Marsden's room; all this, however, is speculation as to future arrangement, but the two Secretariats of the Admiralty are actually vacated. How far the Irish Marsden will be reconciled to serve under Nepean may be a question as difficult to solve as it is difficult to conceive what particular motive should have led to so whimsical a nomination for Ireland as that of a man entirely unconnected with the Lord Lieutenant, the Secretary of State, and the country and business where he is going to preside. This change in all its circumstances seems to announce more weakness and rottenness in the present feeble system of government than I had suspected; and I should almost incline to think that they could not maintain themselves or be maintained, if they were not fortunate enough to find an artificial strength in the marvellous weakness of those from whom they naturally should expect their downfall. A report is current, and is said to be not without authority, that Addington has very recently represented in the closet the impossibility of his going on, and that he was answered by being told that he could have no real difficulty while he met with no real opposition. I do not vouch the truth, but I do not utterly reject it as incredible.”

## THOMAS GRENVILLE to the MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

1804, January 13. Althorp.—“I have communicated to Lord Spencer the letter which you enclosed to me from my brother, as well as that which contained your own sentiments

upon it. I confess that I am not disappointed now at the determination which it announces, because I was not disappointed at the sight of the few previous lines from William which you had shewn to me at Stowe, and which left no possible doubt as to the result of the conferences in Baker Street. It is easier however to see the inefficiency that so much disgraces the principal actor in this tragedy, than to decide upon the parts which it leaves to us to act in it. I continue to agree with you as much as I did in thinking that it is our business to pursue the course which we have followed, and to obtain the best assistance which we can get in making that course effectual. Perhaps I may entertain some degree of doubt whether that line, which you so naturally dwell upon as our obvious resource in the present circumstances, be as much in our reach to decide upon as might be imagined; but of this as of every other part of this interesting discussion, I must defer the details till Monday, on which day I shall return to Stowe to dinner, with your horses if you send them to Towcester, or otherwise with post-horses.

“Lord Spencer’s intention had been to go up to town for the birthday, and from thence to Norfolk for ten days shooting; but as he agrees in the necessity of discussion upon this important matter, he has abandoned his project of the birthday, and has undertaken to come over to Stowe on Wednesday next to meet William and you and me on that day. He desires you therefore to have the goodness to apprise Lord Grenville of his having put off his journey to town and Norfolk, in hopes of meeting him at Stowe on Wednesday; and, further to ensure this desirable object, he will hold himself equally ready for Thursday or Friday if either of those days should be more agreeable to Lord Grenville for our meeting at Stowe than Wednesday. By sending to Dropmore you will have an answer, and I can communicate it to Lord Spencer from Stowe on Monday, if Lord Grenville should prefer Thursday or Friday to Wednesday.

“No successor is appointed to Nepean, who goes to Ireland; Marsden of the Admiralty still declines, but this is *entre nous*.”

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1804, January 14.] Stowe.—“I cannot repine at the circumstances that induce Lord Spencer and Tom to press you so earnestly to meet them at Stowe, for they will at all events give me your society for one day. Fix your day, and a pair of my horses shall meet you at Winslow at such hour as you shall appoint to help you on to Stowe. If you want a saddle horse pray let me know, but otherwise I send none, as I think your servant always goes on the box.

“As to the decision that seems to be taken I could not help

observing to Tom that I am satisfied (if Pitt's mind is as much incensed as you think it) that he will gradually heat himself in the discussions which he announces, though I am equally satisfied that his only *decision* is to let *us* make the opposition to Addington as strong as we can make it by any means in our reach, and to secure to himself the undisputed right of taking such part in whatever of any sort arises out of it, as he may at the time think proper.

"It is useless to comment on such a game, but I am satisfied that this is his course, though I think that in various ways and from various causes he will be forced to abandon it, and in the mean time he will lose in strength and character, and the ministry will stand till some great national calamity drives them out.

"Our line in all this appears to me very clear, namely, to increase the activity and energy of our opposition, to endeavour to find grounds on which as many can act in concert as possible, looking for that concert with Mr. Fox in the same manner as Lord Rockingham, Lord Shelburn, and twenty other discordant *Dii Minores* acted together, and endeavouring to find grounds occasionally on which Mr. Pitt may, for reasons of his own and perhaps unexplained to us, give us the advantage of his attack. Out of such an opposition it is possible that the good many arise of routing the Doctor, and I am ready before hand to say that, though I have a most decided opinion of what might be best for the succession to him, yet I am contented to think that we had done much good even if the result of it were that Pitt should join Addington, or that Fox should form a Ministry entirely of those whose opinions during the last ten years have been most adverse to ours.

"I look on those two results as being very bad, but as very possible; and I am prepared to work against the Doctor even if I were sure that one of these was the only alternative.

"I have nothing more to add upon this subject except that I can account for Mr. Pitt's conduct in this matter only from engagements which I verily believe he has taken with the King, in favour of the Doctor, by which he is hampered. I *know* that Addington countenances the story now circulated of Mr. Pitt's negotiation through Willis with the King after Lord Spencer and you had resigned; and says that Mr. Pitt's offer was that of putting by the Catholic question, and of entire co-operation with Addington as Secretary of State: surely this cannot be *all lie*.

"As to Addington's present fears I *know* them to be great, and that he has been flirting with some of the Irish Catholic clergy; but *you may be sure* that the project of pensioning them (as this will be termed) will not be accepted, for *they dare not*. They are going to print *Lord Fingall versus Lord Redesdale*."

## THE EARL OF CARYSFORT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, January 17. Elton Hall.—“On my arrival here this morning I found the enclosed letter from the bishop of Lincoln, which was plainly intended not to be kept secret from you. I apprehend that the present state of public affairs as well as of parties does not make it probable that you will bring forward immediately any question of opposition. Our opinion of ministers, and of those parts of their conduct which have been the sources of the public calamities, has been strongly and specifically declared; and the ordinary course of Parliamentary business will present many occasions which it would be impossible for us to let pass without marking how strongly the judgment we had formed of them and their measures has been confirmed by subsequent events. Whether this is what Mr. P[itt] would call a *teasing, harassing opposition* I know not; but, though consistency requires that we should not abstain from it altogether, it might, I presume, be in the power of Mr. P[itt] to moderate it, by giving assurances of his readiness and determination to stand forward whenever there shall be an opportunity of exposing the incapacity of ministers in any important degree, or on any material point. Upon the whole I judge from the bishop's letter that Mr. P[itt]'s mind is really more inclined to opposition than might be supposed from his conversation with you; but, if that is the case, it is unaccountable that he should use so much reserve with you. Whatever he may ultimately determine, I must always think that he has given proof of a littleness of character in some respects that will greatly diminish my confidence in his abilities.”

*Enclosure.*

## THE BISHOP OF LINCOLN TO THE EARL OF CARYSFORT.

1804, January 13. Stevenage.—“I was summoned to town the beginning of this week by Mr. Pitt, and I received your Lordship's letter at his house, where I slept on Wednesday. I immediately went to Cumberland Place with some hope of finding you there, as I knew that Lord Grenville was in town; but you had set out for Stowe.

“I will write to Doctor Pearce, the Master of Jesus College to-morrow, and I am very confident that he will make every possible search after Irish manuscripts in the University and College libraries. You shall know the result.

“Your Lordship of course knows what passed between Lord Grenville and Mr. Pitt. I lament exceedingly that, while they agree in the necessity of Mr. Addington being removed from his present situation, they differ in their ideas of the *sort of opposition* which ought to be carried on against him in Parliament. I am, however, by no means without hope that

many questions will arise in which they will be disposed to adopt precisely the same line of conduct, and in which they will have also the concurrence of Mr. Fox and his friends. I wished much to have seen Lord Grenville, but I had not a proper opportunity of calling upon him. I might perhaps have stated to him my opinion, confidentially, that Mr. Pitt will in a short time, at least, if not immediately upon the meeting of Parliament, take a stronger line of opposition than he at present intends or even would allow to be probable. His opinions and feelings, both upon public and private grounds, are such that it cannot, I think, be long before he fully expresses them; but this probably will not take place till it is called forth by some new occurrence, I mean some objectionable measure or palpable omission on the part of Ministers, and they will soon furnish such an opportunity. In that case Mr. Pitt might not confine himself to the point in question, but might take a retrospective view, so far at least as to afford him a ground for declaring his conviction of the incompetency of Ministers, and the danger in which the country is placed by their negligence and want of talents. All this, however, would be greatly checked by any violence or intemperance on the part of Lord Grenville. It may appear a strange opinion, but I think that the more moderate Lord Grenville's language is, the more hostile will be that of Mr. Pitt. Mr. Pitt cannot bear the idea of a teasing, harassing opposition; but, as far as I can judge, he is ready to stand forward whenever there shall be an opportunity of exposing the incapacity of Ministers, in any important degree or upon any material point."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, January 25. London.—“My correspondent proposed either to meet me to-morrow half-way for a couple of hours' conversation, or that I should go and pass a day with him on Saturday. I have preferred the first, because I think, as I have told him, the earliest moment is the best. You will therefore expect no letter on Friday as I am to see you at dinner. I have asked nobody, as I think we had better be alone, unless you choose that I should ask E[lliott] with whom I have conversed to-day. My Yorkshire friend concurs entirely, and so does E[lliott]; write a word about E[lliott], aye or no.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, January 26. Charles Street.—“I am just returned from my morning ride, and have only time to write three or four lines to tell you that nothing could be more prosperous than the expedition from which I am just returned. Our modified line is perfectly agreeable, and I was told that the

only difficulty was to overcome a personal indolence and dislike of London which must be endeavoured to be subdued. He is doubtful almost of any effect, even from the most extensive plan, but agrees that this must be tried, because, if anything can do, this will. There was not a word that passed beyond the limits which we had agreed upon. I think he is inclined to consider your armed plan as the best subject in point of priority, and I find him recurring again to the advantage of resuming the motion which he had conceived useful, and which he had postponed. I am to hear again as soon as he can hear from the one or two to whom he writes."

LORD GRENVILLE to W. PITT.

1804, January 31. Audley Square.—“You will remember that I fully explained to you in our late conversations the decided opinion of those with whom I have acted for the last three years, that a declared and regular opposition to the present Government was now more than ever an indispensable public duty; and I stated to you the line which I thought it was likely we should pursue, when they were apprized by me that your resolution was finally taken not to act on any such opinion, either on the extended and comprehensive plan which, in common with them, I had wished, or even on any more limited scale. I mentioned to you this at the time as my own conjecture merely, and liable of course to be altered by discussion with them; but I found in fact that I had judged rightly of their opinion, which proved to be very little, if at all, different from that of which I had spoken to you.

“That personal affection which never can be altered by differences of political conduct, even if they were much greater than I flatter myself are at all likely to be found between us, and a determination that every part of my line shall be both open and unequivocal, make me very desirous not to withhold from you the knowledge of the step which we have taken in consequence of the opinions I have stated. In this communication you will find nothing more than you will hear openly declared in Parliament whenever the occasion may arise. But you will attribute this circumstance not to any reserve of mine, but to the simple fact that, meaning to do nothing but what we think just and honourable in itself, and incumbent upon us as the necessary result of the opinions we have long professed, we are determined that what we do shall be openly avowed, without mystery or concealment of any kind.

“What I have, therefore, to state to you is, that an opportunity has been taken to explain to Mr. Fox that we hold, and as we believe in common with him, two principles of action as indispensable to any reasonable hope of saving the country from its present dangers. First, that the

Government which now exists is manifestly incapable of carrying on the public business in such a manner as the crisis requires ; and that persons sincerely entertaining that opinion are bound to avow and actively pursue it. And secondly, that if now, or hereafter, there should arise any question of forming a new Government, the wishes and endeavours of all who mean well to the country should be directed to the establishment of an administration comprehending as large a proportion as possible of the weight, talents, and character to be found in public men of all descriptions, and without any exception. To this was added our decided opinion that it was not necessary, for the purpose of acting on these two principles, to extend the communication to any other matters whatever ; or to enter into details of any kind not relating to the Parliamentary business which may from time to time be brought forward. And, above all, that anything leading to compromises of former opinions, or to engagements for future arrangements, was to be carefully avoided, in order that it might be, at all times, and with the strictest truth, distinctly and publicly denied.

“I have thus stated to you as exactly as possible what has been said on our part, and I trust I have reason to rely with full confidence on the continuance of those sentiments which you have expressed to me respecting the whole of the conduct which I have observed towards you.

“I very much hope that you continue in the resolution of coming up at all events to the meeting of Parliament. I have reduced to paper the heads of the plan which I opened to you in its first outline. If you continue to think the idea worth pursuing in its details I shall be very glad of the opportunity of shewing it to you in its present form. I see as yet no reason to relinquish my hope of its being supported by all those whose assistance I should think conducive to its success ; and I need not tell you how much, in my opinion, your’s is included in that description.” *Copy.*

#### The EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, February 2. Elton.—“We set out to-morrow, and shall be in town on Saturday.” “I wish I could hear on my arrival that you had seen P[itt] again and found him more reasonable and decided, for, when I recollect the language which has been held since the peace by Fox, and the monstrous lengths he went before, I cannot but shrink from very close connection with [him] ; and yet, if the other does not stand forward, it seems inevitable.”

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, February 4. Walmer Castle.—“I am much obliged to you for having put me in possession as distinctly as you

have done of the line which you, and the friends with whom you act, have determined to pursue. After the full explanation you had given me of your sentiments in our conversations in town, I cannot be surprised at this determination; but I confess that the more I reflect on the subject, the more I regret that the view you form of what is incumbent upon you leads you to embark in a system in which I find it quite impossible to concur, and which, I fear, will not be productive of any increased credit to yourselves, or any advantage to the public. The immediate effect of an active opposition will be to harass a Government confessedly not very strong nor vigorous in itself, and in a situation of the country the most critical, with the constant distraction of Parliamentary warfare. Such a line, though conducted by the first talents and abilities, will, I am confident, not be supported by any strength of numbers in Parliament, nor by public opinion. It will therefore have very little chance of accomplishing its object of changing the Administration, and certainly none of doing so in time to afford the country the benefit of abler counsels to meet the difficulties of the present crisis. Those very difficulties it will in the mean while certainly aggravate; and even if, sooner or later, it should make a change necessary, I am afraid that instead of leading to the establishment of a comprehensive Administration (such as you describe) it will tend to render the attainment of that object more difficult if not impossible. Whatever unfavourable impression may at any time have existed in the highest quarter towards any of the parties engaged in such a system, will, of course, be strengthened and confirmed; and the natural consequence will be a determination, even in case of a change being found necessary, to put, if possible, a negative on them, in forming a new Government. In the event of such being the state of things, I cannot help foreseeing great mischief to the public, and the source of great uneasiness and embarrassment personally to myself; as nothing is more probable than that a call might then be made upon me which I should feel it impossible to decline, and that I should have no means either of forming that comprehensive Government which I agree with you in thinking most desirable, or of obtaining the assistance of those with whom, from public and private feelings, it has been the greatest happiness to me to act during almost the whole of my political life. I am aware that in these considerations there is nothing which I have not before stated to you, and indeed, if there were, it would be too late now to urge them. I have, however, naturally been led to express them again on the present occasion, and having done so, I need hardly add that the line which I must take under the present circumstances will be simply that of giving my opinion fairly on the measures and conduct of Government in important points, and suggesting whatever may appear to my own mind most essential to the public safety, abstaining at

the same time from all attempts to embarrass the Government by any system of opposition.

“I had intended to have come to town the beginning of next week ; but as I do not wish to make a long stay, and as I imagine no occasion will arise for much discussion till the second reading of Yorke’s new Volunteer Bill, I shall now defer my journey till Friday. On my arrival, I shall be very glad to converse with you farther on the general plan of armed force which you described to me in the outline ; and if in the interval you could without inconvenience send me a copy of it, I should be very glad of the opportunity of previously considering it, in the shape to which you have now reduced it. In thinking over the subject since I saw you, I certainly see great difficulties and objections ; but I am sure that I shall think it well worth while to look at it in more detail, before I venture to form a final opinion.”

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, February 13. Charles Street.—“I expect to see you in town to-morrow according to your first intention. I met P[itt] to-day and walked some way with him and Lord C[amden]. I find him fully satisfied of the total insufficiency of the present Bill, and I mentioned the course I had talked over with you. His doubt was whether, as their Bill professes to consolidate the whole system, we should not be obliged to debate the whole system on their narrow ground ; and he suggested the mode of suspending the Committee on the Bill till the House in a Committee should debate the whole subject of the defence of the nation. I consented, but Lord C[amden] interfered by observing that such a notion would be of too decided opposition, and P[itt] seemed struck with this true Arlington Street observation. I left them in that state, but P[itt] expresses a very earnest wish to see you, and therefore I mention this as an additional motive for bringing you if possible to-morrow. I think the printing the circulars will put off Yorke’s second reading till Friday. F[it]zwilliam comes to-morrow, and likewise is impatient to see you.”

#### The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1804, February 14.] Wednesday. House of Lords. Concerning legal opposition in the House of Lords to a private Bill for Aylesbury, promoted by Lords Buckingham and Grenville.—“In truth, however, I was not sorry to put it off for another reason which will equally make it necessary for you to come to town as soon as you conveniently can : and that is the certainty of the King’s insanity having returned, which is now universally known, and makes a strong sensation.

The facts that have come to my knowledge *as certain* are these. He rode three hours on Saturday evening, and had a restless night. He recovered a little on Sunday, *having slept in Chapel*, but was hurried in coming back. They contrived to walk him that evening in the Long Walk, and Sunday night he slept better, though not well. On Monday morning he walked before breakfast over all the home works for above two hours; and at breakfast Simmonds, *who has never left him*, made him promise to dine at two; instead of which he rode till *past five*, notwithstanding every exertion of his three sons to get him home. At dinner he was very unquiet and could not be kept to his seat, getting up perpetually from his chair though eating, and latterly grew so angry and violent that they endeavoured to prevent his evening ride; but his irritation increased, and Simmonds was called in, and succeeded almost by force in putting him to bed about half-past nine. It was then determined to bring him back to town, and the Queen came away about nine next morning. Simmonds could not get the King into his carriage till one, and with the greatest difficulty succeeded. He has been out this morning with the Duke of Cambridge for a short airing, but the impression with everyone is that it is hopeless. Lady Charlotte Finch told yesterday the lady who told me that the King is gone back unwell, and the reports of his health are very unsatisfactory. These are her exact words, after she had seen the Queen. My accounts from two other certain quarters are equally bad. I likewise know that Pitt yesterday told Lord Lowther that he feared we must look finally to a regency; and this moment Lord Lowther told my reporter that Mr. Pitt would immediately look to it. None of the ministers were in the House. The Lord Chancellor looked very ill, and Lord Walsingham told me he was *very ill, and his mind very much* disturbed. I am now going to Lord Fitz-William's, and if I can hear anything sufficiently interesting I will write to you, directed to be sent to you from Beaconsfield by some one of the early morning stages. But under all these Aylesbury circumstances I will not allow myself to doubt that you will come to my assistance on Friday, for indeed it will be impossible for me to fight a moment without you."

*Postscript*.—"Lord Bulkeley is this instant come to me in Pall-Mall to tell me that it is fit I should know that the whole game is considered as up by those nearest to the King, and that he tells me this (*being the first communication we have had*) on the most certain grounds. *Mine are equally certain.*"

#### MARQUIS WELLESLEY TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, February. Fort William.—"This letter will be delivered to you by Captain Charles Wyatt of the Corps of Engineers on the Establishment of Bengal. On my arrival

at Fort William in 1798, I selected Captain Wyatt on account of his professional character and experience to carry into execution a plan which I had determined to adopt for the improvement of the public buildings and of the town of Calcutta, and he has accordingly been employed with great assiduity, skill, and success, on this important duty since that period of time.

“In the course of Captain Wyatt’s superintendance of the duty which I had entrusted to him many improvements have been effected in the town of Calcutta; and the health and convenience of the inhabitants of this populous city have been essentially promoted by the able suggestions, and the laborious services of Captain Wyatt. But Captain Wyatt is entitled to particular credit for building the new Government House at Calcutta, the plan of which was formed by him in 1798, and which has since been completed under his immediate superintendance. This extensive building reflects great honour upon Captain Wyatt’s professional talents, and it has been finished with an attention to economy which affords the most honourable proof of his public zeal and integrity.

“In addition to these services, the public interests have derived great benefit from Captain Wyatt’s labours in other branches of the general plan with respect to public buildings in Bengal; and in consequence of Captain Wyatt’s suggestions, considerable reductions have been effected in the charge for public offices and buildings, both at Fort William, and at almost every station under the Presidency.

“I am extremely anxious therefore that Captain Wyatt’s reception in England should be distinguished by the countenance of my friends, and I shall acknowledge with gratitude any mark of favour which you may be pleased to manifest towards him.

“In addition to the public considerations which have induced me to recommend Captain Wyatt to your favourable notice, I have a great respect for Captain Wyatt’s private character, and I feel a most cordial interest in his future welfare and happiness. He is a most worthy man, and has possessed my confidence and esteem during the whole period of my residence in India. I request therefore that you will receive him with particular kindness, as a person whose character and disposition will justify any attentions which you may have the goodness to confer upon him.

“Captain Wyatt is nephew to your architect of the same name.”

*Private.* MARQUIS WELLESLEY to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, March 14. Fort William.—“I am very anxious that you should converse with Lieutenant-Colonel Hoghton, who carries home the treaties of peace with the Mahratta confederates. You will find him extremely intelligent; and

I recommend him particularly to your notice as an officer for whom I entertain the highest regard and esteem."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, March 25. Bath.—“As to your projects I cannot but smile at seeing you settling them as gravely as if such a person as Bonaparte, or his still more dangerous co-operator the Doctor, did not exist in the world. Long before June the Cinque Port colonel and all other scientific commanders will have been satisfied how idly the real strength of the country will have been wasted. But before that time we must in some way or other have disposed of our yeomanry who, I have ventured to assure Mr. Yorke, will not (unless they have much altered their opinion) agree to be called out upon permanent pay *under military command*, instead of being trained for 14 or 20 days in the way in which they had proposed soon to assemble for exercise; the way to which they have been used, *and under their own officers*. But I have added that as ‘I have not been able to procure a printed copy of the Bill as amended on the report, it is possible that the old Act under which they were trained may be repealed.’

“I have an order for all the [Commanders of] regiments of cavalry and infantry volunteers to appoint a paymaster from out of his subalterns with a pay, when embodied, of 15s. *per diem*, or out of his quarter masters, serjeants, or privates, with a pay of 12s. It is very long, but you shall have it copied, and in the mean time you will look out. I should think you had better engage a new yeoman for the express purpose of making him a paymaster, as much caution will be required in the choice.

“I have begun to bathe and drink, but of course I do not feel any sensible change yet. I shall, however, be better able to judge of myself and my motions in the course of a few days.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, March 31. Charles Street.—“I had written to F[ox] originally to tell him how much P[itt] had expressed himself desirous of joint strength upon the question of a committee of the House on the state of defence; then again I had to write the day before yesterday to state that in consequence of Yorke’s opening Bill, P[itt] was partly inclined to hitch on his army of reserve motions upon Yorke’s bill, and therefore that P[itt] wished F[ox] to defer giving notice till after Yorke’s bill. The consequence of all this eternal uncertainty must be to create distrust in the practicability of any arrangement of measures which depend upon P[itt] who does not seem to know his own mind for two days together; and accordingly I find by the answer which I have just

received from F[ox] (and which I will bring to Dropmore), that he is worried and disconcerted by having always to pursue a concurrence which he never obtains, and if he shews any impatience upon this subject, I take for granted that there are many of his friends who are still less tolerant than he is. I had mentioned to F[ox] your incipient intention of moving to repeal the clause of the levy in mass Bill, and he tells me that he has not examined the law of the question, but is persuaded that he shall agree with you whenever he has conversed with you about it, and that he is disposed to connect his motion with yours upon the matter. I think this very desirable, and I write a line to him to say so, and to ask him to name some day when he will come and meet you here with only one or two to talk the thing over; perhaps to-morrow se'night would be a good day, though I see F[ox] wishes not to come till towards the end of the following week.

“Lord Carnarvon is obliged to be at Highclere on the 10th, and meant to leave town to-morrow, but as he is anxious to be quite in concert with you, and to act with you in this measure on which he is very eager, I have persuaded him to stay in town till Saturday next that he may see you on Thursday and Friday. He and Lord Glastonbury are both anxious that you should move a formal repeal, and not let the business go off incidentally.

“I write these few lines to-day partly because you may perhaps see C[anning?] to-morrow, and partly because there is no post to-morrow. I will come on Monday, and Elliott talks of meeting us on that day.”

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, April 7. Bath.—“I find that the language of Ministers still announces the King as gaining ground, though my information states him neither to gain mental nor bodily strength. He saw the Queen again on Saturday last and (as is said) with less agitation than the Saturday before. Kew or Windsor are still out of the question though eagerly looked to. Many interior evidences *within the House* concur to make me think that those who know the truth despond, and I have reason to believe that Addington thinks very ill of it.

“As to my proxy, it is as you well know most entirely at your service; be so good, therefore, as to send me one, for I have none with me.

“The more I see of the volunteer Bill the more I dislike it. The only real operation of it will be the ruin of the army and militia, and the resignation of the force whenever it is wanted.”

#### W. PITT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, April 18. York Place.—“I have thought it best to put off my opposition to Yorke's Bill till the report, as I find

there has not been sufficient notice to ensure a full attendance to-day. This being the case, I shall remain at home to nurse my gout, and shall be very glad if you can call here any time in the course of to-day, as some things have arisen which I wish much to mention to you as soon as possible."

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, April 20. Bath.—“I have just received the parcel. The contents did not in the least surprise me, for there were yesterday very evident symptoms that had fully satisfied me and through me the Bishop, who is gone to-day to Brazenose in despair at having recollected that he has not taken the oaths, and consequently can give no proxy. I have, however, no doubt that if I go to town before Friday next I shall have influence sufficient with the Bishop to persuade him to come to town for three or four days. My coming must depend upon you, and as I now *understand you*, one word will enable me to decide. My own opinion is that though the first explanation may take place, it will for many reasons stop there for the present. But if not, the result will be *that* which we foresaw in December last, and which we agreed would be a *great object gained*. I repeat that if you seriously wish me to come up, I will do so on Thursday even if I am to return to Bath; but the next seven days will decide much upon my strength, which is recovering, and upon your wishes. All I beg is, one word as daily as you can make it; and pray send me a blank proxy which I will try to make Lord Bridport sign. He seems much disposed to it.

“Clever thinks that Euseby, who is in town, should be tried for by Lord Egremont, for he is very angry at Lindsay's promotion to Kildare. Pray consult Tom whether *he* can try him; of course if he thinks my name can assist, he will use it. He likewise thinks he is sure that Bishop Horsley will vote with you if you *choose to ask it*.

“I am just come from the bath, and writing drives the water into my head.”

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, April 24. Bath.—“Bishop Cleaver meets me on Thursday night at Maidenhead, and we come up together early on Friday; I have got Lord Bridport's proxy, and it is still possible that I may bring you another. At this distance it must of course be difficult for me to make out your list; but my list of what I consider effective and certain are only 72 peers; but I make out fourteen more doubtful amongst those who used to vote with Mr. Fox or Lord Moira against

you. Cleaver appeared certain that you could gain Bishop Horsley's vote if you chose to have it. I shall endeavour to get at the Bishop of Ferns (at least to make him stay away) through his brother. I have just seen Lady Spencer, so that from her accounts and yours I think I see clearly that the Doctor is in most serious difficulties *of all sorts*. I am persuaded from my accounts that the King is utterly incapable of a council.

"If you can call for half an hour in Pall Mall I shall be there before twelve on Friday.

"Lord Waterford arrived here from Ireland yesterday and went up to town immediately. *He is against us.*"

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, April 29. [York Place.]—"On my return home this evening, I find an intimation that I am to have a communication *early to-morrow*, but I have no new means of guessing what will be its nature. Probably by twelve to-morrow I may be able to let you know whether it turns out to be anything that ought to affect the proceedings of the day, and I will call on you as near that time as I can."

*Private.* PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, May 6. York Place.—"I called to give you an account of the state of things up to this time. I now expect to see the King to-morrow morning. Till then I can say nothing decisive on the first point I have been aiming at, but I am afraid there is very little chance that my verbal representation on that subject will be more successful than those in writing have been. It seems pretty clear that a sufficiently explicit communication will be made in the House of Lords to-morrow."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, May 7. York Place.—"I am expecting every moment a summons from the Queen's House. I will call on you as soon as possible after my return from thence. If you should be gone out, pray leave word when I can see you before four."

LORD GRENVILLE to W. PITT.

1804, May 7. Camelford House.—"Since I saw you I have had the opportunity of conversing with the persons whose opinions it was necessary for me to learn, before I could give you any final answer. Those opinions appear to be all of them in exact conformity to that I had already intimated to

you as probable, and it is therefore best that you should lose no time in acting upon them. But before they are laid before the King we should wish to have the opportunity of stating upon paper the grounds on which they rest, in order that His Majesty may not believe that any slight motive would induce us in such a moment to decline any public service which he may think us capable of rendering. This paper I hope to send you in the course of to-morrow." *Copy.*

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, May 7. London.—“I have just got certain information (which cannot be mistaken) that Lord Hawkesbury came to his office at nine this morning in great apparent agitation; and has sent round every messenger in waiting and many extra messengers summoning the Lords to attend as *early this day as possible*. He has likewise got three or more messengers returned in the course of the night who were sent off on Friday and yesterday for fresh proxies.

“Surely this does not look like the *something satisfactory* that we understood to be settled last night for the House of Lords.”

EARL SPENCER to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, May 8. Wimbledon Park.—“I return you the copy of the letter which you have been so good as to send me, which I think unexceptionable. It places our line of conduct on this occasion on its true grounds, and is, at the same time, so expressed as not to be liable to any imputation which one would desire to avoid.

“I am very sorry that you have had the trouble of sending after me, and if I had known that you intended at all events to send the answer to-day, I should willingly have waited in town to have saved you that trouble.

“I cannot say that I feel very sanguine on the subject of any change being produced by this communication on Pitt's mind, but *nous verrons*.”

*Private.* LORD GRENVILLE to W. PITT.

1804, May 8. Camelford House.—“I send you the enclosed, which I will beg you to lay before the King as the ground of our declining your offer. I still indulge the hope that your farther representations to him will save both to you and to the country the perilous step in which you are now engaged.” *Copy.*

*Enclosure.*

LORD GRENVILLE to W. PITT.

1804, May 8. Camelford House.—“ I have already apprized you that all the persons to whom, at your desire, I communicated what passed between us yesterday, agree with me in the decided opinion that we ought not to engage in the administration which you are now employed in forming. We should be sincerely sorry if, by declining this proposal, we should appear less desirous than we must always be of rendering to His Majesty, to the utmost of our power, every service of which he may be graciously pleased to think us capable. No considerations of personal ease or comfort, no apprehension of responsibility, or reluctance to meet the real situation to which the country has been brought, have any weight in this decision ; nor are we fettered by any engagements on the subject, either expressed or implied ; we rest our determination solely on our strong sense of the impropriety of our becoming parties to a system of government which is to be formed, at such a moment as the present, on a principle of exclusion.

“ It is unnecessary to dwell on the mischiefs which have already resulted from placing the great offices of Government in weak and incapable hands. We see no hope of any effectual remedy for these mischiefs but by uniting in the public service as large a proportion as possible of the weight, talents, and character to be found in public men of all descriptions, and without any exception. This opinion I have already had occasion to express to you in the same words, and we have for some time past been publicly acting in conformity to it ; nor can we, while we remain impressed with this persuasion, concur in defeating an object for which the circumstances of the present moment afford at once so strong an inducement, and so favourable an occasion.

“ An opportunity now offers such as this country has seldom seen, for giving to its Government, in a moment of peculiar difficulty, the full benefit of the services of all those who, by the public voice and sentiment, are judged most capable of contributing to its prosperity and safety. The wishes of the public on this subject are completely in union with its interests ; and the advantages which not this country alone, but all Europe and the whole civilized world, might derive from the establishment of such an Administration at such a crisis, would probably have exceeded even the most sanguine expectations. We are certainly not ignorant of the difficulties which might have obstructed the final accomplishment of such an object, however earnestly pursued. But when in the very first instance all trial of it is precluded, and when this denial is made the condition of all subsequent arrangements, we cannot but feel that there are no motives of whatever description which could justify our taking an

active part in the establishment of a system so adverse to our deliberate and declared opinions." *Copy.*

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, May 19. London.—“Though this letter is to go through the Post Office it will convey to them no news, though it may be news to you that the King is supposed by every one to be very much deranged.

“Much was built on the hopes of being able to move him to-day to Windsor, but *Dr. Symonds* has stated the decided impossibility of such a journey in the present state of *irritation*. I quote the name and the phrase, being certain of both. The Duke of Cambridge accompanies him in his daily airing; the Queen and Princesses following in another carriage, *having found it impossible to control the King to any propriety of conduct in their coach*. But what is most material and admits of no doubt is the letter written by the King on Thursday night, and directed by him to the *Earl of Salisbury*, in a style of great bitterness, utterly incoherent and unconnected, reproaching him with ingratitude after he had made him a Marquis and given him the Garter, and assigning reasons for promoting Lord Dartmouth and Lord Aylesford. This letter was seen by many yesterday, and the original was put into the hands of my informant, who read it very carefully twice, and tells me that the first sentence is kind and connected, but that the conclusion of near thirty lines is unconnected and bitter. Many other stories are in circulation, tending to establish the same fact, but I was anxious that you should know *what is certain*. I likewise know that the queen, princesses, and those of his sons who see him, all think very ill of him. No order is given yet for the birthday, and the ladies who are looked to for the signal for new gowns have not as yet, in any case, ordered their birthday dresses.

“Under all these circumstances you will not wonder that our new Ministers should look very blank, and that they have found great difficulties in filling their vacancies. Lord Hawkesbury speaks of his ill treatment, and Lord Liverpool and the younger Jenkinson were in opposition on Thursday, till the latter was named Secretary of Legation to Vienna, Lord *Dunlow* the India Board, with H. Wellesley, who is succeeded in the Treasury by young G. Rose. The old Rose joint Paymaster. The India Directors waited on Lord Melville on Thursday to solicit the benefit of his *assistance and advice*, which he promised them! This is all my budget; and God knows it is gloomy enough.

“Lord Chesterfield wrote to the King on Monday to offer his office, and to return thanks for the promise lately renewed of the blue ribbon, but at twelve this day had received no answer, and thinks very ill both of his office and Garter.”

## THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, May 24. Charles Street.—“The Duke of Montrose told me to-day that Government (as such) will not take part in the Aylesbury Bill, or send cards out for attendance, but that every individual would take what part he might fancy upon the subject.

“You will have seen our ineffectual effort yesterday to stop the march of the Lords’ Amended Volunteer Bill, but Pitt was determined to divide if pressed upon it, and it was thought better to content ourselves with the conversation that took place. Why our committee have determined to disagree to your clause for not making commanding officers publick accountants I know not ; you will know if you chuse to hear the reasons which our committee will give for that disagreement.

“The town is full of the same sort of reports as those which you left behind you. No Master of the Horse finally named, and no Lords to fill the vacancies in the Bedchamber.

“I was told yesterday by a friend of P[itt] who knows the fact, that P[itt] has been obliged to apologize to Lord Euston for [tur]ning out Smith, and puts it upon his finding it impossible to refuse to Lord Hawkesbury to keep Wallace !!! I think you named to-morrow or Saturday for your return, so I suppose we shall meet at dinner on Sunday in Grosvenor Square. You would be much missed there if you did not come.”

## The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, May 30. Buckingham House.—“I send you one of my stable people with this note, as it is too delicate to trust to the chance of the coach. The Prince before dinner took Lord FitzWilliam, Lord Carlisle, and me (for Fox was at the House of Commons) aside, and told us that the King’s situation *was desperate*, and that he should wish to converse with us after dinner. I observed he was very discreet on the subject of the King’s illness during dinner, but evidently he had much on his mind, and we observed that he was very deeply engaged with the Duke of Richmond who was next him. Tom and Grey and Windham went away as soon as the cloth was removed to the House of Commons, and after coffee the Prince took first Lord FitzWilliam for half-an-hour, and then he called me. It is very difficult to detail a conversation of half-an-hour, but it began by stating the certain information he had received from *every branch* of the royal family, but particularly from the Dukes of Kent, Cumberland, and Cambridge, of the King’s situation whilst at Windsor, and of his personal conduct *to them* and to the queen and the princesses in their presence ; and his conviction from these whom

he named, and from other information, that the King was *as bad and perhaps worse than ever*. That he was satisfied that the moment was approaching in which there would be no alternative but that of a regency; that he wished not to precipitate that discussion, but to be prepared for it by the advice of those whom he trusted, and to put himself entirely into the hands of a very few, whom *he would anxiously press and even command* to dine with him for the purpose of receiving advice on the steps to be taken whenever *that moment forced forward* the discussion of what might be best for the country. That he desired to confine that dinner to FitzWilliam, Carlisle, Fox, Grey, Windham, T. Grenville, you and me, excluding every other person whatsoever, (and by name *Lord Thurlow, who possibly might be unpleasant to Lord Grenville*) and to receive and abide by their advice. That he had *already* ordered the Lord Chancellor to attend him to-morrow, and had intimated what he meant, namely, to order him to report to him *de die in diem* a written report of the King's health, for which he should be considered responsible; that he was determined to wait for what might occur, but that he conceived the state of his Majesty's health *irrecoverably gone*; and that in a few days the voice of the country would force a communication from Government, and that he wished to be prepared for it by advice. He detailed all that had passed on the King's illness between him and ministers since February last, and added that for above six weeks the physicians and the ministers had ceased to communicate to him one iota. He then said that he knew your difficulties as to a regency if we were driven to it, and that he was prepared to give every facility to you on that head, and to accept *the whole of the restrictions as a temporary arrangement*, according to the spirit of Pitt's letter to him of 1788; but that he must know what he was to depend upon, and that he must throw himself on our advice.

“He added that the Duke of Richmond had advised him to this measure, and had offered (as a man abstracted from all party) to move whenever we should advise in this matter. I, of course, referred all this to discussion with our friends, eagerly applauded his forbearance, urged the continuance of it, and stated how little I was pledged to any regency opinions, but how much I was decided to uphold your fair fame and your consistency so far as they were involved in this question, supposing it forced forward by the King's illness. On this I urged him, and shewed him most clearly the advantage he would gain in public opinion by accepting *instantly* the bill such as it was proposed to him in 1788. He agreed to all this as clearly as I could, and I am satisfied he will lend himself to all you could wish on that head. This very long explanation led to many other details, but it ended in his directions to me to write to you to consider all the circumstances that might press out of the situation of the

King, if it was as desperate as he believed it, and to order you to dine with him on Friday for this purpose. I hinted Aylesbury to him as a challenge thrown out by the Lord Chancellor and Lord Thurlow to us for Friday; and he said he would direct *them both* to put off the discussion; for that this matter was too near to him to delay the consideration of it.

“I afterwards had a very long conversation with Fitz-William, who urged me to press upon you to come up to this meeting for the purpose of *taking him* under our *direction*, for that unless we moderated his impatience, and advised him well, he would get *into worse hands who would mislead him*; and after a full explanation from me of all I felt of your regency difficulties, he said he considered your character for consistency as deeply as his own, and that he would lend himself to any arrangements that could induce the Prince to take *all* the restrictions as a temporary arrangement on the presumption of the King’s recovery, subject (according to Mr. Pitt’s reservation) to new arrangements if the regency were to be permanent, and if that prospect of recovery diminished. But I find your presence so anxiously pressed, that I promised to state all this with my advice to you to think the matter over; and, at all events, the Prince *directed me to command you to attend him, for that he considered this the most critical period of his life.*

“All these discussions with him, Carlisle, and FitzWilliam, lead us to a very late hour, and my private communication with the latter was most satisfactory, but very long, and it is now half-past one; so that I can write no more, but beg you to send my boy back immediately with one word that I may put off Aylesbury if you agree (what indeed you cannot avoid) to meet this party; and, in that case, let me know when you come, that I may be in the way to receive *you here*, and to tell you all that passed.”

#### The LORD CHANCELLOR to the PRINCE OF WALES.

1804, June 10. London.—“The Chancellor has laid before His Majesty’s confidential servants the letter of the seventh instant, with which he was honoured from His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales on Friday morning. The Chancellor has already had the honour of transmitting, with the concurrence of His Majesty’s servants, the opinion, given by the physicians on the 5th instant. He now encloses, pursuant to His Royal Highness’s desire expressed to His Majesty’s servants, that of the 31st of May, which the physicians thought it advisable to draw up with a view to its being laid before His Majesty; and he transmits with it a further opinion given as late as last night.

“His Majesty’s servants have thus laid before His Royal

Highness the most authentic information upon the state of His Majesty's health up to this time ; and they observe that it is His Royal Highness's intention in future, to desire the physicians to make communications upon this most interesting subject directly to himself.

"In consequence of one part of His Royal Highness's letter, His Majesty's servants feel it incumbent upon them to represent to His Royal Highness that they have not been so unmindful to their own duty, or of the province of His Majesty's physicians, as to have referred to the judgment of those physicians any legal or constitutional point. The opinion of the physicians (founded upon a knowledge of the circumstances of His Majesty's situation) fully confirmed by their own observation, appears to them to form the best ground upon which they can judge of the actual state of His Majesty's health.

"Thus informed, it has remained for them to regulate their public conduct in the discharge of the trust which His Majesty has been pleased to repose in them by a sense of [what] their public duty, and their allegiance to His Majesty, have indispensably required of them ; and by those considerations they must continue to be guided." *Copy.*

*Two enclosures.*

*Enclosure I.*

1804, May 31.—"We continue to be of opinion that His Majesty is sufficiently recovered to be capable of exercising his high functions ; but there are still certain symptoms remaining, which make us apprehensive of a relapse, unless His Majesty will strictly and uniformly exert himself to correct those ideas which occasionally shew themselves in his less guarded moments. For, we cannot conscientiously pronounce His Majesty to be out of danger of a relapse till those symptoms no longer exist. We, therefore, think it our duty to express our opinion of the absolute necessity of His Majesty still conforming to medical guidance, till we can have the satisfaction of declaring that the recovery is perfect."

(Signed) L. Pepys.  
H. R. Reynolds.  
Francis Milman.  
W. Heberden.  
S. F. Simmonds.

*Copy.*

*Enclosure II.*

"In giving an opinion on His Majesty's state since Tuesday last, we beg leave to refer to the judgment we

expressed on that day, and declare that the favourable opinion then given has been daily confirmed.”

(Signed)

L. Pepys.  
H. R. Reynolds.  
Francis Milman.  
W. Heberden.  
S. F. Simmonds.

9 June, 1804. *Copy.*

The PRINCE OF WALES to the LORD CHANCELLOR.

1804, June 19.—“The knowledge which the Prince of Wales has at length obtained of the King’s actual state compels him to express to His Majesty’s ministers his sense of what has hitherto been done on this most delicate and interesting subject. The discussion is in many respects painful to him, but his silence might imply an acquiescence in proceedings, which both as a dutiful and affectionate son, and as a faithful subject, he has every reason to disapprove.

“It is now not less than five months since His Majesty was afflicted with a return of his former unhappy malady. His recovery, however advanced, is still imperfect, and his situation continues to require the guidance and control not only of his physicians, but also of their inferior attendants. Of these distressing circumstances no communication has ever been made, either to His Majesty’s Privy Council, or to his Parliament. His Ministers have claimed, on the contrary, to act in such a situation from their own authority, and appear to conceive that the trust which His Majesty has reposed in them for very different purposes empowers them to exercise their own discretion on public interests to which that trust certainly does not extend. Without any communication with the Prince, His Majesty’s medical treatment has been regulated under their orders alone, even when it became necessary to exclude from His Majesty the whole of his own family. By their opinions it has been determined at what seasons His Majesty should be importuned with difficult business, and exposed to fatigue the most likely to obstruct his recovery. And by their judgment alone it is now decided that, under the British constitution, the King’s commands may legally be received on the highest matters of his government, at the very time when his person and all his ordinary actions are subjected to constant and necessary control.

“Under such circumstances, the Prince can no longer forbear to express his entire disapprobation of principles and measures which he sees to be full of danger to the British monarchy. He cannot acknowledge in the King’s Ministers an authority which they have assumed, as he believes, without warrant, and which is manifestly capable of the worst abuse. Still

less can he recognise a practice so injurious to the constitutional rights both of the Crown and of Parliament, as that under which His Majesty's government has been administered for the last five months, while His Majesty's person has been under restraint, and his Parliament, though sitting, kept in utter ignorance of his real situation. Against the alarming consequences of such a precedent the Prince of Wales feels it his indispensable duty to make this his solemn protest, as the King's son, as the first subject of his empire, and as the heir apparent of his throne. And if the hopes which he now anxiously cherishes of His Majesty's immediate and perfect recovery should unhappily be still disappointed, he thinks it necessary to require, on the behalf both of the King and of his people, that all future proceedings in this momentous business shall henceforth be strictly regular, warranted by some authority already known to the law, or, in cases of unforeseen difficulty, referred to Parliamentary decision.

“This explicit declaration of his sentiments on so solemn an occasion the Prince has judged to be due to his sovereign, to the country, and to himself. The necessity of expressing them adds to the pain which he feels from the afflicting circumstances to which they relate. But he should never cease to reproach himself if any apparent acquiescence on his part could be thought to sanction a course of conduct which he must always deeply regret to have seen pursued.”  
*Draft by Lord Grenville. Endorsed:—*“(This draft was, I believe, still further altered before the letter was sent. G.)”

#### COLONEL J. McMAHON to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, July 12. Carlton House.—“By the command of the Prince of Wales, I have the honour to enclose your Lordship the copy of a note which His Royal Highness received from the Lord Chancellor on the 10th instant, in answer to his communication of the 2nd instant.”

#### *Enclosure.*

#### THE LORD CHANCELLOR to the PRINCE OF WALES.

1804, July 10.—“The Lord Chancellor has communicated to His Majesty's Ministers the note with which he was honoured from His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales on the 2nd instant.

“It must be most painful to His Majesty's Ministers to receive the repeated intimation of the unfavourable view which His Royal Highness has taken of their conduct; but, as His Royal Highness is pleased to intimate in his last note that he has nothing to add to his communication of the 19th of June, His Majesty's servants deem it necessary only to entreat His Royal Highness's permission to refer to the notes which the

Lord Chancellor has had the honour of submitting to His Royal Highness, in which they have presumed respectfully to state to His Royal Highness the principles of duty and allegiance to His Majesty by which that conduct has necessarily been regulated.

“The Lord Chancellor begs leave to assure His Royal Highness that he has not failed to weigh with the utmost deference and attention such parts of His Royal Highness’s communication as more immediately concern the Chancellor himself; and with every sentiment of respect to His Royal Highness, he has to lament that he cannot feel it consistent with his duty to His Majesty to enter into a full explanation upon the subject.

“It is this consideration which compels him to restrain his anxiety to do justice to himself; an anxiety which must be proportioned to the consciousness which the Chancellor asserts, that in the discharge of his duty to the King, he has been actuated only by motives the most pure, and directed, in all circumstances, by the best judgment which he could form with respect to the nature of that duty, considering it with reference both to example and principle.” *Copy.*

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, September 8. Wynnstay.—“Your letter found me yesterday, but newly returned a little more to the southward after having ventured as near the Scotch borders as it is safe for any man to do who may be disposed to question the omnipotence of the Lord Advocate of Scotland, Elliot, to whom long habit has made this subjection more tolerable, went gaily on from Carlisle, after having passed eight or ten delightful days at Windermere or Keswick; to me the gratification of all that romantic and beautiful scenery exceeded all that my most sanguine expectations had promised to me; and brought me back to the same objects not only without being satiated with them, but with an eager determination to employ six hundred miles upon the same objects again, if no natural or political [convulsion] of the country shall have changed the face of it, or have deprived me of the means of enjoying it. Upon invasion, however, in spite of the long train of military go-carts, the long subscriptions of the hackney-men, the long speeches of Sir B. Watson, and the long paragraphs of the ministerial newspapers, I continue to be incredulous. In truth, as it seems to me, the ministers themselves do in their own persons but faintly support the alarms which they endeavour to excite, for the Secretary at War, whom I met at Trentham a month ago, disclaimed all knowledge of any immediate pressure; and went accordingly to Scotland till the end of September. Dundas is learning the conduct of the navy by studying the manœuvres

of the bathing-machines at Worthing, and Lord Hawkesbury is exercising the vigilance of his Home Department in a close attention at Weymouth upon all that may be curious and interesting to him to observe in that quarter. Of the refreshed giant what I hear from pretty good authority is that there has been lately in all his manner and appearance so much distress and despondency, that he seems so 'absorbed and melancholy, and ailing' that his friends are extremely uneasy about him; and that it is impossible to see him without feeling persuaded that 'some great crisis is at hand which entirely overcomes him.' I tell you this precisely as I heard it two days ago in a letter of good authority. How to comment upon this fact I know not; my own conjecture has been that we are more looking after peace than after war; and certainly, while peace offers so little security as in the present moment it does, it would be a high trial of any man's nerves to rest the security of the country upon the faith of a treaty signed with Bonaparte; but yet, with Pitt's very, very sanguine temper, it is difficult to believe that he would not teach himself to think peace as defensible now as he did when he defended the treaty of Amiens. Some conjecture that his own health is impaired, and some attribute his despondency to the unsatisfactory state of health in another quarter; but tho' I hear what might confirm this latter conjecture, I have not certainty enough to rest entirely upon it. With respect to the explanation that has been in part supplied to you, it is evident that the *whole truth* must go a little farther than what has been described to you. I am told that Lord Melville and the Chancellor were the two negotiators; that they held out to the P[rince] the gratification of his favourite wish of his military rank, while the King had never for a moment given the slightest ground for such a hope; the consequence was that, after the time of the interview had been fixed, and before it took place, the P[rince], having ascertained his favourite object to be unattainable, regarded this continued refusal as a new proof of there being no sincere wish for reconciliation. It is added that a new arrangement for Princess Ch[arlotte] at Windsor, and for the Princess of Wales in Greenwich rangership for life, without his knowledge or concurrence, contributed to encrease his dissatisfaction. With all, however, that looks so unpromising to Government, I am inclined to believe that, tho' there is no general satisfaction in what is doing, there is no general desire for active opposition; and in that case Pitt will meet Parliament stronger than he left it. Nothing can be more uncertain than my steps, till you want them with you."

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, September 9. [Stowe.]—"I return you the letter which you sent to me, which confirms most fully the opinions

I intimated to you in my last letter. I was well aware of the total and absolute loss of all influence of the queen, and there is a history belonging to that chapter which I cannot state by letter, but which is decisive on the impaired state of the King's mind. He was very sturdily disinclined to any reconciliation; and certainly had expressed himself quite up to the day of the interview, as determined to that measure from principle of expediency only. The measure of removing Princess Charlotte to Windsor, *even though the Prince of Wales should object*, is announced without any management; and I should imagine that this will be a *casus belli* between the father and son. Surely in all this, Mr. Pitt (for I say nothing of those minor actors, Lord Chancellor and Lord Melville) has been most disgracefully ill-advised; for it is difficult to conceive any state of things that could justify the risk of various kinds, and repay him for running that risk of putting his fingers *entre tel arbre et tel écorce*.

"I hear a little of Weymouth, and I understand that the whole is very childish, and that they are too happy to get him safe on board from ten o'clock till six, out of the view of all that come to look at him. These constant salutes from all the frigates, yachts, and batteries, both on going on board and on returning, are new *and by particular order*. The old rule was to salute only the first time of going on board, and on the usual gala days. But this is only one of a thousand proofs of weakness, which I verily believe was found so troublesome near London, that Mr. Pitt was too glad to lend himself to the Weymouth journey, to remove the King from *his* presence and councils. At the same time I perfectly agree with you that the Colonel in Kent is as fully entitled to the attention of the public as the King in Dorset. Sir Brook Watson is a most excellent ally in the military project of crying out for invasion; but charm he never so wisely, I cannot find one creature who believes that it will be attempted. The expence, however, if I may judge of it from all that is wished to be done in this county, is unbounded.

"I do not wonder that Boconnoc should occupy you so entirely; you know my partiality to it, and at some less busy moment I shall hope to share with you the tranquility of those lovely vallies in which I have passed such happy days.

"I cannot *débrouiller* the Vienna measure, which is big with everything most dangerous and most humiliating; nor can I better understand the Petersburg language to France, being convinced that Alexander is anything but *Great*."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1804, September 23. Stowe.]—"My accounts from Weymouth are the same. *Mens non sana in corpore sano*. The

stories multiply, and the Hanoverian review with all its very many circumstances has made great impression. Pitt has taken care that his three Secretaries should relieve each other, so that the K[ing] never has been unwatched for more than three days, and the result of all this, that on the 20th September a proclamation has been signed fixing 27th November for the dispatch of business in Parliament, thereby giving 69 days' notice; a circumstance that clearly marks to me Pitt's sense of the risk that attends the delay of that proclamation.

"On that day then we are to meet, and to be told of no one victory or advantage, and to hear that the result of the add[itiona]l force bill is an army diminished near 3,000 men, a militia diminished about 1,000, volunteers ditto near 17,000, (and probably many more not returned in the monthly states), sea fencibles ditto above 2,000 (by paying off the block ships to the river ships); artillery ditto about 300 men; and the seamen, till the last East and West Indian arrivals had increased the levies, had not kept up to the 97,000 returned in June last as effective.

"This, I have reason to think, is nearly if not exactly an accurate statement of the result of that wonderful operation. As to Pitt himself, he is really as mad as the K[ing] ever could be as to his own hobby-horse of waggons and cars, which occupy his whole mind. Sir Brook yesterday sent orders to his commissioner here for arranging the move of 37,000 men, in case of invasion, in the following proportions:—

"*First division from Newport to Dunstable.* To move in ten divisions at various intervals of six, twelve, and fifteen hours, but all to move in the course of five days, and to be collected at Newport: 25,000 men in 1,577 waggons with 7,885 horses and 9,262 trusses of wheat straw. *Second division from Tingewick to Hardwicke and from Hardwicke to Amersham.* To move in nine divisions at various intervals of hours, but all to move in the same course of five days and to be collected at *Tingewick*; 11,729 men, 735 waggons, 3,675 horses, 4,410 trusses of wheat straw.

"The same to be collected at *Hardwicke!* making a total to be collected from the Newport, Buckingham, Ashenden, and Cottesloe Hundreds of 3,047 waggons, 12,235 horses, 18,282 wheat straw trusses.

"And orders that these waggons are to move (day and night; in the *sands* of Dunstable and in the *clays* of our vale) at the rate of five miles per hour!

"I had determined (as I have not been consulted) to leave all this to its fate; but as, upon fuller reflexion, I have thought it too serious a thing to play with, I shall write to shew the *impossibility* of such an arrangement.

"With all this Mr. Pitt is certainly very unwell, and very desponding, and speaks of this Russian breach with France as a matter from which we are to expect *little or nothing*; in

confirmation of which you will see that Lord Granville Levison is still in London. What is all this to end in? Surely Mr. Pitt cannot be blind to all that must fall upon his head whenever the scene is fully opened to the publick. Addington is very loud in singing his own triumph, (and to say truth Mr. Pitt has given him full grounds) and the Weymouth tone is to abuse the dear Doctor for not abiding by *his promise to the K[ing] to give Mr. Pitt his 'constant support.'* So are the tables turned. Adieu; when you return to Dropmore we must meet to talk. But all I now write may be read at Charing Cross.

“ I did not think when I wrote that the new triumphs which Lord Melville’s folly has (by his sea-trips) adopted as his own, would have been ready so soon. My fears, which I expressed to you, of the failure of this new *charlatannerie* have been too well verified, notwithstanding the letter (written as I am well assured by Lord Melville and Pitt at Walmer and signed Keith) to Mr. Marsden to inform their L[ordship]s at the Admiralty that the project would succeed whenever it was tried upon a larger scale! George Berkeley has made an admirable drawing of what he calls Sir H. Popham’s flag-ship; with Lord Melville’s head appearing above the water’s edge in a fire-coffer, and with three references, namely, (a) the fire-coffer under water; (b) the paddle or oar; (c) the noddle or head. But surely all this must shake publick confidence (if such a thing exists) most wonderfully. My accounts of Weymouth, *from the same undoubted authority*, are progressively less favourable; and I now know *from certain authority* that Mr. Pitt is, within these ten days, satisfied that the King is hourly losing ground, and is most seriously alarmed respecting it. At the same time I do not expect any explosion till later in the year.

“ My two last letters from Ferrol are so curious, that I have determined to send them to you, and I will beg you to return them to me unless I can persuade you to come here for three or four days. Tom comes here to-morrow, and after Lady Fermanagh and her party leave me (they come on Wednesday and go on Friday or Saturday) I shall be alone.”

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, September 23. Castle Howard.—“ Having extended my tour from Wynnstay hither for the object of Fountain’s Abbey, I find with the equinox the winds and the storms which decidedly pronounce against any more northern projects for this year; after a few days, therefore, spent here, I shall turn again to the southward, and hope to find myself at Elton about the first of October. From thence I shall probably pass on to Stowe and Dropmore, waiting nevertheless to hear of the yeomanry campaigns in both places, in order that I may not

run my head against inspecting field officers, generals of districts, and the new manœuvres which must necessarily belong to the evolutions of the volunteer carts and coaches in the wide and hard roads of Stowe and Wotton. Write me word, therefore, of what you know of the middle and southern regiments, that I may dispose of myself accordingly.

“The papers of to-day confirm the account which Fawkener had sent me of the meeting of Parliament early in November; and as we have good reason to know that Ministers had calculated their money resources to last them up to January, their present meeting implies an error upon that score to a very considerable extent either in deficiency of receipt or in excess of expenditure. I do not find that anybody here has heard anything upon the subject of the report which had been made to me respecting the giant refreshed, so that my speculation upon that report is still as helpless as ever.”

#### The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1804, September 30. Stowe.]—“I now write to copy an extract upon which *I can depend* respecting the K[ing]’s health. ‘You may depend upon it that the K[ing]’s situation accords perfectly with the short account contained in your letter, but I am sure that when the season advances and prevents the constant air and exercise, things will not go on even so favourably as at present. It is impossible to describe half the hurry and irritation that constantly occurs, and, unless it abates, no frame can continue to support it.’ This is so much from the fountain head that I was anxious that you should know the opinions of one who is particularly able to form a good judgement, but is biased by wishes and by interest in favour of his recovery.

“My son writes me word from Coxheath that Mr. Pitt and L[or]d Chatham both told him that ‘no good was to be done from this Russian quarrel with France, unless the Austrian Emperor would likewise take part against his new brother,’ which Pitt said was not unlikely, but which L[or]d Chatham (not having learnt that part of his lesson) said was not to be expected. They are both very low on general politicks, and Pitt very sore that he has got no men by his Bill, which he told Lord T[emple] was ‘full of difficulties.’ I have now obtained a detail of the wonderful expedition fitting in the most secret recesses of Portsmouth-yard, under the advice and direction of Sir H. Popham, who, I know, is higher in your good books, than in mine; *for I think ill of him.* The project is to tow a fire-vessel without masts, and level with the water, thirty-two feet long, into Bulloigne [Boulogne] harbour. The eight boats that perform this miracle are rowed *under water*, each by two men whose head and shoulders only are above water. The experiment has been tried in the basin at Portsmouth

by night, and the boats moved very rapidly. The whole will be ready by about the 14th October, and will be tried, as I suppose, at the spring tides, which are the 19th and 20th, under Sir Home's orders! In all this *charlatannerie* I have no faith.

"The temptation will be irresistible of calling (in the two Houses) for a return of the encrease of the vol[untee]r force, army, r[oya]l artillery, and marines, since the 5th and 29th of June, under the operations of the Act entitled 'for *amending* the Provisions of the several Acts relating to Volunteer and Yeomanry Corps,' and of an Act entitled 'for establishing and maintaining a permanent *additional* force, and for *augmenting* H[is] M[ajesty's] forces.'

"I take it for granted that this will find you at Boconnoc, but as your time for exercise approaches so soon, I conclude that I may soon hope to see you here.

"There has been a private flirtation carried on at Brighton between the P[rin]ce and the Doctor, who rode over several times from Worthing, and met H[is] R[oyal] H[ighness] on the Downs. But last week Addington, Tiernay, Erskine and Dallas dined with him!

"How much have you given to Bonaparte to intercept and to print your letter directed to L[or]d Wellesley? And what an egregious simpleton Mr. H. Wellesley appears to be, though perfectly matched by his L[or]d Castlereagh."

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, October 11. Stowe.—". . . . I know not whether I have had an opportunity of congratulating you upon the capture of the *Aplin* with its cargo of manuscripts. I never before felt the same partiality for the official paper of the Imperial Consul, whose publications in this instance have been highly useful and honourable to you; and it is not a little gratifying to me to find from various quarters that there is but one opinion upon the letter of the ex-Minister to the Governor-General.

"I hear nothing where I am which can be new to you, unless it is new to you that there are immediate and sanguine hopes of such an arrangement as our friend at the Palladian bridge has long been seeking for; perhaps this is a moment at which such an arrangement might become peculiarly useful."

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, November 8. Charles Street.—"Mr. Fisher of Elton to whom at my request you promised your vote at the next election of the Master of the Charter House, has just been with me to tell me that Mr. Beardmore is dead, and that he thinks

he has a good chance of being chosen. He is told that a Mr. Wollaston of Cambridge is his most formidable antagonist; besides this candidate Lord Bath supports a Mr. Thomas; and Dr. Rayne, the school-master, will likewise make a strong fight. If the election takes place in a fortnight as it is expected, there will probably be very few voters, and it will be a very near race.

"Nobody can tell me distinctly why Parliament is deferred, but I suppose it is partly because they find they can scramble up money to go on, and partly because time, which cures all evils, may amongst others cure that of the barren and unproductive defence Bill. I hear to-day that Lord Harrowby is gone to Bath, and that his brother says he must quit his office from ill health. Will Lord Hardwicke come and try his hand at foreign dispatches; or will Yorke cross over, as Lord Hawkesbury did, to shew that it is a new government because the two Secretaries have changed places? Canning, if there was likely to be a question of him, is, I am informed, not thought to be in high favour in Downing Street. After all, very likely Lord Harrowby will take a new lease with the Bath waters, and all these speculations sleep again till he is out of health again.

"In the circle of foreign ministers there is a whisper that the King of Prussia has taken fright at the activity and neighbourhood of his French friends in Hanover, and has formally announced that he cannot patiently see any augmentation of French force in a country so near his own. I think some of the maps which I sent you from Berlin might have suggested this apprehension earlier, and after he has so long been patient why should he become impatient now? I do not believe it."

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, November 11. Charles Street.—"I have had an opportunity to-day of learning, from a channel which I can entirely trust to, so curious and interesting an account of the state of the P[rin]ce's negotiation, as described by him up to a late hour last night, that, in default of any post, I am almost tempted to send my groom with this letter to Dropmore to-morrow morning early. Lord M[oira] is described by his master as having come up to town on his own private business, and from town to have visited his master at the seaside. While he was on this visit, the letter from the Chancellor (which I mentioned in my last) arrived by a messenger, and Lord M[oira] persuaded his master to come up to town with him. On the following morning (I cannot distinctly make out whether on Friday or yesterday or Saturday last) Lord M[oira] was sent for by Mr. P[itt] and the following is the account given by Lord M[oira]'s master of the report made to

him of that conversation ; namely, that Mr. P[itt] had sent for him to say that there were good hopes of bringing about an interview of reconciliation between the K[ing] and the P[rince], upon which subject he wished to discourse with Lord M[oir]. It was answered that the P[rince] was in town, which furnished great additional facility. Mr. P[itt] went on to say that he very much wished the interview to take place ; that he himself had never seen anything in his own observations of the K[ing] that did not shew him to be fit for business, but Mr. P[itt] had no hesitation in adding that he had received from other persons a different account, and that it was highly desirable to make a proper provision for a case of so much real distress to the country ; that his own idea most certainly was that of the P[rince]'s being at the head of the regency both for the civil and military government of the country ; that he trusted nobody whatever could be found who would hold back or refuse himself under such circumstances of public danger, and that he particularly wished to know Lord M[oir]'s opinion upon this part of the subject. To this Lord M[oir] is described to have answered that for himself he must fairly say that he would not sit in any Cabinet from which Mr. F[ox] was excluded. No more of the report of this conversation was detailed to me ; but I learnt that from this interview Lord M[oir] went to the Ch[ancellor] and described himself (by his master's account) to have reproached the Ch[ancellor] with having been the cause of this calamity by too early a production, and by premature assertions of competency which, in removing controul, had removed the only chance of perfect recovery, and that for all the distresses of this moment he was above all others eminently responsible. This subject is said to have been pressed so home that the Ch[ancellor] burst into tears, and bewailed himself for having ever accepted a situation which was the misery of his life, as his most conscientious desire of doing the best had ended in doing what was approved of by nobody. My report ends there, because the memory of my informer supplied no more ; except to say that it was the P[rince]'s intention to send for F[ox] to-day. It was further added, as an observation made by Lord M[oir], that he had received private intelligence of some strange irregularities on the 4th and 5th of this month, and that he was satisfied the real motive for the adjournment of Parliament was solely and entirely in this subject.

“I am quite aware of the difficulties which must attend the exact recital of conversations of this kind, but it seems to me difficult to imagine that there could have been such an entire misunderstanding or exaggeration as that the conversation with Mr. P[itt] should not have turned upon the subject which is quoted ; and for any such subject to have been started by him, it is manifest he must have thought there was pressing and weighty occasion for entering into

such discussions. If F[ox] is sent for, it is probable that you will hear from him an accurate account. If the information which I can trust to, was accurately reported by Lord M[oir] and by his master, it would seem as if this important discussion was actually brought to a point; and although I do not know of anything that you can do, I feel that it may be of advantage to you to turn this in your thoughts before-hand, and therefore I am inclined, at all events, to send my groom with this to-morrow.

"I should add that I am assured that within these three or four days the mother and the second brother have conveyed the most conciliatory messages to the eldest brother, and that Harry the Ninth is grown quite loud in his praises. If I send my groom, he will leave his horse at Cranford Bridge, and take a post-horse from thence so as to return to town upon his own horse the same day.

*Postscript.*—"Just as I close this letter I have ascertained that the P[rin]ce has sent at five this evening to Woburn for Mr. F[ox]. Yet how is it possible that matters should be so far advanced as the report of P[itt]'s conversation implies, without it's being even suspected by the public?"

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, November 12. Charles Street.—"I find by my informer, that upon a second edition of the same narrative from the same authority, it appears that the most *important* part which I quoted of the conversation in Downing Street was not as prominently and distinctly brought forward, as the first narrative had represented it; so that some of the high colouring which was to be apprehended has evidently been given to this important part of the transaction; nevertheless my informer assures me that *it* did make *a part* of the conversation in question. I conclude therefore that your conjecture is quite correct, and that the stranger in Downing Street was sounded rather as to future projects and provisions, than upon any immediately to be brought into action from the necessity of the thing.

"I have this moment seen F[ox] getting out of his post-chaise, but I had scarce spoke to him before the master came up, and, as I retired, the master said to me that he would desire F[ox] to tell you and me everything.

"I will write a few lines to Stowe to-night to describe the general state of the thing such as I conceive it, but I have scarcely time to write more than very few words."

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, November 13. Charles Street.—"Having been obliged to go after Lord Sp[encer] and Wi[ndham] to-day,

and having likewise to write into Yorkshire, I can only hastily copy over to you what I have written to Stowe.

As soon as F[ox] had quitted the P[rince] yesterday evening he and Sh[eridan] called upon me here. The first and main object of their visit was to say that the P[rince] had directed them to make to me (for the information of yourself and Lord B[uckingham] the following communication : that an interview had taken place that morning at Kew between the K[ing] and himself, but without any political reference whatsoever ; and farther he directed us to be informed that in a conversation which took place between P[itt] and Lord M[oir] upon some enquiries made by P[itt] as to the possibility of the P[rince]'s friends co-operating with the K[ing]'s government, that Lord M[oir] had answered that after the communication which the P[rince] had last session with those whom he had thought fit to consult with, he, Lord M[oir], would not advise the P[rince] to try to influence the political conduct of his friends, without the concurrence and communication of those same persons whom he had called to his councils last session, and the P[rince] desired that we should all be informed that he entirely approved of and assented to the answer given by Lord M[oir] to Mr. P[itt].

“ This was, as well as I recollect, the purport if not the exact shape of words of the message sent to us. What I have farther learnt is that Ti[erney] avows his using his best efforts to engage the P[rince] in unison with the present ministers, who are doing all they can to invite it by the most distinct professions of their intention to give him (in that case) all the authority, influence, and pre-eminence which he can look for. You know, however, that his mind rests entirely upon military rank and command ; and it is not easy to conceive, however eager ministers may be to obtain it, that the K[ing] will ever concede anything upon that subject. At the interview were present the K[ing], Q[ueen], and P[rincess]es, and D[ukes] of Suss[ex] and Cam[bridge] ; no embrace or shaking of hands, nor one word of allusion to the late separation or to the present interview, nor any remark besides the ordinary course of conversation ; the Q[ueen] found an opportunity of telling the P[rince] it was not her fault that this meeting had not taken place before. The K[ing] appeared to the P[rince] much fallen away, but Sheridan who saw the King at Lymington at a sort of *levée* there, and was spoken to for near half an hour, says the K[ing]'s conversation was remarkably cool and collected ; and I find there is a general belief that the last fortnight did the K[ing] much essential benefit, and produced an almost incredible change for the better ; so that what I had heard of the 4th and 5th was perhaps as much exaggerated as a good deal of what I first heard appears to have been. The P[rince] is to take the D[uke] of Cl[arence] down to dine at Windsor on Friday, and Lord M[oir] returns on Saturday

to Scotland. This negotiation therefore may be considered as concluded, and if it be so, I confess I do not see what advantage the ministers who have been so zealous for it are likely to derive to their own power.

What Lord K[illeen]'s account was to you of Irish intelligence I know not, but F[ox] thinks that the *question* must come on very early in the session, and that it will produce the same distinction of parties and persons which was left at the end of last session; it is material to add that the P[rince] in conclusion said yesterday that he wished the question to come on as early as possible, and that he the P[rince] should certainly himself vote for the question. Sh[eridan] says that, as lately as ten days ago, Addington was more bitter than ever against the present ministers, and was pressing him Sh[eridan] to move on the first day the repeal of the Defence Bill. I understand Parliament will not meet till the 17th, so they have two months more of preparation; and yet I am inclined to think that their active canvass, and all their diligent endeavours, will rather betray the sense of their own weakness, than add any real accession to their strength.

“Your friend Wor[onzow] suspects and fears they are looking to Henley upon Thames for the successor to Lord H[arrowby]; he Wor[onzow] wishes Cann[ing] and thinks it likely.

“I have just heard from good authority that Lord Mel[ville] congratulated Lord M[oir] yesterday on the interview, and added that he hoped it would not end there; both of my visitors however are satisfied that nothing will induce Lord M[oir] to accept. Sh[eridan] talks with great and I believe real earnestness of his wish to counteract T[ierney]. He says T[ierney] told him that he T[ierney] might go to Ireland, but he believed he should not.

“F[ox] is returned to Woburn and then goes to Whitbread's.”

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, November 16. Charles Street.—“I am just returned from passing two days at Wimbledon with Lord Spencer, and I have found Wind[ham] here impatient to tell me that the P[rince] had sent for him yesterday to relate to him all that had recently passed. The account up to Monday night tallied tolerably well with what I had heard from him through F[ox] and Sh[eridan]; but you will remember that I told you F[ox] thought with me the whole thing concluded; and went early next morning. Tuesday, to Woburn. Now the P[rince] tells W[indham] that Mr. P[itt] sent for Lord M[oir] early on Tuesday to tell him that the K[ing] would see him Lord M[oir] yesterday at Windsor; and I understand Lord M[oir] to have asked the P[rince] what he Lord M[oir]

could say, if the K[ing] should press him upon the subject of *general union*; a subject which the P[rince] says Mr. P[itt] had in his last conversation with Lord M[oir]a, professed to be still his own desire and wish. The P[rince] related that in case the K[ing] should urge this to Lord M[oir]a, his advice to Lord M[oir]a was, to decline entering into details of any length, and that he should rather refer the K[ing] to Mr. P[itt] as being acquainted with all Lord M[oir]a's sentiments on this subject. Lord M[oir]a was to return last night from Winds[or], and there has been no communication to any of us of what has happened there; but it is evident to me that the negotiation is renewed in this manner, after F[ox] had returned with the impression of its being all at an end. I am therefore glad to find that Wind[ham] wrote to F[ox] last night an account of all that the P[rince] had said to him.

“It is farther important that you should know that Wind[ham] told me that when the P[rince] had spoken of the probability of the K[ing] pressing Lord M[oir]a upon the subject of general agreement of all the P[rince]'s friends, including F[ox] and you, Wind[ham] said he had unequivocally then told the P[rince] that he thought no such union desirable, but that it was better that Mr. [Pitt] should take his course and that we should take ours. Upon Wind[ham] repeating this to me, I said that I must fairly tell him that I thought we were so placed as to make it impossible for us to discourage or to refuse discussions upon general union, after having made that the touchstone of all our political conduct last session; that I agreed that the difficulties were increased, and that what had passed might fairly lessen the most sanguine hopes for success from it; but that still we could with no consistency do other than profess our hope and desire of its being found practicable. This is important, and therefore I write to name it, and to shew you that something is still stirring.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, November 21. Charles Street.—“Having passed the last two or three days with General Ross at Russel Farm, I returned to town this morning and found a note from Sheridan, *dated last night*, in which he tells me that he has great satisfaction in informing me that all the negotiations proposed to or proceeding from Carleton House closed *on that morning* by the Prince's adopting the only line of conduct which anyone who really regards his interests or his honour could wish to see him adopt: and this was formally communicated by Lord Moira to Mr. Pitt. Sheridan adds that he will call and tell me the particulars. The whole matter therefore seems finished for the present, though I cannot conceive why in that case the P[rince] should be gone to Lord Thurlow to Bath, as to-day's papers inform us.

“I am glad that what I said to Windham meets with your approbation; although the only use of saying it is to set ourselves right, but without any hope, as it should seem, of altering his sentiments; at least so I apprehend from seeing precisely his opinion on this matter stated in the last Cobbett in a manner too much bearing upon the face of it, that the opinion there stated of having no connexion with Pitt is the opinion of all the leading persons in question. I cannot approve this, and yet under our present penury of printed papers, it is hardly possible to remedy this evil as it should be.

“Your anecdote about Canning and Pitt and Lord Hawkesbury is a stronger proof of the lowered tone of our ministers’ spirit and feeling than any that I have yet heard. I must write of Sheridan’s message to Stowe.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, November 23. Charles Street.—“Sheridan having proposed to tell me what is called the particulars, I made an appointment with him to which of course he did not come; and I cannot say that I much regret this failure, because, though it may be well to know the general results upon these subjects, it is much to be desired to be as little as possible *e secretioribus*. Mean-time you will be amused to hear that the visit to Bath has no reference to the general matters, but relates altogether to the little adopted child, the retaining of which is the fever of the present moment; and the legal consultation sought for is to furnish the means of continuing to keep the child against the vehement reclamations of Lord H. Seymour and the other guardians. It is curious to observe too that, while so much pains are taken to keep one’s neighbour’s daughter from the care of her guardians, there is the same undiminished jealousy of one’s own daughter being taken away from the care of her natural parent.

“I heard yesterday, and from good source, that the P[rin]ce has spoken out to Tierney, has told him that he is convinced of his friendship, and in return for it, assures him of his own wish for his general success, but that upon political subjects and persons their opinions differ so very much, that he wishes T[ierney] to take his own part in whatever way he likes without any reference to the political opinions or conduct of the P[rin]ce. This accords with the expressions of Sh[eridan]’s note to me, and seems to shew that Sh[eridan] has had a signal victory over his political rival for the favour of Carlton House.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, November 24. Charles Street.—“There has been some strange confusion in the communications which took

place previous to the family interview. I have now discovered that the Ch[ancello]r and Mr. P[itt] had in these communications suggested to the P[rince] that it was the wish of the K[ing] to take the Princess Royal under his own eye with an establishment of his own appointing, leaving to the P[rince] the power of visiting and seeing his daughter when he wished it. The P[rince] maintains that his answer was uniformly the same on this subject; that he would never make any bargain or condition about his daughter, nor suffer her to be removed from under his care, although he should certainly never object to the K[ing] seeing her when he wished it. The P[rince] having, according to his account, never varied one iota from that answer, whenever the subject was named to him, and hearing nothing of it in the interview with the K[ing], has just now received through the Chancellor a paper from the K[ing] in which the K[ing] seems to consider the removal of the Princess as a matter agreed upon; and talks of taking into his own hands the sum allowed for the maintenance of the Princess Royal, and of distributing it into a new establishment under the care of Lady Waldegrave, Bishop Fisher, a Swiss gentleman and others. At this paper, I am told, the P[rince] is very indignant, and intends to answer it by referring the K[ing] upon that subject to his the P[rince]'s conversations with the Ch[ancello]r and with Mr. P[itt] and all this in the determined resolution not to part with his child. If this be so, and I have no reason to think that I am ill-informed, the determination which seems to be taken on both sides cannot be persisted in without producing more fever and ill blood than we have yet seen.\*

“F[ox] was in town yesterday morning, but had returned to St. Anne’s before dinner, so that I did not see him. I have not seen S[heridan] but what I told you of the P[rince]’s declaration to Tierney is repeated to me to-day as quite authentic.”

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, November 26. Charles Street.—“Lord Spencer, as well as yourself, seemed to entertain the notion of voting the mastership to Fisher and the living to Rayne, and Fisher does not think it for his credit to say more upon that subject than to remark that the mastership alone is only 200*l.* *per annum*, and that the living was added to it 30 years ago in consideration of that salary being too small for enabling the master to keep his house warm. The election will run near; it is supposed Pitt and his brother will not vote; Addington tells Fisher he has promised no candidate, but will vote with Lord Ellenborough, who will not promise anybody. I shall be very much delighted to have little woman and you to dinner on Thursday and Friday, and hope Lord Spencer will

\* The correspondence here referred to on the subject of the education of Princess Charlotte of Wales, is given in the Appendix to this volume.

come up to vote and meet you. I will send my carriage for you to Oxford Street on Thursday, a little before six.

“Meantime Sheridan has called upon me, and has confirmed all that I had told you upon my former information. It seems in the *first* negotiation Lord M[oi]ra had induced the Prince to allow him to say that, if there was a cordial reconciliation, the P[rin]ce would be willing to meet the K[ing] half way in discussing such an arrangement with the K[ing] for the P[rin]cess R[oya]l as might place her exclusively under the care of the K[ing] and P[rin]ce, or as L[or]d M[oi]ra had expressed it, the K[ing] holding her by one hand and the P[rin]ce on the other. But a main condition of any such arrangement was that there was to be no tampering with the Pr[ince]ss of W[ales], and it now turns out that the interview between the K[ing] and P[rin]cess of Wales in August was thought a breach of this engagement, and contributed to break off the then proposed reconciliation. When at last it took place lately at Kew, the P[rin]ce had expected the K[ing] to mention the subject to him, but neither then nor in the three days at Windsor was one word said to the P[rin]ce; but two days after his return from Windsor the P[rin]ce finds that the K[ing] goes and passes a whole day alone with the P[rin]cess of W[ales] at Greenwich; and the next day the Ch[ancello]r was sent to the P[rin]ce with a paper from the K[ing] which begins by stating that the P[rin]ce *having expressed a wish* that the P[rin]cess R[oya]l should be put under the special control of the K[ing] for the care of her person and education, H[is] M[ajesty] proposes to make a new establishment, a new residence, and so on. The P[rin]ce is quite furious, but writes a temperate answer to the Chancellor in which he returns the paper, denies his having expressed the wish there quoted, refers to L[or]d M[oi]ra for the truth of this denial, protests that he has not heard a word upon the subject, and insists that the Ch[ancello]r and Mr. P[itt] should explain distinctly to the K[ing] all that L[or]d M[oi]ra had said to them by the P[rin]ce’s direction. This answer was sent yesterday by the P[rin]ce to the Ch[ancello]r. You see what a wretched state of things arises out of all this imperfect and oblique intrigue.

“The message to Tierney from the P[rin]ce was as I told you, and moreover Lord Moira by the P[rin]ce’s order told Mr. P[itt], before he went to Scotland, that the P[rin]ce was no longer desirous of any military rank or command whatever.”

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, November 27. Charles Street.—“The Prince having somehow or other found out that you was to be in town on Thursday and Friday, has sent me his orders that *you and I*

should dine with him on Thursday ; and that he had sent likewise to Windham. L[or]d Spencer having promised to be my guest on Thursday, I have got him into the scrape by letting the P[rin]ce know that he was to be in town likewise. Still however we shall have a snug comfortable dinner here on Friday. I will call for you or send the carriage for you on Thursday at six."

MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, December 14. [Stowe.]—"You are distinctly charged with having *writ* the letter sent by the P[rin]ce of Wales to the L[or]d Chancellor ; and this is told to me, as a point so certain, that no doubt can exist upon it. I know not whether it is worth while to undeceive *anyone* on this subject ; but I rather think *not*. The demand will be persisted in, to its fullest extent ; and the L[or]d Ch[ancello]r and Mr. Pitt are understood to be *pledged to carry it*. At least all discussion on this subject is now to pass through them, as it has been put entirely into their hands. Such is *my belief* of the present state of this very painful and difficult matter, *on which Pitt's uneasiness increases*. Addington *is said* to have listened to ideas of joining Gov[ernmen]t, and this coalition *is considered* and *stated* to be certain. With all this, I understand that the opinions of those about the king's person are not sanguine respecting his present health, or the future prospects, supposing him to be much disturbed by any domestic or political *contre-temps* ; and how it can be imagined that such difficulties of both sorts are not to occur I cannot conceive.

"Pray let me know how your leg goes on, and let me have your news in return for mine *on which you may depend*."

"Much is built on the wording of a letter sent by L[or]d Moira to the L[or]d Chanc[ello]r in the summer ; which *is stated* to be a direct, distinct, and irrevocable acquiescence of H[is] R[oyal] H[ighness] in the idea of placing his daughter's education completely and *exclusively* in the King's hands."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, December 21. Charles Street.—"You will be as much shocked as I was to learn that melancholy event which makes the subject of the enclosed letter. Poor L[or]d Proby, besides being a generous and amiable young man, and likely to rise high in his profession and in the estimation of the country, was also the best son and brother that ever was, and consequently his loss will be unusually afflicting to all of our dear friends at Elton. If I had been able to move I should have gone down there, but yesterday I was seized with the return of my naval rheumatism in my neck, and am therefore entirely

unable to move. I have written to L[or]d Carysfort, but what matters it? What have letters to do in the first pressure of such a calamity? You will observe that even in these moments however L[or]d Carysfort has not neglected to apprise my brother of what must of course affect his parliamentary arrangements. I have no guess what my brother's inclinations will be, nor whether it would occur to him to think of the second brother; nor yet whether, if that option was given to the Colonel, it would be best for him to avail himself of the offer. Perhaps upon the whole, considering his own attachment to the army, and the protection and favour of the D[uke] of York, it may not be wise in him to risque it by the chance of a few parliamentary votes which he may think it right to give against the Duke's wishes; it is however premature to discuss this, as I do not know that my brother has any such offer in contemplation.

"Gen[era]l Grenville is come to Mr. Metcalfe's, waiting for his own house to be ready for him, but confined at present by a humour in the inside of his mouth. L[or]d Glastonbury is expected in a week. I know nothing distinctly of L[or]d Moira's interviews, but I hear and believe that Pitt has no dispute with him about the former negotiation, and is now occupied in finding some middle course, which is to carry the Princess Charlotte to Windsor, and yet to leave the Prince a share in the care and control of her education; and perhaps L[or]d M[oira] may usefully assist this arrangement which might furnish the most desirable solution to the business."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1804], December 21. [Stowe].—"I should spare myself the trouble of writing to you in answer to your long letter, having been so disturbed by this shocking calamity to the poor Carysforts, if I did not think it right to let you know that I have the most decisive and positive information that appearances at Windsor are most unfavourable; there is an evident alteration for the worse; great irritation of manner and general system; and in various particulars that cannot be described, but are decisive with those who know his habits, and can hourly observe them.

"I find likewise that the L[or]d Ch[ancello]r *has been stated* 'so undecided, so cowardly, and so dirty' that much is not expected in his personal contest with L[or]d Moira.

"Addington *is expected* to support, though *it is stated* that 'the ill-blood between Pitt and him is not done away.'"

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, December 22. Charles Street.—"It is very kind in you and Lady G[renville] to offer to go to Elton. If you

can prevail upon them to come away with you to Dropmore, that would be, as I should think, the arrangement that would be likeliest to assist (as much as it can be assisted) the distress of this calamity. I am still confined to my room or I would have done my best to have met you there *on Tuesday*. L[or]d Moira has been in town these two days; so has Fox and the Prince, and they dined together at Carleton House yesterday; but, being confined, I have seen nobody and heard nothing, except that Fox has said he was satisfied with L[or]d M[oir]a, and the P[rin]ce has said that L[or]d M[oir]a has just now again refused the foreign seals.

“If you go on Tuesday, pray write me a line from Elton the day after you come there, to tell me how you find our poor dear friends there.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, December 28. Charles Street.—“I now find that L[or]d M[oir]a’s letter to the D[uke] of Kent was a long recapitulation of all that had passed, and a statement also of the concessions which the P[rin]ce was inclined to make; requiring for the P[rin]ce that the child should not be taken from him to be put under the care of the Princess; and reserving an approbation from the P[rin]ce of the persons to be named by the King; this ended, as I before told you, by desiring to receive the King’s commands. The Duke of Kent read the letter; it was heard with great agitation; and the answer dictated by the K[ing] was that none of the unpleasant parts of this business were imputable to L[or]d Moira, but that the King had no commands to give him.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, January 5. Charles Street.—“I have this moment been *confidentially* informed from the *best* authority, that Pitt has found it impossible that L[or]d Wellesley can go on in his warfare with the Directors, and that L[or]d W[ellesley] is believed to be now actually at sea on his return; I therefore take for granted that Pitt will reserve some Cabinet arrangement for his landing. My friend at Russell Farm surprised me a good deal by telling me that L[or]d Cornwallis has actually consented to return to India for two or three years, and is going out quite immediately. L[or]d C[ornwallis] it seems, offer’d his services when Pitt came in, and upon this being proposed to him, he accepted immediately, and sails immediately; a bold undertaking at sixty six, and as I hear, he takes out nobody with him, as he finds a military secretary among the officers now in India.

“I am also told, *but in confidence*, that Osborne Markham

is to-day dismissed by a letter from being a Commissioner of Navy Board on account of indiscretion; but with an intimation that, in consideration of his services, he shall have some other office. I understand his indiscretion to have been that of thwarting Sir A. Hammond. I have heard no new details of the P[rince]ss Charlotte, but still suppose all will end peaceably, tho[ugh] L[or]d B[uckingham]'s accounts to me from Stowe, are those of new jealousy on this subject, new uneasiness about health, and of the most general and indiscreet language to everybody about the *praise of Addington* and *about Pitt*.

"I know of no details, but I am told that the Prince has seen the Chancellor again, and that all will end peaceably as to the family discussions—so much the better. L[or]d Moira is also said to have been again sent for, and to have arrived.

"I expect L[or]d Melville is to be foreign Secretary, in order partly to save Canning; Addington to be L[or]d Reading and L[or]d President."

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, January 7. [Charles Street].—"Lord St. Helen's quotes the King and L[or]d Glastonbury quotes Pitt for saying the day before yesterday that Addington certainly will be a peer, and the publick believes that he will be L[or]d President. L[or]d Mulgrave, with Ward for his Under-Secretary, has the foreign seals, which he is supposed to hold *ad interim* till L[or]d Wellesley arrives, who is expected in June. It was said yesterday that the King had demurred to Lord Mulgrave and Ward, thinking their appointment too hostile to Addington; but I do not find this report confirmed, though certainly Mulgrave's speeches and Ward's pamphlet do not make them very conciliatory partners in office with the new Lord President. Some people fancy that Canning is to go to Ireland, to soften to him the asperity of these domestick arrangements; but he is out of town, and declines writing to his friends as to his own intentions, before he sees them in town.

"Two days before the reconciliation, Fawkenor told me from Dyson that while he Dyson was riding with Addington, Pitt passed, and coldly touched his hat, upon which Addington observed to Dyson that even that cold greeting was new to him; Pitt made the overture by a letter to L[or]d Hawkesbury written to be shewn to Addington.

"Lyll the messenger is arrived from Lisbon, which he left on the 11th Dec[ember]. It appears that Frere, while all the world was waiting upon his motions, has been amusing himself by a jaunt of pleasure with Lord and Lady Holland. You who know him will perhaps not be surprised to hear that

while the letters of marque, and privateers, and declaration of war here were hourly watching his return to justify our intercepting the Spanish trade, he, Frere, was going a sort of tour of pleasure, having left Madrid the 14th Nov[embe]r, and not having reached Lisbon till the 10th of Dec[embe]r, though there was no hindrance or impediment whatever. He is making love to Lady Holland, and is now staying at Lisbon for a month or two with them for his recreation; this is almost incredible, but I know it to be true."

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, January 8. [Charles Street.]—"Hatsell, with whom I conversed to-day, told me that he believed the D[uke] of Portland's answer was not yet received; and upon my saying that I knew the peerage at least was settled, he said 'then they have overcome Mr. Addington, for I know his letter to Pitt of Saturday was to urge Mr. P[itt] to leave him in the H[ouse] of Commons without office, though in the Cabinet, in order by being in the Cabinet to shew his entire concurrence.' And why, said I, did Mr. Pitt press him so vehemently to be a peer against his wish; to which he answered 'because he wanted his help in the House of Lords, *for I suppose I must not be allowed to say that he wanted him out of the House of Commons.*' This language in a person so confidential to Addington cannot be mistaken, and I find every day new proofs of the haughty and unconciliatory language of Addington's friends, and hear of some of Pitt's best friends who think that he would have done better to have resigned than to have connected himself in this new shape. T. Villiers held this language quite distinctly to me, and though I know he will vote as he ought to do with Pitt, he quite distinctly told me he should have advised Pitt rather to resign, than to have taken Addington, in order to keep his office. Hatsell sighed out to me several wishes for peace, and there is industriously circulated by Addington's friends an opinion that he will bring about peace.

"In confirmation of this I receive by this post a letter from G. Berkeley from Ramsgate, telling me that on Sunday evening a fishing boat brought on board of our admiral a Frenchman with a pass-port from Talleyrand, purporting that he was a lieutenant de marine charged with dispatches of great importance from Talleyrand to L[or]d Harrowby; and he was immediately forwarded to London with great dispatch and a great mystery.

"Elliot dines with me on Saturday, and I will ask Windham also to meet you and the little woman, as I expect you both to dinner in Charles street on Saturday, and I will send the carriage for you at six."

## THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, January 9. Charles Street.—“I have received a letter to-day from Fox in which he tells me that he comes to-morrow to town to stay, and wishes to have some conversations upon the approaching business. I have told him that you and Windham and Elliot are out of town now, but will dine with me on Saturday, and I have desired him to be of the party. He is of opinion that not a moment should be lost in moving about the Defence Bill; although the objectionable mode in which the Spanish war has been commenced must necessarily first force itself into discussion. It seems to me, however, to be very easy, upon the address in answer to the King’s speech on the Spanish war, to give notice on that first day of some motion to ascertain what the success of the Defence Bill has been; in order to ascertain the best mode of carrying on the war in which we are engaged. This indeed would be so regular that it might actually be moved to be inserted as an amendment, if we had not seemed to have agreed in general upon having none, and if I had not consequently told Watkin and Charles that they would not be much wanted before Monday the 21st.

“If L[or]d Fitzwilliam or Grey come to town by Saturday I will ask them to dine here. Tell the little woman she need not be afraid of us, because she may go up to coffee whenever she is bored with the politicians.”

## THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, January 22. [Charles Street.]—“I am very sorry indeed to hear of the painful seizure under which you are suffering; the chest is a bad seat for the rheumatism, and sometimes a pain in the chest and left side which seems rheumatick, in fact is the beginning of an incipient pleurisy. I hope therefore that at all events you will not let the day go by without seeing Dr. Ferris, who will probably be able at least to determine whether you are certainly right in conceiving your complaint to be rheumatism.

“L[or]d Hawkesbury yesterday told L[or]d Carlisle and L[or]d Spencer that the papers would probably be printed upon the table on *Wednesday*, and that he should move for the debate on them for *Tuesday* next; if therefore by Friday you are not well enough to think you can attend on Tuesday, L[or]d Spencer or L[or]d Carlisle should be instructed by you to move on that day for deferring it to Thursday or Friday.

“Our day for the Spanish papers is fixed for Monday next, but as we shall not have them before Wednesday or Thursday, I think our debate will perhaps be postponed; Windham’s Defence Bill will stand for next Monday se’nnight.”

## THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, January 24. Charles Street.—“I hope, by your describing continued though slow amendment, that your complaint is not more than rheumatism, which, God knows, is bad enough; but as you have no prior authority for supposing yourself rheumatic, I still trust you will hear what the learned call it in London, if it pursues you hither.

“The debate on the Spanish papers being adjourned in our House till Thursday next, I take for granted the Lords keep time to the same tune; the papers that Windham moved for yesterday are such as we know will take no time in preparing, and therefore that debate still stands for Monday se’nnight.

“I do not hear who is Archbishop to-day, although it was to be settled yesterday; but Sutton is still the favourite, and the harder Pitt fights for Prettyman, the more marked will be the disappointment.

“Ponsonby writes word that the Catholic petition will be adopted for immediate presentation on the 3rd February; and Newport, who is arrived, confirms that account.

“I have been much surprised lately in hearing that Pitt was forced to this last junction with Addington by your unreasonably continuing to deny yourself to any of the overtures and communications made to you by Pitt, and this is the explanation of what I told you was called the violence of your opposition. This is too abominable a lie, and I have contradicted it, and mean to do so whenever I hear it, without reserve.

“Grey is come; my brother is to dine in town to-day.

“I find their army is fortunately more numerous than I had imagined, though certainly not by Pitt’s Bill; they have thirty thousand infantry for general service in England, and twenty thousand in Ireland, exclusive of guards and artillery.”

*Private.* LORD THURLOW to LORD AUCKLAND.

1805, March 22.—“Being without books I cannot give more than crude ideas on a motion which you have considered so maturely. It is difficult to deny the general competence of the House to address, but I lean every hour more and more to Lord Grenville’s line, that where crimes are alleged they should be left to the appropriate course of trial. In disposing of a criminal charge, sound discretion is the essence of justice. Would it be just, after a motion in the House, to leave a judge exposed to a severer process with a previous declaration of his guilt? or would it be wise to risk his subsequent acquittal? Whatever we may think of ourselves, the world will justly give superior credit to the ordinary and more formal

tribunals. I write without reference to the statutes and journals which I have not here. I would not mention the statutes in the motion, you know that the judges have them all *in scrinio pectoris*. Nor would I mention the 'address'; the judges would say that they are not competent to pronounce what the course of Parliament should be. The great point is that they should state, whether the charge in question is a legal and sufficient ground whereupon to found the jurisdiction of the House to take judicial cognisance.

"It may be material in some part of the debate to ascertain whether the Lords cannot by judgment or impeachment deprive the culprit of an office which appears to be abused. I have a confused recollection of such judgment and of incapacities." *Extract.*

*Endorsed by Lord Auckland in lead pencil:* "I have made some alterations pursuant to Lord Thurlow's suggestions and submit the motions so altered to any corrections your lordship may think proper to make.

"At the same time I strongly incline to think (and Mr. Cowper agrees with me) that the preliminary motion ought to be 'that the entry in the journal of the last session and in the minutes of this session concerning a complaint made by a peer, *be vacated*.' Either the Chancellor will negative that motion and then the ground of the two enclosed motions will be strengthened, or (which I have some reason to believe) he will reluctantly give way, and then the object will be gained."

#### LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, March 31. Palace Yard.—"The Chancellor has intimated to me (with civil expressions of regret) that his objections to the motion, to which you gave so distinguished a support on Monday last, are insurmountable. He thinks that 'the motion as at present worded, would carry the subject to the consideration of the judges, in terms that would give to the whole proceeding a character not belonging to it. He can shew (he says) by our journals that every step taken in the business is connected with the purpose of *deliberating whether we should address or not*. The statute (he adds) gives to the House a right to address upon the grounds alleged if true, and implies a right in the House to institute its own proceedings in order to determine its own judgment. He infers that our right, so described, is too clear to make it fit to put any question to the judges respecting it.'

"In the result he inclines to recommend to the House either that a motion to address should *now* be made, or to wait till the 6th of May, and then to move an address and an immediate proceeding at the Bar, on the event of which he would ground an address, taking proper means to dispose

of what has hitherto been done (he does not think illegally but perhaps not prudently) in the Committee.

“I have stated these details, not because they carry any conviction or satisfaction to my mind, but because I think it material that they should come under your better consideration. I really cannot comprehend how the difficulty is lessened by the use of the word ‘address.’ An address cannot be moved without a previous exhibition of grounds for it, and if the enquiry for the purpose of shewing grounds should be extended to matters of crime and misdemeanour, our proceeding then ceases to be consonant to justice, to the usage of Parliament, and to positive law.

“Still it is so evidently the wish of some who are engaged in this business to maintain the punctilio of not confessing an error, that a negative is likely to be given to any motion, however altered or modified, for a reference to the judges.

“Thus circumstanced, and after taking Mr. Cowper’s private opinion, I submit to your lordship, whether it may not be expedient, after enforcing the motion of reference to the judges, and after receiving a negative to it, to move ‘that the proceedings of the 5th July, 1804, containing certain matters of crime and misdemeanour alledged against Luke Foxe, Esq., and communicated to him that he might answer to them, were not conformable to law’ (or ‘irregular’ or ‘illegal.’) Some such measure well weighed and well worded seems to be right. We call for precedents on the question of legality; they are refused. We then call for a reference to the judges on the same point of legality, and that reference is refused. The next step may reasonably be to require the House to declare that the proceeding is conformable to law. The affirmative will not be easy.”

SIR J. C. HIPPESELEY to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1805, April.] Grosvenor Street.—“Should your lordship wish to have an interview with Dr. Milner, he will wait on your lordship at any time your lordship may be disposed to receive him. He dines with me to-day. He had a very detailed conversation with Mr. Fox on Monday last.

“Connected with the little *brochure* I now send your lordship my apologies are also due for the reference I have made to a note of your lordship, in *page* 342. The editor applied to me about two years since to supply him with notes connected with the King’s bounty to the Cardinal of York, and such other transactions in which I had been engaged. The Duke of Portland, Lord Minto, Sir W. Hamilton and some others with whom I had been in correspondence permitted me to make use of their correspondence as far as it was connected with public transactions, and I did not scruple to avail myself of the extract of your lordship’s letter, as I considered it in some degree official.

“Lord Glastonbury has encouraged me to think I was right in introducing the notes in the baronetage, and as far as precedent goes, I perceive that others have done the same, partially Lord Macartney in Debrett’s peerage.

“I will beg to refer your lordship to the concluding or summary note, which the editor has *suppressed* in the *published* edition for the reasons assigned *page* 360.

“In the years 1799 and 1800 I had much correspondence with Lord Castlereagh, who approved my suggestions and acted upon them; but as the correspondence was of a confidential nature, I did not think myself authorized to refer to it.”

*Postscript.*—“I shall be very happy to shew your lordship Lord Castlereagh’s letters, when I can have a quarter of an hour’s interview.

“I will much thank your lordship for Bishop Coppinger’s letters this evening or to-morrow morning.”

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1805, April 1-7.] Charles Street.—“By what I hear of Whitbread’s resolutions they are not of a very hostile personal description, but as the course of the debate may take a more personal turn than can easily be controlled, I have thought it more consistent with your wishes to stay away altogether, and I have spoken to L[or]d Temple, Ch[arles] Wynn and L[ord] Althorp, who will do the same. The hostile array of the Addingtons on the last question, the anxiety of L[or]d Sidmouth on that day, and something that I have heard of their private language, convince me that they can no longer go on with Pitt, and probably he too has found that they cannot go on together. Under these circumstances I am very glad to find that my friend in Arlington Street, who considers some reference to you or to him as of great probability, thinks exactly as you would wish him to do on the subject. In a very long conversation that I had with him yesterday, he professed explicitly that in his opinion nothing could save us all, but a general union of all without any exclusion whatever. He still adheres to the opinion that he has expressed to you, that it will *now* be impossible to consider of an arrangement in which P[itt] shall be left acknowledged prime minister; and I see that he is earnest that you should keep this in mind; but as for the rest, if I can judge from his language, he very sincerely wishes a general union, including P[itt] and L[or]d S[idmouth], and I am convinced he would do all that could be done by him to facilitate that measure, if there should be question of it.

“I know your hurry of to-day too well to write you a longer letter, but I thought it important that you should know this as soon as may be. I hope you will come up on Monday if

possible, as in the present circumstances, it seems very desirable that you should be in town as soon as you can with convenience.

“An answer is at last sent to Petersburg, but I know not what.”

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, April 4. Palace Yard.—“I am clearly convinced by what you say that it will be best to move simply to vacate the proceedings of last session, as manifestly contrary to law. In truth this was my original opinion, and I adopted the more complicated proposition partly from deference to Mr. Cowper. I will try to satisfy him, and to-morrow or Monday I will give the notice accordingly for the 3rd May. I must also speak to Lord Spencer, who feels strongly that we ought further and fully to discuss the legality of the proceeding; perhaps if you see him you will have the goodness to satisfy him that the mode now proposed is the best.”

EARL SPENCER to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, April 7. [London.]—“I send you a proxy by desire of the Prince of Wales, who is very eager to have a strong division, as to numbers, to-morrow in the House of Lords on the third reading of the Militia Bill. His Royal Highness has taken some pains to get an attendance, and I thought it impossible to decline obeying his commands in sending you this proxy to sign, which will be entered in Lord Fitzwilliam’s name, if I get it in time to send to the House to-morrow.

“The news of the day is that Government are to prepare to refer the matter of the tenth Report to a Select Committee, having found that they could not command numbers sufficient to risk a more direct resistance to Mr. Whitbread’s motion.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, April 13. Charles Street.—“The uncertainty of my steps, and the daily project of my coming down to Dropmore has made me every day save myself the trouble of writing, in the confident hope of seeing you; but much as those resolutions have hitherto failed, I do now trust that if the weather continues as fine, I shall certainly be with you towards Tuesday next.

“So many people have quitted town that there is scarce wherewithal to furnish as much conversation as the interest of the moment would naturally afford. The two persons the most named to-day as likely to succeed L[or]d Melville

are L[or]d Hood and Sir Charles Middleton ; but these reports are so vague, that it is evident nothing is yet decided. It is something in Pitt's favour that he has ten days to look about him before Parliament meets ; but he has so much to look for, and has so little hope of finding anything that can suffice to all his present necessities and distresses, that his prospect even to his own sanguine mind must be gloomy in the extreme. The first idea of his friends seems to have been that he must go out ; but the difficulty of taking that step without its implicating him in all the disgraces of L[or]d Melville's resignation, seems at present to make that step impossible ; and what indeed must be the extent of his embarrassments, when all immediate retreat is cut off from him, so much that he cannot even insist upon naming his own Lord of the Admiralty, because both Addington and the K[ing] know that he dares not threaten them with resignation. I think his friends will grow so sensible of his danger as to rally in force around him when we meet again ; and yet even as late as on Wednesday last it was evident that Banks and Wilberforce and all the saints are still to the greatest degree eager to push on the consideration of the other parts of the tenth and of the eleventh Report ; and this spirit of enquiry spreads so much, and (as I hear) among all ranks of people with so much eagerness, that it will be in vain for Pitt to hope to parry it by delay or by management. His only possible chance will be to endeavour to divert the public attention a little to the Catholic question, and to strengthen himself in the Closet by all the means which that topic will afford him there. In the meantime I hear they are uneasy at the expectation of the next news from the W[est] Indies, as it is to be feared that the *next* account from thence cannot probably supply anything favourable, whatever may be the ultimate result."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, April 15. Charles Street.—“The east wind and the dust of yesterday and of this morning would alone have made me pause upon an excursion from London ; but, in addition to this, L[or]d Carysfort's report of the hole in the wall, and of the evening walk is of much too airy a description for me, under my present tendencies to catch cold. Towards the middle of June, I will dine with you at three, to lounge about in the evening, but for the 15th of April it sets me a sneezing to think of it.

“I have no rose-coloured suggestions to enliven the gloom of your political picture ; nor do I see any way by which Pitt can extricate himself from his present difficulties, or can afford to the country by any step that he shall take, the chance of such a government as it ought to have, and as it might have had. All that I hear of the language of his friends sounds as if they were persuaded that the thing cannot go on as it is,

but that it is Pitt's business to hold office a little longer in order to separate his own case from that of Dundas, to defend the King upon the Catholic question, and to take the chance of a Protestant clamour prevailing against his adversaries. In the meantime I do not hear of anything fixed for the Admiralty; but whether it be old Hood or young Castlereagh, or Hobart or L[or]d Camden or Yorke, or whether old Hood will hold it for two months by which time L[or]d Royston will be of age to succeed Yorke for Cambridgeshire, these various alternatives may be interesting to the parties but cannot be so to the public, who are likely to have little preference for any one of these gentlemen to any other. The K[ing] has written a letter to Dundas to say that 'he is sorry to find that some incautious acts done by him in the office of Treasurer of Navy makes it necessary for him to quit the Admiralty; that he is satisfied with his good services in that department; and whatever may be the clamour of the day, he believes posterity will do justice to the vigour and ability which he has shewn in the Admiralty.'

"What that vigour and ability is, the people in the city who are trembling to open their next letters from the W[est] Indies, are at a loss to understand; they are furious against Lord Castlereagh who has been so incautious as to say he is glad they are gone to the W[est] Indies."

#### LORD AUCKLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, April 18. Eden Farm.—"It requires an effort of mind to advert to printed debates and journals amidst the scenes and subjects of a pleasanter description which my shrubberies, fields and gardens furnish at this season, and which probably exist in equal beauty on a larger scale at Dropmore. Still I should be sorry to abandon our point of parliamentary law, as I am satisfied that our construction of it is right, though not consonant to the professional and ministerial authorities of the House.

"I am indeed well convinced not only that our positions are well founded, but that they are of a first-rate importance in the theory of the constitution. And if any proceeding should take place in virtue of the opposite doctrines, I shall feel it a duty to enter an explanatory and solemn protest; and I believe that Lord Spencer will do the same. In the meantime, the chancellor inclines to supersede the proposed motion of the 3rd of May by an offer to put an end to the committee, and to bring the whole consideration *de novo* before the House. It is probable that such a measure would be, in its effect, a dereliction of the whole enquiry, which can hardly go forwards at so late a period of the session, and under an accumulating pressure of public embarrassments, which seem likely to produce events and fermentations of a very superior interest. Your lordship will best judge how far we ought to rest satisfied with this negative sort of victory, if it should present itself.

“I write at present chiefly to mention (what has been pointed out to me) that on the 13th February, 1673, ‘a Bill for settling the fees and powers in the Patents of Judges’ was read a second time in the House of Commons. It contained a clause of *quamdiu se bene gesserint*, and a long debate took place, and is stated in *Grey’s Debates*, Vol. II, pp. 415 to 420. The speeches are given in some detail, but in a style of abridgment not very intelligible. It appears however that the notion of original enquiry into crimes and misdemeanours for the purpose of grounding a parliamentary address to remove, never occurred either to the promoters or opposers of the Bill. I have not yet looked into the contemporary histories for any further accounts of that debate. In truth my reading has not gone beyond *Les Mémoires de Marmontel*, which is a long chapter of *commérage*, in four volumes, but not the less agreeable on that account.

“We are obliged to remove to Westminster on the 23rd, in order to go to Cooper’s Hill on the 24th, and to Frogmore the 25th.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804 [1805], April 20. Charles Street.—“Elliot, who is gone to Beaconsfield, will tell you the news of London, though it is so poor in matter that it is scarce worth telling. The prevailing report still is that L[or]d Hawkesbury is to have the Admiralty, and Yorke the seals when L[or]d Royston is of age; but in answer to this report I find that L[or]d R[oyston] is already of age, and both Windham and Elliot think they know (from pretty good authority) that L[or]d H[awkesbury] has refused it. You will find Elliot a good deal impressed with the idea that (barring the Catholick question) the K[ing] himself has entertained the notion of looking to Opposition for a Government, and he, Elliot, is very solicitous that much management should be had at least in the debating of the question.

“L[or]d Harrowby is come up quite furious, as I hear, about this unjust attack upon L[or]d Melville, and several of Pitt’s friends are doing all they can, and saying all they can, to rally round Pitt for the defence of him and of his government. Among other things they say in the *M[orning] Post* that L[or]d Lowther has promised unqualified support to Pitt, which I know is not true. It is true that he has said to one of Pitt’s friends that, much as he disapproved of Pitt’s conduct, he would not press upon him now in any question that was personal to him, but he likes less than ever the present state because, as he says, it shews Pitt in a state of dependence quite disgraceful to him. It is however new to me to hear that Rose and some others of Pitt’s confidential friends, *when talking together*, do not spare L[or]d Melville, whom they describe (and probably truly) as having put the seal

to the ruin of Pitt by the scrape he has got into. It is curious, but I know of a certainty, that L[or]d Melville, four days ago, said to a common friend of his and of Pitt's, 'do you not think that Pitt should go out upon *this*' ; you must not repeat this, but I know the fact.

"In the meantime on the one hand, the spirit of enquiry certainly spreads, as it naturally would among the better class of middling men as well as among the lower orders ; while the Court politicians are moving heaven and earth to resist what they call a common danger to all governments. Your own notions, I see by your letters, are not cheerful or sanguine, and I do not perhaps see much more sanguinely than you do ; and yet I must say the present state of a more successful opposition is that to which we were all naturally looking, and to which we were all contributing ; so that I know not what new difficulty should press more upon us now than for the whole of the last year.

"The B[isho]p of Oxford called on me to-day. He spoke with very real feeling of his obligations to you for supporting him the other day in his Bill, and with much regret that he had no chance of you on the 25th. I have advised him to put off his Bill till you come, but he doubts if it is right. I have still more unwellness about me than belongs to the activity of excursion, though I wish to see and talk with you."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, April 22. [Charles Street.]—"Yesterday everybody thought it settled that L[or]d Hawkesbury and Yorke divided between them Admiralty and Home Seals ; but Sir H. Mildmay, whom I have just seen, assures me that he positively knows that both this arrangement, and the projected exchange between L[or]d Camden and L[or]d Sidmouth, went off again yesterday, and that up to the present hour nothing of any kind is settled. I learn from the same quarter that all Pitt's friends consider the game as completely up, and look upon Pitt as only waiting to discuss the charge against him (I suppose that of the eleventh Report) previous to his resignation, a measure which, I am told, many of his friends are even now urging him to in the present moment. This news was told me with great invectives against the present Parliament for their desertion of Pitt in the vote against L[or]d Melville ; and by the same authority I learn that Pitt does not resist the motion for prosecution by the Attorney General, nor that for a Committee, though possibly the mode of naming it may create debate and division. The Frogmore ball stands much in the way of Thursday's H[ouse] of Commons, but as the House does not meet before Thursday, I do not see that any arrangement can be had for putting off the debate.

"Calcraft hears that L[or]d Mulgrave dislikes his situation as Foreign Minister, and if the Government can stand, would insist upon taking some other in exchange.

“This is all the news of the day. The violent abuse of the Parliament by P[itt]’s friends, would in other times announce a dissolution, but under the present circumstances, I think it cannot be ventured.

“L[or]d Buckingham excuses himself from the installation for fear of illness, and so does L[or]d Carlisle.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, [April 23]. Charles Street.—“They have sent a messenger to Sir Charles Middleton to offer him the Admiralty, which they think he will accept; they have likewise sent a messenger to Whitbread to desire him to put off his motions till Monday. I know not what his answer will be, but as the Windsor ball ends on Thursday, I see no pretext for the business being put off beyond Friday, if it be put off at all. Ministers are pressing vehemently for attendance in order to make such a Committee as they may like; L[or]d Melville’s friends still continues to press Pitt to go out now. The Russian news is said not to be over-good, but as Austria is decided not to act, what can be done by Russia alone? I hear from good authority that ministers boast that they have a measure on foot that must divide Opposition on foreign politicks. This sounds like the whole subsidy to Russia, because they will naturally suppose that Fox will not think it right to give that enormous sum mentioned for Russia alone; but who is there that will think that anything worth doing can be done by Russia without Austria or Prussia?”

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, April 25. Charles Street.—“I have no doubt but that your speculation as to Pitt’s present and future intentions is as near the truth as the general uncertainty of the present circumstances will allow any speculation to be. All that I heard in the last two days announced his intention of his making a struggle to sustain himself for the present. His notices for a military enquiry by Commissioners, and for renewing the naval Commission were dexterously contrived to take these two subjects out of the hands of Opposition in the House yesterday. They had taken little or no measures for attendance while Government had been indefatigable in procuring it; so that, although we carried out in our division almost all the *doubtful votes* of the former night, we had between fifty and sixty absentees, who might just as well have been present as not.

“In addition to this mistake, Whitbread (I know not why) abandoned his regular motion for prosecution by the Attorney-General, a measure which both Grey and I had thought was the true course to pursue, and which in the House we expressed our preference for, and our desire still to pursue. These

blunders and neglects, and the falling off in the numbers of the first division, made it easy for Pitt to carry his subsequent motion of balloting for the Committee, which will, of course, throw it into his own hands ; and I see no reason now why he should not struggle on through the session without being in a minority, though such a government as his is now become cannot certainly offer any prospect of real or permanent advantage to the country. That this weak and unfortunate state of things should continue, is for the country a great calamity ; but I own I have no hope that the resource which your letter alludes to, as arising out of your conversations at Dropmore, can take place after all the circumstances attending the disappointment of it last year. The eager and irritating course of all the present debates shews the utter impossibility of that *general* union taking place ; and a *partial* one continues subject to all the former objections, with many additional which are daily arising. That nothing can be worse therefore than the present state of things, I readily admit ; but still it appears to me that there is nothing new in any of the circumstances attending it, and nothing therefore that would naturally lead to any new conduct on our part. Under this impression I am a good deal surprized to read in your letter of yesterday that you propose to come up for the Catholick question *only*, and then to remain in the country. In the situation in which you stand as to political connections, it is impossible you should not see that such an absence from Parliament will of necessity cut short the chain of those connections, without any reasonable expectation of the means of renewing them if it should become desirable to you. Such a determination, therefore, as it appears to me, should naturally require a good deal of previous reflection and consideration, which I have no doubt that you will give to it. It was Fox's intention the day before yesterday to write to press very earnestly to see you by the end of this week ; but I have not been able to have any conversation with him alone as yet, and therefore I know not upon what subject he is so intent to see you, though I suppose it is upon the question of Russian subsidy. Certainly I agree with you in thinking that a possible case might arise where it would be well worth while to give even the enormous sum of five million of subsidy ; but, I own I do not think it is easy to conceive that, under the present circumstances of Europe as far as they are known, the *single* co-operation of Russia could be stated to be worth the purchasing at such a price, or when purchased could be expected to produce effectual or extensive results.

“Of this however and of all other matters we shall be able to talk shortly. L[or]d Spencer is impatient to see you, and so are many of our friends. The enclosed note came to me to-day from B[isho]p of Oxford, and I told him I would send it on to you at Dropmore.”

## EARL SPENCER to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, April 26. London.—“In this strange state of politics you will not be surprised at my being very anxious to have some conversation with you; which, indeed, independently of the matters now agitating in Parliament, I should very much desire on account of the Catholic question which is fast approaching, and upon the details of which I am far from feeling sufficiently clear to enable me to form a satisfactory judgment for myself without the benefit of some previous discussion of it with you. If I had not been apprized of your excursion to Oxford, I believe I should have made an attack on you from Windsor on Wednesday; but now I hope you will come to town, as there are really a good many points that require your immediate attention.

“The Bishop of Oxford’s Bill about livings is postponed till Monday next, and I trust that on that day at latest we shall see you here.”

## THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1805, April 25–30. London.]—“I despaired of finding your *Don Whiskerandos*, for he called at your door and left no card. But Proby has found him this morning, and dines him at L[or]d Carysfort’s to-day, and to-morrow with me. This evening they shew him the King at the ancient musick, and to-morrow young Roscius, so that his hours will be filled till you see him.

“The Catholicicks saw Pitt yesterday and proposed to him :—

1. To present the petition purely and simply.
2. To state them as contented with a declaratory vote of the justice of their application.
3. To state them as contented that nothing should be done in this session.

“Mr. Pitt declared himself unchanged in his opinions on the justice of their pretensions, but alleged that there were reasons that rendered it impossible for him to support their petition or to *intermeddle in it*; and further, that in justice he must inform them of his intention to oppose it with all his exertions; and lastly he suggested that it might be adviseable for them not to urge this matter which might indispose and pledge against them many who would otherwise wish to support them *at a fit opportunity*.

“This is the result of the meeting which has rendered them outrageous; and they have at their meeting this day agreed to put the whole matter into the hands of L[or]d Grenville and of Mr. Fox, and have appointed L[or]d Fingall and L[or]d Kenmare to request you both to appoint a day for meeting the deputation. They know that you are to be in town on Friday, so they will leave their note for you at Camelford House to-morrow.

“ I think it probable that the proposal to you both will be the presentation of the petition purely and simply, without anything of what is stated in the second or third proposal made to Mr. Pitt ; and I think that this will be the cleanest and neatest way of putting it into your hands. But, if you wish to have the same discretion (which I think you ought not to wish for), you may have it. At all events pray let me see you on Friday as soon as you arrive, for I have much more to tell you on this subject.

“ Pitt is savage on his horse-tax defeat ; and much sensation has been created by it. He has shewn disposition to give way on the Militia question, and I fancy that others who are wiser have frightened him.”

SIR J. C. HIPPIESLEY to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1805, May 1.]—“ I received this morning the enclosed from the Roman Catholic Bishop Coppinger.

“ Your lordship may possibly not have at hand the *Observations* to which Dr. Coppinger’s former letter replied. I therefore enclose them, and will much thank your lordship to favour me with the former enclosures in the course of tomorrow.”

*Enclosure.*

BISHOP W. COPPINGER to SIR J. C. HIPPIESLEY.

1805, April 27. Middleton.—“ The kind interest you were pleased to take in the malevolent introduction of my name into the ‘ *Observations upon the late and present state of Ireland,* ’ induces me to hope that, as it carried you patiently through my long and tedious letters while I endeavoured to unfold such calumnies as bore upon me in that furious production, so it will ensure me your attention to a few particulars which remain to be cleared up in a weightier volume of congenial cast and disposition ; Sir Richard Musgrave’s *History of the Rebellions in Ireland*. The author of the *Observations* will doubtless consider himself flattered at hearing that his pamphlet is ascribed by some of our best judges to the very flippant pen of that renowned baronet ; the matter, the manner and the style bespeak identity. We behold every where in both the same cogency of assertion ; the same extensive indiscriminating censures ; the same confident hardihood in circumstantiating his facts ; and the same satisfactory authorities ; namely *I have heard !—it was commonly said at that time !—it was well known !—or I have been assured by a gentleman !—or by a lady !*—The kindred of these two exquisite performances is yet further evinced by the multitudinous assemblage of their topics, which must ever secure them both against detailed refutation or detection. Having already exposed to you the falsehoods which touched me in the one ; I beg leave to trespass on you a few moments

longer, while I hold up the like falsehoods regarding me in the other ; at least such of them as I noticed in a very rapid flight through it. In page 42 of his *quarto* appendix, he gravely introduces some home-bred cub, who has received, he says, a good classic education, and who laboured with great effect among the Roman Catholic clergy in proselyting them to the Jacobin treason of 1798. The clergy of this county are these he intends particularly to asperse ; they all in general, according to Sir Richard, received the itinerant incendiary very well. There were but three exceptions ; the Right Reverend Doctor Moylan of Cork, the Reverend James Barry of Charleville, and the Reverend Thomas Barry of Mallow. About one hundred Roman Catholic priests are here stigmatized with a single dash, and the credulous reader in England will have logic enough to infer that the Irish Roman Catholic priesthood should not be suffered to exist. Now for my own part I can declare upon oath, I never saw, nor heard of this emissary, until Sir Richard introduced him to me in page 42 of his appendix ; nor have my best enquiries among the clergy subject to me been able to discover any such person as Sir Richard describes, addressing, or received by any of them ; and I could not but have heard of him had he a being elsewhere than in the baronet's creative fancy. Doctor Moylan has most peremptorily disavowed, and even under his hand, any knowledge whatsoever of this incendiary. The Rev. James Barry of Charleville in like manner has disclaimed under his hand, as he will upon his oath, any knowledge of the same ; and the Rev. Thomas Barry has not only given it under his hand that no man of this description ever spoke to him, but further spiritedly adds, that no man had dared to hold such language to him. It is very probable, notwithstanding, that Sir Richard, by this triple exception at our *general* expense, intended a compliment to Doctor Moylan and to my two clergymen ; but it was a bear's hug, and I believe the Doctor would have given him his thoughts upon it had not cooler reflection left it beneath his notice. It was reserved for Sir Richard to panegyryze Doctor Moylan by exhibiting him as a man that would suffer himself to be tampered with, upon the sacred obligation of his allegiance, by an upstart puppy, just let loose from school, whom he did not even stop in his career of treason. As to myself, I would think it a slighter injury that Sir Richard had spit his most tainted venom full into my face, than to beslaver me with an Iscariot kiss of that sort. It is his unenvied fate that his compliments like his dedication should be spurned alike by the objects of them. In the very last page of this same appendix I am set down as an unfeeling illiberal bigot who, in return for the kindness which actuated different Protestant commanders in either sending or permitting their regimental bands to play on Sundays in the Roman Catholic chapel at Youghal, withheld my assent from a Roman Catholic bandsman playing for divine

service in a Protestant church. No *gentleman* could have told Sir Richard that a regimental band was either sent, or permitted to play, at any time or on any occasion whatsoever, in the Roman Catholic chapel at Youghal, because in such assertion there is no truth. It must have been deposited in the baronet's tablets by one of the many trading story tellers who, if his neighbours are to be believed, were hospitably received where they could bring materials for the bulky volume ; and in return for their wares, carried away his meat and his drink ; nay, at times, his money. A regimental band consists, I believe, in general of from sixteen to twenty persons ; of these, at certain times, three, but oftener two boys, and occasionally one, would run off to the Roman Catholic chapel after playing the regiment, as their phrase is, to the gate of the Protestant church ; and here, for their private devotion, would play at some parts of the Mass. If these can be called the band, it must be upon the principle so happily adduced by Mr. Sheridan, *ipse agmen*—I am the band—a favourite trope in the baronet's eloquence. As to the charge of bigotry or illiberality I rejoice that it has been made, because it affords me now an opportunity of declaring my religious sentiments. I firmly believe that I am bound to love God above all things, and my neighbour as myself. I believe that every human being is that very neighbour whom I am bound to love ; let his religion, his prejudices, or his opinions be what they may. Were my last moment to overtake me with enmity in my heart, against any man, or any description of men, I would not expect salvation, though the injuries done to me, or intended against me by them, were ever so atrocious ; moreover though I firmly believe that there is but one true religion, as there is but one Eternal Truth, who can not possibly reveal contradictions ; and though I am fully convinced that the religion of my preference is that only true one, yet I am also persuaded that vast multitudes are comprised within its pale, in the sight of God, who do not adhere to it by bonds of communion visible to me. I am not warranted to judge my brother. I am to work my own salvation with fear and trembling, while I pray for all and desire eternal happiness to all. I will not however join in the exterior rites of worship with those of other religions because that, though they themselves may, and I sincerely hope, do according to their several means, honour God and forward their salvation in this way, I, believing as I believe, cannot so honour Him. If for this creed I be denominated an intolerant bigot, I bow to the charge ; and I glory in the denomination. In wishing well to all I certainly do not exclude Sir Richard ; I wish from my soul that God may incline him to make one good general confession to some worthy priest, who might convince him of what is indispensibly due to the characters he has injured. Arthur O'Leary I know, had he been consulted in his day, would have most forcibly inculcated

the necessity of reparation ; he would have reminded his penitent that no time was to be lost ; that in every page of the bulky volume a great number of formidable items were staring at him ; that to leave so long an account to be settled in the next world was perilous in the extreme ; for that the certain consequence of neglect in this point would be sentence to a region widely different from Purgatory, where he must go farther and fare worse.

“ We have heard of different publications heretofore censured most severely by the Legislature, and condemned to be burned by the common hangman. If the complexion, the injustice, the effect, and the mischievous tendency of the baronet’s work were duly considered by the great inquest of the empire, it would very probably be immortalized by a similar fate. And should the author, emulous of Fénélon’s fame, be the first to light up the funeral pile, he would thereby attain a character which his writings can never procure for him. Depurated in this manner from all its misrepresentations and untruths it would, in the sublime language of our Henry Flood, arise like a Phoenix from its own ashes, and with the flames of its cradle illuminate our isle.”

#### R. CHURTON to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, May 1. Middleton, near Banbury.—“ As you have honoured the Roman Catholic petition by introducing it into the House of Lords, I have no doubt you would wish it to have a full and fair consideration ; and will therefore, I trust, receive with favourable allowance every well-intended hint or suggestion on the subject. And this emboldens me to lay before your lordship the enclosed paper, which nothing but the most imperious sense of duty has extorted from me, and which I have or mean to submit to the indulgence of some others, as well Lords of Parliament as members of the House of Commons.

“ A notion some time ago seemed to be gaining ground that a tacit reformation had taken place among the Roman Catholics, and that they had relinquished many of their more absurd and dangerous tenets. I was myself a most unwilling, but by degrees a complete convert from this opinion. Their authorized manuals are as grossly superstitious and idolatrous as ever ; their public rituals unaltered. Their own writers, the Plowdens, Dr. Troy, and others, reject with disdain the intended compliment of amelioration, and insist that their faith is the same it ever was. The creed of Pope Pius is still their creed, and that recognises the traditions and decrees of the canons and councils, especially of the Council of Trent ; which authorize the persecution of heretics. A full toleration they already enjoy, and no one wishes to hurt a hair of their head ; but they now demand power, which whenever they have possessed they have always abused ; nor while they

hold the known principles of their Church can they, as a body, ever be trusted, and scarcely individuals in times of danger. In the late unhappy rebellion in Ireland some of Bishop Euseby Cleaver's most approved domestics and retainers, to whom before the troubles he would have trusted his life, were at the head of those who plundered his property and drank confusion to his lordship.

"But my apology, if I go on, will itself want an apology. I have beheld your lordship's talents with constant admiration since your early days at Oxford."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1805, May 1-5. Charles Street].—"I waited till one, and then went to Arlington Street. I found there Fitzgerald, two Ponsonbys, Grattan, Grey, Windham, Sir J. Newport, L[or]d Temple, Fitzpatrick. We all agreed that to put it off for a short time was out of the question, but Grey, Windham, Fitzgerald, L[or]d Temple and myself were the discussers of putting it off without fixing a precise period. What I hear of the indisposition of our whole party to it, as well as its general unpopularity, incline me to this; but this is much increased by the eagerness and irritation of the Prince, who called in Windham and myself in Pall Mall after the meeting, and shewed me in his conversation the extreme to which he pushes this matter. He entertains the idea of calling a general meeting and asking each individual their opinion, when he will be sure to have a majority. Windham suggested the mooting with Fox the question of deferring the business till next session, leaving to the Catholics a positive promise to bring it on then, if *they then* require it. The P[rin]ce directed us to urge Fox to this, and we shall do so when we see him, though I know not with what success. My conviction is that in persisting you will make the future possessor of the Crown as adverse to it as the present."

THE EARL OF FINGALL to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, May 10. Thayer Street.—"Not having had the honour of seeing your lordship when I had that of calling yesterday on your lordship, I take the liberty of enclosing a copy of the resolution entered into at the last meeting of Catholics held in Dublin. It is merely in case anything should be urged against the measure being brought forward at this moment, I trouble your lordship with this communication."

PETER TRANT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1805], May 12. Bath.—"I am induced to trouble your lordship with this letter in consequence of having read in the *Courier* of Saturday the report of Lord Redesdale's speech on the subject of the Catholic petition brought forward in the House of Lords with so much patriotism and ability by

your lordship. I arrived very lately from Ireland and have resided chiefly in the county of Kerry; and of the state of the Roman Catholic clergy of this remote county I can speak with the utmost certainty, not only by means of the general information I have for several years past had an opportunity of obtaining, but also by means of my personal acquaintance with Doctor Sugrue the Roman Catholic bishop of the diocese.

“ I lament much that in his statement of the immoderate power possessed and exerted by the Roman Catholic hierarchy of Ireland, Lord Redesdale’s zeal should have urged him to transgress the bounds of truth, and appear the champion of religious bigotry and intolerance. But his lordship has been deceived; he never called upon the moderate, well-informed, disinterested Protestant country gentleman of Ireland for information relative to the character and situation of the Roman Catholic hierarchy and clergy of his county; his lordship only drew his information from men who have notoriously ever distinguished themselves by their rancour to the Catholics and their dislike of religious liberty. However I think myself bound as an Irishman and a Protestant to declare that Lord Redesdale’s observations on the general state of the Roman Catholic hierarchy, clergy, and laity, are devoid of sufficient information, and should not make an unfavourable impression on the minds of noble peers; besides, I feel myself obliged as a country gentleman of Ireland to declare, and I call upon the Knight of Kerry and Mr. T. Crosbie the representatives of the county of Kerry to confirm my assertion, that the character given by the Chancellor of Ireland of the Roman Catholic hierarchy and clergy does not apply to Doctor Sugrue or to the clergy of his diocese. The influence of the Roman Catholic clergy has most sensibly declined these fifteen years past in every part of Ireland, and proportionably as much in the county of Kerry as elsewhere. I have heard the worthy prelate above mentioned say that the disgraceful scenes which are too frequently exhibited on the Sabbath day at the parish chapels, producing riot and disorder within them, not respecting the altar or the priest whilst celebrating Mass, prove strongly that religion has no longer any hold on the minds of the common people, and that their clergy no longer possess the power of enforcing obedience to their exhortations or observance of religious duties. I entreat you to be assured that the Chancellor has viewed the power and situation of the Roman Catholic hierarchy, clergy, and laity with a disordered imagination; and that the power and influence of the clergy instead of being reduced should be strengthened, and their character be made respectable; the distinction of religion should no longer be made the pretext for depriving three millions of people of the rights of citizenship, to the disgrace of the most civilized empire in the world, and during its most enlightened period.

“I forgot to mention to your lordship that the Chancellor of Ireland is not unacquainted with Doctor Sugrue, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kerry. I remember he dined last summer at Killarney with Lord Redesdale. If these observations can be of any use to your lordship in your reply, I shall think myself very fortunate to have made them ; if not, I beg your lordship to excuse this letter.”

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, May 16. Palace Yard.—“I enclose a copy of the resolutions which I prepared, and moved yesterday in concurrence with the Chancellor, and which I hope you will approve. Lord Mulgrave thought proper to oppose our putting a previous question on the last resolution, which he contended ought to have a direct negative ; and some others were inclined to support him in that idea, but at last they gave way.

“In effect therefore the proceedings will commence as *de novo* on Tuesday next, and there seems to be little probability that can tend to anything either useful or creditable ; that opinion gains ground, and if we help it forwards a little, some means may be found to close the enquiry. If the judge deserved a little punishment he will have had more than enough by the inconvenience, loss, and expense to which he has been subjected.

“I also send the printed copy of the resolutions and message respecting Lord Melville’s proposed attendance.

“It seems to be believed that on the 22nd April\* the combined Toulon and Spanish fleets were certainly in one of the harbours near to Cadiz. A lieutenant of the King’s navy who reconnoitred them towards sunset has written a detailed account of the flags, the number of ships, and other particulars. If he should not have been deceived, I think it likely that the first report of sailing westward on the 10th April was unfounded.”

EARL SPENCER to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, May 21. London.—“I am come to town this morning (meaning to return at night) and shall go down to the House to see what they do about the proceedings on Judge Fox. I called on Cowper to learn at what time they were to begin, and I find from him that there is a difficulty in point of form *in limine*, namely, where the judge is to be placed ; a question which though merely a matter of form, has some difficulty in it, and will probably occupy, at least for a few days, the undecided minds of the Chancellor and Lord Hawkesbury before they can settle what to do about it.

“Nothing more transpires, as far as I have yet heard, about the Russian Treaty ; and the time is getting so late that it is very easy to foresee that nothing of active co-operation for

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\* I am not quite sure that this is the date.

this year can possibly arise out of it ; and, under those circumstances, I confess I think it will be rather difficult to justify any very considerable pecuniary sacrifices if such should be proposed to us ; though I perfectly agree with you on the importance of re-connecting ourselves with the Continent.

“The Brest fleet was only making a demonstration, and I fear produced the effect they wished by doing so, as it has occasioned a further delay in the detachment of Admiral Collingwood to the West Indies, whither, it now appears most probable, that the Toulon and Cadiz combined squadron is gone ; the reports which have been circulated of their return to Cadiz being now looked upon at the Admiralty as perfectly unfounded.”

#### MARQUIS WELLESLEY to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, May 22. Fort William.—“It is difficult to adjust the account of correspondence between us. I am in debt to you on account of a letter which I never received, but which I have read and admired in common with all the world. Yet it is not easy to answer what you have not avowed. You have received (I think) a letter from me respecting the war in India which, I suppose, you have not acknowledged either from an expectation of my early return home, or of my answer to your letter which never reached me. Whatever may be the balance of our account of correspondence, I feel and confess myself to be deeply in your debt on account of your invariable kindness and affectionate attachment towards me and my family. My obligations to you in this respect are indeed boundless and inestimable.

“You may well conceive the delight with which I have viewed my dearest Richard’s progress, and how much that joy has been enhanced by the consideration that my favourite son has met all my hopes under the guidance and care of my most respected, affectionate and first friend. Lady Wellesley and Richard will assure you of the sincerity and warmth of my gratitude for this most acceptable proof of your unabated friendship.

“Having sent you a variety of documents respecting the state of affairs in India, I shall not enter into any further details upon that subject in this letter than to apprise you that tranquility is now sufficiently restored to admit of my departure, under the expectation either of the arrival of a successor to me from England, or of the confirmation of Sir George Barlow’s appointment. The Court of Directors is incensed against me, because three packets have been taken by the enemy ; because the public business in India has been dispatched in the most expeditious form in a crisis of war ; and because they suppose me to be a friend to the free trade of India, and to the extension of the general executive power

of the realm over these possessions. In their suspicions, they happen to be erroneous, as I believe you know ; for I think we have always concurred in the necessity of maintaining the Company's charter, and the authority of the Direction, as the best securities for the maintenance of the British empire in India and for the purity of the constitution of our country at home. With these established principles, however, I trust that it is neither heresy nor treason to entertain a hope that the Indian branch of our government with every other, may be susceptible of improvement, without any injury to the foundations of the present system. Progressive improvement, derived from the ancient sources of the constitution, and conducted through channels which tend to purify the original fountain without perverting its course, or excluding the accession of other streams, has been the happy policy of Parliament in the best times. And I confess that I cannot forget all my old principles, and embrace the Hindu faith so exclusively, as to reject every idea of the possibility of gradual improvement in our established Eastern system. On the other hand, I am not so entirely *désorienté* as to desire or attempt any change of the great foundations of our power in the East. The truth, however, is that (whatever may be the suspicions of the India House) I entertain no notion of making any exertion whatever on the subjects of the alarms of the Directors ; and that I am much more inclined to seek repose for a time, and, when recovered from the present fatigues of my health and spirits, to turn my mind to other objects, than to continue in the state of a nabob for the remainder of my life.

“ Under these impressions I hope to meet you in the course of the next winter in England, with all the cordiality and freedom of our long established friendship. My health has suffered considerably during the last year, but I trust it may be improved by the voyage. I shall probably leave India in August, and I may arrive in January. The season for embarkation is not favourable in August, and I may possibly be delayed, in which case I cannot hope to reach England before the spring of 1806.

“ I think Richard should be sent to Oxford at least as early as January next ; if it be deemed an object that he should wait for my arrival, before he leaves Eton, he might be detained at Eton until the Christmas holidays, but he should (I imagine) be sent to Oxford at the first term after Christmas.

“ Upon the state of politics in England and Europe I say nothing at present ; it is really difficult to form a correct judgment at this distance on a state of things so complicated and extraordinary. My first object will be to maintain all my old friendships, which have constituted so large a portion of the happiness of my early life, and of which I cannot afford the loss at the close of my career. At all events I trust that

I shall preserve your regard and esteem, without which the prospect of a return to my country would be gloomy and cheerless."

*Private.* LORD AUCKLAND to [LORD GRENVILLE].

1805, May 31 Palace Yard.—“Lord Spencer will (I hope) have drawn your attention to Lord Melville’s public notice, through his son, that on Thursday next he will attend at the House of Commons to answer Mr. Whitbread’s motion for a further proceeding in a business respecting which several accusations and criminating resolutions have already passed, and have been carried to the throne by an address. This is not therefore a case within any of the precedents, nor is there any instance of such a previous notice. The words in the first resolution communicated in our late conference are ‘that a lord may be permitted to go down to the House of Commons to defend himself on any points, on which that House has not previously passed any accusatory or criminating resolution against him.’

“I feel every due consideration, and every right delicacy concerning the party in question, but I find it difficult to satisfy my mind that such a breach, not merely of our standing orders but of the essential principles of our independence on the other House of Parliament ought to be permitted. At the same time (though all those to whom I have mentioned the subject see it in a similar point of view) I much doubt either the prudence or propriety of stirring the question without your concurrence and assistance.

“The prosecution of Mr. Justice Foxe is to ‘commence’ to-day at four o’clock.”

*Private.* LORD AUCKLAND to [LORD GRENVILLE].

1805, June 4. Palace Yard.—“The point of view in which you see Lord Melville’s notice to the House of Commons is such as to leave no doubt on my mind that, if that notice should be carried into effect without remark or resistance, the privileges of the Lords will be violated not merely in a consideration of punctilio, but in a question involving their independence, character, fortunes, and personal safety. In saying this, I assume (what I believe) that Lord Melville does not intend to ask any permission.

“He misconceives himself to be authorised by the two cases of the Duke of Leeds (*House of Commons’ Journals*, Vol. 11, p. 326) and of Lord Somers (Vol. 13, p. 489). The first of those cases is a strange specimen of Parliamentary irregularity. The charge had been framed on an enquiry before a joint committee of the two Houses, and the impeachment had been voted, and ordered to be carried up before the Duke of Leeds appeared at the Bar. In the other case, nothing criminatory was voted, till after Lord Somers had been heard. Neither of those cases (even if admissible) can justify Lord Melville’s

' ten days previous public notice of his intention ' ; besides, the votes of accusation already passed against him are grounded indeed on evidence and facts distinguishable in their details from the new charges to be found in the report of the Committee ; but still they are all *ejusdem generis*, and so interwoven and connected that it is impossible to enter into any separated reasonings of defence. The consequence will be that he must either claim an acquittal under an implied trial in the House of Commons, or, if he should fail in that object, that he will lay open his means of defence prior to the trial by impeachment, and will have established a precedent most injurious hereafter to every peer who may be either justly or unjustly accused.

" Seeing the business in this grave light, I really lament your absence, for the subject is certainly more important than the duties (however important and respectable) of preparatory field days. I see that there are circular and pressing notes for a full attendance at the House to-morrow (I do not know with what view) and I should not hesitate either to bring forward the discussion or to support it ; and as the House must be cleared below the bar, all delicacies respecting Lord Melville may be observed, even if it should be thought proper to have it understood by him that he must either apply for permission, or subject himself to an eventual animadversion for the breach of privilege. If he should apply for permission, it would be difficult to frame it in terms which would leave no future doubts.

" I have been obliged to trouble you with this long note, as I am prevented by mourning from going to the Courts of the morning or evening, when I might perhaps have found you."

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, June 5. Charles Street.—" Calcraft has sent an express to stop Fox from coming to town to-day, as the Athol business is put off. I have therefore just written to him to tell him that, if he had come, my business was to have told him from you that you had seen Windham who, upon re-consideration, had entirely agreed to the motion as it was *last* discussed in Arlington Street ; that therefore you saw no necessity for any previous meeting, unless Fox much wished it, in which case you would come for an hour next Monday. I have further desired Fox to write me a line by return of post, to fix whether Lord Carysfort shall give notice of the motion on Friday for Tuesday se'nnight ; and I have desired Fox, in case he has any question to put, to send a letter to Dropmore to which he may have an answer time enough to write to me by Thursday's post, as L[or]d Carysfort goes to Worthing on Saturday for a few days. In like manner, I must beg of you to write me a line by Thursday's post, to say whether L[or]d Carysfort shall give notice on Friday or not.

“No naval news. If you think further communication with Fox necessary, perhaps your servant, with a letter to St. Anne’s, might bring you an answer in time for your writing to me by Thursday’s post.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, June 7. [Charles Stre]jet.—“Fox came to town yesterday, and has settled with Grey that Grey should give notice to-day in the Commons, and L[or]d Carysfort in the Lords for Wednesday se’nnight.

“It is now generally understood that the session cannot end sooner than in five or six weeks, and it has been settled that Lord C[arysfort] should first ask if ministers had any communication to make on foreign affairs, and upon their answer, that he should then give notice in *general* terms, in order to keep within his own hands the precise terms of his motion.

“L[or]d Minto is said to have made a very impressive speech yesterday, and was supported by L[or]d Ellenborough against the Chancellor, who daily adds to his disgraces on the subject of Judge Fox.

“L[or]d Auckland moved to restrict L[or]d Melville from defending himself, and L[or]d Hawkesbury, after reading a long letter from L[or]d Melville, said he should support L[or]d M[elville] in his desire of defending himself, restricting him only from the matter contained in the criminatory resolution.

“Strong rumours prevail of increased ill humour between Pitt and L[or]d Sidmouth; Pitt’s friends now abuse him without any reserve, and L[or]d Sidmouth’s resignation was again bruited about yesterday. All that I know for certain is that L[or]d Sidmouth yesterday followed L[or]d St. V[incent] from house to house till he obtained an interview with him; the same interview, as you may remember, took place in his last resignation.

“L[or]d Dartmouth has written by the K[ing]’s order to Birmingham to fix the day for the ceremony of H[is] M[ajesty]’s laying the first stone of a new church there; and I am told that at the City review yesterday, the K[ing] ordered himself to be stopped in going down the line when he came to Birch the pastry cook, who is a volunteer officer, and H[is] M[ajesty] then thanked him for his laudable endeavours to support the true Church to which the K[ing] said he had shewn himself a true friend. Perhaps you recollect that Birch moved in the city against the Catholick petition.

“I have spoke to L[or]d B[uckingham] about your standards, and he says he will give the proper orders for them.

“Pitt’s St. Anthony’s fire prevented his going to the House yesterday, and I know not if he can go to-day; if he does not appear, Grey will put off his notice till he does.”

## MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, June 8. Buckingham House.—“The news of yesterday was all hostility of Pitt and Addington on the subject of L[or]d Melville; but still I believe, *though I do not know*, that no explanation has taken place. *Tierney* is now *confident* that Addington will join in the impeachment. But the scene of the two last days in the H[ouse] of Lords shews disunion of the most marked kind; in which every minister has danced round every point of the compass on the questions respecting Judge Fox, and have shewn uncommon pains to avoid even the semblance of co-operation. On Wednesday they all refused through the L[or]d Ch[ancello]r your motion for reviving the committee; on Thursday L[or]d Hawkesbury objected to Adam’s even referring to the evidence given by a witness in the committee; L[or]d Ch[ancello]r supported L[or]d Hawkesbury; L[or]d Minto spoke most ably, L[or]d Eldon grew convinced, L[or]d Sidmouth joined him, L[or]d Mulgrave spoke for L[or]d Ch[ancello]r’s opinions. The debate was resumed yesterday when L[or]d Minto again pressed it. L[or]d Hawkesbury gave way immediately, but urged as a *sine qua non* that the evidence should not be communicated to Fox, but that it should be printed for the use of the Lords, by which means it would ‘*properly and regularly find its way to the parties.*’ L[or]d Ch[ancello]r called him to order, made a most angry speech on the law and the order of this proceeding, declared he would dissent but not divide, and threw out a challenge on both points to L[or]d Ellenborough; who argued very warmly on the law, and quoted the communication *every day* of Hastings’ trial to him (as counsel) of the printed papers and evidence by order of the House; was flatly contradicted on this fact by L[or]d Ch[ancello]r, and again rose to re-assert with much warmth the story as he had first stated it. The motion was then carried, and L[or]d Ch[ancello]r gave notice that when the papers were printed he would move a resolution which should prevent the Lords from communicating to any person whatsoever those papers which were to be printed *solely for their use!* And in this temper the House broke up, after L[or]d Auckland had commented on the state of *all* the parties at the bar, who by this proceeding could not hope that the question could be even pursued in its present slow course sooner than the 19th or 20th of June; and consequently, that it was utterly impossible that the evidence on one side should close this year. The report is that the K[ing] has expressed himself strongly against this proceeding. L[or]d Sidmouth did not attend yesterday.

“The next wonder of wonders is the speech of the K[ing] on Thursday at the review of the eight London reg[imen]ts to Lieutenant Colonel Mr. Deputy Birch, the Great Pastry Cook. H[is] M[ajesty] enquired for him, and on going down the line stopped when he came to him; the music ceased, and the

monarch made a speech of thanks to the Lieut[enant] Col[onel] for having as a common council man proposed the petition to Parl[iamen]t against the Catholics!!!

“This is the farce of the more solemn scene of the same sort in the speech to the bishops at the birthday, where he called upon them to resist ‘*this daring attempt*’ to overthrow the Church.

“And on the day before, Monday, he had ordered L[or]d Dartmouth (the Lord Chamberlain, not the Sec[reta]ry of State) to write to the Bailiff of Birmingham to announce H[is] M[ajesty’s] intentions to lay the first stone of a new church.

“So much for the state of his mind!

“The account of the captured Spanish packet is true, and there is no reason to doubt the originality of them. They were addressed to Vera Cruz and announce a great armament destined for the Havannah.

“We have given L[or]d Melville leave to attend, but not to defend himself.”

#### LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, June 12. Palace Yard.—“The inclosed protest might have been stated with more precision if it could have had the benefit of your corrections. Still I am satisfied both on full reflection, and from a due confidence in those who signed with me, that the several reasons are good. And the consideration is become so important that I think it material you should be apprized of it.

“I apprehend that Lord Melville’s speech in the House of Commons by virtue of the permission protested against will not have been advantageous to him. Indeed it seems doubtful whether the sense of a majority may not be decided to-night for the impeachment; more especially if Mr. Bond’s amendment can be disposed either ‘by previous question’ or by his agreeing not to urge it in a form which might eventually prove a negative to every mode of prosecution whether by impeachment or by the Attorney General.”

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, June 13. [Buckingham House.]—

Impeachment	For .. .. .	195	} Maj[orit]y 77
	Against .. .. .	272	

Prosecution by Att[orne]y G[enera]l	For .. .. .	238	} Maj[orit]y 9.
	Against .. .. .	229	

“The debate and division will shew you that my information was good respecting the pistol put to Mr. Pitt’s head by L[or]d Sidmouth, and nothing could exceed the anxiety or exertions of the latter all yesterday to secure the prosecution by the Att[orne]y Gen[era]l. It was obvious that we should fail

in the impeachment, not only because ten or eleven of our numbers had left us and gone over to Pitt, but, because several absented, and all the (few) Addingtons voted against us. But it is a fact within *my knowledge* that Pitt was quite confident to a late hour last night of resisting Bond's motion by a majority of forty, nor have I yet seen any one who accounts satisfactorily for our majority. They divided at half past six, and you will see that, including the Speaker and tellers, 472 members were then present, and I understand that above forty had paired off, so that it seems impossible for Pitt to recover this blow. The violence of Pitt's friends against Addington cannot be described, and they are equally loud against L[or]d Melville for the extreme indiscretion of the greatest part of his speech, which is universally described as being made in a tone that could only be justified on the supposition of being borne out by an eager and triumphant majority. He threw everything upon Trotter, and certainly when he left the House he thought he had done wonders! Pitt was unwell, quite beat down with anxiety and fatigue, but confident of success to the last moment. It is however matter of astonishment that he did not speak either night, and no one clearly understands it.

"The most important feature of the last two hours is the universal conviction that L[or]d Sidmouth was to have been removed by Pitt if the question of prosecution had been successfully resisted; and it is now said that he, Pitt, means immediately to resign, of which I do not believe one word. Canning went out of his way to make the breach with Bond and Bragge more marked and more completely irreparable."

LORD GRENVILLE to THOMAS GRENVILLE.

1805, June 24. Dropmore.—"I wrote you three lines just before I left town to-day, and in truth I have not much to add to them. Lord Camden sent me a note in the morning to say he would call upon me. When he came he said that his only object was to renew the conversation we had a few weeks ago, but that he came to me *perfectly unauthorised*; that he thought the present circumstances were still more favourable than those which then existed for the formation of a Government on the most extended plan; and that he wished to know my ideas on the subject, especially as all the personal questions affecting Pitt seemed now at an end, and had, he said, been terminated in a manner in the highest degree liberal and honourable on the part of Opposition. In the course of this conversation he spoke in strong terms of resentment respecting the conduct of the Addingtons, and said that Pitt now felt on that subject as he (Lord C[amden]) wished.

"My answer was that I thought the business was now come to its point. That I was (as I had long been) fully convinced that nothing could save the country but a full and complete union of all the men of talents and weight. That if Pitt was

of that opinion, it was for him to act upon it. That no *unauthorized* communication could lead to any satisfactory explanation on such a subject ; a *direct* communication was the only thing that could do any good ; and if that was made, or wished to be made, *to me*, I could receive it only with the view of imparting it to Fox, and of our making our answer in common. But the King's journey would very soon put all these ideas out of the question. If therefore Pitt meant anything, he must have an immediate explanation with the King, and make his communication in consequence.

"L[or]d C[amden] then shewed a great desire to know how far Fox's declaration in the H[ouse] of C[ommons] might be considered as a ground to be proceeded on. I told him that the declaration he alluded to was made without any communication with anybody. That I was no party to it, and for my own part, though I thought the declaration highly honourable to Fox, yet I couldn't see how either of the two objects in view, that of a Government comprizing all the talents of the country or supported by a union of the great parties in Parliament, was likely to be promoted by any such ideas. That all this however was matter into which I could not enter individually, being engaged in a party, separately from which neither any of my immediate connections nor myself would listen to any suggestions on the subject. If therefore any disposition towards such discussions existed in Pitt's mind, he had no time to lose in trying his ground with the King, and then making a direct communication of whatever he had to say on the subject.

"This is nearly the substance of what passed, beyond mutual expressions of kindness, and a strong declaration of L[or]d C[amden]'s as to *his own* wish to see an arrangement formed on the largest scale ; and to contribute to it by any means in his power. He told me incidentally that Pitt had not seen the King *for a month*."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, June 25. Charles Street.—"It is now four, and I have twice called on Fox, who is not yet come, but who has sent word that he will certainly be in town before the House.

"I will make a point of shewing him your letter of to-day as soon as I see him. Nothing can be more correctly satisfactory than the account which you have given of the conversation on your part ; on the other side it is moving upon a very little scale to send out these unauthorized skirmishers, instead of looking the whole business manfully in the face. The account which was given to you on Sunday night seems to me probably to have accelerated the tardy and reluctant steps upon which P[itt] is still pausing, and hesitating, instead of acting. The eager desire for making the dis-interested declaration alluded to the ground-work of discussion, was very properly rejected by you, and should never have been proposed

by the other. The total want of the *last month's* communication, which your last line describes, shews that none of the previous difficulties have been likely to have been discussed or removed in the quarter where they are most to be feared ; but, on the other hand, it shews too that, on the part of P[itt], there can be no claim on him for any special marks of attachment where so little confidential intercourse has been allowed to him. I learn to-day from sure knowledge that, not very long ago, your friend who conversed with you professed himself to be weary of office, and anxious to devote himself entirely to domestic enjoyments; and from a good quarter too I know and see that L[or]d H[awkesbury] is now considered as devoted to P[itt], and as the favourite with the K[ing], so that I am pretty confident you will find, if it comes to question, that P[itt] will insist on L[or]d H[awkesbury] and on L[or]d Castlereagh, and that L[or]d C[amden] will offer to make room.

“I am now going to make another effort in Arlington Street. I know not what is to happen in the House, but so many of our friends are gone, that the Ministers may beat us, if they have the face to interpose for the protection of L[or]d M[elville] which will naturally make us all very savage.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, June 26. [Charles Stree]t.—“I communicated your letter to Fox yesterday, and as he seemed to wish it, I ventured likewise to read it to Grey, desiring them to mention the contents of it to nobody else, and to recollect that it related merely to private unauthorised conversation. They both spoke in high terms of approbation of every word of the letter, which they seemed to think was most perfectly and entirely what they could have wished ; but they are both as much at a loss as I am to foresee what is the next step which will be taken by Pitt. That which is the most obviously pointed to by your conversation seems to be of little promise, as a practicable measure, because where there has been no communication for a month together, there seems little hope of any point being gained by discussions of mutual confidence. I hear to-day that notions circulate much of the K[ing's] being less well, and I am told that Phipps the oculist was sent down yesterday with many mysterious precautions to prevent it's being known. I hope by Saturday or Sunday to pass a few days at Dropmore.

“I hear no news. Canning joined me and walked a great way with me to-day, but as he did not open any interesting subject, I let him alone to ordinary conversation, and we parted without a word on any business.”

MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, June 26. House of Lords.—“L[or]d Hawkesbury brought in his Bill yesterday, and gave notice for the second

reading to-morrow. The precedents are the Bills in the case of Sir T. Rumbold, which we talked over, and the Bill in 1786 for continuing the proceedings against Mr. Hastings, before any impeachment was resolved or even announced; and I own that this last Bill appears more nearly in point than any other. At all events, however, the House appears so entirely forsaken, that I see no chance of collecting three persons to form an Opposition.

“You will have observed that after I had noticed yesterday some language of the D[uke] of Montrose leaning upon the Lieut[enant] Governor of Jamaica, L[or]d Camden and L[or]d Hawkesbury took very particular pains to assure the House and me that nothing could have been more correct than General Nugent’s conduct.

“The reports which I mentioned to you on Sunday night are very much in circulation; and I understand, from the same authority, that on Monday, the complaint of the eyes was increased, and that the despondency had increased in proportion with very great apprehension of a *gutta serena*. Mr. Pitt was called out of the House of Commons on Monday at *half past four* by L[or]d Camden and L[or]d Harrowby, who took him to the com[mitt]ee room of the H[ouse] of Lords for a long time; and upon his return to the H[ouse] of C[ommons] he took Mr. Canning and Mr. Long up into the Speaker’s room for near half an hour. This story is commented upon as connected with the K[ing]’s situation.

“You will have seen the result of last night’s debate, which has given much room for speculation. Nothing could be more adverse than the two parties of Pitt and Addington, or seemingly more happy than Pitt in his victory. Everyone round me is waiting (with near forty peers in the House) with impatience for Whitbread and his impeachment, but no one seems to have an idea that it can be heard this session.

“Whitbread has just appeared and has done his part very well; he was very well attended. The message has been read and nothing said upon it.”

#### MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, June 27. [Buckingham House.]—“My son came to me this evening to tell me, that Mr. Bourne Sturges had come over to him this day in the H[ouse] of C[ommons] and settling down next to him, began immediately: ‘how happened it that Mr. Fox’s speech of Tuesday was so much more hostile to us, than that which we considered so very conciliatory?’ The answer was ‘Mr. Fox probably has many friends, whose feelings he must consult, and that may account for slight variations of tone, and of phrase, though possibly there is no variation in the essential.’ *St[urges]* ‘Do you think then that Mr. Fox is as disposed to discuss the formation of a *new ministry*, as he was?’ *Lord T[emple]*, ‘I do

not know what he may discuss, but I conceive him quite as open to discuss *a new ministry*, as he was before that second speech.' St[urges], 'I am glad you think so; for if there are difficulties in such a discussion, they will come from your friends rather than from us.' The conversation then went very much at length into the question of the present ministry which St[urges] said was *at an end*, for that Pitt never could go on with Addington, of whom St[urges] spoke with great violence. He said that he was not very sanguine in his expectation of a junction 'for you will make propositions that Mr. Pitt never will accede to.' L[or]d T[emple], 'What are they? I hope you do not expect L[or]d Grenville and Mr. Fox to consider themselves as coming in to serve under Mr. Pitt?' St[urges], 'No, that is out of the question; the whole must be considered as white paper; there must be equality of pretension; but Mr. Pitt never can serve in office under Mr. Fox.' L[or]d T[emple], 'Certainly not, but if it is admitted that he is to quit his present situation, what is the difficulty to which you advert?' St[urges], 'It is that, probably, his friends who may think he degrades himself by quitting his situation may advise him to resign absolutely, and to take no office. AND THEN YOU WILL HAVE THE DOCTOR.' Lord T[emple], 'I think that possible, though not probable; but what is to happen if that should be the case?' St[urges], 'Why in plain English, there are four parties in the country; and if your two parties expect to govern without a third, you will fail.' Lord T[emple], 'That may be, and I should regret the experiment, as I sincerely wish for an extended administration.' St[urges], 'So DOES MR. PITT, and the difficulties will not arise FROM HIM, or from HIS PRESENT SITUATION; but from difficulties on your part, and from the reluctance of his friends to see him in an inferior office, and therefore I AM PERSUADED THIS WILL ALL END IN HIS RESIGNATION.'

"This is the general tenor, and the parts underscored the exact words of a very long conversation, intermixed by frequent abuse of Addington, wishes for coalition, approbation of Fox's foreign politicks, and lamentation that the broad administration of last year had failed. The DIFFICULTIES in question though never exactly defined, appeared always to be the minor arrangements; for Sturges originally stated that he was persuaded Pitt was ready to sacrifice HIS SITUATION, but expressed his doubt whether he would not resign altogether rather than take one inferior. But it must be observed that, during the whole of this conversation, my son remarked, that ten different times (at least) Sturges spoke of the Ministry as *at an end*, and of the question being not the retaining the Treasury, but the question of an inferior office, or of entire resignation; but with a *caveat*, often repeated, against serving under Mr. Fox, which would only point at the exclusion of Fox from the Treasury. The result of this *talk* of a full half hour, evidently courted by Sturges, was the persuasion of

Lord T[emple] that Pitt will resign, so soon as he has made his proposition of quitting the Treasury in favour of some one, whom he has in view, but whom Sturges (if he knows him) has carefully kept out of sight.

“Sturges said carelessly that Pitt was to see the K[ing] on this day; and that he hoped he would open himself to the K[ing], for that the country could not go in on its present state. Soon after this, it was known in the H[ouse] of C[ommons] that Mr. Pitt had seen the K[ing] after council, and had been with him (as reported) near an hour. He came to the House, and Lord T[emple] spoke to him on indifferent points, and found him cheerful, but could gather nothing from his manner.

“As it is possible that you may hear to-morrow from him, I have thought it right that you may know this interesting conversation, which L[ord] T[emple] reports to have been too long for a perfect detail of it; but to be correct in the general view of it, and in the particular words underscored.

“The King’s eyes now occupy everybody’s conversation. I have seen my authority this day, and *nothing can be worse* than this whole chapter; it is however more than probable that the disorder is compleatly and indisputably cataract; which has wholly seized one eye, and partially the other. His head is said not to be affected, but his dispendency and irritation are *stated to me* to be very great indeed. Phipps (the partner of Wathen) has been called in on Monday last, and is said (but this is not clear) to have proposed the operation of couching; but my authority doubts whether the K[ing] is informed of the extent of the disorder, and is of opinion that the K[ing]’s head will give way when he knows the full mischief. The whole is indeed most lamentable!

“I forgot to say that Sturges said that Pitt hoped to get all his Bills out of the H[ouse] of C[ommons] by Tuesday or Wednesday next; and *if so*, that Parl[iamen]t might be prorogued about the 12th or 13th; and Canning seems to have been equally confident on this, last night to my brother. How can we reconcile this with the K[ing]’s situation, which is incontestable.

“Under all these circumstances, it seems clear that you will have another message, and possibly as early as this letter; but I should think that the real push will be to place L[ord] Hawkesbury at the Treasury, and that on failure of this device, Pitt will wholly retire; and Addington will be employed to propose a new ministry; to which attempt he will be encouraged by Fox’s speech of Tuesday, which was addressed to the wise country gentlemen who support the Doctor.”

#### MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, June 28. Buckingham House.—“I have nothing to add to my letter of last night save that I now know from the very best authority, as well as from my usual channel, that nothing

can be worse than the King's situation. Phipps saw him on Monday and did not tell him all he thought of his case, but told *the very best authority* that there was no *gutta serena* but a decided cataract on one eye, and one forming on the other. He added that there would be no danger in removing them by operation. All this may be true, but it is equally so that the absolute quiet of mind and body to which the King must submit when he is couched, will, according to the opinion of my usual channel, utterly and rapidly destroy the little remains of sanity that at present exist. Old Lady Bath passed this week at Windsor and says that the King, putting the hand on one eye, said, now I do not see you or any object whatsoever, but a very dim haze of light; and then moving the hand to the other eye said, now I see that something is between me and the light, but I cannot distinguish your figure or features, 'and what is extraordinary my spectacles do not help me.'

"It is now said—this morning—that the Weymouth journey is stopped, and indeed it is not possible that it should go on if all this is as correct as I believe it. Lord Chatham [said] last night to a *person*, 'the journey is stopped for a reason you know'; and Lady Chatham said 'I wish that the eyes was the only reason.'

"The universal language is that the change must take place immediately, and I am told that the impression is that Mr. Pitt will resign as soon as the Bills are out of the House of Commons, which is now fixed for Thursday next; but of this I do not profess to be a believer.

"In consequence of your note I have determined to remain in town, very much against my inclinations, but thinking it right so to do.

"The articles against Lord Melville are three—as I hear—namely for the three sums, and they will be ready on Monday. The universal idea is that Pitt was more actuated by the desire of over-throwing Addington's measure than by the wish of saving Lord Melville in the last division in the House of Commons; and this opinion is held by the *doctor's* friends.

"Nothing is yet known of Mr. Pitt's audience of yesterday, which common report says was to produce immediate consequences. The King was to go this day to see Cashiobury, and was very peevish yesterday with some of his family who tried to dissuade him."

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, June 28. Charles Street.—"I have no news to tell you except that Lord Stafford met Pitt in the park the day before yesterday, and Pitt told him he expected the Parliament to be up on the 10th of July. I still hear a bad report of the King's eyes, and I am assured that, two days ago, he spoke of his being sure that he had lost the sight of one. I have

a letter from the bishop at Brasenose, in the moment that he is packing up to set out for Bangor. He writes me word that they are told at Oxford that Sir W. Scott is immediately to be a peer. That will open a vacancy for Windham whose friends begin to stir, but the bishop is convinced that it will be quite hopeless for any who have given a decided vote for the Catholic question; and he thinks it will be either Dickenson or Heber. As he very kindly writes this in enquiry as to my views or wishes, I mean to write him word that I retain no personal views, taking for granted that my vote for the Catholic question is a complete bar to my pretensions; that I conclude him in that case to be interested for Heber's success, which—if Windham does not stand—I shall be glad to hear of as a circumstance gratifying to the Principal of Brasenose. My intention of coming to you on Saturday must be put off till Wednesday, as I must stay till then to see Tatham on Monday about the house, and to sign on Tuesday or Wednesday the agreement with Lord Stafford.

“Lord Buckingham goes to Stowe to-morrow to meet his wife; he will come up if anything arises.”

#### MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, June 29. Buckingham House.—“The same conversation was resumed yesterday between the same persons, and no variation in the opinions expressed that the thing was at an end; but the difficulties appeared to have increased in S[turges's] mind, though the resentment against Addington was more strongly stated. Upon the whole it appeared that he was less sanguine in hope, though equally strong in the expressions of the state of things and of his wishes. All this appeared difficult to account for, as my informant thought he was sure that there was no real variation in his friend's opinions, and did not see where the hitch had been from anything he could collect; but in a few minutes after Fox took him aside and told him that he had just got information from a quarter on which he could absolutely and entirely depend, that Mr. Pitt had gone into the King on Thursday with the intention of preparing his mind for discussions on the state of his Government, but that, after trying a few general observations, he had found his mind so much depressed by the state of his eyes, and by the heavy complaint which at times affects his bladder, that he had found it impossible to proceed, and turned the conversation to other matters. Fox had no doubt on this fact, and judges from it that Pitt has made up his mind to endeavour to rub on with Addington as well as he can. This seems perfectly of a piece with the tone held by S[turges], so that it is possible that Pitt may see in the King's state new motives of various sorts for endeavouring to go on with what all his friends—some of them even this morning—say is hopeless and disgraceful.

“My accounts yesterday to you of the King’s health are confirmed to me this morning. He is very low at times, but does not even yet know the extent of the mischief. On the contrary, he said yesterday that he should be ‘confined for four days by physic for his eyes, which are so much inflamed that he could not see out of them.’ I cannot imagine how they will propose the couching to him.

“I open my letter to say that a very intimate friend of Addington’s told me this day that Addington said to him yesterday that the Government was at an end, and that he should be sacrificed.”

#### MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, July 1. Buckingham House.—“The cataracts are beyond all doubt, one complete the other in progress. Phipps was at Windsor yesterday and was to open the idea of couching, for as yet the King imagines the complaint to be inflammation and removable by physic. It is doubtful how far he can bear this communication, and therefore, I doubt if it will be made. The operation however cannot yet take place, for they must prepare him by medicine, and the left eye is not yet ripe. The confinement *in darkness* cannot be less—as I hear—than a month; and, if so, I much doubt whether his mind or body will bear it. His family are very low on the subject. He has been bound up ever since Wednesday, and was at Cashibury in that state, sometimes speaking gloomily but in general cheerful. Phipps is confident that he can remove the cataracts, but I find that the operation on old subjects is thought hazardous. This state of things evidently increases the ideas of change, but the Post Office is welcome to my opinion that it will give Pitt and Addington the means of sacrificing their resentments *sur l’autel de la patrie*. We shall however judge better of this matter when it is known whether Foster resigns or not. His Bills for taking all revenue patronage from the Lord Lieutenant, after lying upon our table for three weeks, were thrown out upon the motion of Lord Hawkesbury on Friday; and on Saturday *Foster resigned* and told it right hand and left. Yesterday he was to see Pitt, and as I know that an Irishman takes a great deal of time to resign, I wait for his ulterior resignation of which as yet I know nothing.

“News is just arrived of the French fleet by the *Triton* merchant ship, arrived at Liverpool the 29th with despatches from General Prevost, announcing that the French fleet arrived at Martinique May 15, consisting of 16 sail (the whole number that sailed being 12 French and 4 Spaniards) and a crowd of smaller ships. They sent two sail to attack Diamond Rock on the same day, who were beat off, and Captain Maurice sent a boat to St. Lucia to apprise the governor of Antigua, whom he imagined most threatened; but the idea was that they

were bound for St. Domingo, not for Jamaica. Admiral Dacres at Jamaica had detained six of Cochrane's ships, which he added to his own three ; and Cochrane, though Commander in Chief of the Leeward Islands, has given himself leave and is coming home angry. Lord Nelson sailed, as you remember, from Cadiz Bay on the 14th of May with ten ships, namely 1 of 100, 3 of 84, and 6 of 74 guns. Upon the whole I am glad to find this fleet in the West Indies, and not going further, where they might be much more troublesome. I have letters from Ushant of June 26. All well and no news but that nothing is moving in Brest, and that Sir C. Cotton, the second in command, has written in the strongest terms to complain of Nugent's appointment, who is senior to him."

#### MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, July 5. Buckingham House.—“The report of both Houses last night was, that Addington had resigned to the King as a measure of hostility to Mr. Pitt, and though I thought I saw signs of various sorts that inclined me to think that it was so, yet I did not give credit to it till six o'clock. The person—Lord Temple—whom I quoted to you, as having had the very interesting conversations in the House of Commons with the man in office, Sturges, who crossed the House to sit by him; told me that not that man in office, Sturges, but another, Ward, equally confidential, had told him, ‘all is over with us; the Doctor has resigned this morning and Pitt must now make up his mind to resign, or to form the broad-bottomed government.’ He added that Addington had attended the King’s council *pro forma*, but that he and Lord Buckinghamshire did not attend the Cabinet which was held afterwards at Lord Mulgrave’s office. This was soon afterwards confirmed to me by Charles Williams, to whom the same man in office, Ward, told the same thing. The absence of Lord Sidmouth and Lord Buckinghamshire from the House gave me a pretence to ask one of the Cabinet—Lord Westmoreland—whether they were in town; and afterwards to challenge him with this rumour; which he did not controvert; though he spoke much of his wishes for a broad government; and from his tone and manner, as well as from that of all his colleagues, I have no doubt but that the fact is true. I likewise know that one of the King’s sons—Duke of Sussex—likely to be the best informed, said yesterday that it was known at Windsor that Addington had resigned to the King, and that ‘great changes would immediately take place.’

“I wrote this early this morning, and I now find that this is all over London as a fact of which there is no doubt. I shall of course keep this letter open.

12 o'clock. “Lord Buckinghamshire has been with me this moment, and has shown me his official resignation, telling

me that Addington and he notified this step yesterday to the King. Addington had informed Pitt of his intention, and had desired him to let him know what day would be most convenient for this communication, and he requested him to inform the King of the intention that it might not agitate him too much. Pitt sent to him on Monday, and fixed yesterday. Addington said the King's manner was firm and temperate, but very kind to him. All which Lord Buckinghamshire says was assumed, for that he is very hostile to them. Vansittart has resigned; and they are trying to patch up with Foster, but hitherto have failed. *He* clearly thinks that Pitt will patch up the government without applying to us, and thinks the whole of his mind is directed by Lord Harrowby, who is—as he thinks—to be Chancellor of the Duchy, and Lord Camden President; Mr. Yorke Secretary for War. His opinion is, that the King is so weak in mind, and so obstinate, that he will support Pitt in any mad attempt to go on, but he conceives this to be impracticable. The Prince of Wales has sent for me; I must therefore break off and shall send this by my groom, keeping it open for news.

6 o'clock. "I have seen the Prince, who,—as usual without any distinct object—has desired me to write to you to come up to town on Monday to meet Fox, evidently with the intention of mixing himself in any discussions that might take place. I told him that I had every reason to think that Pitt would endeavour to patch up these vacancies with Lord Harrowby and perhaps Mr. Yorke, as a peace offering to Lord Hardwicke on the dispute with Mr. Foster; and that, as I thought so highly of the very wise and dignified line which he had taken in not appearing to obtrude himself on the King in his present infirm state, I would submit to his better judgment, whether it might not be wiser that those who were known to be so much devoted to his service as Lord Grenville and Mr. Fox, should communicate with each other in the country, and should remain there, unless any communication was made to them by Government; in which case they would of course take the earliest moment of receiving His Royal Highness's commands. He then proposed that he would go down and take a bed at Dropmore and appoint Fox there. This brought me with a bow to the ground to acknowledge the high honour intended to you; but to submit whether if it were true—as I firmly believe it was—that Pitt would try to patch his government, such a meeting, which could not be secret, might not interfere with the line he had taken, particularly when there could be no distinct question on our line of conduct, or upon any specific proposition. And therefore I again suggested, and promised for you, that my brother Tom and you should drive over to-morrow to St. Anne's Hill, and should converse with Fox on the present state of things, with a view of informing him whether any good purpose was to be answered by your coming to town on Monday; which I promised for you and

for Mr. Fox that you would both do, if you saw any such good purpose. Be so good therefore as to redeem my pledge by seeing Fox, and writing to me an ostensible letter, when you return from St. Anne's.

"The Prince told me that Addington has desired Sheridan last night to tell him of his resignation; and took great pains to vindicate Sheridan and himself from having spoke to him for the three last months. He spoke with great acrimony on Addington's conduct in having deferred to this period of the King's situation, 'this mortal and diabolical stab to Mr. Pitt, in revenge for the blows which he had received.'

"Sheridan's account of Lord Sidmouth's exposition to him agrees with Lord Buckinghamshire's to me, namely that three points were made by him when he joined Pitt.

1. Free liberty to vote against the Spanish war, if he should so please!!!
2. Free liberty in the case of Lord Melville.
3. Protection and favour to the Board for naval enquiry.

"On number 1 Lord Sidmouth did more than he engaged for; and on numbers 2 and 3 Mr. Pitt has broken faith; but the great and specific grievance as stated both to Sheridan and to me is the breach of faith respecting offices for Addington's friends. The explanation was forced forward by Pitt on Saturday; and on that day Addington notified to Pitt his intention to resign; but desired Pitt to open it to the King, least it should agitate his mind, and to name to him the day on which he might see the King for the purpose of resigning. Pitt saw the King on Sunday, and on Monday desired Addington to attend council on Thursday and to resign after council. It is therefore clear that Pitt must already have made up his mind to his arrangements; for—as Lord Buckinghamshire observed—he might have protracted this for a few days, if he had pleased.

"I have understood from others as well as from the Prince that the King's eyes are in a more precarious state than are imagined. Phipps told my informant—and he told the Prince the same—that all operation was out of the question till late in the autumn, and that he had great doubts when that time [came] whether it would be advisable. His habits are entirely broken in upon, and his daughters think very ill of him.

"I have just seen my son, who says that the language of Ward, whom he has just seen, is, 'that a proposition will be made, but that he feared our terms would be too high, and that Pitt would then stand his own ground'; but his language and that of Sturges was great triumph that they had got rid of Addington. This you see agrees with my idea that Pitt will patch the business. And yet, after all, how is it possible that he should go on under such circumstances.

"I saw Lord Carlisle in the House of Lords, and told him of the Prince's wish, that Fox and you should come up; and

of my ideas on that point in all which he cordially joins, and authorises me to state that opinion to you. But you must remember to send me a proper confidential letter for his Royal Highness's perusal.

"You will see that I had intended to send you this letter by the post, and therefore concealed the names in the beginning of Lord Temple, and of his friend Mr. Ward, and I have been so broken in upon that I have written very disjointedly, and fear that you can hardly make out all that I have collected. The idea in the streets is that the whole machine has fallen to pieces, and that the game is in our hands, which I do not believe."

J. T. TROY, R.C. Archbishop of Dublin, to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, July 5. Dublin.—"Permit me to assure you of the singular satisfaction indeed which I enjoy in having been charged by my brethren with the very honourable commission of forwarding their enclosed letter to your lordship.

"However disproportioned their language is to an adequate expression of their grateful feelings, your lordship may rest satisfied it is sincere, untingered with adulation.

"I shall therefore only add their wish that the sentiments and statements it conveys may be rendered as public as the subject and circumstances seem to demand, in such manner as your lordship shall judge expedient. They have likewise addressed a letter to Mr. Fox, which I forward to him by this mail.

"My satisfaction in executing this commission is increased by the opportunity it presents to me of declaring my high esteem and great respect."

[*Enclosure.*]

1805, July 5. Dublin.—"We, the undersigned Archbishops and Bishops of the Roman Catholic Church of Ireland, beg leave to convey to your lordship our testimony of sincere and respectful gratitude for the powerful support which the recent discussion in Parliament of the Catholic petition has derived from your lordship's name and distinguished abilities. We acknowledge and shall ever hold in memory the generous promptitude with which you undertook the cause of the petitioners; and the force of argument with which you maintained that great national measure. Though we are sensible that justice, expediency, and policy were on this occasion the paramount objects of your lordship, we trust nevertheless, that you will kindly receive this particular acknowledgment from persons whose principles and conduct you have so zealously vindicated. To the noble Lords who have co-operated with your lordship is also due the tribute of our most fervent gratitude. We are deeply impressed with a sense of the liberality which actuated so many of the noble

and some of the right reverend speakers, in their late splendid efforts to promote our interests. The principles contained in the Catholic petition we avow as our principles, agreeably to those reiterated and solemn oaths whereby we have bound ourselves to our sovereign and our country. But if, notwithstanding such pledges, we be still charged with tenets immoral or anti-social in consequence of canons and decretals misunderstood, or of divines and schoolmen delivering their own particular opinions, our answer is, that we have long since abjured all such tenets, maxims, and sentiments.

“However we may wish for the speedy accomplishment of the measure petitioned for, yet we never did, nor do intend to disturb the security of the established Church. We ambition not its preeminence, nor repine at our own situation, neither do we seek to exalt our Church by means of wealth or power. The titles, precedence, and privileges of the established clergy, conferred by the laws of the land, we freely acknowledge in our daily intercourse with them, nor have we ever refused to them their rights and distinctions. The jurisdiction we exercise over our respective congregations is merely spiritual, and this, in its extent and nature, we conceive to be in perfect analogy with that necessarily exercised in every other religious society, when any member is segregated for his disorderly life or obstinate criminality, but we do not assume or pretend to enforce such sentence of removal otherwise than by spiritual coercion.

“The principles of our holy religion as taught and practised by us are not only compatible with the most faithful allegiance to our gracious sovereign, but are also among the most powerful incentives to the conscientious discharge of that sacred duty. It will, moreover, be found that the best instructed Catholics are the most loyal of subjects, and the most virtuous in the community. These, our principles and practice, have long been submitted to the severest scrutiny.

“We earnestly solicit a full enquiry into our past conduct, in order to an exculpation from the charges which are said to have been lately preferred against us; charges heretofore unheard of in Ireland, and of which we are confident our country will acquit us, for *we know* them to be groundless.

“And surely now we may presume to express our confident hope, founded upon the known wisdom of the legislature, that no imputations contrary to these our solemn disavowals will be admitted against the Roman Catholic hierarchy of Ireland, the spiritual teachers and comforters of so large a portion of his Majesty’s European subjects, without full investigation and substantial proofs.

“We may doubtless be permitted to hope that such imputations so unsupported, so contrary to fact, will not be allowed to prejudice us, or the laity of our communion; or to postpone the long-wished-for enjoyment of the entire benefit of the British laws and constitution.”

## MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, July 8. Buckingham House.—“No news except that all Pitt’s friends hold the same language that his immediate dependants held a few days since, and it is the general opinion that he will make propositions on Wednesday or Thursday, but there does not appear any general confidence that they will succeed. The King stays at Windsor till Monday—as it is said—at Mr. Pitt’s desire. He is very tranquil, and his immediate dependants have not been able to form their guess whether he disapproves the *Doctor’s* conduct. In fact, no one—and I quote one of his Majesty’s first confidential favourites—has heard him open his lips on that subject. At times he is very low and desponds, and you may be sure that his remaining eye gets worse every hour. It is now clear that Mr. Pitt was apprized of Addington’s intention more than ten days before it took place, and is not yet prepared to announce the successors to the offices. The conclusion is obvious and is in everybody’s mouth.

“The letter you sent me was perfectly satisfactory, and the person to whom I sent it, meaning to return the original, gave me the copy of it by a mistake, of which I took no notice.

“I have now to state to you that I saw the Prince of Wales on Sunday, His Royal Highness having sent to me to fix his day for Stowe, and he has fixed ‘soon after his birthday,’ having proposed to me to defer it to the first week in September. I have, however, prevailed upon him to throw it back as far as he can for your sake as well as my own, and he will fix it about the 16th. He has ordered me to invite all my own family to meet him, as he means to bring no one but the Duke of Clarence. Personally, I am sorry that this will break in upon your Cornish journey, but I should hope that we might go down together as soon as this visitation was over, which will last three days, during which Lady Grenville and you will see the repetition of your illuminations.”

## MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, July 9. Buckingham House.—“I have now before me a letter from Lord Nelson dated Antigua, June 12th. He arrived at Barbados, June 3rd, and by false information from St. Lucia was lead to embark 2,000 troops for Tobago and Trinidad, during which time the French fleet slipped out of Port Royal, and he has missed them. A French corvette dogged him for two days off Madeira, and gave them notice of his arrival. They left Martinique on the 6th, were off Guadelupe on the 8th, and passed to leeward of Antigua on the same day, standing to the westward. They are, therefore—as he imagines—pushing for Europe, and he is returning as soon as he is sure of their course to the streights’ mouth. Admiral Gravina commands them.

“All this is most unlucky, but he has saved the islands, and above 250 sail of loaded ships. I hear no other news and am full of my Isle of Man. Lord Harrowby quoted you and your House of Commons speech approving this compensation, and drew from me a declaration that all you was pledged to was to an enquiry upon the case then alleged; but that, so far from approving this new Bill, you had never seen it; and that you most certainly never ought to be stated as approving the Bill or admitting that the Duke of Athol had established the case which he put forward. And after taking notice that this quotation of your speech was personally addressed to me, and stated by his lordship to be ‘the opinion of one equally near to Mr. G[renville] with myself,’ it became necessary for me to observe that ‘it ill became anyone to infer opinions of one perfectly able to state his own ideas if he had thought fit to have been present, and that such a quotation, considering the person to whom it was addressed, and on what subject, *would have been much better spared.*’ He came to me afterwards to apologise, but I was very much out of humour.

“No news of Lord Sidmouth’s successor, but the same language is held.”

#### MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, July 11. Buckingham House.—“I went into the House yesterday, half dead with fatigue of Tuesday night’s debate, which fell wholly upon me, and lasted till four o’clock, and too late to write to you the detail of the new arrangements, namely, Lord Camden, President, Lord Harrowby, Lancaster, Lord Castlereagh, Secretary of State and Board of Control. The comment by Pitt’s friends on all this is that it is a preliminary for negotiation, inasmuch as he must show that he is capable of going on without the Opposition if they are unreasonable in their treatment of the offer which is to be made, and that the retreat of the Board of Control for Lord Castlereagh marks this disposition. But all this is to my conviction nonsense; for I am satisfied that nothing of that sort is really meant, though I doubt not but that some offer will be made as matter of form. You will observe that all the Ministers and papers announce that Lord Grenville had an audience of his Majesty for an hour and a half before Lord Camden was named; and you will observe what they do not state, namely, that Lord Sidmouth saw the King for an hour and a half at Windsor on Sunday, which you will believe, for it is most true; and it is equally true that the King was most extremely hurried and agitated in mind yesterday evening after seeing Mr. Pitt. This last fact I know.

“I finish this from the House of Lords, where I learn that Talleyrand is certainly dead, and that Starembergh expects an immediate attack from Bonaparte on Vienna.

“The Prince of Wales has ordered me to attend him to-morrow at two; he is gone to Windsor. When I return from him I will write you. I am very unwell and quite exhausted.

“The language of the Ministerialists is that an offer will be made to-morrow or next day to you and Mr. Fox. I do not believe it.”

MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, July 12. Buckingham House.—“I have for your accommodation prevailed on the Prince to fix his visit finally and decisively to the 15th of August, so that I hope this will not altogether be as inconvenient to your Cornish arrangements as it might have been. I will write to Lord Spencer, and have already spoken to Windham and Elliott, and will think of others.

“You have received my letter announcing the *nova progenies*, and you know likewise by the same letter that you are bound to consider this step as a preliminary to a negotiation with Fox and you. At least this is the text on which every one connected with Government talk to everybody who will hear them. Charles Williams came to me last night to tell me that my son’s informant had come to him to say that ‘he hoped Opposition understood this arrangement in its true light, namely, as a measure necessary to enable Mr. Pitt to treat with Lord Grenville and Fox, which could not be until he had filled the vacancies made by Addington’s resignation.’ The answer was obvious and only expressed a wish that the difficulties might not be rendered more difficult. And the reply was ‘Good God! how can that be when every one must see that these arrangements cannot be permanent, and are only intended to keep these and all other arrangements of office open for discussion.’ This led to a great deal more of the same, when the same expressions which were so distinctly used to my son were again repeated. Elliott and Windham have just left me, having heard, as I had, from various quarters that propositions are immediately to be made to you for Fox and yourself, and they believe it. But believe with me that it is all hollow, and that the whole will be a trial of carte and tierce for public opinion.

“The King most certainly on Sunday used every exertion with Addington to make him stay, and Monday and Tuesday passed in negotiation between Pitt and him, through the Duke of Cumberland—as is said—at the King’s request. The Duke breakfasted with Addington on Tuesday, then went to Pitt, returned with Lord Camden to the Doctor, and again returned to Pitt; but on Wednesday I was told, and by the surest authority, that the quarrel had been finally stated by Addington to Pitt as ‘irreconcilable and for life’; and this phrase he again used to various persons yesterday.

“Pitt saw the King on Wednesday, and his Majesty was very much agitated, even to strong symptoms of disturbed mind on that evening; which clearly proves that Pitt on that day opened ideas unpleasant to him; and it is not impossible to guess them.

“The tone in the Speech to-day is hostile, and I understand that immediate hostilities are expected from Bonaparte against Vienna. Russia has negatived the Duke of York, who has been proposed to command an allied army of English, Russians and Swedes; and has admitted that the King of Sweden shall command in person when present; on this fact you may depend.”

#### MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, July 15. Stowe.—“Your letter, which ought to have reached me on Friday in London, appears not to have had the Beaconsfield postmark till that day, and consequently reached London after I had left it on Saturday. And as if it was doomed that I should rest in ignorance of all the progress made by that letter and your answer, it was missent to *Stone*, and reached me this morning. I shall strictly obey your commands, and as you certainly have no present demand for your copies, I detain them that no other post may be wiser. I agree with you as fully on the awkwardness as you probably do with me on your estimate of the result of this step.

“The person whom I saw on Friday is, of course, most anxious to mix himself in all that is to be said or sung; and repeatedly bid me tell you how ready he was to come to you, or to St. Anne’s Hill at a moment’s notice, so soon as any real move was made; all which I promised and vowed in your name would be done *in limine*. I found that he—like everybody else—has some exclusion to suggest; all which I took care to combat as departing from the general principle, though I admitted his reasons. In truth—as you know—my opinions on some of his exclusions agree with his, if I did not see the necessity of adhering to one principle on this subject.

“I have very little idea that your Cornish journey will be finally deferred, though I have some doubt whether your science in *carte* and *tierce* will enable you to say when this trial of skill shall end, if does not end *in limine*, which I think not impossible. I know that the King does not state all his objections latterly as strongly as he did, which makes me think that he does not absolutely put the whole aside. It is remarked that he does not speak hostilely of Addington since his last interview.”

#### LORD GRENVILLE to ARCHBISHOP J. T. TROY.

1805, July 16. Dropmore.—“I have had the honour to receive your letter, with one from the respectable persons who exercise episcopal functions among the Roman Catholics of

Ireland, expressing to me in very flattering terms their acknowledgments for the part which I took in the late discussion of the Catholic Petition. My sentiments on the subject have been long known. I thought it one of the greatest advantages of the Union that it would, without the smallest danger to the Establishment, afford the means of relieving a large class of the community from disqualifications still attaching upon them. Entertaining these opinions, I was gratified by an unexceptionable opportunity of declaring them in public. And although the endeavours of those with whom I had the satisfaction of concurring on this subject have not, for the present, been successful, yet the manner in which the question was for the most part discussed could not but be satisfactory, even to those who most regret the result. Much advantage was, I hope, derived from the opportunity of bringing before the public facts and circumstances very little known in this country; and few things can be more conducive to ultimate success than the avowal on the part of yourself and your brethren, of those sentiments of loyalty and attachment to the established government and laws of your country, which you have expressed in the letter now before me, and which, I am confident, you will always be desirous to manifest in every part of your conduct." *Copy.*

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, July 18. Worthing.—“I have been so constantly in motion since I last saw you that till my arrival here last night I have not had a moment to command. I now enclose to you your letter from Lord Camden, which, together with your answer, I communicated to Fox on Sunday. I found him still more strongly impressed than I had expected with the belief that Pitt had not any intention of moving with real effect towards the attempt at forming an extensive administration; and I found that this belief arose very principally from his having been informed by the illustrious Wednesday visitor of St. Anne's, that it was a positive fact known to him that Pitt had already for several days past, obtained from the highest quarter sufficient authority to endeavour to form an extended administration, without any exclusion. The mode in which this information was obtained was not, as I am told, specifically described to Fox, but Fox said that it had all the appearance of authenticity. He also added that this account tallied exactly with another description which had been given to him to the same effect, in a more subordinate but very well informed channel of intelligence. According to this latter account, the King had agreed to receive into the Cabinet, Fox, Grey, Lord Moira, Lord Spencer, Windham and yourself, but this was accompanied by a suggestion that Fox—taking me for his partner—might go to a general congress to settle the affairs of this country with the Continent; and, though no precise offices were named, he understood it to be

in contemplation that P[itt] was to retain the Treasury, with Lord Castlereagh and Lord Harrowby for the two Secretaries of State. Having found him much impressed with these reports, as I confess I do not believe them, I endeavoured to show him, without naming distinct names or authorities, how uniformly all P[itt's] friends, high and low, had concurred in representing this last step of filling up the offices as a mere temporary measure, which would not be allowed to create any new difficulty; and I asked him what advantage Lord Camden could mean to gain by referring to the King's journey to Weymouth, unless there was really an intention to pursue the object there. And I told him how very improbable it seemed to me that Pitt would have incurred all the risk and difficulties of obtaining sufficient authority, without the desire or intention of acting under it. After a good deal of such conversation, I think he admitted that it was probable that he had been misinformed, but he said it was impossible not to see that all these delays and circuitous steps did much increase the indisposition of several of his friends, though he would do all that could be done by him to smooth that road. He added, however, that he never could think of any negotiation for strengthening P[itt's] government, and knew not how to believe that P[itt] would ever negotiate upon the principle of his government being at an end. In this perhaps I do not much differ with him, but still it is right to keep everything in as practicable a state as possible; and therefore if Lord B[uckingham] is permitted to enable you to make direct communication to Fox of what was said to you, I hope you will send a letter to that effect to St. Anne's.

“Lord Moira had written to thank Fox for his account of what had passed. His letter, which I saw, rested entirely upon the necessity of forming a new Government, and not patching up an old one.”

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, July 23. Worthing.—“Lord Buckingham has just sent me 50*l.* for Mr. Kidd, and I have authorised Nares to draw on my account at Coutts's for the same sum, as a joint contribution from you and me, which I understood you to approve of, so that Mr. Nares will receive from the *Adelphi* 100*l.* for his Greek friend. If this meets with your approbation be so good as to direct Coutts' to place 25*l.* from your account to mine, and the whole thing is done.

“My brother speaks with some disappointment of Lord Spencer's having declined the visit to meet the Prince, at which, however, I am myself not very much surprised. He says he has written to Fox and the Duke of Bedford, and that if his beds hold out, he will write to Lord Stafford also; and he speaks in high spirits of his satisfaction with his preparations. Watkin is young enough to have determined to go to Brighton and Lewes Races, which I fear will more than counteract the

good effects of the regularities of Worthing, but at 32 years of age he must decide for himself, instead of letting his wary uncle decide for him. I am sorry for it, as I feel confident that with care he would be as well as ever, and that without it, all will be precarious.

“It is probable that I shall go to town for two days in five or six days time, and then shall go to Stowe, but whether by Dropmore or not will depend partly upon the room in your house, and partly upon what I hear of your own intentions.

“A line from Lord Carlisle tells me that P[itt] goes to Weymouth the first week of August, and that P[itt's] friends continue to speak confidently of the result.”

#### EARL TEMPLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, July 28. Avington.—“I have reason to think that *the enemy* is active both in the county and borough, and we *must* be on the alert. Could you help us by looking about, between this and the time when we shall meet at Stowe, for any persons in your neighbourhood who would buy freehold votes in Aylesbury to serve us. There are two ways of doing this which will suit different pockets. The first is the obvious the most expensive way of authorising us to lay out from 30*l.* to 100*l.* in the purchase of a cottage in Aylesbury; the other, which will answer better for *tenants* or *farmers* or tradespeople, is to authorise Chaplin to purchase forty shillings *per annum* of *land tax*, arising out of freehold property. This can be done to any extent, and quite secretly, for about 50*l.*, to be paid in four instalments within the year. Pray see whether you cannot bring from your neighbourhood a list of names for these purposes, as the fatal negligence which lost Aylesbury last time makes immediate though discreet activity necessary to insure our future object there and elsewhere. We have the means of managing both the above-mentioned methods to any extent if we had names, and the present state of uncertainty of *every sort* makes the existence of Parliament, of course, more doubtful, and therefore no time must be lost. P. Grenfell has bought votes for himself and two brothers.”

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, July 31. Charles Street.—“A letter from Calder to Cornwallis is just arrived at the Admiralty. It is dated the 23rd, and Calder says that on the preceding day he had with fifteen line of battle brought to action the combined fleet of twenty line of battle besides frigates, and that he had captured the *St. Raphael* 84, and the *Firm* 74, both Spanish, which he has sent to Plymouth with the *Windsor Castle* that had been crippled in the action. It took place in lat. 43, 30, long. 11, 17, which is near Ferrol, and Calder adds that he hopes to be able to force a renewal of the engagement. We have lost only 41 killed and 158 wounded. No news of Lord Nelson.

“Your foreign intelligence has nothing good in it, because I fear that Austria will be swallowed up in the first outset; and then I know not what hope remains upon the continent, and what I hear of domestic news is not promising of any practicable result. I hear from some good authority that P[itt] distinctly says that *rather than find a middle-man for the Treasury like the Duke of Portland he should think it better to resign*; and farther that he means to make a point in any negotiation of keeping Lord Castlereagh, War Secretary of State. These two opinions, which I can trace to very authentic sources, show such a very mistaken notion of the first principles on which a large comprehensive Government should and might be formed, that I am less sanguine than ever as to the result of a negotiation, though I think that some proposition will be made.

“I was in hopes to find you in town, as you talked of two days in this week for London; pray let them be soon, as you will find the Carysfort’s, Williams’s, and me for this week here. I am in great rage to be told by Hoppner to-day that the picture has not arrived, though I thought I left it on its road.

*Postscript.*—“I wish you could find it convenient to send the picture soon, as Hoppner goes out of town in ten days or a fortnight; and if he does not first give directions about it, I shall not be able to keep my promise to Malone.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, August 2. Charles Street.—“I do not find that there is any account arrived this morning from the fleet, and in truth I do not expect any further good news, as the conversation of all office people shows that no such expectations are entertained by them. There is something a little obscure in the account of the engagement, and, as far as I can collect, they are not well satisfied with what has passed, though I do not trace the exact ground of question about it. Cook tells Elliot that the greatest part of the Antigua convoy was taken by the combined fleet and burned by them. Fawkener, whom I saw yesterday, told me that Sir C. Cotterell was to go *about the 14th* to Weymouth, to hold a council for the further prorogation of Parliament, but he did not mention any of an earlier date. The first opinion which I quoted to you, I learned from Morpeth, who had it from Canning, so that its authenticity cannot be doubted. I am, therefore, now disposed to think that Pitt will probably obtain permission from the K[ing] to offer to *receive into the Cabinet* the persons whom I had before named to you, and that Pitt will rest entirely upon his having overcome the difficulty of the exclusion of Fox, and will trust that in having so done he will have done all that is necessary to satisfy the public mind on his part, and to put our friends in the wrong in the case of the failure of the negotiation, after such a concession made by the King, and by

himself. Perhaps such a confidence might be well grounded, for, if the public be as anxious as I believe them to be for a large Government, they will be disposed enough to blame those who, upon the general view of the subject, seem foremost to make the greatest objections and difficulties to such a union. War being so decidedly the order of the day, will, however, still more increase Fox's reluctance at this particular moment, or will at least increase that of his friends. Elliot thinks Lord Castlereagh pretty sure of his election.

"My brother was so vexed at Lord Spencer's absence, that I have set to work, and have prevailed upon him and upon Lord Althorp to join our celebrity.

"I enclose you a Windsor buck, and will not leave town before Monday, so that I shall depend upon seeing you."

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, August 30. Stowe.—"I am just stepping into my carriage to join Lord Carysfort in our progress to Wynnstay, which has hitherto been delayed by the military cares of the Northamptonshire major of yeomanry. Whether from Wynnstay I shall have courage enough to undertake the Cornish journey as late in the year as the 20th of September, and whether you yourself will make any long stay there while the Dropmore walls are still building, are two questions of doubt, the latter of which you will probably now be able to resolve.

"My brother is well, and is now left entirely alone. We have heard nothing of Kings, Princes or Ministers since you left us, and I suppose by your silence that your visits upon your road have not supplied you with anything worthy of communication; reports have been whispered of more malady than mere rheumatism at Weymouth, but we know nothing here beyond the London report in the streets upon the subject.

"Our naval accounts in the channel are pretty much what you would expect. Cornwallis, in answer to Douglas's offer of coming aboard of him to receive his orders when he joined the fleet, sent him word that he had never asked for him, did not know how he came there, and had nothing to say to him.

"Nugent is in disgrace with Cornwallis, and is either sent or to be sent home again. This is all very lamentable. I know no other news, except that Lord Melville and Trotter are just arrived at Edinburgh in the same post-chaise; and that William Dundas is announced as manager of Scotland, where the elections, in case of dissolution, are stated to me to be less promising to Government."

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, September 14. Wynnstay.—"I received yesterday your letter from Boconnoc, together with the copy of your answer to Lord M[into], which I will return to you when we meet.

The opinion which you expressed in it was certainly the safest, because in such cases the decision is, nine times out of ten, already taken in the affirmative before any advice is desired upon it; and it is agreed that the only prudent answer to a doubt stated about taking a wife is to wish the man joy of his marriage. Under this impression therefore, and with the natural delicacy which you must have felt of interposing a negative in which you might seem to have a political interest of your own, I do not wonder that you did not choose to put yourself upon this occasion between the cup and the lip; but I will fairly own that your statement of the arguments *pro* and *con*, would have left me, upon your own showing, no doubt as to the necessity of adopting that negative, which, I am glad to see, had in this instance fairly and honourably been given, in anticipation of your answer. I will not certainly undertake to say that there is no possible case in which such a service might not be required to supersede the objections arising from the difference of political parties and opinions; but I must fairly confess that, in the present instance, there did not appear to me to be the shadow of a pretence for making that claim on the one side, or for acquiescing in it on the other. The suggestion of such a service being professional, and therefore independent of political opinions, I consider only as a shabby apology provided by those who made the offer for anybody who could be found to be shabby enough to adopt and to act under it. But say you, here is a great national concern pending at Petersburg, and the ministers have nobody belonging to them that is fit to be sent there. Granted; and that this weak ministry is so constituted, is of the very essence of the opposition which you and I, and Lord M[into] with us, have therefore made both to the formation and to the existence of such a ministry. And the solidity of this objection of ours is almost acknowledged by the Ministers themselves, as well as by their followers, and by the public, in the general wish that has been expressed for a union of all parties; but instead of openly and honestly pursuing this great object, it is plain that the ministers are now only endeavouring to detach and to separate their opponents, without any idea of looking after a more manly and comprehensive system. And can it be endured that, for this paltry purpose, their own insufficiency should give them a claim to try to bolster themselves up with the assistance of the separate talents of any of those whose general weight and authority they are apparently labouring to exclude from the public service. They have nobody fit to send to Petersburg, and therefore Lord M[into], say they, should go to do that public service. They have nobody fit, that I know of, to hold the foreign seals in this moment when so much depends upon our negotiation with the different powers of Europe, but does it follow from their insufficiency (which ought at this moment to be fatal to their administration) that you or Fox are bound to

answer any claims from them for your separate and individual assistance? Or would Lord Spencer, upon a similar plea, be held to the call of the old gentleman at the Admiralty? The littleness of all these petty shabby devices is really quite of a piece with the persons by whom, both in body and mind, Pitt is at present surrounded; and though it seems to make the general picture of our affairs more frightful, it serves likewise to show beyond a doubt that a determination is taken to persevere to the last in a continuance of the present wretched system. I had a short line from Fox two days ago to ask for some Scotch assistance to make the P[rince's] chaplain Moncrieff, Procurator of the Church of Scotland; and he tells me that the last communication from Austria hither is to promote a renewal of negotiation, and that we have sent, or that we are to send, a favourable answer; but he has not heard what is likely to be the answer to a similar application to Petersburg and Berlin. All this looks to me like a greater desire at Vienna to avoid hostilities than our English newspapers would admit; and inclines one to suspect that Austria is less confident in her own strength and preparations than she ought to be when she begins a war which is to decide perhaps upon the existence of her empire. Our coffee-house politicians will rejoice to see the Boulogne army menacing Vienna instead of London, but, if the activity of the French should give them soon another treaty of Leoben, I do not know that London or Europe will have much profited by the event."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, September 20. Wynnstay.—“I take my chance of this letter finding you either at Boconnoc or in your road from thence, to tell you that, by what I hear this morning from Fox, I see he is persuaded that Pitt's journey to Weymouth on Sunday last is to produce some proposition or other. Of what nature it will be he has no knowledge, but he expects it to be such as will appear to everybody to be of a nature entirely inadmissible upon the face of it; and even if it be such as to require discussion, he appears more impressed than I have yet seen him with the belief that the preliminary difficulties, as well as those of the arrangement of Pitt's personal situation, will be found insuperable; and he talks of putting upon paper some of his opinions upon this interesting subject, which he will communicate to you if he finds in himself activity enough to put pen to paper. Perhaps I am not less sensible than my correspondent is to the difficulties of giving any real good effect *now* to a proposition such as, in the most favourable sense, can *now* be expected; and all the circumstances which have necessarily attended the delay and reluctance that Pitt has shown towards the making any proposition, have obviously so much increased the original difficulties, that I had persuaded myself that Pitt had entirely abandoned

any ideas which he might have entertained of pursuing the great object of general union. Still, however, it seems to me that, notwithstanding the justice of the reproaches to which Pitt has subjected himself by having hitherto disappointed the country of what was perhaps the only practicable mode and moment for a general union, we and our friends are, and must be, somewhat differently placed from the old Opposition for the discussion of that question, under whatever circumstances it shall come to be discussed ; and though our conclusion should be found to be the same with theirs, we should probably not have to arrive at it through the same course of arguments and opinions. Difficulties enough there always were, even at the most favourable moment, but, what alone would be a difficulty insuperable, is the additional disinclination and distrust which Pitt's conduct has created in the old Opposition since the question of union has been before the public. And if he has so conducted himself as to destroy all confidence in his sincerity, it will be hopeless to look for such a union as could be maintained upon no other grounds than those of mutual and unreserved confidence. I still, therefore, am inclined to believe that Pitt may mean to make a proposition of union, grounded on the present state of foreign politics, in the hope that a preliminary discussion of that question, though it may not unite the three parties, may tend to divide the two parties of which the present Opposition is composed. If this be his object he certainly has not my good wishes for his success in it ; but if he is *bona fide* endeavouring even now to bring about a real good understanding, founded upon the public dangers and necessities of the times, I must fairly say that, though I think he has taken the most unfavourable time and means to obtain it, and though I doubt whether it can now be productive of all the good that might have been supplied by it, still I should not be discouraged from manifesting the best and fairest endeavours to assist and promote it ; and this is one of the instances in which the opinions of some of our friends will naturally differ from those of the old Opposition, as I suspect that few, if any, of that party retain the inclination which they have had to the accomplishment of this object. It is probable that if any proposition is, as Fox believes it, the motive of Pitt's journey to Weymouth, you will soon be to hear of it ; and my chief purpose in writing now is to prepare you for the receipt of some overture or other which my correspondent is persuaded will be made either to you or to himself. Of foreign news he adds nothing, except that, according to his information, Bonaparte will instantly attack Austria ; and he thinks there has been much indiscretion on the part of our ministers in their having announced the intention of Austrian confederacy by their speeches and their newspapers, before the Austrians were ready to strike their blow. In the meantime I know not what course our British expeditions are to take. I am told by very good authority that there is at this moment

no precise object whatever in view ; and that the extensive orders for foreign service are merely given in proof to our allies of our general intentions of military co-operation, but that there is no expedition actually in view. It is possible that this may be said to deceive, but I am sure that this has very recently been confidentially said by those who must know what is intended, and who describe this general bustle of regiments, generals, orders for victualling and ordnance, as being only calculated to keep up the spirits of this country, and to raise the expectations of our allies and the alarms of our enemies upon the Continent. If this be so, it is most miserable work indeed. Long is Irish Secretary, Foster is to remain, and if Long cannot make peace between him and Lord Hardwick, the Lord-Lieutenant is to go to the wall."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, September 26. Llangedwin.—“I have this moment received your letter of the 19th, and, as I wrote to you from Wynnstay two days ago, I should not in the common course of things have pursued you with so quick a succession, but the times are interesting enough to give more than usual importance to the intelligence of the day. I know from more than one channel of good intelligence, that two or three days before Pitt went to Weymouth, one of his most confidential friends said and wrote that Pitt was extremely anxious to give effect to the great end that he had in view, that the alarm of invasion had hitherto prevented him from going to Weymouth to obtain leave to make some overture ; that things were, however, now *just drawing to a crisis* in which this country must take a decided line, and that *after* that line had been taken, he should be better enabled to judge what proposal he could best make. It seems to me, by a comparison of dates, that this language was studiously held by his friends at the moment at which Fox conceived that he knew Pitt went to Weymouth to arrange his proposal ; and my correspondent, in giving me the information which I now quote to you, considers it as mere artificial language, which is not likely to be followed by any real effects ; so that, if I did not rest entirely upon Fox's letter, I should be taught to think that there would not be more of a proposal after the Weymouth journey, than there was before it. And when I find from you so much reason to believe the notion of dissolution, I am more than half-inclined to think that this strange measure may be after all the only real object of the Weymouth journey. The one way which is left to reconcile the different account given me by Fox and by my other correspondent, is to suppose that there is question of dissolution, which is the first object of the Weymouth journey ; and that some overture to Opposition is to accompany that measure. But then every part of that combined scheme would become so

incomprehensible, that it is desperate to pursue such a speculation, and I must be content to let time unravel a clue which I do not know how to follow. In the meantime I have answered Fox's letter by telling him that I agree with him in thinking it probable that the proposal which he expects may be so made as to appear to be inadmissible in the first instance, and therefore incapable of further discussion; but I have said that if Pitt should make a proposition which, fairly speaking, ought to lead to farther discussions, my opinion is that, in that case, Pitt will be found ready to make greater concessions in order to overcome the obvious preliminary difficulties, including, too, that of his own situation; and that, upon the whole, much more will be done by Pitt to forward the general object—if he once makes a proposal that it is possible to discuss—than Fox appears to believe or to expect. And this is certainly the opinion which I have formed, and which I have thought it useful to state; although I do not deny that I incline to think the proposal which is to be made will be a mere inadmissible offer of accepting an accession to the present Government, instead of an offer to agree in the composition of a new one.

“I am rather sorry that you have encouraged Proby to make any offer of his military-diplomatic services. If Lord Mulgrave should have invited him to any such mission, and should have stated it to be a mere professional service, perhaps the case of an officer who is merely to arrange the military details of a military engagement already taken, might be fairly enough deemed so far professional as not to interfere with his own political character or connections; but an application to be so employed is and must be looked upon as having in it more of solicitation than either Lord Carysfort or Lord Proby can mean to acknowledge or to pursue. And so I think it must strike you, if you ask yourself how you, in Lord Mulgrave's situation, should have interpreted such an offer from General Phipps, or from any younger branch of that family, in the military line. Perhaps, however, I am more rigid than I should be upon these matters, but I say to you naturally what occurs to me upon them. It is in the same spirit, too, that I should a little hesitate to adopt your creed about supporting what is done, without previously satisfying one's-self that what is done was right to do. What has been done wrong may render the correction difficult, but in proportion as it does so, its original character of wrong would increase one's indisposition to be controlled by its effects.”

#### MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, October 1. Stowe.—“Arthur Wellesley has passed two days with me, and has made me very happy by a most confidential and unreserved statement of his view and opinions of his brother's line of political conduct. I cannot, of course, say more by letter on that subject, but I cannot avoid giving

you this intimation of what he conceives will hardly be paused upon for many minutes. In short, I am made very happy, chiefly because I know how essentially all this will contribute to your public and private comfort.

“I conclude that my prayers have been heard by the Jupiter of our political heaven, and that no proposition will be made, which, on every account, now seems the one thing best for us. Addington is still in a very critical state of health. His medical men think very ill of him, and his son’s *insanity* presses severely on his mind, but still I understand that his anger will induce him to every the most unqualified exertions against Government.

“The King is certainly lowered in mind, body, and eyes. I do not mean by this that he is in a state of imbecillity, but he is very inactive, not easily roused to exertion, and his eyes quite hopeless to any purpose save that of distinguishing light, but he never will be able to read a line.

“The Duke of York attends very much to him, and stated this attendance very lately as a necessary bar to any possibility of his assuming any Continental command. But, in truth, this was unnecessary, for, after sending away the Scotch brigade of three regiments, embarking now for Malta, and two more for the West Indies, who go with Coote from Ireland, I do not see how they can spare more. Baird is now avowedly going—as I expected—to the Cape.

“The continental war waits, as I hear from good authority, for the arrival of the second Russian army on the 12th September, but I confess I shall not believe it till I see Bonaparte strike. The French accounts speak of domestic agitation and *arrestations*.”

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, October 4. Trentham.—“I found on my arrival here last night your two letters of the 29th September and 1st October. You will already have perceived that nothing short of the authority which Fox seemed to write from would have induced me to expect any proposition for union after the many instances which had appeared to show on the part of Pitt so much reluctance towards the discussion of that measure. Your enclosure, however, has set at rest all farther speculations of this sort, and we must—however reluctantly—confess to ourselves that there is no longer any chance of obtaining for the country the one object which would have made it the most strong to meet the tremendous crisis which is now at hand. I acknowledge that I give up the pursuit of this object with reluctance and regret; and although I certainly never have been blind to the infinite difficulties which hung upon all the discussions connected with it, I have never ceased to hope that, if it once was fairly and honestly put in train on both sides, the general benefit

and advantage of the measure would have carried it through, and would have forced down the multitude of objections which grew all round it. That Pitt himself should have closed, in the manner which he now has closed it, the communication which had been so recently made by him of his own disposition and wishes for its success, and that the dry expression which is quoted in Bathurst's letter should appear to him to be the fit and proper conclusion of all that had been previously said to you by him and from him, is a topic upon which it can now neither be useful nor pleasant to dwell. It may be a matter of political curiosity to try to account in an intelligible manner for a course of conduct which no obvious reasoning can explain ; but it is enough for us and for our own measures to know the result, and to see that a union of the two great hostile political parties in this country is no longer a measure to be pursued, and is, to all appearance, no longer now desired or wished for by either. Released as we are by the knowledge of Pitt's decision upon this subject, I see however that you naturally feel scrupulous of betraying prematurely your knowledge of it. I am therefore glad to relieve you from this embarrassment in part, by telling you that the first thing which passed on my arrival here was that Lord Stafford put into my hand a letter from Long apologising for not calling here in his way to Ireland, and concluding with expressions of regret that they were not now to meet in politics as he had hoped they would. You see therefore that the abandonment of union is talked of without reserve, and described generally as such by a general reference to the language now held by Pitt's friends, without the breach of any confidential communication whatever.

"I return your enclosure as you had desired, and shall be very glad to talk at large with you upon all that remains to be talked of. I see your reluctance to engage in the course of the Opposition, and my own opinions are not such as would lead me to press upon yours ; but there are considerations affecting the possibility of future advantage from keeping our own friends together which are important enough to demand very serious reflection. I am here for a few days, and then shall come to you by way of Stowe, and of Althorp, if they are there."

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, October 7. Trentham.—"Since I last wrote to you to return your enclosure, I have heard that Lord Spencer is not at Althorp ; I shall therefore go from here direct to Stowe on Saturday or Sunday next, and after two or three days there, shall hope to be with you at Dropmore.

"Lord Spencer writes me word that Edmund Phipps being asked two days ago what news there was, answered 'Oh, the best in the world, for we have now got the King our fast

friend again, and we may now defy *them* all.' Silly as this is, it tells much when one recollects that it comes from one of the most familiar and most indiscreet inmates of Downing Street.

"Prettyman has been writing to the Bishop of Carlisle to say that government will go on upon its own ground, although it is to receive some great additional strength. No explanation is given of this obscure promise, which my friends here suppose to allude to Addington; and yet the shocking disaster of his son's insanity, and attempt upon his own life at Worthing, is too recent to suppose it possible that there can just now have been any discussions going on with him.

"Villiers is quoted to me for having said that when he went *this last winter* to announce his political opinions to Pitt, P[itt] asked him if he knew what he would have or what he could advise; that V[illiers] said his advice was for P[itt] to desire the King to enable him to negotiate with Fox, and with Lord Grenville; and that Pitt's first answer was, with respect to F[ox], 'Villiers are you gone quite mad;' and again, 'since when is it that you are so fond of the Grenvilles, you who knew when Lord G[renville] was with me before, the trouble I had to make him give up any opinion he had conceived. What do you think that I could do with him now?' Of these expressions I am so far assured that I am quite confident that Villiers repeated them; and I quote them now only to show how utterly impossible it has been ever to carry into effect what, upon public grounds alone, was so strongly the wish of you and of myself.

"Lord Harrowby drove over here yesterday. I collect by what he said that the ministers think Bonaparte is taken unawares by the activity of Austria. He seems to expect the Russians in Bavaria by the 20th instant, and mentions two different armies of them of 50,000 each. I just hinted my suspicion that the Elector of Bavaria might only be making a show of co-operation with Austria, till France could be ready to defend him against Austria; and I saw that he entertained the same suspicion, which he strengthened by observing that the Elector had promised to put all his troops under an Austrian general, which, however, he had hitherto evaded doing."

#### W. WINDHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, October 8. Pall Mall.—"At the moment at which I write, being just about to get into my chaise, I can say nothing about public affairs, if indeed I had anything particular to say. For domestic politics I think it is pretty clear now that we shall have for the present neither overture nor dissolution. Overture I think will not come at all, at least without some great change. But dissolution is still thought by many likely to happen, if any favourable event calculated to make much impression should take place.

“What chance there is of any event of that sort I hardly allow myself to conjecture. My fears outweigh my hopes. In the meanwhile, I cannot by any means reconcile my mind to that part of the Austrian declaration which disclaims all interference in the internal concerns of France, though I am afraid it is the part which will be the most popular. I can understand perfectly why they should have said nothing upon the subject. I might, myself, easily have been persuaded that such was the best course. But why they should cast away the hope of such means of interference, even in their own minds, and still less why they should publicly renounce such hope, I cannot at all see. In the meanwhile, I think I see great prejudice that may attend their so doing.

“Some have thought that this Declaration will not at all fetter their conduct should any favourable opportunities present themselves; but, if it does not, it will, I think, injure their reputation, in spite of any interpretation which would confine the meaning of it to their mere views in commencing the war, as distinguished from what they might do in the course of it.”

MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, October 27. Stowe.—“Two things have occurred to prevent my answering your letter which I received on Wednesday, namely my having been unwell at Wotton for two days, and my determination, which I must now break, of setting out for Dropmore to-morrow. Upon my return hither last night I found some company which I shall not be able to get rid of till towards the end of the week, when I certainly shall be with you, being naturally very anxious to converse with you on all the various points arising out of the domestic and foreign politics of this country. I have no objection to the Post Office knowing that—with respect to the first—I am very happy that no proposition has been made to us, and that we have been saved the odium of refusing assistance where no real confidence could have existed, even if we had been ready for sacrifices such as would, I fear, have been fatal to our characters. As to all the rest I say nothing; and, in truth, I see too little of the real state of things to risk an opinion of what may be the state of the foreign politics of this country on the 28th November. Perhaps my expectations are not very sanguine, and every gazette necessarily lowers them.

“The defeat of the Austrians—such as we have heard it—will not tempt our Ministers to claim much share in their military councils, and as nothing has occurred to make me think Lord Castlereagh more able to conduct the war, Lord Barham to conduct the navy, Lord Mulgrave to conduct the negotiations, or the Ministry in general to conduct the country, I feel these specimens of incapacity and imbecillity a *summum malum*, and—coupled with the king's present situation—such as will bring on rapidly the consideration of our very existence.

“A few days will satisfy us whether the Austrians and Russians will not have received the law of the victor; and in all events, the promising bud of Prussian enterprise will, I fear, have been nipped before Lord Harrowby's instructions will have been signed.

“As to our expedition, I have no doubt but that it goes to the Elbe because the little energy of the King's mind looks to Hanover, and to the means of recovering it by direct attack rather than by arrangements arising out of a more useful employ of the 20,000 disposable men which the two islands can now furnish. I find that three additional regiments are to embark since the news of the Austrian reverses.

“God grant that all this may not have staked our last means on a desperate game?”

#### W. WINDHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, November 3. Sunning, near Reading.—“I had thought of driving over to you to-morrow to dinner, on the chance of your being at Dropmore, and of returning the next morning; but I believe it will be better to beg you to let me have a line merely to say whether I may be pretty sure of finding you during the course of the present week, and at the beginning of the next, as, in that case, I shall shape my course from here so as to enable me to spend a day with you.

“In great calamities and dangers men flock together, even where the distress is such as to leave no hopes of relief from any combination of counsels or exertions, and where the only effect of the meeting will be to express to each other their sense of the common danger. Disastrous as events have certainly been, there will be a hope that all is not yet lost, nay that much may possibly be to be gained, if the remains of Mack's army have not actually surrendered, and he himself become a prisoner. It is that last incident of the piece, that finishing stroke, of the general himself being captured—‘Romeo banished’—that seems to extinguish all chance of recovery; not, probably, on account of the value of the general himself, but by the evidence which it contains of the state to which things must have been reduced. There seems still to be a ray of hope that this may not be true, and then not only something but perhaps a great deal may be hoped. On this however it is in vain to enlarge. I send this off in a hurry in the hope that you may be able to favour me with a line by return of post. Soon as I may hope to see you, many things, bad at least if not good, may be expected to happen between.”

#### MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, November 4. Stowe.—“From various quarters I am informed that Parliament certainly does not meet on the 27th, but is postponed to the 3rd or 10th of January. The

ostensible reason is that the money holds out, which is not true. The real, I take it, is the hope of bringing to a favourable issue a negotiation for strengthening themselves by Erskine, Tierney and York, of all of whom it is said that they have hopes. I have reason to know that their despondency is very great indeed, both on the Spanish question, and on the other more material which we discussed so much at Dropmore. All this is fully confirmed by a conversation held by Lord Chatham to Lord Temple on Thursday last, so that I think there can be no doubt of it. Lord Chatham said that the King meant to be in town on Monday—tomorrow—to attend the council for the further prorogation, but he spoke doubtfully upon it ; and as the Queen has put off the crowded drawing-room, expected on Thursday the 8th, until after Christmas, I shall anxiously watch the points connected with this drawing-room, namely the proposed *fête* to the young princess, which is not announced, though talked over at Weymouth as for the third week in November. The King was not to have been at the drawing-room, so that this further adjournment of it is not accidental. I likewise know that the troops ordered for embarkation at Cork are above 9,000 men, exclusive of what may be to assemble at Portsmouth. From the victualling it is clear that they are not meant for the West Indies ; and the report is that they are to be ready *about the 14th December*. The Defence Bill—or rather the 20*l.* Bill, as it is better termed—does not meet a single friend. Duke of York and brother Ministers all abuse it. The idea now is to draught the militia by volunteers, which, after the pledge so solemnly given by Mr. Pitt, is a bold undertaking.

“ Sir J. Orde is certainly gone to Cadiz with his six ships, for he has taken on board a very large medical establishment bound for Gibraltar.”

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO W. WINDHAM.

1805, November 5. Dropmore.—“ I shall certainly be here all the time you mention, and I need not say that I shall, on every account, be happy to see you when it best suits you to come. I wish it had been this morning as you had proposed, because you would have found both brothers here, and I am very sure your coming would have induced them to prolong their stay. They left me only an hour ago, and I have but just now received your letter.

“ You will have seen that, contrary to what is usually the case, the calamity very much exceeds the first report of it. One’s mind is lost in astonishment and apprehension when one looks at what has happened, and what is still to be expected. An army of 100,000 men, reckoned the best troops in Europe, totally destroyed in three weeks, without (as far as yet appears) sustaining any one considerable action ; and 36,000 of them capitulating on a bare statement of the position occupied by their enemy, are events that really confound one’s imagination.

And yet, even this is, I am afraid, only the beginning of misfortunes. The situation of the Arch-duke's army in particular seems quite desperate, unless he has had the means of retreating in time; which the account of the affairs of Verona, if true, puts out of the question.

"The only remaining hope seems to rest on Prussia. Knowing nothing of the grounds or motives of the unexpected vigour lately shewn at Berlin, I cannot reason much on what is now to be looked to from that quarter, but, after all I remember, I cannot look with much confidence for effectual assistance there. Yet such a confidence must, I apprehend, exist in other quarters, and be much relied on there, since the plan of sending a British force to Hanover is persisted in; and that too at a season when our escape by sea from such an immense superiority of force as an Austrian peace might pour back upon us, would be cut off by the frost, and no other resource be left to us but the protection of Prussia.

"As to our internal situation, we must now fairly say to the country that they must rely on themselves alone.

"Even the last resource to which I had looked with more sanguine hopes than many entertained, that of rallying the exertions of the country round one common centre of union, seems, to say the least, as far as ever it was; and we are plunging into a sea of hitherto unthought of difficulties, with little hope that our internal divisions will leave us the fair use even of that measure of activity and vigour, whatever it be, that the country still possesses.

"These croakings may be allowed to the first impressions of such a calamity. Time and reflection may suggest topics of confidence which I have hitherto looked for in vain. I wish you may see the whole in a less unfavourable point of view, but, at all events, it will be a great satisfaction to me to talk the subject over with you, both as it relates to our situation and our conduct." *Copy.*

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, November 6. Charles Street.—"You will probably before this have heard of Nelson's most glorious victory and death.

"19 sail of line of battle taken or destroyed, chiefly French. Nelson had detached Admiral Lewis with 7 towards Carthagena, which left himself only 27, and this tempted the combined fleet to come out of Cadiz on the 19th, with 33. On the 21st he fought them, took and destroyed 19, and made Villeneuve prisoner, but was himself killed by a musket shot from the tops of the *Santa Trinidad*. He lived two hours, long enough to know his victory, and to thank his friends, and to die the most glorious death that a British heart like his could wish for. The regrets for his loss are almost greater than the exultation for his victory.

“ Bourne Sturges is quoted for saying that the Prussians have taken possession of Hanover.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, November 11. Charles Street.—“ The gazette which is already printed, and which will be in the evening papers, will give you Strachan’s account of his having fallen in with and taken three 74 and one 80 French ship on the 4th November from Cadiz. These ships either did not know or did not speak of Nelson’s victory, as the officer who brought the news from Strachan knew nothing of Nelson’s battle till he landed here.

“ There is a strong report current in the last two hours of Stirling having taken 3 of the Rochefort squadron, but I cannot yet find on what authority this report rests. Count Munster has received accounts of the Prussians having re-established the electoral government in Hanover. This seems to commit irrevocably the Cabinet of Berlin; and being committed, they have nothing to do in common sense but to press as fast and as close as they can upon Bonaparte. If they give him time to beat Prince Charles first, and the Russians next, their own turn will come next, and the Elector of Hanover will not then be able to save them, even though the great commanders whom we have heard of should be sent to their assistance.

“ I am impatient to hear more of Collingwood; all that I hear of Pitt is that he is *tout rayonnant de gloire*.

“ I agree with you in thinking that the state of things is so critical as to undergo some change every day; and therefore it is useless to concert measures at a time when that which is right for to-day may become unwise or impracticable to-morrow.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, November 12. Charles Street.—“ There was no truth whatever in yesterday’s report respecting Stirling, nor is there as yet any further account from Collingwood. The language of Ministers is more sanguine than ever respecting Prussia, although I cannot find that there are any new grounds known upon which to form any new hopes. The armed camp which they are reported to be forming in Westphalia sounds too like a defensive position to promise any good to the Austrians, or even to the Prussians themselves. If they are in a state of war they are undone if they do not attack rapidly enough to give a chance to the armies of Prince Charles and Prince Ferdinand, if they are yet within the possible chance of escaping entire defeat.

“ I had not heard of the demand for titles for Lord Spencer and for you. Whatever tardiness and reluctance Pitt’s silence has shown on his own part, is more than compensated by the

activity of his followers who certainly have succeeded in creating a general impression, nobody knows how, that the union has failed by the fault of the Opposition only. This is a paltry and wretched artifice which would make me more angry if I did not feel that greater matters are at issue than the dirty little tricks of the politicians of the second table.

“What could Lord Camden mean by telling me the Swedes and Russians are gone to the Ems? are they really attacking Holland, or does the Lord President know the Ems from the Elbe.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, November 15. Charles Street.—“Henry writes on 2nd November from Dresden, that from authentic information they know that the Austrian loss has not been much exaggerated by the French accounts. But he says it is likewise indisputably true that the French had lost not less than 25,000 killed and wounded in all the different actions that preceded the capitulation of Ulm. He says it is still a mystery at Dresden what course the King of Prussia will pursue!!!

“No naval news, nor any confirmation of the arrival of any of Collingwood’s prizes. Lord Macartney has just seen a friend of Wellesley’s just arrived from India, who says he was to embark on the 8th August. His report of the close of the war is not pleasant. He considers the treaty with Holkar as only patched up to save our credit for the moment; but he describes Holkar and Scindia as combined in determined hostility, and as confirmed by the experience of this war that their Mahratta course of destroying the country, and moving rapidly away, will wear out our army, and prevent our arriving at any final success. He describes the East India paper at a discount of 15 or 16 *per cent*; and I see that, upon the whole, Lord Macartney does not think well of the present state of things there.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, November 19.—“You see that the Italian news is composed of a new surrender of 5,000 men on the 2nd November, and a new effort on the part of Prince Charles towards retreat; while upon the Danube, the combined armies are at Molz, not 20 leagues in the high road from Vienna, and followed by the French who are already at Wels. In this state, when nothing but the most rapid march of the Prussian army is worth looking for, we are desired by the ministers in London to rejoice at the news of Haugwiz and Lombard having set forth to begin a negotiation with Bonaparte in the style and character of armed mediation. If this be their good news, it is sadly thrown away upon me. Lukin from the War Office tells Windham that the *expedition*, meaning Don and his

troops, are to be made up 60,000 ; and Elliot has seen upon paper a muster-roll of 58,000, which I suppose they will call 60,000.

“ Lord Nelson’s will leaves 1,000*l.* *per annum* to Lady Nelson ; and gives the house at Merton, with 500 *per annum*, to Lady Hamilton. Government are to give Lady Nelson 2,000*l.* *per annum* for her life, and are to attach 5,000*l.* *per annum* to the earldom.

“ Thelusson’s Irish peerage is finally fixed ; his father was a Swiss and a banker’s clerk, and he himself is what you see him.

“ Lord Harrington’s friends are all much out of humour at his going to Ireland under Lord Powis ; but, nevertheless, both appointments will take place, and Lord Harrington told me that he should sail next week.”

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, November 22. [Charles Street.]—“ I have just seen General Phipps, who tells me there is no news of any sort at any of the Offices. Sir W. Scott said that yesterday when he asked Pitt if Sir Sydney had yet burned the Boulogne flotilla, Pitt’s answer was ‘ no, *nor has he any orders from us to do so.*’ This sounds like the last Catamaran project, which though protected by the King’s ships and the King’s officers, was maintained by Lord St. Vincent to have been a private expedition, not ordered by the Admiralty.

“ There are rumours that the frequent expressions of public dissatisfaction and apprehension have stopped the Duke of York’s command ; I believe there is some ground for this. Lord Powis desires not to go to Ireland till February ; his appointment makes it clear that Ministers mean to support the two Indian governors.

“ They are still exulting in their Prussian hopes ; what can they hope from mediation and negotiation at such a moment ? ”

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, November 23. Charles Street.—“ Lord Camden, whom I have just seen, tells me that there is no news of any sort.

“ I dined yesterday at Holland House, and found Tierney there, who took an opportunity to say that Pitt had called upon Addington to show the interest that he took in his family distresses ; but that Addington assured him, Tierney, that nothing else had passed, and that he was sorry Pitt had done more than send to him, for fear his visit should give rise to political reports and speculations. T[ierney] added that he thinks the young man will die, as there is great increase of debility from week to week.

“ I was sorry to find from Lord Holland that Campbell the poet, whom he has seen, is in great distress ; as he has nothing but a guinea or two a week by writing for the booksellers. He told Lord H[olland] that having now a wife and

two children, he would gladly take the office even of a sweeper in the India House, for any certain provision, was it ever so small. Is it possible that you can assist by any of the subordinate stations in the Auditor's Office? or shall we endeavour by means of Dardis to overcome his reluctance to take money, and make a brotherly purse for him as we did for our Greek scholar. The poor fellow has consented to have a guinea subscription opened for printing his works, but that, I fear, will not do much. Do let us somehow contrive to help him. He has got somebody to mention his name to Lord Hawkesbury who says that there are prior claims upon him, but that when they are satisfied, he will see what he can do. In the meantime poor Campbell has four mouths to fill, and nothing to give them but verses; though I hear he has still a laudable pride which stands in the way of pecuniary assistance. But that may be overcome in some way I am sure."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, November 25. Charles Street.—"Instead of news I give you the Duke of Montrose's authority for saying that there is none by land or sea. Collingwood has no frigates to send, so that the only immediate chance of hearing from him is via Lisbon; but although we receive nothing new from Germany, we are going to furnish them with news there, for it is just determined to send Lord Cathcart *immediately to Vienna*; and as I hear Lord Granville is not expected till the spring, I presume Lord Cathcart stays till that time with the Austrians, to give them the benefit of his military science.

"Woronow talks largely of the Russian force now in motion, which he puts at 200,000 men; namely in Germany a first body of 50,000, a second of 50,000, and a third on their march from Galicia of 60,000; to which he adds 20,000 with his son adjutant-general at Lawenburgh, and 20,000 at Corfu. All this, he protests, to be a real effective force; but of the last I fear there is much question, for Drummond told Lord Stair a few days ago that he had the means of knowing the exact force at Corfu, and that Ministers here were outrageous with him for asserting the truth that their 20,000 at Corfu did not exceed 8,000 at the utmost. If the other numbers are equally exaggerated, the exertions of Russia are less than they might be.

"I did not find the Duke of Montrose as sanguine in his expectations of Prussia as I had expected; and the apology which he furnishes for their present inactivity, namely, that of being unprepared to move, would be too foolish if it were true, and not being so, is subject to an imputation of a different sort. I am afraid, and Elliot confirms my fears, I am afraid that Ministers almost avow that they think the immediate possession of Holland an object of more pressing importance than the relief of the Austrian and Russian army. And yet I am at a total loss to conceive how it is possible for them to

flatter themselves that the possession of Holland is worth a fortnight's purchase in case the army of Prince Charles or Prince Frederick should have met with the same fate which has attended the army of Mack.

"Can the mind of our Minister descend so low at such a crisis as to like to vapour about the conquest of Holland at the beginning of the session, when he sees at the same time that there is ten to one against maintaining that conquest, if the campaign should continue in its course to be as favourable to Bonaparte as it has been in the outset.

"I ventured to ask the Duke of Montrose if Parliament was likely to meet on the 7th, and he said he thought very likely they would not, if money would hold out.

"Charles was at Judge Johnson's trial. He thinks the Judge innocent, and is in great indignation at Lord Ellenborough."

#### MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, November 28. Stowe.—"Your distinction of voting the volunteers capable of acting *without* troops of the line, because they may be fit to act *with* them, had not escaped me, and most certainly does not add to the pain with which I see the last stake of England and perhaps of Europe committed to the Dukes of York, Cumberland, Cambridge, and Lord Chatham! I know the difficulties of a thousand sorts that would occur to any Parliamentary discussion of such an arrangement; but I am so satisfied that it is of such transcendent importance to check this arrangement which is now certain, and, as I believe, finally submitted to by Mr. Pitt, and so sure of the universal panic which it has struck on the minds of *all descriptions*, that I am anxious to find some mode of stopping this measure *almost at any risk*. Pray think this over.

"I cannot understand why Collingwood is not instantly ordered with Admiral Louis's ships, and the five who sailed to join him on the 15th to the Mediterranean to attack Genoa or Toulon with Craigs troops, now 7,800 men, at Malta. This would surely assist the Austrians as a diversion in their favour.

"I have no letter from Fremantle who is blockading Cadiz. He has done most superiorly in the action, having dismasted the *Bucentaur* and the *San Ildephonso* in forty minutes, by placing himself on their stern and quarter, whilst they could hardly fight a gun against him.

"I have no additional news, except confirmation of that which my son sent you."

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, November 29. [Charles Street.]—"I have only just time to tell you that there is a new paper called *The Morning Star*, the editor of which has been to Windham to profess

himself a friend, and to desire the assistance of hints and communications. His name is Hunt, and Wi[ndham] knows his connections to be respectable. I have written to Stowe to suggest enquiries for our friend there. In the meantime pray take the *Morning Star*, and the more so as this is the only morning paper which contains the substance of the 18th and 19th Bulletins, which I cut out to send you.

“Pitt, till now, has been in conversation sanguine beyond imagination; though with reproaches and reflection on the Austrians. It now seems all over as I have long feared; and Bonaparte will force Austria to a separate peace first, and Russia next, and we shall be the third and last to treat, if that be a distinction valuable either in honour or interest.

“I still believe in further adjournment if they can get money to go on.

“Tell me as soon as you know anything for Campbell. It will be fortunate indeed if you can help him in the Office in any practicable shape. Your picture is taken back from Hoppner’s to Oxford Street; you shall have some proofs when you come to town.

“J. King (as I hear it whispered) will succeed Long in Ireland.

“Elliot says Lord Cathcart will command on the Continent instead of [the] D[uke] of York; and Lord Harrington go as military minister to Vienna and Petersburg.”

MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, November 29. Stowe.—“I conclude you have no doubt but that the French are in Vienna, though they could not be there on the 10th. I have as little doubt but that the Prussian negotiation will end in a continental peace, which will nearly balance the transcendent advantages that might have been derived from Nelson’s victory. The order for embarking not only all the German cavalry, but the 11th Dragoons and the Greys, was issued on Saturday last, and the 11th embark this day. What madness is this if the Ministers are not sure of Prussian co-operation. The army is loud in blame, as *I was told this morning*; and my alarms respecting the three Royal Dukes and Lord Chatham are, I find, very general. There is much talk of proroguing for ten days, and I see no objection to that idea, for, if they can weather the payments of January 5, they may go on for ten days longer, and they will hardly have given time for Lord Harrowby’s mission.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, November 30. [Charles Street.]—“I have written a line to my brother to tell him that we are still disgusted in London by hearing from all the government runners *what a trap* Bonaparte has fallen into by being drawn away to the capture of Vienna.

“ Lord Castlereagh said at dinner yesterday ‘ that he did not think *so ill* of the capture of Vienna ; but what he *really* thought *bad news* was that a *feu de joye* had been heard at Boulogne, which might very probably be for having forced the *Emperor to make a separate peace.*’ You will probably conclude as I do from this judicious remark that they know this event either has happened or is taking place. In the meantime Lord Harrington is actually gone to Windsor to-day to take leave, being instantly departing for Vienna instead of Lord Cathcart ; and I still suspect *Lord Cathcart* to be destined to the Continental command, of which expedition there is more talk than ever, now that there is less than ever any probability of it’s being undertaken with any prospect of success.

“ I am so much pressed by my friends at Althorp and Stowe that I believe I must commit my cold carcase to all the horrors of a winter journey ; for which, as soon as I can muster resolution enough, I will if possible set forth by way of Dropmore ; but you shall hear of me before you see me.

“ Elliot is gone to Park Place in his way to Dropmore, and Beaconsfield.”

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, December 2. Charles Street.—“ You will have seen that I was but too just an interpreter of Lord Castlereagh’s cyphered conversation. I do not yet find that any regular confirmation of the Austrian peace is received, but no doubt remains in London ; and the sensation made appears to me to be more strong, more general and more hostile to Government, than I could have expected it to be, who have seen no other result before my eyes since my leaving Dropmore at the time of the capitulation of Ulm. But, in truth, if any thing could add to the impression of such disastrous news, it would be found in the childish affectation of sanguine confidence which the Ministers so universally displayed, that nobody who trusted them at all could be prepared to receive the tremendous reverse which has now happened.

“ The ill opinion that I have entertained of the time and manner in which this business has been so misconducted has so impressed my mind with impressions of blame and reproach to the principal actors in it, that I must fairly own myself to be but a bad counsellor for the disguise or restraint of those sentiments. I can however, at the worst, be a patient hearer ; and certainly can answer for being a silent one ; as it is of much more importance to me to hear the opinions that are to be discussed rather than to express any of my own. I will therefore obey your summons, and will be with you to dinner on Friday, and go on to Stowe, and Althorp, on Sunday.

“ Before I received your letter Elliot had stopped at my door to say that he was on his road to Beaconsfield, and he begged

me to mention that it was his intention to come to Dropmore on Thursday. If the possibility of Fox's sleeping at Dropmore (as you should perhaps press him by letter to do) should make Elliot's arrangement inconvenient to you, a line from you will find him at Beaconsfield.

"Farquhar thinks Pitt wants Bath, but does not describe him as being materially ill. He went on Saturday to *Lord Camden's*, and is to return to town to-day with all the advantage that he may have obtained from his discussions with the sage of the Wilderness!!! The second embarkation has, I believe, actually sailed. The Ministers here will probably forget that it has done so, and will leave them, till the Elbe has fast frozen them, for Bonaparte's Christmas dinner. Courtier as Lord Macartney is, he said yesterday he was convinced the country would not longer bear such men as Pitt has now got round him. Where he is to get others I know not."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, December 3. Charles Street.—"The recent mails which appear in the morning papers, seem to warrant the belief that there is no truth in so much of the Dutch communication as relates to the Austrian peace, and to the death of Prince Charles. When I heard that Stahremberg had set the Twickenham bells a-ringing at a late hour last night, I was in hopes that he had received some authentic accounts; but I find that at 2 o'clock to-day nothing had been received by Ministers, foreign or domestic, beyond what you see of the Dutch and French gazettes in the morning papers. I cannot help, however, upon the whole flattering myself that, if the Imperial Court have so long since abandoned Vienna, they will not be found to have made this disastrous peace upon the loss of it. The campaign seems, it is true, almost irrecoverable; but yet the difference between a disastrous campaign, and such a disgraceful and precipitate peace is so great, that I consider the escape from it almost as a victory. I see in all the foreign papers that the Austrians had asked an armistice, which Bonaparte refused unless they would give for it the Tyrol and Venice; and I will hope that the Dutch report is no other than a confused account of what passed upon this proposal for armistice.

"Windham talked to me to-day of going down with me to Dropmore; I therefore thought it best to tell him who would be there on Saturday, in order not to have the appearance of any mystery where none is meant; but his goings and comings are too uncertain for me to rest upon.

"I shall certainly be with you on Friday, and go to Stowe on Sunday."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, December 4. Charles Street.—"The produce of the last mails, which you see in the morning paper, is a full

conviction of the falsehood of the Dutch news, and seems still to leave a possibility of Prince Charles's army retreating into Hungary; while, at the same time, the Austrian manifesto leads one to hope that they will continue stout long enough at least for Prussia to take part with them, if this extremity of danger can induce them ever to take their part like men and soldiers.

"While this contest is alive, while there is yet left any faint hope of continuing the struggle against France, you yourself cannot be more averse than I should be to the utterance of one word in Parliament that should tend to lessen the confidence either of our allies in us, or of our own people in our allies.

"The Ministers themselves cannot have a more eager wish for their success in this tremendous contest than what I myself entertain; and whatever I may think of the means, motives, and persons employed in it, I would give to it as much assistance as if I most approved of every one of those circumstances.

"Windham talks of going to Beaconsfield to-morrow, and very justly observes that he can easily return from Dropmore on Saturday to Beaconsfield, if there is not room for him.

"Lord Harrowby's dispatches are certainly come, but I can hear nothing of them.

"I think it a very good symptom of hope, that the French are so industriously fortifying the Lech, and Donawert, and Augsburg."

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, December 15. Althorp.—"After passing two days with my brother at Stowe, he came over with me to Althorp on Wednesday, and returned home yesterday.

"We found the opinions of the master of the house here coincide with those of Dropmore and Stowe upon the general topics which had been matter of discussion between yourself and Windham and Fox. The first impression made upon his mind by the account of those discussions was to attribute to the natural consequences of them more extensive and permanent mischief than will, I trust, be found in the event; but the more we talk the subject over he becomes, I think, more inclined to agree that *political* difficulties of our present situation are rather likely to be lessened than to be increased in these eventful times before the actual moment of the meeting of the Parliament. In truth the *difference* in question cannot but be materially affected either by any great reverse to the successes of the French, or by such a confirmation of them as should close the contest upon the Continent by negotiations for peace. I wish I could see any reason to indulge a hope of the first of these events taking place; but, whatever my wishes may be, certainly my opinion is that our news will very soon be that of armistice or peace. The mission of Guilay

as described by the Emperor of Germany, together with the French statements of proposals from the Russians and from Hungary (which I know not how altogether to disbelieve) would alone be sufficient to lead me to strong expectations of armistice or peace. But when, in addition to this, we find Prussian negotiation in the hands of Haugwiz, under the immediate impression of the daily progress of Bonaparte and the daily retreat of the confederates, I know not how to entertain a doubt that such negotiations will arise as will leave Prussia in a state of peace rather than induce their ministers to challenge that war with France in the present impaired state of the Austrian army, which Prussia did not feel bold enough to challenge when the fresh and untouched army of Austria was so much better able to second the efforts of Prussia. Still however in my mind, even this event of peace made in any common concert is so much lesser an evil than that which Kirkhert reported, and which we *are told* we shall still live to desire and to regret, that, at least in this comparison, I shall think we have escaped an irreparable evil; and, however, perilous and unsatisfactory the terms may be of any general peace, I shall think them almost a triumph when compared to that peace of Kirkhert's, which some of our friends are disposed to consider as a boon well worthy of our acceptance. I shall stay here a week longer, and then go for a few days to Stowe.

“I have subscribed 10 guineas at Coutts's to Campbell, and am pressed to obtain your name there. If you approve, write to Coutts who receives the subscriptions.”

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, December 18. Althorp.—“I have this moment received from Stowe the account which you had sent there of the last news from Germany, of which the evening papers had given but a very confused and perplexed account. I certainly agree with you however in thinking that even a drawn battle is rather a favourable circumstance, more particularly as one may hope that so general an action, of which the two Emperor's personally partook, will discountenance the habit of capitulation and surrender which has so much disgraced the beginning of the campaign. It is something too to see by the position of Wischau that, prior to that battle, the French had begun to retreat; and the combined armies had advanced from the neighbourhood of Olmutz. If, in addition to this, one could really give credit to the report of the commencement of Prussian hostilities, much indeed might be done, and I am very glad to see that both my brother and you seem to speak with confidence of this important article of intelligence. At the same time I cannot help feeling some distrust of the truth of *this* news when I observe that the papers describe the arrival of letters of the 8th from Berlin,

without furnishing any such authentic notification of this important fact as they might and would naturally afford, if the fact was true. It appears to me to be highly probable that, in consequence of Bonaparte's refusing to accede to the proposals made by Haugwiz, the Prussian troops may have approached nearer towards Bohemia and Franconia; but no march of the Prussian troops is decisive of hostilities till they have either declared war or begun it. To be sure, if the battle of the 2nd or any subsequent event should afford to Prussia a fair prospect of being able at one blow to decide the fate of the French army, it may be hoped that they will be tempted to avail themselves of it; but I am so strongly impressed with the notion of their pluming themselves upon their system of neutrality that, even if they begin to engage in the war, I suspect they would very probably, upon the first fair offer made to them by Bonaparte, fly back to their *cordon*, their line of demarcation, and their magnificent protection of the north of Germany. I have thought it right to give some account of our Dropmore conference, in confidence to Lord Stafford and Lord Carlisle, and I see by their answers that they are both of them very anxious that all appearance of difference should be kept back; and both of them are disposed to think that may be done without any great difficulty. Hitherto I have likewise been of that opinion, because I have hitherto been persuaded that the interference of Prussia, added to the bad success of the combined armies, would quickly produce negotiation and peace on the Continent; in which case our respective opinions as to Continental confederacies would not be 'the order of the day.' If, however, the hopes of the Confederates revive, as I hope in God they will, by the retreat or defeat of the French, we must then look to another solution, and trust that Fox will not take the moment of the success of the Confederates to make a Parliamentary war upon the system of confederacy. To both my correspondents I have talked of the probability of our having a perfect agreement in our questioning the insufficient state of the British army, and the tardy and inadequate support which it has as yet afforded in co-operation with our allies upon the Continent. Lord C[arlisle] writes me word that he hears a great deal latterly of the dejection of the K[ing], which he is told is owing to the expectation of the departure of the D[uke] of Cambridge. Is it true that Pitt has been in great danger from gout in the stomach?

"Lord B[uckingham] writes me word that Haugwiz proposed a joint peace embracing *all* the powers at war, with a reserve as to England *if Bonaparte should demand her exclusion*. This might be made a fair ground of Parliamentary or political attack; but, in truth, if the powers on the Continent make a joint peace upon a real and well-understood concert, I should not think the nominal exclusion of England would, for our separate interests, be the worst that could happen."

## LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 1. Eden Farm.—“I wish to trouble you with a few lines respecting the old story of Mr. Justice Foxe, though it is become almost a ludicrous consideration amidst the gigantic businesses which seem likely to occupy the ensuing session. I am going on Friday next with a family party to Dr. Heath’s at Windsor; on Saturday to Blenheim; and on the Thursday following for a couple of days to Park Place; after which I incline to resettle here till about the 10th February, with the exception perhaps of the first day of the session. But if it were thought material to resist any farther that silly and irregular proceeding against a judge for a few intemperate phrases used above three years ago, I certainly would attend to have at least a day’s debate against the renewal of the order for witnesses; which order will otherwise pass as a matter of course.

“The continental catastrophe is most afflicting in many points of view, and equally disgraceful (and almost equally dangerous) to all the old established governments in Europe. But from the date of the incomprehensible capitulation of Mack’s army, I have considered, and have professed to consider the whole enterprise as desperate. It was then evident, that the war had been forced forwards without any comprehensive plan, and consequently without resources to compensate for any material disaster; and that, in the whole line of territories from Malta to Lapland (Naples, Berlin and Hanover included) there was a want of communication, preparation, promptitude, decision, and concert. The prospect is now most gloomy, and our good countrymen do not appreciate perils which as yet are at a certain distance; but, unless there shall be some special interposition of Providence, their feelings will be well awakened before midsummer. In the meantime I am tempted to enclose an extract which is just sent to me as copied from an Irish paper. It is certainly not written in the spirit of wise conciliation, nor with due political foresight; I hope and trust therefore that it is not penned by my old friend the new Chief Secretary.”

## LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 6. Blenheim.—“We really should have been most happy to have availed ourselves of your premission to us to pay our respects to Lady Grenville, and to see Dropmore in our way homewards, even if we had not been able to call for more than an hour or two. And I conceive that would have been a digression only of 4 or 5 miles from our direct line, which is by Windsor through Kingston. But we think that the Malmsbury’s may have had enough of us from Thursday to Saturday; and also our troop left at Eden Farm would mutiny if we should prolong our absence beyond Saturday evening. We are therefore under the necessity of leaving Park Place early in that day.

“I will ask leave to wait on you in town some morning before the opening of the session, for I am solicitous to know your sentiments respecting the best means of resisting the farther prosecution of the Irish judge.

“I am fearful of adverting to other subjects which are become momentous and menacing beyond the powers of my mind, and seem to me to be swallowing up all secondary interests; and to involve, at this hour not only the well-being but the very existence of the British empire. The danger is of a different description, but not less alarming than that which existed in 1792.

“In admiring the varied and magnificent scenes of this place, I am induced every hour by the buildings, monuments, pictures and historical tapestries to wish for the revival of a John, Duke of Marlborough, with all his energies and successes; or at least for a recurrence of those times when we were able to maintain the independence and balance of the continental powers.”

#### MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 6. Stowe.—“Stunned indeed are we all by this continental news. I have no faith in the re-embarkation of our troops, for it is too tempting to Bonaparte that to attack them appears to me certain, and equally sure that we shall buy their retreat by another Helder convention which will cede the Trafalgar prisoners in exchange for them. Surely the blow of Ulm was a sufficient lesson to our Ministers to have played better what remained of their immediate game, I mean the movements of the Anglo-Russian army in Westphalia; but the mind is sickened by this horrible picture of imbecility from which I see no salvation. Much as I felt on the subject of misconduct before, I must say that I could not conceive that so much could have occurred since Trafalgar of omission and commission, in all which I think our Government so deeply guilty.

“I heard of Mr. Pitt yesterday that he is still very lame, and is much beaten down by this news; and of the King I heard this day that he is well, but gloomy to a degree that has seriously alarmed all his family. He believed this bad news to its fullest extent quite from the first report of it, and resisted all the lies of which every one heard so much for ten days.”

#### MARQUIS WELLESLEY to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 10. Portsmouth.—“I seize the first moment of recovery from the fatigues of my voyage and of landing, to thank you cordially for your very kind letter written upon the first intelligence of my arrival.

“I hope to be in town to-morrow night or sometime on Sunday, and on my arrival I will immediately inform you,

and shall most eagerly expect the happiness of taking you again by the hand either in London or at Dropmore according to your convenience.

“My obligations to you are innumerable, but the first is your attention to Richard, who surpasses even my very sanguine expectations.”

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 15. Eden Farm.—“It would be quite convenient to me to wait upon you at any early hour either on Monday or Tuesday (or even on Saturday if you preferred it) respecting the renewal of the enquiry into Judge Foxe’s conduct, which, though of trivial import amidst the actual and increasing pressures, may deserve a few minutes consideration.

“I have not yet heard what sums have been remitted to the (late) foreign powers; I believe not much above one million. But I understand that the naval expenditure has necessarily and considerably exceeded the amount voted, and must be immediately provided for (having been defrayed from other branches of service). I enclose a rough minute of the state of the consolidated fund, though perhaps you have a more detailed account from the Exchequer.”

*Enclosure.*

In the grants for the year 1804 (ending 5 April, 1805) the surplus was taken at 5,000,000*l.* It produced about two millions. The deficiency was voted as supply, and the fund left clear from the 6th April, 1805.

“In the grants for the year 1805 the surplus of the consolidated fund was taken at four millions.

For the quarter ending 5th July last the surplus was .....	206,907
10th October .....	2,287,077
Surplus .....	2,493,977
For the quarter ending the 5th last there was a deficiency .....	410,117
	<hr/>
	2,083,860
Income .....	8,861,941 9
Charge .....	9,272,059 4

Deficiency .....

410,117 15  
and therefore the deficiency is 1,916,140*l.* which sum will be diminished or increased according to the produce of the quarter ending 5th April next.”

CHARLES JAMES FOX to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 18. Arlington Street.—“I send you enclosed two sketches for an amendment, one by Lord Henry Petty,

the other nearly the substance of that I left with you yesterday. I understand that you sent last night was only made with a view to the case of the House feeling the propriety of adjourning certain discussions on account of Mr. Pitt's absence. This is a case which I own I think very unlikely ; but, if it were to happen, and one felt oneself obliged to sacrifice principle and decency to delicacy, we ought at least to wait till we feel the necessity, by which means too we should have the advantage of some speeches at least before we give way.

“ With regard to the particular point on which there is unfortunately a difference, there is nothing in either of the drafts I send which in any way touches upon it. I confess I thought the same with respect to my original sketch in which I had purposely omitted my favourite words *ill-timed, ill-concerted, ill-supported* ; and if the word *councils*, being liable to be misunderstood for *counsels*, was objectionable I was willing to substitute *conduct* as it now stands. If any other plan is suggested I shall be happy to see and discuss it, but I fairly own that I can hardly feel myself justified in supporting any that does not in some way convey strong feelings of indignation at the situation to which we are reduced.”

#### THE BISHOP OF LINCOLN to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 18. Putney Heath.—“ I am very happy to be able to inform you that all the physicians have pronounced Mr. Pitt to be rather better this morning, and there are symptoms which seem to indicate that his stomach is in a less relaxed and irritable state ; he has taken chicken broth with something like appetite, and his countenance is improved. I do not, however, mean to represent his amendment as great, but in my judgment it is the first day that there has been any amendment at all since he returned from Bath. He seems to have no positive complaint, and the physicians have repeatedly assured me that no essential organ is injured. His cough, which arose entirely from irritability, has been much less in the last twenty hours, but still a great degree of weakness remains. Be assured that I shall always find leisure to answer any inquiries I may receive from you.”

#### THE BISHOP OF LINCOLN to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 19. Putney Heath.—“ I am very happy to make a second favourable report of Mr. Pitt. Though he had not a very good night, he thinks himself better to-day, and the physicians expressed themselves decidedly of that opinion ; they said that they now saw light. Doctor Reynolds and Doctor Baillie assured me that they considered him better this morning than any day since they first saw him, which was last Sunday, the day after he returned from Bath.”

## MARQUIS WELLESLEY to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1806, January 20.] Park Lane.—“I send you the enclosed with real grief of heart. Pray return it, and do not copy, nor communicate it.

“Once more let me entreat you to consider again your intended conduct for to-morrow. I am persuaded that any measure tending to create a division in either House or manifesting any degree of warmth, will be deeply injurious to the common cause.

“A shock might be given to the feelings of many, of which advantage might be taken to the prejudice of every great object of the public interests.

“If you could substitute in place of your intended motion, a notice for a motion at the distance even of a week, you would obtain every object which you stated to me this morning, and you would avoid all the mischief which I apprehend.”

*Enclosure.*

## SIR WALTER FARQUHAR to MARQUIS WELLESLEY.

1806, January 20. Putney Heath.—“Sir Walter Farquhar intended to have had the honour of waiting upon the Marquis Wellesley this morning, but he has been detained with Mr. Pitt. It would afford Sir Walter great and heartfelt satisfaction to send a good report. He is sorry he cannot. The symptoms are unpleasant, and the situation hazardous. If there should be a favourable change towards night, the Marquis Wellesley shall have a report again.”

## EARL FITZWILLIAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 20. Milton.—“Being unable to attend on more accounts than one; the severe illness of Milton, who, thank God, is now safe, but still in bed, and my own crazy frame, not quite (even if the former obstacle did not exist) equal to a long sitting in the House, I trouble you with my proxy, to apologize in the best way I can for my absence.”

## LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 20. Palace Yard.—“The following account which is direct from Putney may be depended on and I am grieved to see it. ‘The situation of the day is certainly discouraging, the pulse 130, other symptoms unpleasant; on the whole, the view is unpromising and hazardous.’

“Permit me under these circumstances to repeat with great submission to your superior judgment, but with some knowledge of general impressions out of doors, whether it would be desirable to push any amendment at the moment. I think it liable to invidious remark; and also that many (of whom I cannot scruple to say I am one) will be precluded from the immediate concurrence which they would wish to give. I have indeed (*confidentially*, and say it) reason to believe that this

would be the impression of a considerable set, to whom we alluded to-day. I conceive that it would be right in both Houses to open the amendment, to give the pledge and impression to the country, but to take a further day for it, or to be induced to withdraw it. Excuse this suggestion."

CHARLES JAMES FOX to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 21. Arlington Street.—"I should be much inclined to your suggestion if I did not feel two difficulties; 1st, the old one of so many people being come to whom it will be difficult to explain our reasons, 2ndly, upon what ground I or any of my friends can state Pitt's being so ill, we having no particular means of information on that head. This objection would be obviated by the proposition for delay coming from the other side. I will mention the thing as early as I can to-morrow morning to a few persons, and if Pitt is really considered to be in such danger as you suppose, I shall be for putting the business off. I will let you know the result as soon as I can, unless you could call here and assist at a very small *conciliabulum*."

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 21. Palace Yard.—"It is quite a load off my mind to learn what you mention. I am satisfied (and not merely from reflection but from knowing the sentiments of several) that it makes an essential difference respecting the future goodwill of the country (which is now more than ever essential) to proceed with extreme delicacy, and better to be pressed for, than to seem to press.

"The commission with the Speech will open at three.

"I have a confidential note from a medical friend best informed as to Mr. Pitt, and it most fully confirms the melancholy account which I sent yesterday, though he is said to be not worse to-day than he was yesterday. The only hope remaining is that it may not be a failure of vital powers, but a twenty-one days fever."

THE BISHOP OF LINCOLN to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 21. Putney Heath, 9 o'clock a.m.—"Mr. Pitt shewed great marks of weakness on Sunday night, and yesterday morning the symptoms were very unpleasant; he improved in the course of yesterday, and took full as much nourishment as usual without incommoding the stomach; at ten last night the physicians pronounced all the symptoms to be more favourable; he rested tolerably well, but Sir Walter Farquhar is not yet able to pronounce anything respecting the situation of his patient this morning comparatively with last night. The consulting physicians are to come at half-past five this evening, and I will trouble you with a note by

the messenger whom I shall send to town probably about nine. The physicians are to dine here, and I shall not be able to write any letters till they leave Putney."

THE BISHOP OF LINCOLN TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 21. Putney Heath.—"The symptoms are all aggravated, and Mr. Pitt is materially worse to-night."

THE BISHOP OF LINCOLN TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 22. Putney Heath.—"Sir Walter is engaged with Mr. Pitt, he has passed rather a better night than was expected, and his pulse are rather better this morning. But still there is not, I fear, a ray of hope. I was in his room just now, and he knew me, and I hope he will presently be able to receive some comfort from me. You shall hear again when the physicians have been here at ten."

*Postscript.* "Mr. Pitt has declined to see me just at present for the purpose of my praying with him.

"Sir Walter begs me to make his excuses."

SIR WALTER FARQUHAR TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 22. Putney Heath.—"Sir Walter Farquhar was so occupied by his attendance upon Mr Pitt this morning that the Bishop of Lincoln was kind enough to answer his Lordship's enquiries for him.

"Sir Walter has since that been in town for an hour by appointment of the Prince of Wales, and, on his return, certainly is of opinion that *no ground has been lost* since morning. Would to God he could say any were gained."

SIR WALTER FARQUHAR TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 22, 10 o'clock, p.m. Putney Heath.—"He is sorry he cannot add one word of comfort to the morning's report. Mr. Pitt is worse—not a ray of hope left." *Copy.*

THE BISHOP OF LINCOLN TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 22. Putney Heath,  $\frac{3}{4}$  past 11 [p.m.].—"The physicians have pronounced that Mr. Pitt's pulse are more feeble and more frequent; that his general strength is less, and that the disease is making progress, though there are no symptoms of immediate dissolution.

"I am confident that I may mention to you that I talked with Mr. Pitt for some time upon religious subjects and found his mind in a state very much to my satisfaction; he expressed great humility and trust in the mercy of God, and said that he should die in perfect charity and peace with all mankind. He attempted afterwards to write but could not; he desired me to write down some particulars which he mentioned; he

signed them after hearing them read by me, and indeed he also read them himself, in the presence of Sir W. Farquhar and three servants."

THE BISHOP OF LINCOLN TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 23. Putney Heath, 7 o'clock a.m.—"The last sad scene closed at half-past four this morning. Delirium and shortness of breath increased for the last three hours, but I trust there was no particular suffering."

LORD AUCKLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 23. Eden Farm.—"You will have learnt this morning the last afflicting account from Putney Heath.

"I deeply lament the death of one for whom I retained both respect and undiminished affection, although a misunderstanding (arising perhaps in the mutual infirmities of the human mind) had interrupted our intercourse on public subjects. It is also a painful reflection that such a man should quit the world in the middle period of life, and in a disastrous conjuncture so adverse to fair ambition and noble pride, which had animated all his pursuits and existence.

"God only knows what difficulties and perils are in store for the age on which we are thrown; but I at least know too well that if a most strong government cannot now be formed; and if when formed it shall not manage both the defensive system and the financial means with an unexampled energy and wisdom, this empire will soon be in an agony.

"The proposed address for Monday next will, I hope, be superseded and suspended for a short time by new circumstances. At any rate I submit to you that, both from tenderness to the memory of an individual, and from the justice and expediency of the case, it may be very desirable to vary the apparent aim and direction of the measure, and to direct it specifically against the war department and the foreign department.

"After you left the House on Tuesday I was told that the one million of prize money had not actually been applied, but was only offered as now applicable; that distinction makes an essential difference if it be founded in truth.

"It is a small matter to mention, but Lord Abercorn's speech seemed to imply that he was tired of the proceeding and would not renew it unless called upon.

"I go from this place on Saturday afternoon to Roehampton (Lord Buckinghamshire's) till Monday, when I will go for the day to town.

"Is it not a great subject deserving of private enquiry whether a large proportion of the volunteers (as they are now called) might not in their improved state be brought into some system approaching to an efficient militia?"

## MARQUIS WELLESLEY to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 23. Park Lane.—“In the present state of public affairs, I think it necessary to apprise you at the earliest moment of my determination to co-operate with you in the great work of endeavouring to surmount the difficulties and dangers which surround the country.

“It will be sufficient to explain that, in my judgment, no administration can prove equal to the present exigency, which shall exclude any description of persons distinguished by public talents or virtues from His Majesty’s councils; and that I will not lend my aid to any administration formed upon such a principle of exclusion.

“Understanding that some persons now acting with you have manifested a disposition to investigate the state of that branch of the empire which was lately entrusted to my charge, I assure you that I shall never object to any examination of the affairs of Asia which may be deemed advantageous to the national interests or honour; on the other hand, it is proper to apprise you of my resolution to maintain and assert in every situation the principles which directed my conduct in the government of India.”

## LORD GRENVILLE to MARQUIS WELLESLEY.

1806, January 23. Dropmore.—“I found myself last night so entirely overcome by the melancholy event which was then hourly expected, and which has since taken place, and so utterly unequal to the discussions in which I might have been engaged this day, had I remained in town, that I took the resolution of coming down here this morning (if the account from Putney was such as I feared, and as it turned out to be) and endeavouring by one or two day’s quiet to recover myself a little, and to prepare my mind for any discussions to which this great public and private misfortune may give rise.

“It is quite superfluous for me to express to you the satisfaction I must always feel from your concurrence and co-operation in those views which I entertain of the public interest. I am utterly ignorant what steps the King may be advised to take towards the formation of a government calculated to meet the difficulties of the present crisis. It is perhaps little likely that my advice or opinion on this subject should be asked. If it should, it will certainly be given with sincerity and freedom, and will be in substance that there is no other prospect of safety to the country than the formation of a government upon the most extended basis that the circumstances and situation of affairs shall be found to render practicable.

“The possibility of realizing such a plan must of course depend on the views and dispositions of the different parties, and leading individuals in the country, on the sentiments they may be found to entertain towards each other, on the pretensions they may form for themselves, and on the extent

to which they may, on mutual communication, be found to concur in the course to be now pursued for the safety of the country.

“On all these points I can speak only for myself, till some circumstances shall arise to justify the calling for explanation from others. My own sentiments upon them you already know. There is no sacrifice, consistent with duty and honour, that I have not long ago professed myself ready to make for giving them effect; and be assured that of such sacrifices the greatest of all would be that of my own peaceful, studious, and domestic life.

“What you say on the subject of India is no more than I had anticipated, and had always said for you. The limited knowledge which I have from time to time acquired of the subject has always confirmed, what my full knowledge of your character had uniformly impressed upon my mind, that the more the principles and conduct of your government are understood, the greater your claims will be found to be on the applause and gratitude of your country.” *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to THOMAS GRENVILLE.

1806, January [23]. Dropmore.—“I very much incline to think that the state of the nation is the properest question to move after such a pause as the present circumstances require, and which I trust there will be no eagerness shown on our part to shorten. This change of plan will relieve me from a difficulty which I should have found insuperable, that of coming down for the first time after this great loss to urge a censure upon his measures and character; and I am fully persuaded that, now we have lost him, the impression of that loss will be such as to give to his colleagues the greatest possible advantage in sheltering themselves under his name, should there be the least appearance of pressing upon his memory.

“The public opinion is likely, with proper management, to be entirely adverse to the notion of leaving all that is most important to us in such hands as the Hawkesburys, Castlereaghs and other ministers. It is therefore of the utmost importance that we should do nothing that can create unfavourable impressions against us, and that if we err, we should err rather on the side of moderation and forbearance, than on that of impatience and violence. I know and see and lament every day, how adverse this course of opinion is to the temper and habits of some of Fox’s friends, but the point is too important both to our own characters and to the success of any plan by which the public dangers can be averted, to make it possible that I should for an instant lose sight of it. It has been, more than once Fox’s misfortune to let himself be hurried on in this way against his own better judgment, and to throw away, by yielding to the intemperance of others, those advantages which he never afterwards could regain. I trust that

he himself has no disposition to follow the same course again ; but I am sure that for myself at least, and in the situation in which I stand, all chance of my being useful depends on the moderation and temper of our present conduct, and that, instead of outrunning the public sentiment, the true line for us now is to let the public press us forward, and not we them.

“ If all this were merely a speculation how to overturn one government, and to put in its place another, which should include our own friends, you know how little appetite I feel for such pursuits at any time, and can easily believe that I am less than ever inclined to them just now. But I do see, and cannot doubt that this is now the last chance of saving ourselves from such evils and dangers as this country has never yet experienced ; and I am very anxious that this chance should not be thrown away for the gratification of party violence, or the pleasure of a triumphant debate in Parliament.

“ And so ends my sermon, which I do hope will make more impression than sermons often do.

“ I think there can be no doubt that you should be at the Speaker’s dinner and in mourning.

“ Wellesley, not seeing me yesterday as he was to have done, has written to repeat to me more distinctly what he had indeed already said, that his mind was decidedly made up to have nothing to do with any government except one formed upon the broad basis which I have recommended.

“ I think from something I have heard, that your report of Lord Sidmouth’s language is likely to be true. I wish he may have steadiness to adhere to his resolution. Should the King apply himself earnestly to shake it, I should fear the result.

“ If I hear anything that seems to call for my being in town, I shall be ready to come at a moments notice any time after to-morrow morning. But if nothing particular should arise, as seems now most likely, and if both Houses should be adjourned till towards the middle or end of next week, I should then wish to stay here a day or two longer, supposing that I am not *really* wanted. Do not think this is mere idleness. I assure you that the quiet of these two days was become absolutely necessary to me, and that I shall be much better able in consequence of it to do whatever can now be fairly required of me.

“ In the meantime let me conjure you to apply yourself singly to the object of moderating and restraining. Indeed, indeed, it is the bridle and not the spur that is wanted just now.” *Copy.*

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 23. Charles Street.—“ I have seen Fox and Grey who both seem persuaded that, either by the desire of government, or by their own proposition, the business must be put off from Monday next to give the King time to make

his arrangements; and Fox supposes that Ministers, if hard pressed for money, may lay the navy estimates on the table to-morrow, and then adjourn over for a few days, so as to vote the navy estimates on the first day after adjournment. We are to meet 5 or 6 in Arlington Street tomorrow to settle this, and to talk over the future question. Fox thinks the best motion to make—after the proper pause—will be the state of the nation, and Grey and Windham and myself feel inclined to the same opinion; and, as far as we hear of the Addingtons, they are likely to be for the state of the nation, though they are adverse to Lord Henry Petty's motion to the effect of the proposed amendment. Speculations are still divided between Lord Hawkesbury and Lord Sidmouth; but Lord Sidmouth is reported to have said this day that he had no enmity with the great person that is no more, but that nothing shall ever persuade him to act with the dirty fellows that had betrayed him, and these are interpreted to be the Chancellor, Lord Hawkesbury and Lord Castlereagh. The King passed all his time this morning previous to the Cambridge address, with the Duke of York and Lord Hawkesbury. He looked well in the *levée* room, was very collected, but so blind that, having passed close to Lord Spencer, he asked Lord Dartmouth what star he had passed. He seemed to know nobody but the Archbishop and Duke of Rutland, who were the only persons to whom he spoke. Lord Hawkesbury read the King's answer, with all the air of a new-appointed Minister, but nothing of any sort is yet known."

LORD GRENVILLE to THOMAS GRENVILLE.

1806, January 24. Dropmore.—“I enclose you a letter which I have this moment received from Wellesley, and a copy of that which I write by his messenger to Lord Chatham. I know that you will feel at once, more than volumes could express it, the earnest and anxious desire which I feel to be enabled to render this last melancholy service to a friend whose memory will ever be most dear to me.

“I hope I do not flatter myself in thinking that the object of this request may not be difficult to accomplish. I know the generosity and liberality of Mr. Fox's mind, and have often admired it when I had not the good fortune of agreeing with him as now in political opinions and conduct. And I cannot but persuade myself that it will appear to him a line becoming his character to express his acquiescence (perhaps even his approbation) of this public testimony to the memory of a man distinguished by so many virtues and talents, and doing so much honour to the country by his general character; although in his estimate of some of Mr. Pitt's public services, Mr. Fox may still feel himself obliged to differ from the proposers of this motion.

“If to these considerations any weight whatever can be added by any personal request of mine, I have no difficulty in

saying that it is very little likely he or any other person should ever again have the opportunity of conferring upon me an obligation which I should so highly prize, as by his compliance with this request ; and should it be necessary to add to what you will say in support of it as a personal application from me, I will only beg you to send me an express without loss of time, and I will not delay an instant coming to town for that purpose.

“ At all events I feel so much interested in the result of this business, that I will beg you, as soon as you have seen Mr. Fox, to send my groom down with one of my horses, which he may leave at Cranford Bridge, and come on with a post-horse.” *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to MARQUIS WELLESLEY.

1806, January 24. Dropmore.—“ I do not lose an instant in sending back your messenger with a letter to Lord Chatham, to assure him of my earnest endeavours to contribute every thing in my power to the object you mention, and with another to my brother Mr. Grenville requesting him to see Fox in my name and to say everything to him from me that may best conduce to its success ; and if, contrary to my wishes and hopes, there should arise any difficulty on the subject, I have desired him to send me an express which will bring me to town in less than three hours after I receive it. As this is Friday, I presume the notice could not be for an earlier day than Monday, and therefore that, by coming to town to-morrow in the course of the morning, I shall have full time for every exertion ; and certainly I will spare none, if any should be necessary.

“ I hope none will. Have the goodness to send my two letters to Lord Chatham and my brother as soon as you get this.” *Copy.*

MARQUIS WELLESLEY to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 25. Park Lane.—“ I received your letter last night with great satisfaction, and forwarded the inclosures immediately.

“ I am extremely anxious to see you, and I would have gone to Dropmore, if I had not expected you in town. An event has happened which renders it very desirable that I should see you early to-morrow morning, and, if you could come to town, I should be much obliged to you, and ready to receive you at any hour you will appoint. I do not wish to go out of town at present, as I am rather afraid of changing my bed.

“ My anxious desire to see you arises from this circumstance. A man of the name of Paul (whose character you probably know) rose yesterday in the House of Commons, and gave notice of a motion for Monday, when he says he proposes to move for papers with a view of founding charges against

Lord Wellesley. It is said that he is supported by Francis, even by Wyndham, and that the Prince of Wales has also ordered all his friends to attend for the purpose of countenancing the miserable attack of this obscure and low man. Certainly this is not the mode in which I expected to be treated. If any person honestly wishes to examine the affairs of India, let him first receive from me all the information I can afford, and if that should not satisfy him, or should convince him that I have been wrong, and that a change of system is requisite, let him then proceed in Parliament. But to aid the vindictive designs of such a person as Mr. Paul is not worthy of any character with whom I can ever attempt to act. I am informed that the main object of the design is to cast a shade over my reputation in this critical moment for the express purpose of excluding me from public affairs. On this occasion I trust that you will come to a full explanation with Mr. Fox and his friends; you must see the necessity of doing this very early, for if the plan to be pursued be not fully arranged before Monday, the shaft may be shot, and I may be separated from you by absolute necessity. You must see the impossibility of my acting with Mr. Fox and his friends, while they are employed in co-operating with such a man as Paul to disturb the repose which I am entitled to enjoy, after such arduous and successful labour in the public service.

“On the other hand, I am totally ignorant of the designs of Ministry, with whom I have had no intercourse whatever on this subject. My intention is without delay to require Lord Castlereagh to take some direct line with relation to this attack, and in the course of to-morrow I shall ascertain his views.

“But I must rely on you to obtain for me a distinct view of the intentions of your friends, and I therefore earnestly entreat you to come to town for that purpose, as well as for the purpose of advising me with regard to the conduct which I ought to pursue on this occasion.”

#### MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 25. Buckingham House.—“I know that you will be delighted to hear that the Prince of Wales has this moment left me, having called here to command me to tell you, that as soon as he saw by the papers that Mr. Paul had given notice of an attack on Lord Wellesley, he sent immediately for Mr. Francis, and through him to Mr. Paul; and the result has been, that Mr. Francis has assured his Royal Highness that he has no idea of bringing forward or joining in any measure of attack at present, and that he had little doubt of being able to induce Mr. Paul to desist. And his Royal Highness particularly desires this may be stated to you, as a very anxious proof of his attachment to you, and of his partiality to Lord Wellesley. You may be assured

that I acknowledged it in your name, with proper expressions of gratitude and respect.

“The exact state of politics at this hour is very curious. Every exertion was yesterday made by the King to induce Lord Hawkesbury to accept the Treasury; and, upon the arrival of a messenger yesterday evening at Windsor, his Majesty appeared overjoyed, and ordered his carriage for this morning, announcing that he should return to Windsor, and therefore forbid the Queen or his family coming to town. He arrived at noon, and saw Lord Hawkesbury, who was with him for an hour; and afterwards he saw Lord Castlereagh and the Lord Chancellor; and he received from them the unanimous opinion of a Cabinet held late last night that they could not undertake his government in the shape proposed by his Majesty. The King then saw Lord Ellenborough, and it is understood that he gave him the Exchequer seal. He then ordered his bed to be prepared at the Queen’s House, and announced his intention of sleeping in town; and at the moment I now write,—*having been trusted by his Royal Highness with the channel of his information*—I can state to you beyond a doubt that the whole is at sea, in consequence of the opinion of Cabinet being so clearly expressed against the possibility of patching this administration; which, for several hours, everybody had concluded to have been finally arranged, and which, I will fairly own, I should have been glad to have seen so settled. As to what is to come next I cannot guess, for the King has declared he will not send for Addington; and even if he did, there seems little doubt but that he would decline any share in a government composed of his friends, and those remnants.

“It is supposed that he will not send to you; though I know he has enquired very much in the last four days into the history of our connexion with Fox; and that he has declared that he will not ‘suffer the latter to sit in any cabinet that is to advise him.’

“He was very much agitated this morning after he saw Lord H[awkesbury] and certainly came to town under the idea that he was sure of forming the ministry out of the old remnants.

“I have seen your letter to Tom. You may be assured of every compliance on my part, and that of Lord Temple, with your wishes; and nothing can be more conciliatory than Fox; but the matter is become delicate and difficult for Fox from the manner in which it has been conducted. My son threw out to Mr. Fox an idea of a sort of compromise which I thought Mr. Pitt’s friends might even prefer to a funeral; namely a monument, and payment of his debts. To this Lascelles readily jumped, and Mr. Fox said it was less objectionable, but Grey and Windham are stated to be impracticable. I will however try further, and have great pleasure in letting you see my son’s eager pursuit of your wishes on this subject.

“ Lord Castlereagh has just announced to the House, upon being challenged, on a motion for the Committee of Supply, that it could not proceed without filling the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer, that ‘ he was commanded by his Majesty to inform the House that he would forthwith take steps for forming a new administration.’ ”

“ The words are accurately taken down.

“ The King is very much agitated indeed.

“ I open my letter again to say that I have now reason to know from a note I have just seen, that the Chancellor has been ordered to sound whether Lord Sidmouth would accept any share, and he has refused.”

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 25. Charles Street.—“ I will not delay your groom by writing at any length upon the post-letter which I receive from you, but will satisfy myself in assuring you that the general course of my opinions corresponds with those expressed by you, as to avoiding all unnecessary precipitation, and as to endeavouring to moderate the eagerness of those who from excess of zeal may move faster than is either prudent or decorous. The event however which I have just heard from very good authority, removes all plea of delay for the purpose of forming a government.

“ A Cabinet was held yesterday and, the result of it being carried to the King yesterday night, he announced his intention of going to town this day. He arrived an hour ago, and from a person of undoubted authority I just learn that *Lord Hawkesbury is First Minister*. I do not hear of any accession as yet, but I am told that Lord Sidmouth has nothing to do with this, but that the present ministry will continue, with no new person except a new Chancellor of the Exchequer who is not yet named. If Lord Hawkesbury is gazetted to-night, I presume business will come on immediately; and you will probably think it necessary to come up to settle what is to be done.

“ It is from a near connection of the Duke of York that I learn this news.”

#### LORD GRENVILLE to MARQUIS WELLESLEY.

1806, January 25. Dropmore.—“ I this moment receive your letter, and had, only five minutes before, seen in the papers some account of what was said on Friday by Mr. Paul. You refer to him as to a person whose character and situation I probably know, but I am ignorant of both. I should think what you mention respecting the Prince of Wales to be of all unlikely things the most unlikely, but I have lived too long in this world to answer for anybody but myself. Francis’s disposition I was well aware of, and mentioned it to you from

the beginning. I shall not fail to be in town early to-morrow, and will immediately call upon you to concert with you what it is best to do in this state of things.

“I inclose a letter I have just received from my brother, by which you will see that the business on which you wrote to me yesterday has been, like many others, spoiled by precipitation and inconsiderate zeal. What is now to be done I know not, for certainly every man of feeling must agree in the opinion you expressed to me that such a question, if it is to be opposed and merely carried by a majority, had much better never have been stirred at all.

“Can it really be true, as the letters I now receive positively affirm, that Lord Hawkesbury has accepted the office of First Minister of this country at this time, and with no other accession of strength to the government than he can derive from some solitary individual whom he may tempt to come forward as *his* Chancellor of the Exchequer?

“If you should happen to see Bathurst before I call upon you to-morrow, which however is not likely, I would wish you to show him my brother’s letter. I trust I need hardly say that if there be any course in Parliament by which my opinion on that subject can be manifested, I will most gladly embrace it.” *Copy.*

#### THE EARL OF CHATHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 25. St. James’s Square.—“The letter you were so good to write to me, in consequence of a communication from Lord Wellesley, reached me last night. On a subject so near my heart, I feel most sensibly all the kindness of it. It had not however been my intention to have made any direct suggestion on this melancholy occasion, either to you, or to any one else, from motives which you will at once enter into. But, feeling that all the value of any such object as that in question depends wholly on a pretty general, if not unanimous concurrence, and being perfectly convinced of those sentiments on your part, the result of a long and intimate friendship, and conceiving, at the same time, that you would be most likely to know the dispositions of a numerous description of persons, I certainly concurred entirely in the opinion expressed by Lord Bathurst, when I saw him, that it would be very material, before any friend of my brother’s stirred in it, to ascertain, and through Lord Wellesley, what your opinion was on the subject. As it is, I have now only to express my thoughts most truly for the very kind manner in which you received this communication, and to assure you, that the warm and affectionate interest you have taken on the occasion of this last tribute of respect and veneration to the memory of one so near and dear to me, cannot but make the most lasting impression on my mind.”

## MARQUIS WELLESLEY TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 25 [26?]. Park Lane.—“Upon thinking over what passed between us to-day, I think it is very desirable that I should be in your Cabinet at all events, whether with or without office. The last office I should wish is the Board of Control. You will understand however that the whole of this statement is subject to the same reservations which I have already mentioned, namely that I shall aid you with the utmost zeal in every way, whatever may be my situation.”

*(Private.)* LORD GRENVILLE TO EARL FITZWILLIAM.

1806, January 26. Camelford House.—“I lose no time in apprising you that I have received thro’ Lord Dartmouth his Majesty’s commands to attend him to-morrow at two o’clock. Of course there can be no doubt that in the present circumstances the object of this step must relate to the formation of a new government, and I have reason to believe that the present ministers themselves have expressed to his Majesty their opinion that the measure of a change is now of indispensable necessity.

“In this state of things there is nothing I so much wish for as the opportunity of communicating fully and confidentially with you on every part of this momentous and difficult concern. The only thing I can say to-morrow will be to express my decided opinion that nothing can be done, unless with the fullest concurrence of Mr. Fox, and with the abandonment of all idea of exclusion. If this point be conceded the rest will then be to be considered,—and I feel extremely anxious for your presence here, and earnestly hope that the state of your health will not prevent your coming up as soon as you can.”  
*(Holograph draft.)*

## MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 26. Buckingham House.—“I send you the enclosed as it is most necessary that you should know accurately the state of the King’s mind as far as it can be collected from this close observer. I received it last night, but of course did not trouble you with it at that hour. Jemmy, whom I have just seen, tells me that Lord Cardigan told him this morning that the Queen comes up with the King, and that it was hoped his Majesty would remain in town till this change of government was settled.

“You will judge of Fremantle’s request. In some points of view the appointment might be very useful to you. At all events I am bound to bear every testimony to his fidelity, zeal, discretion and abilities, and to recommend him as every way qualified to serve you; at the same time that his declarations in this letter, which you will keep, clearly releases you

at all times from claim upon you if you should employ him. Beyond this I feel I ought not to say one word.

“The conversation of last night shows me but too clearly the difficulties on the Irish question; and, after consulting my pillow, I hasten to request you will forget all that passed on that matter between us, for I feel that such a sacrifice for a public purpose so ungracious would be too heavy.

“I have said nothing respecting the Cabinet; but if any one is called to it not holding official situation connected with it, you will, I am sure, discuss it with me, before you finally decide upon it.

“I mean to remain at home, and will not wish to detain you a moment; but as I cannot go to ask the result of your interview from Mr. Fox, and as it is probable that the Prince of Wales will be at my door immediately after he knows it, I think it highly desirable that you would give me a minute on your return from Carleton House.

“The letter I enclose shows strongly the necessity of resisting immediately the inordinate influence to which Fremantle refers, so far as it affects the control over the King, and the entire independence claimed and exercised of the army administration. The more I consider this, the more strongly I am convinced that the ideas discussed last night must be asserted at an early period, though perhaps not at the earliest.”

*Enclosure.*

W. H. FREMANTLE to the MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

1806, January 25.—“Of course your Lordship knows by this time that the King has made his determination, and is to see Lord Grenville to-morrow morning. He goes to town for that purpose. I trust everything will end to your perfect satisfaction. The King returns to Windsor in the evening, and the royal family do not go to town until about the middle of the week, at least this was the determination last night. You may easily imagine that this decision operates in different ways upon the royal family. I am persuaded the Queen is delighted with it, but not so the party of the Duke of York. There has been intrigue beyond exception, and now the great exertion is to prevent the King sleeping in town which would, if once done, break the tie, and induce him to repeat it, and not so wholly to detach himself from his ministers and the public. He seemed in good spirits last night, and I am sure is glad at the determination he has made.

“If your lordship don't take office, I should really be obliged to you, if you would name me to Lord Grenville to be employed under him. I know how he must miss Fisher, and I should feel truly grateful and happy if I could supply his place. I flatter myself my attachment and affection to your family makes it unnecessary for me to say anything on this head; and for upwards of twenty years, that I have

served your lordship I trust you will give me credit, for stability, truth and correctness. I know how necessary it is for a Minister to have a private confidential friend ; such a friend Lord Grenville should find me, without private objects or political ambition, and most steadily devoted to his interest."

MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 26. Buckingham House.—“ I have seen Tom, and am happy to find from his accounts that you appear relieved by your Dropmore air. By coming away so early, I understand that you missed a long letter, which I wrote to give you the account of the pains which the Prince of Wales had taken on the subject of Lord Wellesley, and of the exertions that my son had made on another point very near to your feelings. I fear however that great difficulties will occur in the way of any attempt to moderate those who have made the real objections in this matter. As I find that you have settled to see Fox this evening upon the subject of the communication to be made to you to-morrow, I will call upon you before my brother and he can get away from the Speaker's dinner, that I may discuss with you your wishes on the subject of Lascelles's motion, in which I need not add that your wishes, whatever they are, shall implicitly guide me ; and therefore, even if you cannot avoid the whole of the unpleasantness which this matter has created, you have at least the satisfaction of seeing all that is dearest to you rallying round your personal feelings.”

EARL FITZWILLIAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 27. Milton.—“ I am truly sensible of the confidence reposed in me by your early communication of the King's orders, and by your wishes for my presence in town.

“ Under any other circumstances than those in which I now find myself, I should not hesitate to obey the summons and set out immediately. My health is equal to the task, I could bear the journey ; it is not therefore on that account, that I must excuse myself for not obeying. Milton, though declared by the physicians free from fever, and out of all immediate danger, is left in a state of extreme debility, usual in such cases, but still requiring unceasing attention ; and though perhaps he is so far recovered, as to put a relapse out of question, he still remains liable to consequences that are not unfrequently entailed upon the patient by illnesses of this description, and of so long duration ; consequences to be provided against by unremitting care and attention. To leave Lady Fitzwilliam there alone to watch and take care of him, to leave upon her the sole responsibility of doing so (for so she would consider it) would, I am sure, be so distressing to her, that hardly any occasion could justify me to myself, for placing her in a situation of so much anxiety. On the present, I should have less

to satisfy my own conscience, from the full conviction, that my presence can be of no importance, scarcely of any possible utility. The King has taken his line ; he has sent his orders, and is to communicate with you directly, not by any intermediate means. The confidence that I have seen with such heart-felt satisfaction take root mutually between you and Fox, founded upon the ingenuous mode of proceeding, and the upright ways of thinking of each party, promises on this occasion the formation of a wise, and respectable administration, founded on principles truly congenial with the spirit of the constitution ; and I shall be happy to hear in the country that this desirable event has taken place. I assure you it has been the object of my anxious wishes very, very long."

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 27. Palace Yard.—“ I write and forward this on arriving in town for the day. From the reports of last night at Roehampton, I hope and trust that the results of a royal conference this morning will give full powers to you to form a government on a very comprehensive and solid ground, adequate to a conjuncture of some peril and great difficulties both at home and abroad. You will have to counteract the manœuvres of some who are reluctantly quitting the scene of action, and to reconcile the jarring claims of others whom you will wish to bring forwards ; but I am not aware of any essential obstacles to whatever arrangements you may think best. I have only therefore to repeat *explicitly*, that if in any respect or at any time I can be of use, either in stating privately what I know relative to the views and pretensions of individuals ; or in private discussions of finance, and of new and necessary taxation ; or in saving time and trouble to you by adverting to the progress and details of parliamentary businesses, you may rely on my acting with the strictest care and discretion, and with an honourable zeal to promote your measures for the public service.

“ I state these sentiments without hesitation, because I really am not aware that I have any view or object of a beneficial nature, although I should be glad both from personal considerations, and for the purpose of being more useful, to have at least some ostensible link of connection with your government. My income is straitened, but I am content that it should remain so. I never even in more auspicious times, and when I was ten or fifteen years younger, had a wish for a Cabinet office ; and now I am aware that such an object would be utterly unattainable, and to me the reverse of desirable. A return to the office which I quitted two years ago, and which had been given to me as a permanent retreat from long and laborious services, would be of no benefit to me ; for I could only accept it on the condition of suspending pensions of a larger amount. The Presidentship of the Board of Trade would be, as an

employment, perhaps not ill suited to me ; but I have always considered it as an office of thankless trouble, and not well constituted to answer the good purposes to which it points.

“ I think it, however, not unreasonable or unnatural to mention that I have a son of a most promising character, and of talents greatly above par, as all who know him will allow. It would be an object to me to see him in a secretaryship of a higher form than that which he filled three years under Lord Buckinghamshire, and I hope very soon to see him in Parliament. He has a promise of the same seat which I held, most unconditionally, during twenty years, and through the same old and respected friend (whose interests I shall now wish to conciliate to your government).

“ I have thought that you would permit me to mention these small particulars. At any rate, and from a kind recollection of all that passed during the momentous period when I served with you, and under you, from 1786 to 1794, I feel that in giving a most earnest support to your government, I am gratifying my personal feelings, and at the same time promoting the best interests of the empire.”

*Postscript.*—“ May it not be worth consideration whether in commencing a new system of war, under circumstances of unexampled novelty, it may not be useful to issue a declaration explaining the circumstances and principles of the war, and the general grounds of a safe and honourable pacification.”

*Private.* LORD GRENVILLE to LORD AUCKLAND.

1806, January 27. Camelford House.—“ I have only a moment to acknowledge your kind letter. I am certainly very desirous of availing myself of the assistance and friendship you offer in so obliging a manner ; and I shall be anxious to converse with you as soon as the hurry of these days is over. I am ordered to lay before the King a plan of a government, his Majesty putting no exclusion upon anybody, but reserving to himself to judge of the whole. What all this will end in is perhaps still very doubtful, but we must do our best.”  
—*Copy by Lord Grenville.*

W. WINDHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 28. Pall Mall.—“ I need not say how much pain it has given me to be obliged to resist what I knew to be so anxiously your wishes, and that for a purpose sufficiently disagreeable to myself. But you know as well as anybody what it is to adhere to principle in opposition to every other consideration, and, though differing in the application, will readily see that if I thought Mr. Pitt’s political life, with all his talents and all his virtues, had not been beneficial to the country, it was impossible for me to concur in a vote decreeing to him the highest national honours. I am vexed not a little

that, among many things forgot or ill-said, I omitted what I had fully intended to do, that is to anticipate what is meant to [be] proposed respecting the debts, and to concur in what I understand is already done respecting Lady Hester and her brothers. I had stated my opinions, however, upon those points to various people. Anything personal to Mr. Pitt, anything not involving a judgment on the general effect of his political life, I could concur in with the greatest pleasure."

#### W. WINDHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 28, night. Pall Mall.—“In mentioning to you Lord Kensington and Lord Folkestone, I did not, I think, sufficiently point out the situation in which I stand to both of them, but particularly with respect to Lord Folkestone. They were both in our division of twenty in 1802; they have both acted with us more steadily since; and both are in circumstances, I fear, to render some situation desirable.

“Lord Folkestone has great industry, and by no means inconsiderable talents for business; and seems to be so marked out for the situation which I suggested, that I hardly know how I could be thought to satisfy the fair claims which he has upon me personally, as well as upon all of us conjointly, [if] I were to be seen going into a great office without obtaining for him the offer of the situation above alluded to, or of some one equivalent to it.

“Lord Kensington, though more pressed in his circumstances, may be put by, perhaps, for the present, under an assurance of being considered on the first opportunity.

“Elliot stands so high in all our wishes and opinions and has so many qualifications to render him useful and valuable, that it is idle to say anything about him, except to urge the keeping something in reserve if possible, now that the Secretaryship of War is otherwise disposed of, on the possible failure of the situation in Ireland.

“Lord Minto feels, I know, and on grounds which cannot be disputed, that he is entitled to look to the Cabinet, and I fear is decidedly adverse to a foreign mission. On the former of these points you may probably know his opinion as well as I. He certainly is peculiarly fitted for the situation of the Board of Control. Smaller matters it is needless now to talk about.”

#### LORD AUCKLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 28. Palace Yard.—“We are setting off for Eden Farm till Monday next, when we settle in town; in the meantime, however, I shall always be ready to attend to your summons. I write now to acknowledge your kind and right construction of my yesterday's letter.

“I am aware of some of the circumstances which may raise a doubt as to the final results of the plan of government which

you are preparing ; and I can see a cherub who sees other circumstances, which are not yet brought into our view. But I foresee no difficulties of a texture or magnitude to resist a decided firmness on your part.

“ I have been told that there is a question as to the compatibility of your auditorship with the other office, which it is material (I might say essential) that you should hold. If there be anything in that question, nothing can be more easy (or decorous) than to give the auditorship avowedly to some friend to hold for you and for yours, whilst you remain at the head of the Treasury ; and, in truth, that mode would give to you an interest for a certain period of two-lives in the office.

“ I forgot to mention yesterday that, though the competition for situations will not allow you to sink the Irish Chancellor of Exchequer, it is most material to keep in view the importance of consolidating the two Exchequers, and the whole system of the finance of the two countries.

“ And in the paragraph where I alluded to the Board of Trade, I meant to have added that, in the supposition of a permanent ministry being formed, we should find it of incalculable importance so to apply the powers and communications and facilities of that Board, as to rally the mercantile body round government, far beyond what has yet been done.”

#### MARQUIS WELLESLEY to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 29. Park Lane.—“ I send you the enclosed note ; I believe the account is certainly true.

“ The subject will require instant attention. My advice to you is to appoint Sir G. Barlow acting Governor-General ; to order Lord Lake to resume the chief command of the army ; not to appoint Lord William Bentinck Governor-General yet ; he is not yet qualified for it ; to send a proper person fully instructed in the course of a few months ; to give Lord W[ellesley] Lord C[ornwallis's] Garter.

“ I have received other accounts which leave no doubt of the fact. The *Medusa* is arrived with Lord Cornwallis's private secretary.”

*Enclosure.*

#### W. B. DAVIS to LORD MACARTNEY.

“ I take the liberty of informing your lordship, that I have this instant seen a letter from Captain Robinson stating that he is just arrived at Plymouth and that the Marquis Cornwallis is dead.”

#### EARL SPENCER to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 29. London.—“ I trouble you thus early to mention a point to you which I have much at heart

respecting our present interior arrangements, but which the multiplicity and difficulty of the matters we have hitherto been employed upon prevented me from doing sooner.

“It has always been my wish, as soon as I had a fair opportunity for it, to introduce my son into something of public business. If I had been at the Admiralty, I should have certainly wished most to place him there, as it would have been the most natural appointment; but, as it is, I need hardly say how much satisfaction I should derive from his being at the Treasury whilst you are at the head of it. The situation would also, I know, be much more agreeable to him than any other, on account of his intimate friendship with Lord H. Petty. I am aware of the numerous claims there must be on this head; but I trust to your kind indulgence which I have so often experienced on other occasions, and on none more than the late one, when you consented to relieve my mind from a weight under which I believe it must have sunk.”

MARQUIS WELLESLEY to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 30. Park Lane.—“You will be glad to learn that, after my departure from India, the settlement of Madras voted me a very flattering address, and the settlement of Bombay voted me a statue to be erected at that town. It is necessary that these compliments to a *delinquent* should be known.

“I find by my letters from India that Lord C[ornwallis] had commenced a systematic demolition of all my plans of policy, and had thrown many of our affairs into confusion. This subject requires immediate attention; not an hour should be lost in giving full powers to those on the spot. Barlow is now without such powers; Lord Lake is not *full* commander in chief; and such dissensions have arisen, as I never witnessed during the whole period of my government.

“I wish what I stated to you yesterday on the subject of Lord C[ornwallis's] Garter to be understood as the expression, of my just claim founded upon public services to that honour, and I wish the grounds of that claim to be distinctly stated, and fairly and fully considered. After all that has passed, I think it would be an act of positive injustice to my fair pretensions not to submit them in a clear and plain manner for determination.

“The Duke of York has just now written to me to inform that the King (without a suggestion that I am aware of from any quarter) has given the 33rd regiment, vacant by Lord Cornwallis's death, to Sir Arthur Wellesley. This is an act of real justice, and will highly gratify the army in India. Arthur has been Lieutenant Colonel of that regiment ever since the year 1793, and has constantly served with it since that time

in Europe and India. In every view this favour will be very acceptable to him. He had also been Major of that regiment for some time."

CHARLES JAMES FOX to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 30. Arlington Street.—"T. Grenville will have told you my clear opinion on your own business. I have not sent to Lord Spencer partly because I deferred it owing to that forgetfulness which hurry occasions, and partly because I find that Windham and Lord Spencer did understand that, after Mansfield's compliance or refusal, the matter was again to be discussed. I am sent for in a great hurry to Carlton House, and therefore I fear shall not be able to see you, till we meet at Spencer House."

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD AUCKLAND.

1806, January 30. Camelford House.—"We have brought our arrangements into a shape which will admit of their being laid before the King to-morrow.

"The Treasury is to be placed in my hands, with Lord H. Petty as Chancellor of the Exchequer; Lord Spencer, Fox, and Windham are to be the three Secretaries of State. Grey, First Lord of the Admiralty, and Lord FitzWilliam and Lord Sidmouth, President and Privy Seal. The seals were offered to Sir Joseph Mansfield, and Lord Ellenborough, but both declined them, and Erskine will therefore be Chancellor.

"I have taken the liberty to put down your name for the President of the Committee of Trade, which I hope will not be disagreeable to you, and which is a situation in which I am confident the public will derive essential advantage from your abilities and knowledge; and in which, from its necessary connection with the Treasury business, it was of extreme importance to me to have the assistance of a person with whom I hope to live in habits of mutual confidence. Lord Temple is desirous, if this arrangement takes place, of profiting by your instructions and knowledge of business, and acting in the House of Commons as Vice President of the Committee. Lord Minto will be at the Board of Control if he does not object to that situation when he arrives. Lord Buckinghamshire will have the Post Office, and Lord Ellenborough be called to the Cabinet, which (with his single exception) will consist exclusively of persons whose situations absolutely require their being called to it.

"I do not expect the King to give me an answer to-morrow, but merely to take the paper for consideration; but as the thing will probably be now brought to its final issue in the course of a day or two more, I should be very glad to know that you approve of this arrangement, and that you are coming to town."

*Copy.*

## LORD GRENVILLE to VISCOUNT SIDMOUTH.

1806, January 31. Camelford House.—“I had my audience of his Majesty to-day, and delivered the paper containing the plan of the proposed arrangements, which his Majesty took for consideration, informing me that he would send for me again when he was able to communicate to me his determination upon it.”

*Postscript.*—“I mentioned the subject of Mr. Vansittart’s situation; and I think there is reason to hope that, if other matters are satisfactorily settled, no objection will be made on that point. I look with much satisfaction to the prospect of having so able and useful an assistant.” *Copy.*

*Confidential.* LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 31. Eden Farm.—“I feel as I ought to do the whole value and interest of the communication which you have had the goodness to make to me. I accept most readily the office of President of the Board of Trade, because it will be gratifying to me to discharge its duties under your immediate inspection, and with your concurrence and confidence; and also because it presents to me an ostensible and creditable pretension for taking a zealous part in the details of your parliamentary measures; and, indeed, I am not without hopes that, by your assistance, I may be able to give an utility and efficiency to that Board beyond what it has yet had. I am most unaffectedly glad to have Lord Temple for my associate, for I know him just sufficiently to wish to know him much more, and I have not the smallest doubt that we shall work together with mutual satisfaction and cordiality, and I entreat the favour of you to say this to him.

“Lord Minto’s intended appointment is precisely that which I had marked out for him. I have not a doubt that he will be gratified by it.

“Lord Buckinghamshire in many respects will like the Post Office much, and will be liked in it. I conceive that he wished to be of the Cabinet; but I shall be able to contribute to convince him (if he retains any doubt) that the ground taken of including in the Cabinet only those whose offices make it necessary, is the right and wise ground in every respect; and he knows that this is not with me a new opinion.

“Your note does not happen to mention who is the other Postmaster-General. I hope Lord Charles Spencer, and yet I am sensible that the pressure of circumstances may have made it difficult. I shall hardly venture to write to Blenheim till I know how that matter rests.

“As to the other arrangements, one circumstance (which could not be otherwise) excepted, they appear to me to be the best possible, and such as must, upon the whole view, be soothing and encouraging to the royal mind, for which however

I always feel some uneasiness. There are in your back ground some gigantic considerations respecting military influence and administration, the duration of the parliament, which must, I am sure, have given to you a good deal of thought in this whole arduous transaction.

"I am tempted, *quite in confidence*, to enclose to you an arrangement which I made last Tuesday night, at my library table, for the amusement of Lady Auckland and my son. You will see where it tallies, and in what slight respects it differs.

"I am ready to go to town at an hour's notice, but as I am going for four full months (with the exception of the Easter recess) and am packing up, I want a day or two. I conceive that my intended situation will require a kissing of hands; if that ought to be before Monday or Tuesday next, perhaps you will have the goodness to order a line to be written to me by this night's post, and I shall have it at eight o'clock to-morrow; and indeed I would have asked leave to wait on you to-morrow at twelve o'clock if I had not supposed that as yet you may be too much occupied; or I can attend you at any hour on Sunday. But if I hear nothing, I shall infer that you will permit me to see you at Camelford House at eleven o'clock on Monday morning, and that you prefer that hour; still observing that either to-morrow or Sunday would be nearly equally convenient to me.

"The variation from the Cabinet rule in respect to Lord Ellenborough is certainly an excellent idea."

LORD GRENVILLE TO EARL FITZWILLIAM.

1806, January 31. Camelford House.—

Lord Chancellor	..	Mr. Erskine.
Lord President	..	Earl FitzWilliam.
Lord Privy Seal	..	Viscount Sidmouth.
Secretaries of State—		
Foreign	.. ..	Mr. Fox.
Home	.. ..	Earl Spencer.
War	.. ..	Mr. Windham.
Admiralty	.. ..	Mr. Grey.
Lord Lieutenant of Ireland		Earl of Moira.
Chancellor of the Exchequer		Lord Henry Petty.
First Lord of the Treasury		Lord Grenville.
Chief Justice	..	Lord Ellenborough.

"The above plan of Cabinet was this day submitted to the King, with a minute reserving for future discussion the military arrangements and administration.

"His Majesty took the whole for consideration, and told me he would send for me again when he was ready with his answer, which would probably be in a day or two.

"I trust that Lord Milton goes on as favourably as you can wish." *Copy.*

## APPENDIX.

1804-5.

## CORRESPONDENCE OF GEORGE III. AND HIS SON, THE PRINCE OF WALES, ON THE SUBJECT OF THE EDUCATION OF PRINCESS CHARLOTTE OF WALES.

## THE EARL OF MOIRA to the LORD CHANCELLOR.

1804, July 17.—“The Prince of Wales has just honoured me with a commission to your lordship, which I fulfil with infinite satisfaction. From various quarters it has come round to his Royal Highness that his Majesty had expressed a wish to have the Princess Charlotte under his immediate care. The Prince of Wales apprehends that the gracious delicacy which so peculiarly marks the King, may have prevented his Majesty signifying his desire upon this subject. Therefore his Royal Highness commands me to request that your lordship will tender his humble duty to the King, with the profession that, if such be his Majesty’s inclination, nothing could be more highly gratifying to his Royal Highness than to see the Princess under his Majesty’s special direction. The Prince of Wales only hopes this explanation may, in indulgence to a father’s anxiety, be permitted; that he would solicit to commit the Princess Charlotte to the sole and exclusive care of the King.”

## GEORGE III. to the LORD CHANCELLOR.

1804, 23 November.—“The King incloses to the Lord Chancellor his instructions as to the language he is, if the Prince of Wales is in town, to hold to him on the subject of his Majesty’s granddaughter, or if absent, which the Lord Chancellor is to write in the King’s name to the Prince of Wales. His Majesty trusts he has stated the whole in so clear and concise a manner that further explanation from him cannot be necessary.” *Copy.*

## THE LORD CHANCELLOR to H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES.

1804, November 23.—“The Lord Chancellor, offering his very humble duty to his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, begs leave to inform his Royal Highness that his Majesty has been pleased to command him to lay before his Royal Highness the inclosed paper, containing an outline of the plan which his Majesty proposes respecting the care and education of her Royal Highness the Princess Charlotte, previous to any decision being made what persons may be proper to be named to the important situations mentioned in the paper.”

*Enclosure.*

“The Prince having, through the Earl of Moira, expressed his wish that the education and care of the person of his daughter shall be placed under the immediate inspection of the King, his Majesty is willing to take that charge on himself, and has prepared an house at Windsor for the reception of the Princess Charlotte. The sum now issued, in each quarter, out of his Majesty’s Civil List for the maintenance and education of the young Princess, should in future be paid into the hands of the person who shall be named by the King to defray those expenses; and such additional charges as may arise from the change of establishment, will be defrayed by the King. His Majesty proposes to name a bishop to superintend Princess Charlotte’s education, as it cannot be alone that of a female, but she, being the presumptive heir of the Crown, must have one of a more extended nature. His Majesty also thinks it desirable that the bishop should fix on a proper clergyman to instruct the young Princess in religion and Latin and daily to read prayers; that there should be another instructor for history, geography, *belles lettres*, and French, and masters for writing, music, and dancing. That the care of the person and behaviour of the Princess should be intrusted to a governess; and (as she must be both day and night under the eyes of responsible persons) that a sub-governess and assistant sub-governess should also be named.

“These seem the necessary outlines to form such a plan as may make so promising a child turn out as it is the common interest of the King, all his family, and indeed the whole nation, eagerly to wish.

“It may not be improper to add that the conduct of the Dowager Countess of Elgin has been so exemplary that, though her age and weak state of health must make her retiring necessary, the King will give her a pension equal to her present salary.” *Copy.*

## H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES to the LORD CHANCELLOR.

1804, November 24. Carlton House.—“The Prince of Wales has received a letter from the Chancellor, inclosing a paper, which he understands to come from the King, containing the outlines of a plan for the future care of the person and education of his daughter the Princess Charlotte. It is with no inconsiderable degree of surprise that the Prince observes, in the very commencement of the paper transmitted by the Lord Chancellor, a reference to a communication through the Earl of Moira, which can only relate to the letter which his lordship wrote the Chancellor (his Majesty never having yet been pleased to utter one word upon the subject to the Prince), the contents of which letter the Prince had, not without reason, flattered himself had been sufficiently explained to the Lord Chancellor by the Prince himself in the interview he had with

his lordship at Carlton House, the day but one previous to his Majesty's leaving Windsor for Weymouth; and by the Earl of Moira, immediately before the last time his lordship left London to resume his command in Scotland, as well as very lately indeed (only a few days ago) in the very short interview he had with the Chancellor; in which interview the Earl of Moira assured the Prince that he had put the Chancellor most fully in possession of the Prince's feelings and intentions.

"The Prince likewise knows from the Earl of Moira that he has completely informed Mr. Pitt of the Prince's dispositions and resolutions upon the subject. The Prince therefore returns the inclosed paper to the Chancellor, and desires that both he and Mr. Pitt will most respectfully, but most thoroughly, at the same time, explain to his Majesty what the Earl of Moira has been so fully authorised to communicate to them upon this head; and, in order to prevent in future any misunderstanding or misinterpretation, the Prince further desires that all communications with him upon this subject may pass through the Earl of Moira." *Copy.*

#### THE LORD CHANCELLOR TO H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES.

1804, November 27.—"The Lord Chancellor, with every sentiment of respect and duty, acknowledges the receipt of his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales' letter of the 24th instant. With the same sentiments he expresses his hope that his Royal Highness will allow him to mention, as his Royal Highness's letter leads him to doubt whether he is sufficiently aware of the fact, that the paper, which he had the honour of transmitting, was delivered by his Majesty himself to the Chancellor, with his express commands that the Chancellor should communicate it to his Royal Highness. Having stated this circumstance he very humbly solicits that his Royal Highness will be graciously pleased to inform him whether he is to acquaint his Majesty that his Royal Highness has returned the paper to the Lord Chancellor, signifying his desire that all communications upon this subject with his Royal Highness should pass through the Earl of Moira, who is, as the Chancellor understands, at present in Scotland. The Lord Chancellor further humbly informs his Royal Highness that he has communicated the letter he has received to Mr. Pitt, expressing his Royal Highness's pleasure that Mr. Pitt and the Lord Chancellor should explain to his Majesty what the Earl of Moira had been authorized to state to them upon the subject. The Lord Chancellor can only, most respectfully, and dutifully, assure his Royal Highness that, according to his understanding of what the Earl of Moira has been pleased to communicate, he has nothing to add to what he has already stated to his Majesty; and that, according to that understanding, he is not aware that any part of what his Majesty stated in the paper transmitted to his Royal

Highness, as proposed by his Majesty, is inconsistent with what the Lord Chancellor had learnt from the Earl of Moira." *Copy.*

H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES to the LORD CHANCELLOR.

1804, November 30. Carlton House. — "The Prince of Wales has received the note of the Chancellor, in which his lordship appears to decline to lay before his Majesty the answer which the Lord Chancellor received from the Prince to the communication made to him through the Lord Chancellor, by command of his Majesty. The Lord Chancellor has only to refer to that answer to observe that the Prince never doubted his lordship's assertion that the communication in question was made by the command of his Majesty. The presumed error therefore of the Prince in this respect can afford no ground for the Chancellor's continuing to decline or defer communicating the Prince's answer. At the same time the Prince desires it to be most distinctly understood that, in returning the paper transmitted by the Lord Chancellor, nothing is so distant from the Prince's feeling and intention as to be guilty of the least disrespect to his Majesty, or to depart, in the slightest degree, from that dutiful and grateful attention with which the Prince must ever entertain any communication coming from his Majesty, when he shall have reason to think that his Majesty has been duly informed of the grounds upon which such a communication professes to proceed. But the Prince feels himself bound explicitly to declare that he cannot entertain any proposition which has for its preliminary the idea that the Prince is to relinquish the care, custody, and education of his daughter, however solicitous he may be, as he ever has been, to meet his Majesty's wishes, and to have the benefit of his Majesty's gracious advice and counsel upon this most important and interesting subject.

"The Prince is compelled to add that after the very full explanations which have passed upon these points between the Earl of Moira on the part of the Prince, and the Lord Chancellor and Mr. Pitt, he did not expect that his Majesty would have remained so uninformed of the Prince's sentiments as to have commanded the Lord Chancellor to transmit to the Prince a paper, wholly grounded on the statement of a wish on the Prince's part, which, if ever expressed to the extent assumed (the Prince having no copy of Lord Moira's letter), subsequent explanations, and even those accompanying that letter, must have clearly shown to warrant a very different conclusion from that which has been drawn from it; and it is only for the purpose of securing that a distinct statement of those explanations shall now be made, that the Prince has thought it necessary to take this course.

"With regard to what has occurred in the interviews of

Lord Moira with the Chancellor or Mr. Pitt, the Prince places the most implicit reliance on the representations, verbal and written, made to him of what passed in those interviews, by Lord Moira, to whom the Prince will immediately communicate the letters of the Lord Chancellor and Mr. Pitt, and by whom alone misunderstandings, if any such in fact exist, can be cleared up.

“The Prince has only further to observe that his Majesty has never been pleased to speak to the Prince upon this important subject ; nor to the Earl of Moira in the audience with which he deigned to honour him ; that, if the Lord Chancellor and Mr. Pitt decline to return to his Majesty such reply as the Prince humbly conceives himself bound to make to the propositions conveyed through them, the lamented appearance of disrespect towards the King can, in no degree, be imputed to the Prince. The Prince desires the Lord Chancellor to communicate this note to Mr. Pitt.” *Copy.*

THE LORD CHANCELLOR to H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES.

1804, December 1.—“The Lord Chancellor has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales’s letter of yesterday’s date, and according to his Royal Highness’s commands, will immediately communicate it to Mr. Pitt.” *Copy.*

THE EARL OF MOIRA to the LORD CHANCELLOR.

1804, December 21.—“The Prince of Wales arrived last night from Brighton, and has honoured me with his commands to attend him at one o’clock this day. I shall then be apprised of what his Royal Highness considers as essential deviations from the principles on which he allowed me to proceed in my former communications.”

H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES to the LORD CHANCELLOR.

1804, December 23. Carlton House.—“The Prince of Wales has, this afternoon, been informed by the Earl of Moira that the Lord Chancellor represents the King as waiting for an answer to a paper delivered on the 23rd of November last. The Prince of Wales never could have been guilty of such disrespect to his Majesty, as to have left any communication from his Majesty so long unanswered. And he did imagine that he had fully testified his duty to the King by the note dated the very next day, the 24th of November, which he transmitted to the Lord Chancellor. The note explained there was a misapprehension in the preamble, upon which the propositions on the part of the King were grounded, such as could only arise from his Majesty’s not having been in possession of all the circumstances relating to the subject in question. As the effect of such misapprehension would pervade every

arrangement built upon it, and alter the quality of measures in which the Prince might otherwise most cheerfully concur, there was a necessity that the mistake should be remedied in the first instance. The Prince of Wales therefore endeavoured to recall the Lord Chancellor's advertance to a special condition which the earl of Moira was originally commissioned to insert; and on the apparent disregard of which he was subsequently directed to comment. Although that condition was only, through motives of peculiar delicacy, indicated by the word 'exclusively,' the full report of it was detailed by the Earl of Moira, in the trust that his Majesty would be made acquainted with its bearing, an attention which the Prince of Wales could not but suppose from the paper of the 23rd November, had been omitted. Till this is cleared, the Prince can only repeat the unfeigned professions of his humble and affectionate duty to the King, and the assurances of his anxious desire to gratify his Majesty's wishes in every particular that may not injuriously affect his own honour; a reservation which the Prince of Wales would not express, did he not know that the King would be, beyond any other man living, solicitous to guard him against such a consequence. The Prince of Wales persuades himself that this explanation cannot but satisfactorily remove all supposition of the existence of any inattention so inconsistent with his heart-felt reverence towards his father and sovereign." *Copy.*

#### GEORGE III. to the LORD CHANCELLOR.

1804, December 31.—“The King, with many good wishes to the Lord Chancellor on the approaching new year, transmits the paper to be either delivered or sent to the Prince of Wales by the Lord Chancellor; who is authorised, at the same time, to forward a copy to the Earl of Moira at Donington, as that Earl, being early apprised of the contents of the paper, may enable him to expedite this tedious business, and at length bring it to a fair conclusion.” *Copy.*

#### *Enclosure.*

“His Majesty in the paper which the Lord Chancellor communicated by the King's command on the 23 November to the Prince, referred in the preamble to the Prince's wish, expressed through the Earl of Moira. That wish was expressed in the Earl's letter of 17 July last, in which the Lord Chancellor was requested to tender the Prince's humble duty to his Majesty with the profession that, if such was his Majesty's inclination, nothing could be more gratifying to the Prince than to see the Princess Charlotte taken under his Majesty's special direction. His Majesty, therefore, in the preamble of the paper, referred to the wish which had been so communicated on the part of the Prince, and he accordingly considered the communication through the Earl of Moira as representing

that the Prince wished to see the Princess Charlotte taken under the King's special direction, in consequence of the Prince's understanding that such was his Majesty's wish and desire. The King repeats what he has before stated to the Lord Chancellor and Mr. Pitt, which he has been informed they represented to Earl Moira, that his Majesty regards the communication from the Prince, founded upon his desire to gratify what he understood to be the King's wishes, as a step very acceptable to his Majesty, and conformable to the sense of duty which the Prince has expressed. His Majesty has uniformly stated that, in the taking upon himself the care and management of the Princess Charlotte, he must be understood to do so in a sense consistent with all the attention due to each of the parents of the Princess. His meaning was to form the best plan he could for the education and governance of the Princess, and so to refer it to the consideration of the Prince, and to make such communications respecting it to the Princess of Wales, as the nature of their respective relations to the Princess Charlotte seemed to require. It will be his Majesty's earnest desire to act according to this principle. His Majesty has great satisfaction in believing that there is reason to think that the Prince is likely to concur in the measures proposed by his Majesty, if the misapprehensions, which have been unhappily entertained, are removed; and he trusts that the explanations which have taken place may effectually remove them.

"If this should happily be the case, his Majesty would proceed to state, for the consideration of the Prince, the names of the persons who may appear proper to fill the very important situations mentioned in his Majesty's paper; and, as this measure originated, and has been carried on, in consequence of the Prince's having expressed a wish to meet his Majesty's inclination, it will be most satisfactory to the King that the arrangement should be completed upon the same footing, and that his Majesty's choice should be made with the Prince's entire concurrence." *Copy.*

H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES to the LORD CHANCELLOR.

1805, January 3. Carlton House.—"The Prince of Wales requests that the Lord Chancellor will express to the King how sensible the Prince is to his Majesty's condescension in the explanations now transmitted. From the moment in which he first allowed Lord Moira to write to the Lord Chancellor on the subject, the Prince of Wales has never varied in his readiness to meet the King's wishes on any terms consistent with his honour and parental duty to his daughter; a duty the fulfilment of which he could, with cheerful conscientiousness, share with the King, but with no other individual whatsoever; well knowing the implicit confidence which might be placed in the King's honour, he never would

have an apprehension of deviation from the true spirit of the condition, supposing it once distinctly understood. But circumstances led the Prince to surmise that there had not been a clear communication upon this point, and he thence had to fear that the Princess Charlotte might imperceptibly have fallen under other guidance, than that to which he was willing to commit her. Now that the Prince of Wales is satisfied that the King has a correct view of what is to be the good faith of the engagement, he hastens to profess his happiness in concurring with His Majesty's pleasure as far as it is yet indicated; construing, of course, the allusion to the respective relations of the parents by that universally recognised moral feeling which has, in all countries, and in all times, made a marked distinction between the rights of a father and a mother, and has uniformly assigned to the judgment of the former the direction of the offspring. Assenting perfectly to the outline which his Majesty has deigned to trace, the Prince of Wales anticipates with pleasure the hope of finding himself enabled to concur with the King in the details which his Majesty has been pleased to say shall be presented for the Prince's concurrence." *Copy.*

GEORGE III. to the LORD CHANCELLOR.

1805, January 5.—“The King authorises the Lord Chancellor to inform the Prince of Wales that he has received with satisfaction the answer to the paper which the Lord Chancellor sent to the Prince of Wales from his Majesty, and will in consequence proceed with as little delay as the due consideration of so serious a concern requires, to state to the Prince, through the same channel, for the Prince's consideration the names of the persons that shall occur to his Majesty as most likely to suit the situations necessary for the care and instruction of his grand-daughter, the Princess Charlotte, who has every gift from nature to render her capable of profiting by that care and attention which may render her in future an honour to her family, and a blessing to those, if it pleases the Almighty to preserve her life, who must on a future day acknowledge her as their sovereign.” *Copy.*

THE LORD CHANCELLOR to H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES.

1805, January 17.—“The Lord Chancellor offers his most humble duty to his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales and, by the King's commands, transmits for his Royal Highness's consideration the inclosed paper. The Lord Chancellor has been authorised by His Majesty, and has thought it his duty to his Royal Highness to transmit a copy to Earl Moira.” *Copy.*

*Enclosure.*

“The King having given the utmost attention to the magnitude of the object he has at heart, the fixing on proper

persons to superintend the care and education of his dear grand-daughter the Princess Charlotte, is convinced that, on the bench of bishops, no man is so well calculated to plan the mode of education as the Bishop of Exeter who, in addition to his exemplary conduct, erudition, and having with great assiduity and attention attended the Duke of Kent, has the peculiar advantage of being of a very mild disposition, and possessing a most engaging manner, likely to gain the esteem of any young person he is required to converse with. To him must be left the choice of the instructor in religion, Latin, English history, and the duty of reading prayers. In examining those who, from their rank and unimpeached characters might be thought eligible to the employment of governess, immediately the names of the Marchioness of Townsend, and the Countess of Cardigan and Aylesbury occurred ; but from their particular situations, it appears evident that any application to them could not succeed. His Majesty therefore thinks that, considering the excellent education and character, as well as the exemplary attention which she has given to the education of her children, Baroness Howe is the person best qualified for this great trust ; and the real attachment which the Howe family have ever manifested towards every branch of the Royal Family ensures that, should she undertake the task, she will fulfil it with real diligence and the utmost propriety.

“The King has with great attention viewed the behaviour, the last summer at Weymouth, and enquired into the character of Mrs. Campbell, the widow of a colonel in the army, who died governor of the Island of Bermudas. She is by birth Irish, her name was Kelly, she lived as a friend with Lady Strangeways last summer, and would not have been invited by the Countess of Ilchester had she not in every light been able to stand the severest scrutiny ; and his Majesty thinks she might with great propriety be intrusted with the important situation of sub-governess. It seems only necessary to mention the idea of an assistant sub-governess. The nomination ought, his Majesty thinks, to be left to the governess, as the person most interested to find an assistant sub-governess every way fit to attend the young Princess in the absence of the sub-governess. His Majesty thinks that on this plan the Princess will be surrounded with persons who will cultivate her mind, furnish it with excellent principles, and render her an honour and comfort to her relations, and a blessing to the dominions over which she may hereafter preside.” *Copy.*

H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES to the LORD CHANCELLOR.

1805, January 18. Carlton House.—“The Prince of Wales desires to acknowledge the receipt of a paper, which the Lord Chancellor transmitted yesterday from his Majesty. Truly sensible how much his Majesty wishes that the arrangements

should give the completest satisfaction to all parties, the Prince would think that he did not do justice to the King's gracious intentions, if he did not suggest any alteration which occurred to him on so important a subject. In this sentiment the Prince ventures to express his earnest hope that the King may deign to reconsider an article of the plan, upon grounds relative to which the Earl of Moira is authorised to confer with the Lord Chancellor." *Copy.*

GEORGE III. to the LORD CHANCELLOR.

1805, January 20-25.—“His Majesty, next to doing his duty, has nothing more at heart than that the arrangement for the due care of the person and education of his granddaughter the Princess Charlotte should be settled to the satisfaction of all parties; of which he will give the fullest proof; as he finds the Prince of Wales doubts the idea of the fitness of Baroness Howe, whom the King would undoubtedly have named as governess, if the appointment had respected one of his own daughters. His Majesty however waives the idea on the present occasion, and, after the severe loss which she has sustained within these few days, a doubt might reasonably be entertained whether she would accept the situation, if the appointment had met with the approbation of all parties. The King, having reason to believe that the Baroness de Clifford would be acceptable to the Prince of Wales, and being convinced of her excellent sense and correct conduct, is willing to cast his eyes upon her for the important situation of governess to the Princess Charlotte, trusting, that, this being agreed to, no further difficulties will be made respecting the subjects in the paper, transmitted through the Lord Chancellor.” *Copy.*

H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES to the LORD CHANCELLOR.

1805, January 28. Carlton House.—“The Prince of Wales requests the Lord Chancellor to lay before the King the dutiful and most respectful acknowledgments of the Prince for his Majesty's condescension in reconsidering an article in the proposed arrangement. The footing, on which the matter is now placed, the Prince most earnestly hopes will remove any further difficulty. The Prince of Wales has nothing to add but his renewed assurances of his devotion to the King, and of the happiness he must ever feel when he has the good fortune to have it in his power to do anything that is pleasing to his Majesty.” *Copy.*

GEORGE III. to the LORD CHANCELLOR.

1805, February 18.—“The King authorises the Lord Chancellor to acquaint the Prince of Wales that his Majesty has, this morning, received notice of Mrs. Campbell's acceptance of her nomination as sub-governess of his dearly beloved

daughter the Princess Charlotte. This completing the most necessary attendants upon the young Princess, the King approves of the Baroness de Clifford taking the charge of the Princess whenever it shall be most agreeable to the Prince of Wales. She will then be a better judge of the requisites necessary in the lady she may recommend as assistant sub-governess, who must be of sufficient birth to appear with the young Princess in the absence of Mrs. Campbell. The Earl of Dartmouth has very handsomely consented to regulate the expenses of the young Princess's establishment." *Copy.*

H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES to the LORD CHANCELLOR.

1805, February 19.—“ The Prince has to acknowledge the Lord Chancellor's note of this day containing a communication from his Majesty. The Prince of Wales will take as early an opportunity as possible of introducing Lady de Clifford to the Princess Charlotte. At the same time the Prince must add that he has some observations to offer, which he will delay making till the arrival in town of the Earl of Moira whom he expects on either Thursday or Friday next.” *Copy.*

GEORGE III. to the LORD CHANCELLOR.

1805, February 20.—“ The King has just received the Lord Chancellor's note forwarding a copy of the one from the Prince of Wales on the receipt of the King's message. The transaction is now happily concluded, though his Majesty cannot conceive what further observations are to be made.” *Copy.*

GEORGE III. to the LORD CHANCELLOR.

1805, March 1.—“ The preparations for establishing the Princess Charlotte at Windsor being now in such forwardness that the King can authorise the Lord Chancellor to acquaint the Prince of Wales that her apartment will be ready for her reception in two weeks, and that then he shall give notice to Lady de Clifford for her removal to that place. From what he has seen of his dear grand-daughter during the few days she has been there, he doubts not but, with the proper attention of those now placed to superintend her education, and the upright conduct, in all situations, of the governess, who is to have the care of her, she will prove a blessing to her relatives, and an honour to her native country.” *Copy.*

H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES to the LORD CHANCELLOR.

1805, March 1.—“ The Prince of Wales has to acknowledge the receipt of the Lord Chancellor's note of this morning enclosing a communication from the King. The Prince of Wales will, in consequence, prepare a paper with as little delay as possible to be laid before his Majesty.” *Copy.*

## THE EARL OF MOIRA to the LORD CHANCELLOR.

1805, March 2.—“Could I be of any further utility I should not go out of town; but I do not see of what further service my longer stay here can be in either result of the step which will now be taken by the Prince of Wales. Anxious in the extreme to avoid anything which can be dissatisfactory to the King, his Royal Highness will adopt a course for submitting to his Majesty’s own judgment certain points of convenience in such manner as he hopes may preclude every appearance of altercation. Until the issue of this endeavour, the most truly respectful he can devise, shall be known, the Prince will delay any formal paper. I ardently hope this measure may yet succeed in removing all difficulties.” *Copy.*

## THE BISHOP OF EXETER to the LORD CHANCELLOR.

1805, March 8.—“The Bishop of Exeter is commanded by the King and authorised by his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales to deliver to the Lord Chancellor a sealed paper, which the Bishop has received from the Prince to be presented to the King.” *Copy.*

*Enclosure.*

## MEMORANDUM of H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES.

1805, March 4.—“Lady de Clifford and the Bishop of Exeter having now entered upon the important functions committed to them, the Prince is desirous that they should, from time to time, lay before his Majesty such ideas as occur to him, as to the details necessary for carrying into execution the general principles adopted respecting the education of Princess Charlotte. This memorandum is therefore intended to apprise them of the general state of the business, and to serve as a guide for them in such conversations as his Majesty may honour them with upon this subject. In consequence of some previous intimation which the Prince had received of his Majesty’s wishes, the Prince has expressed that, without meaning to discharge himself in any degree of that duty of superintendence and control which nature imposes on a father in all that relates to the education of his child, he was, at the same time desirous of receiving the benefit of his Majesty’s gracious advice and assistance in a matter so interesting to his feelings, and of giving to Princess Charlotte the full advantage of that affectionate interest which his Majesty is graciously pleased to take in her welfare. But reasons, which it is not necessary here to particularize, compelled the Prince to require that the persons, through whom this communication was made, should respectfully, but distinctly, explain to his Majesty that the Prince could on no account agree to the interference of any other person whatever, except his Majesty, in the dispositions to be made on the subject, and that this point must at

all times be considered as the indispensable condition of the Prince's consent to any arrangement present or future. What has hitherto been done on the subject has, as the Prince conceives, been intended to be regulated by this principle. The next point to be adjusted for giving effect to it is that which relates to the residence of the Princess Charlotte. On which subject the Prince desires that Lady de Clifford and the Bishop will submit to his Majesty, for his gracious consideration, the following ideas. The Prince thinks that, during the period of the year in which he is usually resident in London, his daughter can nowhere be so properly placed as under her father's roof, where her education may be carried on without interruption, and where he himself will have the constant opportunity of observing its course and progress. His Majesty's habits of doing business in London several days in each week will afford to the Princess Charlotte ample opportunity of paying her duty there to the King and Queen, as often as they may be pleased to require it. And it is by no means the Prince's idea that this arrangement should exclude such short visits to Windsor, during the seasons of holidays, or on other temporary occasions, as may be found not to break in too much upon the course of her education. During those months when the Prince is usually not resident in London, he would have great satisfaction in his daughter being allowed to reside at Windsor, at Weymouth, or elsewhere, reserving to himself in the same manner as is above stated, the pleasure of seeing her sometimes, if he should wish it, on short and occasional visits. The communications already made to Lady de Clifford seem to give every reason to hope that these ideas are very little, if at all, different from those entertained by his Majesty on the subject; and, at all events, the Prince is confident that they cannot fail to be considered as fresh proofs of his respectful desire to meet his Majesty's wishes in every way consistent with his honour, and with the feelings of paternal affection and duty towards his daughter." *Copy.*

GEORGE III. to the LORD CHANCELLOR.

1805, March 18.—“The King having signed the commission for passing the Bills now ready for the royal assent, returns it to the Lord Chancellor. His Majesty is well satisfied with the Chancellor's report that the business of the future care of the education and person of his dearly beloved granddaughter has been stated to his confidential Ministers for their opinion, as he has no view but fulfilling his duty on this occasion. He is desirous the opinion should be well weighed before given; and consequently, clearness in giving it, more than despatch, is required.” *Copy.*

GEORGE III. to the LORD CHANCELLOR.

1805, November.—“The King has not thought it necessary previous to his return to Windsor to take any further steps

for fixing the residence of his grand-daughter, as the apartment is not yet entirely prepared for her reception. It has been his Majesty's earnest wish, from the beginning, in superintending and directing her education to act in entire concurrence with the wishes of her father, and it was, in full conformity to this principle, that he directed a proper place to be prepared at Windsor for her residence, except at such times as she might occasionally visit either of her parents. Having since learnt that the Prince is desirous that she should remain under his roof during the time of his usual residence in town, and that she should remain with his Majesty in the summer, except during the time of occasional visits, his Majesty is disposed to concur in that proposal; and is desirous to fix the period of her residence at Windsor from June to January, and is willing that she should reside at Carlton House the remaining months of the year. And his Majesty would not be desirous of making any alteration in this arrangement, which admits the absence of the Princess for so long a period of the year from his own roof, unless it should appear to him to become detrimental to the execution of the plan prepared for the education of the Princess, in which his Majesty can never cease to take the strongest interest, both from personal affection, and from what he feels to be due to the future welfare of his subjects." *Copy.*

H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES to the LORD CHANCELLOR.

1805, December 12. Brighton.—“The Prince of Wales acknowledges the Chancellor's letter, which he has this moment received, inclosing a paper from his Majesty relative to the Princess Charlotte. The Prince must observe that, as all communications throughout this business have passed, on the part of the Prince, through the Earl of Moira, as they have, on the part of his Majesty, through the Chancellor, it will be impossible for the Prince, at any rate, to send as immediate an answer as he could wish to do to the King's paper. The peculiar delicate situation of the Earl of Moira's family would preclude the Prince from sending for his lordship, even if the power of so doing rested in the Prince; but, from the military command which the Earl of Moira still holds, it must require an order from his Majesty for him to leave his post. In addition to this consideration, it is proper to observe that, since the last communication on this subject took place several months ago between his Majesty and the Prince, various circumstances have occurred, of many of which the Chancellor cannot fail to be in possession, and which make it absolutely necessary that nothing should be left now open to the possibility of further or future misunderstandings. There are also, in his Majesty's present note, some passages which render it impossible for the Prince to proceed without a clear explanation of the extent and meaning in which they are

understood by His Majesty, as the Prince has always wished to have everything that concerns this transaction settled upon the most distinct, the fairest, and the most honourable grounds. In this situation it is scarcely necessary that the Prince should again observe to the Chancellor that all further discussion or proceedings on the subject of his Majesty's papers, must consequently be suspended until whatever period the Earl of Moira may arrive in London." *Copy.*

THE EARL OF MOIRA to the LORD CHANCELLOR.

1805, Decembér 30. London.—“ Allow me to offer with the greatest truth my deep condolence on the grievous loss you have suffered. In such circumstances I should deem it unpardonable to intrude upon you anything of business beyond a simple intimation for which I conceive your lordship may be even at present solicitous. Having had leave to come hither for a few days on my private concerns, I was on my arrival made acquainted with a message, recently transmitted through your lordship, by the King to the Prince of Wales, together with an answer, in which the Prince has honoured me so far as to refer to my absence, his Royal Highness not being then aware that I was coming to town. Of course I have taken the earliest opportunity of waiting upon the Prince of Wales, and I am just returned from Brighton. I have humbly conceived that his Majesty did not mean to state a reservation which would annul the terms of the proposal he had deigned to make, as well as all former points mutually understood on the subject. If I do not err in that construction, I am sure there cannot (when I have the honour of meeting your lordship) be any difficulty in settling everything consonantly to the King's wishes. Nothing is lost by the delay, as the arrangement looks to no consequence till late in the spring. A just reverence for your lordship's sorrows, added to the pressure of public affairs after the painful news just received from the Continent, would prevent advertence to this topic for a longer period than the probable absence which I am now to make from London. When the matter shall be resumed, I have the happiness of thinking his Majesty will find cause to give credit to the Prince of Wales for being actuated solely by the fear that the reservation (if unexplained) might be a source of misapprehension hereafter; a possibility which his affection and veneration towards the King led his Royal Highness most anxiously to avoid. His Majesty will then be further satisfied that the Prince of Wales has felt with full sensibility the King's gracious expression of his desire that the arrangement should be on such a footing as would be completely agreeable to his Royal Highness. I earnestly entreat your lordship not to take the trouble of acknowledging this letter.” *Copy.*

## APOLOGY FOR THE LOSS OF MALTA.

“PRÉCIS DE LA RÉVOLUTION DE MALTE,” by BARON DE HOM-  
PESCH, GRAND MASTER OF THE ORDER OF ST. JOHN OF  
JERUSALEM.

“ Pour faire une rélation exacte de la révolution de Malte et de l’envahissement par les Français qui la suivit, il faudroit attendre du tems et de la communication des différens membres fugitifs de l’Ordre bien des circonstances encore ensévelies sous le voile du mistère L’espèce de conjuration étoit si préméditée et si noire, qu’elle ne permet pas de juger des faits d’après un premier coup d’oeil. On les rapportera tous ici, comme on les a vu se succeder les uns aux autres ; mais on n’entrera pas dans tous les détails des causes qui peuvent les avoir fait naitre. Ce sera dans le suite, lorsqu’on aura éclairés bien des doutes, qu’on communiquera une historie détaillée à tous ceux qui doivent prendre intérêt à un Ordre qui, dans l’intention de se faire honneur, fut le sacrifice de la plus noire des trahisons.

“ Le 6. juin, 1798.—On decouvrit vers midi cette grande flotte Francaise dont l’armement excitoit l’attention de toute l’Europe. Quelques heures après, deux batiments marchands Grecs qui avoient devancés de beaucoup l’escadre pour faire un détour et paraitre venir du levant, entrèrent dans le port ; ils dirent être chargés de grains, venir de l’Archipel, et furent mis, selon l’usage, en quarantaine.

“ Le 7. juin.—La première division de la flotte avoit déjà deployé devant le port. Son commandant nommé Eidoux, s’appercevant qu’on avoit renforcé quelques batteries sur le rivage, écrivit à Monsieur Caruson, consul de France, né Maltais, le charger de témoigner au gouvernement son étonnement de ce qu’on supposoit à l’escadre des vues qui démentiroient la bonne intelligence qui n’avoit cessé de regner entre la France et l’Ordre.

“ Le Gouvernement de Malte ne se refusa pas à laisser entrer dans le port plusieurs petits batiments endommagés. Ils saluerent le port et firent une foule de declarations d’amitié°. On leur facilita les radoub, et on leur donna les rafraichissements nécessaires.

“ Ce même Eidoux, ainsi que d’autres officiers, firent une quantité de demonstrations qui tendoient à prouver l’amitié constante de la République francaise pour l’ordre de Malte, en ne cessant de louer la neutralité que le Gouvernement avoit gardé jusqu’ici. Ces declarations engagerent une partie de la population à croire que les Francois n’avoient pas des vues hostiles sur Malte. Malgré cette opinion, malgré la conduite qu’avoit tenu la flotte Francaise le mois de Mars passé lorsque, revenant de l’isle de Corfu, elle s’étoit arretée à

Malte pour passer à Toulon, le Grand Maître a jugé nécessaire d'ordonner les dispositions suffisantes à repousser une attaque du dehors, mais malheureusement trop faibles à prévenir une trame intérieure ; les ordres nécessaires furent donnés au Maréchal de l'Ordre Commandant les forces, le Bailli de Loras. On fit rassembler les milices et marcher les reserves dans les différens forts ; en même tems l'on envoya plusieurs barques pour chercher le vaisseau et la frigate de l'Ordre qui étoient encore en croisière, et venoient de prendre un chebec de Tunis. Les vaisseaux furent trouvés ; ils revinrent deux jours après, passant au milieu de l'escadre Française qui, pour faire croire à ses bonnes intentions, ne leur fit aucun empêchement. Le retour des vaisseaux rendit à la ville un grand nombre de canoniers qui manquoient, et cela acheva de garnir les forts autant que la petite garnison le permettoit.

“ Lorsque l'on vit que la première division de l'escadre Française ne faisoit que croiser sur le port et revirer toujours, on s'aperçut que, non-obstant les déclarations d'amitié des Français, on devoit être sur ses gardes contre toute surprise. Le Gouvernement fut enchanté de voir qu'il regnoit une satisfaction générale dans tous les esprits, et que tant le corps des chevaliers que le peuple étoit bien disposé à la défense, et l'on jugea superflue et inutile toute proclamation là, où un concert général faisoit entrevoir l'heureux ensemble de l'opinion.

“ Les nobles, les gens de justice, et les riches bourgeois de le ville, n'étant point employés dans les dispositions de défense, eurent d'autant plus occasion de tenir leurs desseins cachés. C'est ainsi que se passerent les deux premiers jours. Les préparatifs se firent avec autant d'ordre et de tranquillité que l'on pouvoit attendre d'une troupe renforcée de milices peu exercées.

“ Le 9. juin.—Le troisième jour le consul de France, Caruson, se présenta auprès de son altesse Eminentissime, et lui demanda de la part du général en chef Bonaparte, l'entrée du port pour toute l'escadre et le convoi, ainsi que l'assurance d'obtenir tout ce qui feroit l'objet de ses recours. La reponse à cette demande hostile et insidieuse fut : qu'on refusoit l'entrée de l'escadre d'après les loix ; qu'on ne recevroit que quatre batiments à la fois d'après les loix ; que d'ailleurs, on donneroit les secours qu'il conviendrait ; enfin que l'on souhaitoit avoir cette demande par écrit. Le Consul Caruson partit avec cette réponse et ne revint plus.

“ Le 10. juin.—Le lendemain à la pointe du jour les Français armerent leurs canots, les chargerent de troupes, et les dirigerent vers le lieu du débarquement. Ils envoyerent en même tems au port un officier chargé d'une lettre du dit consul à son Altesse Eminentissime.

“ Elle étoit conçue en ces termes,

Eminence.

‘Ayant été appelé pour aller à bord du vaisseau amiral pour porter la réponse que votre Eminence avoit fait à ma proposition de permettre à l’escadre de faire de l’eau, le général-en-chef Bonaparte a été indigné de ce qu’elle ne vouloit accorder la permission de faire de l’eau qu’ à quatre batiments à la fois, et en effet quel tems ne faudroit-il pas á cinq ou six cent voiles pour se procurer de cette manière l’eau et d’autres choses dont ils ont un besoin pressant ! Le refus a d’autant plus surpris le général Bonaparte qu’il n’ignore pas la préférence accordée aux Anglais, et la proclamation faite par le prédécesseur de votre Eminence. Le Général Bonaparte est résolu à se procurer de force ce qu’on auroit du lui accorder suivant les principes d’hospitalité, qui est la base de votre Ordre. J’ai vu les forces considérables qui sont aux ordres de Bonaparte, et je prévois l’impossibilité où se trouve l’Ordre de résister. Il eut été à souhaiter que dans une circonstance si majeure, votre Eminence par amour pour son Ordre, ses chevaliers, et toute la population de Malte, eut pu proposer quelque moyen d’accomodement. Le général n’a point voulu que je retournasse dans une ville qu’il se croit désormais obligé de traiter en ennemie, et qui n’a plus d’espoir que dans la loÿauté du Général Bonaparte. Il a donné les ordres les plus précis pour que la religion, les moeurs, et les propriétés des Maltais soient scrupuleusement respectés.’

“ Les François estoient arrivés a terre. Une petite tour de garde qui est dans ces environs, dont on attendoit d’ailleurs peu de défense, fut abandonnée des huit soldats qui y estoient, après qu’ils eurent tiré une couple de coups de canons. Les bataillons Francois se repandirent bientôt dans l’ysle ; quelques troupes de milices qui gardoient les villages se defendirent, d’autres prirent la fuite en vraies milices.

“ Les Français avouerent pourtant d’avoir perdu dans les campagnes plus de monde qu’ils n’auroient cru ; ils s’en vengerent en pillant impitoyablement les villages. Comme on ne s’etoit jamais attendu à voir la campagne defendue, et que, faute de troupes réglées, on n’en avoit pas même fait le projet, on resolut sur le champ de se borner à une vigoureuse defense de la place. Malheureusement ces paÿsans fuyards des villages, accompagnés de femmes et enfants, se précipiterent dans la ville, et par leur multitude et leur stupidité naturelle, conservent dans la suite tant de confusion et de malheurs. En se bornant à la défense de la forteresse, on n’espéroit pas de soutenir pour tous les tems une place qui seroit imprenable avec les troupes et les moyens nécessaires ; mais on etoit dans la persuasion de pouvoir se défendre au moins quatre ou cinq mois : c’est à dire jusqu’à ce que l’automue eut amené un coup de vent qui auroit chassé l’escadre. Voilà quelle eut été l’issue de cette affaire si la ville n’y avoit pas mis tant d’entraves,

“Cependant on fit aussi du côté du port tout ce que les circonstances permettoient. Une galère, deux galiotes garde-côtes, et une couple de corsaires à rames sortirent et canonèrent vivement les chaloupes de débarquement. On ne put en faire sortir davantage, parceque les canoniers et les matelots avoient été distribués dans les différents forts. Cette sortie du port, secondée du feu vif des forts St. Elme et Tigny, ne vint pas à tems pour empêcher le débarquement, mais ne laissa pas de faire du mal aux bâtimens Français qui s'étoient le plus approchés de terre ; il y eut même une chaloupe coulée bas par le feu d'un petit corsaire Maltais.”

Le 10, juin.—“C'est dans la même matinée que le conseil de guerre donna l'ordre de faire une sortie avec la garnison réglée de 900 hommes sur les troupes Françaises qui approchoient ; mais lorsque ce corps, en sortant de la ville, vit que les milices revenoient en déroute, et qu'ainsi il n'avoit aucun soutien à attendre, il montra mauvaise contenance.

“Comme en effet on ne pouvoit attendre aucun fruit de ce petit nombre, on le fit rentrer et on le distribua dans les forts.

“Les Français commencent à cingler la ville hors de la portée du canon ; il y eut de leurs bataillons qui, du côté du port, approchèrent jusque sous les forts, voulant s'assurer si on étoit en état de défense, et essayer de faire un coup de main. Mais les forts Emanuel et Tigny repoussèrent vivement ces épreuves, surtout pendant la nuit du dix au onze, dans laquelle les Français firent plusieurs tentatives.

“Les ennemis voyant que les coups de main ne réussiroient point, et qu' on étoit disposé à se défendre vigoureusement, se retirèrent tout à fait hors de la portée du canon, et attendirent tranquillement les effets d'autres épreuves qu'ils avoient préparés.”

Le 10, juin.—“Ce fut après midi que l'on s'aperçut que les vivres qu'on envoïoit aux forts et aux batteries de la ville étoient détournés par de mal-intentionnés de différents états qui, sous prétexte de rendre service dans le département des vivres, fomentoient de la confusion. Ces traitres, satellites des conjurés qui n'étoient pas encore démasqués, avoient soin de diriger ces secours vers les côtés les plus forts pour laisser manquer de tout le Floriane, forteresse de terre, qui fut reconnue dans la suite être le lieu destiné par les Français à une attaque. Mais le gouvernement se hâtant de faire amener de nouvelles provisions, y mit ordre pour le moment. En même tems il fit exhorter les employés à la tranquillité et au devoir, et en fit relever quelques-uns.

“Alors les conjurés, encore toujours masqués, commencèrent à insinuer dans la Floriane aux milices et aux troupes qui la gardoient, que leurs chefs, pour se faire un mérite auprès de leurs compatriotes ennemis, les avoient déjà vendu. Ce peuple cruel se saisit avec acharnement de plusieurs de ces chefs et les traina, avec les traitements les plus cruels, comme en triomphe par la ville. Plusieurs y furent blessés à mort.

Le Chevalier du Chatel, officier du premier mérite, fut le plus indignement traité, et resta à l'hôpital avec ses compagnons de malheur.

“ Ces troubles inattendus persuaderent au chef de l'Ordre de ne pas changer de place, afin que ceux qui avoient à donner des rapports, ou à recevoir des renseignements, ne fussent pas obligés de le chercher en vain. D'ailleurs dans ce genre de conjuration son apparition en publique auroit, peut-être, haté le terme qui en étoit l'objet, sans aucune probabilité de pouvoir être utile. Il n'auroit certainement pas été difficile aux conjurés décidés de consommer leur œuvre d'iniquité à planter dans les têtes déjà échauffées d'un peuple imbecile la même opinion sur leur prince, qu'ils avoient réussi à mettre sur les chevaliers, leurs chefs et commandants ; et c'est cette même raison qui a induit le conseil à faire des remontrances au grand-maitre, décidé de paroître au milieu de son peuple, dont la plus grande partie étoit induite en erreur par des scélérats qui avoient vendu leur foi at leur honneur à l'ennemi.

“ Le Gouvernement voyant les horreurs qui se commettoient dans la ville, envoya de patrouilles pour essayer d'y mettre ordre ; mais, malheureusement, il diminua par là le nombre des gardes du Palais. On fit aussi relever en hate beaucoup de chefs de portes. Surtout les Français qui, quoiqu'ils fussent les officiers les plus expérimentés et fidèles (à l'exception d'un petit nombre) ne pouvoient plus être utiles, depuis qu'on avoit inspiré au peuple de la méfiance contre eux. Pendant que le gouvernement faisait l'impossible pour mettre de l'ordre dans les dispositions, les conjurés étoient occupés à faire atrouper le peuple de la campagne, encore armé en différentes hordes, et à le faire agir, toujours trompé, selon leur dessein d'augmenter la confusion. Ces troubles se fomentoient dans la ville dans un moment où l'on devoit fournir aux forts les secours de munitions dont ils avoient besoin, en aiant déjà beaucoup consumé ; mais les porteurs furent interceptés et pillés par ces hordes que les conjurés faisoient agir à leur volonté. Ces interceptions se firent d'autant plus facilement que le chef de l'artillerie, commandeur Bardonanché, étoit, comme on l'apprit dans la suite, gagné par les conjurés.

“ Le servant d'armes Foussard, étoit depuis longtems chef du génie. Il eut l'adresse de ne se demasquer dans la suite que lorsque la révolution étoit faite ; il contribuoit insensiblement à faire naitre des mesentendus, et à détourner tout le fruit qu'on auroit pu attendre de la bonne disposition de la chevalerie et du peuple. Il étoit certainement un des chefs de la conspiration, aussi suivit-il l'escadre Française comme officier ingénieur du premier rang.”

Le 11, juin.—“ Cependant les atroupements du peuple, qui n'avoient cessé pendant la nuit, augmentèrent le matin ; les uns demandoient du pain, les autres exigeoient la punition des

traîtres, et désignoient en même tems les meilleurs et les plus fidels chefs ; d'autres étoient envoyés par les forts et se plaignoient de n' avoir pas reçu des vivres qu' on avoit pourtant envoyé la veille ; et chaque troupe, en se plaignant, reçut d' autant plus facilement les impressions qui leur furent communiquées, chemin faisant, par les émissaires des conjurés, toujours occupés à persuader le peuple que l' état d' oubli dans le quel on le laissoit, venoit de la trahison de ses chefs.

“ Les deux batiments grecs dont on a parlé plus haut, qui étoient mouillés dans le fort depuis le jour qu' on avoit aperçu les Français, voyant ces attroupements, crurent que c' étoit déjà le moment de la revolte ; ils débarquèrent des soldats Grecs armés, qui avoient été cachés dans ces batiments, et ils firent une attaque sur le peuple. Mais une patrouille qui passoit dans ce moment fondit sur eux, secondé par le peuple, en tua une vingtaine, en blessa un grand nombre, et on eut beaucoup de peine à arracher le reste, au nombre de cent, à la fureur du peuple. Tons ceux qui y échaperent furent jettés dans les prisons. Voilà un des moiens dont les Français vouloient se servir pour seconder la revolte ; ils avoient donc projeté de la faire par le sang. On trouva dans la suite dans ces batiments toutes les espèces d' armes et de munitions, qui auroient suffis pour armer une grande troupe. Le Gouvernement voyant qu' on cherchoit à lui susciter une guerre intestine, essayä d' y rémédier par différentes précautions ; on avoit déjà mis en prison le Commandeur Ransijat pour avoir tenu quelques mauvais propos. On promit encore au peuple armé dix écus par tête pour tous ceux qui voudroient être d' une sortie qu' on comptoit faire sur les Français. On espéroit par là occuper ce peuple dont l' erreur et l' oisiveté servoient à seconder toutes les entreprises des conjurés. Mais ces sorties n' eurent aucun fruit, puisque le peuple en général se méfioit de la chevalerie, et ne lui obéissoit plus ; il revint donc en ville après s' être légèrement escarmouché. Ce retour de la foule échauffée occasionna de nouveaux tumultes. Les patrouilles qu' on envoya de tout coté heurterent non seulement contre les milices, mais s' escarmouchèrent même entre elles, croyant toujours rencontrer des ennemis de l' état.

“ Une troupe de bourgeois de la ville de différentes classes profita de ce moment d' allarme générale pour faire une deputation à son altesse Eminentissime : ils demanderent simplement, et sans s' expliquer plus clairement, sureté de vie et de propriété. Le Grand-Maitre leur repondit qu' il sauroit ce qu' il auroit à faire, et qu' il en consulteroit avec le conseil, en leur déclarant qu' on devoit penser à se defendre jusqu' à la dernière extrémité. Au reste, qui ne voit dans cette deputation d' un petit nombre des bourgeois, peu instruits de ce qui pouvoit arriver dans une attaque réglée d' une place comme Malte, le soin luisant de ne pas laisser reduire en décombres leurs maisons ? ”

Du 11, au 12, juin.—“ La nuit suivante les conjurés, profitant de l’obscurité, n’épargnerent ni peine ni argent pour achever de gagner le peuple dont ils avoient déjà égaré l’esprit. Des hordes armées courroient par la ville, sans qu’on pût jamais bien savoir qui les avoit envoyé, et qui les commandoit. Des coups de fusil qu’on tiroit de tout coté, la plupart en l’air, faisoient naitre des allarmes à tout moment, et en attirant de monde, augmentoient la confusion. Plus le gouvernement envoïoit de patrouilles, plus elles souleverent contre elles les hordes du peuple, et plus elles furent seduïtes et égarées elles-mêmes. Ce fut dans une de ces occasions que le Bailli de Neveu, Chef des chasseurs de la langue d’Allemagne, qui avoit été depuis trente ans l’idole du peuple, fut blessé par une balle de fusil au cou, qui vint d’une patrouille du corps dont il étoit le chef. Lui-même étoit occupé à y mettre ordre.

“ C’est vers la fin de cette cruelle nuit, dont les scènes sanglantes sont encore peu connues même aux membres de l’Ordre, qu’il parut une seconde deputation nombreuse, à la tête de la quelle étoient les chefs de la conjuration ; le reste étoit des nobles du paÿs, les avocats, bourgeois, marchands, et une quantité de gens de justice. Ils declarerent avec les expressions les plus menaçantes que, ne voulant pas faire depeudre leur sûreté des resolutions de l’Ordre, ils y avoient déjà pourvu, en signant de leurs noms chez le consul d’Hollande, le désir des habitans de se rendre aux Français par un traité préparé, et qu’ils avoient chargé ce consul de la transmettre incessamment au général Bonaparte, avec ou sans l’aveu de l’Ordre.

“ Ces Deputés avoient pris la precaution de venir en grand nombre, et de se présenter dans un moment ou les gardes du Palais, à l’exception des sentinelles, étoient occupées à patrouiller ; ils étoient d’ailleurs maitres de la force armée, en dirigeant depuis deux jours les hordes du peuple repandu dans la ville. Le Grand-Maitre, des mains du quel la force coactive étoit déjà échapée, espéroit toujours encore de pouvoir ramener les égarés ; les nouveaux efforts que fit son altesse éminentissime pour tacher de mettre ordre dans la ville, furent infructueux, par les cruelles scènes que ces traitres venoient de préparer pour appuyer leur demande.

“ Ils avoient entièrement réussi à persuader le peuple que leurs chefs les avoient déjà vendu, et alloient traiter pour les livrer aux ennemis. C’est tout de suite après cette deputation que l’on vit, l’un après l’autre, sept chevaliers massacrés par ce peuple furieux. Les chevaliers Doremi, D’Andelar l’ainé, et Vallin étoient parmi eux des chefs du premier mérite.

“ Les serviteurs de l’Ordre les plus fidèles entre les habitans du paÿs, vinrent à chaque moment donner avis au gouvernement que ces massa[c]res ne faisoient que commencer, et qu’on travailloit à les faire continuer sur tous les membres de l’Ordre qu’on pourroit rencontrer.

“ Le Gouvernement sachant que la force armée étoit généralement égarée et gagnée par les conjurés, se vit obligé, pour faire finir au moins pour le moment les massacres, de permettre à cette députation rebelle, dont il falloit se débarrasser, de traiter avec les Français, en leur imposant cependant de demander une trêve. On eseroit par là gagner du tems, et trouver peut-être encore quelque remède à la révolution qui avoit éclaté. On fut obligé de consentir à faire relâcher de sa prison le Commandeur Ransyat, qui alla avec la députation. En revanche, le gouvernement jugea à propos de la faire accompagné par le bailli de Frisary, pour essayer de temporiser. On demanda, en même tems, l’intermédiation du Ministre de l’Espagne, qui suivit aussi.

“ Pendant que cette députation devoit demander un armistice, le gouvernement essaya encore de remettre quelqu’ordre dans les dispositions ; mais il vit avec désespoir que, quoique pour le moment on eût mis trêve aux massacres, les vivres et munitions étoient à tel point interceptés par la force armée, qu’on ne pouvoit plus y mettre ordre. Quelques corps de troupes revenoient de leur poste, manquant de munitions, et mettoient le comble au désordre en augmentant la foule. Les troupes en ville refusoient généralement d’obéir aux chevaliers, dont elles croyoient avoir été trahis. On reçut tout à coup le rapport que la Floriane, forteresse qui rase la porte de terre de la ville, étoit en pleine insurrection, de façon à ne plus résister à un assaut que les Français pouvoient donner d’un moment à l’autre. Une foule de crieurs démocrates de toutes les classes, sachant qu’ils étoient maîtres de la force armée, avoient envahis le Palais, et crioient à la reddition de la place. Ils avoient constamment entretenu les dissensions dans le peuple, qui n’attendoit qu’un signal pour recommencer les massacres. Enfin on vit qu’il n’y avoit plus de remède. La seule chose qui restoit à faire, fut de se servir des voyes de douceur pour empêcher le peuple d’éclater.

“ Pendant qu’on y travailloit, la députation à Bonaparte, dans la quelle les conjurés, qui étoient les plus nombreux, avoient pris le dessus, accorda la reddition de la place qui étoit déjà prise par les conjurés. Les Français offrirent une infinité d’articles de capitulation qu’ils dictèrent selon leur caprice, et qui furent imprimées dans la suite en différentes variantes. Mais le fait est qu’ils donnerent d’autant plus la loi que, dans le fond, la ville se rendoit à discrétion, et qu’on ne put rien repliquer à tout ce qu’ils dictoient.”

Le 12, juin.—“ C’est le lendemain que les Français commencèrent à entrer dans la ville, et dans ces forts que le manque de vivres avoient fait abandonner par leurs garnisons. Il faut remarquer que les Français étoient déjà vingt-quatre heures dans la ville, que quelques forts éloignés, comme celui de Marsasciroc, ignorant la révolution de la ville, canonoient encore, et se defendoient vigoureusement. Il y eut même une couple de forts du côté du port, qui étoient encore bien

fourni de munitions, et où les émissaires séducteurs n'étoient pas parvenus, qui refuserent de se rendre, ne sachant pas jusqu' où étoit allé révolution dans la ville.

“ L'isle du Goze, où il n'y avoit qu'un commandeur de l'Ordre, qui étoit le Commandant d'un peuple qui ne fut point séduit, parce qu'il n'y avoit ni nobles, ni riches, ni gens de justice, réussit même à repousser deux fois le débarquement des Français ; cette isle peu fortifiée, ne se rendit que lorsque Malte étoit entre les mains des Français.

“ Ceux-ci n'eurent d'autre mérite dans toute cette affaire que d'avoir soutenu par une armée au dehors la revolte qui se fit dans l'intérieur, mais ils agirent, cependant, en vainqueurs altiers et vindicatives.

“ Il faut observer encore que bien des pièces ont été imprimées en différents pays, où il est question de la rentrée des Français dans leur pays, de grand dédommagement d'argent, de pension, et d'une infinité d'autres articles. On verra clairement par cette rélation, que ces différens imprimés sont ou dictés par les Français pendant la révolution, ou bien inventés par des mal-intentionnés.

“ Aussitôt après l'entrée des Français, il y eut un grand nombre de boutiques qui furent pillées ; la dépouille de la riche église de St. Jean et du trésor de l'Ordre suivit. On arracha toutes les armoiries de l'Ordre, et les différentes puissances dont les sujets avoient des hotels. Les vaisseaux, les galères et tout l'équipement des arsénaux furent enlevés.

“ C'est quatres jours après que partit son Altesse Eminentissime. Elle demanda à emporter quelques reliques de l'Ordre, qui lui furent remises, dépouillées de leurs riches ornements. Elle fut accompagné de plusieurs anciens de l'Ordre, qui formerent son conseil.

“ Ce qui se passa après l'entrée des Français, leur manière d'agir vis-à-vis des différentes nations, et vis à vis de la population de Malte, ne manquera pas d'être fort intéressant, lorsqu'on aura été à même de rassembler les faits. Le séjour des premiers fugitifs de l'Ordre a été trop court pour s'assurer de la vérité de ces circonstances ; à peine a-t'on pu apprendre le détail des scènes sanglantes qui caractérisent cette révolution. La suite des tems prouvera qu'on ne les a que foiblement mentionné. Elle prouvera que le Grand-Maitre de l'Ordre, dans les circonstances épineuses dans lesquelles il s'est trouvé, loin d'avoir perdu l'espérance de conserver l'isle, loin de craindre les menaces des traîtres et de l'ennemi peu généreux au quel ils l'avoient livrés, n'oubliait ni son rang, ni les sentimens d'humanité, n'a pas voulu user de sévérité où elle ne pouvoit être utile ; et n'a pas composé lui-même avec un ennemi injuste dans ses vues, dans ses mesures, et dans son procédé, et dont les faux lauriers ne sont dus ni à la vertu ni au courage, mais à une vile, et infame trahison.

“ Les chefs de la conspiration étoient, parmi la chevalerie,

le Commandeur Ransyat, Secrétaire du Trésor ; le Chevalier De Fay, Commissaire des Fontaines, le Commandeur Foussard, ingénieur, servant d'armes ; le Commandeur Bardouanche, chef de l'artillerie ; le Chevalier de St. Simon. Le Chevalier de Picot avoit quitté Malte depuis peu de tems ; embarqué avec Bonaparte, il dirigea le débarquement. Doublet, sous-secrétaire de son Altesse Eminentissime, avec quelques-uns de ses subalternes ; le consul de France Caruson, né Maltais, avec toute sa société ; les prêtres conventuels Beaufort, Sandiblau, Feÿdon, et Frein. Il y eut quelques Espagnols du premier ordre qui se montrèrent fort suspects.

“ Parmi les Maltais, les familles de Poussielque et de Seyonds ; Schembri avocat ; Bouano, conseiller du magistrat ; Guido Greffier ; Gavino Bonavita notaire ; Casavana, secrétaire de l'éveque ; Planes, bourgeois ; Sacchel, constructeur ; une foule d'avocats à la tête des quels étoit Muscat ; presque tous les nobles Maltais, parmi les quels Dorel, Baron, jouoit le premier rôle.

“ Les Chevaliers qu'on a vu massacrés par les intrigues de ces traitres sont : Vallin, Dandelar, Dormi, Montazet, Rigaud, Moudion, Dechoux, Du Chatel, Du Quesnoi ; les trois derniers n'étoient pas encore morts au départ de Son Altesse Eminentissime. Une infinité d'autres furent blessés par les mauvais traitements qu'ils reçurent. Bien des chevaliers, dont on n'a plus eu de nouvelles, font craindre que la révolution ait immolé plus de victimes que celles qu'on a vu périr. Une relation plus détaillée, historiquement travaillée et communiquée à tous ceux qui prennent intérêt à L'Ordre, satisfera dans la suite la juste curiosité d'un chacun.”

## A RUSSIAN INVASION OF INDIA.

JOHN MALCOHM to LORD ELGIN.

1801, March 23, near Baghdad.—“ I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's late letters, the last of which reached me on the march to Baghdad, and I hope your Lordship will pardon my delaying to answer them till I arrived at that city.

“ A rupture with Russia would from your Lordship's letters appear inevitable, and as every intelligence relative to the possible attempts of that power to affect the English possessions in India will, in such event occurring, have an importance, I am encouraged by your Lordship's condescension to offer my sentiments upon that subject, which, though incorrect, may perhaps add in a trifling degree to the information already in your Lordship's possession.

“ Any successful attempt of Russia to affect the British interests in India through the means of intermediate powers appears to me attended with so many difficulties that I should doubt the possibility of its immediate execution, even should that

powerful nation make the utmost exertions for its accomplishment ; by immediate, I mean, a period of three, four, or five years. For that that vast empire, if it continues united, and is governed by a succession of able monarchs, will extend its influence and power over this part of Asia, I have not a doubt ; but such must from its nature be a work of time, and any hasty stride imprudently taken to affect an immediate purpose will be more likely to retard than facilitate its ultimate execution.

“ Any influence Russia could establish with an Eastern power, unless she afforded such the means of attacking the English territories by furnishing ample supply of men and artillery would, I consider, be of little consequence. All Asiatic monarchs are sufficiently disposed to extend their dominions, and when they remain at peace, their conduct almost invariably proceeds from a want of courage or ability to attack their neighbours.

“ Russia can distantly threaten the British possessions in India in many quarters. Establishing a settlement on the banks of the Tygris, or northern shores of the Persian Gulf, would be perhaps the most likely mode of doing this with a probability of success. The difficulty of accomplishing these objects may be conjectured when it is considered that to effect them, the whole Eastern part of Turkey or the western provinces of Persia must be subdued, and settled ; and, even after such a conquest, what a period it would require to form a force in the gulph equal to any enterprize against British India.

“ There are only two routes by which it is possible for Russia, either by herself, or in co-operation with any other power, to make an immediate attack on the British possession in India. The one from an eastern port in the Caspian to the banks of the Indus ; or through Tartary from the port of Ovenburg to Bockhara, from whence they might either proceed against the province of Oude by the Punjaub, or through that of Moultan, or along the banks of the Indus against Bombay.

“ For Russia to attempt either of these projects by herself is out of the question. Such would require the conquest and settlement of the intermediate [nations], a task that would from its nature, supposing it possible, occupy a period much beyond the probable duration of any war. It is then to consider how far any co-operation of intermediate nations is to be expected, and how likely such would be to meet with success.

“ The Persian, Afghaun, and Usbeg Governments are the only ones that could act with Russia against India ; it remains to show how far any of these have either the inclination or ability to aid in the execution of such a scheme.

“ The Persian Government has a direct and easy communication with Russia, and all supplies required could be

sent by the latter to Inzellee, a port in the Caspian, and from thence transported in a few days to Teheraun, the capital of the Persian empire; and, under present circumstances, if the King of Persia could overcome his fear and prejudices, and take full advantage of the skill and courage of a body of Russian auxiliaries, he would not only soon subdue that part of the province of Khorassaun governed by independent chiefs, but the Afghaun empire, and he might then threaten India with a serious invasion.

“The following existing causes seem however to preclude every idea of a connection so dangerous taking place.

1st.—“The jealousy that the Persians entertain of the progress of the Russians, which has been of late so much heightened by the circumstance of the Empress Catherine sending an army into that kingdom in the year 1796.

2ndly.—“The conduct of the present Emperor Paul to the King of Persia, to whom he wrote proposing to send an ambassador for the purpose of cementing the friendship between the two states on the condition of the Persian monarch’s consenting to give up all claims on the province of Georgia; to which an answer was returned by the King of Persia that he would never part with his inheritance, and that, if circumstances prevented his reducing to subjection a province of the Persian empire at the present moment, he trusted at some future to do it.

3rdly.—“The intimate alliance into which the King of Persia has entered with the English Government, all the benefits of which he must at once forego, should he dream of connecting himself with the Russian state for any purpose hostile to that nation; and both inclination and interest are likely to ensure his keeping his engagements with the English, who have been the means of raising his reputation, and can, he must be sensible, do him either (as policy dictates) the most serious service or injury.

“I confess the above considerations have so much weight with me, that I do not think any intimate alliance between the present government of Persia, and that of Russia is likely to be effected. On the contrary, I think a rupture between these two states is a much more probable event.

“The present King of the Afghauns, Shaah Zumaun, I consider as an enemy of the English power in India, and one whose enmity no influence from a foreign quarter can increase. He will invade Hindoostan if ever he has the means. His intentions have been hitherto defeated by a variety of events, and it appears to me they cannot be renewed for a period of one or two years, nor indeed for a much longer, if the present government of Persia is enabled to perform its recent engagements with the English nation.

“Though pride, jealousy, and prejudice is more likely to prevent the Afghaun Government than any other Asiatic power whatsoever co-operating with a body of Russians, or

any other European nation in an invasion of India, and though, if it consented to do so, the difference of manners and habits would destroy every hope of cordiality, and defeat the purpose of such an unnatural union, yet I shall for a moment conceive the contrary, that I may examine how likely such alliance would be to answer the end intended.

“ There are three routes by which a force of men, or a supply of stores from Russia could reach the Afghaun territories. One from the port of Asterabad on the Caspian to Mushid, and from that to Heraut. The second from a more northern port in the Caspian to Oorgunge, and from that to Kandahar by the cities of Khaurizim, and Bokhara ; and the third from the port of Ovenburg to Kandahar, by the way of Bokhara. The two first of these roads are well known, being constantly travelled by caravans ; the latter is little frequented, as tribes of Tartars who are esteemed by *even* the Usbeks as savages, possess the intermediate country.

“ The shortest of these roads is a distance of upwards of 400 English miles. The nature of the intervening country would render the march by any of these impracticable for a small body of men ; and I shall proceed to state the causes that would combine to impede the progress of a larger force. If they took the first mentioned route, Asterabad, which is the native city of the present family on the throne of Persia, and the place where they deposit most of their wealth, must be reduced, as well as the adjoining country, as it never can be imagined the King of Persia would give his consent to an auxiliary force marching through his dominions to assist his rival and enemy ; and after this was effected, which it only could be by defeating all the force of Persia, the Russians would also have to conciliate or combat all the tribes of Turkomans, and the various independent chiefs of Khorassan, through whose territories they must pass ; which they could only hope successfully to accomplish by the advance of an Afghaun army to near Asterabad ; after their junction with which, when they marched eastward, all communication with the Russian dominion would be entirely cut off, unless the provinces of Mazinderaum and Khorassaum were previously subdued and settled, or, in other words, the Persian Government overthrown.

“ By the route of Origunje, Kharozin, and Bokhara, still more difficulties would obtrude. The hordes of Turkomans, and the independent chiefs of the western parts of the province of Kharivism, jealous of their independence and alarmed at any event that has a tendency to increase the power of their neighbours, would at least oppose in some degree the advance of such a force ; while the King of the Usbeks, Shauh Muraud, would, though in close alliance with Shauh Zumaun, be little inclined to admit a body of auxiliaries to pass through his capital and territories that would add so much to the strength of the Afghaun nation, of which he already stands in much

dread. A Russian force advancing by this route implies nothing short of the conquest and settlement of the intermediate countries, and if that was not thoroughly effected, all communication with the port in the Caspian at which they had disembarked would be soon cut off.

“With the country through which a Russian force must pass that takes the last mentioned route from the port of Ovenburg, I am little acquainted, but this attempt I conceive of all others the most difficult. The distance exceeds 600 miles, and through a country that is little cultivated, and badly supplied with water. By this route, the territories of the King of the Usbegs must also be passed, and the same opposition from the independent chiefs to the northward of Bokhara, and from Shauh Muraud is to be expected, as they would be actuated by the motives I have before stated to oppose the progress of any European force.

“It appears from what has been said, that if the Afghaun monarch was disposed to accept the aid of the Russians (which is a very improbable case) that effecting a junction of any force they might send, and keeping open their communication with their own territories would, in all likelihood, lead into a series of operations quite foreign to the original intent of the alliance.

“The Russian Government forming a connection for the purpose of invading India with Shauh Muraud, or Begg Laun, (as he is more generally termed) is still more unlikely than with the Persians or Afghauns. The Usbegs are both a more ignorant, and more prejudiced race than either, and their present ruler (who has confined his sovereign the descendant of Ghenghiz) preserves his authority entirely by wearing the mask of a devotee. He assumes both the manner and garb of a derveish, and has so imposed upon his weak subjects that they view him with an enthusiasm bordering upon adoration.

“It is evident that a ruler whose conduct is regulated upon such principles would be little inclined to risk the loss of the power he has obtained by acting in direct opposition to his professions, and connecting himself with a nation whom religious duty (for he is the priest as well as the sovereign of his people) obliges him every day to denounce as infidels.

“Supposing however the desire of increasing his power led him to waive his scruples, let us examine what difficulties remain to be encountered. The only routes to Bokharra are those before-mentioned from the Caspian Sea by Vorgunje [or Origunje] and Khaurvim [or Kharvism], and from the port of Ovenburg. The difficulties that would oppose the progress of a force on either of these roads, has been already stated. It remains to add, that after all these had been overcome, the Afghauns must either be brought over to the league or subdued; and means must be taken to keep the powerful

Khauns that border on the Usbeks' territories in order, while the force of Shauh Muraud was employed in the distant conquest of India.

“Though the present king of the Usbeks and Shauh Zumaun are friends, and of the same sect in religion, their both uniting with a Russian force for the purpose of making a conquest of India, is an event that I may almost pronounce impossible ; and if they did, the different habits and interests of the parties would to a certainty defeat any project that they might originally propose by their combined efforts to accomplish.

“From what I have said the difficulty of any attempt made by Russia to affect either by her influence or power British India may be conjectured. I shall only add my conviction of the fallacy of an opinion that has been often entertained that a hatred and jealousy of the power of the English in India would incline any neighbouring nation to co-operate for the purpose of attacking them. The fact is, most Asiatic nations, but particularly those that I have alluded to, have but a very confused idea of the different powers of Europe. They blend them all under the name of Feringuy, a term signifying European, and are equally alarmed at giving any of them a footing in their dominions, as they dread their art and courage ; and the great strides which the English have made in India has made this alarm rise to a height, that will, or I am mistaken, prevent any of these nations ever admitting into their territories a European force of any consequence.”

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*Private.* MARQUIS WELLESLEY TO LORD GRENVILLE.

<sup>1</sup>1804, January 1. Barrackpore.—“By this conveyance I have sent you a printed copy of notes (officially recorded at Fort William) which will offer a sufficient excuse for my silence since Henry's departure, as well as for the hasty and short letter which I must now be content to write to you. I trust you will be of opinion that I have omitted no exertion within my power to extinguish whatever portion of French influence has been situated within my reach. I refer you for more particular details to Henry, who will be amply supplied with materials to enable you to form a judgment of the difficulties and dangers by which I have been surrounded, and of the glorious (I must say magnificent and noble) result of the military operations, of which it became my duty to form the plan. In the execution of this great work I have been served with the most unexampled and unrivalled zeal, ability, perseverance and courage. It is impossible to give vent to all the sentiments of my heart respecting General Lake. The British military service has not produced a more

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<sup>1</sup> This letter was inadvertently omitted from its proper place in the text of the volume.

consummate officer. His ardent valour has been long distinguished ; but his judgment and skill are equal to his spirit in the field ; and his cordial and honourable support of all my plans and arrangements for the campaign has been a main source of our brilliant success in Hindostan. I hope you will bear public testimony to the merits of General Lake, in the capacity (which I know you you will never decline) of my personal friend. I owe every acknowledgment to General Lake, and he deserves every honour which has ever been conferred on the most exalted military achievement. You will exult in the eminent glory which has been obtained by your old friend Arthur ; he has conducted the army in the Deccan, under even greater difficulties than General Lake experienced in Hindostan, through a succession of triumphs never surpassed by the British arms in any quarter of the globe ; and his merits in various negotiations and political arrangements are of the highest character. We are now approaching rapidly to peace upon terms which, I trust, will bar the portals of the East against all the fraud and force of the Consuls of France.

“ You will perceive that these unexpected and important events have also barred the portals of the East against my return to Europe. Every motive of public duty and personal honour have concurred to induce me to remain in India until the result of this war can be determined, and until the finishing hand can be put by myself to my own plans. It is not possible, at present, to determine the precise moment of my release ; but I think it cannot be sooner than the month of December, 1804. I cannot sail from Bengal after the month of March with tolerable safety, and I cannot expect even to conclude peace much before that month. A considerable period of time must be occupied in the settlement of various treaties and arrangements connected with the peace ; and I therefore entertain no expectation of being able to embark before December, which is the earliest favourable season after March for the passage from Bengal.

“ I have received your kind letters down to the month of May, 1803. My communications by Henry will have apprized you of the state of my situation here, as well as of my opinions respecting the political state of England and of Europe. I refer you to Henry for further details on both those points, and I am satisfied that you will concur with me in opinion, that while my judgment and conscience indicate to me the necessity of my retaining my present station until the operations and plans commenced under my orders can be completed, I am bound in honour to serve the executive power at home with fidelity and zeal. In my judgment I could not abdicate my present station during the existing crisis, without involving the trust committed to my hands in certain and inevitable ruin. What my ultimate judgment may be upon the questions which appear to have scattered

all my friends in England to different positions in the field of contest, I cannot even calculate with the limited means of information which I possess at this distance. On some points, as far as my information extends, I confess myself to entertain different sentiments from those which you have stated in public and in your letters to me. It appears to me that the peace with France was inevitable, in the temper of the nation, of Parliament, and of the Crown, at the period of time when the peace was made : and although the terms were nothing less than secure, I think they could not have been amended, otherwise than by a renewal of war which, at that time, I believe to have been impracticable. The renewal of war in the spring of 1803 seems to me to have been inevitable ; and I think it is a general duty to support the prosecution of the war with cordiality and firmness, in the hands which, I apprehend, must conduct it. For I see no prospect of forming any administration, which would improve the security of the nation. I perceive no symptoms of harmony or union in any quarter, excepting the Cabinet. Pitt's conduct is to me utterly unintelligible ; and he has not written a line to me since his resignation (excepting a short letter of introduction by a young writer) although, upon the first intelligence of his resignation, I wrote to him in the most affectionate and earnest terms, urging an explanation of his wishes and views. In this state of my sentiments events have occurred within the limits of my own station which have demanded my most strenuous exertion for the preservation of that branch of the empire entrusted to my charge : the result of those events has required my continuance in my station for a considerable period of time. While that exigency shall last, I must hope that I shall not give offence to any of my friends by contributing my aid against the common enemy. You will think me well employed in securing these possessions against France ; I trust Pitt will be of the same opinion, although he does not appear to me to agree with you in all points. Upon my return to England, I hope we shall all unite against the common enemy. With you I never can hold a public difference of political sentiment ; and I repeat it, if we should differ essentially, I shall renounce all attendance upon Parliament, and retire from the world. At the same time it is just and candid to declare that Addington has acted towards me with honour and public spirit ; and that I have not yet seen any reason to warrant an abatement of my respect and esteem for him, either with reference to myself, or to his public conduct.

“ I never experienced such astonishment as I felt in reading a passage in your last letter, which states that the public in England had received an unfavourable impression of my conduct respecting the settlement of the Carnatic. Henry will have informed you of the sense which I entertain of the merits of that arrangement ; and Lord Clive will also be able

to afford you full information upon the subject ; or to refer you to persons now in England (especially Lieutenant Colonel Kirkpatrick, Mr. Cowper, and Mr. Cockburne) who can illustrate every branch of the question. You must be satisfied of the utter impossibility of my finding time to address the public in England on such a question. The documents on which my judgment was founded are all deposited at the India House, together with my arguments upon the whole settlement. I must therefore leave the public, as it has often been left, to find the road to truth by means of its own common sense. I entertain no kind of anxiety upon the issue of any discussion, otherwise than as it may affect the interests of the nation in India : my judgment has been passed to the best of my ability and knowledge : the information on which I acted is public ; my duty is therefore discharged ; the rest is for the decision of higher authorities."

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